Tag Archives: Ukraine

Russia Increases Defense Spending for 2024

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Early variant of the 152mm self-propelled gun 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV on parade in Moscow, 2015. The Koalitsiya-SV is set to be fielded in 2024.

“It became clear that a large-scale war requires a lot of equipment. It needs to be constantly improved, adapting to new weapons that the enemy has, damaged vehicles need to be repaired somewhere. And the priority in rearmament shifted towards the army.”

According to the 10 January excerpted article from the Russian state-owned domestic news outlet RIA Novosti, Russia will increase its defense spending in keeping with the release of Russia’s federal budget in October 2023 that dedicated “almost 11 trillion rubles” ($117 billion) to the armed forces.[i] The article notes plans to grow the armed forces by nearly half a million men, while most of the funds will be earmarked for weapons and equipment, whose procurement is informed by lessons learned in Ukraine. The emphasis is on ground forces but includes new spending on air and naval assets. As it articulates: “In recent decades, the ground forces of many countries have been financed on a residual basis—the United States relied on the Air Force and Navy. Russia was no exception in this regard, but the Ukrainian conflict put everything in place.”

Increasing the quantity and quality of its armor, tanks, and artillery is a primary focus, according to the article. Russia will ramp up production of improved variants of the T-90M Proryv [RG1] , T-72B3M [RG2] , and T-80BVM [RG3] main battle tanks. Artillery is also being updated with the introduction of the upgraded 152-mm Msta-S [RG4] self-propelled gun[ii] and the latest Malva [RG5] -wheeled howitzer, which entered service in late 2023.[iii] Russia’s newest artillery system, the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV [RG6] , is projected to be fielded in 2024. The weapon systems and upgrades reflect immediate application of lessons learned from the Ukrainian battlefield. Ukraine seemed to have an edge when NATO-manufactured long-range weapons arrived on the battlefield and Russian units were forced to move their command and logistic lines farther from the front lines. The article notes that the Koalitsiya-SV “will become the longest-range weapon in the Russian Army, able to fire a “high-explosive fragmentation projectile at a range of 40 kilometers, and a guided projectile at 70 kilometers…more than enough [distance] for effective counter-battery warfare.” Drones are also featured in Russia’s defense plans for this year.[iv] The “long-awaited Izdeliye-53, another version of the Lancet [RG7] kamikaze drone,” is projected to be fielded in 2024. Like long-range artillery, the Izdeliye-53 could have an immediate battlefield impact as it is said to have a range of more than 60 kilometers. The much-publicized increase in Russian defense spending, and the types of weapons Russia will field, based on lessons learned in Ukraine, could put additional pressure on Ukraine and its Western partners just to maintain the status quo.

Sources:

Andrey Kots, “Приоритеты на будущее. Чем вооружат армию России в 2024-м (Priorities for the future. What will the Russian army be armed with in 2024?)” RIA Novosti (Russian state-owned domestic news outlet), 9 January 2024. https://ria.ru/20240109/perevooruzhenie-1917044593.html?in=t

… Earlier, back in January 2023, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced an increase in the size of the army to one and a half million people by 2026.

…

At the end of October, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov announced the total amount of defense spending in 2024 – almost 11 trillion rubles. The lion’s share will go to the purchase of military equipment. The domestic defense industry has to work hard: it is necessary to saturate not only new units, but also units on the front line with everything necessary.

“Taking into account additional budgetary allocations in 2024, the volume of purchases and repairs of weapons and military equipment will increase,” Sergei Shoigu said at the end of November. “In the current conditions, it is necessary to ensure an advanced supply of weapons, military and special equipment to the troops, as well as to increase the production capabilities of enterprises military-industrial complex for the production and repair of the most popular models.”

In recent decades, the ground forces of many countries have been financed on a residual basis – the United States relied on the Air Force and Navy. Russia was no exception in this regard, but the Ukrainian conflict put everything in place. It became clear that a large-scale war requires a lot of equipment. It needs to be constantly improved, adapting to new weapons that the enemy has, damaged vehicles need to be repaired somewhere. And the priority in rearmament shifted towards the army.

The Ground Forces will continue to receive modern main battle tanks. First of all, the T-90M Proryv, T-72B3M and T-80BVM, which have proven themselves well in combat. New tanks are significantly different from pre-war ones. They received additional armor, equipment to suppress UAVs, and modern communications equipment. Many are equipped with a factory “visor” – a lattice superstructure over the turret with dynamic protection modules for defense against “roof-killing ATGMs” and kamikaze drones.

Motorized rifle units will receive vehicles, BTR-82A [RG1] armored personnel carriers, BMP-3 [RG2] infantry fighting vehicles and modernized BMP-2M [RG3] . The latter began to enter the troops only in 2020. Their difference from the early “twos” is the Berezhok combat module, equipped with a 30-mm automatic cannon, an automatic grenade launcher, a machine gun and four Kornet ATGMs. The vehicle has an updated fire control system, ensuring round-the-clock use, automatic target tracking and increased shooting accuracy.

The artillerymen will receive 152-mm Msta-S [R4]  self-propelled guns and the latest Malva wheeled howitzers, which first entered service with the troops in the fall of 2023. What’s even more important: next year, the promising self-propelled gun “Coalition-SV,” which the troops have been waiting for a long time, will go into serial production. It will become the longest-range weapon in the Russian army… .In 2024, the long-awaited Izdeliye-53, another version of the famous Lancet kamikaze drone, should go into service with the troops. All that is known about the new UAV is that its range is over 60 kilometers and it will be designed to operate in a “flock.”

Notes:

[i] For more information regarding defense spending within Russia’s new federal budget, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Russia’s Federal Budget Puts Economy on War Footing,” OE Watch, 01-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russias-federal-budget-puts-economy-on-war-footing/

[ii] For a look back at Russian efforts to increase the effective firing range of the Msta, see: Charles Bartles, “New Artillery Rounds Will Extend Russian Artillery Range,” OE Watch, January 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/294224

[iii] The Msta-S is an old system introduced in 1989. For information on recent modifications and upgrades, see: “Artillery of the future: modernization of the ACS 2S19 “Msta-S” and its prospects,” Military Review, 16 December 2023. https://military-review.com/12479016-artillery-of-the-future-modernization-of-the-acs-2s19-msta-s-and-its-prospects; the 2S43 Malva wheeled artillery is also a legacy system but previous Russian claims refer to the new variant as the Russian HYMARS, although the effective range as been disputed. See: Ellie Cook, “What Is 2S43 Malva? Soviet Self-Propelled Howitzer Dubbed ‘Russian HYMARS’,” Newsweek, 17 August 2023. https://www.newsweek.com/russia-military-2s43-malva-howitzer-ukraine-himars-artillery-1820411

[iv] Drones, or UAVs, have become ubiquitous in the war in Ukraine at every level. For additional insight on Russia’s use of drones, see: Charles Bartles, “Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons To Engineer Units,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-plans-to-add-remote-mining-uav-platoons-to-engineer-units/; see also, Dodge Billingsley, “Russia Details Plan To Overcome Military Drone Deficiencies,” OE Watch, 01-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-details-plan-to-overcome-military-drone-deficiencies/

Image Information:

Image: Early variant of the 152mm self-propelled gun 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV on parade in Moscow, 2015. The Koalitsiya-SV is set to be fielded in 2024.
Source: Vitaly Kuzman, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2S35_Koalitsiya-SV – /media/File:9may2015Moscow-35_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA BY-SA 4.0

Ecuador Faces Reprisals for Indirect Support to Ukraine

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A Russian military Mi helicopter of the kind Ecuador was prepared to donate to Ukraine.

“The decision unleashed the fury of the Kremlin, which defended the parts sold to Ecuador years ago.”

Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, Latin American and Caribbean countries have been reticent to get involved.[i] Specifically, they have resisted calls to send Russian military equipment stockpiles to support either side of the conflict. For this reason, Ecuador stood out when, following the recent declaration of an “internal armed conflict,” Spanish wire agency EFE reports that President Noboa expressed his country’s desire to trade Soviet-era military equipment for a $200 million security package of new equipment from the United States. This security package is meant to bolster the government’s position in the current domestic security crisis.[ii] The Soviet-era equipment, six Mi-8 [RG1] helicopters, a rocket launcher, and anti-aircraft systems, from previous arms deals with Russia would then be transferred to Ukraine.  To avoid provoking the ire of Russia by signaling overt support for Ukraine’s cause, EFE reports that the Noboa government has referred to this equipment, as inoperative “junk.” Nevertheless, Russia responded angrily and referred to original contracts for the equipment, which allegedly prohibit the export of this equipment to third parties. In addition, following Noboa’s announcement, according to the second excerpted article from the Argentine regional outlet Infobae, Russia’s phytosanitary agency halted imports of Ecuadorian bananas, claiming an uptick in flies. The article also notes that Russia is Ecuador’s second-largest customer for banana exports, and a halt in Russia’s imports of Ecuadorian bananas will hurt Ecuador economically and force it to quickly divert exports to other countries. While the quantity and types of weapons Ecuador plans to send to the United States (and eventually on to Ukraine) will not, by themselves, change Ukraine’s fortunes on the battlefield, the decision is a potential watershed moment for Latin America because its governments have generally pursued a studious policy of “non-alignment,” with several regional leaders declining to send Soviet-era equipment in their stockpiles.[iii] It is possible that Ecuador may pave the way for the region to assist Ukraine despite the threat of economic reprisals.

Sources:

“EE.UU. confirma que equipos soviéticos de Ecuador irán a Ucrania para guerra contra Rusia (The US confirms that Soviet equipment from Ecuador will go to Ukraine for war against Russia),” EFE (Spanish wire agency), 8 February 2024. https://es-us.finanzas.yahoo.com/noticias/ee-uu-confirma-equipos-sovi%C3%A9ticos-215123186.html

The president of Ecuador, Daniel Noboa, described the equipment as ‘scrap’ so his country will receive new equipment worth about 200 million dollars…the Russian government transmitted to the Ecuadorian government its position regarding these supplies, ‘indicating the specific points of the agreements and contracts’ linked to Russian military supplies to Ecuador that the South American nation would violate if it re-exported them.

“Ecuador se ve obligado a buscar nuevos mercados para sus bananas tras el cese de exportaciones a Rusia (Ecuador is forced to look for new markets for its bananas after the cessation of exports to Russia),” Infobae (Argentine regional outlet), 14 February 2024. https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/02/14/ecuador-se-ve-obligado-a-buscar-nuevos-mercados-para-sus-bananas-tras-el-cese-de-exportaciones-a-rusia/ 

The decision unleashed the fury of the Kremlin, which defended the parts sold to Ecuador years ago…The measure ordered by Vladimir Putin will considerably affect Ecuadorian exporters and, consequently, the profits that the Ecuadorian government receives from bananas. Now, Noboa must campaign to relocate one of its top products in the world, outside of nations that interpose their political interests on commercial ones. At the same time, the president continues with his war against gangs, launched in early January, which he hopes to promote with new equipment.

Notes:

[i] For greater detail on how the region has remained “non-aligned,” see: Ryan C. Berg, Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Juliana Rubio, Henry Ziemer, and Rubi Bledsoe, “A Hesitant Hemisphere: How Latin America has been Shaped by the War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 27 February 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/hesitant-hemisphere-how-latin-america-has-been-shaped-war-ukraine

[ii] For more, see: Ryan Berg “Rising Violence Prompts Ecuador To Declare ‘Internal Armed Conflict’,” OE Watch, 02-2024. Need Link

[iii] For more on Latin America’s response to the war in Ukraine, read: Ryan C. Berg, Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Juliana Rubio, Henry Ziemer, and Rubi Bledsoe, “Two Years Later: LAC and Russia’s War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 22, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/two-years-later-lac-and-russias-war-ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Russian military Mi helicopter of the kind Ecuador was prepared to donate to Ukraine.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mil_Mi-8MTV-5_Hip_82_yellow_%288587491042%29.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0 DEED

Hungary Deepens Bilateral Ties With Chad

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Trigger time at Flintlock 20, USAFRICOM from Stuttgart, Germany.

“Prime Minister Viktor Orban has decided to deploy a military contingent to Chad for two years before March 2024 to assist the country economically, prevent illegal immigration, and help combat terrorism.”

In recent years, France, the historical European power in West Africa, has been withdrawing from the region, while Russia has been reasserting its military and political influence.[i] Additionally, Hungary, a country with a foreign policy more aligned with Russia than other European Union (EU) countries, has begun expanding its footprint in West Africa. As the excerpted French-language article in the Chadian news website alwihdainfo.com notes, Hungary has signed military, educational, health, agricultural, and energy memoranda of understanding with Chad. Both countries have expressed the desire to strengthen their bilateral ties.

A French-language article on the website of Radio France Internationale, provides additional details, reporting that Hungary intends to send between 200 and 400 soldiers to Chad to focus on stopping migration, countering terrorism, and providing humanitarian assistance. The article also notes that with instability surrounding Chad, the country has become a refugee hub. This is why Hungary is setting up a permanent base in the country and why Hungary’s foreign minister stated his country was determined not to let Chad collapse.

The article acknowledged the domestic policy motivations for Hungary, which, like Russia, has become antagonistic to the EU, despite Hungary being a member-state.[ii] Further, according to the article, Hungarian media has promoted the story that the EU plans to establish “migrant ghettos” in Hungary. This represents an effort to sway Hungarian public opinion for foreign policy measures to stop migration, such as the new measures in Chad. It also appears Hungary is aligning its foreign policy in Africa with Russia’s. Russia is over-extended in Africa because of its Ukraine operations and can only deploy a few thousand former Wagner fighters to Africa, seemingly in the context of the Africa Corps. However, in countries where former Wagner troops are not operational, Hungary can step in and support juntas or other authoritarian regimes, such as Chad, which is seeing diminishing Western support. The emerging “coup belt” countries in West Africa will be empowered and less likely to restore civilian rule like the juntas had originally promised now that Russia and seemingly Hungary are backing them.

Sources:

“Coopération: Le Tchad et la Hongrie renforcent leur coopération dans plusieurs domaines (Cooperation: Chad and Hungary strengthen their cooperation in several domains),” alwihdainfo.com (Privately owned French-language Chadian website noted for being critical of the government), 8 December 2023. alwihdainfo.com/Cooperation-Le-Tchad-et-la-Hongrie-renforcent-leur-cooperation-dans-plusieurs-domaines_a128541.html

During a joint press conference, the two diplomats highlighted the advantages and objectives of the agreements, emphasizing their importance in strengthening the new and strengthened cooperation while respecting the interests of each country…. They expressed their confidence in strengthening ties between Chad and Hungary, and stressed that the bilateral cooperation will benefit both peoples and contribute to regional stability. According to Ndjamena, the agreements signed on December 7, 2023 create a pathway for productive collaboration between Chad and Hungary and offere new opportunities for economic growth, social development, and scientific progress.

“La Hongrie compte envoyer des militaires au Tchad pour lutter contre «les migrations» (Hungary plans to send soldiers to Chad to fight against “migration),” rfi.fr (French state-owned radio news website reporting on international affairs), 19 November 2023. rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20231118-la-hongrie-compte-envoyer-des-militaires-au-tchad-pour-lutter-contre-les-migrations

As Budapest is strongly opposed to the European refugee acceptance policy, it continues to claim that it is necessary to “support the management of problems where they begin and not transfer them to Europe”, Prime Minister Viktor Orban has decided to deploy a military contingent to Chad for two years before March 2024 to assist the country economically, prevent illegal immigration, and help combat terrorism. Instead of welcoming refugees to Hungary, Viktor Orban’s government prefers to support the African people there. Hungary will send between 200 and 400 soldiers to Chad. The government continues to generate fear of migration in the run-up to the 2024 European elections. The Hungarian Post began sending a government questionnaire to all Hungarians, which was published on the Internet. It has questions such as “Brussels wants to install migrant ghettos in Hungary. Do you agree ?” which is a totally false statement.

Notes:

[i] The French withdrawal from West Africa was a major trend in 2023. The year concluded with the French Embassy in Niger announcing that it was ending its diplomatic presence in the country. France also withdrew its 4,500-troop Operation Barkhane force from Mali in August 2022 and withdrew its troops from Burkina Faso in February 2023. These events have all occurred after coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in May 2021, January 2022, and July 2023, respectively, which France and the West denounced. Russia, in contrast, has backed the post-coup military regimes. For more on Burkina Faso’s role as a bellwether of Russian and France in West Africa, see Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso: A Bellwether on Russian and French Presence,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/burkina-faso-a-bellwether-on-russian-and-french-presence/

[ii] Since Viktor Orbán became Prime Minister in 2010, Hungary has passed several illiberal legislative bills, with strict anti-migrant legislation as a core policy. Hungary also has embraced the authoritarian leaders in Russia and China and helped to deepen their political and economic influence throughout Central Europe. Although little existing research has discussed Hungary coordinating or aligning its foreign policy with that of Russia, Hungary’s cultivating security ties specifically with Chad—whose authoritarian leader since 2021, Mahamat Déby, succeeded his father, who ruled for three decades—notably comes at a time when Russia is supporting other military-authoritarian regimes in West Africa as well, which border Chad, including in Sudan, Libya, Central African Republic, Mali, and Niger. For an assessment of Russian influence on Hungary, see Dr. Péter Krekó, “ING2 Committee Hearing on Russian interference in the EU: the distinct cases of Hungary and Spain,” European Parliament, 27 October 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/256493/OJ%20item%204_peter_kreko_ing2_hearing_20221027_speaking_points.pdf.

Image Information:

Image: Trigger time at Flintlock 20, USAFRICOM from Stuttgart, Germany.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Trigger_time_at_Flintlock_20_(50111204252).jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

India Looking to Alternative Arms Suppliers Because of Delays From Russia

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The next generation M4 rifle from Swiss Arms, the Sig Sauer SG 516 is a newborn assault rifle manufactured by the SIGARMS GmbH, Switzerland. The rifle is based on an American-made Colt Defense M4 Carbine but combined with gas piston/op-rod system, based on the SIG 550 series system.

“This deficit surfaced visibly in the inability of the Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited (IRRPL) joint venture (JV), instituted in late 2021, to deliver the first batch of around 5,000 AK-203 7.62x39mm rifles to the Indian Army, by March 2024.”

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the impact on the Russian defense industry’s deliveries of weapons and equipment to numerous countries, including India, is well documented.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website The Wire reports on a Russian-Indian joint venture failing to meet an early 2024 delivery deadline of a batch of assault rifles for India’s Armed Forces. While this marked a small item that Russia has failed to deliver to India compared to the larger systems that have been delayed, the article notes that India has already found an alternative. The article reports that the Indian Army recently acquired 73,000 SIG Sauer rifles from the United States, similar to a purchase of SIG Sauer rifles a few years ago to meet a short notice operational requirement.[ii] The article notes delays of a few other Russian systems, including two S-400 [R1] surface-to-air missile systems and two guided missile frigates. India is not likely to quickly find alternatives to the S-400s or frigates, considering the cost and delivery timeline for these types of systems. However, India’s purchase of SIG Sauer rifles shows that it is willing to look for alternative partners whenever possible.

Sources:

Rahul Bedi, “Russian Rifle Delays Raise Concerns Over Deliveries from Moscow,” The Wire (an independent English-language news website), 15 December 2023. https://thewire.in/security/indias-assault-rifle-induction-woes-continue-with-delays-in-indigenous-ak-203-production

Delays in the indigenous licensed manufacture of Russian Kalashnikov AK-203 [R1] assault rifles at a dedicated facility in Korwa near Amethi in Uttar Pradesh, has further raised concerns in domestic military circles over Moscow’s ability to deliver assorted contracted-for platforms and other materiel to India on time, or if at all.

Despite the sanguinity expressed periodically by Russian officials and diplomats to their Indian counterparts – over the fact that their military-industrial complex remained robust and was ‘on stream’ to vindicate its equipment delivery schedules, US-led sanctions on Moscow for invading Ukraine have, in reality severely jeopardised its capacities in this regard.

This deficit surfaced visibly in the inability of the Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited (IRRPL) joint venture (JV), instituted in late 2021, to deliver the first batch of around 5,000 AK-203 7.62x39mm rifles to the Indian Army, by March 2024. Instead, at the Indian Army’s prompting, the Ministry of Defence recently approved the add-on import of around 73,000 ‘Patrol’ Sig Sauer assault rifles from the US…

No official statement on this postponement in supplying the AK-203s to the Indian Army units has been forthcoming, from either IRRPL, the Indian Army or the Ministry of Defence. But industry sources said that the economic and technological sanctions on Russia, were together responsible for deferrals in even an industrially low-end project entailing the licensed manufacture of assault rifles. The IRRPL was formed, amidst much fanfare, to manufacture some 750,000 AK-203 rifles…

Russia’s defence industrial complex seems to concur, as it recently conceded its inability in continuing to deliver military kit to its many clients, including India, as it needed to prioritise ‘manufacturing and supplying products to the Russian Army’…

Meanwhile, apart from the deferred AK-203 project, India has three other major Russian platforms on order, all of which were plagued by delays, and possibly an ambiguous future.

These included the delivery of two of five Almaz-Antey S-400 Triumf self-propelled surface-to-air missile systems, acquired for the Indian Air Force (IAF) in a deal signed in October 2018 for $5.5 billion, constructing two Project 1135.6M Admiral Grigorovich guided missile frigates worth an estimated $950 million at Russia’s Yantar Shipyard at Kaliningrad…Between 2021 and March 2023 Russia had delivered three S-400 systems, and Rosonboronexport’s Mikheyev had recently told the country’s state-owned news agency TASS, that the remaining two air defence systems would arrive by end-2023, which has not happened…

Notes:

[i] For more information on Russian military equipment delays to India since the war in Ukraine began, see: Matthew Stein, “India Takes a Step Away from the Russian Defense Industry,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 31 July 2023. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3475660/india-takes-a-step-away-from-the-russian-defense-industry/

[ii] See: Matthew Stein, “Bypassing the “Make in India” Initiative,” OE Watch, May 2020. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-21393-00-00-00-35-96-47/2020_2D00_05_2D00_01-Bypassing-the-_1C20_Make-in-India_1D20_-Initiative-_2800_Stein_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true

Image Information:

Image: The next generation M4 rifle from Swiss Arms, the Sig Sauer SG 516 is a newborn assault rifle manufactured by the SIGARMS GmbH, Switzerland. The rifle is based on an American-made Colt Defense M4 Carbine but combined with gas piston/op-rod system, based on the SIG 550 series system.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SIG_SG_516_14.5%E2%80%B3.jpg
Attribution: CCA 3.0

Russia Changes Arctic Icebreaker Names To Honor History

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The Russian Nuclear Icebreaker Arktika, the first of its class of nuclear-powered icebreakers.

“The naming of ships in Russia has become increasingly politicized. Recently, state oil company Rosneft put its new tanker on the water. It is named the Aleksei Kosygin after the prominent Soviet Politburo representative. In Soviet history, a significant number of ships have carried Stalin’s name.”

Russia is changing the planned names of its next two icebreakers, usually named for Russian geographic regions, to reflect Russian history. Russia is renaming its next two Arktika [R1]  class nuclear icebreakers after previous leaders Stalin and Lenin.[i] The next icebreaker, which was to be named Kamchatka, will now be named Stalingrad, and the following Sakhalin will become the Leningrad. According to the excerpted article from The Barents Observer, “the naming of ships in Russia has become increasingly politicized” as Moscow seeks to sustain the memory of those Soviet victories, both significant in Russian history. Both dictators, Stalin and Lenin, overmatch even Ivan the Terrible in Russia’s long history. After Stalin’s death, Soviet Premier Khrushchev led the de-Stalinization campaign and amongst other initiatives, renamed Stalingrad to Volgograd and Leningrad back to St. Petersburg. Undoubtedly the current Russian invasion of Ukraine is part of Putin’s rationale. To many Russians, the names denote sacrifice, heroism, and victory—important historical rallying points in the current context of Russian losses and determination in Ukraine.

Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “In chilly return to past, Putin names new icebreaker “Stalingrad,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 20 November 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2023/11/shadow-strife-and-aggression-descends-arctic-putin-names-new-icebreaker-stalingrad.

The projected nuclear-powered icebreaker was originally to be named Kamchatka. But the Kremlin now appears to have intervened and renamed the powerful ship Stalingrad.  According to the government-controlled newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta, the name change comes after a proposal from Governor of Volgograd region Andrei Bochkarev. Putin has approved the idea and the icebreaker will carry the name Stalingrad, Bochkarev told the newspaper. “The initiative is important for the preservation of the memory of the bravery of protectors of Stalingrad during the Great Patriotic War”. The city of Volgograd was called Stalingrad until 1961. It was site of one of the most bloody and cruel battles during the whole Second World War. Up to 1.9 million people are believed to have been killed in the battles that raged between August 1942 and February 1943. It is considered a turning point in the war that ultimately led to the fall of Hitler’s Nazi regime.

The Stalingrad will be Russia’s sixth icebreaker of the Project 22220. Its construction is due to start in 2024. Russia currently has three vessels of this class in operation. The Arktika, Sibir, and Ural keep Arctic ports and shipping lanes open for shipments. The Yakutia and Chukotka are due to be ready for operations in 2024 and 2026 respectively. In addition to the renaming of the Kamchatka to Stalingrad, Putin has reportedly also approved the renaming of the Sakhalin to Leningrad.The naming of ships in Russia has become increasingly politicized. Recently, state oil company Rosneft put its new tanker on the water. It is named the Aleksei Kosygin after the prominent Soviet Politburo representative.  In Soviet history, a significant number of ships have carried Stalin’s name.

Notes:

[i] For previous reporting on Russia’s nuclear icebreaker production, see: Les Grau, “Russia Cutting Back On Nuclear Icebreaker Production,” OE Watch, 04-2023, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-cutting-back-on-nuclear-icebreaker-production-2/

Image Information:

Image: The Russian Nuclear Icebreaker Arktika, the first of its class of nuclear-powered icebreakers.
Source: Abarinov, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Russian_Nuclear_Icebreaker_Arktika.jpg?uselang=ru – Лицензирование
Attribution: Public Domain

Ukraine Launches Counteroffensive in Sudan and Across Africa To Minimize Russian Influence

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Following its invasion by Russia, Ukraine is now launching a counteroffensive against Russian influence in Africa.

“Ukraine’s involvement in attacking Wagner forces in Africa signifies a limited yet noteworthy expansion of the Ukrainian conflict.”

While the diplomatic implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine have been felt in Africa,[i] the security implications have been less so. That appears to be changing. As the first accompanying article from the Nigeria-based Military Africa monitoring site suggests, members of the Ukrainian special forces appear to have targeted members of the Russian Wagner Group operating in Sudan supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). In April 2023, fighting erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary RSF, two groups that had previously worked together to oust Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir in 2019, and then led a subsequent military coup in 2021. As tensions between the two groups rose post-2021 coup, fighting broke out in the spring of 2023. Reporting has suggested that Wagner Group forces—which have been in Sudan since 2017 to support deposed President Al-Bashir—are now aiding the RSF, providing the faction surface-to-air missiles and other support. Notable is that Ukrainian special forces have taken their fight against Russia to Sudan, allegedly working with members of the SAF to attack the rival RSF/Wagner contingents in the country. As the article notes, other reporting has suggested that Ukrainian mercenaries not officially associated with the government may also be participating in fighting in Sudan on the side of the SAF. Indeed, this news from Sudan falls in line with Ukraine’s August 2023 pledge to radically revive Ukraine’s relations with African countries to lessen what one Ukrainian diplomat called Moscow’s “grip” on the continent based on “coercion, corruption, and fear.”[ii] Showing that the African continent is emerging as part of the broader landscape of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the second article from the Nigerian newspaper Premium Times describes how, even during its war, Ukraine plans to invest $25 million to create ten new embassies in Africa over the coming years, adding to the current eleven. Sudan is among the ten countries in which Ukraine plans to open a new embassy. Commenting on the opening of new Ukrainian embassies in Africa to counter Moscow, President Zelensky has noted: “We are not afraid of Russia’s presence in any African country.”

Sources:

“Africa emerges as the new battleground between Russia and Ukraine,” Military Africa (Nigeria-based military news aggregator), 9 November 2023. https://www-military-africa.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.military.africa/2023/11/africa-emerges-as-the-new-battleground-between-russia-and-ukraine/?amp=1

Recent reports suggest that Ukrainian special services may have played a role in a series of attacks against forces affiliated with Russia’s Wagner Group and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, thousands of miles from the main theater of war.

But, since the outbreak of war in Sudan earlier this year, there have also been reported suspicions of Ukrainian mercenaries fighting on the side of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in their battle against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This April, CNN reported that Wagner had supplied RSF paramilitaries with missiles.

Notably, the action didn’t occur within Ukraine’s borders, but rather against forces associated with Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) and the RSF….

The videos depict a special unit sniper of the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducting precision strikes on Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) forces in Sudan. This expands the theater of the Ukraine-Russia conflict into Africa, with Ukraine’s intelligence agency vowing to hunt down Wagner forces anywhere in the world…

Ukraine’s involvement in attacking Wagner forces in Africa signifies a limited yet noteworthy expansion of the Ukrainian conflict.

Chiamaka Okafor, “Ukraine to invest $25 million in establishing embassies in Africa,” Premium Times (Nigeria), (Lagos, Niger-based daily), 15 November 2023. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/643589-ukraine-to-invest-25-million-in-establishing-embassies-in-africa.html

The Government of Ukraine on Wednesday said it is set to invest $25 million in establishing nine embassies in African countries. This was revealed by Ukraine’s Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal in Kyiv while meeting with African journalists. He said the establishment of these embassies was a part of Ukraine’s African renaissance and rekindling its relationship with its African counterparts…

Ukraine, according to the prime minister, already has 11 embassies in Africa and is ready to open 10 more. Clarifying, he said plans to open an embassy in Ghana have already been finalised and not included in the $25 million budgeted for the other nine. The other nine countries include Sudan, Mozambique, Botswana, Mauritania, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, and Tanzania.

According to the prime minister’s office, the plan to establish these embassies in Africa and other parts of the world had been developed in 2019 by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy until the war derailed the plans. Asked if he was concerned by the growing presence of Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa, he said, “We are not afraid of Russia’s presence in any African country…”He added that the presence of Wagner in any part of the world is a bad signal although “no third party will stop us from moving forward.”

Notes:

[i] For more reading on the ways that Africa has responded to the Ukraine-Russia war, see: Jason Warner, “Morrocco Sending Military Equipment to Ukraine,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/morocco-sending-military-equipment-to-ukraine/; Jason Warner, “African Stances on the Russia-Ukraine War Demonstrate Reliance on, Antipathy Toward West,” OE Watch, 09-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/african-stances-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-demonstrate-reliance-on-antipathy-toward-west/

[ii] For more on the August 2023 Ukrainian declaration of a revival of its relations with Africa to lessen Russia’s grip, see: “Ukraine announces a long fight against the “Russian hold in Africa,” AfricaNews.com, 17 August 2023. https://www.africanews.com/2023/08/17/ukraine-announces-a-long-fight-against-the-russian-hold-in-africa/

Image Information:

Image: Following its invasion by Russia, Ukraine is now launching a counteroffensive against Russian influence in Africa.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Africa_Ukraine_Locator.png
Attribution: BY-SA 4.0

Israel’s Operation in Gaza Compounding Logistical Delays for India’s Armed Forces

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Indian Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the India-Israel Business Summit, in New Delhi on January 15, 2018

“Consequently, in light of the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and now in Gaza, Russia and Israel, he warned, could well end up either failing to meet India’s numerous materiel requirements or delaying deliveries interminably.”

Two months after Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, India began to experience delays in deliveries of weapons and equipment from Russia. The Israeli operations in Gaza have only compounded the delays.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the independent English-language news website The Wire reports on the ongoing delays of military equipment from not only Russia, but now Israel, as it carries out its Gaza operation. The article examines how two of India’s main suppliers of weapon systems and equipment, Russia and Israel, are currently engaged in conflicts. It also notes how Israel has not provided India with major platforms or systems like Russia has but provided components for various systems as well as different munitions. These components have been implemented into systems of all branches of the Indian Armed Forces making it difficult to quantify the number of Israeli systems in Indian platforms. The author of the article ends by mentioning that Russia’s and Israel’s conflicts could motivate India to pursue alternatives to continue building its defense industry. While the article does not offer specifics on how India will deal with the delays, the situation may push India to seek other partners to find short and long-term solutions to grow the country’s defense industry.

Sources:

Rahul Bedi, “Ukraine and Gaza May Impact Russia and Israel’s Ability to Sustain Materiel Exports to India,” The Wire (an independent English-language news website in India), 14 October 2023. https://thewire.in/security/ukraine-gaza-materiel-exports-to-india

The involvement of India’s two principal materiel providers – Russia and Israel – in their respective wars and conflicts has the potential to impact the inflow of defence equipment supplies into the country, warned a cross-section of service veterans and military analysts.

…This equalled a whopping 55% or so of Russian and Israeli military imports for India…

Retired Brigadier Rahul Bhonsle of the Security Risks Asia consultancy in Delhi said that while the BJP-led government had launched the atamnirbhar initiative to indigenise Indian military needs, Delhi still topped the global list of defence equipment importers.

Consequently, in light of the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and now in Gaza, Russia and Israel, he warned, could well end up either failing to meet India’s numerous materiel requirements or delaying deliveries interminably.

Unlike Russia, Israel does not provide India any major platforms, but supplies critical and innovative force multipliers like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), assorted missile, guidance and avionics systems, precision-guided munitions, diverse sensors and surveillance and targeting radars, amongst other equipment.

Most of this was fitted onto combat aircraft, helicopters, warships, submarines and armoured vehicles.

But such equipment and component diversity made it difficult to quantify the exact or even near-precise percentages of Israeli military equipment in service with India’s armed forces.

…(though) Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza against Hamas was ‘unlikely’ to impact military hardware and spares supplies to India in the short term, they cautioned that an extended conflict could jeopardise deliveries.

…Once diplomatic ties with Israel were instituted under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1992, the two sides fast-tracked their strategic and defence relationship based on mutual security and commercial interests.

Israel, for its part, rightly perceived a commercial opportunity, while India looked upon Tel Aviv as a reliable and ‘no-questions-asked’ materiel provider, especially of varied ammunition and missile systems which India’s military badly lacked, and still does.

Nonetheless, it still took another six-odd years and the BJP’s ascent to power under Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee for Israel’s defence machinery to definitively establish itself in India…

However, it was the 11-week long Kargil war with Pakistan in 1999 that catapulted Israel’s defence industry to centre stage domestically.

As the seriousness of the deadly conflict unfolded, commercially savvy Israel dug deep into its military reserves to supply India high-end hardware, especially badly-needed 155mm rounds for its FH-77B Bofors howitzers, laser-guided munitions and other ordnance that contributed largely to the Pakistan Army vacating the mountainous region’s siege and ending hostilities.

Two decades later, the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) Mirage 2000H fighters in their attack on a Pakistani militant training camp at Balakot in Pakhtunkhwa in February 2019, fired specifically configured Israeli Crystal Maze Mk2 missiles (variants of the Rafael Advanced Defence Systems AGM-142 Raptor Have Nap/Popeye missile)…

…And though India had reduced its dependence on Russia for military equipment by some 33% between 2011 and 2020 in an effort to diversify its network of materiel suppliers, switching entirely to alternate sources was not an option military-planners in Delhi desired, as it entailed colossal expenditure, reworked infrastructure, inordinate delays and doctrinal changes.Perhaps the individual wars in Ukraine and Gaza and the constraints these could impose on Russia and Israel’s ability to export defence equipment may end up providing alternative routes to sustain and modernise India’s military through indigenous efforts.

Notes:

[i] For more information on India’s issues with deliveries of ordnance since the war in Ukraine began, see: Matthew Stein “India Takes a Step Away from the Russian Defense Industry,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 31 July 2023. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3475660/india-takes-a-step-away-from-the-russian-defense-industry/

Image Information:

Image: Indian Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the India-Israel Business Summit, in New Delhi on January 15, 2018
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Prime_Minister,Shri_Narendra_Modi_and_the_Prime_Minister_of_Israel,_Mr._Benjamin_Netanyahu_at_the_India-Israel_Business_Summit,_in_New_Delhi_on_January_15,_2018(2).jpg
Attribution: Government Open Data License – India (GODL)

Russia Denies that North Korea Is Supplying It With Weapons for Use in Ukraine

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Meeting of Russian and North Korean Defense Ministers at Sunan International Airport in Pyongyang on 25 July 2023.

“The accusations made by the ‘collective West’ of ‘illegal’ military-technical cooperation between Russia and North Korea are unfounded and unsubstantiated.”

Relations between Russia and North Korea are drawing concern as new evidence emerges that Pyongyang has supplied Moscow with conventional munitions and missiles for use in Ukraine. Satellite activity from October 2022 revealed that North Korea supplied an arsenal of weapons – including short-range ballistic missiles, anti-tank missiles, and portable anti-air missiles as well as rifles, rocket launchers, mortars and shells.[i] If confirmed, North Korean sales of weapons to Russia would violate several UN Security Council resolutions  (1718, 2270, and 2321) going back to 2006, which ban the sales of all arms, ballistics systems, and related materials to and from Pyongyang. 

It is estimated Russia received some 350,000 artillery shells from North Korea. At a rate of fire of 10,000 per day at its high at the time of this writing (down from an estimated peak of 60,000 per day in 2022[ii]), that gives Russia just short of a two months’ supply. To put that figure in comparison, given American production levels of 24,000 artillery shells per month, that is more than the US produces in an entire year. The slower pace of Russian missiles fired (based on the 10,0000 per shells per day statistic) on Ukrainian cities could reflect its lack of supply, or it could be a sign of stockpiling in anticipation of a winter offensive, as some analysts suspect.[iii]  

For its part, Russia’s foreign ministry has vehemently denied any violations. According to the excerpted article in the pro-Kremlin news site Sputnik News, Russia denies any “illegal” weapons transfers. Yet satellite imagery starting in August 2023 captures some 1,000 containers leaving North Korea’s Rajin port bound for an ammunition dump near Ukraine’s border.[iv] Indeed, as of October 2023, research from CSIS indicates that cross-border activity at North Korea’s Tumangang Rail Facility has spiked to its highest levels since before the pandemic.

In exchange, Russia has reportedly provided technical support to North Korea’s nascent space program, as well as ICBM technology. Such assistance is likely needed given Pyongyang’s two previous attempts to launch reconnaissance satellites failed due to booster malfunctions. Theodore Postol of MIT has suggested that Russia also supplied North Korea with the Topol-M [R1] ICBM, the basis for its solid-fuel Hwasong-18 [RG2] missile.[v] Though these reported arms transfers are notable, the Russia-North Korean nexus is not new. After the Cold War, observers raised fears that out-of-work Russian nuclear scientists were assisting Pyongyang to develop nuclear weapons. Today, fears of an arms race are rising in Seoul.[vi] That has prompted South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. to begin sharing real-time missile warning data emanating from North Korea.[vii] Experts disagree whether the Russia-North Korea nexus is a sign of Russian weakness (Russia is badly in need of arms) or strength (Moscow has allies and an arsenal it can call on rapidly for arms). Whatever the assessment, this nexus bears attention from the U.S. Army.

Sources:

“МИД РФ отрицает нарушение резолюций СБ ООН по Северной Корее (Russian Foreign Ministry Denies Violating UNSC Resolutions on North Korea),” Sputnik News (pro-Kremlin news outlet directed at foreigners), 11 November 2023. https://sputnikglobe.com/20231111/russian-foreign-ministry-denies-violating-unsc-resolutions-on-north-korea-1114884101.html  

“The accusations made by the ‘collective West’ of ‘illegal’ military-technical cooperation between Russia and North Korea are unfounded and unsubstantiated … Russia is responsible in fulfilling its international obligations, including Security Council resolutions. This does not prevent us from deepening traditional relations of friendship and cooperation with our neighbors, including North Korea,” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova was quoted as saying by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Russian Foreign Ministry Ambassador at Large Oleg Burmistrov told Sputnik that Russia thoroughly abides by its international obligations towards Pyongyang within the Security Council’s resolutions.

Earlier in the day North Korean Foreign Ministry said in a statement distributed by the Korean media that friendship between Russia and North Korea will only strengthen in the future, and the United States will face a “powerful and coordinated response” if it attempts to disrupt stability in the region.“Relations of friendship and cooperation between two countries – Korea and Russia, striving for independence, peace and friendship, will unshakably strengthen and develop, and any attempts by the United States and its satellites aimed at disrupting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region will face a powerful and coordinated response from independent sovereign states,” the statement said. It said the US administration should get used to the “new realities of Korean-Russian relations.”

Notes:

[i] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun, “Ongoing Arms Transfer Activity at Najin Port,” Beyond Parellel, CSIS, 17 October 2023. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/ongoing-arms-transfer-activity-at-najin-port/

 [ii] Jeff Schogol, “Russia is hammering Ukraine with up to 60,000 artillery shells and rockets every day,” Taks and Purpose. 13 June 2022. https://taskandpurpose.com/news/russia-artillery-rocket-strikes-east-ukraine/

[iii] Dara Massicot, “Putin’s Cannon Fodder: Foreign Affairs Interview,” Foreign Affairs, 2 November 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D2sUEB_rRhA

[iv] The shipment came shortly before the leaders of Russia and North Korea met for five hours at Russia’s Vostochny Spaceport, according to TASS, the Russian News Agency. See: Five hours at Vostochny Spaceport: Putin, Kim Jong Un meet again four years later,” TASS (Russia’s main state news agency), 13 September 2023. https://tass.com/politics/1674459: The satellite imagery is further backed up by recent analysis by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) that found that two Russian vessels made at least five round trips between North Korea and Russia, believed to be arms transfers. See: Song Sang-Ho, “2 Russian ships made 5 trips between N. Korea, Russia since mid-Aug. in suspected arms transfers,” YonHap News Agency (South Korea’s leading news agency) 17 October 2023. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20231017000351315

 [v] Theodore Postol of MIT suggests that Russia also had supplied North Korea with the Topol-M ICBM, the basis for its solid-fuel Hwasong-18 missile. See: Theodore Postol, “The Transfer of a Russian ICBM to North Korea?” Beyond Parallel, 17 August 2023. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/the-transfer-of-a-russian-icbm-to-north-korea/

[vi] Simon Hutagalung, “Russia and North Korea relations in transition,” Korea Times (English-language newspaper in Seoul), 5 November, 2023. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2023/11/137_362456.html

[vii] Anastasia Kostina, “Учения обстоятельств: США и Южная Корея отработают оборону от КНДР (Exercises of circumstances: the United States and South Korea will practice defense against the DPRK: How Pyongyang and Beijing react to the maneuvers of Washington and Seoul),” Izvestia (Russian news outlet), 30 October 2023. https://iz.ru/1596255/anastasiia-kostina/ucheniia-obstoiatelstv-ssha-i-iuzhnaia-koreia-otrabotaiut-oboronu-ot-kndr

Image Information:

Image: Meeting of Russian and North Korean Defense Ministers at Sunan International Airport in Pyongyang on 25 July 2023.
Source: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Meeting_of_Russian_and_North_Korean_Defense_Ministers_(2023)_01.png
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Russian Arctic Naval Activity and Capability Continue To Expand

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The Knyaz Oleg arrives at the Northern Fleet in February 2022. The Knyaz Oleg is the fifth Borei-class submarine on active duty.

“Each of the Borei submarines can carry 16 ballistic Bulava missiles, each armed with 4 to 10 nuclear warheads.”

Despite the fighting in Ukraine, a military commitment in Syria, and Western sanctions, Russia continues to test new strategic systems and expand its Northern Fleet[i]—but not without a few hiccups. According to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, a Russian Borei-class strategic ballistic missile firing submarine, the Imperator Aleksandr III, is currently undergoing sea trials in the Arctic. The Imperator Aleksandr III is the seventh Borei-class [R1] submarine in operation with three more under construction and an additional two planned, for a total of twelve. The article notes that the Imperator Aleksandr III launched a Bulava strategic missile across the Russian Arctic from the White Sea to Kamchatka as part of its sea trials.[ii] The article also notes that a nuclear triad exercise on 25 October featured a canceled Bulava launch. According to the second excerpt, from the Russian Telegram channel Sirena, there have been six failed or canceled missile tests since June 2023. Despite the setbacks, and if a Bulava ballistic missile was fired from the Imperator Aleksandr III, Russia would continue to improve its missile capabilities and advance its strategic power in the Arctic.

Sources:

Thomas Nilsen, “Newest submarine launched Bulava [R1] missile from White Sea,”

The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 5 November 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/11/newest-strategic-submarine-launched-bulava-missile-white-sea

It was Sunday morning, 5 November, when the Defense Ministry in Moscow reported that the Imperator Aleksandr III was sailing under the surface in the White Sea and launched a Bulava. A few minutes after breaking the surface in Russia’s northwestern region, the missile hit the designated target at the Kura range on the Kamchatka Peninsula.

The Imperator Aleksandr III (K-554) was launched in December last year from the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk and has since been undergoing state trials at sea and while at berth at the yard.

The submarine is the 7th Borei-class submarine and will likely be transferred to the Navy before New Year. Like the sixth submarine in the class, Generalissimus Suvorov, also the Imperator Aleksandr III will cross under the Arctic ice and sail for Russia’s Pacific Fleet.

Each of the Borei submarines can carry 16 ballistic Bulava missiles, each armed with 4 to 10 nuclear warheads. Three more subs of the class are currently under construction in Severodvinsk, and two more are planned, but no contracts have been signed.

When Russia tested its nuclear deterrence triad on October 25, the only submarine-launched ballistic missile fired was an older Sineava, fired from the Northern Fleet’s Delta-IV class Tula in the Barents Sea.

“Шесть испытаний российских ракет отменились или провалились с июня (Six Russian missile tests have been canceled or failed since June). Sirena (Russian Telegram Channel), 1 November 2023. https://t.me/news_sirena/20870

Since June 30, 2023, at least six unsuccessful rocket tests have taken place in Russia, a source at one of the rocket and space industry enterprises told Sirena . Some launches failed altogether. Here are the details:

On June 30, the Poseidon device was tested unsuccessfully – an underwater nuclear torpedo that should hit coastal areas, ships and naval bases. According to our source, the cooling sensor showed a lack of coolant, the reactor did not start, and the Poseidon was thrown out of the shaft, after which it sank. The next launch was planned for late October – early November, but it has been postponed.

On August 30, the third launch of the Sarmat complex did not take place. It was postponed due to a failure in the missile’s centralized control system, Sirena’s interlocutor claims.

On October 25, “presidential launches” took place – Putin led the tests. The Kremlin then stated that all the objectives of the exercises had been completed. Our source says that the Yars missile fell during the second stage of flight, and the Bulava launch was canceled at the last moment.

On October 31, the next Sarmat launch failed because the telemetry system failed. According to the source, this was explained by a mistake by the maintenance staff.

Today, the Sarmat fell 77 seconds into the flight, 300 kilometers from the launch site. This already happened to the complex in February. Test participants do not have clear versions of why something goes wrong.In September, the head of Roscosmos, Yuri Borisov, said that the Sarmat complexes were put on combat duty. Sirena’s source believes that the Russian authorities were “obviously in a hurry” with this.

Notes:

[i] It was previously reported that the Northern Fleet is expanding its capability by acquiring ice-class minesweepers for their Arctic waters.  See: Atle Staalesen, “Three ships of Russia’s new class of minesweepers are being built for Arctic waters,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 22 June 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/06/new-minesweepers-coming-northern-fleet

[ii] For more information on the Bulava nuclear capable submarine launched ballistic missile see: RSM-56 Bulava (SS-N-32), MissileThreat, CSIS Missile Defense Project, CSIS, 2 August 2021. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-n-32-bulava/

Image Information:

Image: The Knyaz Oleg arrives at the Northern Fleet in February 2022. The Knyaz Oleg is the fifth Borei-class submarine on active duty.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_submarine_Knyaz_Oleg – /media/File:K-552_at_Northern_fleet.jpg
Attribution: CC by 4.0

Russia’s Federal Budget Puts Economy on War Footing

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The new Russian budget, 2024-2026, will throw a lifeline to the Russian defense industry as well as the war in Ukraine. Russian pavilion at a previous International Defence Exhibition & Conference (IDEX) held in Abu Dhabi, UAE.

“Everything for the front, everything for victory,” – Head of the Ministry of Finance, Anton Siluanov

On 27 November 2023, Russian President Putin signed the federal budget for 2024-2026. The budget dedicates a dramatic 30 percent of total expenditures to the Armed Forces and military industrial complex. According to the excerpted article from the Russian and English-language independent online newspaper The Moscow Times, the increase in funds dedicated to the military establishment is “2.3 times more than [was appropriated] in 2022.” For comparison, funds dedicated to the military represented only 17 percent of the federal budget in 2022 and 19 percent in 2023. That percentage will increase to 29.5 percent in 2024. The Russian government will also spend “another 3.338 trillion rubles under the heading ‘national security,’ which includes the budgets of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, the special services and the FSIN[i] system. Thus, in total, nearly “40 percent of the [federal] budget will be spent on law enforcement agencies.” To make this happen, Russia will have to pull funds from other parts of its economy including healthcare (which will be cut by 10 percent), aid to small businesses (which will lose 20 percent), and the “development of Infrastructure for Scientific Research,” (which will be reduced by 25 percent). Notably, “funding for state propaganda,” a line item of Russia’s federal budget and a critical part of its war in Ukraine, would remain the same as in the last budget. The signing into law of the new budget comes in conjunction with multiple other significant financial changes, including the Russian reintroduction of capital controls[ii] to stabilize the ruble against the dollar and other global currencies.[iii] Taken together, the signaling demonstrates Russia’s determination to see the war to a positive outcome—at a time when funding for Ukraine in the U.S. and among other Western powers is under scrutiny.

Sources:

“Путин утвердил рост расходов на армию до рекорда со времен СССР (Putin approved an increase in spending on the army to a record since Soviet times),” The Moscow Times (a Russian-English language online newspaper), 27 November 2023. https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2023/11/27/putin-razreshil-rosnefti-idesyatkam-goskompanii-zasekretit-informatsiyu-osebe-a114361

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Monday, November 27, signed the law on the federal budget for 2024-26. According to the document, which was adopted by the State Duma on November 15 and approved by the Federation Council a week later, next year, for the first time since Soviet times, the Russian authorities intend to allocate almost a third of all expenditures on maintaining the army and the military-industrial complex.

For the year, under the item “national defense” the budget will spend 10.775 trillion rubles – 70% more than in 2023 (6.8 trillion), 2.3 times more than in 2022 (4.7 trillion), and three times higher than the pre-war 2021 indicators (3.5 trillion).

The share of military expenditures in the budget, the total size of which will be 36.66 trillion rubles, will reach 29.5%. For comparison: the current year’s budget initially included only 19% of defense spending (5 trillion rubles out of 26.1 trillion); in the first year of the war with Ukraine, this share was 17% (4.7 trillion rubles out of 27.8 trillion).

The USSR spent a third of its budget on defense in its final years. Thus, in the 1990 budget, 71 billion rubles out of 241.3 billion, or 29.4%, were allocated for “military purposes” (data published in the archive of ex-Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Yegor Gaidar).

According to the budget law, the government will spend another 3.338 trillion rubles under the heading “national security”, which includes the budgets of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, the special services and the FSIN system. Compared to the current year, these expenses will increase by 163 billion rubles. Thus, in total, almost 40% of the budget will be spent on law enforcement agencies.

To make ends meet, the government will cut costs to support the national economy: they will decrease from 4.125 to 3.889 trillion rubles. Funding for education and medicine – 1.6 trillion rubles each – will be “frozen”, and in real terms – taking into account inflation – will be reduced.

Expenses under the national Healthcare project are planned to be cut by 10%, from 321.3 to 289.9 billion rubles, and the sequestration will affect almost all of its subprograms. Expenses under the federal project “Modernization of Primary Health Care” will be reduced by 14%, to 81.64 billion rubles. The federal project “Fighting Cancer” will lose weight by 8%, to 147.4 billion rubles. Expenditures on the development of children’s healthcare will be reduced by almost half – from 19.5 to 10.2 billion rubles; for the development of primary medical care – by 20%, to 7.677 billion rubles.

The national project to support small businesses will lose almost 20% of funding (67.7 billion rubles); Expenses for the federal project “Development of Infrastructure for Scientific Research” are reduced by 25% – to 47 billion rubles. Allocations for the state program “Development of the Aviation Industry” will be cut by 28% – 37.3 billion rubles. In addition, the government plans to save on supporting the regions: transfers to them from the federal budget will be less by 4% – 1.474 trillion rubles.

Funding for state propaganda will remain at record levels: state media will receive 121.3 billion rubles from the budget compared to 122 billion this year. Expenditures under the item “culture and cinematography,” which includes budgets for the creation of war propaganda films, will increase by 11%, to 234 billion rubles.“Everything for the front, everything for victory,” said the head of the Ministry of Finance Anton Siluanov in September, commenting on the document. He urged people not to worry that there would not be enough money in the treasury. “But there will be enough for what is planned. A normal, healthy budget,” the minister emphasized.

Notes:

[i] FNIS is the Federal Penitentiary Service (ФСИН России), the federal authority for the detention of suspected and convicted persons, and the security and maintenance of prisons in Russia.

[ii] Capital Controls are measures taken by a government to limit the flow of foreign capital in and out of the domestic economy. Since the war in Ukraine began in February 2022, Russia has sought, among other regulatory actions, to stabilize the ruble by requiring that a large portion of all foreign currency profits made by Russian exporters be converted into rubles. For a recent discussion on some of the capital controls recently imposed by Russia, see: “Russia has tightened capital controls to help prop up ruble, report says,” The Guardian, 31 October 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/31/russia-capital-controls-rouble-vladimir-putin

[iii] For more on other Russian moves to reduce the dominance and dependency of the U.S dollar, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Russia Enlists Partners To Attack U.S. Dollar To Fund War In Ukraine,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-enlists-partners-to-attack-u-s-dollar-to-fund-war-in-ukraine/