Monthly Archives: July 2024

Belarussian Military Undertakes Mass Training Mobilization

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103rd Mobile Brigade of Belarus, BTR-ZD [R1] tank with an installed ZU-23-2[R2] . Belarus has recently mobilized parts of its military along Lithuanian and Polish borders.

“A situation has been created where there is not yet a war today, but the enemy prepares for one. Our actions demonstrate our determination to protect our country. We are prepared to protect our homeland.”

Belarus has mobilized 5,000 reserve troops to conduct extensive military training along two NATO borders, according to the first excerpted article from the state-run news agency Belarus Today. The first site is located along the border of Lithuania, seven miles from the Lithuanian capital city Vilnius, near the Belarussian village Grodzie. The second training site sits along the Polish-Belarussian border in Brest. Additionally, the Belarussian Ministry of Defense reports that its 19th Mechanized Brigade and the 120th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade are fully combat-ready. Belarus Today also reports that Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin stressed that Belarus cannot react calmly to the growing threats and militant rhetoric of its neighbors and that Belarus must learn from its history and apply the lessons learned to the modern day. The minister further emphasized that although Belarus is monitoring the situation, the defense ministry will not hesitate to act in defense of its homeland. The Belarus Today article reports that Defense Minister Khrenin noted that the function of these combat readiness checks is to “train military personnel, improve issues of combat and mobilization preparedness, and to improve skills operating on unfamiliar terrain.”[i] Among the delivered supplies, the Belarussian Ministry of Defense showcased T-72B [R1] tanks and BMP-2 [R2] armored vehicles.

The second excerpted article from the prominent Polish public news service Polskie Radio 24 describes these training movements as “disturbing” with soldiers simulating realistic combat situations with large quantities of heavy military equipment being stationed on the frontier with NATO. The exercises were noted to be in response to NATO exercises in nearby nations, according to Deputy Minister of Defense General Viktor Gulevich. Belarus’s recent military activities suggest the nation may be actively preparing for a wartime footing to engage in armed conflict by training and improving military readiness, or that the nation is utilizing its military to posture, understanding the close watch the NATO border states of Lithuania and Poland maintain. While the exact intentions of these exercises are unclear, in either scenario, these movements bear monitoring.

OE Summary Insight:

BLR mobilizes an extensive network of military personnel and equipment to complete combat readiness checks and training along the borders of LTU and POL.

Sources:

“Хренини: Вооруженные Силы Беларуси повышают уровень проверок боеготовности (Khrenin: The Armed Forced of Belarus increase the level of combat readiness checks),” Belarus Today (Belarussian state-run media outlet), 26 March 2024.  https://www.sb.by/articles/khrenin-vooruzhennye-sily-belarusi-povyshayut-uroven-proverok-boegotovnosti.html 

There are increasing challenges and threats, and we are increasing the level of checks. According to the scale carried out, this check is one of the largest. The 19th Mechanized Brigade and the 120th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade are on full combat readiness. Nearly 5,000 reserve soldiers are taking part in these events (combat readiness checks).

“Today we are seeing many challenges and threats growing. It is the militant rhetoric which is heard from our neighbors. We cannot, of course, treat this calmly because we have learned our lessons from the history of our time,” stressed Viktor Khrenin.

Concerning combat readiness checks, (they are being) held in order to train military personnel, improve issues of combat and mobilization preparedness, and to improve skills operating on unfamiliar terrain. 

“Therefore, units did not go to the training ground, but to real places, real routes, and real borders. The tasks (these places) fulfill are educational. For them a situation has been created where there is not yet a war today, but the enemy prepares for one. Our actions demonstrate our determination to protect our country. We are prepared to protect our homeland,” stressed the minister (Viktor Khrenin). 

“We must watch and track the situation. If needed, (we are) determined to act. We will not stand on ceremony if we experience provocation. This is our main task,” added Viktor Khrenin. 

“Niepokojące ruchy białoruskich wojsk. Ćwichzenia tuż przy granicy z Polską (Disturbing movements of Belarusian troops. Exercises right next to the border with Poland),” Polskie Radio 24 (Polish national public-service radio broadcasting network), 21 March 2024. https://polskieradio24.pl/artykul/3353184,niepokojace-ruchy-bialoruskich-wojsk-cwiczenia-tuz-przy-granicy-z-polska 

The squadron of the 115th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment of the Belarussian Army is conducting tactical exercises at the “Brest ” training ground, informed the Ministry of Defense of Belarus. The “Brest” training ground is located near the border with Poland. 

Soldiers shoot at training targets, operating in a situation as close to combat conditions as possible. The Ministry of Defense emphasized that the units take into account the experience of the Russian army in the war in Ukraine.

The exercises are part of the control of the combat readiness of the Belarusian armed forces, which has been carried out for 10 days, mainly in the western part of the country. Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff, General Viktor Gulevich, stated at the beginning of this operation that it was being carried out as a reaction to military exercises of NATO countries near the borders of Belarus. 

…Railway transports carrying elements of the 19th mechanized Brigade of the Belarusian Armed Forces arrived in Ashmyany in the Grodno Oblast, Belarus. A total of 50 wagons with soldiers and military equipment. 

The amount of equipment delivered corresponds to an incomplete mechanized Battalion reinforced by a tank company. These are four passenger cars with staff, three covered wagons with equipment and ammunition and 39 platform wagons…Ashmyany is located just over 50 km from the capital of Lithuania, Vilnius. The arrival of the transport at the station there was confirmed by the Belarussian Ministry of defense. The resort even published photos, among others T-72B tanks and BMP-2 to armored vehicles. After unloading, the equipment will go to the position scheduled for inspection. The field camp where the Belarusian soldiers with equipment will stay is to be located near the village of Grodzie, 12 kilometers from the border with Lithuania.

Notes:

[i] Belarussian opposition website Belarusian Hajun Project, which reports on the movements of the Belarussian military within Belarus, noted 50 rail cars-worth of soldiers and equipment arrived at the Lithuanian-Belarussian border for inspection and combat readiness checks. For more, see: “Large-scale combat readiness inspection, drills with the territorial defense, and rearmament of the army: review of the main military events in Belarus in March,” Belarusian Hajun Project, 14 April 2024. https://hajun.info/analytics/large-scale-combat-readiness-inspection-drills-with-the-territorial-defense-and-rearmament-of-the-army-review-of-the-main-military-events-in-belarus-in-march/

Image Information:

Image: 103rd Mobile Brigade of Belarus, BTR-ZD [R1] tank with an installed ZU-23-2[R2] . Belarus has recently mobilized parts of its military along Lithuanian and Polish borders.
Author: Serge Serebro
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armed_Forces_of_Belarus#/media/File:Btr-d_Belarus.jpg 
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0

Russian-Finnish Tensions Rise Amidst Border Closures and “Hybrid” Tactics

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Russian border crossing at Paljakka, Kuusamo, Finland. In light of rising tensions, Finland shut down its border with Russia.

“There are hundreds and possibly thousands of people close to Finland’s border on the Russian side that could be instrumentalized against Finland.”

In December 2023, Finland closed its 800-mile border with Russia, which included three maritime crossings for smaller boats, in the wake of Finland formally joining NATO. These closures have heightened tensions between Russia and Finland.

According to the first article from the Norway-based The Barents Observer, the closure includes three maritime border crossings for smaller boats, which will impact leisure boating in the Barents Sea.  As per a second article, also from The Barents Observer, Finland had been overwhelmed with over a thousand migrants and asylum seekers from the Middle East and Africa. According to the article, Moscow has orchestrated the influx of migrants in a deliberate “hybrid” tactic by the Russian government – so-called “instrumentalized immigration” – to overwhelm the country and its border police as a punishment for closing the border to Russians. Authorities in Moscow have organized flows of asylum seekers on Finland’s eastern border since last fall, the Finish prime minister has argued. A representative for the Finnish border guard said that the maritime border was important to close because reaching Finland by sea is “life threatening,” given the Baltic Sea’s much harsher conditions than the Mediterranean.[i]

In response, the European Union has voiced its support for Finland. The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, paid a visit to the Finnish-Russian border in April to say that “Europe stands by your side” as it seeks to secure its border against such “hybrid attacks.”[ii] With the weather warming up, officials there expect an even larger influx of migrants and asylum seekers in the weeks and months ahead. For the latter half of the 20th century, following a war between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1939, relations between the two neighbors were relatively peaceful. The recent rise in tensions and border closures have drawn concerns that Russia, beyond staging hybrid operations like “instrumentalized immigration,” could stage a false-flag border intervention to test NATO resolve and its Article Five protections.

OE Insight Summary:

As the RUS-FIN border remains indefinitely closed, RUS has employed hybrid tactics and ‘instrumentalized immigration’ to protest FIN joining NATO.

Sources:

“Finland’s eastern border to remain shut indefinitely (Восточная граница Финляндии останется закрытой на неопределенный срок),” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 8 April 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/ru/granicy/2024/04/vostochnaya-granica-finlyandii-ostanetsya-zakrytoy-na-neopredelennyy-srok

In the past, the closure has been reconsidered every couple of months, but this time the decision is open-ended…

With warmer weather on the way, this time the decision also covers border crossing points at three small-boat harbours: Haapasaari, an island off the southeastern city of Kotka, Santio, an island in Virolahti, Finland’s southeasternmost municipality, and Nuijamaa lake harbour in Lappeenranta on the Russian border. They will be closed to pleasure boat traffic from mid-April. “By closing border crossing points for maritime traffic to leisure boating, the Government is preparing for the possibility that instrumentalised migration could expand to maritime traffic as spring progresses,” the Interior Ministry said in a statement.

“This would be dangerous to people seeking to enter Finland and would burden maritime search and rescue,” it went on to say.

The frontier has been closed since December, when Finnish authorities accused Russia of orchestrating the flow of third-country asylum seekers across the border as a means of hybrid influence.

Nearly two months ago, the government led by Prime Minister Petteri Orpo (NCP) extended the closure until 14 April. Another extension was widely expected, with officials predicting that favourable spring weather conditions would spur more arrivals across the border.

The cabinet also plans to ask Parliament soon to approve a more stringent border law that would allow migrants deemed to have no grounds for seeking asylum to be immediately sent back to Russia. That bill, which was still being finalised on Thursday, has come under criticism for violating international border treaties.

Atle Staalesen, “As Helsinki prepares new measures against Russian hybrid operations, President Stubb makes visit to the border,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 27 March 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/borders/2024/03/helsinki-prepares-new-measures-against-russian-hybrid-operations-president-stubb

Together with his wife, President Alexander Stubb on Wednesday arrived at Niirala checkpoint where he met with representatives of the Finnish Border Guard. Captain of the border guard station Mikko Sorasalmi gave the president an introduction to equipment applied by the border patrols. On site were also representatives of the EU border agency Frontex and the discussion took place in Finnish, English and German, Yle reports.

The Niirala border-crossing point used to be site buzzing with travellers, but since mid-December the border between Finland and Russia has been closed and travellers forced to use checkpoints in the Baltic states or northern Norway. The closure came after several thousands of migrants flocked from Russia and into the Schengen zone through the Finnish border-crossing points. Finnish authorities are confident that the migrant flows were orchestrated by Moscow as part of a hybrid influence operation. 

This week’s visit of Alexander Stubb comes as Finland is preparing new measures to counter Russian hybrid influence on the country. Last week, the government completed a draft law that is aimed at preventing asylum seekers from entering the country. The bill aims at preventing asylum seekers from entering the country. The acceptance of asylum applications would be significantly limited. The bill is balancing between national security concerns and international human rights consideration, representatives of the government admit … It is aimed at influencing Finland’s national security and public order, the government leader underlines. “We have to prepare for the fact that the situation may get more difficult when spring arrives,” he said in last Friday’s press conference. “The authorities need tools to manage the terrain border.”

Notes:

[i] Mariia Yemets, “Finland closes sea checkpoints near border with Russia until mid-April,” Ukrainska Pravda, 5 April 2024. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/5/7449951/

[ii] Doug Cunningham, “Ursula von der Leyen visits border to stand by Finland against Russian ‘hybrid attacks’,” UPI, 19 April 2024. https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2024/04/19/Finland-EU-Russian-hybrid-attacks/1921713541719/

Image Information:

Image: Russian border crossing at Paljakka, Kuusamo, Finland. In light of rising tensions, Finland shut down its border with Russia.
Source: Fanny Schertzer, (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Finland-Russia_border#/media/File:Finnish-Russian_border,_Paljakka-2.jpg)
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0

Sanctions Drive Russia’s Shift to Domestic Weapons Production

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Still-frame from video of BM-27 Uragan MLRS supposedly moving into position to fire on Ukrainian targets near Belgorod, 16 April 2024.

“The Russian transition to the BAZ-69092 chassis seems to be motivated by several factors… but also aligns with Russian strategic preferences [necessity] for local production.”

Despite Western efforts to dismantle or limit its defense industry, Russia continues to find ways to produce the weapons it needs to fight its war in Ukraine.[i] As discussed in the excerpted article from the Azeri based Caliber news outlet, on 16 April, the Russian Ministry of Defense released a video unveiling an updated version of the BM-27 Uragan [R1] self-propelled multiple rocket launcher (MRL), supported by a new BAZ-69092 [R2] three axle chassis, at work in Ukraine.[ii] According to the Caliber article, the modifications are a reflection of not only the need to modernize Russia’s rocket and artillery systems, but also “align with Russian strategic [necessity] for local production.” The article notes that Russia has lost at least 83 BM-27 systems in Ukraine since it invaded in Feb 2022. Replacement of these and other systems is critical to Russia’s war effort. The article points out the original Uragan chassis were built in other parts of the former Soviet empire, including Ukraine.[iii] The new BAZ-96092 is a multi-platform chassis wholly built in Russia. Russia continues to rearm its military despite sanctions and restrictions imposed by the West to reduce Russia’s ability to fight the war in Ukraine.

OE Watch Insight:

Updated RUS Uragan MRLS appears on UKR battlefield demonstrating RUS ability to replenish its military systems despite western sanctions and restrictions intended to hold back military industrial establishment.

Sources:

“Russian Army deploys new version of BM-27 Uragan MLRS Rocket Launcher in Ukraine,” Caliber (Azeri based news source with good regional coverage from neighboring perspective), 18 April 2024. https://caliber.az/en/post/234544/

On April 16, 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense released a video showing a night-time operation involving the BM-27 Uragan 220mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) near the Belgorod region. Notably, the video unveiled an updated version of the BM-27 Uragan launcher mounted on a new platform, identified as the BAZ-69092 three-axle chassis, marking a significant departure from its traditional ZIL-135LM 8×8 truck chassis.

The transition to the BAZ-69092 chassis is part of an ongoing modernization effort within the Russian Army to upgrade existing military equipment and improve its artillery capabilities. This strategy includes plans to replace the aging BM-27 Uragan MLRS with the more advanced Tornado-S [R1] system….

…

The Russian transition to the BAZ-69092 chassis seems to be motivated by several factors. Firstly, the Russian Army lost at least 83 units in Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict. As of 2023, the Russian Army had only 150 of these vehicles in service, indicating a critical need for the modernization and replacement of this valuable system. Secondly, Russian engineers could face difficulties in modernizing older vehicles such as the ZIL-135LM, whose production ceased in 1995. Thirdly, these difficulties need to be compared with the advantages offered by new platforms for improving combat efficiency. The adoption of the newer BAZ-69092 6×6 chassis offers several advantages, including its capacity to accommodate weapons systems weighing up to 13 tons, but also aligns with Russian strategic preferences for local production.

…It is interesting to note that the BAZ-69092 chassis was specifically developed to standardize and facilitate the use of various military and special vehicles within the Russian army. This initiative began in the early 1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which affected the supply of special chassis as key manufacturers were outside Russia (for instance MKZT in Belarus and KrAZ in Ukraine). The Bryansk Automobile Plant (BAZ) was tasked with developing the BAZ-69092 under the project code “Voshchina-1” to substitute for foreign-made chassis. The model is part of a family of vehicles designed for diverse functions, including combat and support roles, tailored to meet specific requirements of the military.

Notes:

[i] For recent media reporting on Russia’s resurgent domestic arms industry, see: “Russia ramps up weapons production, using mass quantity to outgun Ukraine,” The Washington Post, 19 April 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/19/russia-weapons-production-ukraine-war/; Russia has also received Chinese and Iranian weapons assistance. For recent news coverage regarding Chinese assistance, see: “China Has Helped Russia Boost Arms Production, U.S. Says,” The Wall Street Journal, 12 April 2024. https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-russia-arms-production-help-c098c08b and “US intelligence finding shows China surging equipment sales to Russia to help war effort in Ukraine,” The Associated Press, 19 April 2024. https://apnews.com/article/united-states-china-russia-ukraine-war-265df843be030b7183c95b6f3afca8ec

[ii] Fielding of the new and improved Russian BM-27 had been anticipated for months. See: Російські БМ-27 “Ураган” отримали нове шасі БАЗ-69092 (Russia Modernizes BM-27 Uragan Rocket Launchers with BAZ-69092 Chassis Upgrade),” Militarnyi (Ukraine media outlet focused on the military and defense industry), 22 December 2023. https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/rosijski-bm-27-uragan-otrymaly-nove-shasi-baz-69092/

[iii] The above sourced Caliber article noted that Ukraine is also “modernizing its BM-27 MLRS, fitting the Uragan launcher on a Tatra Т815-7Т3RC1 chassis, resulting in the creation of the Bureviy system. Revealed in 2020 and developed by the Shepetiv Repair Plant, the Bureviy successfully completed fire tests in November 2020. Ukraine also developed the Bastion-03, which combines a KrAZ-6322 chassis with a 9K57 Uragan MLRS launcher. This latter project is part of a Ukrainian initiative to standardize rocket artillery chassis using the KrAZ platform, following the earlier Bastion-01 and Bastion-02 models.”

Image Information:

Image: Still-frame from video of BM-27 Uragan MLRS supposedly moving into position to fire on Ukrainian targets near Belgorod, 16 April 2024.
Source: Russian Ministry of Defence, https://t.me/mod_russia/37664
Attribution: Public Domain

Chinese Officials Seek Engagement With All Middle East Regional Players

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Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hama’s political bureau, at a meeting in Moscow (2020).

“The Hamas movement is part of the Palestinian national fabric.”

China has embarked on a policy characterized by diplomatic engagement with all regional parties alongside rhetorical alignment with the pro-Palestinian views that are dominant in the Muslim world and “Global South.”[i] In mid-March, a Chinese delegation met in Doha with the Qatar-based head of Hamas’s political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh. It was the first publicly acknowledged meeting between Chinese and Hamas officials since 7 October.[ii] The first accompanying excerpt from the Palestinian news agency Safa, reported noteworthy statements by China’s ambassador in Qatar describing Chinese interest in preserving ties with Hamas and describing the group as “part of the Palestinian national fabric.” The meeting should not be considered an expression of Chinese support for Hamas at the expense of other parties, given that it came at the end of a trip that also included visits with officials from Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Qatar.[iii] Instead, the meeting is noteworthy in that it confirms that China is less wary of Islamic activism than in recent years. As noted in the second excerpted article, from Qatar’s Al-Jazeera, China views Hamas and other mobilized Sunni groups with suspicion due to concerns over Uyghur Muslim activism in its western Xinjiang province. Uyghur-related concerns have previously put Beijing at odds with Sunni groups such as Hamas and their backers, including the Qatari government.[iv] More recently, though, these disagreements have subsided amidst a broader regional détente. This trend has not been affected by events since 7 October.This approach may lead to a greater Chinese alignment with Qatar, which has positioned itself as the most effective intermediary between interested governments and mobilized Sunni groups such as Hamas and the Taliban. China’s multi-partner approach to the Middle East is similar to Qatar’s, and one may expect these governments to fully put aside past disagreements regarding Muslim activism as they seek to position themselves as key brokers in a new regional order.

OE Insight Summary:

Diplomats from CHN held their first officially reported meeting with Hamas in QAT, indicating that China seeks good relations with all parties in the Middle East and has softened its distrust of mobilized Sunni Muslim groups such as Hamas.

Sources:

السفير الصيني: حماس جزء من النسيج الفلسطيني ونحرص على العلاقة معها

“Chinese Ambassador: Hamas is part of the Palestinian fabric and we are keen on our relationship with it,” Safa (Palestinian Press Agency), 17 March 2024. https://safa.ps/post/367879/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B5-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%87%D8%A7

The Chinese Ambassador to the State of Qatar, Cao Xiaolin, stated on Sunday that the Hamas movement is part of the Palestinian national fabric and that China is keen on having relations with the group.

الصين تعترف بـ”حماس” بقليل من الخجل!      

“China recognizes “Hamas” with little shame!” al-Jazeera Mubashir (Qatari news agency),24 March 2024. https://www.aljazeeramubasher.net/opinions/2024/3/24/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%A8%D9%80%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%AC%D9%84

The meeting did not appear in international newspapers, and some news sites covered it hastily, quoting an official statement issued by “Hamas.” We did not find an echo of it in the Chinese media, except for one sentence, which was reported by the “Xinhua” agency and the websites of the Chinese embassy in Egypt and Qatar…

Beijing includes “Hamas” on the list of extremist Islamic groups, like the ones it is pursuing in northwest China on charges of “terrorism” and inciting Muslim Uyghurs, Kazaks, and Uzbeks to secede. It does not classify Hamas as a terrorist group, as the United States and its allies do, to avoid being drawn in by the West into problems that it does not need, in a region that is witnessing constant political and security fluctuations, which it will not be able to resolve….

China’s fears of “Hamas” come against the backdrop of strong ideological hostility from the ruling Communist Party, which rejects citizens’ adoption of any religious or political belief other than what the party adopts, under the pretext of protecting the nation-state…

[Chinese diplomat] Wang Kejian lived through the Arab Spring revolutions and knows a lot about the Islamic and tribal movements in the region. He exchanged books with us and talked a lot about them. He has a good understanding of “Hamas” as a national liberation movement…

Notes:

[i] See: “China’s Game in Gaza,” Foreign Affairs,8 January 2024. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-game-gaza

[ii] China’s ambassador to Qatar met with Haniyeh in late February 2024, in a meeting reported by Hamas but never officially confirmed by the Chinese government. See: “Hamas Leader Ismail Haniyeh Meets With Chinese Ambassador To Qatar,” MEMRI (The Middle East Media Research Institute),29 February 2024. https://www.memri.org/reports/hamas-leader-ismail-haniyeh-meets-chinese-ambassador-qatar

[iii] For more details see: “Chinese envoy meets Hamas chief Haniyeh after first visit to Israel since Gaza war began,” CNN, 19 March 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/19/china/chinese-envoy-hamas-meeting-israel-intl-hnk/index.html “China’s Middle East diplomat meets Hamas’ Haniyeh in Qatar,” al-Monitor,19 March 2024. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/03/chinas-middle-east-diplomat-meets-hamas-haniyeh-qatar “Three reasons behind rare China-Hamas meeting in Qatar,” al-Monitor, 22 March 2024. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/03/three-reasons-behind-rare-china-hamas-meeting-qatar

[iv] Alongside Hamas, the Qatari government was among the few Arab critics of China’s Xinjiang policies. Beginning in 2022, however, Qatar ceased to publicly oppose these policies. See: “Activists hail Qatar withdrawal from pro-China text over Uighurs,” al-Jazeera,21 August 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/21/activists-hail-qatar-withdrawal-from-pro-china-text-over-uighurs “U.N. body rejects debate on China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims in blow to West,” Reuters,6 October 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/un-body-rejects-historic-debate-chinas-human-rights-record-2022-10-06/ “U.N. body rejects debate on China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims in blow to West,” Chinese Embassy in Qatar,25 December 2022. http://qa.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zkgx/202212/t20221225_10994873.htm

China Uses Non-Lethal Tactics To Harass Philippines Personnel

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China claims a maximal amount of maritime territory in the South China Sea, which leads to disputes with all of its neighbors over reefs, shoals, islands, and other features.

“The People’s Liberation Army claims that compared with face-to-face conflict, this aerial sand-blowing tactic will not cause fatal harm to [Philippine] personnel and can prevent them from ‘causing chaos’.”

China often asserts its maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea by employing non-lethal tactics that are sufficient to prevent an adversary’s ships from approaching or landing on disputed features. Referred to as “salami slicing,” these tactics avoid provoking direct confrontation with naval adversaries, such as the Philippines, and their stronger allies, such as the United States, while allowing China to dictate when clashes occur and to incrementally control disputed shoals and reefs.[i] On 26 March, the Chinese-language website wenxucity.com published the excerpted article detailing specific tactics the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) employs against Philippine vessels and personnel near the Tiexian Reef in the South China Sea. The Philippines occupy the Tiexian Reef, which lies in shallow water preventing larger ships from approaching, by dispatching smaller vessels to it from nearby Thitu Islands. Only several dozen Philippine personnel can land on the reef at any one time. The CCG have utilized the non-lethal tactic of flying a helicopter at low altitude over the reef to blow enormous amounts of sand and rock into Philippine vessels and personnel. The article claims that the deafening noise from the helicopter’s three turboshaft engines can cause dizziness and affect the internal organs of Philippine soldiers or researchers. As a result, the Philippines has been unable to station forces on the reef to enforce Philippine sovereignty. The article concludes that these methods are sufficient to evict Philippine personnel from disputed areas without causing fatalities, reducing the risk of escalation or retaliation from the Philippines or its allies, while allowing China to still assert its territorial claims.

OE Insight Summary:

CHN deploys helicopters to blow sand and rock and make deafening noises to prevent PHL personnel from stationing on disputed the Tiexian Reef as part of a broader CHN strategy to enforces its maritime territorial claims in SCS.

Sources:

“菲律宾再登铁线礁 中国用直升机掀“飞沙走石”驱离 (The Philippines once again lands on Tiexian Reef, but China uses helicopters to send ‘flying sand and rocks’ to force them out),” wenxuecity.com (Chinese-language website tailored towards educated Chinese outside mainland China), 26 March 2024. https://www.wenxuecity.com/news/2024/03/26/125489186.html

After the Philippines landed on Tiexian Reef, a disputed reef in the South China Sea, for the second time, it was immediately forced away by the Chinese Navy’s Z-8J [R1] helicopter at a very low altitude. Under the effects of the powerful airflow from the helicopter, there was nowhere to hide on the coast as sand and rocks were blown everywhere. The Philippine “scientific research team” who landed on the reef was escaping…. When operating at full strength, the noise is unbearable. If one is too close to the helicopter, it can even disturb a human’s internal organs. 

The People’s Liberation Army claims that compared with face-to-face conflict, this aerial sand-blowing method will not cause fatal harm to personnel and may prevent them from “stirring chaos”, so it is more suitable for evicting Filipinos who land on the reef. The shallow water is not suitable for interception by large ships, and besides that Thitu Island has comprehensive facilities that can provide effective logistical support. For example, large aircraft can take off and land to pull people over, and then directly transfer to ships to ascend the reef.

Notes:

[i] “Salami slicing” refers to the taking of territory in a slow and gradual manner and is “a strategy that involves divide and conquer process of threats and alliances to overcome opposition and acquire new territories.” China has employed this strategy in the South China Sea and in the Himalayan region. Prabhash K Dutta, “What is China’s salami slicing tactic that Army chief Bipin Rawat talked about?,” India Today, 7 September 2017. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/doklam-china-salami-slicing-army-chief-general-bipin-rawat-1039864-2017-09-07

Image Information:

Image: China claims a maximal amount of maritime territory in the South China Sea, which leads to disputes with all of its neighbors over reefs, shoals, islands, and other features.
Source: Voice of America, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:South_China_Sea_claims_map.jpg
Attribution: CCA 2.0

China Employs AI Enabled Water Cannon To Enforce South China Sea Territorial Claims

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Chinese Coast Guard use water cannons to harass Philippine fishermen.

“The Philippines’ entire naval force owns only two frigates capable of launching missiles. Recognizing this imbalance, the Chinese government has ramped up investment in water cannon technology… Beijing increasingly sees the weapons as vital to bolstering its hold over the disputed waters while also lowering the odds of armed clashes.”

China has managed to avoid open conflict while continually advancing its claims in the South China Sea in part because China employs a variety of non-lethal weapons and tactics. In the following excerpted article published by Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, the author notes that water cannons have been a critical non-lethal weapon regularly used by the People’s Liberation Army Navy and Chinese Coast Guard against the navies and personnel of other countries in the area, especially in its territorial disputes with the Philippines.[i] The article describes a recent case when a Chinese ship fired a traditional water cannon into a Philippine ship shattering the cockpit windscreen, injuring several personnel, and forcing the Philippine ship to cede. However, according to the article, current water cannon technology is less effective in rough seas. The article claims that a new artificial intelligence (AI) water cannon has been developed by a Chinese firm that could have an outsized influence on China’s ability to maintain its maritime territorial claims. The newly developed AI water cannon is “equipped with motion sensors that collect the swing state of the ship to alter the ballistic parameters allowing it to stay on target under a variety of conditions,” enabling China to continually target adversaries “with an error of only two meters in rough conditions.” The development of a more accurate AI driven water cannon should be considered part of China’s full spectrum warfare. Non-lethal in nature, it would allow China to take offensive action while minimizing the threat of a traditionally lethally armed confrontation. This places the onus on China’s competitors to come up with their own non-lethal weapons and counter-tactics, respond with violent action that could plunge the South China Sea into armed conflict, or ultimately cede the territory.

OE Watch Insight:

The development of an AI-driven water cannon seems to indicate CHN’s commitment to use non-lethal weapons to advance its territorial claims in the South China Sea while avoiding armed conflict.

Sources:

Stephen Chen, “’Subdue the enemy without fighting’: How China’s powerful water cannon will change the game in South China Sea,” SCMP. 13 April 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3258772/subdue-enemy-without-fighting-how-chinas-powerful-water-cannon-will-change-game-south-china-sea?utm_medium=email&utm_source=cm&utm_campaign=enlz-today_international&utm_content=20240413&tpcc=enlz-today_international&UUID=200d3857-7b09-402a-bc24-cdd797d79a18&next_article_id=3258875&article_id_list=3258772,3258875,3258822,3258887,3258877,3258884,3258908,3258904&tc=4

The world’s first “smart” water cannon, controlled by artificial intelligence (AI), has been developed by researchers in central China – and it could take the non-lethal weapon to new heights..

The water cannon is also equipped with motion sensors that collect the swing state of the ship to alter the ballistic parameters.

Conditions at sea create complex environmental wind and fluid patterns and mechanical transmission errors, so it can be challenging to lock onto and hit a precise spot on a ship in the distance, such as a smokestack, with a water jet on a swaying coastguard vessel.

…

China has been vigorously developing its maritime forces in recent decades, including electromagnetic catapult aircraft carriers, hypersonic anti-ship missiles, ultra-high-power electronic warfare systems and other cutting-edge equipment.

They are formidable weapons, aimed squarely at the US military, but they are too much for territorial disputes against smaller Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea.

The vast disparity in military strength renders China’s hi-tech arsenal impractical against these neighbours. For instance, the Philippines’ entire naval force owns only two frigates capable of launching missiles. Recognizing this imbalance, the Chinese government has ramped up investment in water cannon technology, developing a range of increasingly automated and powerful products.

The technology has also been aided from an unlikely quarter – China’s infrastructure projects. With large-scale land reclamation and other infrastructure projects under way, China has some of the world’s most powerful dredging vessels that suck seabed sediment to redistribute it to designated areas. The water pump technology involved in that process is perfectly suited to driving high-performance water cannons…

Zhang Yuqiang, a researcher with the People’s Armed Police Maritime Police Academy Command Department, said that shipboard non-lethal weapons including water cannons “will play an increasingly important role in future maritime conflicts”.

“In recent years, competition and struggles around marine interests and power have become increasingly fierce, and maritime disputes have become a common challenge faced by most maritime countries in the world,”

Because all sides are “fighting for every inch of land and refusing to cede an inch”, the team said, using traditional lethal weapons in small-scale skirmishes could cause them escalate into large-scale armed conflicts. It is a situation that neither China nor other countries around the South China Sea wish to see.Other major maritime countries are now stepping up research and deployment of other types of non-lethal weapons, including blinding lasers and microwaves that can cause skin-burning sensations, they said.

Notes:

[i] South Korea, Taiwan and Japan are also equipped with, and have used, water cannons in naval disputes with competitor nations over maritime territories or fisheries, while the Philippines is lacking in comparison.

Image Information:

Image: Chinese Coast Guard use water cannons to harass Philippine fishermen.
Source: https://www.jamesokeefe.org/2023/12/naval-politics-by-other-means/
Attribution: CCA 4.0 INT

China Reveals Its Carrier-Based J-15D Electronic Warfare Fighter

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The J-15D, featured in a CCTV-7 Military News episode, displaying two electronic warfare pods on the wing tips and two larger electronic warfare pods on the inside of the wings.

“Chinese aircraft carrier formations have reached a new level of comprehensive combat capabilities, and has entered the era of offensive operations, breaking the monopoly advantage of the U.S. military. This is something we are very happy about.”

The introduction of the J-15D [R1] signals a pivotal moment for Chinese aircraft carrier formations, enabling them to execute strikes against adversaries with sophisticated air defense systems according to the first article published by government-censored Chinese internet and gaming provider NetEase. The Chinese J-15D electronic warfare aircraft made its first public appearance on CCTV in late March 2024.[i] Equipped with electronic countermeasures, reconnaissance capabilities, and the capacity to disrupt enemy radar and missile systems, the J-15D substantially enhances the combat power of Chinese aircraft carriers.[ii] The article highlights three key aspects of the J-15D. First, its strategic value in anti-ship warfare is underscored by its comprehensive suite of electronic warfare, anti-radiation warfare, and air combat capabilities. Second, the J-15D signifies China’s comparable strength to the U.S. in the field of electronic warfare. Third, its ability to provide situational awareness is crucial, particularly in scenarios involving the deployment of hypersonic missiles by Chinese aircraft carrier formations. The J-15D confers an asymmetric advantage with its capacity to target adversaries at long distances and provide targeting guidance for hypersonic missiles. Overall, the J-15D signifies a “a new level in terms of comprehensive combat capabilities” for the Chinese aircraft carrier fleet. The second excerpt, published on highly regulated Chinese internet platform Tencent, suggests that the introduction of the J-15D also marks a significant shift in the combat strategy of China’s aircraft carriers. The excerpt states that in the past, the People’s Liberation Army Navy followed the Soviet Navy’s model, relying on carrier-based fighter jets for air defense while utilizing escort ships for long-range anti-ship attacks. With advancements in the performance of the J-15D, Chinese aircraft carriers are now capable of conducting long-range anti-ship and ground operations coupled with defensive and offensive electronic warfare.[iii] The J-15D, with its offensive capabilities, can engage in long-range sea or ground attacks alongside other carrier-based fighters, leveraging electronic warfare systems to dominate the battle space.[iv] This poses an “unprecedented” threat to U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups.

OE Insight Summary:

CHN’s naval aviation strength has significantly increased with the introduction of the J-15D, a carrier-based EW fighter jet. This EW fighter enhances CHN’s ability to assert electronic dominance from its aircraft carriers, providing strategic versatility in maritime operations.

Sources:

Fu Qianshao, “ ‘央视曝光’电战鲨’，歼-15D推动航母编队进入攻势作战时代 (CCTV Reveals ‘Electric War Shark’, the J-15D Propels Aircraft Carrier Formations into an Era of Offensive Operations),” Netease (one of China’s largest internet companies, subject to regulatory oversight and censorship by the national internet regulator, China’s Cyberspace Administration), 02 April 2024. https://www.163.com/dy/article/IUPAKE5T0535T18G.html

CCTV’s ‘Military Report’ recently aired footage showcasing the J-15D fighter jet as it commenced a naval training program, signaling a significant advancement for China’s aircraft carrier capabilities. Notably, the J-15D fills a crucial gap that its predecessor, the J-16D, couldn’t address, as it lacked compatibility for deployment on aircraft carriers.

The introduction of the J-15D into Chinese naval aviation signifies a pivotal advancement, enabling Chinese aircraft carrier formations to conduct air strikes against adversaries equipped with sophisticated air defense systems. Reflecting on the Gulf War, the US Air Force frequently coordinated air strikes against ground targets with electronic warfare aircraft to neutralize ground defense systems. This underscores the critical role of electronic warfare aircraft in suppressing air defenses, a capability that the J-15D helps address.

Compared with the US EA-18G, is the J15-D superior or inferior? 1. The J-15D offers enhanced strategic value particularly in anti-ship warfare. The J-15 is equipped with electronic warfare capabilities, anti-ship warfare and anti-radiation warfare, and has a relatively complete air combat capability. Compared to the J15-D, the EA-18G has excellent electronic warfare capabilities, limited anti-radiation and air combat capabilities, and almost no anti-ship combat capabilities. 2. The J-15D holds the advantage of possessing more modern electronic warfare technology, benefitting from China’s robust capabilities in the electronic industry. In the competition between China and the US in electronic warfare, China stands equal to the United States in terms of industry strength. 3. The tactical awareness offered by the J15-D holds significant value in scenarios where Chinese aircraft carriers possess hypersonic missiles. The J15-D’s ability to lock onto opponents’ carrier formations at longer distances and provide target indications for hypersonic missiles presents an asymmetric advantage. While the U.S. EA-18G possesses similar capabilities, its missile speed and range are insufficient to pose a threat to Chinese carrier formations.

Overall, the J-15D entry into service signifies that Chinese aircraft carrier formations reached a new level in terms of comprehensive combat capabilities, and entered the era of offensive operations, breaking the monopoly advantage of the US military. This is something we are very happy about. 

Kongtian Daliang, “央视官宣，歼15D ’咆哮鲨’ 喷涂海军灰，中国航母任务出现转变 (CCTV Reveals, J-15D “Roaring Shark” Sprayed Navy Grey, Marks Changes for Chinese Aircraft Missions),” Tencent (China’s largest multinational technology conglomerate, operating within a tightly regulated environment), 26 March 2024. https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20240326A0442K00

Recent footage from the CCTV Military Channel showcased the J-15D carrier-based electronic warfare aircraft. The aircraft, painted in navy gray, suggests that it is either nearing or has already entered service. The presence of the J-15D fighter indicates a shift in focus for Chinese aircraft carriers from air defense to offense.

The CCTV footage reveals that the J-15D electronic warfare aircraft is equipped with two electronic warfare pods mounted under its wings, like the PLAAF J-16D [R1] electronic warfare aircraft. The primary function of this electronic warfare equipment is to analyze enemy radar frequencies, identify, jam, position, and target enemy radars. A notable distinction between the J-15D and other J-15 fighters is the absence of the airspeed tube, indicating comprehensive upgrades to the aircraft’s electronic equipment such as radar and sensors, facilitating comprehensive control of electromagnetic signals in combat airspace.

The introduction of the J-15D signifies a significant transformation in China’s aircraft carrier combat missions. Previously, Chinese aircraft carriers faced a distinct disadvantage compared to American super aircraft carriers. Consequently, the Soviet Navy model was adopted, utilizing carrier jets for air defense cover while escort ships launch long-range anti-ship missiles to conduct attacks. With the increasing maturity of the J-15, it is now equipped with air-launched anti-ship missiles, bolstering Chinese aircraft carriers’ offensive air capabilities.

The primary objective of the J-15D is to employ high-power electronic warfare equipment to suppress and disrupt the opponent’s electronic systems, while employing various methods to degrade the opponent’s radar detection capabilities. Alongside other carrier-based fighters, the J-15D can execute long-range sea and ground attacks, utilizing its electronic warfare capabilities to neutralize the opponent’s air defense systems. For US aircraft carrier strike groups, the threat posed by the J-15D is unprecedented. As for Japan’s ‘Izumo’ class light aircraft carriers, they are equipped with the F-35B stealth fighters, which have a generational advantage over the J-15 series. However, the number of F-35B aircraft is limited and may have limited warning aircraft to provide airspace intelligence and early warning. This greatly reduces the situational awareness capability of the F-35B. In addition, the J-15D retains most of the J-15’s air combat capabilities, and electronic warfare aircraft can be regarded as the nemesis of stealth fighter jets. Therefore, Chinese aircraft carriers employing J-15D aircraft are enough to cause Japanese light aircraft carriers to suffer significant losses.

Notes:

[i] To watch the full CCTV-7 video of the J15-D, see CCTV’s C-Bit Series Baidu post, Baidu, 24 March 2024. https://haokan.baidu.com/v?pd=wisenatural&vid=17129917562037813254

[ii] Mu Feng Lun Dao, “电战版歼-15D来袭，央视正式官宣，中国航母舰载机最后拼图全凑齐 (Electronic Warfare Version of J15-D is Coming, CCTV Formally Announces, Completing the Final Piece for China’s Carrier-Borne Aircraft),” Netease, 26 March 2024. https://www.163.com/dy/article/IU70SP910552YXLH.html

[iii] A Taiwanese news channel invites a Chinese military expert to discuss the strengths and advantages of the J-15D fighter plane, CTI News Channel, 02 April. 2024. https://youtu.be/srdhxxwV-CQ?t=304

[iv] A Taiwanese news channel invites a Chinese military expert to discuss the combat application of the J15-D, CTI News Channel, 30 March 2024. https://youtu.be/s6o1H0ffZXU?t=101

Image Information:

Image: The J-15D, featured in a CCTV-7 Military News episode, displaying two electronic warfare pods on the wing tips and two larger electronic warfare pods on the inside of the wings.
Source: https://haokan.baidu.com/v?pd=wisenatural&vid=17129917562037813254
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

China Rehearsing Possible Taiwan Decapitation Operation

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Taipei Taiwan Presidential Office Building

“In the past, the PLA had created a Presidential Office Building replica in another location. However, he said this mockup covered much of the Bo’ai Special Zone and appears to be an aerial bombing and gunnery training range.”

China is expanding its capability to train for a decapitation operation against Taiwan. On 26 March, Joseph Wen, a Taiwanese defense analyst, posted satellite images of a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) training ground in southwest Inner Mongolia. The images appear to show a mockup of the Bo’ai Special Zone, a restricted area that houses key government buildings, including the Presidential Office Building in Taipei. The first excerpted article, taken from the popular Taiwan English news source Taiwan News, highlights some of the concerns and speculation resulting from the images. For example, it explains that while this is not the first time the PLA has created a replica of Taiwan’s Presidential Office Building, this mockup is different in that it “covered much of the Bo’ai Special Zone and appears to be an aerial bombing and gunnery training range,” which indicates where China is likely to be focused. Lu Te-yun, a satellite imagery expert, explains that “visually speaking, the degree of realism in comparison with the actual location is quite high.” However, some experts, such as a former Kuomintang legislator cited in the article, believe the PLA would be unable to swiftly launch a decapitation strike. Instead, he believes, the exercise is more likely part of psychological and cognitive warfare effort to pressure Taiwan into believing that it must negotiate.[i] As seen in the second excerpted article, taken from an editorial published in Taiwan’s English-language newspaper Taipei Times, the PLA has repeatedly held other military exercises at its Zhurihe Training Base,[ii] also located in Inner Mongolia, during which they used a scale replica of the Presidential Office Building to simulate a decapitation strike. Published one month after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the article explains that the media had been predicting a potential “decapitation strike” from Moscow. The author, Yao Chung-yuan, former deputy director of the Taiwan Ministry of National defense strategic planning department goes on to stress the importance of Taiwan preparing for such an event. Today, as the Russia-Ukraine conflict drags on with no victory in sight for Moscow, China could be placing more urgency into honing its own capabilities to prevent a protracted conflict should it one day invade Taiwan.

Sources:

Keoni Everington, “China Creates Taipei Mockup to Train for Invasion,” Taiwan News (popular online English-language news source in Taiwan), 28 March 2024. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/5131830

Joseph Wen …posted satellite images of a mockup of the Bo’ai Special Zone (博愛特區), which is a restricted zone in Taipei’s Zhongzheng District where the Presidential Office Building and other key government buildings are situated. The training ground is located in the Alxa Left Banner administrative division of Alxa League in the southwest of China’s Inner Mongolia.

Wen said in the past, the PLA had created a Presidential Office Building replica in another location. However, he said this mockup covered much of the Bo’ai Special Zone and appears to be an aerial bombing and gunnery training range.

Lu Te-yun (盧德允), a satellite imagery expert who once served as an inspector for the Ministry of National Defense (MND) told UDN that the proportions of the training grounds need to be measured. However, Lu said that “visually speaking, the degree of realism in comparison with the actual location is quite high.”

On the TVBS program “Situation Room” on Wednesday, former Kuomintang (KMT) Legislator Lin Yu-fang (林郁方) said that given Taiwan’s extensive air defenses, it is unlikely that the PLA could swiftly launch a decapitation strike on Taipei. Lin said, “This is psychological and cognitive warfare. China will not relax and will continue to put pressure on Taiwan, telling Taiwan that it can negotiate or fight, simultaneously employing a dual strategy of negotiation and confrontation.”

Yao Chung-yuan, “Prepare for ‘Decapitation’ Attempts,” Taipei Times (Taiwan’s English-language daily newspaper), 28 March 2022. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2022/03/28/2003775565

At the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the media predicted a potential “decapitation strike” from Moscow. An in-depth discussion of the issue seems necessary in Taiwan.

There are many ways of launching a decapitation strike, which seeks to assassinate a national leader. ….

Despite Russia’s failure to kill Zelenskiy, Ukraine must remain extremely vigilant.

“Decapitation” is a military term for the use of ballistic and precision-guided missiles to assassinate a national leader or destroy a presidential office, to demoralize and severely weaken an enemy.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has repeatedly held military exercises at its Zhurihe Training Base in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, during which it used a scale replica of the Presidential Office Building in Taipei to simulate a decapitation strike…

The purpose of Russia’s supposed decapitation attempts was to hijack Zelenskiy, not assassinate him, but as tension mounts during a continued war, whether Russia attempts other decapitation methods is a possibility. In Taiwan’s 2020 Han Kuang exercises, the military simulated strikes against PLA and Chinese secret agents targeting the Presidential Office Building and other central government agencies in Taipei’s Boai Special Zone (博愛特區), while training for countermeasures against the CCP’s hijacking of the Taiwanese president. From the situation in the Russia-Ukraine war, the scenario set in the Han Kuang military drill is not impossible.

Notes:

[i] For more on this, see: Cindy Hurst, “Chinese Cognitive Operations Might Impact Taiwan’s Will to Resist,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-cognitive-operations-might-impact-taiwans-will-to-resist/

[ii] Zhurihe is the PLA’s largest military training base. For more information, see: Chen Zhuo, “8 Things to Know About China’s Biggest Army Training Base,” South China Morning Post and reposted to China Military, 13 May 2019. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/Features_209191/9501757.html

Image Information:

Image: Taipei Taiwan Presidential Office Building
Source: CEphoto, Uwe Aranas, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Taipei_Taiwan_Presidential-Office-Building-01a.jpg
Attribution:

The 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV, Robotics, and the Future of Russian Artillery Modernization (Bartles and Grau) (June 2024)

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Key Takeaways:

  • Given Russia’s strong interest in artillery and robotics, it is no surprise that it has integrated robotic technology into its newest premier artillery platform—the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV—by way of an auto-loading, uncrewed turret and remote-controlled external weapons module.
  • This article, based primarily on information published in Russian defence journals before the current combat in Ukraine, outlines the purported capabilities of the 2S35, the current structure of Russian artillery units, and how the Russian artillery community envisages future structural changes to these units to best employ the 2S35 and robotics.
  • Capabilities Of The Koalitsiya-SV Armament. Perhaps the 2S35’s most impressive feature is the uncrewed turret. Russia has already had much experience with autoloaders in tanks, starting with the T-64 (also produced by UralVagonZavod), but this will be the first Russian artillery system with an autoloader and a completely uncrewed turret.
  • This provides several advantages, namely faster rates of fire, the capability to store more ammunition, and reduced weight. The 2S35 can reportedly fire up to 16 projectiles per minute and store up to 70 projectiles internally. This is a significant capability improvement from the latest modification of the similarly sized 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzer. The 2S19M2 has a maximum rate of fire of 10 projectiles per minute and can store up to 50 projectiles.
  • The Russian artillery community is particularly interested in how robotics can be integrated into artillery systems.
  • Robots and robotics can reduce force size and save human lives while increasing the intensity and effectiveness of combat, but the force structure, training, logistics and maintenance must be changed to effectively in corporate this developing technology into the force and support it.

Gaza War’s Impact On The Middle East Strategic Landscape (Lucas Winter)(June 2024)

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Key Takeaways:

  • Three de facto strategic coalitions dominate the contemporary Middle East geopolitical landscape: the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance,” the Turkish-led “Political Islam Coalition,”
    and the U.S.-led “Arab Normalization” Coalition, anchored by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Hamas fits uneasily between the Axis of Resistance and Political Islam Coalitions, receiving
    tepid support from both but fully trusted by neither. The Arab Normalization Coalition does not support Hamas.
  • Members of the three de facto strategic coalitions responded differently to Hamas’ 7 October attacks and their aftermath: “Axis of Resistance” members contributed calculated, largely symbolic military support; the Political Islam Coalition supported Hamas in media and diplomacy; and the Arab Normalization Coalition sought to maintain a neutral distance from the war in Gaza.
  • Prior to 7 October, the Middle East was in the midst of a new era of regional détente, in which members of the different de facto strategic coalitions were re-engaging and de-escalating their conflicts. The War in Gaza shifted the regional strategic calculus in ways that are not yet clear. Three scenarios are presented for how these changes may occur, and how China and Russia may seek to benefit from them. The first scenario involves increased Turkish-Iranian policy convergence, the second a deepening of Turkish-Egyptian relations, and the third a “grand bargain” that includes Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey. Russia is more likely to benefit from the first two scenarios, while China is likely to benefit most from the third.