The 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV, Robotics, and the Future of Russian Artillery Modernization (Bartles and Grau) (June 2024)

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Key Takeaways:

  • Given Russia’s strong interest in artillery and robotics, it is no surprise that it has integrated robotic technology into its newest premier artillery platform—the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV—by way of an auto-loading, uncrewed turret and remote-controlled external weapons module.
  • This article, based primarily on information published in Russian defence journals before the current combat in Ukraine, outlines the purported capabilities of the 2S35, the current structure of Russian artillery units, and how the Russian artillery community envisages future structural changes to these units to best employ the 2S35 and robotics.
  • Capabilities Of The Koalitsiya-SV Armament. Perhaps the 2S35’s most impressive feature is the uncrewed turret. Russia has already had much experience with autoloaders in tanks, starting with the T-64 (also produced by UralVagonZavod), but this will be the first Russian artillery system with an autoloader and a completely uncrewed turret.
  • This provides several advantages, namely faster rates of fire, the capability to store more ammunition, and reduced weight. The 2S35 can reportedly fire up to 16 projectiles per minute and store up to 70 projectiles internally. This is a significant capability improvement from the latest modification of the similarly sized 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzer. The 2S19M2 has a maximum rate of fire of 10 projectiles per minute and can store up to 50 projectiles.
  • The Russian artillery community is particularly interested in how robotics can be integrated into artillery systems.
  • Robots and robotics can reduce force size and save human lives while increasing the intensity and effectiveness of combat, but the force structure, training, logistics and maintenance must be changed to effectively in corporate this developing technology into the force and support it.

Details Emerge on the Russian Medical System in Ukraine

A Russian medic applying first aid. While Russia has released very little information about its casualty rate, a newly-released report offers some initial insights.


“The high professionalism of military doctors allowed them to reduce disabilities of military personnel, but most importantly, to reduce their hospital mortality rates, the lowest in history military medicine.”


Since the beginning of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, there has been little, if any, information released from Russian sources about the workings of the Russian military medical system in general, and Russian casualty rates in particular.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the official medical journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Voyenno-Meditsinskiy Zhurnal, is the first publicly released information about the inner workings of the Russian military medical system during the special military operation. Although this detailed 17-page account does not mention specific casualty numbers, some idea of the magnitude of Russian casualties can be postulated by the information it provides about the increases in various types of Russian military medical facilities, including long-term rehabilitation, palliative, and prosthetic care. The article also lays out the four stages of Russian military medical treatment consisting of forward treatment, treatment at Military District facilities, treatment at centralized MoD military medical facilities, and rehabilitation centers. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable effort in placing medical treatment as close to the line of contact as possible to increase positive outcomes. This is being accomplished not only by placing medical units further forward, but also by placing various medical capabilities/personnel at lower echelons than have historically occurred. In sum, the article does not provide Russian casualty figures but does support the premise that Russia has suffered large numbers of casualties in the operation and is adapting in response. The article highlights what the U.S. military medical community may expect if the U.S. engages in Large Scale Combat Operations on the modern battlefield.


Sources:

D.V. Trishkin, “Итоги деятельности медицинской службы Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации в 2023 году и задачи на 2024 год (Results of the medical service activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 2023 and goals for 2024.),” Voyenno-Meditsinskiy Zhurnal (official medical journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense) January 2024. https://voenmed.ric.mil.ru/upload/site229/3JSanq38G6.pdf

The results of an analysis of the medical service activities of the Armed Forces in 2023 in its main areas are presented. Particular attention is paid to the organization of medical care and treatment of the wounded during a special military operation. The multi-level system of staged medical care has proven its effectiveness.  The following results were achieved: the time for providing first aid was reduced by 3 times (to 10 minutes), providing medical care to a serviceman from the moment of injury – by 2 times (to 1 hour); 98% of military personnel were discharged upon recovery after treatment for wounds and injuries; mortality at the stages of

medical care was 0.43%, disability – 2.1%. First aid training for personnel resulted in a potentially preventable mortality rate of 5.2%. The main task facing the medical service in 2024 will be the timely and high-quality provision of medical care to the wounded and sick when performing tasks in a special military operation…

The main efforts of military medicine were aimed at organizing medical support for the special military operation.  The enemy’s use of modern types of weapons and ammunition during military operations determined the prevalence of combined, combined lesions and shrapnel wounds. Taking into account these factors, it was formed a medical care system in which there are 4 main stages for the provision of medical care and treatment to special military operation participants:

— the stage of providing qualified medical care, which is represented by mobile medical units;

— the stage of providing specialized medical care, consisting of stationary military hospitals of military district subordination;

— the stage of providing high-tech medical care, at central military medical facilities;

— the stage of medical rehabilitation at rehabilitation centers and military sanatoriums…

One of the most important aspects in the system medical treatment and evacuation support is the stage of providing qualified medical teams and medical battalions directly in area of the special military operation …medical units are put as close as possible to the line of contact. At the same time, the medical detachments and battalions have been strengthened with surgeons and traumatologists from central hospitals that are capable of performing surgical procedures that were previously not typically conducted at this stage…

The next stage of treatment involves the wounded being treated at military district hospitals…The tactics of “damage control” [«контроля повреждений»] are widely used to providing specialized medical care with the goal of minimizing the volume of surgical interventions in the seriously wounded and performing definitive surgical treatment after stabilization of their condition.

In central hospitals, the basis for the provision of high-tech medical assistance is based on a multidisciplinary approach to the treatment of patients by specialists with different specialties within one military hospital. Multidisciplinary teams include resuscitators, vascular surgeons, traumatologists, general surgeons and extracorporeal detoxification specialists….

[T]he medical system evacuation, includes mass casualty aviation evacuation to district and central military hospitals, and medical evacuation by ambulance, sea, and rail transport…

[T]he quality of medical care provided remains sufficiently high level. The high professionalism of military doctors allowed them to reduce disabilities of military personnel, but most importantly, to reduce their hospital mortality rates, the lowest in history military medicine.

At the same time, in order to prevent a decline in the quality of medical care, the leadership of the medical service of the RF Armed Forces has taken a number of measures aimed at increasing the number of military and hospital medical specialists and units to prevent staffing and medical unit shortages in the special military operation, including:

— forming separate medical battalions, medical companies and medical posts for formations [объединение], large units [соединение], and units [часть];

— 4 additional medical billets in the staffs of the combined arms armies;

— Branch Clinic No. 4 was added to the 1602nd Military Clinical Hospital (Lugansk) with 300 beds;

— construction of military hospitals is underway in Ryazan, Belgorod, Bryansk, Makhachkala, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Mirny, Vladikavkaz, Kursk, Sevastopol, new 100-bed medical buildings are in Samara, Pskov, Krasnoznamensk, Kostroma, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ivanovo;

— major and ongoing repairs of military hospital facilities are underway in Rostov-on-the-Don, Chita, Polyarny, Volgograd, Novosibirsk, Stavropol, Khabarovsk, Selyatino;— a medical detachment (reserve) has been formed and successfully performs its tasks with citizen volunteers that have medical training (currently a decision is being made to form a second detachment from among the volunteers).


Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.


Image Information:

Image: A Russian medic applying first aid. While Russia has released very little information about its casualty rate, a newly-released report offers some initial insights.
Source:
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl

Armenia Distances Itself From Instruments Of Russian Security

An image of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan from 2023. Armenia is currently taking steps to distance itself from both the CSTO and Russia.


“The CSTO, instead of fulfilling its obligations to Armenia in the field of security, on the contrary, creates security problems. And this position, I say frankly, is a threat to the national security of Armenia.”


Armenia has been critical of both Russia and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) over their responses to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and the subsequent clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Some Armenian officials have even called for the country to leave the CSTO and limit cooperation with Russia, though Armenia has continued to engage with both since the end of the 2020 war because of a lack of other options.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Kavkazskiy Uzel, reports that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on 22 February 2024 that Armenia had ended its participation in the CSTO, though he did not go as far as to say that Armenia is leaving the organization. The article notes that the decision is based on the CSTO’s responses to the 2020 war and the numerous clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan since then. The article also relays that Armenia has been critical of the Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh for not favorably dealing with Azerbaijan’s blockade of the breakaway region and not preventing Azerbaijan’s operation in September 2023, which ended with Azerbaijan regaining full control of the region. The article ends with a statement from Pashinyan, who claims that the CSTO is a threat to the national security of Armenia. Based on this statement, it is possible that Armenia will leave the CSTO, but the country will still be home to a Russian military base and Russian border guards in its territory for the foreseeable future.[ii] In a seemingly related development, the second excerpted article, from the Armenian news website News.am, reports that Armenia has notified Moscow that Russian border guards will need to be removed from the Zvartnots International Airport. Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyancommented that Armenian border guards are capable of taking over duties at the airport. The article clarifies that Armenia is not asking the Russian border guards to leave their positions on the border with Turkey or Iran, but only to leave the airport. While this development has yet to play out, it is one step Armenia has taken to rely less on Russia.


Sources:

“Главное о критике Арменией ОДКБ и Кремля (The heart of Armenia’s criticism of the CSTO and the Kremlin),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website reporting on the Caucasus), 29 February 2024. https://www.caucasianknot.com/articles/386973

After Russia’s refusal to intervene in the armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020, Armenia’s confidence in the benefits of participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization weakened to the point of threats to leave the CSTO. The “Caucasian Knot” has prepared a report on how the degree of Armenia’s unfriendly rhetoric towards Russia increased and what steps Armenia took in its attempts to look for an alternative to the CSTO…

During the escalation of the Karabakh conflict in 2020, Armenia turned to the CSTO for help. Moscow responded by saying that it could not help, since the borders of Armenia were not violated and the war took place on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh…the Kremlin limited itself to political support for Yerevan, and after that it sent peacekeepers to the Karabakh… conflict zone.

At a meeting with Putin on December 27, 2022, the Armenian prime minister again recalled the responsibility of Russian peacekeepers. “The Lachin corridor has been blocked for almost 20 days. This is the area of responsibility of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. And I want to remind you that according to the trilateral statement of the presidents of the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia, the Lachin corridor should be under the control of Russian peacekeepers,” said Pashinyan…

On September 21, 2023, the day after the end of hostilities in Karabakh, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan sharply criticized Russian peacekeepers. “The Russian peacekeeping contingent was supposed to guarantee the safety of the civilian population…We bear our share of responsibility. But I don’t think that we should turn a blind eye to the failures that the Russian peacekeeping force had contingent,” he said…“Due to the inaction of the Russian peacekeeping contingent, over 100 thousand Armenians left their homes and native places in Nagorno-Karabakh in a week,” Pashinyan said…

On February 22, 2024, Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, in an interview with France 24 TV channel, stated that the CSTO reaction did not correspond to reality in relation to the Republic of Armenia, in particular in 2021 and 2022. “And, obviously, this could not go unnoticed by Armenia. Today, in practice, we have actually frozen our participation in this agreement in this organization,” said the Prime Minister of Armenia…

On February 28, 2024, answering questions from deputies in the Armenian parliament, Nikol Pashinyan stated that “The CSTO, instead of fulfilling its obligations to Armenia in the field of security, on the contrary, creates security problems. And this position, I say frankly, is a threat to the national security of Armenia…”


“Armenia FM comments on Russian border guards’ presence on Turkey border,” News.am (Armenian news website), 7 March 2024. https://news.am/eng/news/811212.html

Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan explained how Yerevan informed Moscow about the matter of the Russian border guards at Zvartnots International Airport of the Armenian capital city of Yerevan.

At Thursday’s press conference, the FM confirmed the statement by the secretary of the Council of Armenia regarding the aforementioned matter, and stated that the Russian side was informed about the initiative to remove the Russian border guards from Zvartnots airport…

“Now we believe that Armenia is institutionally capable of independently implementing border guard service at the [Yerevan] airport, about which we have informed the Russian side. I believe that this will be enough for the Russian side and the matter will be over,” Mirzoyan noted, adding that it is about the entire package of jurisdiction at the airport…To the question about the presence of Russian border guards in other places in Armenia, for example on the Turkish border, the minister responded that the matter is only about Zvartnots airport. “Therefore, we are talking only about the airport,” added the Armenian FM.


Notes:

[i] Russia and the CSTO have had separate responses to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and subsequent clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia deployed a peacekeeping mission to Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the ceasefire agreement, but the peacekeepers are not affiliated with the CSTO. The CSTO declined to intervene in the 2020 war or the clashes on the grounds that the organization stated Armenia itself was not attacked in any of the instances and thus, does not necessitate a collective defense response from the organization.

[ii] Russia’s 102nd Military Base is located near the city of Gymuri, Armenia with an estimated 3,000 soldiers garrisoned there, while Russian border guards provide security on Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran as well as operating at the Zvartnots International Airport outside of the capital Yerevan.


Image Information:

Image: An image of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan from 2023. Armenia is currently taking steps to distance itself from both the CSTO and Russia.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nikol_Pashinyan_-_2023_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA 2.0


Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Names New Leader

Sana’a, capitol of Yemen at Night.


“Despite its decline in the Arabian Peninsula, [AQAP] remains the most effective terrorist group in Yemen, with the intent to launch attacks in the region and beyond.”


Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) named a successor after the recent loss of its leader. According to the first excerpted article from the Saudi state-owned international news outlet Al Arabiya, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, aka “Abu al-Laith,” a Yemeni national, has been named the new leader of AQAP. The organization’s official, Ibrahim al-Qusi, confirmed in a broadcast recording that the group’s former leader had been killed, declaring that “Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki is the new leader of the organization in the Arabian Peninsula.”[i] The new AQAP leader, Al-Awlaki, reportedly had direct ties to former al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden and was repatriated to Yemen by Bin Laden. Al-Awlaki is reported to also have originated from the same tribe as former al-Qaeda spiritual leader Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed in 2011. There is a $6 million reward from the U.S. State Department for information about the new AQAP leader, who has “publicly called for attacks on the U.S. and its allies.” The U.S. has designated AQAP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization since 2010.[ii]

The second excerpted article from the Jeddah-based Saudi daily newspaper Okaz, provides some perspective on the current status of AQAP, as well as the potential effect of Al-Awlaki as the group’s new leader. The article notes that the al-Qaeda affiliate has struggled for a multitude of reasons, including the loss of several key leaders, financial challenges, and internal disputes that have led to structural issues. The article also states that Al-Awlaki could be a unifier for AQAP due to his extensive background in the terrorist network, experience in the al-Qaeda leadership council, and previous position as Emir in the Shabwa Province. While there has been a shift in the West to focus on great power competition with China and Russia, and persistent challenges from Iran, the ongoing threat from international terrorist organizations cannot be discounted, especially with new leaders who have openly called for attacks against the United States.[iii]


Sources:

سعد العولقي.. من هو زعيم “القاعدة” الجديد في اليمن؟  (Saad Al-Awlaki… Who is the New Leader of Al Qaeda in Yemen),” Al Arabiya (Saudi state-owned news outlet), 11 March 2024. https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/yemen/2024/03/11/بعد-الاعلان-عن-مقتل-زعيم-تنظيم-القاعدة-من-هو-خليفته؟

Al-Qaeda in Yemen confirmed the killing of its leader, Khaled Batarfi, without going into details, announcing that his new successor is Saad Al-Awlaki. The SITE Center, which monitors terrorist media, stated that the organization’s legal official, Ibrahim al-Qusi, confirmed in a recording broadcast yesterday, Sunday, the killing of Batarfi, the organization’s leader since February 2020, declaring that “Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki is the new leader of the organization in the Arabian Peninsula.” , which the United States classifies as a terrorist…

Saad bin Atef Al-Awlaki, nicknamed “Abu Al-Laith,”… is of Yemeni nationality, and media reports indicate that he is one of those who was repatriated from Afghanistan to Yemen by the former leader of Al-Qaeda, who was killed by America in 2011, Osama bin Laden. Thus, Al-Awlaki becomes the fifth leader to publicly lead Al-Qaeda in Yemen, after working for years as the extremist organization’s second-in-command in the country.

Saad Al-Awlaki was born in the town of Al-Shu’bah in Wadi Yasbam in the Upper Egypt District in Shabwa Governorate (south). He comes from the large Al-Awalqi tribe, the same tribe from which the spiritual father of Al-Qaeda, Anwar Al-Awlaki, who was killed by an American drone in 2011, descends.


Mohamed Hefney, “خبير مصري لـ عكاظ: الخلافات تفكك تنظيم القاعدة الإرهابي في اليمن (An Egyptian expert to Okaz: Disagreements are Disintegrating the Al-Qaeda Terrorist Organization in Yemen),” Okaz (Saudi based newspaper), 13 March 2024. https://www.okaz.com.sa/news/politics/2157390

Fears are escalating within Al-Qaeda, after the killing of its fourth leader in Yemen, Khalid Batarfi, nicknamed “Abu al-Miqdad al-Kindi,” and the appointment of his successor, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, nicknamed “Abu al-Layth,” who the US administration classified in 2021 as a global terrorist, and offered a reward of $6. Millions of dollars in exchange for providing information about him.

Dr. Nabil Naeem, believes that Al-Awlaki is known for his extreme hostility toward America, and like all of his predecessors, he called for the necessity of launching attacks on the United States of America, which prompted the American administration to allocate a large financial reward to anyone who provides information about him. He stressed that Al-Qaeda in general, whether in Yemen or elsewhere, has become weak and fragile and is witnessing a major liquidation of its leaders, whether in Yemen or other countries in the region. It is not the organization that existed 20 years ago. The new leader of Al-Qaeda in Yemen faces grave challenges and priorities, including how to preserve his life and the lives of his followers from the expected physical liquidation. The Yemeni organization also faces challenges at the financial and structural levels, as the financial level is very weak. Structural level: There is a state of splits and divisions within the organization left behind by the former leader of the organization, which indicates that his death was under the direction of those close to him. Therefore, we do not rule out that the new leadership will seek to bring the terrorist organization together.Al-Awlaki is considered one of the founding leaders of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and he served as a member of the leadership council of Al-Qaeda. He was born in the 1980s. He joined the organization in 2010, and assumed the position of Emir of Shabwa Province until 2014, then he was appointed a member of the organization’s Shura Council, which is responsible for Managing operations, and he was called the second man in Al-Qaeda in Yemen.


Notes:

[i] Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was initially created in 2009 after the Saudi and Yemeni branches merged forces. The group is currently assessed to be one of the most lethal al-Qaeda affiliates. The Council on Foreign Relations published a backgrounder on AQAP, see: “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),” Council on Foreign Relations, 19 June 2015. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap

[ii] For a complete list of designated terrorist organizations by the United States Government see: “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, Accessed 12 March 2024. https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/

[iii] The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community further notes that, “Al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates on the African continent and Yemen will sustain the global network as the group maintains its strategic intent to target the United States and U.S. citizens.” The entirety of the most recent unclassified annual threat assessment issued by the United States Intelligence Community can be located here: “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 5 February 2024. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf


Image Information:

Image: Sana’a, capitol of Yemen at Night.
Source: https://openverse.org/image/c4b13d0f-5ffa-44fc-9a82-518d08dbfbc0?q=yemen Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0


Iranian Self-Sufficiency in Aircraft Spare Parts May Benefit Sanctioned States

Inspecting Airbus jet engines, April 2022


Some countries that were sanctioned… are coming to Iran and entrusting their planes to Iranian experts.”


Iran’s air transportation industry is under stress due to international sanctions.[i] In response to the sanctions, the Mehr News Agency reports that Iran’s Ministry of Defense has developed the industrial and technical capacity to develop spare aircraft parts and conduct maintenance on critical systems like aircraft engines.[ii] While this follows a known pattern of Iranian claims to immunize themselves from international sanctions, the current iteration differs because Iranian officials openly say they will use their new capacity to help other countries subject to international sanctions.

The willingness to help Russia or other countries evade sanctions, for example, by shipping drones to Russia, signals both a sense of impunity among Iranian officials but could also reflect growing substance to Iran’s alliances with other states that find themselves international pariahs. For Iran to help Russia service its leased Boeing or Airbus aircraft fleshes out bilateral relations beyond simply a one-way drone trade. Iran’s stated willingness to bypass sanctions to maintain or potentially upgrade Russian aircraft can have broad ramifications on the operational environment, not only in the Middle East but elsewhere around the world. First, Iranian efforts to help subjected states bypass sanctions blunt a major tool of international diplomacy meant to deter rogue or aggressive behavior. Second, supplying sanctioned states much-needed aviation hardware would be a boon to Iranian defense industries both financially and by allowing them greater opportunities to reverse engineer platforms such as the Sukhoi-35S [R1].[iii] Finally, money earned by Revolutionary Guard-run factories could also help support or subsidize Revolutionary Guard or proxy activities across the region.


Sources:

“خودکفایی ایران در ساخت قطعات هواپیماهای مسافربری”(Iran’s self-sufficiency in the manufacture of passenger plane parts),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news agency owned by Iranian government’s Islamic Development Organization), 9 March 2024. https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6049371

In an interview with Mehr, Javad Mashayekh, with reference to Iran’s self-sufficiency in the field of manufacturing passenger aircraft parts that researchers and specialists in knowledge-based companies have achieved, stated, “In the field of commercial and passenger planes, Iran was once dependent on procurement of aircraft parts, even for maintenance but because of sanctions,
we were unable to procure parts from other international suppliers. The deputy of the scientific department of knowledge-based economy development added, “This is what happened after the imposition of sanctions: Some of Iran’s knowledge-based companies used their power to develop car parts, and repair and maintenance of aircraft engines locally.” Mashayekh also said that the most complex part of an aircraft is its engine and, he noted, maintenance requires a high degree of technical knowledge. We promise that in these fields, our country has achieved self-sufficiency so we do not need to send out planes to foreign countries for almost any kind of repair or to have maintenance done there.

He continued, “In fact, we are currently witnessing that some countries that were sanctioned for various reasons and are not able to supply parts and get maintenance services are coming to Iran and entrusting their planes to Iranian experts…. For example, Russia has suffered many sanctions in the aviation sector due to the Ukraine crisis, and for this reason, it has concluded good contracts for maintenance services with Iranian knowledge-based companies.”


Notes:

[i] In 2016 Iran sought to purchase nearly 200 passenger jets split between Boeing and Airbus. At the time, the Iranian government justified the deals as an air safety matter. However, ambitions for a new fleet faltered as seating capacity of the new jets outstripped Iranian passenger traffic projections. Critics claimed the proposed deals were meant to provide spare parts to keep Iran’s military aircraft aloft. While Boeing and Airbus planes do not contain parts suitable for jet fighters, passenger jets and military cargo planes can share many parts. Boeing ultimately cancelled its deal, while Airbus delivered only four planes.

[ii] For discussion of Iranian turbojet engine development, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: New Heavy Engines on the Drawing Board,” OE Watch, November 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195245/download

[iii] For discussion of the Iranian desire for Sukhoi-35s, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Wants Sukhoi-35 Fighters From Russia,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-wants-sukhoi-35-fighters-from-russia/


Image information:

Image: Inspecting Airbus jet engines, April 2022
Source: https://media.mehrnews.com/d/2024/03/08/3/4894679.jpg?ts=1709893408775
Attribution: Mehr News Agency


Russia Celebrates 10th Anniversary of Crimean Annexation

A view of the Crimean (Kerch) Bridge, linking Crimea to Russia.


“[The railway] will be another, alternative road instead of the Crimean Bridge,” said President Vladimir Putin.


On 18 March, Russians celebrated the tenth anniversary of their “reunification” with Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. One of the Kremlin’s major priorities for the peninsula was the construction of a $2.5 billion land bridge, known as the Kerch Bridge, to link the annexed region with the Russia-controlled provinces of eastern Ukraine. At 19 kilometers (11.8 miles), the bridge is Europe’s longest. The excerpted feature article in pro-Kremlin newspaper Kommersant, celebrated Russia’s modernization of the peninsula, including a gleaming new $350 million international airport at Simferopol shaped like a sea wave; the extension of a new water pipeline; a large mosque for Crimea’s Tatars; and refurbished statues to commemorate what Russians call the “Crimean Spring.” The article notes that the Kerch Bridge has come under attack by Ukraine at least twice during the special military operation. As an insurance policy—announced at a rally on Red Square to honor President Vladimir Putin’s March presidential victory and the 10th anniversary of the annexation of Crimea—Russia will restore a railway linking Rostov-on-Don with Donetsk and Mariupol, eventually reaching Sevastopol, according to the excerpted article in nationalist online newspaper Lenta.ru. The announced railway connection could suggest that the Russian authorities are concerned about the vulnerability of the Kerch Bridge to attack. Some Western analysts have called on Ukraine’s military to target it with advanced missiles[i] The railway extension project could simply be meant to symbolize the connection of mainland Russia with its annexed peninsula. Either way, the Ukrainian military will have an additional target as it seeks to take back Crimea and weaken Russia’s grip on the peninsula.


Sources:

“Крым десятилетней выдержки: Как обжился полуостров в составе России, (Crimea after 10 Years of Improvements: How the Peninsula has Taken Shape within Russia),” Kommersant.ru (center-right Kremlin newspaper), 17 March 2024. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6535646

After the “Crimean Spring” the peninsula was in a land blockade, so the construction of a transport corridor through the Kerch Strait was declared a priority. On March 19, 2014, President Vladimir Putin instructed to connect new entities with the “big land” by rail and roads. The construction of the bridge worth 228 billion rubles began in February 2016 and lasted a little more than two years. The 19 km long structure was the longest in Europe. After the start of the special operation, the crossing was twice attacked by Ukraine.


“Путин анонсировал появление альтернативы Крымскому мосту” (Putin announced the emergence of an alternative to the Crimean Bridge), Lenta.ru (right-wing nationalist online newspaper), 18 March 2024. https://lenta.ru/news/2024/03/18/putin-anonsiroval-poyavlenie-alternativy-krymskomu-mostu/

The restored railway from Rostov-on-Don to DonetskMariupol and Berdyansk will be an alternative to the Crimean Bridge. Its appearance was announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin at a rally-concert in honor of the tenth anniversary of the reunification of Crimea with Russia, his words are quoted by the TASS agency.

The Head of State noted that the country will continue to restore the railway, which goes from the Rostov region through Donbass and Novorossiya. The President promised that the railway trains would soon go to Sevastopol. “And it will be another, alternative road instead of the Crimean Bridge,” he added. Putin also stressed that Russia and Crimea will go together and further hand in hand. He pointed out that this will be proved not in words, but in deeds, which will only make the country and the peninsula stronger.In November, Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin reported that the new railway from the Rostov region to Crimea, which will become an alternative to the route along the Crimean Bridge, is at the design stage.


Notes:

1 Ben Hodges, Led Klosky, Robert Person, Eric Williamson, “Putin’s Weak Link to Crimea: Kyiv Should Target the Kerch Bridge—but Needs Missiles to Take It Out,” Foreign Affairs, 5 December 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/putins-weak-link-crimea


Image Information:

Image: A view of the Crimean (Kerch) Bridge, linking Crimea to Russia.
Source: Rosavtodor.ru https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Crimean_Bridge#/media/File:Крымский_мост_13_сентября_2019_года_(1).jpg
Attribution: CC By 4.0


Russia Invoking Heroic Military Heritage To Frame Current War

The city cemetery of Kherson contains a military plot with 122 Soviet graves from the Second World War. The soldiers buried here, belonging to the 49th Guards Rifle Division and the 295th Infantry Division, fell while liberating the city in 1944.


“This is how our valiant warriors reminded the invaders that victory will be ours, just like 80 years ago.”


Russia continues to use memories of past battles and heroic sacrifice to fuel domestic support for its war in Ukraine. According to the excerpted article published by Russian news outlet RTVI, a detachment of Russian soldiers recently conducted a “daring raid” across the Dnieper River, attacking Ukrainian troops near Kherson before retreating across the Dnieper River. Although this story is barely newsworthy considering the larger and more significant battles for Mariupol, Bakhmut, and Avdeevka, it illustrates Moscow’s determination to attach Russia’s rich and heroic military history to the current conflict in Ukraine. Sources quoted in the article claim, “up to 30 [Ukrainian] personnel lost,” and that Russian troops returned “without irreparable losses.” However, the article compares the raid to the  strategic seizing of Kherson from the Germans in March 1944 by General Margelov and the 49th Guards Rifle Division. The 49th was awarded the title “Kherson” an honorific denoting the unit’s role in liberating the city from the Germans, while Margelov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Margolev was later instrumental in developing Soviet paratroop forces and became known as the father of Russian airborne forces.[i] The reference to Margelov in  the article was to connect Russian actions on today’s Ukrainian battlefields with past Russian battlefield heroics. This particular historical comparison augments the recent renaming of the Northern Military District to be the Leningrad Military District, and the renaming of Artic icebreakers to honor Lenin and Stalin.[ii] This is part of a broader Russian effort to use its military history, and Russia’s ongoing heroic fight for survival, to strengthen Putin’s position on Ukraine domestically.[iii] It is not for nothing that Russia refers to the Second World War as The Great Patriot War. Indeed, Russian invocation honoring the past appears to be an integral part of Moscow’s IO campaign surrounding its special military operation in Ukraine. Using Margolev as an example illustrates Russia’s position that this land has been fought for and liberated once before and belongs to Russia.


Sources:

“Сальдо рассказал о «дерзком рейде» на подконтрольный ВСУ правый берег Днепра (Saldo spoke about the “daring raid” on the right bank of the Dnieper controlled by the Ukrainian Armed Forces),” RTVI (Russian news service), 13 March 2024. https://rtvi.com/news/saldo-rasskazal-o-derzkom-rejde-na-podkontrolnyj-vsu-pravyj-beregdnepra/?utm_source=24smi&utm_medium=referral&utm_term=10949&utm_content=6021008&utm_campaign=14335&utm_referrer=24smi.info

On the night of March 13, an assault group of employees from the Dnepr group of troops conducted a “daring raid” on the right bank of the Dnieper River, said the governor of the Kherson region, Vladimir Saldo. According to him, the Armed Forces of Ukraine suffered losses.

“Last night, a joint assault group of fighters from the Dnepr group of troops carried out a daring raid on the right bank of the river,” Saldo wrote in his Telegram channel.

According to the governor, marines, paratroopers and volunteers disembarked from watercraft at the base of the Antonovsky Bridge, “the enemy did not have time to react in time.” The military destroyed several positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, “including a UAV control center and an electronic warfare station, observation, communications and temporary concentration of manpower points,” Saldo wrote.

He added that the Russian military after this “managed to retreat to the left bank without irreparable losses,” and the Ukrainian side lost up to 30 military personnel.Saldo emphasized that “the landing force landed at the same place where in 1944 Margelov’s soldiers captured the first bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper, which became the key to breaking the fascist defense.” “This is how our valiant warriors reminded the invaders that victory will be ours, just like 80 years ago,” the governor is confident.


OE Insight Summary:

In effort to instill patriotism and increase domestic support for its operation in Ukraine, Russia compares the special military operation to past battlefield heroics, usually from World War II.


Notes:

[i] See: “Troops of Uncle Vasya. Why General Margelov is called the father of Airborne,” Rusreality, 27 Dec 2018. https://rusreality.com/2018/12/27/troops-of-uncle-vasya-why-general-margelov-called-the-father-of-airborne/ and also Vasily Margelov, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasily_Margelov

[ii] See Les Grau, “Russia Changes Arctic Icebreaker Names To Honor History,” OE Watch, 02-2024.  https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-changes-arctic-icebreaker-names-to-honor-history/

[iii] Multiple western organizations track Russian use of its history to maintain domestic popular support. A RUSI publication noted that “Kremlin narratives about the Soviet Union’s role in the Second World War are uncritical, mythologised by the authorities. They have become an identifying feature of Russia’s foreign and domestic policy, based mostly around the Soviet Union’s heavy losses and military greatness.” See: Royal United Service Institute (RUSI), 27 July 2022. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/how-russias-narratives-ukraine-reflect-its-existential-crisis


Image Information:

Image: The city cemetery of Kherson contains a military plot with 122 Soviet graves from the Second World War. The soldiers buried here, belonging to the 49th Guards Rifle Division and the 295th Infantry Division, fell while liberating the city in 1944.
Source: TracesofWar.com, https://www.tracesofwar.com/sights/9948/Soviet-War-Graves-Kherson-City-Cemetery.htm
Attribution: CC BY SA


Russia Bids Farewell to the Northern Military District

“Given NATO’s desire to build up military potential near the Russian borders, as well as to expand the North Atlantic Alliance at the expense of Finland and Sweden, retaliatory measures are required to create an appropriate grouping of troops in Northwest Russia.”


The Russian Northern Military District is deactivated and the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts are back—albeit with changes to reflect Russia’s current security situation. According to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, the restructuring of the Russian Northern Military District to the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts comes in response to Finland and Sweden joining NATO.[i] With the move, the Northern Fleet, headquartered in Murmansk, is now “officially absorbed into a renewed Leningrad Military District.” St. Petersburg, Russia is again the command center of the extended Leningrad Military District.[ii] According to a defense expert quoted in the article, “as seen by Russia, it is necessary to improve the ability to fight full-scale land operations along the Finnish border and in the Baltic theatre of military operations.” The Northern Fleet will be subordinate to the Moscow Military District. These recent changes are more than just a re-ordering, as Russia continues its military reform and restructuring to give Russia an advantage in Ukraine and strengthen its position vis-a-vis a much longer frontier with NATO given the inclusion of Sweden and Finland.


Sources:

Thomas Nilsen “Putin signs northwestern regions into Leningrad military district,”The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 26 February 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2024/02/putins-signs-northwestern-regions-leningrad-military-district

Vladimir Putin on Monday signed a decree reestablishing the Soviet-era Moscow and Leningrad military districts which means an end to the Northern Fleet as a military district.

With the move, the Northern Fleet is now officially absorbed into a renewed Leningrad Military District. The Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command was given the status of a military district on 1 January 2021, a move seen to mirror the importance of Russia’s Arctic regions. In geographical size, the Northern Fleet was until today the third largest of Russia’s five military districts. At the same time, what was the Western Military District is now split into the new Moscow and Leningrad districts.

The Leningrad Military District includes the Republic of Karelia, the Komi Republic, and the oblasts of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Novgorod and Pskov, as well as the Nenets Autonomous Okrug and the City of St. Petersburg.

Dictator Putin’s decree was signed the same day as the Hungarian Parliament voted to ratify Sweden as NATO’s 32nd member state.

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu last December said “retaliatory measures are required” as both Finland and Sweden join NATO.

“Given NATO’s desire to build up military potential near the Russian borders, as well as to expand the North Atlantic Alliance at the expense of Finland and Sweden, retaliatory measures are required to create an appropriate grouping of troops in Northwest Russia,” Shoigu said.

Katarzyna Zysk, a professor with the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), agrees that the ongoing restructuring is linked to the fact that Russia has got a much longer land-border with NATO.

“The dividing of the Western Military District into the Moscow Military District and Leningrad Military District, as well as possibly subordinate the Northern Fleet to the latter, is a response to NATO enlargement in Northern Europe and expected further changes in allied defense posture,” Zysk previously said to the Barents Observer. She explains that seen with Russian eyes, it is necessary to improve the ability to fight full-scale land operations along the Finnish border and in the Baltic theatre of military operations.In addition to the new Leningrad- and Moscow military districts, Putin’s decree also adds the illegally occupied Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye and Kherson as part of the Southern Military District. The changes in Russia’s military districts take effect from March 1, Putin wrote in his decree.


Notes:

[i] For an additional European perspective on the restructuring of its military districts, see: “Russia Restructures Military Districts Amid Warnings of NATO War,” Euronews. 27 February 2024. https://www.euronews.com/2024/02/27/russia-restructures-military-districts-amid-warnings-of-nato-war

[ii] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the city of Leningrad was renamed St. Petersburg, but the regional oblast designation remained Leningrad.


The Race to Incorporate Artificial Intelligence Into Attack Drones in Ukraine

Russian military prepares Orlan-10 drones for launch during Russia’s Vostok-2018 Maneuvers.


“The Russian Army will receive weaponized drones, operated with the help of artificial intelligence (AI) – their delivery to the troops in the Special Military Operation (SMO) zone is already planned.”


The Russian Defense Ministry has announced that it will incorporate artificial intelligence (AI) into its attack drones to increase their accuracy and precision. According to the excerpted article published by the government news agency RIA News, Russia conducted around 700 successful drone attacks on Ukrainian targets in Avdiivka during the first half of February 2024. The article states that Russia plans to introduce AI to further refine its attack drones as part of a wave of military modernization incorporating more advanced technology and electronics into military systems. The aim is to allow AI to control the drones, increasing the battlefield efficacy of Russia’s drone complex. However, it is important to note that Ukraine is also working to incorporate AI capability in its attack drones. According to the second excerpted article from private Ukrainian media outlet Focus Media, Ukraine’s effort to implement AI on the battlefield has support from the West as well as internally from Ukrainian technology developers. In addition to testing AI-capable drones from the United Kingdom, the Ukrainian Minister for Technology Development reports having more than 20 different teams developing similar technologies. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry believes that AI-capable attack drones could overwhelm Russian positions, while Russia believes the same to be true in reverse. Thus far, Ukraine has developed two AI-capable drones approved for battlefield use, the Saker Scout[i] and SkyKnight2.[ii] While neither Russia nor Ukraine have fully implemented AI into their drone fleets, they are racing against each other to gain this advantage. Should Russia succeed in its goal of increased tactical efficacy in attack drones, it may be able to set a pace of sky-borne destruction that cannot be countered by the Ukrainian and Western technologies currently being employed in the war effort.[iii] AI integrated into attack drones will provide Russia with a technological advantage that is unmatched by regional forces.


Sources:

“Армию России вооружают беспилотниками с искусственным интеллектом (The Russian Army will be armed with drones with artificial intelligence),” RIA News (one of the largest Russian government news agencies), 24 February 2024. https://crimea.ria.ru/20240224/armiyu-rossii-vooruzhayut-bespilotnikami-s-iskusstvennym-intellektom-1135183675.html

The Russian Army will receive weaponized drones, operated with the help of artificial intelligence (AI) – their delivery to the troops in the Special Military Operation (SMO) zone is already planned. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced this during an inspection visit to the Russian central grouping of troops. His words are quoted by the Ministry of Defense. “We have come to this point. This is becoming a pretty serious weapon.” – said the minister, noting that the deliveries of the latest unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russian troops will increase the effectiveness of their application.”

… in the last two weeks of February attack drones have destroyed upwards of 700 different enemy targets in Avdiivka, including armored vehicles, artillery systems, radar facilities, and enemy manpower. In particular, during the liberation of Avdiivka the reconnaissance UAV complex, Orlan-30 [R1] , proved itself well…

Based upon the results of the report, Shoigu set the task to further strengthen the Russian central grouping of troops via electronic warfare, chiefly at the tactical level.

A few days prior, the head of the Russian government Mikhail Mishustin gave instructions to maximize the process of modernizing combat systems used as a part of the SMO and to expand their combat capabilities.


Alexander Zalata, “Украина вооружается дронами с ИИ: чем лучше обычных и когда массово появятся на фронте (Ukraine is arming itself with AI drones: better than the usual and when will they appear en masse on the front),” Focus Media (a privately-owned Ukrainian media company), 22 February 2024. https://focus.ua/digital/628357-ukraina-vooruzhaetsya-dronami-s-ii-chem-luchshe-obychnyh-i-kogda-massovo-poyavyatsya-na-fronte

More than 20 teams are already working on artificial intelligence (in drones) and many of them are already in the final stages, but before launching it must be ensured that the UAVs don’t attack everyone. 

In his article, published on the site Ukrainian Truth, the Minister for Technology Development Mikhail Fedorov, wrote that currently around 20 companies are working on developing AI for implementation in UAVs, in particular, the computer vision technologies (CV) for additional guidance. As the official explained, they will allow UAVs to analyze video streams in real-time, to find and identify objects, such as Russian vehicles, manpower, and artillery. 

At the beginning of autumn, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry stated that one of these drones, the Saker Scout, had been approved for use in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Specialists assure that thanks to the newest optical system this drone can independently recognize and record the coordinates of the enemy’s equipment… Later the Defense Ministry allowed yet another Ukrainian-made UAV to be used in the armed forces that is equipped with artificial intelligence and an autonomous flight system – the SkyKnight2. “And this will already be a decisive advantage, because then we can send a swarm of drones either on their own or with a queen, and they will perform the function of an assault unit. There are many problems, but everyone is moving in that direction,” said Alexey Teplukhin.


Notes:

[i] For further information on the AI-enabled Saker Scout drone, from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s Telegram, 4 September 2023. https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/7951?single

[ii] For further information on the AI-enabled SkyKnight2 drone, from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s Telegram, 19 August 2023. https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/7884

[iii] Kristen Thompson, “How the Drone War In Ukraine Is Transforming Conflict,” Council on Foreign Relations, 16 January 2024. https://www.cfr.org/article/how-drone-war-ukraine-transforming-conflict


Image Information:

Image: Russian military prepares Orlan-10 drones for launch during Russia’s Vostok-2018 Maneuvers.
Source:  
Attribution: CC BY 4.0


Belarus Agrees To Host Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko (Left) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (Right) at a joint press conference.


“As a part of the response to possible threats to the military security of our country, we clearly defined and communicated the views of Belarus on the use of the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in our territory.”


Belarus has agreed to allow Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) to be deployed in the country, a decision that has led it to revise its national military doctrine. According to the first excerpted article from Russian state-managed RIA News, presidents Lukashenko and Putin confirmed the successful deployment of Russian TNWs onto Belarusian soil in December 2023. Under the agreement, Russian TNWs in Belarus would remain under Russian control.[i] The placement of these weapons in Belarus would put them close enough to strike NATO members.

As a result of this move, in January 2024, Belarus revised its military doctrine, which is now known as the New Military Doctrine. Belarus’s newly revised military doctrine is unequivocal in declaring the West as an aggressor actively seeking to disrupt the integrity of Belarussian national security. Notably, the New Military Doctrine states that the Russian TNWs are an acceptable means of national defense, citing a willingness to work with Moscow to deploy these weapons against perceived threats from the West. Belarus’s New Military Doctrine underscores its willingness to use TNWs, citing reasons of national security and an explicit list of enemies, including the United States and NATO, with Poland and the Baltic states as its primary adversaries. The excerpted article from Belarus Today, a government publication closely linked to the Belarussian presidential administration, points out that the “Aggressive nature of the military policy of Western nations has ceased to be masked by formulations about the exclusively defensive orientation of their military doctrines. These national and coalition documents establish claims to global and regional dominance. They openly name states that are hostile to them, including Belarus.” For Russia, the move to station TNWs in Belarus has expanded its strategic footprint.[ii] Furthermore, as detailed in the third excerpted article, from the Belarusian state-run media organization BELTA –News of Belarus, Belarus has revised its doctrine to increase its defense by focusing on Belarussian military strategy in the likelihood of escalating conflicts with neighboring states such as Poland. Russia arming its ally with nuclear devices, Belarus revising its military doctrine to allow for deployment of Russian TNWs and explicitly naming enemies serves to further heighten regional tensions, especially between Poland and Belarus.[iii]


Sources:

RIA News, “Лукашенко назвал последствия появления ядерного оружия в Белоруссии (Lukashenko identifies the consequences of the appearance of nuclear weapons in Belarus),” RIA News (One of Russia’s largest state news agencies), 19 January 2024. https://ria.ru/20240119/belorussiya-1922400028.html

In March (of 2023) Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that Moscow and Minsk had agreed to put tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. … In June the President of Russia communicated that in accordance with Belarussian-Russian plans the first nuclear charges had been delivered to Belarus. In December (of 2023), Lukashenko informed journalists that all Russian tactical nuclear weapons, agreed upon by the two countries, had been delivered to the (Belarussian) Republic, and were “in place, in good condition,” and that the military is training daily.


Nikolai Buzin, “На чем сделан акцент в проекте новой Военной доктрины Беларуси (What is the emphasis of the New Military Doctrine of Belarus),” Belarus Today (official government news channel), 24 January 2024. https://www.sb.by/articles/v-mire-uvazhayut-silnykh.html

“As a part of the assessment of trends in the development of the military-political situation (we have) clearly named the sources of military threat to Belarus. (These are) the United States, NATO, Poland and the Baltic nations. In particular, article 9 states that the “aggressive nature of the military policy of Western nations has ceased to be masked by formulations about the exclusively defensive orientation of their military doctrines. These national and coalition documents establish claims to global and regional dominance. They openly name states that are hostile to them…, which includes the Republic Belarus.”


“Какой будет новая Военная доктрина Беларуси. Хренин раскрыл подробности документа (What will be the new Military doctrine of Belarus. Khrenin revealed the details of the document),” BELTA – News of Belarus (official government news channel), 6 January 2024. https://www.belta.by/society/view/kakoj-budet-novaja-voennaja-doktrina-belarusi-hrenin-raskryl-podrobnosti-dokumenta-610049-2024/

Among important innovations, (Viktor Khrenin) describes, for instance, targeting, that is, a clear indication of the sources of military threats to Belarus. At the same time, unlike NATO countries, which in their war documents explicitly name (their) enemies, listing specific countries, Belarus states likely sources of threats. “We expressly name sources of threats and from the countries which they emanate.” – explained Viktor Khrenin. He also brought attention to the strengthened concepts of national security. “For existing challenges of military security there is a clearly formulated line of threats.” The head of the Ministry of Defense explained. “Based on this, we have formulated measures that the state will take in case of risks, challenges, and threats. We have clearly defined what government agencies should do and what functions they will perform. As a part of the response to possible threats to the military security of our country, we clearly defined and communicated the views of Belarus on the use of the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in our territory.”


Notes:

[i] TNWs are designed for the battlefield and can greatly range in impact. A tactical nuclear weapon is any nuclear weapon not classified as “strategic” by U.S.-Russian arms control agreements, such as SALT. For more information, see: “What are ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons?,” The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), https://www.icanw.org/what_are_tactical_nuclear_weapons; Most TNWs have a maximum range of 500km if land-based or 600km if airborne. For additional information, see: “Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW),” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 30 April 2002. https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/tactical-nuclear-weapons/

[ii] Previous reporting notes that the withdrawal of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons would only be negotiable if the United States were to completely withdraw American nuclear arms from the European continent. See: RIA News (one of Russia’s largest state news agencies), 31 July 2023. https://ria.ru/20230731/tyao-1887278977.html

[iii] For the Polish perspective on Belarus’s tactical nuclear weapons, see: Andrezj Wilk and Piotr Zochowski, “Russian nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus: the consequences,” Center for Eastern Studies (Warsaw based think tank) 6 June 2023. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2023-06-06/russian-nuclear-weapons-deployed-belarus-consequences


Image Information:

Image: Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko (Left) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (Right) at a joint press conference.
Source: Kremlin.ru, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66648
Attribution: CC BY 4.0