Iraqi Shia Militia Attacks Create Atmosphere of Uncertainty

Photo of Al-Nujaba Movement forces (from PMF) in the Makhul Mountains of Salah al-Din province, one kilometer from the ISIL Front, 6 July 2016.


“Anxiety is rising in Iraq in general… [prompting] the faction leaders to change their tactics and movements and attempt to take stricter security measures to avoid being targeted by America.…”


Strikes and counterstrikes involving U.S. forces and so-called Iraqi “Islamic Resistance” factions of Shia militias may lead militant leaders to seek cover with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in ways that would likely strain U.S.-ISF relations. The first accompanying report, from the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed, claims that Islamic Resistance factions are seeking to safeguard their weapons from U.S. strikes by transferring them to ISF bases under Iraqi Defense Ministry control. The Islamic Resistance is a branding name used by various Iran-led militant Shia Iraqi groups, most prominently Kataib Hezbollah (KH) and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HAN).[i] These militias exert substantial influence in Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which are an appendage of the ISF akin to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[ii] As PMF units, the Islamic Resistance factions are part of the Iraqi state, but their interests and actions are rarely aligned or coordinated with those of the State apparatus writ large. Since the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel, the Islamic Resistance has conducted regular attacks on U.S. positions in Syria and Iraq. The attacks escalated in late January 2024, when an unmanned aerial vehicle attributed to KH killed three U.S. Army soldiers stationed in Jordan. In response, U.S. forces killed Abu Baqir al-Saadi, a KH official involved in planning the attacks. The strike followed an earlier one targeting a HAN leader. Both strikes occurred in Baghdad, prompting Iraqi government officials to publicly denounce them as violations of national sovereignty. Islamic Resistance and other Iraqi Shia militias in turn intensified pressure on their government to negotiate a withdrawal of U.S. troops and launch an investigation into the targeted killings. As reported in the second accompanying article, also from al-Araby al-Jadeed, KH also launched an investigation aimed at identifying and rooting out U.S. collaborators within the Islamic Resistance. As noted in the third accompanying article, from the pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, the Islamic Resistance’s attacks and threats may be used to sow distrust between the United Stats and ISF partner forces. The escalatory tit-for-tat between the Islamic Resistance and U.S. forces is ushering in an atmosphere of increasing uncertainty and distrust in Iraq, further complicating what is already a tangled and potentially volatile security environment.


Sources:

العراق: فصائل مسلحة تضغط لنقل مستودعات أسلحتها إلى قواعد الجيش لتجنّب القصف الأميركي

“Iraq: Armed factions are pressing to transfer their weapons depots to army bases to avoid American bombing,” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 6 January 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B6%D8%BA%D8%B7-%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4

Today, Sunday, Iraqi security sources in Baghdad revealed to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense was under pressure to transfer ammunition depots belonging to armed factions to Iraqi army bases and camps to prevent them from being targeted in the future by American aircraft.


العراق: تحقيقات سرية بحثاً عن “متعاونين” مع واشنطن بتنفيذ عمليات الاغتيال “Iraq: Secret investigations in search of “collaborators” with Washington in carrying out the assassination operations,” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 11 February 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B0-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA

The source told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, on condition that his name not be mentioned, that “the accuracy of choosing the targets and the accuracy of carrying out the assassination operations indicated the presence of a dangerous infiltration and collaborators who provided accurate information to Washington to carry out its strikes”… 

Anxiety is rising in Iraq in general, and among the factions in particular, which fear assassinations and other strikes that may be carried out by the United States of America, whose drones roam the skies of Baghdad on an almost daily basis. This has prompted the faction leaders to change their tactics and movements and attempt to take stricter security measures to avoid being targeted by America.


عزل أميركي للعراقيين خشية «الاختراق»: المقاومة تضمّ «السفارة» إلى بنك الأهداف “American isolation of the Iraqis for fear of ‘infiltration’: The resistance includes the ‘embassy’ in the target bank,” al-Akhbar (pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily), 9 February 2024. https://al-akhbar.com/Palestine/374023

…an Iraqi military official from the security crews residing inside the Ain al-Assad base (west of Baghdad), in an interview with Al-Akhbar, recounts his observations. Since the beginning of the base being subjected to missile strikes, he said, “The American forces have dealt with us with constant caution, and have their own security protocol in terms of inspecting all those entering and leaving the base. But after the recent attacks, it increased its measures in a way that we did not witness even two years ago, when Iran bombed the base with a large number of ballistic missiles”…

He explains that “the American side deals with the Iraqi side with suspicion in terms of exchanging information, for fear of it being leaked to parties linked to the armed factions.” 


Notes:

[i] Of the two, HAN has been by far the most hardline and active member of the “Islamic Resistance” since 7 October. See: “Who Are Nujaba and Why Did the U.S. Just Strike Them?” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 4 January 2024. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-are-nujaba-and-why-did-us-just-strike-them In late January, KH vowed to suspend attacks against the United States. HAN, in contrast, vowed to continue its attacks. See: “Explaining Apparent Muqawama De-Escalation Since January 28,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7 February 2024. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/explaining-apparent-muqawama-de-escalation-january-28

[ii] “KH operates the state-funded 45th, 46th, and 47th Brigades of the PMF. Chain of command nominally runs through the KH-dominated Popular Mobilization Committee in the Prime Minister’s Office. In practice, KH’s PMF brigades frequently disobey the government chain of command while legally remaining organs of the Iraqi state.” See: “Profile: Kataib Hezbollah,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 April 2021. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-kataib-hezbollah

For an up-to-date overview on Iraq’s militia landscape, see: “Iraq’s New Regime Change: How Tehran-Backed


Terrorist Organizations and Militias Captured the Iraqi State,” CTC Sentinel, December 2023. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/iraqs-new-regime-change-how-tehran-backed-terrorist-organizations-and-militias-captured-the-iraqi-state/


Image Information:

Image:  Photo of Al-Nujaba Movement forces (from PMF) in the Makhul Mountains of Salah al-Din province, one kilometer from the ISIL Front, 6 July 2016.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Harakat_Hezbollah_al-Nujaba_in_2016_(24).jpg
Attribution: Fars Media Corporation, CC BY 4.0


Iran Warns United States Against Attacking Ships in Red Sea

“The Story of the Behshad’s Mission for Maritime Security,” Telegram video screenshot.


“Those engaging in terrorist activities against Behshad or similar vessels jeopardize international maritime routes, security, and assume global responsibility for potential future international risks.”


Iran has warned the United States against targeting cargo ships that the United States and others believe to be Iranian support ships feeding intelligence to Houthi rebels in Yemen. “Those engaging in terrorist activities against Behshad or similar vessels jeopardize international maritime routes, security, and assume global responsibility for potential future international risks,” the Iranian Army declared in an English-language video recently posted on its Telegram channel Aja Media, clips of which are included in the first excerpted post. The Behshad is a cargo vessel widely believed by Western intelligence officials to be a spy ship operated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC is said to be passing electronic intelligence to Yemen’s Houthi rebels—armed with drones and ballistic missiles—to spot and target ships passing in the Red Sea region in reaction to the ongoing Gaza war.[i]

In the video, the narrator describes Behshad and other cargo ships like it—including the Saviz and Behzad—as “floating armories” stationed in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to prevent the hijacking of Iranian ships by pirates—a problem that began in the 1980s. According to the video, 93 squadrons have been dispatched to the region and thwarted 183 piracy attempts against Iranian ships. To maintain the ship’s innocence and its respect for international law, the video goes as far as to cite the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, claiming the ships are storage and support centers offshore.[ii] Very little information is available on the Behshad and other cargo ships in Iranian state media coverage. However, as per the second excerpted article, in April 2021, the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that the Saviz had been the target of a limpet mine attack allegedly by Israel because it was believed to be “Iran’s naval base” for the Houthi rebels.[iii] The third excerpted article published by the Iranian daily newspaper Hamshari reported that the United States and UK media coverage of the cargo ships in recent weeks were adopting “more hostile positions” because the media wanted to provoke the United States into a war with Iran.


Sources:

“رسانه ارتش جمهوری اسلامی ایران ‘آجامدیا’ (Media of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army ‘Aja Media’),” “The Story of the Behshad’s Mission for Maritime Security,” Telegram video post, 4 February 2024. https://t.me/aja_media/3797

Since the late 1980s, with the rise of piracy in the Bab el-Mandeb region, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea leading to the hijacking of several Iranian ships by pirates, the Iranian military, like many other countries, decided to deploy squadrons to this area in order to protect its commercial vessels and ensure the security of its shipping crew and commercial cargo. To date, ninety-three squadrons of the Iranian navy have been dispatched to this region and have prevented 183 piracy attempts against Iranian ships before the pirates could reach them… Those engaging in terrorist activities against Behshad or similar vessels jeopardize international maritime routes, security, and assume global responsibility for potential future international risks.


“گزارش تسنیم| مأموریت کشتی ساویز در دریای سرخ چه بود؟ (Tasnim Report: What was the Saviz ship’s mission in the Red Sea?),” Tasnim News Agency (IRGC-affiliated news source), 7 April 2021. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1400/01/18/2480574/%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AA-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B2-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AE-%DA%86%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF

This ship was the Iranian ship Saviz that was in the region for a long time already, and while some sources reported that it might have been hit by a missile or torpedo, a Tasnim reporter informed that likely this scenario is because of the explosion of magnetic and sticky mines on the body of the ship. After the publication of this news, there were different discussion s about the Saviz ship’s mission in the Red Sea, and some incorrectly—or on purpose—considered it to be Iran’s naval base to support the resistance of Yemen.


“واکنش سخنگوی وزارت دفاع آمریکا به کلیپ رسانه ارتش ایران در خصوص شناور بهشاد (The reaction of the U.S. Defense Department spokesperson to the media clip of the Iranian Army regarding the Behshad float),” Akharin Khabar (News aggregator with Telegram account), 12 February 2024. https://akharinkhabar.ir/story/9941219

The Pentagon spokesperson regarding the Behshad vessel: We have heard things about the mission of this vessel, but it is Iran’s right to have a vessel in the Red Sea and conduct operations. We are not looking for a naval confrontation with Iran.

A journalist told him during a press conference: Iran has issued a warning and told America that you are not allowed to target this ship. Iran has announced that it is an anti-piracy ship.


“ایران درباره کشتی بهشاد و ساویز به آمریکا هشدار داد؟ (Iran warned America about Behshad and Saviz ships?),” Hamshahri (Iran daily newspaper), 4 February 2024. https://www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/830282/%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B2-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF

Some American and British media continue to create a media space to provoke the United States to attack Iran… Iran issued a warning to the United States on Sunday about the potential targeting of two ships in the Middle East long suspected of serving as operations bases for Iranian commandos… It seems that Iran’s statement about the Behshad and Saviz shows Tehran’s growing concern that the American attacks in the past days in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen that targeted militias supported by the Islamic Republic.


Notes:

[i] Keir Simmons, Mo Abbas, Dan De Luce, and Matthew Mulligan, “Iran goes public with stark warning over suspected spy ship as U.S. refuses to rule out more strikes,” NBC News, 6 February 2024. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-goes-public-stark-warning-suspected-spy-ship-us-strikes-rcna137150

[ii] The vessels were sanctioned by the previous U.S. Administration in 2018. See: “Non-Proliferation Designations; Iran-related Designations Updates,” Office of Foreign Assets Control, 8 June 2020. https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20200608

[iii] According to Western media reports, the attack was apparently by Israel in retaliation for Iranian strikes on a Liberian-flagged ship owned by an Israeli shipping billionaire. See: Oren Liebermann, “U.S. watching as Iran quietly replaces Red Sea spy ship damaged in April attack” CNN, 6 August 2021. https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/06/politics/us-monitor-iran-spy-ships/index.html


Image Information:

Image: “The Story of the Behshad’s Mission for Maritime Security,” Telegram video screenshot
Source: https://t.me/aja_media/3797
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.


Iranians Using Black Market VPNs To Bypass Restrictions

Abolhassan Firouzabadi, secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace, poses in 2018.


Surveys show that about 64 percent of [Iranian] users use VPNs.”


While Iran has long sought to constrain internet access and limit the information ordinary Iranians can access, Iranians’ use of virtual private networks (VPNs) to bypass restrictions and regime censorship is flagrantly increasing. According to the excerpted article from Iran’s main financial newspaper Donya-e Eqtesad, almost two-thirds of Iranians now use a VPN. Among those affiliated with universities and scientific institutions, that number increases to more than 90 percent, suggesting that rhetoric about indigenous scientific prowess and a national intranet aside, Iranian researchers find no substitute for the information they gather from abroad.[i] It also suggests that Iranians do not accept the government’s previous efforts to greenlight specific VPNs.[ii] Iranians grumble that the regime’s efforts to filter and censor the internet is rendering free VPNs worthless and is driving up the cost of paid services that must constantly augment their products to stay ahead of regime censorship attempts.[iii] Notably, the article also reveals that the amount Iranians spend on VPNs exceeds the combined revenue of the top two Iranian cell phone companies. Open discussion about nominally illegal technologies in Iran reflects the widespread rejection of regime precepts by the broader Iranian population.[iv] Such a widespread embrace of VPNs by both the general population and the educated elites suggests that Iranians are primed for change. While the government’s monopoly of force can perpetuate internet restrictions regardless of popular will, the desperation by Iranians to escape the Islamic Republic’s ideological bubble indicates that it would be naïve to accept regime claims of popular legitimacy.


Sources:

“بازار سیاه وی‌پی‌ان”(Black Market VPN),” Donya-e Eqtesad (Iranian financial newspaper, 13 February 2024. https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/بخش-بازار-دیجیتال-19/4045965-بازار-سیاه-وی-پی-ان

…. The number of users who buy VPNs is constantly increasing. Meanwhile, studies show that the price of filter breakers is getting more expensive by the day, and the volatility of the black market is also the result of inflation. People are forced to pay exorbitant prices for their natural right, i.e. free access to the Internet, to the extent that according to some statistics, in the past year, the annual gross for filter breakers reached 300 trillion rials [$7.14 billion]… greater than the revenue of the country’s two largest mobile providers.

In July-August this year, the Majlis Industry Commission published a report on the state of the Internet, in which it presented interesting statistics about the extent of people’s use of VPNs. According to this report, credible surveys show that about 64 percent of users use VPNs, and anonymous bandwidth share on the international network was less than five percent last year but now stands at 25 percent. During the presentation of the report of the Majlis’ Industries and Mines Commission, Gholamreza Nouri Ghezeljeh, the head of the independent faction in the Majlis [parliament] pointed to the statistics of 64 percent of people using filter breakers and said that some scientific centers reported up to 96 percent of the use of such workarounds to filters in scientific centers…. The frequent blocking of free VPNs has forced users to buy paid VPNs. Marzieh Adham, a communications scientist and cyberspace activist, told Donya-ye Eqtesad, “The reason for the price of VPNs is that the VPNs that are designed are constantly blocked and need to be recreated and made available to users.”


Notes:

[i] For an earlier discussion of Iranian efforts to create a national intranet, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Progress on National Intranet,” OE Watch, July 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/312355

[ii] For an earlier discussion of Iranian efforts to create state-sanctioned VPNs, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Established Official VPN Operators,” OE Watch, December 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/345959

[iii] For broader discussion of Iranian efforts to censor the internet, see: Michael Rubin, “Evolution of Iranian Surveillance Strategies Toward the Internet and Social Media,” The Institute for Policy, Advocacy, and Governance, December 2019. https://www.aei.org/articles/evolution-of-iranian-surveillance-strategies-toward-the-internet-and-social-media/

[iv] The current VPN battle parallels the efforts by ordinary Iranians to access satellite television in the 1990s. Iranians openly put satellite receivers on the roofs of their houses and apartment buildings. When efforts to bribe officials to look the other way failed, Iranians illegally imported ever-smaller satellite receivers they acquired in Dubai or Istanbul that they could better hide. After decades, the government effectively acknowledged defeat and stopped meaningful efforts to prevent Iranians from watching television programming from the outside world.


Image Information:

Image: Abolhassan Firouzabadi, secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace, poses in 2018.
Source: https://www.atnanews.ir/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/bazdid-fazaye-majazi-ertebatat-8.jpg
Attribution: Allameh Tabataba’i News Agency


Iran Conducts Joint Exercises To Bolster Air Force

Iran’s Yasin training jet unveiled on 11 March 2023.


The Air Force has had a very good year in the field of defense diplomacy.”


Iran’s Air Force traditionally lags behind its other military branches, but Iranian authorities are seeking to close the gap.[i] With the end of many sanctions and growing confidence, the Iranian Air Force is engaging in “defense diplomacy” with friendly regimes to improve pilot training and overall capability. While the excerpted article from a pro-regime website Alef.ir does not mention specific partners, there are few possibilities. Iran collaborates with the so-called “Axis of Resistance” consisting of pro-Iranian regimes or proxy groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Iranian soldiers have participated in exercises in Russia and former Soviet states in Central Asia, many of which might also open doors to Iranian pilot training.[ii] Any willingness by other countries to welcome Iranian pilots for training courses or exchanges could enhance Iranian familiarity with aircraft and platforms it might encounter in conflict and enable Iranian Air Force personnel to surreptitiously learn about potential new technologies. For example,  the Iraqi Air Force flies U.S.-produced F-16s that are a generation more advanced than jet fighters in Iran’s arsenal. Exchanges with Russia or China could foreshadow investment in their military markets. Air Force Commander Hamid Vahedi’s comments about “maintenance and repair of parts and airplanes” suggest that the Iranian Air Force might use new partnerships to acquire spare parts or upgrade avionics. While Iranian leaders often embraced the rhetoric of self-sufficiency to suggest isolation and sanctions did not hurt them, the scramble for new relationships suggests the Iranian Air Force seeks to emerge from its isolation and play a greater role in Iran’s regional military calculations.


Sources:

“بآمادگی نیروی هوایی ارتش برای انجام رزمایش با کشورهای همسو”(The Air Force is Prepared to Conduct Exercises with Allied Countries),” Alef.ir (website affiliated with conservative populist politician Ahmad Tavakkoli), 15 February 2024. https://www.alef.ir/news/4021126042.html

Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi, commander of Iranian Army’s Air Force, in a meeting of foreign military attaches in Tehran [coinciding with the 45th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution], said, “The Air Force has always been effective and decisive in every field that it has entered. The commander of the Army Air Force spoke of [recent achievements, including] “production and utilization of Yasin [RG1] training light fighter bomber and purchase and acquisition of the Fajr-3 training aircraft of the Pak-130 training aircraft; production and operation of a variety of drones including Kaman-12 [RG2] and Saman-22; performing long-range operations outside Iran’s flight information region (FIR); manufacturing of various simulators, laser-guided bombs, anti-radar rockets, as well as the establishment of new science centers including those focused on artificial intelligence…. He added, “The Air Force has had a very good year in the field of defense diplomacy, with a number of positive steps and productive instances of delegation exchanges, meetings and visits, training courses, and the dispatch of observers to exercises in other countries….” He added, “The Islamic Republic of Iran [Army] Air Force is prepared to cooperate and interact as much as possible with aligned countries in various fields, including carrying out joint exercises, educational cooperation, especially the exchange of students and professors between aviation universities in various fields, cooperation in the affairs of maintenance and repair of parts and airplanes.”


Notes:

[i] For a moment the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps sought to develop a strike fighter, but it was unable to compete technologically with the U.S.-produced F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and upgraded F-16s, Russia’s Sukhoi-35s, or their Chinese corollaries. Instead, Iran sought to jerry-rig and cannibalize its existing fleet to keep the dwindling number of its 1970s-era aircraft viable. For discussion of the state of the Iranian Air Force see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian F-14 Crash Highlights Iran’s Need for New Fighter Contract,” OE Watch, 08-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iranian-f-14-crash-highlights-irans-need-for-new-fighter-contract/

[ii] For earlier Iranian participation in Russian war games, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Revolutionary Guards Take Part in Russian Military Games,” OE Watch, September 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195247/download; For Iranian participation in Chinese war games, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: IRGC Training in China,” OE Watch, September 2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/205061/download


Image Information:

Image: Iran’s Yasin training jet unveiled on 11 March 2023.
Source: https://cdn.isna.ir/d/2023/03/11/3/62547091.jpg?ts=1678512083735
Attribution: Iranian Students’ News Agency


Houthis’ Red Sea Attacks Not Only Motivated by Gaza

Yemen map showing major population centers as well as parts of neighboring countries and the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.


“The preparation of the naval force comes in light of the enemy mercenaries’ relinquishing of national sovereignty, and their exposing the country’s sovereign oil, gas and fishery resources to unprecedented plunder…”


While recent naval attacks by Yemen’s Ansarallah group—better known as the Houthis—have been justified as being in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, Ansarallah’s build-up of capabilities to engage in an anti-access naval campaign was motivated by domestic concerns that predate Israel’s operations against Hamas in Gaza. Beginning on 19 October, Ansarallah began targeting primarily commercial vessels in the Red Sea using unmanned aerial vehicles, ballistic missiles, and anti-ship cruise missiles. The majority of these weapons were shot down by ships from the USS Gerald Ford Carrier Strike Group.[i] These attacks were concurrent with other attacks carried out by Iranian allies, all presented as in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza and as part of a coordinated anti-Israel response by members of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”—Hezbollah in Lebanon, “Islamic Resistance” militias in Iraq, and Ansarallah in Yemen. According to the accompanying excerpt from the official Yemeni daily 26 September, Ansarallah leaders have justified their buildup of anti-ship capabilities as motivated by their adversaries “exposing the country’s sovereign oil, gas and fishery resources to unprecedented plunder” and their attempts to “expand and control the most important strategic ports and islands, such as Socotra and Mayun [also known as Perim Island].” From Ansarallah’s perspective, its domestic adversaries—both the Saudi-backed Internationally Recognized Government and the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council—have used the early 2022 UN-brokered truce in Yemen to tighten control over resources and strategic locations on Yemen’s coastline with foreign assistance and complicity.[ii] In August 2023, a few months before hostilities broke out in Gaza, Ansarallah officials threatened to sink two oil tankers seeking to transport Yemeni oil for export from ports in the Gulf Aden under the control of Ansarallah’s domestic opponents. Ansarallah’s position vis-à-vis Red Sea shipping prior to 7 October, per the article, was “to encourage international navigation through the [Bab El Mandab] Strait provided that it does not harm the sovereignty, unity, security or independence of the Republic.” Thus, while Ansarallah’s attacks on shipping vessels transiting Bab El Mandab are—at least rhetorically—linked to Israel’s invasion of Gaza, they should also be understood as a deliberate effort by the group to assert control over the entirety of Yemen’s territorial waters and internationalize the struggle for control of Yemen’s resources and strategic locations.


Sources:

“قدرات اليمن في حماية البحار والمياه الوطنية  Yemeni capabilities for protecting national seas and waterways,” 26 September (official Yemeni daily), 25 September 2023. https://www.26sep.net/index.php/local/64705-2023-09-25-05-09-57

”We were in a raging war with two ships coming to the port of Aden to plunder Yemeni gas, and they retreated four times, most recently yesterday. We informed the companies that owned the ships ‘Sinmar Jane’ and ‘Bolivar’ that we would strike them if they entered to loot gas from the port of Aden, and they are ready to do so. A few days earlier, President Al-Mashat vowed to ‘target the military bases of the Saudi-Emirati coalition forces on the Yemeni islands.’ At that time, he concurred with the Chief of Staff of the Naval Forces and Coastal Defense, Brigadier General Mansour Ahmed Al-Saadi, ‘on the level of qualitative armament that the naval forces now possess, which enables them to confront the enemy with all merit and ability, and allows them to meet the challenges…”


The Minister of Defense, Major General Muhammad Nasser Al-Atifi, had previously confirmed that maritime security of Yemeni territorial waters would be a priority in the next stage…

The preparation of the naval force comes in light of the enemy mercenaries’ relinquishing of national sovereignty, and their exposing the country’s sovereign oil, gas and fishery resources to unprecedented plunder. Alongside this organized plunder are the occupation’s efforts to expand and control the most important strategic ports and islands, such as Socotra and Mayun. It was necessary for the Yemeni armed forces to carry out their duty to protect the territorial waters and the sovereign wealth of oil, gas and fisheries from the dangers coming from the coalition of aggressors and their mercenaries from inside and outside the country, and to prepare themselves as a deterrent weapon for all these ambitions. Regarding freedom of international navigation in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the position of the Republic of Yemen is specific and clear, which is to encourage international navigation through the Strait provided that it does not harm the sovereignty, unity, security or independence of the Republic.


Notes:

[i] For details on Ansarallah’s naval arsenal, see: “A Maritime Menace: The Houthi Navy,” Oryx Blog, 2 January 2023. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2023/01/a-maritime-menace-houthi-navy.html; “Houthis Showcase Large Arsenal Of Missiles, Drones At Sana’a Military Parade,” MEMRI, 21 September 2023. https://www.memri.org/tv/houthis-showcase-large-arsenal-missiles-drones-military-parade; “Under Fire in the Bab al-Mandab: Houthi Military Capabilities and U.S. Response Options,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 8 December 2023. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/under-fire-bab-al-mandab-houthi-military-capabilities-and-us-response-options;“Houthi anti-ship missile systems: getting better all the time,” IISS, 4 January 2024. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/01/houthi-anti-ship-missile-systems-getting-better-all-the-time/ For details on Ansarallah’s anti-ship ballistic missiles, see: “We Might Have Just Seen the World’s First Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Attack,” Popular Mechanics, 1 December 2023. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a45964460/first-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-attack-houthi-rebels/

[ii] For more on control over Socotra, see: Lucas Winter, “Regional Friction Over Yemen’s Socotra Island,” OE Watch, June 2018. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-17883-00-00-00-27-93-72/2018_2D00_06_2D00_01-Regional-Friction-Over-Yemen_1920_s-Socotra-Island-_2800_Winter_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true; For more on control over Yemen’s Arabian Sea ports, see: Lucas Winter, “Saudis Seek Pathway to the Arabian Sea,” OE Watch, October 2018. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-17883-00-00-00-26-69-08/2018_2D00_10_2D00_01-Saudis-Seek-Pathway-to-the-Arabian-Sea-_2800_Winter_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true


Image Information:

Image:  Yemen map showing major population centers as well as parts of neighboring countries and the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
Source: CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/yemen/map
Attribution: Public Domain

Iran Rationalizes Russia’s Pro-Arab Position on Disputed Islands

Iranian graphic depicting the strategic location and Iranian control over Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tonb Islands.


“Russia seems to take for granted its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.”


Despite official warmth, Iran has reason to be suspicious of Russia, given Russia’s historic willingness to interfere in Iranian politics and/or infringe on Iranian sovereignty.[i] The excerpted opinion piece from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated news outlet Fararu.ir, highlights that one of the most sensitive sovereignty issues for Iran today revolves around three islands—Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tonb Islands—occupied by Iranian forces in 1971 to prevent the UK from transferring their control to the UAE. While international law sides with the UAE, Iran has been unwilling to return the islands due to their strategic importance overseeing the shipping lanes on the Persian Gulf side of the Strait of Hormuz. Indeed, Abu Musa has become home to a major IRGC base.[ii] The excerpted article seeks to rationalize Russia’s decision to side with the UAE over Iran on questions about the islands’ sovereignty. It argues the UAE is an important outlet for the Russian economy in an era of isolation and sanctions. Russian officials may also believe Tehran has become so dependent on Moscow that Iran has little choice but to accept Russia’s pro-UAE position on the matter. Regardless, short of civil war distracting Iran during any transition following Khamenei’s death, there is little possibility that the UAE could liberate its occupied territories or that Russia could compel Iran to abandon the three islands. Still, Iranians have long memories and are unlikely to forgive the Kremlin for what they see as a betrayal. Iran may tilt more toward China in the future or simply bide its time and lick it wounds. But, when Iranians feel the moment is right, they will use the Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tonbs episode to justify a future betrayal of Russia.


Sources:

“Cherayi Mawzehgiri Russiyeh dar Khasus Jazair She Ganeh” (What Explains Russia’s Position with Regard to the Three Islands?),” Fararu.com (nominally independent web portal close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), 31 December 2023. https://fararu.com/fa/news/695771

Russia is a country that does not make treaty of friendship with anyone but rather pursues only its own interests. To put it simply, from the Russian perspective, there are no strategic enemies or strategic friends. Russians… do not see everything as zero sum game. For example, Russia is now at odds with the West, but it has also maintained cooperation on some issues, openly or covertly.

With this brief preamble, we return to recent Russian behavior with regard to the three islands. First, we need to look at things globally. Everyone knows well that America’s power in the world, if not weak is waning. On the other hand, China, with its strong economic backing and lack of arrogance in the style of the West – now has a positive image in the world. By mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China somehow announced its presence in the region, though it had been in place for many years as an emerging power in the world that is transforming from bipolar to multipolar….Perhaps one of the main reasons for Russia’s recent stance is the oil dollars of Arab countries, which have caught the eye of [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and Russia under sanctions. Moscow is under severe pressure due to Western sanctions, so it seems that with full cooperation with Arabs on the issue of the three Persian Gulf islands, it intends on one hand to influence the circle of America’s Arab allies and on the other hand, take a realistic view of its national and financial interests…. Russia seems to take for granted its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since the West has no place in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kremlin officials have sided with Arab countries without worrying about Iranian reactions.


Notes:

[i] For an earlier discussion of Iran’s the history and development of Iran-Russia relations, see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian Influence Extends to the Mediterranean,” OE Watch, September 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/242569/download

[ii] For background on the island dispute, see: Michael Rubin, “Revolutionary Guard Chief Exacerbates UAE-Iran Island Dispute,” OE Watch, June 2012, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195617


Image Information:

Image: Iranian graphic depicting the strategic location and Iranian control over Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tonb Islands.
Source: https://www.tabnak.ir/files/fa/tags/4706/1674926_155.jpg
Attribution: Tabnak.ir


Iran Hints It Will Supply Air Defense Weaponry to Palestinians

Iraj Masjedi, a Qods Force commander and former Iranian ambassador to Iraq, meets with Qassem Soleimani, the late leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Qods Force.


“A day will come when… [Palestinians] will obtain air defense weapons.”


The advisor to the commander of the Qods Force, Iraj Masjedi, used the 3 January anniversary of the 2020 death of former Qods Force chief Qassem Soleimani to deride both the United States and Israel. The anniversary has become an annual commemoration in Iran.[i] Multiple Iranian politicians and military officers give speeches lionizing Soleimani and condemning the United States. While the Iranian population is inured to such bombast, the speech by Masjedi was noteworthy for its specificity about providing anti-air defenses to the Palestinians. In practice, support for Palestinians means support for Palestine Islamic Jihad and Hamas, both of which act as proxies for Iran.[ii] “A day will come when they [the Palestinians] will not allow bombardments by the Zionists and they will obtain air defense weapons,” he promised. Masjedi’s resume enhances the importance of his words. He was a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) general, Soleimani’s top advisor, and a former Ambassador to Iraq who today serves as a supreme advisor to the IRGC-Qods Force. If Iran can smuggle anti-aircraft missiles into Gaza, Hamas could target Israeli aircraft engaging in the Gaza fight and endanger commercial traffic servicing Ben Gurion Airport, with approach and departure routes over the West Bank.


Sources:

“Sardar Masjedi: Filistiniha beh Salah Pedafandi Dast Miyaband” (General Masjedi: Palestinians to Get Defensive Weapons),” Fararu.com (nominally independent web portal close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), 8 January 2024. https://fararu.com/fa/news/698061

The supreme advisor to the commander of the Qods Force [Iraj Masjedi] said that the strength of the Islamic Resistance is increasing daily. He said, “The Palestinians are fighting with rockets today, but a day will come when they will not allow bombardments by the Zionists and they will obtain air defense weapons,” he added.

Referring to America’s evils in the region, Masjedi said, “What is the commander of CENTCOM doing in Israel?” American planes are regularly sending weapons and bombs to Israel. The United States claim to stand for human rights when in fact they are the parents of terrorism.

The Americans have the largest army in the world but I tell you, they do not base one division of it in the United States itself, and instead it is spread out in the world. What are U.S. bases doing in the region? By what right are they based all over the world? Armies are responsible for maintaining their own territorial security. Where in the world do the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Islamic Republic of Iran Army have military bases? In this situation, the Americans tell others that Iran is interfering in the world, but this is very shameful.

He also referred to the weakness of the Israeli army in confronting the Palestinian resistance, saying that the Israelis have a special force called the Golani Brigade, which is considered to be a special force to deal with the Palestinians, but this brigade was so badly hit by the resistance forces that it was ordered to withdraw and the other five brigades of the Israel Defense Forces were forced to withdraw.The Supreme Advisor to the commander of the Qods Force also emphasized that the regional resistance forces with the support of the Iranian resistance force will break the hands of the enemies.


Notes:

[i] Against the backdrop of the Israel-Hamas war, this year’s commemorations of Soleimani’s death stretched on for a week with senior political and military  officials including, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, making statements testifying to Soleimani’s embodiment of the revolutionary values Iran seeks to espouse.

[ii] Iran initially embraced late Palestinian chairman Yasser Arafat and his Palestine Liberation Organization, the Iranian regime began to shift its support to Hamas following Arafat’s decision to begin negotiating with Israel at the end of the Reagan administration and largely broke with the PLO and the Palestinian Authority it dominated following the Oslo Accords. For an earlier discussion of Iran’s concept of strategic boundaries extending to its west, see: Michael Rubin, “Khamenei Speaks On Necessity Of Palestinian ‘Resistance,’” OE Watch, 06-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/khamenei-speaks-on-necessity-of-palestinian-resistance/


Image Information:

Image: Iraj Masjedi, a Qods Force commander and former Iranian ambassador to Iraq, meets with Qassem Soleimani, the late leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Qods Force. Source: https://jamejamonline.ir/files/fa/news/1402/10/13/1064448_573.jpg
Attribution: Jamejamonline.ir


Spotlight on Vatanpour, Iran’s “Most Active” Airbase

Shahid [Martyr] Vatanpour Air Base, Isfahan


“If the army helicopters were not present, the costs in blood and treasure…would have been far greater.”


When the Iranian Air Force makes news, it is often for bad reasons, such as when its aging jets crash.[i] The excerpted article from Iranian news outlet defapress.ir features the Shahid Vatanpour Army Air Base south of Isfahan, providing some previously under-reported detail on the fact that it is a logistics and training base.[ii] The article also provides insight into activity and flight hours flown at Vatanpour and other air bases. For instance, the 168-fold difference in hours flown between Vatanpour and the Tehran Army Air Base is striking (366,477 vs. 2,177 hours). As a training base, it makes sense that there would be many flight hours logged at Vatanpour. However, delegation may be part of the enormous number of hours flown out of the base with Vatanpour being more central, less congested, and better suited as a logistical hub. Additionally, the metrics may be somewhat skewed because Iran stations certain F-14s at Tehran’s Mehrabad International Airport rather than at the Army Air Base, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operates airliners for military transport and logistics under the guise of passenger and cargo planes.

The aircraft themselves also tell a story. The short number of flight hours for the Chinooks stationed at Vatanpour may reflect, both the small number of Chinooks that remain in service and their poor condition.[iii] The inventory of Bell Helicopters has likewise shrunk, though the smaller platform and easier access to spare parts enables greater flight time.[iv] The excerpted article itself may serve another purpose as well. While the IRGC can rely on its many business interests to increase its official budget by more than an order of magnitude,[v] the regular Army has no such recourse. Even with the end of many international sanctions, funding remains limited. By highlighting the importance of Vatanpour, the IRGC may be seeking to protect the base should the Army’s top brass be considering an Iranian equivalent of a base realignment commission.


Sources:

“Paygah-e Isfahan: Fa’altarin Paygah-e Havaniroz Artesh” (Isfahan Base: The Army’s Most Active Air Force Base),” defapress.ir (official news agency of Iran’s defense ministry), 14 January 2024. https://defapress.ir/fa/news/644683

The Army Ground Forces are among the most influential forces that comprise the armed forces of our country. Within the ground forces is the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Aviation, colloquially known as “Havaniruz,” that has performed many missions in its existence, especially since the victory of the Islamic Revolution when it participated prominently in battle, security, and relief operations. In many cases, if the army helicopters were not present, the costs in blood and treasure we may have paid would have been far greater. The pilots of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Aviation carry out both helicopter and fixed wing missions. The Chinook pilots have the least numbers of flights, and the [Bell] 209 [Cobra], [Bell] 205, [Bell] 206, and [Bell] 214 pilots the most flight hours. The fixed-wing pilots also fly with [Dassault] Falcons, [Fokker F-27] Friendships and [Rockwell 690] Turbo Commander jets from Iran Army airbases in Tehran, Mashhad, Abyek [Qazvin], Masjid Suleiman, Khuzestan, Kerman, Kermanshah and the general support group and Vatanpour training center in Isfahan…. In the fixed-wing sector, Falcon jet pilots have the lowest number of flights and Turbo Commander pilots have the highest number of flights.In addition, the pilots assigned to the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Air Force base in Tehran recorded the least flight time with 2,177 hours, while the pilots assigned to the Shahid Vatanpour base in Isfahan recorded the highest amount, with 366,477 hours.


Notes:

[i] For previous discussion of Iranian fighter jet crashes, see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian F-14 Crash Highlights Iran’s Need for New Fighter Contract” OE Watch, 08-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iranian-f-14-crash-highlights-irans-need-for-new-fighter-contract/

[ii] The Iranian air forces are often subordinate to other branches of the Iranian military. Within both the regular Army and in the IRGC, the ground forces and navy are more prominent. In 2008, the Air Defense Force split from the Army’s Air Force to become its own distinct military branch focused on anti-aircraft capabilities. The IRGC, meanwhile, folds the role of its air force into the strategic missile and space forces, both of which outshine Iran’s aging jetfighters and other military aircraft. While Tehran spotlights its satellite launches and precision missiles, the bulk of its manned air force dates from prerevolutionary days with most aircraft more than a half century old.

[iii] Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s Chinooks numbered more than 100. They were once a workhorse for the Iranian Army. Famously, less than a year before the Islamic Revolution, four Iranian Chinooks strayed into Soviet airspace during a training mission, leading to the downing of two, with eight fatalities. Today, the Iranian Army Air Force may have at most two in service, the rest destroyed during the Iran-Iraq War, through attrition, or cannibalized for spare parts.

[iv] For background into Iran’s efforts to keep its helicopter fleet flying, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Reconstruction and Overhaul of Helicopters” OE Watch, March 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/368233/download

[v] For background about the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ economic interests, see: Michael Rubin, “The IRGC Wins Multibillion Dollar Economic Projects” OE Watch, August 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/241432/download


Image Information:

Image: Shahid [Martyr] Vatanpour Air Base, Isfahan
Source: https://www.ibena.ir/files/fa/news/1401/9/27/24702_342.jpg
Attribution: defapress.ir


China’s Economic Interests at Risk With Rise of Houthi Shipping Attacks

Chinese container ship off the coast of Los Angeles, California.


China is the customer for 90% of the oil exported by Iran. The chances of the Houthis firing on ships of a state-owned Chinese company are therefore very low, raising questions about the reasons for COSCO’s decision”


The Israel-Hamas conflict and the conflict’s subsequent spread to Yemen and the Red Sea is challenging Chinese economic interests and policy in the region. In early January, Chinese shipping giant China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) and Hong Kong–based subsidiary Overseas Orient Container Line announced that they would cut service to Israeli ports in response to Houthi attacks on ships destined for Israel. According to the first excerpted articles from the Israeli business news publication Globes, China has in effect sacrificed trade with Israel to maintain shipping access to the Red Sea. While the article vilifies the Chinese position, China is in a bind because both Israel and Iran are significant regional trading partners with China. The Houthis are militarily and diplomatically supported by Iran. China must balance its priorities in the region between Iran and Israel—and any regional war would be bad for China’s Middle East interests.[i] In the second excerpt, taken from a speech delivered by China’s UN Ambassador less than a week after the COSCO announcement, the Ambassador noted that “the waters of the Red Sea are an important transportation channel for goods and energy” and called on the Houthis to “to immediately stop harassing merchant ships and respect the navigation rights of merchant ships from all countries in the Red Sea waters, in accordance with international law.”[ii] Not long after, a Houthi official interviewed by Russian news source Izvestia stated that all Russian and Chinese ships would be safe navigating the Red Sea but that ships aligned with Israel would be subject to targeting. The Houthi spokesman continued “Our goal is to raise the economic costs for the Jewish state to stop the carnage in Gaza.” However, despite these assurances, any economic pain that Israel might feel because of reduced shipping to its ports also transfers to China, complicating its economic strategy in the Middle East.


Sources:

“Chinese shipping giant COSCO to stop visiting Israeli ports,” Globes (Israeli business news), 7 January 2024. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-chinese-shipping-giant-cosco-to-stop-visiting-israeli-ports-1001467115

Chinese state-owned shipping giant COSCO Shipping has stopped visiting Israeli ports, “Globes” has learned. The company, the fourth largest container shipping line in the world, with about 11% of world trade, decided on this step even though it is not much threatened in the Red Sea, because of the very fact that it is Chinese, and because of China’s ties with Iran, the patron of the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Besides the effect on trade between the Far East and Israel, COSCO’s decision is significant because it cooperates with Israeli shipping line ZIM, which will have to operate more ships on the Far East routes, which is liable to will lead to higher shipping costs, since XIM will be short of ships.

The second direct effect will be on the Haifa Bayport, which is operated by another state-owned Chinese company, SIPG. The port is dependent on the many COSCO ships that visit it.

The Houthis are threatening to attack vessels of any company that sails to Israel, but China is the customer for 90% of the oil exported by Iran. The chances of the Houthis firing on ships of a state-owned Chinese company are therefore very low, raising questions about the reasons for COSCO’s decision, of which international shippers have yet to be notified.

A pointer to COSCO’s step was the recent announcement by its Hong Kong-based subsidiary OOCL that it was ceasing to sail to Israel because of “operational problems”. That announcement, intended to enable it to sail in the Red Sea without interference by the Houthis, led to wide criticism. In the end, the company caved in, like Singapore-based shipping line ONE (Ocean Network Express).


“常驻联合国代表张军大使在安理会红海局势紧急公开会上的发言 (Speech by Ambassador Zhang Jun, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at the Security Council’s emergency public meeting on the Red Sea situation),” PRC Permanent Mission to the United Nations, published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of China, 12 January 2024. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/zwbd_673032/wjzs/202401/t20240114_11223386.shtml

Mr. President: China thanks Russia for its initiative to hold this emergency meeting and thanks Assistant Secretary-General Kyali for his briefing. The United States, Britain and other countries have carried out air strikes on targets in Yemen, further escalating tensions in the Red Sea region. China expresses serious concern about this.

The waters of the Red Sea are an important transportation channel for goods and energy. For some time, the Houthi armed forces have repeatedly attacked and seized merchant ships in the Red Sea waters, disrupting international trade order and not conducive to regional stability. China has repeatedly called on the Houthis to immediately stop harassing merchant ships and respect the navigation rights of merchant ships from all countries in the Red Sea waters in accordance with international law. China also calls on all parties, especially influential major powers, to play a constructive and responsible role in jointly safeguarding the safety of waterways in the Red Sea.

We regret to see that the brazen military actions taken by relevant countries against Yemen not only caused infrastructure damage and civilian casualties, but also aggravated security risks in the Red Sea waters and did not help protect the safety of commercial ships and freedom of navigation. Relevant military actions may also impact the political process in Yemen. We fail to see how such a military operation could achieve the stated intended objectives.

It must be noted that the Security Council has never authorized any country to use of force against Yemen. The military actions taken by relevant countries run counter to the purpose of Resolution 2722 just adopted by the Security Council. China reiterates that no country shall misinterpret or abuse international law and Security Council resolutions to create new tensions in the Red Sea waters.

Mr. President: The current tensions in the Red Sea are one manifestation of the spillover effects of the conflict in Gaza. Letting the conflict in Gaza prolong while hoping that the conflict will not expand may be wishful thinking. It is even more contradictory and irresponsible to advocate preventing conflicts from spilling over, while at the same time adding fuel to the fire and provoking military confrontation. The Middle East is already on the brink of extreme danger. What we should avoid most at the moment is reckless military adventurism. What we need most is calmness and restraint to prevent further expansion of conflicts. We urge all relevant parties, especially the influential powers, to abide by the UN Charter and international law, adhere to the correct direction of dialogue and consultation, and make practical efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Red Sea and the Middle East. Thank you, Chairman.


В «Ансар Аллах» гарантировали безопасность судам РФ и КНР в Красном море (Ansar Allah guaranteed the safety of Russian and Chinese vessels in the Red Sea),” Izvestia (Russian news source), 19 January 2024. В «Ансар Аллах» гарантировали безопасность судам РФ и КНР в Красном море | Новости мира | Известия | 19.01.2024 (iz.ru)

Representative of the al-Buheiti movement: the Houthis will not attack Russian and Chinese ships

The Yemeni Houthi movement Ansar Allah is attacking US and British ships in the Red Sea; as for other countries, including Russia and China, their shipping in the region is guaranteed safety. A member of the Ansar Allah Politburo, Muhammad al-Buheiti, stated this on January 19 in an interview with Izvestia.

“As for all other countries, including Russia and China, their shipping in the region is not threatened. Moreover, we are ready to ensure the safety of the passage of their ships in the Red Sea, because free navigation plays a significant role for our country,” Al-Buheiti noted.

The politician also added that any Israeli ships or those connected with Israel will not have the slightest opportunity to sail through the Red Sea – attacks on them will continue.

“Ansar Allah does not pursue the goal of capturing or sinking this or that sea vessel. Our goal is to raise the economic costs for the Jewish state to stop the carnage in Gaza. If the crews of the ships that came under our fire had not ignored our warning signals and changed their direction, the further escalation that the American side caused in the interests of protecting Israel could have been avoided,” he said.

Earlier, on January 17, the military representative of the Ansar Allah movement, Yahya Saria, said that it launched a missile attack on the American ship Genco Picardy in the Gulf of Aden. According to him, the Houthis recorded a direct hit on the ship.

On the same day, the UK Navy’s Maritime Trade Coordination Center (UKMTO) reported that a drone attacked a ship off the coast of Aden, Yemen, which led to a fire on board the ship. A previous attack on a ship in the Red Sea was reported the day before. The Houthis then took responsibility for it and confirmed the fact of a missile attack on the bulk carrier Zografia, which was flying the Maltese flag.The Houthis began attacking shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden from November 2023 to protest Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip…


Notes:

[i] For a previous perspective on the conflict in Gaza’s impact on China interests in the region see: “Israel’s close economic ties with China worked well – until the Gaza conflict,” South China Morning Post, 2 November 2023. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3240061/israels-close-economic-relationship-china-worked-well-until-gaza-conflict-revealed-its-limits

[ii] A wide range of global reporting has indicated that China is also said to have put pressure on Iran to rein in the Houthis, while the United States has asked China to take more of a role in mediating the conflict in Israel.


Image Information:

Image: Chinese container ship off the coast of Los Angeles, California.
Source: Corey Seeman
Attribution: CC By-NC-SA 2.0


Belarus and Iran Form Alliance Against the West


Our answer is one: we must work closely with one another and cooperate together to resist these attacks.


In response to perceived Western aggression, Belarus and Iran have deepened their pre-existing relationship into a strategic alliance that now includes a developing partnership in military, economic, and political affairs. According to the excerpted press statement published by The Press-Service of the President of Belarus, the goal of the alliance is to “work closely with one another and cooperate together to resist…attacks.” In an additional press statement featured on the Belarus Ministry of Defense website, Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin, stated “from the beginning of the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the coalition of Western states, led by the United States, has always tried to hinder the development and prosperity of Iran. But, despite the imposed eight-year war, numerous territorial acts, unprecedented sanctions and political pressure, Iran has built a strong and independent government.” Underscoring this alliance, earlier this year the two nations signed a comprehensive cooperative roadmap that runs through 2026.[i] Prospective discussions between the two Ministries of Defense see the possibility of collaborative military training as well as bilateral cooperation of their Armed Forces. Through their alliance, Belarus and Iran seek to strengthen their military position in response to perceived threats from the West. This could indicate the possibility that Belarus and Iran are actively preparing for a military engagement, fueled by shared feelings of Western aggression. The new agreement has set a precedent for military resources and information to be shared openly and freely, as we have seen from the discussions by the Defense Ministers about beginning joint field training. This new alliance strengthens the two nations through political, military, and economic preference and support on the perceived hostile global stage. From this accord, each nation has now gained a resource to increase their resiliency both in and out of military conflict. Iran and Belarus mutually benefit from sharing military training to increase proficiency, and outside of wartime, they each have a partner in economic and political growth globally.


Sources:

“Встреча с первым вице-презмдентом Ирана Мохаммадом Мохбером (Meeting with the First-Vice President of Iran Mohammad Mokhber),” Пресс-служба Президента Республики Беларусь (The Press-Service of the President of Belarus), 17 October 2023. https://president.gov.by/ru/events/vstrecha-s-pervym-vice-prezidentom-irana-mohammadom-mohberom-1697531352

“I hope that you will not be disappointed with your visit. There are a lot of questions to discuss. Therefore, I also hope that our conversation will have a good practical result,” the head of state welcomed the Iranian guest. “You know the situation that Belarus is in. It is a similar situation to your own. Pressure, exerted on our states, without precedent, but you have already learned to resist it somewhat, and your experience for us is most important”…Alexander Lukashenko remarked that the situation in the world is heating up, and the crisis in the Middle East contributes to the fact that unfriendly Western states, led by the United States, are constantly directing this conflict against Iran. “You feel it better. Our answer is one: we must work closely with one another, and cooperate together to resist these attacks,” stated the President (Lukashenko).


“Официальный визит Министра обороны Беларуси в Исламскую Республику Иран (дополнено) (Official Visit of the Minister of Defense of Belarus to the Islamic Republic of Iran (Updated)),” Министерство Обороны Республики Беларусь (The Ministry of Defense of Belarus), 01 September 2023. https://www.mil.by/ru/news/162070/

“The history of relations between Belarus and Iran has shown, that our people know how to be friends and highly value the relationship between our countries, built on the principles of mutual respect and common values,” stated the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Belarus Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin during the meeting with the Minister of Defense and Support of the Armed Forces of Iran Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani.  

Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin also noted that from the beginning of the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the coalition of Western states, led by the United States, has always tried to hinder the development and prosperity of Iran. 

But, despite the imposed eight-year war, numerous territorial acts, unprecedented sanctions and political pressure, Iran has built a strong and independent government. “And in this our nations are similar. We, like you, clearly and consistently defend our sovereignty and independence. We are brought together by the similarity of our positions in many international issues. It is not only the independent and pragmatic political leadership of our governments but the unity of views on the establishment of a just world order based on the development of multipolarity and non-interference in internal affairs. Our nations together defend the inviolability of international law,” noted the Minister of Defense…The parties discussed the state and prospects for bilateral cooperation in field training and usage of the Armed forces, also further steps were planned to deepen and intensify bilateral collaboration.


Notes:

[i] For a more comprehensive understanding of the types of cooperation, military and other, that Belarus and Iran have agreed upon, see: “Лукашенко и Раиси подписали дорожную карту всестороннего сотрудничества до 2026 года (Lukashenko and Raisi sign roadmap of comprehensive cooperation until 2026),” Gosstandart (Belarussian State Media), 13 March 2023. https://gosstandart.gov.by/lukashenko-i-raisi-podpisali-dorozhnuyu-kartu-vsestoronnego-sotrudnichestva-do-2026