Tag Archives: Iran

Iran Struggles to Supply Its Electric Grid

Posted on by

The Tehran headquarters of Tavanir, a subsidiary electricity company of Iran’s Ministry of Electricity.

“There will be electricity cuts in the domestic and commercial sectors.”

While Iran boasts the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves after Russia, it is increasingly difficult for it to provide enough supply to its electrical generating stations to power its electric grid. The problem is especially severe in the winter as consumption increases. Iran’s failure to provide electricity has ramifications for domestic stability and could affect the larger regional operational environment.[i]

The excerpted notice, first posted on the Iranian Ministry of Electricity’s website, noted that there will be forthcoming power disruptions, partially due to the decision not to use mazut. This heavy, low-quality fuel oil is a byproduct of refining but degrades electrical generating plants and causes heavy air pollution. President Masoud Pezeshkian’s decision to shutter mazut-burning plants suggests regime fear of popular backlash to air pollution trumps the discord of suffering power cuts.[ii] He is right to worry; Iran has experienced nationwide protests over poor stewardship of the environment.[iii]

While Iranian analysts place responsibility for the energy shortfall on growing consumption, especially during the cold winter months, such an explanation may be too straightforward and exculpatory toward the regime: Iran’s population growth rate is only 0.8 percent. More likely is that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which dominates the power industry, is diverting resources for its own aims and agendas. It is unclear if the pending energy cuts will spare the IRGC’s manufacturing base, but, if so, it will likely spark popular antagonism against the elite military force and its domination of Iran’s industrial sector.

Because Iran’s refinery network is decrepit, Iran cannot adequately refine gasoline domestically. This forces the regime to export gas for refining and then reimport it for use in power generation and to inject into oil fields to enable further oil extraction. This creates a lose-lose situation for the Iranian leadership: either it reverts to burning highly polluting substances and risks public protest, or it suffers more frequent power shortfalls and risks public unrest and industrial shortfalls. The danger of either scenario for those outside Iran is similar: When Iran faces domestic unrest, it often lashes out militarily to distract its own public around the nationalist flag.

Sources:

 “اطلاعیه شماره ۱ شرکت توانیر درباره برنامه قطع برق”(Announcement No. 1 of Tavanir Company about the power cut program),” Donya-e-Eqtesad.com (nominally independent center-right financial newspaper), 9 November 2024. https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/بخش-سایت-خوان-62/4121436-فوری-اطلاعیه-شماره-شرکت-توانیر-درباره-برنامه-قطع-برق  

“We would like to inform our dear compatriots that due to the onset of the cold season and the increase in gas consumption in the domestic sector and the restriction of the supply of gas fuel to power plants, and in accordance with the decisions taken not to consume mazut in some power plants, there will be electricity cuts in the domestic and commercial sectors. Respected subscribers can be informed about the time schedule for imposing electricity restrictions from the relevant electricity distribution companies on the My Electricity System website.”

Notes:

[i] For previous discussion of Iranian blackouts, see: Michael Rubin, “Blackouts in Bushehr Province Risk Unrest,” OE Watch, August 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/387127/download/

[ii] For previous discussion of Iranian air pollution, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Pollution Problems Peak,” OE Watch, September 2021. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-21393-00-00-00-39-51-99/2021_2D00_09_2D00_01-Iran_1920_s-Pollution-Problems-Peak-_2800_Rubin_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true&_=465e6ac6175646f29c3498916f3fcd2f

[iii] For discussion of Iran’s arrests of environmental activists, see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian Environmentalists Arrested as Spies,” OE Watch, April 2018. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-17883-00-00-00-28-50-74/2018_2D00_04_2D00_01-Iranian-Environmentalists-Arrested-as-Spies-_2800_Rubin_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true&_=401ef985fd9b4fb89199f41137332cb3

Image Information:

Image: The Tehran headquarters of Tavanir, a subsidiary electricity company of Iran’s Ministry of Electricity.
Source: https://static.neshanmap.ir/places/images/dca/1043877_3901745–شرکت-توانیر.jpeg
Attribution: Nashan.ir

Iranian Navy Closely Monitors U.S. Naval Operations in the Persian Gulf

Posted on by

“Commander of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shahram Irani,” published on 3 November 2024.

“The U.S. aircraft carrier, as well as sixteen destroyers and frigates present in the region, are monitored by our reconnaissance drones, and we are surveilling them from above.”

As tensions stemming from the Gaza war continue, Iran claims that it is sending a message through its monitoring of U.S. naval vessels in regional waters, which it believes do not belong there. As per the excerpted article published by the semi-official Iranian news outlet Mehr News Agency, on 3 November, marking the anniversary of the 444-day hostage crisis, the commander of the Iranian Navy, Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, said, “The U.S. aircraft carrier, as well as sixteen destroyers and frigates present in the region, are monitored by our reconnaissance drones, and we are surveilling them from above.” Irani noted that Iranian reconnaissance drones could be seen with the naked eye, and their presence was intended to send a clear message to the United States that its presence is not welcomed in the Middle East and that its naval movements in the region are being monitored. He added, “This is a very important point that we have the ability to monitor the enemy at sea, and it’s become a concern for the Americans.”

Previously, the rear admiral made a reference to the Marshall Islands-flagged Suez Rajan oil tanker (renamed St. Nikolas), which the United States confiscated in 2023 for carrying Iranian oil as it headed to the Bahamas. The rear admiral stated Tehran was able to seize it back from the Gulf of Oman.[i] Irani also said that Iran is capable of escorting oil and commercial shipments   point of strength.”

Although Irani made his comments prior to the U.S. presidential election, it is worth noting that the previous Trump administration’s oil embargo—as part of its maximum pressure strategy—escalated U.S.-Iran tensions to a historic high with the regular seizing and sabotaging of oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. Tehran has always threatened to shut down the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil passes.[ii] As these comments were made on the anniversary of the Iran hostage crisis, Irani appears to have wanted to emphasize Tehran has command of the waters in the region regardless of tensions and whatever the outcome of the U.S. presidential election.

Sources:

“ناو هواپیمابر، ۱۶ ناوشکن و ناوچه آمریکا را در منطقه رصد می کنیم (We monitor US aircraft carrier, 16 destroyers and frigates in the region)” Mehr News Agency (Iranian state media outlet), 3 November 2024. http://mehrnews.com/x36nJL

According to Mehr News Agency, Shahram Irani, the commander of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, met with Ayatollah Seyed Mohammad Saeedi, custodian of the holy shrine of Fatima Masuma, stated in reference to the National Day of the Fight Against Global Arrogance: “The US aircraft carrier, as well as sixteen destroyers and frigates present in the region, are monitored by our reconnaissance drones, and we are surveilling them from above.”

He stated that our reconnaissance drones can be seen with the naked eye to tell the Americans that their place isn’t in the region and that we are always monitoring their movements. He added: “This is a very important point that we have the ability to monitor the enemy at seas, and it’s become a concern for the Americans.”

The commander of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that our navy was able to escort the ships of the countries… the navy escorts oil and commercial shipments from the shores of Venezuela to America, Europe, and Africa, and if any aggression is made against our ships, we will respond to it.

He added, “One of the recent actions we carried out was recapture an oil shipment that had been seized by the United States, along with the vessel that was transporting it, despite the US having renamed it.”

Irani added: “We are going after showing system authority in the depths of the oceans, and our actions will be a point of strength for the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

Notes:

[i] Kathryn Armstrong, “Iran seizes oil tanker St Nikolas near Oman,” BBC News, 11 January 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67948119

[ii] Mark Landler, Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt, “US Puts Iran on Notice and Weighs Response to Attack on Oil Tankers,” New York Times, 14 June 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/us/politics/trump-iran-tanker-hormuz.html

Image Information:

Image: “Commander of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shahram Irani,” published on 3 November 2024.
Source: Mehr News Agency, http://mehrnews.com/x36nJL
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Iran and Saudi Arabia Deepen Defense and Bilateral Ties

Posted on by

General chief of staff of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces, General Fayyadh al-Ruwaili, and his Iranian counterpart, Major General Mohammad Baqeri, in Tehran.

“We are interested in having the Saudi navy in the coming year participate in a naval exercise with Iran, either with its naval units or as an observer.”

Iran and Saudi Arabia’s defense ties grow despite Donald Trump winning the 2024 U.S. presidential election—known for his maximum pressure strategy on Tehran. According to the semi-official media outlet Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA), on 10 November, the general chief of staff of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces, General Fayyadh al-Ruwaili, met with his Iranian counterpart, Major General Mohammad Baqeri, in Tehran, where they discussed “the development of defense diplomacy and the expansion of bilateral cooperation.”

According to the excerpted article from the semi-official news outlet Mehr News Agency, during the meeting, Major General Bagheri also invited the Saudi defense minister to visit Iran and said Tehran is “interested in having the Saudi Navy participate in a naval exercise with Iran in the coming year, either with its naval units or as an observer.” The countries recently participated in a joint naval exercise with Russia and Oman, as well as five other observer countries—among those Saudi Arabia—in the Sea of Oman.[i] General Bagheri is the second high-ranking Saudi official to visit Iran after Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan visited in June 2023.[ii]

The storming of the Saudi missions in Tehran and Mashhad following the execution of prominent Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr in January 2016 prompted Saudi Arabia to sever ties with Iran.[iii] In the years since, particularly under the Trump administration, Riyadh had taken a harder stance against Tehran. After the 2019 Aramco attacks, Saudi Arabia felt vulnerable due to Iran-backed attacks, which the administration failed to address. This led to a reassessment of its approach to Tehran and a de-escalation of tensions. It was not until a China-brokered deal in March 2023 that the two neighbors recommenced relations with the reopening of embassies in their respective countries.[iv] According to the Mehr News Agency article, Ruwaili called the Beijing deal “a good basis for increasing bilateral work together between the two countries,” noting that Riyadh considers “this agreement as a strategic opportunity.”

The rare Saudi visit to Iran demonstrates that rapprochement will continue despite a new U.S. administration that is expected to resume its maximum pressure strategy on Tehran. Iran’s “neighborly policy” of improving ties with its Arab neighbors appears to be paying off for now.

Sources:

“رئیس ستاد کل نیروهای مسلح عربستان با سرلشکر باقری دیدار کرد (Saudi Arabia’s chief of staff of the armed forces met with Major General Bagheri),” Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA; semi-official news agency), 13 November 2024. isna.ir/xdSfrg

General Fayyadh bin Hamed al-Ruwaili met with the chief of staff of the armed forces. According to ISNA, quoting the public relations office of the general staff of the armed forces, General Fayyadh bin Hamed al-Ruwaili, [Saudi] chief of staff of the armed forces, met and talked with Major General Mohammad Bagheri, the[ Iranian] chief of staff of the armed forces.

The development of defense diplomacy and the expansion of bilateral cooperation are among the main topics of this meeting.

Today at noon, the Saudi chief of staff of the armed forces arrived in Tehran as the head of a high-ranking military delegation.

“همکاری‌های دوجانبه دفاعی و نظامی ایران و عربستان بررسی شد (The bilateral defense and military cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia was reviewed),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news outlet), 13 November 2024. mehrnews.com/x36rn3

Major General Mohammad Bagheri, after greeting and welcoming, said: “We believe that cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries, given numerous commonalities and abundant potential, can increase.”

The chief of staff of the armed forces of Iran emphasized improving cooperation in the fields of defense and exchanging experiences in the education and sports sectors, adding: “We are interested in having the Saudi navy in the coming year participate in a naval exercise with Iran, either with its naval units or as an observer.”

Examining the improvement of bilateral defense and military cooperation and the Palestine issue was among the topics that were part of the parties’ discussion.

Army General Fayyadh bin Hamed al-Ruwaili, at the time of thanking for the hospitality of the chief of staff of the armed forces, highlighted and emphasized the improvement of the level of cooperation in various fields in the armed forces of the two countries and stated: “The Bejing agreement was a good basis for increasing bilateral work together between the two countries and we consider this agreement as a strategic opportunity.”

He also emphasized the importance of the two countries’ role-playing and influence in uniting the Islamic and regional countries and the continuation of political and defense relations between the two countries.

At the end, Major General Mohammad Bagheri invited the Saudi defense minister to visit Iran.

Notes:

[i] “Iran and Saudi Arabia hold joint naval exercise in Sea of Oman,” Times of Israel, 24 October 2024. https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-and-saudi-arabia-hold-joint-naval-exercise-in-sea-of-oman/

[ii] Amir Vahdat, “Saudi foreign minister in Iran as part of restoration of diplomatic ties after a 7-year rift,” Associated Press, 17 June 2024. https://apnews.com/article/saudi-arabia-iran-c04f4483f660c65229535ae80083dbd6

[iii] “Saudi Arabia breaks off ties with Iran after al-Nimr execution,” BBC News, 4 January 2016.  https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35217328

[iv] “What You Need to Know About China’s Saudi-Iran Deal,” United States Institute of Peace, 16 March 2023. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/what-you-need-know-about-chinas-saudi-iran-deal

Image Information:

Image: General chief of staff of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces, General Fayyadh al-Ruwaili, and his Iranian counterpart, Major General Mohammad Baqeri, in Tehran,”.
Source: mehrnews Mehr News Agency (semi-official news outlet), 13 November 2024, com/x36rn3
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Hints at His Own Succession

Posted on by

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei speaks to the Assembly of Experts in Tehran, 7 November 2024.

“There will be no pause or interruption in the system….”

On 7 November 2024, Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is 85 years old,[i] appeared before the 88-member Assembly of Experts, a clerical body charged with selecting the new supreme leader, to discuss—obliquely but still more directly than ever before—his own succession. Published on his official website, Khamenei.ir,Khamenei’s speech discussed the possibility of his own “absence” and the need for a rapid transition. While his comments were oblique, they nevertheless represented the bluntest discussion of an increasingly sensitive subject. To hint at his own mortality and the looming succession risks not only transforming Khamenei himself into a lame duck but can also be destabilizing as regime officials begin to maneuver for the post-Khamenei scramble.

Whenever it occurs, the leadership transition in Iran will have an important impact on the operational environment, because, constitutionally, the supreme leader is also the commander-in-chief with authority to hire and fire military commanders in both the Revolutionary Guard and the regular Iranian Army. The speed of succession could also affect both domestic and regional stability. Quick acceptance of a new leader lessens the chance of domestic unrest. However, there is the risk a new leader may resort to military action, terrorism, or through proxies, to establish his revolutionary bona fides. One major question is whether Khamenei’s successor will launch a cultural revolution to try to tamp down dissent in a way that could lead to a public backlash and exacerbate unrest.

Beyond nods to his succession, Khamenei’s speech included other notable takeaways. While Khamenei has previously voiced concern about declining revolutionary fervor among Iranian youth, the speech was also the first time that Khamenei raised the possibility that the gains that resulted from the 1979 Islamic Revolution could be reversible.[ii] Khamenei also criticized former Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin for allowing the Soviet experiment to descend into dictatorship at the expense of “communist democracy,” but does not appear self-aware that many within Iranian society see him as a dictator and that Iran as a regime has betrayed its promised values: chants of “death to the dictator” during last year’s “Woman, Life, Freedom” are one example of this public sentiment.

Sources:

“بیانات در دیدار اعضای مجلس خبرگان رهبری”(Statements in the Meeting of the Assembly of Experts),” Khamenei.ir (official website of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei), 7 November 2024. https://tinyurl.com/48rfb7rj

Within the structure and general framework of the Islamic system, the primary role of the Leader is to ensure that the system’s orientation is directed toward the goals of the Revolution. This is the main responsibility of the Leader. The Revolution took place for a purpose. Of course, all revolutions have goals. They have fundamental goals that lead them to reshape and transform the order of life… [Those opposed to revolution] were able to prevent [previous] revolutions from achieving their goals and reverse their course. For instance, in the great French Revolution, which was one of the most significant revolutions in our contemporary history, barely 15 years had passed since the start of that revolution when the previous authoritarian monarchy and dictatorship were reestablished. All the efforts of the people, the endeavors of renowned French intellectuals, the efforts and struggles of the masses, the casualties, the massacres, the conflicts — all of these were essentially nullified and destroyed in less than 15 years!

A similar but worse case was what happened to the Soviet Revolution, which was also another major revolution. There too within less than a decade, the claims, the rhetoric, the professed justice and so-called “communist democracy” all vanished. A dictator, a ruthless tyrant like Stalin, seized power and that was the end of it. So this is a risk that all revolutions face.

The Quran repeatedly emphasizes and warns about this matter, not just once or twice, but perhaps tens of times. The holy verses of the Quran repeatedly speak about regression and returning to the previous state from which people had been liberated and saved. This warning is directed toward both the believers and the unbelievers.

An element is necessary to prevent this [regression]. In the Islamic system, this element is the position of the Leader. Such a deviation must be prevented by a leader. This is very important. It is very important…! The establishment and creation of the Assembly of Experts signifies the uninterrupted progress of the Islamic system. This means that there will be no pause or interruption in the system. The Assembly of Experts exists to be able to designate a successor. Therefore, this succession will continue with full strength, power, and ability. This readiness and presence of the Assembly of Experts has such a meaning. If the current Leader were to be absent, the Assembly of Experts would immediately take action to select a successor. It is like this.

Notes:

[i] Ali Khamenei’s health struggles are not entirely secret: a 1981 assassination attempt left him partially paralyzed, and the regime photographed him in the hospital five years ago as he received treatment for prostate cancer.

[ii] For discussion of Khamenei’s concern about declining revolutionary fervor, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Warns of Declining Fervor of New Generation,” OE Watch, 08 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/irans-supreme-leader-warns-of-declining-fervor-of-new-generation/ . See also: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Speaks on Martyrdom” OE Watch, December 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/399678/download and Michael Rubin, “Khamenei Warns Veterans of Declining Revolutionary Fervor” OE Watch, February 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/310925/download

Image Information:

Image: Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei speaks to the Assembly of Experts in Tehran, 7 November 2024.
Source: https://idc0-cdn0.khamenei.ir/ndata/news/58257/C/14030817_0758257.jpg
Attribution: Khamenei.ir

Iran Conducts First-Ever Military Exercise With Oman

Posted on by

“[T]he first joint ground exercise between the ground forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Sultanate of Oman, which is known as “Mountain Falcons 1,” started on Monday, 30 September, in Al Jabal Al-Akhdar province of Oman.”

Despite regional tensions reaching an all-time high, Iran and Oman engaged in their first-ever bilateral military exercise on 30 September. Per reports in the first excerpted article by state broadcaster Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, the exercises, known as Mountain Falcons 1, took place in the Al Jabal Al-Akhdar province of Oman, involving ground forces from both countries, with support from the Royal Omani Air Force and Police.

According to the second excerpted article from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-controlled Islamic Republic News Agency, the exercises “focus[ed] on combating regional terrorism, establishing sustainable security, urban warfare, and the exchange and transfer of experiences between the two countries.” The timing of the joint military exercise is significant, occurring just as Iran launched its second direct retaliatory strike against Israel on 1 October with the firing of 180 ballistic missiles. Arab countries in the Persian Gulf have expressed concern about the Israeli response, noting that they would not take sides in a conflict between Iran and Israel.[i] However, Oman is considered the “Switzerland of the Middle East” for its neutrality and has for years played the role of interlocutor between the United States and Iran, who have had no formal ties since the 1979 revolution.[ii]

Since 2019, Tehran has championed what it calls a “neighborly policy,” in other words, seeking better ties with its Arab neighbors. Not surprisingly, as the military drills continued, the Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was on a diplomatic blitz, visiting a host of Arab states to ease concerns of an escalation while also calling for a truce in Lebanon and a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[iii] While regional tensions suggest otherwise, Tehran and Muscat’s military exercises with the threat of war looming seem to indicate that business is as usual in the region.

Sources:

“آغاز نخستین رزمایش مشترک زمینی ایران و عمان (Visit of the commander army ground forces to the plan to block the eastern border),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 30 September 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00IA6v.

According to IRIB, the first joint ground exercise between the ground forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Sultanate of Oman, which is known as “Mountain Falcons 1,” started on Monday, 30 September, in Al Jabal Al-Akhdar province of Oman.

This exercise involves the ground forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army and the Royal Sultanate of Oman, with support from the Royal Omani Air Force and Police. It is being conducted with the aim of exchanging and transferring experiences, conducting joint combat training, and improving the level of combat and operational readiness…

“نخستین رزمایش مشترک و مرکب جمهوری اسلامی ایران و عمان برگزار شد (The first joint exercise between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Oman was held),” Islamic Republic News Agency (IRGC), 10 October 2024. www.irna.ir/xjRNKP

According to IRNA, from the army public relations, Brigadier General Kiumars Heydari stated: “At the request and invitation of the Omani Army for conducting an anti-terrorism exercise, the first joint and combined military drill between the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Army Ground Forces and the country of Oman with a focus on combating regional terrorism, establishing sustainable security, urban warfare, and the exchange and transfer of experiences between the two countries, was carried out using day and night tactics in Oman.

”He said that the Islamic Republic of Iran is capable of conducting joint exercises with friendly and neighboring countries, adding: “This exercise, held over two days, involved rapid reaction units and special forces from the 65th NOHED Brigade of the Iranian Army, supported by the country of Oman’s Air Force and police and took place on Omani soil.”

Notes:

[i] Samia Nakhoul, Parisa Hafezi and Pesha Magid, “Exclusive: Stop Israel from bombing Iran’s oil sites, Gulf states urge US,” Reuters, 10 October 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/stop-israel-bombing-irans-oil-sites-gulf-states-urge-us-2024-10-10/

[ii] Kylie Atwood, “US held indirect talks with Iranian officials in Oman earlier this year amid tensions in Middle East,” CNN, 13 March 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/13/politics/us-iran-indirect-talks/index.html

[iii] Natasha Bertrand, Kylie Atwood, Jennifer Hansler and Alex Marquardt, “Iran engages in urgent diplomacy as it braces for Israel’s response to missile attacks,” CNN, 12 October 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/11/politics/iran-nervous-israel-response-missile-attacks/index.html

Iran Concerned About Electronic Devices After Hezbollah Communications Attacks

Posted on by

“In this session, various aspects and details of the recent terrorist operation in Lebanon and the explosion of the pagers were thoroughly examined.”

Iran is concerned about Israel infiltrating its own electronic devices after twin communications attacks in mid-September targeting Hezbollah members in Lebanon killed at least 39 and injured 3,000 people.[i] As per the excerpted article from the semi-official Iranian Mehr News Agency, the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission held an emergency meeting during a 23 September session in parliament to discuss “various aspects and details of the recent terrorist operation in Lebanon, and the explosion of the pagers was thoroughly examined.” According to committee spokesperson Ebrahim Rezaei, part of the session focused on measures to prevent similar incidents in the country, which were widely attributed to Israeli intelligence agency Mossad.[ii] Rezaei noted that the booby-trapped pagers were “the result of industrial contamination,” in other words, that the devices had explosive substances inserted.[iii] According to Rezaei, Iran is “moving toward the localization of telecommunications equipment” and that it is “already capable of exporting some of this equipment,” likely a reference to providing Hezbollah with these domestically made devices.

Israel’s mid-September communications attacks in Lebanon have shaken the Iranian clerical establishment enough to prompt them to conduct investigations and make ensure their electronic devices are not also compromised. With Iran and Israel out of the shadow war since Tehran’s first direct attack against Israel in April, Iran—which has become the Mossad’s playground for operations—is taking further precautionary measures to make sure they are not compromised yet again.

Sources:

“ماجرای پیجرها هیچ ارتباطی با موضوع شهادت «شهید رئیسی» ندارد (Pagers incident has no connection to the martyrdom of ‘martyr [Ebrahim]  Raisi’),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news agency), 23 September 2024. mehrnews.com/x35Znz

According to the correspondent of Mehr [News Agency], Ebrahim Rezaei, in explaining the extraordinary session held this morning (Monday, September 23) by the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the parliament… He continued: “In this session, various aspects and details of the recent terrorist operation in Lebanon and the explosion of the pagers were thoroughly examined.”

The communications minister provided explanations on this matter as well as on measures to prevent similar incidents in the country and said the recent operation in Lebanon was the result of industrial contamination and was a combined operation. He also stated that these pagers were primarily used in the healthcare sector.

The spokesperson for the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of parliament emphasized: “The Communications Minister stated that we are moving toward the localization of telecommunications equipment. This issue has been and continues to be on our agenda to support domestic production by localizing telecommunications equipment, and we are committed to supporting this effort. In fact, we are already capable of exporting some of this equipment.”

Rezaei added: “Regarding imported telecommunications items, the Minister of Information and Communications Technology said that we have sample verification laboratories aligned with our missions, and he stressed that the registry system must be strengthened…”

The spokesperson for the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of parliament added that during this session, the director general for West Asia and North Africa at the Foreign Ministry presented a report on the situation of the region. He emphasized that the recent terrorist operation in Lebanon will not affect Hezbollah’s and the Resistance [Axis]’s support for Gaza. Although the goal of the Zionist regime in carrying out this operation was to deter Hezbollah from supporting Palestine and Gaza, they will not achieve their objectives.

Rezaei, referring to the views expressed by the members of the National Security Commission during the session, said: “The members expressed concern that a similar action might take place in Iran and stressed the importance of preventing and taking precautionary measures to ensure that such incidents are not repeated…”

The importance of electronic warfare and preparedness to counter the enemy’s electronic warfare was also emphasized. Additionally, strengthening the Passive Defense Organization was stressed. Moreover, during this session, it was clarified that the pagers incident had no connection to the issue of the martyrdom of martyr [President Ebrahim] Raisi and his companions.

Rezaei emphasized: “The members of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the parliament unanimously stressed the need for readiness to confront the enemy’s conspiracies, including in the field of cyber and electronic terrorism, and to counter the inhumane actions of the Zionist regime.”

Notes:

[i] On 17 and 18 September, beepers and walkie-talkies belonging to members of the militant group Hezbollah exploded simultaneously. Among those injured in the pager attacks on 17 September was the Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon, Mojtaba Amani, who reportedly lost one eye with the other severely injured. Iranian officials and his family said the ambassador was in “good and stable condition.” See: Holly Dagres, “Iranian ambassador blinded in one eye,” The Iranist, 27 September 2024. https://www.theiranist.com/i/149068347/iranian-ambassador-blinded-in-one-eye

[ii] At the time, there were rumors that members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had been killed in the twin attacks, but per state broadcaster IRIB, IRGC spokesman Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini was quick to dispel media reports and online accounts as false. See: “هیچ نیروی سپاه در ماجرای پیجر‌ها شهید نشده است (No IRGC forces were martyred in the pagers incident),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 18 September 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00IBdr

[iii] David Gritten, “Death toll from Hezbollah pager explosions in Lebanon rises to 12,” BBC News, 18 September 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2kn10xxldo.

Russia To Launch Two Satellites for Iran

Posted on by

Iranian scientists display the Kowsar and Hudhud satellites prior to their transfer to Russia for launch.

“The launch of these two satellites indicates the significant progress of Iran’s space industry.”

While Iran-Russia military trade often makes headlines, the relationship between the two countries continues to expand in numerous ways:[i] Russian Special Forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) train together[ii] while the two governments collude to avoid unilateral sanctions on each other’s industries.[iii] Now, according to the excerpted article published in the IRGC media outlet Tasnim News these bilateral relations extend to Iran’s space program.

Iran’s space program is a source of national pride. Iran has launched numerous domestically built satellites since 2008 and plans to open a spaceport next year.[iv] Iranian Space Agency head Hassan Salarieh has announced between five and seven planned launches by the end of the Iranian year (20 March). The success rate of Iranian satellite launches has been relatively low, however, perhaps between 25 and 50 percent. While the success rate has climbed in recent years, Iran’s turn toward Russia could reflect internal uncertainty about its capabilities or acknowledgment that its Semnan launch facility is not yet ready. There is also a military dimension to Russia-Iran space launch cooperation, as satellite launch vehicles share technology with intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The two satellites Iran plans to launch also reflect the military-private partnership that predominates in Iran and Iran’s growing space capabilities. There is little firewall between Iranian students at government universities and the IRGC. Indeed, the IRGC mandates the participation of many Iranian students who have studied abroad in military related research. Iranian media describe the Kowsar satellite as a high-resolution satellite that can produce imagery useful for agricultural and environmental mapping and crisis management. Iran’s reporting does not describe military applications, but it does mention IRGC visits to the laboratory.

The Hudhud is a smaller communications satellite that the excerpted article claims can “provide communication services in remote and hard-to-reach areas where access to terrestrial communication networks is limited.” During periods of unrest, the Iranian government often cuts internet service. Should the IRGC compartmentalize access to the space-based internet, it might gain an upper hand over protestors.

Sources:

“۲ ماهواره‌ ایرانی بخش خصوصی برای پرتاب به روسیه ارسال شد”(Two Private Sector Satellites Sent to Russia for Launch),” Tasnim News (news agency affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), 12 October 2024. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1403/07/21/3175967  

Two satellites made by the private sector of our country, named “Kowsar”[Abundance of Benevolence] and “Hudhud” [Hoopoe Bird], were sent to Russia for launch into space on Friday, October 11.

Both the Kowsar satellite that has a precision agriculture and mapping mission and the Hudhud satellite that is an Internet of Things telecommunication satellite, are ready for launch.

The construction of the “Kowsar” sensing satellite began in 2019, and the “Hudhud” satellite, which is the result of the use of advanced technologies used in “Kowsar,” was designed and built in a short time, only one year. It is important to note that these two great achievements have been achieved by a group of young Iranians with an average age of 25 years in an Iranian technology company in the private sector….

The launch of these two satellites indicates the significant progress of Iran’s space industry and has important consequences for the country, including self-sufficiency in space technology, the development of space applications, job creation and technology development, and the promotion of international status.Before sending these satellites to Russia for launch, Dr. Hassan Salarieh, the head of the Iranian Space Organization, witnessed the final stages of the construction and preparation of the satellites in the knowledge-based manufacturing company.

Notes:

[i] For an overview of the history and evolution of Iran-Russia relations, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran-Russia Relations,” OE Watch, July 2016, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195435

[ii] Michael Rubin, “Iran: Revolutionary Guards Take Part in Russian Military Games,” OE Watch, September 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195247?pi296680=1

[iii] For discussion of industrial cooperation to avoid sanctions, see: Michael Rubin, “The Unexpected Ways Iran and Russia Are Building Military Ties,” National Security Journal, 6 October 2024. https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/the-unexpected-ways-iran-and-russia-are-building-military-ties/

[iv] For discussion of Iran’s new spaceport, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran to Open New Spaceport in 2025,” OE Watch, 07-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/oe-watch-issue-07-2024/. For discussion of previous satellite launches, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Preparing for Zafar III Satellite Launch,” OE Watch, July 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/284140 and Michael Rubin, “Iran: Simorgh Satellite Ready to Launch,” and “Iran to Launch New Satellite by Year’s End,” OE Watch, August 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/241432

Image Information:

Image: Iranian scientists display the Kowsar and Hudhud satellites prior to their transfer to Russia for launch.
Source: https://newsmedia.tasnimnews.com/Tasnim/Uploaded/Image/1403/07/21/1403072109450377931177524.jpg
Attribution: Tasnim News

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Exaggerate Missile Success in Israel Attack

Posted on by

An Iranian billboard celebrates the April 2024 missile barrage launched against Israel.

“The Zionist regime is terrified of the Islamic Republic’s intelligence.”

On 1 October 2024, Iran launched close to 200 missiles at Israel to avenge the deaths of senior Hamas leader Dr. Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah. As with the 13 April 2024 missile and drone barrage, Israeli, U.S., and allied air defenses downed the majority of the missiles. Those that struck Israel appear to have caused only marginal damage. However, according to multiple Iranian media outlets, including the excerpted article published by Mehr News Agency, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) suggested a 90 percent success rate. While this number is false—the only confirmed casualty was a Palestinian in Jericho struck by falling debris—the acceptance of such lies within Iranian command circles and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s base can have a profound impact on the operational environment.

Overconfidence, not oil or water, causes most wars in the Middle East. In the Iranian case, the IRGC has long exaggerated the effectiveness of its missiles.[i] While in an open society, the 1 October barrage might have embarrassed or caused the regime to question those who previously exaggerated claims; no such fallout occurred in Iran. The supreme leader’s power base is perhaps 20 percent of the country. These revolutionary youth, from whom the IRGC draws its recruits, implicitly trust Khamenei and exist in a media bubble that the Iranian regime creates.[ii] Not only do they suggest Israel’s air defense and that lent by the United States are little more than psychological operations, but the Iranian media narrative also downplays Israel’s ability to respond. The 19 April 2024 Israeli airstrike on Iranian anti-aircraft batteries in Isfahan demonstrated precision, but most Iranians are unaware of their success because the targets were not easily visible to the Iranian public.

The question now is whether a “zero-defect” dynamic is at play in Iran. If the Iranian or IRGC leadership fails to accurately assess Iran’s military ability, then it becomes more likely that Iranian leaders could order additional strikes not only on Israel but also potentially on U.S. bases in the region. A belief that only a set proportion of missiles equipped with chemical, biological, or radiological warheads need to pass through complements this calculation. Any contributing factor that leads Tehran to believe they can inflict maximum damage if not dramatically win a conflict makes the region more dangerous and mandates a recalibration of deterrence.

Sources:

“۹۰ درصد شلیک‌ها با موفقیت به اهداف اصابت کرد”(Ninety percent of the shots hit their targets successfully),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news agency owned by Iranian government’s Islamic Development Organization), 1 October 2024. https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6243668 

In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.

The Islamic Ummah of the Great Front of Resistance and the Noble Nation of Islamic Iran:

Following the previous announcement, your children in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in accordance with the promises made by the Islamic Republic officials and military commanders, with the help of other armed forces, during Operation True Promise II or the Messenger of God (Peace Be Upon Him).

They targeted strategic centers inside the occupied territories with missiles made by the youth of Islamic Iran.

This operation hit some air and radar bases, conspiracy centers which launched the assassination plots against the leaders of the Resistance, especially the [Hamas] martyr Dr. Ismail Haniyeh as well as the leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and the military commanders of Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance, and the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards.

Despite the fact that the area was protected by the most advanced and high-volume defense systems, 90 percent of the shots successfully hit the targets, and the Zionist regime is terrified of the Islamic Republic’s intelligence and operational dominance.

This operation was carried out within the framework of the right of legitimate defense and in accordance with international law, and any stupidity of the enemy will be met with a devastating and regretful response.

Public Relations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Notes:

[i] For previous discussion of Iranian claims about the precision of her missiles, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Khamenei Threatens to Use Precision Missiles,” OE Watch, May 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/276811/download

[ii] For previous discussion of how the regime constructs a media bubble, see: Michael Rubin, “Budget Cutbacks Force Iran Broadcasting Closings,” OE Watch, February 2015. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195463

Image Information:

Image: An Iranian billboard celebrates the April 2024 missile barrage launched against Israel
Source: https://newsmedia.tasnimnews.com/Tasnim/Uploaded/Image/1403/01/27/14030127094522670298182710.jpg
Attribution: Tasnim News

Iran Believes Israel is Too Weak to Take on Hezbollah

Posted on by

Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization, Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia, speaking out against Israel on 10 September 2024.

“The Zionists alone lack the capability to open a new front in the region, and the continuation of the Gaza war is not feasible for them and will not achieve anything for them.”

As tit-for-tat strikes continue between Israel and Lebanon since 7 October 2023, Iran believes the Jewish state is too weak to take on a new war front with Hezbollah. As reported by Iranian state broadcaster IRIB, Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization, Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia, said on 10 September that Israel lacks “the capability to open a new front in the region, and the continuation of the Gaza war is not feasible for them and will not achieve anything for them.” The comments come after Lebanese Hezbollah retaliated on 25 August for Israel’s assassination of its military commander, Fuad Shukr, at the end of July.[i]

In the excerpted article, Brigadier General Akraminia explained that Israel continues to threaten  the Lebanese militant group, which he believes has “precise” missile and drone capabilities, due to Israel’s failure to destroy Hamas and release the remaining hostages, as well as its inability to stop the Hezbollah’s attacks. He emphasized that “internal issues and high casualties in the Gaza war have left the occupiers with no choice but to retreat and accept a ceasefire,” referring to Israel.

Due to its failures, the Brigadier General believes Israel is trying “to draw actors such as the United States and Europe into the battlefield, hoping to save itself from the Gaza quagmire.” In other words, Israel is trying to start a war with its northern neighbor to distract from its failings in Gaza. However, Akraminia noted that the upcoming U.S. presidential election makes it unlikely a full-scale war would be supported. Akraminia’s comments suggest that Tehran and the Resistance Axis—led by its crown jewel proxy, Hezbollah—believe they have been in a position of strength since 7 October 2023, suggesting that these proxy groups will continue responding to Israel as long as the Gaza war continues.

Sources:

“صهیونیست‌ها قادر به نبرد همه‌جانبه با حزب‌الله نیستند (The Zionists are not capable of an all-out battle with Hezbollah),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 10 September 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00I9ou.

According to IRIB News Agency, Brigadier General [Mohammad] Akraminia, in an interview regarding the Zionist authorities’ threat of a full-scale attack on Lebanon, stated: “Given the failure of the Zionist regime in achieving its declared goals, including the release of prisoners, the destruction of Hamas, and the inability to stop Hezbollah’s attacks, the authorities of this regime are constantly threatening the Lebanese resistance forces.”

The Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization added: “The Zionist regime is trying to expand the war in the region in order to draw actors such as the U.S. and Europeans into the battlefield, hoping to save itself from the Gaza quagmire.”

Noting that the Zionist regime is battling the Resistance Axis on several fronts, Brigadier General Akraminia said: “The Zionists alone lack the capability to open a new front in the region, and the continuation of the Gaza war is not feasible for them and will not achieve anything for them.”

The Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization stated that the Gaza battle is being fought directly with U.S. and Western countries’ military aid and remarked: “Considering the upcoming U.S. presidential elections, it is unlikely that they would support a full-scale attack on Lebanon and the opening of a new front in the region.”

Brigadier General Akraminia stressed the precision of Hezbollah’s missiles and drones and their success in various operations against the Zionists, stating: “The Zionists are well aware of Lebanese Hezbollah’s capabilities, and we only witnessed a small part of these capabilities during the Arbaeen operations,” referring to Fuad Shukr retaliation.

The Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization, referring to the Zionist officials’ acknowledgment of Hezbollah’s high capabilities, noted: “Internal issues and high casualties in the Gaza war have left the occupiers with no choice but to retreat and accept a ceasefire.”

Notes:

[i] Ronen Bergman, Adam Rasgon, Euan Ward, Farnaz Fassihi, and Hwaida Saad, “Israel Says It Killed Hezbollah Commander in Airstrike Near Beirut,” New York Times, 30 July 2024.https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/30/world/middleeast/israel-hezbollah-lebanon.html

Image Information:

Image: Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization, Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia, speaking out against Israel on 10 September 2024.
Source: IRIB (Iranian media outlet) https://www.iribnews.ir/00I9ou

Iran Is Building a Wall Along Its Afghan Border

Posted on by

“The length of this wall is extensive, and it takes time, but these security plans are being implemented at the border with the cooperation of the caretaker government.”

As border tensions between Iran and neighboring Afghanistan continue, Tehran has started building a border wall. Per the excerpted article by the Iranian state broadcaster IRIB, Brigadier General Kiumars Heydari of the Iranian Army’s ground forces visited the Iran-Afghanistan border on 11 September, where the army’s engineering units are building the “physical blockade.” This news comes as Iran struggles with an influx of Afghan refugees, drug trafficking, and border disputes.

According to the second excerpted article by IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Supreme National Security Council support the 330-kilometer wall being built in Razavi Khorasan province, reinforcing how the project is a critical national security issue. The border wall, which is in collaboration between the IRGC and the Army, has been a topic of discussion for months. In February, the brigadier general declared, “We intend to block our borders, and no one can object why we erect a fence near their border. This is not unjust to neighboring countries, as it is common practice in all countries,” an indirect reference to Pakistan’s border wall with Afghanistan.[i] At the time, Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi described it as “not a wall” but a “border blockade that is being pursued according to the plan.”[ii]

Iran appears to be being building the border wall for several national security reasons. Since the Taliban took over Afghanistan in 2021, tensions have been at an all-time high between the eastern neighbors over the Helmand River, which flows from Afghanistan into Iran, leading to numerous clashes on the border and political tensions.[iii] However, the second excerpted article states, “these security plans are being implemented at the border with the cooperation of the caretaker government,” referring to the Taliban, which Tehran doesn’t recognize.

At the same time that it is building this wall, Iran is now the largest host for refugees in the world, with the majority coming from Afghanistan, though Tehran has expelled approximately 100,000 refugees since the beginning of the year.[iv] While drug smuggling has always been a contentious issue, Iranian officials are also thinking about the reality that its eastern neighbor is now host to an array of terrorist groups—including the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham-Khorasan Province and al-Qaeda—raising concerns about their potential to launch attacks into Iran.

With anti-Afghan sentiment at an all-time high in Iran, Tehran’s building of a border wall may appease some Iranians. Nevertheless, this project demonstrates the complex relationship between Tehran and Kabul since the Taliban takeover and how Iran has evolved its thinking about its national security to prevent further escalation.

Sources:

“بازدید فرمانده نیروی زمینی ارتش از طرح انسداد مرزهای شرقی (Visit of the commander army ground forces to the plan to block the eastern border),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 11 September 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00IA6v

According to IRIB, the commander of the army’s ground forces, during his trip to the eastern borders of the country, visited this morning the construction sites where Iran-Afghanistan border is being physically blocked by army engineering units.

During the visit, he inspected the progress of the project and reviewed the activities of the army’s engineering combat units involved in the construction. The visit also included assessments of the military and operational readiness of soldiers stationed along the border, with a focus on enhancing security measures in the region.

Amir Brigadier General [Kiumars] Heydari also visited the bases of the 277th Mobile Assault Brigade of Shahid Tolaei in order to check the military and operational preparations of the soldiers and had a conversation with them at the border’s zero point.

The deputy commander of the Northeast Regional Headquarters, the commander of the 77th Division of Saman Al-Aimeh/Eighth Imam Division, the commander of the 277th Mobile Assault Brigade, and Shahid Tolaei Brigade, accompanied Brigadier Heydari on this visit and business trip.

The project of physical blocking the eastern borders of the country for a length of 330 km in Razavi Khorasan is being implemented by four engineering brigades.

The Islamic Republic of Iran shares a 945-kilometer common border with Afghanistan, where the provinces of Razavi Khorasan, South Khorasan, and Sistan and Baluchistan are situated.

Source:

“جزئیات انسداد فیزیکی مرز با افغانستان

(Details of the physical blockade of the border with Afghanistan),” Tasnim News Agency (IRGC), 13 September 2024. https://tn.ai/3155310

According to the foreign policy correspondent of Tasnim [News Agency], Hassan Kazemi Qomi, the acting head of the Iranian embassy in Afghanistan, explained in a discussion regarding the plan to physically block the border with Afghanistan: We in Afghanistan with the caretaker government have the same border security issue, which is the issues of fighting terrorism, drug trafficking, and similar issues.

He added: One of the issues is that the caretaker government supports the plan to physically block the border. The work has already begun along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and fortunately it is in line with the directives of the Supreme National Security Council and orders of the Supreme Leader, as commander-in-chief. 

The special representative of the president for Afghanistan affairs stated: The general staff of the armed forces started this movement in collaboration with the IRGC and the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Of course, the length of this wall is extensive, and it takes time, but these security plans are being implemented at the border with the cooperation of the caretaker government.

Notes:

[i] “Iran Insists On Its Right To Block Borders With Afghanistan,” Iran International, 16 February 2024. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202402167106.

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Christina Goldbaum, “At Least Three Are Killed in Clashes on Iranian-Afghan Border,” New York Times, 28 May 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/28/world/asia/afghanistan-iran-border-clashes.html

[iv] Ayaz Gul, “Taliban: Pakistan, Iran expelled over 400,000 Afghan refugees so far in 2024,” VOA, 10 June 2024. https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-pakistan-iran-expelled-over-400-000-afghan-refugees-so-far-in-2024/7650196.html