Author Archives: Jacob Zenn

Terrorist Attack in Togo Reveals Turkish Counter-Terrorism Role

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Togo’s Savanes Region is JNIM’s latest area of expansion, but it remains unclear whether Turkish PMCs can support the Togolese army to repel JNIM over the long term.

“The [JNIM] attack targeted soldiers who were patrolling the trenches under construction, and who were trying to prevent terrorist incursions at the border.”

The littoral West African country of Togo, along with its neighbor Benin, is a main target of expansion for the al-Qaeda affiliated Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM).[i] As discussed in a French-language article in the Burkinabe publication, 24heures.bf, on 2 October, JNIM attacked a construction site in northern Togo engaged in the building of trenches to defend against JNIM incursions. The attack claimed the lives of nine Togolese soldiers and 10 civilians. This is not the first time JNIM has specifically destroyed trench-building projects and killed construction workers. The article notes that Togolese Army reinforcements accompanied by Turkish instructors in helicopters, finally repelled the attack by firing on the JNIM militants.

Although Turkish instructors have reportedly operated in Niger alongside Russian Africa Corps personnel, it was previously unclear whether Turkish instructors operated in Togo.[ii] The article, in fact, asserts that two Turkish instructors have been killed in previous JNIM attacks in Togo, which suggests Turks may be more involved in counter-insurgency operations in Togo than previously known.

The involvement of Turkish instructors in Togo seemingly differs from that of African Corps personnel operating in the Sahel, who not only engage in counterinsurgency operations against JNIM but are also involved in propping up post-coup junta military regimes in the Sahel, including Burkina Faso. Notably, Africa Corps has suffered numerous setbacks in battles with JNIM. The Turkish private military company, Sadat, had reportedly been active in Niger and Burkina Faso. The presence of Turkish instructors in Togo implies a likely expansion of the Turkish PMC and instructor presence in West Africa

Sources:

“Attaque terroriste au Togo: 19 morts près de la frontière du Burkina (Terrorist attack in Togo: 19 dead near the Burkina border),” 24heures.bf (independent French-language Burkina Faso-based publication with a focus on defense and security affairs), 4 October 2024. https://www.24heures.bf/attaque-terroriste-au-togo-19-morts-pres-de-la-frontiere-du-burkina/

A terrorist attack struck, on October 2, the town of Fanworgou in the Kpendjal region in northern Togo, exactly on the border with Burkina. The [JNIM] attack targeted soldiers who were patrolling along the trenches under construction, and who were trying to prevent terrorist incursions at the border. The result: 19 dead, including 9 soldiers and 10 civilians, including EBOMAF machine operators and technicians.

Reinforcements, especially airborne, were deployed to the site to counter the attackers, who were repelled by military units supported by helicopters and piloted by Turkish instructors. Despite the construction of trenches, the terrorists seem to continue to adapt their tactics.

Notes:

[i] Jacob Zenn, “Al-Qaeda’s Sahel Affiliate Targets Togo,” OE Watch, 07-2022, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/420353?pi296680=2

[ii] According to Africa Defense Forum, “some of Sadat’s Syrian fighters in Niger have ended up under Russian command fighting violent extremist organizations affiliated with al-Qaida and the Islamic State group in the Liptako-Gourma region, the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.” Africa Defense Forum, “Turkish PMC ‘Sadat’ Competes for Sahel Influence,” adf-magazine.com, 30 July 2024. https://adf-magazine.com/2024/07/turkish-pmc-sadat-competes-for-sahel-influence/

OE Watch Insight:  

TUR PMCs are providing support to Togolese army to combat AQ-affiliated JNIM’s attempts to move south from BFA into TGO.

Image Information:

Image: Togo’s Savanes Region is JNIM’s latest area of expansion, but it remains unclear whether Turkish PMCs can support the Togolese army to repel JNIM over the long term.
Source: EC-JRC/ECHO, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Togo_Base_Map.png
Attribution: CC x 2.

Tuareg Separatist Militants Form an Alliance Against Junta-Led Governments in Mali and Niger

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Tuareg ethnonationalist militants who launched the most recent phase of their insurgency in Mali in 2012 are now linking with ideologically similar militants in neighboring Niger.

“The Malian and Nigerien rebels have decided to assist each other, but also to defend their interests together on the international level.”

Since 2021, West African security and political dynamics have deteriorated as a result of coups by military juntas in the region’s three central states—Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. In July 2024, these three juntas agreed to a new regional Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) after leaving the preexisting regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States. They replaced Western military support with that of the successor to Russia’s Wagner Group, known as the Africa Corps. Now, however, two of the Sahel’s ethnonationalist and mostly secular Tuareg rebel groups, the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) in Niger and the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA)[i] in Mali, have formed their own alliance.

According to the excerpted French-language article from French state-owned radio news website rfi.fr, both the FPL and CSP-DPA oppose the respective juntas that are now ruling their countries. The main function of their newly established alliance is for both rebel groups to promise to aid each other in the case of an attack by AES armies, forcing them to confront a more complex and even multi-national insurgency. The article also states that the FPL and CSP-DPA plan to defend each other’s interests on the international level, although whether that entails advocacy or operations or both is left ambiguous. However, by targeting Chinese-funded pipeline projects, the FPL insurgency has already achieved internationalized operations status. The FPL believes such projects fund the junta in Niamey at the expense of predominantly Tuareg and other minority regions of Niger.[ii] Such attacks serve as a form of leverage and pressure against the junta.

The article also highlights that the alliance-making meeting between FPL and CSP-DPA leaders occurred in the northern Malian town of Tinzaouatène. This town near the Algerian border is the CSP base, and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), which is under the CSP umbrella,[iii] and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group of Supporters of Islam and Muslims massacred dozens of African Corps and Malian troops in separate attacks on 28 July. According to the article, the Tinzaouatène meeting sent a message that the new FPL and CSP-DPA alliance could launch similar massacres if their goals for independence or autonomy are not met. This would represent a new development in the Sahel, where Tuareg rebel groups have historically remained relatively independent of each other and have mostly focused on reacting only to their own nation’s political and military developments.

At a time when the AES military juntas have largely lost legitimacy internationally and when Africa Corps is reeling from the massacre it suffered at the hands of the CMA, the FPL and CSP-DPA are escalating their confrontation with the embattled juntas in the political, military, and international realm. Neither group is particularly antagonistic towards the United States or the West. However, even if democratic rule eventually returns, their strengthening insurgencies will make it more difficult to reunite Mali and Niger and restore sovereignty to both nations.

Sources:

“À Tinzaouatène, les rebellions du Niger et du Mali se réunissent pour renforcer leurs relations (In Tinzaouatène, rebellions from Niger and Mali meet to strengthen relations)),” Radio France Internationale (French state-owned radio news website reporting on international affairs), 28 August 2024. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240901-%C3%A0-tinzaouat%C3%A8ne-les-rebellions-du-niger-et-du-mali-se-r%C3%A9unissent-pour-renforcer-leurs-relations

The delegation of the Niger rebels of the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) was led by Barak Taher Hamit, who holds the title of “commander-in-chief” of the armed movement opposed to the Niger junta. The delegation of the Malian rebels of the Strategic Framework for Defense (CSP) was headed by Alghabass Ag Intalla, who is the leader of the militant group and opponent of the Malian junta. To begin discussions with an aim towards strengthening relations between them, the site of the meeting was quite symbolic: Tinzaouatène in northern Mali, located on the Algerian border.

During the meeting, no document was signed, or at least not made public. But the Malian and Nigerien rebels have decided to aid each other, and also to defend their interests together on the international level. According to sources close to both parties, other meetings are being planned about “fighting hand in hand against the militaries in power in Mali and Niger”.

Notes:

[i] “Azawad” is the term that Tuareg ethnonationalists use to refer their homeland.

[ii] In June 2024, the FPL, for example, disabled a section of Niger’s PetroChina-funded crude oil pipeline with the intent to force China to cancel a deal between the junta and China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC). See: Emmanuel Addeh, “Tensions Escalate As Armed Group Attacks Niger’s PetroChina-Funded Pipeline, Threatens More Attacks,” Arise.TV, 19 June 2024. https://www.arise.tv/tensions-escalate-as-armed-group-attacks-nigers-petrochina-funded-pipeline-threatens-more-attacks/

[iii] See: “Northern Mali: A Conflict with No Victors,” ICG, 13 October 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/nord-du-mali-une-confrontation-dont-personne-ne-sortira-vainqueur

Image Information:

Image: Tuareg ethnonationalist militants who launched the most recent phase of their insurgency in Mali in 2012 are now linking with ideologically similar militants in neighboring Niger.
Source: Magharebia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Le_Mali_confront%C3%A9_aux_sanctions_et_%C3%A0_lavanc%C3%A9e_des_rebelles_islamistes_(6904946068).jpg

The China-Africa Cooperation Forum Focuses on Chinese Military Expansion in Africa

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First held in Beijing in 2000, FOCAC has grown significantly over the past two decades and is now the largest diplomatic event organized by China.

“Many countries have serious security problems in society, and there is a growing trend of heinous crimes against Chinese-funded companies and employees as well as overseas Chinese.”

51 African heads of state attended, the tri-annual Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing from 4-6 September. While China currently has one base in Africa on the Djibouti coast, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s FOCAC speech bolstered other reports about China’s ambitions to expand its military footprint on the continent, including possibly establishing other military bases.[i] Xi Jinping vowed that China would train 6,000 African soldiers and 1,000 African law enforcement officers, welcome 500 African military officers to China, commence joint patrols, mine clearance, and other military activities with African partners, and provide security for joint projects with African security officials.[ii] This latter objective was underscored in the article, where it noted the growing trend of violent crimes against Chinese-funded enterprises and employees and overseas Chinese in Africa, which are often seen as exploitative. Only 20 African countries currently have police cooperation agreements with China, a fact the article lamented and stated needs to increase. This suggests a correlation in the future between Chinese economic activities in Africa, which will inevitably lead to security incidents and Chinese security cooperation with African countries.[iii] The FOCAC and Xi Jinping’s speech, therefore, signal a growing Chinese military and security presence in Africa.

Sources:

“中非合作论坛峰会召开：为双边关系良性发展“提质增效”提供契机 (The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation is held: An opportunity is provided to ‘improve the quality and efficiency’ for the healthy development of bilateral relations)” thepaper.cn (Communist Party-affiliated Chinese-language newspaper that appeals to youths and has more editorial freedom than most Chinese media), 5 September 2024. https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_28634922

It is relevant to note that 51 of the African leaders who attended the summit are heads of state or government, which is far higher than other “Africa + 1” meetings, such as the US-Africa summit. Against the background of serious changes in Sino-US relations and Sino-EU relations, the importance of the “Global South” in China’s diplomatic grand strategy is rising sharply.

China’s large-scale financing and loans in Africa have become the focus of public criticism for a long time under the smearing and discrediting by the United States and Europe. In fact, this has had a negative impact on the reputations of both China and Africa.

Many countries have serious security problems, and there is a rising trend of heinous crimes against Chinese-funded companies and employees as well as overseas Chinese. At present, only more than 20 African countries have signed relevant police cooperation agreements with China, so the cooperation between the two sides in the field of police law enforcement needs to be improved.

Notes:

[i] See: Jacob Zenn, “China’s Initiates Push To Establish a Military Base in Gabon,” OE Watch, 04-2024, 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/chinas-initiates-push-to-establish-a-military-base-in-gabon/

[ii] “Full text: Xi Jinping’s speech at opening ceremony of 2024 FOCAC summit,” CGTN, 5 September 2024, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2024-09-05/Full-text-Xi-s-speech-at-opening-ceremony-of-2024-FOCAC-summit-1wDYKL8FhxC/p.html

[iii] On Chinese private military contractors in Africa, see Paul Nantulya, “Chinese Security Firms Spread along the African Belt and Road,” ACSS, 15 June 2021. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chinese-security-firms-spread-african-belt-road/

Image Information:

Image: First held in Beijing in 2000, FOCAC has grown significantly over the past two decades and is now the largest diplomatic event organized by China.
Source: Stephen Wallis, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Forum_on_China-Africa_Cooperation.jpg

Nigerian Security Services Crackdown on Russian Flag Protesters

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Protests against the corruption of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Lagos in the past resemble the current protests across Nigeria over hardship and hunger, but the sight of Russian flags as an anti-government symbol in the north is a radically new development.

“The nationwide protests against hardship and hunger took a dangerous dimension, with protesters in some Northern states waving the Russian flag….”

Russian influence in Francophone West African countries that have experienced military coups in the last few years is a clear trendline. One of the most notable examples of this influence has been the expansion of the Wagner Group – or Africa Corps as the company is now known – in the region. However, the excerpted punch.ng report about Russian flags being seen at anti-government protests in northern Nigeria is a new and unexpected development, and a possible indication that Russian information operations are contributing to a positive image of Russia in parts of Nigeria. This is despite Russia’s dubious counter-insurgency record in the Sahel and its support for anti-democratic military juntas in West Africa.[i] According to the article, certain northern elite politicians provided Russian flags to #EndBadGovernance protesters, who are disappointed with the government’s inability to address hunger and hardship in the country. The article further suggests that these elites seek to remove the current Nigerian president, Bola Tinubu, from power. The Russian flags served as a threat to Tinubu’s administration that what happened to leaders deposed in coups in Francophone West Africa could occur in Nigeria as well. According to the article, the response of the Nigerian military to these Russian flags could lead to an excessive reaction towards the flag holders and their alleged sponsors. The military has a history of cracking down on dissent with excessive violence.[ii] The article quotes top military officials as stating the protesters holding the Russian flags are treasonous could indicate harsh action will be taken against them, including at least 10 protesters and flag makers who have already been arrested.

Sources:

“Russian flag: FG probes four northern political bigwigs,” punch.ng (Lagos-based publication with a southern Nigerian perspective often critical of the government and northern Nigerian powerbrokers) 7 August 2024. https://punchng.com/russian-flag-fg-probes-four-northern-political-bigwigs/

The nationwide protests against hardship and hunger took a dangerous dimension, with protesters in some Northern states waving the Russian flag as they chanted “Tinubu must go.” Russia, an Eastern power currently mired in a cold war with the West, has been blamed for several unconstitutional changes of government in West African countries such as Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and among others. The Nigerian military said persons flying the Russian flag were committing treason and will, therefore, be “prosecuted”.

This act not only disrespects our national symbols but also commits treasonable felony and related offences. Hence, 10 suspects were arrested flying Russian flags,” Public Relations Officer ASP Buhari Abdullahi stated while parading the suspects.

Notes:

[i] See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Mali: Army, Wagner Group Atrocities Against Civilians,” 28 March 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/28/mali-army-wagner-group-atrocities-against-civilians

[ii] Just five years ago, in 2019, for example, the Nigerian military cracked down on the Shia Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and killed several dozen of its members who had been protesting in the streets and nearly killed their leader, Ibrahim al-Zakaky. He was forced to recover from his injuries while under long-term house arrest. See Faiza Mawani, “Persecution of the Shia Islamic Movement of Nigeria,” October 19, 2020, UAB Institute for Human Rights Blog. https://sites.uab.edu/humanrights/2020/10/19/persecution-of-the-shia-islamic-movement-of-nigeria/

OE Watch Insight:

NGA protesters with RUS flags during anti-govt protests indicate desire to remove NGA president from office as has occurred in other Sahelian states. NGA mil officials allege northern elites sponsor the flags but risk excessively cracking down on flagholders for their “treason.”


Image Information:

Image: Protests against the corruption of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Lagos in the past resemble the current protests across Nigeria over hardship and hunger, but the sight of Russian flags as an anti-government symbol in the north is a radically new development.
Source: TobiJamesCandids, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Protest_against_the_Special_Anti-Robbery_Squad_(SARS)_in_Lagos,_Nigeria.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Russia’s Africa Corps Personnel Redeploy From the Sahel to Kursk

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Russian Wagner fighters have been active along the border of Belarus since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2021, but now they are operating along the border with Ukraine, including some who reportedly returned to Russia from Africa.

“He emphasized that the Wagner fighters are returning to Russia, which means that they are being transferred from foreign missions.”

On 28 July, Tuareg rebels in the Coordination of Azawad Movements, a mostly secular Tuareg ethnonationalist militant and political coalition, together with the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), massacred dozens of Africa Corps fighters (formerly the Wagner Group) and Malian soldiers in northern Mali near the Algerian border.[i] This was the most severe loss of life in a battle for Africa Corps since the mercenary contingent increased its presence on the continent in 2020. It would be politically untenable for Russia to reveal weakness and pressure Africa Corps to fully cut and run from its mission in Mali. However, this disaster in northern Mali and the simultaneous difficulties Russia is facing in responding to the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk on Russian territory could lead to the redeployment of Africa Corps fighters from Mali and the Sahel region to Kursk. This, in turn, could result in a reduction of Russian counter-insurgency support to Mali and Sahelian states, which are already being engulfed by JNIM and its rival Islamic State in Greater Sahara.

This possibility is furthered in the pro-Russian government Russian-language website gazeta.ru, which reported that the Ukrainian offensive into Russia’s Kursk oblast is requiring Russia to call for assistance from Africa Corps. The article notes that Wagner Group, forces are returning from missions abroad to Ukraine and highlights how many Africa Corps fighters died in the ambush by Tuareg rebels and JNIM in Mali on 28 July. It further implies, based on a message from a prominent Russian Telegram user, that Africa Corps fighters who participated in conflicts in Africa would be among those transferred to Kursk. While details about this transfer are scant in the gazeta.ru article, such reports have also emerged from Russian-language websites critical of the Russian government. The second excerpted article in the Moscow Times also claims that Africa Corps fighters are being transferred from Africa to Kursk. The article emphasized that Africa Corps forces were previously sent to “distant” African countries, including Mali, where the junta leader extended the group’s contract. However, after the Russian Army’s encirclement in Kursk, those same forces are needed on the Russian home front. It remains unclear how this massacre and the fighting in Kursk will ultimately affect Africa Corps, but it is likely Africa Corps’ presence—and certainly its confidence—is less sustainable now than at any time in the recent past.

Sources:

“Бойцы «ЧВК Вагнер» прибыли в Курскую область. Что происходит в регионе на четвертые сутки боев? (Wagner ‘PMC fighters’ arrived in Kursk Oblast. What is happening in the region on the fourth day of fighting?),” www.gazeta.ru (Russian-language website that tends to be pro-Russian government but with a focus on social issues often more than politics) 9 August 2024. https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2024/08/09/19545865.shtml

Wagner PMC fighters and Akhmat special forces arrived in Kursk Oblast to join the battles against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The situation in the region is tense: a State of Smergency was declared, and border area residents of were evacuated. President Putin ordered that help be provided to the population.

Wagner PMC fighters arrived in Kursk Oblast and entered into battles against the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Sudzha, the SHOT Telegram channel reported. The total number of fighters sent to the combat zone was not specified. According to the channel, brigades of the Ministry of Defense’s volunteer corps are also joining in the fighting.

Military correspondent Yegor Guzenko, who publishes under the pseudonym Thirteenth, also reported that fighters from Wagner PMC were sent to the Kursk region. He emphasized that the fighters are returning to Russia, which means that they are being transferred from foreign missions. Recently, Wagner PMC fighters participated in African conflicts, and especially fought against the Tuaregs in Mali. As a result of these battles, the PMC endured losses, which numbered several dozen people.

В Курскую область начали перебрасывать бойцов «Вагнера» из Африки (Wagner fighters from Africa began being transferred to Kursk region), Moscow Times (independent Russian bi-lingual on-line newspaper previously located in Russia, but since relocated to Amsterdam to avoid government sensorship), 8 August 2024. https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2024/08/08/vkurskuyu-oblast-nachali-perebrasivat-boitsov-vagnera-izafriki-a138964

Russia is transferring Wagner PMC fighters from Africa to the Kursk region amid a successful offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the region, Z-blogger and the Telegram channel “Novorossiya Militia Reports” claim.

At the end of July in Mali, a contingent of government troops and Russian Wagner fighters near the border with Algeria were ambushed by Tuareg rebels. During the battle, Wagner and government troops were destroyed, and the losses of the Russian PMCs alone, according to various sources, may have reached 80 people.

Notes:

[i] Both al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM and the Tuareg rebel group Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) claimed the massacre of Wagner and Malian army fighters. However, both groups denied any cooperation with each other due to their conflicting Islamist and secular ethno-nationalist ideologies, respectively, if not also the CMA’s desire to receive international support for its cause, which would be jeopardized by any association with an al-Qaeda affiliate. See “Au Mali, le lourd revers des mercenaires russes de Wagner (In Mali, a large setback for Wagner’s Russian mercenaries),” Le Figaro, 29 July 2024. lefigaro.fr/international/au-mali-le-lourd-revers-des-mercenaires-russes-de-wagner-20240729

OE Watch Insight:

Former RUS Wagner paramilitary forces, now referred to as Africa Corps, have been redeployed from MLI to RUS in wake of UKR invasion of RUS’s Kursk region.


Image Information:

Image: Russian Wagner fighters have been active along the border of Belarus since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2021, but now they are operating along the border with Ukraine, including some who reportedly returned to Russia from Africa.
Source: Информационное агентство БелТА, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PMC_wagner_in_belarus_3.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Turkey Deploying Syrian Private Security Contractors to Niger

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Turkey and Niger have increased their military cooperation since 2020, including through using Libya as a gateway.

“The defense component of the relationship between Niger and Turkey has become more prominent with the signing of a military cooperation agreement in 2020 and the sale of armed drones.”

Summary: Turkey is deploying Syrian militants to Niger to protect economic interests. While their desire for money presents challenges of commitment and resembles Russia’s Wagner mercenaries in West Africa, the Syrian militants operate more like private security contractors and have a lesser counter-insurgency role.

Russia’s Wagner Group, and its successor Africa Corps, have received significant international attention and notoriety because of their operations propping up of post-coup military regimes in West Africa. While their objectives ostensibly include combating Islamist militants and protecting mining and other extractive industries whose exports benefit Russia, they have also partaken in the excessive killing of civilians during counter-insurgency operations.[i] The excerpted French-language article in L’Orient Le Jour highlights Turkey’s recent programs to deploy militants to West Africa, whose activities can be juxtaposed against those of Wagner and Africa Corps.

According to the article, the program involves hundreds of pro-Turkish Syrians—and not Turks themselves—from the Sultan Murad brigade.[ii] This differs from Russia’s Wagner and Africa Corps, whose members are primarily Russians, despite recent evidence of an African member in Wagner ranks in Ukraine.[iii] The Syrians have been contracted by a Turkish private military company, which has paid the Syrian fighters up to $1,500 per month. This is almost ten times more than they had received when fighting in Turkish-controlled areas of Syria. Like with Wagner and Africa Corps members, remuneration is, therefore, a primary incentive for the Syrians to travel to Niger.

The exact activities of these Turkish mercenaries remain unclear. On one hand, the article asserts that their main role is to protect Turkish interests and projects in Niger, including mining operations. In this sense, they would be functioning much like private security contractors, rather than mercenaries. On the other hand, one of the Syrian contractors interviewed for the article noted that the outfit was deployed to combat Boko Haram. If true, this would likely mean that they were based in southeastern Niger near Lake Chad, where iron ore and other minerals are mined, where Boko Haram factions have pillaged villages and even taken over military outposts in the last few years. If this were the outfit’s primary role, it would appear to function more closely to Wagner, though without the regime protection efforts.

Although the interviewee states that his cohorts arrived in Niger only around one year ago, the article claims Turkey had been preparing for their deployment by sending Syrian fighters to train in Libya for several years. This provided the fighters with combat experience in Africa and a gateway for further travel to Niger. In addition, in 2020, Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement with Niger, which involved the sale of armed drones from Turkey to Niger. However, this may have since evolved into the additional deployment of these pro-Turkish Syrians to Niger as well.

The article does not indicate the Syrians in Niger will play as significant of a counter-insurgency role as Wagner or Africa Corps in West Africa, which also means their presence in the country is less likely to generate international concerns on humanitarian grounds. However, the Syrians’ primary motivation of remuneration and the challenging security environment in Niger, including with Boko Haram and other al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated fighters in their midst, raises questions about their ability to successfully defend Turkish interests, let alone enhance security in the region. Another question lingers about whether friction will develop between Turkey and Russia in West Africa through their deployment of fighters to protect their respective interests in similar areas.

Sources:

“Le Niger, nouvel Eldorado des mercenaires proturcs de Syrie (Niger, the new Eldorado of pro-Turkish mercenaries from Syria),” www.lorientlejour.com (Lebanon-based French-language publication covering Francophone international affairs, including coverage of Islamist militancy) 3 May 2024. https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1413977/le-niger-nouvel-eldorado-des-mercenaires-proturcs-de-syrie-enquete.html

A thousand Syrian fighters from areas under Turkish control have left for Niger for a year to protect Turkish interests and projects. In the areas of northern Syria controlled by Turkey, where recruitment into pro-Ankara factions is the main driver, according to Omar, his monthly salary never exceeded $46. “Here in Niger, we are paid $1,500,” added the young man, who supports his mother and brothers and sisters.

At the group’s headquarters, they signed six-month contracts with a private Turkish military consulting company that protects Turkish interests, including mines, in Niger.

The military regime of Niger, as a result of a coup d’état perpetrated on July 26, 2023, has reoriented its foreign policy and denounced military cooperation agreements with France and the United States, while Russia is advancing its interests in this country. For its part, Turkey has increased its influence in Niger over the past decade through humanitarian aid, development and trade. The defense component of the relationship between Niger and Turkey has become more prominent with the signing of a military cooperation agreement in 2020 and the sale of armed drones.

Notes:

[i] For an analysis of Russia’s Africa Corps, please see: (last Zenn OE Watch)

[ii] The Sultan Murad brigade in Syria was comprised primarily of ethnic Turkmen from Syria and specialized in fighting Islamic State (IS) forces, as opposed to forces loyal to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. The brigade was part of the Jaysh al-Fateh (“Army of Victory”) coalition, which was backed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey and reached its peak in 2015 before suffering from internal factional disputes. See: Fabrice Balanche, “The Battle of Aleppo Is the Center of the Syrian Chessboard,” WINEP, 5 February 2016.

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/battle-aleppo-center-syrian-chessboard

[iii] See, for example, Jacob Zenn, “Russia’s Africa Corps Appears to Be Recruiting African Militants,” Terrorism Monitor, July 9, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/brief-russias-africa-corps-appears-to-be-recruiting-african-militants/

OE Insight Summary:

TUR is deploying militants from SYR to NER to protect econ interests. While their desire for money presents challenges of commitment and resembles RUS Wagner mercenaries in WA, the SYR militants operate more like private security contractors and have a lesser counter-insurgency role.


Image Information:

Image: Turkey and Niger have increased their military cooperation since 2020, including through using Libya as a gateway.
Source: Saotura, https://commons.wikim edia.org/wiki/File:Niger_Turkey_Locator.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Sudanese Armed Forces Employ Iranian Drones in Civil Conflict

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Iranian drones have assisted Sudan SAF to gain a military advantage over the rival RSF paramilitary faction.

“Cooperation between the two countries [Sudan and Iran] increased in various fields since their recent resumption of diplomatic relations.”

Summary: The Sudanese Armed Forces received Iranian drones to gain a military advantage in urban warfare over the rival Rapid Support Forces paramilitary faction. This development deepens Sudan-Iran relations and boosts Iran’s hope for greater access to the Red Sea.

On 25 May, the Sudan News Agency published the excerpted Arabic-language article on the meeting in Tehran between Sudan’s foreign minister, Hussein Awad Ali, and Iran’s foreign minister, Ali Bagheri. The article discussed the deepening relations between the two countries amid a backdrop of Iranian attempts to expand its influence in the Red Sea[i] and to sell drones to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The SAF is combatting the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary faction for control of Sudan in a civil war.[ii] According to the article, the two foreign ministers pledged they would cooperate at the highest levels since resuming diplomatic relations in October 2023.[iii]

Drones will be the most important aspects of the two countries’ cooperation. In particular, the Iranian Ababil-3 flies low to evade radar detection and is ideal for urban combat missions.[iv] The RSF is trained in and accustomed to non-conventional warfare, including urban combat, where it initially gained an advantage over the SAF. However, the SAF’s superior weaponry, such as Iranian drones, is now neutralizing the initial RSF advantage. Although the RSF’s advances exceeded those of the SAF in the first half-year after the conflict broke out in April 2023, the Battle of Omdurman in February 2024 became a turning point when the SAF captured the city and continued advancing afterwards.[v] If Iranian drones support the SAF to retake control of more Sudanese territory, especially around the capital Khartoun, the SAF will become closer, or at least more ingratiated, to Iran. This will facilitate Iranian efforts to gain access to the Sudanese Red Sea coast. This will, in turn, strengthen Iran’s geopolitical position in the region, with its Houthi proxies in Yemen on the eastern side of the RedSea and the SAF in Sudan on the western side.

Sources:

“وزير الخارجية المكلف يلتقي القائم بأعمال وزير الخارجية الإيراني(Interim Foreign Minister Meets with Acting Iranian Foreign Minister),” suna-sd.net (Arabic-language public Sudanese news agency, which commits to independent and balanced reporting), 8 May 2024. Image:https://suna-sd.net/posts/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%83%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A

Acting Foreign Minister Ambassador Hussein Awad Ali met today in Tehran with Acting Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri, where he gave him condolences from the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, the Sudanese government, and the Sudanese people on the death of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi and Minister Foreign Ministry Hussein Amir Abdullahian and their colleagues in a helicopter crash.   

Cooperation between the two countries increased in various domains since their recent resumption of diplomatic relations and their reopening the two embassies again. They agreed to expedite the opening of the two countries’ embassies under the leadership of their respective ambassadors and to contribute to advancing relations between the two countries at a rapid pace to the highest level.

Notes:

[i] See, for example: Mohammed Yassin, “Reports about Iran’s Bid for Naval Base in Sudan Sparks Controversy,” Asharq al-Awsat, 4 March 2024. https://english.aawsat.com/world/4891051-reports-about-iran%E2%80%99s-bid-naval-base-sudan-sparks-controversy

[ii] The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are led by General Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan and are engaged in military conflict with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary faction, which is led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”). In April 2023, al-Burhan called the RSF a “rebel” movement and formally dissolved it, which led to civil war. In early 2024, the RSF still had the upper hand in the fighting, but now the SAF appears to have the military advantage. See: Andrew McGregor, “Gold, Arms, and Islam: Understanding the Conflict in Sudan,” Terrorism Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 9, April 2023. https://jamestown.org/program/gold-arms-and-islam-understanding-the-conflict-in-sudan/

[iii] Sudan severed relations with Iran in 2016 in opposition to Iranian sectarianism and under the geopolitical

influence of Saudi Arabia. However, in an effort to balance against the West, Sudan sought closer relations with Iran. Sudan and Iran’s restoration of relations only two weeks after Hamas’ massacre in Israel on October 7, 2023, and despite a previous thaw in Sudanese-Israeli relations, has only put the SAF’s relations with the West further under strain. See: Mohamed Yassin, “What is Sudan’s Purpose of Diplomatic Approach with Iran?,” Asharq al-Awsat, 22 January 2024. https://english.aawsat.com/features/4805441-what-sudans-purposediplomatic-approach-iran

[iv] See: “Sudan’s small but deadly drone fleet could turn the tide of war,” Military Africa, 22 April 2023. https://www.military.africa/2023/04/sudans-small-but-deadly-drone-fleet-could-turn-the-tide-of-war/

[v] See: Ashraf Abdelaziz, “Sudan war: ‘Iranian drones played decisive role in Omdurman battle.’” Dabanga Sudan, 17 March 2024. https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-war-iranian-drones-played-decisive-role-in-omdurman-battle.

OE Insight Summary:

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in SDN received IRN drones to gain a military advantage over rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF).  This shipment deepens SDN-IRN relations and boosts IRN hopes for Red Sea access.


Image Information:

Image: Iranian drones have assisted Sudan SAF to gain a military advantage over the rival RSF paramilitary faction
Source: Tasnim News Agency, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Iranian_drone_exercise_in_2022_-_Day_2_(52).jpg
Attribution: CC x 4.0

West African Joint Task Force’s “Psychological” Approach Sees Increased Boko Haram Defections

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Major General Ibrahim Sallau Ali commands the MNJTF and greets officers from contributing states

“The success of Operation Nashrul Salam underscores the effectiveness of psychological operations in counter-terrorism efforts.”

In February 2024, the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF)[i] launched Operation Nashrul Salam to dislodge Boko Haram from its bases around Lake Chad in the border region between Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Although operations with similar objectives have been carried out regularly for several years,[ii] the MNJTF has renewed hopes that this time the operation will be more lasting and decisive. The excerpted article in Daily Nigerian from 3 May detailed the MNJTF’s optimism about the operation, and highlighted how it differs from previous operations, namely in its use of psychological operations.

According to the article, written by the MNJTF chief of military public information, Lieutenant Colonel Abubakar Abdullahi, the Lake Chad basin region is the lynchpin of security in West Africa. This was home to some 30 million people until Boko Haram launched an insurgency in 2010 that created widespread unrest and displacement in the region. This time, to dislodge Boko Haram, the MNJTF is not relying on the “hard approach” to countering terrorism[iii] but rather on what Abdullahi describes as a psychological operation.

The operation involved dropping fliers over islands where Boko Haram has hideouts in Kanuri, Hausa, Arabic, French, and English, the five languages spoken around Lake Chad. According to the article, many Boko Haram members surrendered after receiving information about how to defect and enter rehabilitation programs. The article also credits another non-kinetic program called Quick Impact Projects for assisting large numbers of villagers from the Chadian portion of Lake Chad to return to their home villages. MNJTF then provides security so the villagers can recommence their fishing activities and regain their livelihoods. In total, 95 Quick Impact Projects have been implemented in 31 villages, which have impacted an estimated 3,200 people. While Abdullahi may have embellished the success of the operations, the article illustrates that the MNJTF is prioritizing “soft approaches” to counter-terrorism. Such approaches have long been called for by civil society as a complement to the MNJTF and Lake Chad basin region armies’ own kinetic operations and will likely be considered a welcome development.

Sources:

“How troops of MNJTF are progressing towards Lake Chad Basin stabilization,” Daily Nigerian (English and Hausa-language newspaper covering important matters affecting Nigeria, including corruption and military affairs), 8 May 2024. https://dailynigerian.com/troops-mnjtf/#google_vignette

The Lake Chad Basin serves as lifeblood for tens of millions, a unique ecological sanctuary, and a lynchpin in regional stability. Amidst its abundant resources, however, the region has faced its share of turmoil, exacerbated by the shadow of Boko Haram and other insurgent groups.

Enter the MNJTF, a coalition of forces from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin Republic, established with the purpose of counteracting the threat posed by these insurgent groups. Its multifaceted approach, combining kinetic and non-kinetic efforts, has proven effective. Notable successes include the dislodgement of insurgents from its strongholds, rescue of hostages, and reductions in the frequency and severity of attacks in the region. Moreover, the MNJTF has played a major role in facilitating the return of displaced persons and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the affected areas.

The MNJTF has conducted Operation Nashrul Salam, a non-kinetic approach to break the cycle of terror. This psychological operation was tailored to foster surrender and disrupt unity among the terrorist factions. Operation Nashrul Salam disseminated messages across the Lake Chad region in 5 languages, Kanuri, Hausa, Arabic, French, and English, to ensure widespread comprehension. These tailored messages were air-dropped over specific islands known to harbour terrorists, targeting them directly in their hideouts. The operation’s impact was profound, culminating in a significant number of terrorists surrendering.The MNJTF has executed Quick Impact Projects throughout the four sectors of the MNJTF. In particular, after successful kinetic operations, over 3,200 residents of the Bagatelerom community in Chad have returned to their ancestral homes, with MNJTF personnel assisting their resettlement in partnership with relevant agencies.

Notes:

[i] The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprises the four Lake Chad basin states, including Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, as well as Benin and is intended to involve “sharing plans and intelligence, committing troops for longer operations and improving troops’ human rights compliance.” The MNJTF has not significantly reduced Boko Haram attacks or border incursions around Lake Chad, despite claiming several offensives against the group have been successful. See: , “What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?,” Report #291, International Crisis Group, 7 July 2020. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/291-what-role-multinational-joint-task-force-fighting-boko-haram

[ii] See: Jacob Zenn, “Multinational Joint Task Force Lauds Counterterrorism Success Against Boko Haram,” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/multinational-joint-task-force-lauds-counterterrorism-success-against-boko-haram/

[iii] The “soft approach” refers to “all non-military measures adopted by a government in addressing the root causes and containing the spread of terrorism and violent extremism.” This would include flier drops to encourage Boko Haram members to surrender as well as programs to reduce socio-economic inequality, create jobs, and foster political inclusion. In contrast, the “hard approach” to counter-terrorism refers to all military actions taken to contain terrorism, such as the use of air strikes and raids into Boko Haram hideouts. See: Ugwueze, M. I., Onuoha, F. C., “Hard Versus Soft Measures to Security: Explaining the Failure of Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Nigeria.” Journal of Applied Security Research, 15(4), 547–567, (2020).

Image Information:

Image: Major General Ibrahim Sallau Ali commands the MNJTF and greets officers from contributing states
Source: NAweb, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gen_Ali_with_the_MNJTF.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Revisiting Russian “Africa Corps’” Organizational Structure

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Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (left) is heading the newly formed Africa Corps, which under his leadership is set to become a key entity through which the Russian state will project power in West Africa.

“The Africa Corps represents the new incarnation of Russian military influence in Africa.”

Following the death of Russian Wagner Group founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious airplane crash near Moscow in 2023, reports have emerged that his successor is Russian Deputy Defense Minister, General Yunus-Bek Evkurov.[i] However, in Africa, the mercenary company’s operation is rebranding as “Africa Corps” whereas the company’s operations elsewhere in the world seem to be retaining the Wagner brand. This new branding may help the company avoid the stigma of its Wagner predecessors for war crimes and smuggling and reduce international pressure against the company in Africa.

The excerpted French-language article in the Chadian publication, alwihdainfo.com, is an African perspective of the differences between Russia’s Africa Corps[ii] and its predecessor Wagner Group. The article acknowledges that Africa Corps is the successor to Wagner Group with important differences. First, it notes that Africa Corps is intended to legitimize the Russian military influence on the African continent while competing with the diminishing presence of the U.S. and European powers. Second, Africa Corps may have a smaller footprint than Wagner in Africa. For example, the article mentions it operates only in Libya, inheriting Wagner’s main bases and most of Wagner’s fighters; Burkina Faso; Mali; Central African Republic and Niger. According to the article, Libya’s position on the Mediterranean Sea facilitates military supply lines and the movement of Africa Corps personnel into Africa. The previous iteration of Wagner had also operated extensively in Sudan and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in Eastern Africa, including Mozambique and Madagascar.[iii]

Another difference highlighted in the article relates to the way that Africa Corps will operate. Africa Corps is now focusing on providing military support to African countries through instructors, weapons, and developing counter-terrorism strategies with host nations in cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defense. In contrast, Wagner soldiers directly participated in missions against terrorist or insurgent groups and functioned separate from, albeit in support of, the Russian government. The article indicates that the new Africa Corps will be more sustainable than the previous Wagner Group because of Africa Corps’ formal integration with the Russian state, and the ministry of defense. Further the ministry’s commitment to Africa Corps indicates that Russia is serious about its geopolitical ambitions in West Africa and Africa Corps’ impact on the region will not be fleeting. At a time when Western influence and partnerships with West African states are waning, Africa Corps is becoming the entity through which Russia will reassert itself.

Sources:

Source: “De ‘Wagner’ à ‘Africa Corps’: la Russie toujours présente au Sahel (From ‘Wagner’ to ‘Africa Corps’: Russia always is present in the Sahel),” alwihdainfo.com (French-language Chadian publication with a reputation for independent reporting and being critical of the government), 3 May 2024. https://www.alwihdainfo.com/De-Wagner-a-Africa-Corps-la-Russie-toujours-presente-au-Sahel_a132053.html

Recently, many people have been curious about the difference between the Russian paramilitary group “Wagner” and the “Africa Corps”, which newly appeared on the African scene and which was also founded in Russia to be deployed in African countries. In this analysis, we will seek to explain the difference between the two organizations, how and where they operate, and what their ambitions are in Africa.

Africa Corps is a Russian military company that was created in early 2024 as a replacement for the Wagner Group. This organization reflects Russia’s desire to extend its military influence on the African continent and to provide legitimacy to its official and public presence in the face of the European and American presence. Africa Corps is deployed in 5 countries: Libya, Burkina Faso, Mali, Central African Republic and Niger. Libya represents the core of the corps due to the previous activity of Wagner elements in the city of Tripoli…. Another factor in the choice of Libya as the headquarters of this corps is its strategic geographical location due to its connection with the Mediterranean coast, which ensures military supply lines and movement of corps members to other countries The Africa Corps’ modus operandi is entirely dependent on providing military support to African countries such as instructors and weapons. The company also is concerns with the development of strategies in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, such as is the case in Mali and Niger… In short, the Africa Corps represents the new incarnation of Russian military influence in Africa.

Notes:

[ii] Since the death of Russian Wagner Group founder and CEO, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious airplane crash near Moscow in 2023, reports have emerged that his successor is Russian Deputy Defense Minister, General Yunus-Bek Evkurov. For a profile of Evkurov, which argues that he “has the full backing of Russia’s military establishment and will not have to beg for ammunition or restrict himself to the use of contractors and mercenaries,” see: Andrew McGregor, “Yunus-Bek Yevkurov: A Profile of Russia’s New Ingush African Corps Leader,” Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume: 15 Issue: 3, 18 April 2024. (URL?) The article notes that under Yevkurov “the Africa Corps will have greater access to resources, but will be expected to be self-sufficient in many ways. This means Wagner-style associations with business interests will likely continue, although disentangling these interests from the Wagner network will be challenging.” In addition, it asserts that “Improving battlefield performance will be a priority for Yevkurov. Thus far, Russian fighters have not proven any more effective in eliminating Sahelian terrorist formations than their French predecessors.”

[iii] See, for example, Brian Katz, Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, Nicholas Harrington, “Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies, CSIS, September 2020, https://russianpmcs.csis.org/

Image Information:

Image: Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (left) is heading the newly formed Africa Corps, which under his leadership is set to become a key entity through which the Russian state will project power in West Africa.
Source:kremlin.ru, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Deputy_Defence_Minister_Yunus-Bek_Yevkurov_and_Wagner_leader_Andrei_Troshev.jpg
Attribution: CC x 4.0

Islamic State Resurgence Demoralizes Mozambican Soldiers

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Mozambique army personnel are demoralized in their fight with IS-loyal fighters.

“Despite all efforts by the government to prove that the situation is returning to normal in Cabo Delgado province, terrorists continue to carry out attacks with a greater number of fighters”

Until recently, Mozambique asserted that the insurgents were retreating, and the country’s vital economic activities, including the export of natural gas from Cabo Delgado, would resume. However, the excerpted article from the Portuguese-language Evidencias.com reveals the insurgents are not just increasing in number, but also in sophistication and coordination. According to the article, more than 500 IS-loyal fighters[i] recently attacked a 40-man contingent of Mozambique’s Rapid Intervention Unit (RUI)[ii] near Quissanga—forcing its retreat to the Quirimbas islands. The article emphasized that only days before the attack on the RUI, the government claimed the IS-loyal fighters were only capable of small unit hit-and-run tactics. The article challenges government narratives about the insurgents’ impending demise. Based on interviews with Mozambican soldiers, the article describes that low morale, largely due to false information presented about the insurgency by the government, is manifest in the soldiers’ ranks. According to the article, only a true accounting of the insurgency will lead to the military receiving the support, weapons and equipment necessary to defeat the insurgents.

OE Insight Summary:

MOZ soldiers face resurgent IS-loyal fighters in Cabo Delgado and are demoralized by lack of sufficient weaponry and equipment for counter-insurgency, despite government assurances that the fighters are weakened.

Sources:

“Terroristas atacaram Quissanga com mais de 500 homens e perseguiram batalhão da UIR até Quirimbas (Terrorists attacked Quissanga with more than 500 men and pursued the UIR battalion to Quirimbas),” evidencias.com (Portuguese-language website specializing in investigative journalism on Mozambican affairs), 5 March 2024. https://evidencias.co.mz/2024/03/05/terroristas-atacaram-quissanga-com-mais-de-500-homens/

Terrorists attacked Quissanga with more than 500 men and pursued the UIR battalion to Quirimbas several after the President of the Republic, Filipe Nyusi, supported by the Minister of Defense, stated that the terrorists attack in small cells of three or four individuals and then flee.

Despite all efforts by the Government to prove that the situation is returning to normal in the province of Cabo Delgado, terrorists continue to carry out attacks with a greater number of fighters, which contradicts the discourse that has been propagated by the President and Minister of National Defense. UIR elements told Evidências that the insurgents in operations are accompanied by women (including pregnant women) and children and apparently use them as human shields…. In fact, the military has no doubt that the government has been providing false information about the real situation of terrorism in the province of Cabo Delgado.

Notes:

[i] This report about 500 total IS-loyal fighters involved in the attack near Quissanga was consistent with other major attacks by the group, including, for example, in 2020 when Voice of America (VOA) Português reported on 500 attackers in another operation in Cabo Delgado. See “Cabo Delgado: “A rede de terroristas está a ser desmantelada”, repete o chefe da polícia moçambicana,” VOA Português, July 20, 2020, https://www.voaportugues.com/a/cabo-delgado-a-rede-de-terroristas-est%C3%A1-a-ser-desmantelada-repete-o-chefe-da-pol%C3%ADcia-mo%C3%A7ambicana/5507231.html

[ii] The Unidade Intervenção Rapida (Rapid Intervention Unit, or RUI) was formed after the first IS-loyal insurgents’ attacks in 2017 and were supported by units of the national police and the national military. The RUI as intended to focus on the IS-loyal insurgents, but from the RUI’s inception it was insufficiently equipped and trained, partly because the insurgency commenced suddenly and caught the government off guard and because the government had prioritized economic development and not the military in the prior decade. As a result, the RUI suffered from low morale for years even before the resurgence of the IS-loyal fighters in 2024. See Meryl Demuynck and Gijs Weijenberg, “The Upcoming SADC Intervention: A New Way Ahead to Combat Terrorism in Mozambique?,” ICCT, July 22, 2021, https://www.icct.nl/publication/upcoming-sadc-intervention-new-way-ahead-combat-terrorism-mozambique.

Image Information:

Image: Mozambique army personnel are demoralized in their fight with IS-loyal fighters
Source: Steve Evans, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mozambique_army_personnel.jpg
Attribution: CCA 2.0