Tag Archives: Iran

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Names New Leader

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Sana’a, capitol of Yemen at Night.

“Despite its decline in the Arabian Peninsula, [AQAP] remains the most effective terrorist group in Yemen, with the intent to launch attacks in the region and beyond.”

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) named a successor after the recent loss of its leader. According to the first excerpted article from the Saudi state-owned international news outlet Al Arabiya, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, aka “Abu al-Laith,” a Yemeni national, has been named the new leader of AQAP. The organization’s official, Ibrahim al-Qusi, confirmed in a broadcast recording that the group’s former leader had been killed, declaring that “Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki is the new leader of the organization in the Arabian Peninsula.”[i] The new AQAP leader, Al-Awlaki, reportedly had direct ties to former al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden and was repatriated to Yemen by Bin Laden. Al-Awlaki is reported to also have originated from the same tribe as former al-Qaeda spiritual leader Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed in 2011. There is a $6 million reward from the U.S. State Department for information about the new AQAP leader, who has “publicly called for attacks on the U.S. and its allies.” The U.S. has designated AQAP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization since 2010.[ii]

The second excerpted article from the Jeddah-based Saudi daily newspaper Okaz, provides some perspective on the current status of AQAP, as well as the potential effect of Al-Awlaki as the group’s new leader. The article notes that the al-Qaeda affiliate has struggled for a multitude of reasons, including the loss of several key leaders, financial challenges, and internal disputes that have led to structural issues. The article also states that Al-Awlaki could be a unifier for AQAP due to his extensive background in the terrorist network, experience in the al-Qaeda leadership council, and previous position as Emir in the Shabwa Province. While there has been a shift in the West to focus on great power competition with China and Russia, and persistent challenges from Iran, the ongoing threat from international terrorist organizations cannot be discounted, especially with new leaders who have openly called for attacks against the United States.[iii]

Sources:

“سعد العولقي.. من هو زعيم “القاعدة” الجديد في اليمن؟  (Saad Al-Awlaki… Who is the New Leader of Al Qaeda in Yemen),” Al Arabiya (Saudi state-owned news outlet), 11 March 2024. https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/yemen/2024/03/11/بعد-الاعلان-عن-مقتل-زعيم-تنظيم-القاعدة-من-هو-خليفته؟

Al-Qaeda in Yemen confirmed the killing of its leader, Khaled Batarfi, without going into details, announcing that his new successor is Saad Al-Awlaki. The SITE Center, which monitors terrorist media, stated that the organization’s legal official, Ibrahim al-Qusi, confirmed in a recording broadcast yesterday, Sunday, the killing of Batarfi, the organization’s leader since February 2020, declaring that “Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki is the new leader of the organization in the Arabian Peninsula.” , which the United States classifies as a terrorist…

Saad bin Atef Al-Awlaki, nicknamed “Abu Al-Laith,”… is of Yemeni nationality, and media reports indicate that he is one of those who was repatriated from Afghanistan to Yemen by the former leader of Al-Qaeda, who was killed by America in 2011, Osama bin Laden. Thus, Al-Awlaki becomes the fifth leader to publicly lead Al-Qaeda in Yemen, after working for years as the extremist organization’s second-in-command in the country.

Saad Al-Awlaki was born in the town of Al-Shu’bah in Wadi Yasbam in the Upper Egypt District in Shabwa Governorate (south). He comes from the large Al-Awalqi tribe, the same tribe from which the spiritual father of Al-Qaeda, Anwar Al-Awlaki, who was killed by an American drone in 2011, descends.

Mohamed Hefney, “خبير مصري لـ عكاظ: الخلافات تفكك تنظيم القاعدة الإرهابي في اليمن (An Egyptian expert to Okaz: Disagreements are Disintegrating the Al-Qaeda Terrorist Organization in Yemen),” Okaz (Saudi based newspaper), 13 March 2024. https://www.okaz.com.sa/news/politics/2157390

Fears are escalating within Al-Qaeda, after the killing of its fourth leader in Yemen, Khalid Batarfi, nicknamed “Abu al-Miqdad al-Kindi,” and the appointment of his successor, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, nicknamed “Abu al-Layth,” who the US administration classified in 2021 as a global terrorist, and offered a reward of $6. Millions of dollars in exchange for providing information about him.

Dr. Nabil Naeem, believes that Al-Awlaki is known for his extreme hostility toward America, and like all of his predecessors, he called for the necessity of launching attacks on the United States of America, which prompted the American administration to allocate a large financial reward to anyone who provides information about him. He stressed that Al-Qaeda in general, whether in Yemen or elsewhere, has become weak and fragile and is witnessing a major liquidation of its leaders, whether in Yemen or other countries in the region. It is not the organization that existed 20 years ago. The new leader of Al-Qaeda in Yemen faces grave challenges and priorities, including how to preserve his life and the lives of his followers from the expected physical liquidation. The Yemeni organization also faces challenges at the financial and structural levels, as the financial level is very weak. Structural level: There is a state of splits and divisions within the organization left behind by the former leader of the organization, which indicates that his death was under the direction of those close to him. Therefore, we do not rule out that the new leadership will seek to bring the terrorist organization together.Al-Awlaki is considered one of the founding leaders of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and he served as a member of the leadership council of Al-Qaeda. He was born in the 1980s. He joined the organization in 2010, and assumed the position of Emir of Shabwa Province until 2014, then he was appointed a member of the organization’s Shura Council, which is responsible for Managing operations, and he was called the second man in Al-Qaeda in Yemen.

Notes:

[i] Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was initially created in 2009 after the Saudi and Yemeni branches merged forces. The group is currently assessed to be one of the most lethal al-Qaeda affiliates. The Council on Foreign Relations published a backgrounder on AQAP, see: “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),” Council on Foreign Relations, 19 June 2015. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap

[ii] For a complete list of designated terrorist organizations by the United States Government see: “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, Accessed 12 March 2024. https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/

[iii] The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community further notes that, “Al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates on the African continent and Yemen will sustain the global network as the group maintains its strategic intent to target the United States and U.S. citizens.” The entirety of the most recent unclassified annual threat assessment issued by the United States Intelligence Community can be located here: “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 5 February 2024. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf

Image Information:

Image: Sana’a, capitol of Yemen at Night.
Source: https://openverse.org/image/c4b13d0f-5ffa-44fc-9a82-518d08dbfbc0?q=yemen Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0

Venezuela Seeks To Rectify Deteriorating Relations With Iran

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Venezuela’s former Foreign Minister, Jorge Arreaza, visits Iran.

“Venezuela is rushing to meet the terms of a three-year alliance that has involved hundreds of millions of dollars in oil trades and contracts.”

Once considered to be one of the Maduro regime’s staunchest allies, the Venezuela-Iran relationship has entered a rocky period.[i] Beyond military cooperation, Iran has long provided critical support to the Maduro regime in the areas of sanctions evasion and diluents for crude oil refining. According to the first excerpted article from the Venezuelan daily El Nacional, the bilateral relationship began to deteriorate when the West partially lifted oil sanctions on Venezuela following pledges for freer and fairer presidential elections this year. The article reports that the Maduro regime shifted production and export to Western markets, falling woefully behind in its scheduled oil deliveries to Iran. The article also details that part of an earlier three-year agreement aimed at sanctions evasion saw Iran offload much of Venezuela’s sanctioned crude.[ii] The second excerpted article, from the business-focused Venezuelan news outlet Banca y Negocios, cites people familiar with the deal that helped boost Venezuela’s crude exports and mitigate fuel shortages while under previous sanctions. Under the deal, Iran also committed to renovating several of Venezuela’s large oil refineries. The Maduro regime’s decision to abandon the terms of its agreement with Iran has irked Iranian officials, according to the reporting by Banca y Negocios. At the same time, it speculates that the Maduro regime is motivated to return to the Iran deal as it anticipates the return of Western sanctions, having failed to comply with its prior commitments toward freer and fairer presidential elections. Returning to this agreement with Iran will be critical for the Maduro regime to survive the possible reimposition of Western sanctions on its oil sector.

Sources:

“Venezuela se apresura a mejorar su relación con Irán mientras se avecinan sanciones de EEUU (Venezuela rushes to improve its relationship with Iran as US sanctions loom),” El Nacional (Venezuelan daily focused on the politics of the Maduro regime), 13 March 2024. https://www.elnacional.com/economia/venezuela-se-apresura-a-mejorar-su-relacion-con-iran-mientras-se-avecinan-sanciones-de-ee-uu/  

Iran and Venezuela are trying to rebuild an oil alliance that began to crumble last year after Venezuela fell behind in oil trades…A review of PDVSA data and shipping documents shows that Venezuela fell behind on payments to Iran, a shortfall that worsened when the United States began issuing licenses in late 2022. Those authorizations led the state firm to reallocate shipments…to save the partnership, Venezuela is rushing to meet the terms of a three-year alliance that has involved hundreds of millions of dollars in oil trades and contracts. Nicolás Maduro’s government is trying to settle outstanding debt by accelerating deliveries of heavy crude oil and fuel shipments to Iran.

“Venezuela busca mejorar su relación con Irán tras presentar retrasos en el intercambio petrolero (Venezuela seeks to improve its relationship with Iran after presenting delays in the oil exchange),” Banca y Negocios (a Venezuelan digital portal focused on financial and economic reporting), 12 March 2024. https://www.bancaynegocios.com/venezuela-busca-mejorar-su-relacion-con-iran-tras-presentar-retrasos-en-el-intercambio-petrolero/    Six people familiar with the matter stated that the agreement between both nations helped boost crude oil exports and alleviate the fuel problem that Venezuela suffered…the possible reimposition of sanctions by the United States would make the alliance between Venezuela and Iran essential to keeping the Venezuelan oil sector afloat…Venezuela is rushing to comply with the agreement and pay off the debt, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars in oil exchanges and contracts, by accelerating the delivery of heavy hydrocarbons and fuel to the nation located in the Middle East.

Notes:

[i] For more historical background on the importance of the bilateral relationship, see: Moises Rendón and Claudia Fernandez, “The Fabulous Five: How Foreign Actors Prop Up the Maduro Regime in Venezuela,” CSIS Policy Brief, 19 October 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/fabulous-five-how-foreign-actors-prop-maduro-regime-venezuela

[ii] For more information on the deal signed between Iran and Venezuela, see: Deisy Buitrago and Vivian Sequera, “Iran, Venezuela Eye Trade Increase, Sign Petrochemical Deal,” Reuters, 12 June 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/iranian-president-caracas-kicking-off-regional-tour-2023-06-12/

Image Information:

Image: Venezuela’s former Foreign Minister, Jorge Arreaza, visits Iran.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Venezuela%E2%80%99s_Top_Diplomat_Visits_Iran-9.jpg  
Attribution: CC-BY-4.0.

Iran Vaunts Benefits of State-Owned Construction Company

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IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami and Commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters Brigadier General Abdolreza Abed touring preparations for the Grand Mosalla Mosque of Tehran, IRNA (State Media) in March 2024.

“The enemy wanted to prove that ‘we can’t,’ and we had to prove that ‘we can,’ therefore, we were able to overcome the sanctions policy with the power of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters.”

Iran claims it has been able to circumvent sanctions thanks to an infrastructure entity blacklisted by the United States: the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Company (KAA). In an address published by state-aligned outlet Moniban News, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Hossein Salami cheered: “The enemy wanted to prove that ‘we can’t,’ and we had to prove that ‘we can,’ therefore, we were able to overcome the sanctions policy with the power of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters.”

Established during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), KAA functions as the IRGC’s lead contractor for civilian construction projects as well as its nuclear and ballistic missile projects. This resulted in its blacklist designation by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in 2010, given that its subsidiaries are known to funnel money to the IRGC and are used to fund its activities at home and abroad.[i] In the first excerpted article Salami noted that the KAA has helped the country be more independent and is a “powerful response” to sanctions playing a role in at least thirty sectors, including road and urban development, energy, marine, and oil sectors, and hospital construction. The KAA is considered one of the three main pillars of the IRGC-run economy. (The others are the Basij Cooperative Foundation and IRGC Cooperative Foundation.) Beyond its ability to help Iran circumvent sanctions, KAA has played an important role related to educational and employment opportunities. As per the second excerpted article from the Iranian state-run Entekhab News, Salami also emphasized that KAA has provided opportunities for university students not just in the field of engineering but all higher degrees. Additionally, it has prevented brain drain, a historic problem for Iran that has only increased in recent years due to the dire state of the Iranian economy due to U.S. sanctions and systemic mismanagement and corruption. While Iranian officials tend to fluctuate on whether U.S. sanctions on the country have impacted the economy, the recent comments by the IRGC Commander about the KAA seem to confirm that the punitive measures are not putting the necessary strain on the clerical establishment to change its behavior in the region.

Sources:

“سردار سلامی: بدلیل قدرت قرارگاه سازندگی خاتم الانبیا (ص) از تحریم عبور کردیم (General Salami: Due to the strength of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, we overcame sanctions),” Moniban News (State-aligned news. outlet), 3 March 2024.

https://www.moniban.ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-3/203934-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%AF%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%85

Major General Salami added: One of the biggest things the construction headquarters did was refuting the enemy’s particular thinking in this regard. The enemy wanted to prove that ‘we can’t’, and we had to prove that ‘we can,’ therefore, we were able to overcome the sanctions policy with the power of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters and jihadist bodies like the headquarters.

In explaining the hostile sanctions of Iran’s enemies, the IRGC commander stated: The sanctions policy was not a subjective and unrealistic policy, but rather an operational policy of the enemy, and it was completely objective, real, and tangible. But Islamic Iran, with the jihadist forces of Khatam al-Anbiya, was able to surpass and defeat the enemies of the Iranian nation.

In explaining the ethos of the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, he said: The ethos of the Khatam headquarters is not just providing technical work, but rather this headquarters is the heart of the revolution and its ethos is to preserve the political independence of the country, to restore the national self-confidence, and actually making the country not rely on the presence of foreigners, and follows this policy text in its basic actions, and for this reason, it undertakes great works and accepts risks…

Today, the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters is playing a role in at least thirty various sectors: road and urban development, energy, marine, oil, hospital construction and unique buildings, and the subway.

The commander-in-chief of the IRGC states: The Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters has expanded in various specialized fields, which is a powerful response to the enemy’s sanctions.

“فرمانده کل سپاه: قرارگاه خاتم‌الانبیا جلوی فرار مغز‌ها را گرفت (IRGC Commander-in-chief: Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters prevented the minds from escaping),” Entekhab News (state-run media), 3 March 2023.

https://www.entekhab.ir/fa/news/768073/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%DA%A9%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%85%E2%80%8C%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D9%84%D9%88%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%B2%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA

General Salami emphasized that the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters has prevented elite minds from leaving the country. He said: The Khatam headquarters has provided a wide and modern field for technical and industrial elites of our country, and every engineer and doctor with any degree of education can fulfill their dreams during their time at university at the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters.

Notes:

[i] The Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters was designated in 2010 by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. See: “Treasury Targets Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, 10 February 2010. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg539

Image Information:

Image: IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami and Commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters Brigadier General Abdolreza Abed touring preparations for the Grand Mosalla Mosque of Tehran, IRNA (State Media) in March 2024.
Source: https://www.irna.ir/news/85406994/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%87-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%86%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%86
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Iranian Navy Conducts Ballistic Missile Launches From Warship

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“The moment the Dezful ballistic missile is fired from the Shahid Mahdavi warship in the form of a launch container,” Telegram video screenshot, 13 February 2024

“Nowhere is safe for powers who seek to threaten our security.”

Iran has successfully test-fired two unidentified long-range ballistic missiles with a range of 1,700 kilometers (1,056 miles) from the Shahid Mahdavi, a converted cargo ship operating in the Gulf of Oman. According to the excerpted article published by the news outlet Mehr News Agency, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami commented on the first-time launches with a warning: “Nowhere is safe for powers who seek to threaten our security.” The Shahid Mahdavi functions as a multipurpose aircraft carrier capable of carrying an array of military hardware, including air defense systems, drones, radars, and missiles.[i] The ballistic missiles reportedly hit targets in the Kavir Desert in central Iran.

Iran has the most extensive and diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East and North Africa. It is also the only country to possess a 2,000-kilometer range missile without a nuclear weapon capability.[ii] Iranian officials maintain that Tehran’s decision to acquire ballistic missiles was prompted by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) in order to deter future missile attacks by enemy countries.[iii] Calling the launch a “success,” Salami was quoted in the first excerpted article as saying that “the range of influence of [Iran’s] sea power has increased to any desired point.”[iv] The second excerpted article from the Iranian media source Khabar Online reports that Salami highlighted that the IRGC is “determined to powerfully defend national security, national interests, and the achievements” of Iran. As tensions in the region remain elevated as part of the Gaza war, and as Iran-backed Houthi rebels continue to attack ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, this new development underscores what happens when Tehran is unchecked by the international community.

Sources:

“شلیک موشک بالستیک دوربرد از ناو جنگی سپاه (Launch of long-range ballistic missile from IRGC warship),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news agency owned by Iranian government’s Islamic Development Organization), 12 February 2024.

https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6022735/%D8%B4%D9%84%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B4%DA%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87

Referring to the strength of the IRGC Navy, Major General Salami stated: Our offensive power and naval defense, with the arrival of a multitude of drones, cruise missiles, and even ballistic missiles with the ability to target combat vessels at sea, are very complex and show an interweaving of a combination of up-to-date, advanced, and modern capabilities.

He continued: “In the IRGC Navy, we had new achievements. The first issue was the joint work between the Air Force and IRGC Navy with the launch of a long-range ballistic missile from a warship that was successfully achieved, and with this new success, the range of influence of our sea power has increased to any desired point.”

The IRGC commander-in-chief, also referring to the other capabilities of the IRGC Navy, emphasized: “The oceanliner (warships) can appear anywhere in the oceans, and naturally, when they can launch missiles, nowhere is safe for powers who seek to threaten our security.”

“شلیک موشک بالستیک دوربرد سپاه پاسداران از روی یک ناو جنگی به روایت سردار سلامی (Firing a Revolutionary Guards long-range ballistic missile on a warship according to General Salami),” Khabar Online (Iranian news website affiliated with reformist political factions), 12 February 2024.

https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1872279/%D8%B4%D9%84%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B4%DA%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87

According to Khabar Online News Agency, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander-in-Chief General Hossein Salami said in a televised interview with the Revolutionary Guards program on Channel One: “In the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, we are always ready to give our lives for the great Iranian nation and are determined to powerfully defend national security, national interests, and the achievements of the Islamic revolution and must stand against all threats and dangers with all our strength and prevent the formation of new equilibriums in the field of the country’s national security.”

Notes:

[i] The test launch on the Shahid Mahdavi, which was released on video, was a joint project between the IRGC Navy (IRGCN) and Air Force. The type of ballistic missiles used in the exercise was not verified, as several state media outlets have named various missiles with an array of ranges.

[ii] Michael Elleman, “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program,” Iran Primer, 13 January 2021. https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-ballistic-missile-program

[iii] Kamran Taremi, “Ballistic Missiles in Iran’s Military Thinking,” Wilson Center, 14 October 2023. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/ballistic-missiles-irans-military-thinking

[iv] United Nations Security Council Resolution, UNSCR 2231, which once constrained Iran’s ballistic missile-related tests and transfers, expired in October 2023. For additional information, see: “Arms embargo on Iran expires despite US opposition,” Al Jazeera, 18 October 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/18/arms-embargo-on-iran-expires-despite-us-opposition

Image Information:

Image: “The moment the Dezful ballistic missile is fired from the Shahid Mahdavi warship in the form of a launch container,” Telegram video screenshot, 13 February 2024
Source: https://t.me/SEPAHCYBERY/83945
Attribution: IRGC Cyber Telegram Channel

Iranian Self-Sufficiency in Aircraft Spare Parts May Benefit Sanctioned States

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Inspecting Airbus jet engines, April 2022

“Some countries that were sanctioned… are coming to Iran and entrusting their planes to Iranian experts.”

Iran’s air transportation industry is under stress due to international sanctions.[i] In response to the sanctions, the Mehr News Agency reports that Iran’s Ministry of Defense has developed the industrial and technical capacity to develop spare aircraft parts and conduct maintenance on critical systems like aircraft engines.[ii] While this follows a known pattern of Iranian claims to immunize themselves from international sanctions, the current iteration differs because Iranian officials openly say they will use their new capacity to help other countries subject to international sanctions.

The willingness to help Russia or other countries evade sanctions, for example, by shipping drones to Russia, signals both a sense of impunity among Iranian officials but could also reflect growing substance to Iran’s alliances with other states that find themselves international pariahs. For Iran to help Russia service its leased Boeing or Airbus aircraft fleshes out bilateral relations beyond simply a one-way drone trade. Iran’s stated willingness to bypass sanctions to maintain or potentially upgrade Russian aircraft can have broad ramifications on the operational environment, not only in the Middle East but elsewhere around the world. First, Iranian efforts to help subjected states bypass sanctions blunt a major tool of international diplomacy meant to deter rogue or aggressive behavior. Second, supplying sanctioned states much-needed aviation hardware would be a boon to Iranian defense industries both financially and by allowing them greater opportunities to reverse engineer platforms such as the Sukhoi-35S [R1].[iii] Finally, money earned by Revolutionary Guard-run factories could also help support or subsidize Revolutionary Guard or proxy activities across the region.

Sources:

“خودکفایی ایران در ساخت قطعات هواپیماهای مسافربری”(Iran’s self-sufficiency in the manufacture of passenger plane parts),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news agency owned by Iranian government’s Islamic Development Organization), 9 March 2024. https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6049371

In an interview with Mehr, Javad Mashayekh, with reference to Iran’s self-sufficiency in the field of manufacturing passenger aircraft parts that researchers and specialists in knowledge-based companies have achieved, stated, “In the field of commercial and passenger planes, Iran was once dependent on procurement of aircraft parts, even for maintenance but because of sanctions,
we were unable to procure parts from other international suppliers. The deputy of the scientific department of knowledge-based economy development added, “This is what happened after the imposition of sanctions: Some of Iran’s knowledge-based companies used their power to develop car parts, and repair and maintenance of aircraft engines locally.” Mashayekh also said that the most complex part of an aircraft is its engine and, he noted, maintenance requires a high degree of technical knowledge. We promise that in these fields, our country has achieved self-sufficiency so we do not need to send out planes to foreign countries for almost any kind of repair or to have maintenance done there.

He continued, “In fact, we are currently witnessing that some countries that were sanctioned for various reasons and are not able to supply parts and get maintenance services are coming to Iran and entrusting their planes to Iranian experts…. For example, Russia has suffered many sanctions in the aviation sector due to the Ukraine crisis, and for this reason, it has concluded good contracts for maintenance services with Iranian knowledge-based companies.”

Notes:

[i] In 2016 Iran sought to purchase nearly 200 passenger jets split between Boeing and Airbus. At the time, the Iranian government justified the deals as an air safety matter. However, ambitions for a new fleet faltered as seating capacity of the new jets outstripped Iranian passenger traffic projections. Critics claimed the proposed deals were meant to provide spare parts to keep Iran’s military aircraft aloft. While Boeing and Airbus planes do not contain parts suitable for jet fighters, passenger jets and military cargo planes can share many parts. Boeing ultimately cancelled its deal, while Airbus delivered only four planes.

[ii] For discussion of Iranian turbojet engine development, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: New Heavy Engines on the Drawing Board,” OE Watch, November 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195245/download

[iii] For discussion of the Iranian desire for Sukhoi-35s, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Wants Sukhoi-35 Fighters From Russia,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-wants-sukhoi-35-fighters-from-russia/

Image information:

Image: Inspecting Airbus jet engines, April 2022
Source: https://media.mehrnews.com/d/2024/03/08/3/4894679.jpg?ts=1709893408775
Attribution: Mehr News Agency

Iran Navy Upgrades Bell-212 Helicopters

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Iran Helicopter Support and Renovation Company display of upgraded Bell-212, in Tehran in March 2024. Iran’s Navy has announced that it will equip its Bell-212 helicopters with both SONAR and knockoffs of Hellfire missiles.

“This new missile was nicknamed the Iranian Hellfire.”

Iran’s Navy has announced that it will equip its Bell-212 [R1] helicopters with both SONAR and air to ground missiles, copies of the U.S. made Hellfire missiles. While it appears to exaggerate its mastery of SONAR, its reverse engineering of the Hellfire appears real.

As the Iranian Navy expands its footprint, it relies increasingly on helicopters to project power.[i] The excerpted article from the news portal Khabar Online, describes a Defense Ministry exhibition of new products held at the Iran Helicopter Support and Renovation Company. Headlining the exhibit was an upgraded Bell-212 helicopter, modified to conduct anti-submarine operations and to carry Ghaem-114 missiles, an Iranian copy of the U.S.-made AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-ground missile.

SONAR is important to Iran. Even though the Persian Gulf is both narrow and shallow with an average depth of 100 feet and a maximum depth of just 295 feet, Iranian defense officials worry that enemy submarines can approach their shores and ships without detection. Should war erupt between Israel and Iran, for example, submarine-launched missiles would be a major component of any Israeli attack on Iran. Detecting submarines and developing anti-submarine warfare is increasingly important to the Iranian Navy as it operates farther from its shores. The distance between the Iranian naval base at Bandar Abbas and the Bab el-Mandeb, a strategic waterway between Yemen and Djibouti where Iran currently operates, for example, is nearly 1,700 nautical miles. This is outside the defensive layers of speedboats and shore-based missiles the Iranian Navy rely upon closer to its shores.  It is unclear, however, if the Iranian announcement of its helicopter-borne SONAR system is real. While Iranian press photos showing the helicopter at the Tehran exhibit are new, photographs accompanying Iranian media coverage depicting a Bell-212 deploying SONAR at sea are two years old and depict a U.S. Navy helicopter. As such, Iranian Navy helicopter-equipped SONAR is more likely in development.

The Ghaem-114 missile likely represents a truer capability, albeit one that is not new. In July 2021, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces unveiled a helicopter-launched Ghaem-114 Hellfire copy that it billed as an anti-tank missile with a range of six miles. In April 2023, the regular Iranian Army unveiled the “Shafagh” missile that it also likened to the U.S. manufactured Hellfire.[ii] The current announcement likely reflects the standardization of the Ghaem-114 across Iranian services. Iran also claims that its Ghaem-114 has both thermal and laser guidance with a 50-kilogram warhead. Iranian production of a Hellfire knock-off could have substantive tactical ramifications across the region. While Hamas and the Houthis do not have helicopters, the Iranian military could use lifting or non-enforcement of sanctions to provide these groups helicopters that could fire Ghaem-114s. The Houthis could equip drones with Ghaem-114s, while both Syria and Lebanese Hezbollah, both of which operate helicopters, could immediately introduce the Ghaem-114 to the Israeli frontier and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Sources:

“تجهیز این بالگرد ارتش به سونار و موشک قائم ۱۱۴ “(Equipping this [Bell-212] Helicopter with Sonar and Ghaem-114 missiles),” KhabarOnline.ir (general news website affiliated with reformist political factions), 4 March 2024. https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1880466

Iran Helicopter Support and Renovation Company hosted an exhibition of Iran Ministry of Defense achievement. During this exhibition, the Ministry of Defense displayed some achievements in helicopters, including upgrading Iranian Navy [Bell-] 212 helicopters.

One of these achievements was upgrading the Iranian Navy’s [Bell-] 212 helicopters to equip them with sonar to detect submarines and deal with surface vessels…. Sonar technology enables the identification of ships and submarines through the emission of underwater soundwaves and determines their direction and distance. Submarines, surface ships, helicopters and maritime and anti-submarine patrol aircraft use sonar to discover their targets underwater.

Iran has SH-3 specialized anti-submarine helicopters in its air fleet that it purchased before the [1979 Islamic] Revolution and they can both detect all types of submarines and launch Mark 46 torpedoes. In addition, the [Bell-] 212 helicopters have been equipped with Ghaem-114 missiles to neutralize surface vessels and an electro-optical system to detect and targets vessels night and day….

In January 2020, during the delivery of overhauled helicopters to the armed forces, the Aerospace Force of the Army of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps displayed [Bell-] 214 helicopters with Ghaem-114 missiles, similar to Hellfires.  Although no detailed information about this missile was published, this new missile was nicknamed the Iranian Hellfire and many observers saw the development of this missile in the context of the design of new air-to-ground missiles….Equipping Navy helicopters with Ghaem-114 missiles increases the ability of this force to support amphibious operations seeking to capture the enemy coast and to counter small and fast enemy vessels or to deal with piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

Notes:

[i] Iran has no aircraft carriers, but it designs its frigates to accommodate helicopters as a means both to project power onto land from sea and to defend Iranian ships. For discussion of upgrading and rehabilitating Iranian helicopters, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Reconstruction and Overhaul of Helicopters,” OE Watch, 03 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/382672

[ii] For discussion of Shafagh missile unveiling see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Installs New Precision Missiles On Army Helicopters,” OE Watch, 05 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/iran-installs-new-precision-missiles-on-army-helicopters/

Image Information:

Image: Iran Helicopter Support and Renovation Company display of upgraded Bell-212, in Tehran in March 2024. Iran’s Navy has announced that it will equip its Bell-212 helicopters with both SONAR and knockoffs of Hellfire missiles.
Source: https://media.khabaronline.ir/d/2024/03/04/4/6000265.jpg?ts=1709559703000
Attribution: KhabarOnline.ir

Iraqi Shia Militia Attacks Create Atmosphere of Uncertainty

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Photo of Al-Nujaba Movement forces (from PMF) in the Makhul Mountains of Salah al-Din province, one kilometer from the ISIL Front, 6 July 2016.

“Anxiety is rising in Iraq in general… [prompting] the faction leaders to change their tactics and movements and attempt to take stricter security measures to avoid being targeted by America.…”

Strikes and counterstrikes involving U.S. forces and so-called Iraqi “Islamic Resistance” factions of Shia militias may lead militant leaders to seek cover with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in ways that would likely strain U.S.-ISF relations. The first accompanying report, from the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed, claims that Islamic Resistance factions are seeking to safeguard their weapons from U.S. strikes by transferring them to ISF bases under Iraqi Defense Ministry control. The Islamic Resistance is a branding name used by various Iran-led militant Shia Iraqi groups, most prominently Kataib Hezbollah (KH) and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HAN).[i] These militias exert substantial influence in Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which are an appendage of the ISF akin to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[ii] As PMF units, the Islamic Resistance factions are part of the Iraqi state, but their interests and actions are rarely aligned or coordinated with those of the State apparatus writ large. Since the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel, the Islamic Resistance has conducted regular attacks on U.S. positions in Syria and Iraq. The attacks escalated in late January 2024, when an unmanned aerial vehicle attributed to KH killed three U.S. Army soldiers stationed in Jordan. In response, U.S. forces killed Abu Baqir al-Saadi, a KH official involved in planning the attacks. The strike followed an earlier one targeting a HAN leader. Both strikes occurred in Baghdad, prompting Iraqi government officials to publicly denounce them as violations of national sovereignty. Islamic Resistance and other Iraqi Shia militias in turn intensified pressure on their government to negotiate a withdrawal of U.S. troops and launch an investigation into the targeted killings. As reported in the second accompanying article, also from al-Araby al-Jadeed, KH also launched an investigation aimed at identifying and rooting out U.S. collaborators within the Islamic Resistance. As noted in the third accompanying article, from the pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, the Islamic Resistance’s attacks and threats may be used to sow distrust between the United Stats and ISF partner forces. The escalatory tit-for-tat between the Islamic Resistance and U.S. forces is ushering in an atmosphere of increasing uncertainty and distrust in Iraq, further complicating what is already a tangled and potentially volatile security environment.

Sources:

العراق: فصائل مسلحة تضغط لنقل مستودعات أسلحتها إلى قواعد الجيش لتجنّب القصف الأميركي

“Iraq: Armed factions are pressing to transfer their weapons depots to army bases to avoid American bombing,” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 6 January 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B6%D8%BA%D8%B7-%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4

Today, Sunday, Iraqi security sources in Baghdad revealed to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense was under pressure to transfer ammunition depots belonging to armed factions to Iraqi army bases and camps to prevent them from being targeted in the future by American aircraft.

العراق: تحقيقات سرية بحثاً عن “متعاونين” مع واشنطن بتنفيذ عمليات الاغتيال “Iraq: Secret investigations in search of “collaborators” with Washington in carrying out the assassination operations,” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 11 February 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B0-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA

The source told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, on condition that his name not be mentioned, that “the accuracy of choosing the targets and the accuracy of carrying out the assassination operations indicated the presence of a dangerous infiltration and collaborators who provided accurate information to Washington to carry out its strikes”… 

Anxiety is rising in Iraq in general, and among the factions in particular, which fear assassinations and other strikes that may be carried out by the United States of America, whose drones roam the skies of Baghdad on an almost daily basis. This has prompted the faction leaders to change their tactics and movements and attempt to take stricter security measures to avoid being targeted by America.

عزل أميركي للعراقيين خشية «الاختراق»: المقاومة تضمّ «السفارة» إلى بنك الأهداف “American isolation of the Iraqis for fear of ‘infiltration’: The resistance includes the ‘embassy’ in the target bank,” al-Akhbar (pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily), 9 February 2024. https://al-akhbar.com/Palestine/374023

…an Iraqi military official from the security crews residing inside the Ain al-Assad base (west of Baghdad), in an interview with Al-Akhbar, recounts his observations. Since the beginning of the base being subjected to missile strikes, he said, “The American forces have dealt with us with constant caution, and have their own security protocol in terms of inspecting all those entering and leaving the base. But after the recent attacks, it increased its measures in a way that we did not witness even two years ago, when Iran bombed the base with a large number of ballistic missiles”…

He explains that “the American side deals with the Iraqi side with suspicion in terms of exchanging information, for fear of it being leaked to parties linked to the armed factions.” 

Notes:

[i] Of the two, HAN has been by far the most hardline and active member of the “Islamic Resistance” since 7 October. See: “Who Are Nujaba and Why Did the U.S. Just Strike Them?” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 4 January 2024. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-are-nujaba-and-why-did-us-just-strike-them In late January, KH vowed to suspend attacks against the United States. HAN, in contrast, vowed to continue its attacks. See: “Explaining Apparent Muqawama De-Escalation Since January 28,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7 February 2024. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/explaining-apparent-muqawama-de-escalation-january-28

[ii] “KH operates the state-funded 45th, 46th, and 47th Brigades of the PMF. Chain of command nominally runs through the KH-dominated Popular Mobilization Committee in the Prime Minister’s Office. In practice, KH’s PMF brigades frequently disobey the government chain of command while legally remaining organs of the Iraqi state.” See: “Profile: Kataib Hezbollah,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 April 2021. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-kataib-hezbollah

For an up-to-date overview on Iraq’s militia landscape, see: “Iraq’s New Regime Change: How Tehran-Backed

Terrorist Organizations and Militias Captured the Iraqi State,” CTC Sentinel, December 2023. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/iraqs-new-regime-change-how-tehran-backed-terrorist-organizations-and-militias-captured-the-iraqi-state/

Image Information:

Image:  Photo of Al-Nujaba Movement forces (from PMF) in the Makhul Mountains of Salah al-Din province, one kilometer from the ISIL Front, 6 July 2016.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Harakat_Hezbollah_al-Nujaba_in_2016_(24).jpg
Attribution: Fars Media Corporation, CC BY 4.0

Iran Warns United States Against Attacking Ships in Red Sea

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“The Story of the Behshad’s Mission for Maritime Security,” Telegram video screenshot.

“Those engaging in terrorist activities against Behshad or similar vessels jeopardize international maritime routes, security, and assume global responsibility for potential future international risks.”

Iran has warned the United States against targeting cargo ships that the United States and others believe to be Iranian support ships feeding intelligence to Houthi rebels in Yemen. “Those engaging in terrorist activities against Behshad or similar vessels jeopardize international maritime routes, security, and assume global responsibility for potential future international risks,” the Iranian Army declared in an English-language video recently posted on its Telegram channel Aja Media, clips of which are included in the first excerpted post. The Behshad is a cargo vessel widely believed by Western intelligence officials to be a spy ship operated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC is said to be passing electronic intelligence to Yemen’s Houthi rebels—armed with drones and ballistic missiles—to spot and target ships passing in the Red Sea region in reaction to the ongoing Gaza war.[i]

In the video, the narrator describes Behshad and other cargo ships like it—including the Saviz and Behzad—as “floating armories” stationed in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to prevent the hijacking of Iranian ships by pirates—a problem that began in the 1980s. According to the video, 93 squadrons have been dispatched to the region and thwarted 183 piracy attempts against Iranian ships. To maintain the ship’s innocence and its respect for international law, the video goes as far as to cite the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, claiming the ships are storage and support centers offshore.[ii] Very little information is available on the Behshad and other cargo ships in Iranian state media coverage. However, as per the second excerpted article, in April 2021, the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that the Saviz had been the target of a limpet mine attack allegedly by Israel because it was believed to be “Iran’s naval base” for the Houthi rebels.[iii] The third excerpted article published by the Iranian daily newspaper Hamshari reported that the United States and UK media coverage of the cargo ships in recent weeks were adopting “more hostile positions” because the media wanted to provoke the United States into a war with Iran.

Sources:

“رسانه ارتش جمهوری اسلامی ایران ‘آجامدیا’ (Media of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army ‘Aja Media’),” “The Story of the Behshad’s Mission for Maritime Security,” Telegram video post, 4 February 2024. https://t.me/aja_media/3797

Since the late 1980s, with the rise of piracy in the Bab el-Mandeb region, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea leading to the hijacking of several Iranian ships by pirates, the Iranian military, like many other countries, decided to deploy squadrons to this area in order to protect its commercial vessels and ensure the security of its shipping crew and commercial cargo. To date, ninety-three squadrons of the Iranian navy have been dispatched to this region and have prevented 183 piracy attempts against Iranian ships before the pirates could reach them… Those engaging in terrorist activities against Behshad or similar vessels jeopardize international maritime routes, security, and assume global responsibility for potential future international risks.

“گزارش تسنیم| مأموریت کشتی ساویز در دریای سرخ چه بود؟ (Tasnim Report: What was the Saviz ship’s mission in the Red Sea?),” Tasnim News Agency (IRGC-affiliated news source), 7 April 2021. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1400/01/18/2480574/%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AA-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B2-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AE-%DA%86%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF

This ship was the Iranian ship Saviz that was in the region for a long time already, and while some sources reported that it might have been hit by a missile or torpedo, a Tasnim reporter informed that likely this scenario is because of the explosion of magnetic and sticky mines on the body of the ship. After the publication of this news, there were different discussion s about the Saviz ship’s mission in the Red Sea, and some incorrectly—or on purpose—considered it to be Iran’s naval base to support the resistance of Yemen.

“واکنش سخنگوی وزارت دفاع آمریکا به کلیپ رسانه ارتش ایران در خصوص شناور بهشاد (The reaction of the U.S. Defense Department spokesperson to the media clip of the Iranian Army regarding the Behshad float),” Akharin Khabar (News aggregator with Telegram account), 12 February 2024. https://akharinkhabar.ir/story/9941219

The Pentagon spokesperson regarding the Behshad vessel: We have heard things about the mission of this vessel, but it is Iran’s right to have a vessel in the Red Sea and conduct operations. We are not looking for a naval confrontation with Iran.

A journalist told him during a press conference: Iran has issued a warning and told America that you are not allowed to target this ship. Iran has announced that it is an anti-piracy ship.

“ایران درباره کشتی بهشاد و ساویز به آمریکا هشدار داد؟ (Iran warned America about Behshad and Saviz ships?),” Hamshahri (Iran daily newspaper), 4 February 2024. https://www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/830282/%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B2-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF

Some American and British media continue to create a media space to provoke the United States to attack Iran… Iran issued a warning to the United States on Sunday about the potential targeting of two ships in the Middle East long suspected of serving as operations bases for Iranian commandos… It seems that Iran’s statement about the Behshad and Saviz shows Tehran’s growing concern that the American attacks in the past days in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen that targeted militias supported by the Islamic Republic.

Notes:

[i] Keir Simmons, Mo Abbas, Dan De Luce, and Matthew Mulligan, “Iran goes public with stark warning over suspected spy ship as U.S. refuses to rule out more strikes,” NBC News, 6 February 2024. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-goes-public-stark-warning-suspected-spy-ship-us-strikes-rcna137150

[ii] The vessels were sanctioned by the previous U.S. Administration in 2018. See: “Non-Proliferation Designations; Iran-related Designations Updates,” Office of Foreign Assets Control, 8 June 2020. https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20200608

[iii] According to Western media reports, the attack was apparently by Israel in retaliation for Iranian strikes on a Liberian-flagged ship owned by an Israeli shipping billionaire. See: Oren Liebermann, “U.S. watching as Iran quietly replaces Red Sea spy ship damaged in April attack” CNN, 6 August 2021. https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/06/politics/us-monitor-iran-spy-ships/index.html

Image Information:

Image: “The Story of the Behshad’s Mission for Maritime Security,” Telegram video screenshot
Source: https://t.me/aja_media/3797
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Iranians Using Black Market VPNs To Bypass Restrictions

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Abolhassan Firouzabadi, secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace, poses in 2018.

“Surveys show that about 64 percent of [Iranian] users use VPNs.”

While Iran has long sought to constrain internet access and limit the information ordinary Iranians can access, Iranians’ use of virtual private networks (VPNs) to bypass restrictions and regime censorship is flagrantly increasing. According to the excerpted article from Iran’s main financial newspaper Donya-e Eqtesad, almost two-thirds of Iranians now use a VPN. Among those affiliated with universities and scientific institutions, that number increases to more than 90 percent, suggesting that rhetoric about indigenous scientific prowess and a national intranet aside, Iranian researchers find no substitute for the information they gather from abroad.[i] It also suggests that Iranians do not accept the government’s previous efforts to greenlight specific VPNs.[ii] Iranians grumble that the regime’s efforts to filter and censor the internet is rendering free VPNs worthless and is driving up the cost of paid services that must constantly augment their products to stay ahead of regime censorship attempts.[iii] Notably, the article also reveals that the amount Iranians spend on VPNs exceeds the combined revenue of the top two Iranian cell phone companies. Open discussion about nominally illegal technologies in Iran reflects the widespread rejection of regime precepts by the broader Iranian population.[iv] Such a widespread embrace of VPNs by both the general population and the educated elites suggests that Iranians are primed for change. While the government’s monopoly of force can perpetuate internet restrictions regardless of popular will, the desperation by Iranians to escape the Islamic Republic’s ideological bubble indicates that it would be naïve to accept regime claims of popular legitimacy.

Sources:

“بازار سیاه وی‌پی‌ان”(Black Market VPN),” Donya-e Eqtesad (Iranian financial newspaper, 13 February 2024. https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/بخش-بازار-دیجیتال-19/4045965-بازار-سیاه-وی-پی-ان

…. The number of users who buy VPNs is constantly increasing. Meanwhile, studies show that the price of filter breakers is getting more expensive by the day, and the volatility of the black market is also the result of inflation. People are forced to pay exorbitant prices for their natural right, i.e. free access to the Internet, to the extent that according to some statistics, in the past year, the annual gross for filter breakers reached 300 trillion rials [$7.14 billion]… greater than the revenue of the country’s two largest mobile providers.

In July-August this year, the Majlis Industry Commission published a report on the state of the Internet, in which it presented interesting statistics about the extent of people’s use of VPNs. According to this report, credible surveys show that about 64 percent of users use VPNs, and anonymous bandwidth share on the international network was less than five percent last year but now stands at 25 percent. During the presentation of the report of the Majlis’ Industries and Mines Commission, Gholamreza Nouri Ghezeljeh, the head of the independent faction in the Majlis [parliament] pointed to the statistics of 64 percent of people using filter breakers and said that some scientific centers reported up to 96 percent of the use of such workarounds to filters in scientific centers…. The frequent blocking of free VPNs has forced users to buy paid VPNs. Marzieh Adham, a communications scientist and cyberspace activist, told Donya-ye Eqtesad, “The reason for the price of VPNs is that the VPNs that are designed are constantly blocked and need to be recreated and made available to users.”

Notes:

[i] For an earlier discussion of Iranian efforts to create a national intranet, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Progress on National Intranet,” OE Watch, July 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/312355

[ii] For an earlier discussion of Iranian efforts to create state-sanctioned VPNs, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Established Official VPN Operators,” OE Watch, December 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/345959

[iii] For broader discussion of Iranian efforts to censor the internet, see: Michael Rubin, “Evolution of Iranian Surveillance Strategies Toward the Internet and Social Media,” The Institute for Policy, Advocacy, and Governance, December 2019. https://www.aei.org/articles/evolution-of-iranian-surveillance-strategies-toward-the-internet-and-social-media/

[iv] The current VPN battle parallels the efforts by ordinary Iranians to access satellite television in the 1990s. Iranians openly put satellite receivers on the roofs of their houses and apartment buildings. When efforts to bribe officials to look the other way failed, Iranians illegally imported ever-smaller satellite receivers they acquired in Dubai or Istanbul that they could better hide. After decades, the government effectively acknowledged defeat and stopped meaningful efforts to prevent Iranians from watching television programming from the outside world.

Image Information:

Image: Abolhassan Firouzabadi, secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace, poses in 2018.
Source: https://www.atnanews.ir/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/bazdid-fazaye-majazi-ertebatat-8.jpg
Attribution: Allameh Tabataba’i News Agency

Iran Conducts Joint Exercises To Bolster Air Force

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Iran’s Yasin training jet unveiled on 11 March 2023.

“The Air Force has had a very good year in the field of defense diplomacy.”

Iran’s Air Force traditionally lags behind its other military branches, but Iranian authorities are seeking to close the gap.[i] With the end of many sanctions and growing confidence, the Iranian Air Force is engaging in “defense diplomacy” with friendly regimes to improve pilot training and overall capability. While the excerpted article from a pro-regime website Alef.ir does not mention specific partners, there are few possibilities. Iran collaborates with the so-called “Axis of Resistance” consisting of pro-Iranian regimes or proxy groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Iranian soldiers have participated in exercises in Russia and former Soviet states in Central Asia, many of which might also open doors to Iranian pilot training.[ii] Any willingness by other countries to welcome Iranian pilots for training courses or exchanges could enhance Iranian familiarity with aircraft and platforms it might encounter in conflict and enable Iranian Air Force personnel to surreptitiously learn about potential new technologies. For example,  the Iraqi Air Force flies U.S.-produced F-16s that are a generation more advanced than jet fighters in Iran’s arsenal. Exchanges with Russia or China could foreshadow investment in their military markets. Air Force Commander Hamid Vahedi’s comments about “maintenance and repair of parts and airplanes” suggest that the Iranian Air Force might use new partnerships to acquire spare parts or upgrade avionics. While Iranian leaders often embraced the rhetoric of self-sufficiency to suggest isolation and sanctions did not hurt them, the scramble for new relationships suggests the Iranian Air Force seeks to emerge from its isolation and play a greater role in Iran’s regional military calculations.

Sources:

“بآمادگی نیروی هوایی ارتش برای انجام رزمایش با کشورهای همسو”(The Air Force is Prepared to Conduct Exercises with Allied Countries),” Alef.ir (website affiliated with conservative populist politician Ahmad Tavakkoli), 15 February 2024. https://www.alef.ir/news/4021126042.html

Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi, commander of Iranian Army’s Air Force, in a meeting of foreign military attaches in Tehran [coinciding with the 45th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution], said, “The Air Force has always been effective and decisive in every field that it has entered. The commander of the Army Air Force spoke of [recent achievements, including] “production and utilization of Yasin [RG1] training light fighter bomber and purchase and acquisition of the Fajr-3 training aircraft of the Pak-130 training aircraft; production and operation of a variety of drones including Kaman-12 [RG2] and Saman-22; performing long-range operations outside Iran’s flight information region (FIR); manufacturing of various simulators, laser-guided bombs, anti-radar rockets, as well as the establishment of new science centers including those focused on artificial intelligence…. He added, “The Air Force has had a very good year in the field of defense diplomacy, with a number of positive steps and productive instances of delegation exchanges, meetings and visits, training courses, and the dispatch of observers to exercises in other countries….” He added, “The Islamic Republic of Iran [Army] Air Force is prepared to cooperate and interact as much as possible with aligned countries in various fields, including carrying out joint exercises, educational cooperation, especially the exchange of students and professors between aviation universities in various fields, cooperation in the affairs of maintenance and repair of parts and airplanes.”

Notes:

[i] For a moment the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps sought to develop a strike fighter, but it was unable to compete technologically with the U.S.-produced F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and upgraded F-16s, Russia’s Sukhoi-35s, or their Chinese corollaries. Instead, Iran sought to jerry-rig and cannibalize its existing fleet to keep the dwindling number of its 1970s-era aircraft viable. For discussion of the state of the Iranian Air Force see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian F-14 Crash Highlights Iran’s Need for New Fighter Contract,” OE Watch, 08-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iranian-f-14-crash-highlights-irans-need-for-new-fighter-contract/

[ii] For earlier Iranian participation in Russian war games, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Revolutionary Guards Take Part in Russian Military Games,” OE Watch, September 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195247/download; For Iranian participation in Chinese war games, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: IRGC Training in China,” OE Watch, September 2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/205061/download

Image Information:

Image: Iran’s Yasin training jet unveiled on 11 March 2023.
Source: https://cdn.isna.ir/d/2023/03/11/3/62547091.jpg?ts=1678512083735
Attribution: Iranian Students’ News Agency