Iran Conducts First-Ever Military Exercise With Oman

“[T]he first joint ground exercise between the ground forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Sultanate of Oman, which is known as “Mountain Falcons 1,” started on Monday, 30 September, in Al Jabal Al-Akhdar province of Oman.”


Despite regional tensions reaching an all-time high, Iran and Oman engaged in their first-ever bilateral military exercise on 30 September. Per reports in the first excerpted article by state broadcaster Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, the exercises, known as Mountain Falcons 1, took place in the Al Jabal Al-Akhdar province of Oman, involving ground forces from both countries, with support from the Royal Omani Air Force and Police.

According to the second excerpted article from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-controlled Islamic Republic News Agency, the exercises “focus[ed] on combating regional terrorism, establishing sustainable security, urban warfare, and the exchange and transfer of experiences between the two countries.” The timing of the joint military exercise is significant, occurring just as Iran launched its second direct retaliatory strike against Israel on 1 October with the firing of 180 ballistic missiles. Arab countries in the Persian Gulf have expressed concern about the Israeli response, noting that they would not take sides in a conflict between Iran and Israel.[i] However, Oman is considered the “Switzerland of the Middle East” for its neutrality and has for years played the role of interlocutor between the United States and Iran, who have had no formal ties since the 1979 revolution.[ii]

Since 2019, Tehran has championed what it calls a “neighborly policy,” in other words, seeking better ties with its Arab neighbors. Not surprisingly, as the military drills continued, the Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was on a diplomatic blitz, visiting a host of Arab states to ease concerns of an escalation while also calling for a truce in Lebanon and a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[iii] While regional tensions suggest otherwise, Tehran and Muscat’s military exercises with the threat of war looming seem to indicate that business is as usual in the region.


Sources:

“آغاز نخستین رزمایش مشترک زمینی ایران و عمان (Visit of the commander army ground forces to the plan to block the eastern border),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 30 September 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00IA6v.

According to IRIB, the first joint ground exercise between the ground forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Sultanate of Oman, which is known as “Mountain Falcons 1,” started on Monday, 30 September, in Al Jabal Al-Akhdar province of Oman.

This exercise involves the ground forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army and the Royal Sultanate of Oman, with support from the Royal Omani Air Force and Police. It is being conducted with the aim of exchanging and transferring experiences, conducting joint combat training, and improving the level of combat and operational readiness…

“نخستین رزمایش مشترک و مرکب جمهوری اسلامی ایران و عمان برگزار شد (The first joint exercise between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Oman was held),” Islamic Republic News Agency (IRGC), 10 October 2024. www.irna.ir/xjRNKP

According to IRNA, from the army public relations, Brigadier General Kiumars Heydari stated: “At the request and invitation of the Omani Army for conducting an anti-terrorism exercise, the first joint and combined military drill between the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Army Ground Forces and the country of Oman with a focus on combating regional terrorism, establishing sustainable security, urban warfare, and the exchange and transfer of experiences between the two countries, was carried out using day and night tactics in Oman.

”He said that the Islamic Republic of Iran is capable of conducting joint exercises with friendly and neighboring countries, adding: “This exercise, held over two days, involved rapid reaction units and special forces from the 65th NOHED Brigade of the Iranian Army, supported by the country of Oman’s Air Force and police and took place on Omani soil.”


Notes:

[i] Samia Nakhoul, Parisa Hafezi and Pesha Magid, “Exclusive: Stop Israel from bombing Iran’s oil sites, Gulf states urge US,” Reuters, 10 October 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/stop-israel-bombing-irans-oil-sites-gulf-states-urge-us-2024-10-10/

[ii] Kylie Atwood, “US held indirect talks with Iranian officials in Oman earlier this year amid tensions in Middle East,” CNN, 13 March 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/13/politics/us-iran-indirect-talks/index.html

[iii] Natasha Bertrand, Kylie Atwood, Jennifer Hansler and Alex Marquardt, “Iran engages in urgent diplomacy as it braces for Israel’s response to missile attacks,” CNN, 12 October 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/11/politics/iran-nervous-israel-response-missile-attacks/index.html


OE Insight Summary:

IRN and OM conducted first-ever military exercises during heightened regional tensions.


Iran Concerned About Electronic Devices After Hezbollah Communications Attacks

“In this session, various aspects and details of the recent terrorist operation in Lebanon and the explosion of the pagers were thoroughly examined.”


Iran is concerned about Israel infiltrating its own electronic devices after twin communications attacks in mid-September targeting Hezbollah members in Lebanon killed at least 39 and injured 3,000 people.[i] As per the excerpted article from the semi-official Iranian Mehr News Agency, the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission held an emergency meeting during a 23 September session in parliament to discuss “various aspects and details of the recent terrorist operation in Lebanon, and the explosion of the pagers was thoroughly examined.” According to committee spokesperson Ebrahim Rezaei, part of the session focused on measures to prevent similar incidents in the country, which were widely attributed to Israeli intelligence agency Mossad.[ii] Rezaei noted that the booby-trapped pagers were “the result of industrial contamination,” in other words, that the devices had explosive substances inserted.[iii] According to Rezaei, Iran is “moving toward the localization of telecommunications equipment” and that it is “already capable of exporting some of this equipment,” likely a reference to providing Hezbollah with these domestically made devices.

Israel’s mid-September communications attacks in Lebanon have shaken the Iranian clerical establishment enough to prompt them to conduct investigations and make ensure their electronic devices are not also compromised. With Iran and Israel out of the shadow war since Tehran’s first direct attack against Israel in April, Iran—which has become the Mossad’s playground for operations—is taking further precautionary measures to make sure they are not compromised yet again.


Sources:

ماجرای پیجرها هیچ ارتباطی با موضوع شهادت «شهید رئیسی» ندارد (Pagers incident has no connection to the martyrdom of ‘martyr [Ebrahim]  Raisi’),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news agency), 23 September 2024. mehrnews.com/x35Znz

According to the correspondent of Mehr [News Agency], Ebrahim Rezaei, in explaining the extraordinary session held this morning (Monday, September 23) by the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the parliament… He continued: “In this session, various aspects and details of the recent terrorist operation in Lebanon and the explosion of the pagers were thoroughly examined.”

The communications minister provided explanations on this matter as well as on measures to prevent similar incidents in the country and said the recent operation in Lebanon was the result of industrial contamination and was a combined operation. He also stated that these pagers were primarily used in the healthcare sector.

The spokesperson for the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of parliament emphasized: “The Communications Minister stated that we are moving toward the localization of telecommunications equipment. This issue has been and continues to be on our agenda to support domestic production by localizing telecommunications equipment, and we are committed to supporting this effort. In fact, we are already capable of exporting some of this equipment.”

Rezaei added: “Regarding imported telecommunications items, the Minister of Information and Communications Technology said that we have sample verification laboratories aligned with our missions, and he stressed that the registry system must be strengthened…”

The spokesperson for the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of parliament added that during this session, the director general for West Asia and North Africa at the Foreign Ministry presented a report on the situation of the region. He emphasized that the recent terrorist operation in Lebanon will not affect Hezbollah’s and the Resistance [Axis]’s support for Gaza. Although the goal of the Zionist regime in carrying out this operation was to deter Hezbollah from supporting Palestine and Gaza, they will not achieve their objectives.

Rezaei, referring to the views expressed by the members of the National Security Commission during the session, said: “The members expressed concern that a similar action might take place in Iran and stressed the importance of preventing and taking precautionary measures to ensure that such incidents are not repeated…”

The importance of electronic warfare and preparedness to counter the enemy’s electronic warfare was also emphasized. Additionally, strengthening the Passive Defense Organization was stressed. Moreover, during this session, it was clarified that the pagers incident had no connection to the issue of the martyrdom of martyr [President Ebrahim] Raisi and his companions.

Rezaei emphasized: “The members of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the parliament unanimously stressed the need for readiness to confront the enemy’s conspiracies, including in the field of cyber and electronic terrorism, and to counter the inhumane actions of the Zionist regime.”


Notes:

[i] On 17 and 18 September, beepers and walkie-talkies belonging to members of the militant group Hezbollah exploded simultaneously. Among those injured in the pager attacks on 17 September was the Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon, Mojtaba Amani, who reportedly lost one eye with the other severely injured. Iranian officials and his family said the ambassador was in “good and stable condition.” See: Holly Dagres, “Iranian ambassador blinded in one eye,” The Iranist, 27 September 2024. https://www.theiranist.com/i/149068347/iranian-ambassador-blinded-in-one-eye

[ii] At the time, there were rumors that members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had been killed in the twin attacks, but per state broadcaster IRIB, IRGC spokesman Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini was quick to dispel media reports and online accounts as false. See: “هیچ نیروی سپاه در ماجرای پیجر‌ها شهید نشده است (No IRGC forces were martyred in the pagers incident),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 18 September 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00IBdr

[iii] David Gritten, “Death toll from Hezbollah pager explosions in Lebanon rises to 12,” BBC News, 18 September 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2kn10xxldo.


OE Insight Summary:

IRN concerned its telecommunications equipment may be compromised by ISR after pager attack on Hezbollah in LBN.


Russia To Launch Two Satellites for Iran

Iranian scientists display the Kowsar and Hudhud satellites prior to their transfer to Russia for launch.


“The launch of these two satellites indicates the significant progress of Iran’s space industry.”


While Iran-Russia military trade often makes headlines, the relationship between the two countries continues to expand in numerous ways:[i] Russian Special Forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) train together[ii] while the two governments collude to avoid unilateral sanctions on each other’s industries.[iii] Now, according to the excerpted article published in the IRGC media outlet Tasnim News these bilateral relations extend to Iran’s space program.

Iran’s space program is a source of national pride. Iran has launched numerous domestically built satellites since 2008 and plans to open a spaceport next year.[iv] Iranian Space Agency head Hassan Salarieh has announced between five and seven planned launches by the end of the Iranian year (20 March). The success rate of Iranian satellite launches has been relatively low, however, perhaps between 25 and 50 percent. While the success rate has climbed in recent years, Iran’s turn toward Russia could reflect internal uncertainty about its capabilities or acknowledgment that its Semnan launch facility is not yet ready. There is also a military dimension to Russia-Iran space launch cooperation, as satellite launch vehicles share technology with intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The two satellites Iran plans to launch also reflect the military-private partnership that predominates in Iran and Iran’s growing space capabilities. There is little firewall between Iranian students at government universities and the IRGC. Indeed, the IRGC mandates the participation of many Iranian students who have studied abroad in military related research. Iranian media describe the Kowsar satellite as a high-resolution satellite that can produce imagery useful for agricultural and environmental mapping and crisis management. Iran’s reporting does not describe military applications, but it does mention IRGC visits to the laboratory.

The Hudhud is a smaller communications satellite that the excerpted article claims can “provide communication services in remote and hard-to-reach areas where access to terrestrial communication networks is limited.” During periods of unrest, the Iranian government often cuts internet service. Should the IRGC compartmentalize access to the space-based internet, it might gain an upper hand over protestors.


Sources:

“۲ ماهواره‌ ایرانی بخش خصوصی برای پرتاب به روسیه ارسال شد”(Two Private Sector Satellites Sent to Russia for Launch),” Tasnim News (news agency affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), 12 October 2024. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1403/07/21/3175967  

Two satellites made by the private sector of our country, named “Kowsar”[Abundance of Benevolence] and “Hudhud” [Hoopoe Bird], were sent to Russia for launch into space on Friday, October 11.

Both the Kowsar satellite that has a precision agriculture and mapping mission and the Hudhud satellite that is an Internet of Things telecommunication satellite, are ready for launch.

The construction of the “Kowsar” sensing satellite began in 2019, and the “Hudhud” satellite, which is the result of the use of advanced technologies used in “Kowsar,” was designed and built in a short time, only one year. It is important to note that these two great achievements have been achieved by a group of young Iranians with an average age of 25 years in an Iranian technology company in the private sector….

The launch of these two satellites indicates the significant progress of Iran’s space industry and has important consequences for the country, including self-sufficiency in space technology, the development of space applications, job creation and technology development, and the promotion of international status.Before sending these satellites to Russia for launch, Dr. Hassan Salarieh, the head of the Iranian Space Organization, witnessed the final stages of the construction and preparation of the satellites in the knowledge-based manufacturing company.


Notes:

[i] For an overview of the history and evolution of Iran-Russia relations, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran-Russia Relations,” OE Watch, July 2016, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195435

[ii] Michael Rubin, “Iran: Revolutionary Guards Take Part in Russian Military Games,” OE Watch, September 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195247?pi296680=1

[iii] For discussion of industrial cooperation to avoid sanctions, see: Michael Rubin, “The Unexpected Ways Iran and Russia Are Building Military Ties,” National Security Journal, 6 October 2024. https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/the-unexpected-ways-iran-and-russia-are-building-military-ties/

[iv] For discussion of Iran’s new spaceport, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran to Open New Spaceport in 2025,” OE Watch, 07-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/oe-watch-issue-07-2024/. For discussion of previous satellite launches, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Preparing for Zafar III Satellite Launch,” OE Watch, July 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/284140 and Michael Rubin, “Iran: Simorgh Satellite Ready to Launch,” and “Iran to Launch New Satellite by Year’s End,” OE Watch, August 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/241432


OE Insight Summary:

IRN’s turn to RUS to launch two new satellites highlights another facet of the two countries’ growing partnership.


Image Information:

Image: Iranian scientists display the Kowsar and Hudhud satellites prior to their transfer to Russia for launch.
Source: https://newsmedia.tasnimnews.com/Tasnim/Uploaded/Image/1403/07/21/1403072109450377931177524.jpg
Attribution: Tasnim News


Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Exaggerate Missile Success in Israel Attack

An Iranian billboard celebrates the April 2024 missile barrage launched against Israel.


“The Zionist regime is terrified of the Islamic Republic’s intelligence.”


On 1 October 2024, Iran launched close to 200 missiles at Israel to avenge the deaths of senior Hamas leader Dr. Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah. As with the 13 April 2024 missile and drone barrage, Israeli, U.S., and allied air defenses downed the majority of the missiles. Those that struck Israel appear to have caused only marginal damage. However, according to multiple Iranian media outlets, including the excerpted article published by Mehr News Agency, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) suggested a 90 percent success rate. While this number is false—the only confirmed casualty was a Palestinian in Jericho struck by falling debris—the acceptance of such lies within Iranian command circles and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s base can have a profound impact on the operational environment.

Overconfidence, not oil or water, causes most wars in the Middle East. In the Iranian case, the IRGC has long exaggerated the effectiveness of its missiles.[i] While in an open society, the 1 October barrage might have embarrassed or caused the regime to question those who previously exaggerated claims; no such fallout occurred in Iran. The supreme leader’s power base is perhaps 20 percent of the country. These revolutionary youth, from whom the IRGC draws its recruits, implicitly trust Khamenei and exist in a media bubble that the Iranian regime creates.[ii] Not only do they suggest Israel’s air defense and that lent by the United States are little more than psychological operations, but the Iranian media narrative also downplays Israel’s ability to respond. The 19 April 2024 Israeli airstrike on Iranian anti-aircraft batteries in Isfahan demonstrated precision, but most Iranians are unaware of their success because the targets were not easily visible to the Iranian public.

The question now is whether a “zero-defect” dynamic is at play in Iran. If the Iranian or IRGC leadership fails to accurately assess Iran’s military ability, then it becomes more likely that Iranian leaders could order additional strikes not only on Israel but also potentially on U.S. bases in the region. A belief that only a set proportion of missiles equipped with chemical, biological, or radiological warheads need to pass through complements this calculation. Any contributing factor that leads Tehran to believe they can inflict maximum damage if not dramatically win a conflict makes the region more dangerous and mandates a recalibration of deterrence.


Sources:

“۹۰ درصد شلیک‌ها با موفقیت به اهداف اصابت کرد”(Ninety percent of the shots hit their targets successfully),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news agency owned by Iranian government’s Islamic Development Organization), 1 October 2024. https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6243668 

In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.

The Islamic Ummah of the Great Front of Resistance and the Noble Nation of Islamic Iran:

Following the previous announcement, your children in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in accordance with the promises made by the Islamic Republic officials and military commanders, with the help of other armed forces, during Operation True Promise II or the Messenger of God (Peace Be Upon Him).

They targeted strategic centers inside the occupied territories with missiles made by the youth of Islamic Iran.

This operation hit some air and radar bases, conspiracy centers which launched the assassination plots against the leaders of the Resistance, especially the [Hamas] martyr Dr. Ismail Haniyeh as well as the leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and the military commanders of Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance, and the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards.

Despite the fact that the area was protected by the most advanced and high-volume defense systems, 90 percent of the shots successfully hit the targets, and the Zionist regime is terrified of the Islamic Republic’s intelligence and operational dominance.

This operation was carried out within the framework of the right of legitimate defense and in accordance with international law, and any stupidity of the enemy will be met with a devastating and regretful response.

Public Relations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps


Notes:

[i] For previous discussion of Iranian claims about the precision of her missiles, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Khamenei Threatens to Use Precision Missiles,” OE Watch, May 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/276811/download

[ii] For previous discussion of how the regime constructs a media bubble, see: Michael Rubin, “Budget Cutbacks Force Iran Broadcasting Closings,” OE Watch, February 2015. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195463


OE Insight Summary:

IRN exaggeration of missile precision and success in recent strikes against ISR could lower the threshold for further IRN aggression across the Middle East.


Image Information:

Image: An Iranian billboard celebrates the April 2024 missile barrage launched against Israel
Source: https://newsmedia.tasnimnews.com/Tasnim/Uploaded/Image/1403/01/27/14030127094522670298182710.jpg
Attribution: Tasnim News


Iran Believes Israel is Too Weak to Take on Hezbollah

Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization, Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia, speaking out against Israel on 10 September 2024.


“The Zionists alone lack the capability to open a new front in the region, and the continuation of the Gaza war is not feasible for them and will not achieve anything for them.”


As tit-for-tat strikes continue between Israel and Lebanon since 7 October 2023, Iran believes the Jewish state is too weak to take on a new war front with Hezbollah. As reported by Iranian state broadcaster IRIB, Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization, Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia, said on 10 September that Israel lacks “the capability to open a new front in the region, and the continuation of the Gaza war is not feasible for them and will not achieve anything for them.” The comments come after Lebanese Hezbollah retaliated on 25 August for Israel’s assassination of its military commander, Fuad Shukr, at the end of July.[i]

In the excerpted article, Brigadier General Akraminia explained that Israel continues to threaten  the Lebanese militant group, which he believes has “precise” missile and drone capabilities, due to Israel’s failure to destroy Hamas and release the remaining hostages, as well as its inability to stop the Hezbollah’s attacks. He emphasized that “internal issues and high casualties in the Gaza war have left the occupiers with no choice but to retreat and accept a ceasefire,” referring to Israel.

Due to its failures, the Brigadier General believes Israel is trying “to draw actors such as the United States and Europe into the battlefield, hoping to save itself from the Gaza quagmire.” In other words, Israel is trying to start a war with its northern neighbor to distract from its failings in Gaza. However, Akraminia noted that the upcoming U.S. presidential election makes it unlikely a full-scale war would be supported. Akraminia’s comments suggest that Tehran and the Resistance Axis—led by its crown jewel proxy, Hezbollah—believe they have been in a position of strength since 7 October 2023, suggesting that these proxy groups will continue responding to Israel as long as the Gaza war continues.


Sources:

“صهیونیست‌ها قادر به نبرد همه‌جانبه با حزب‌الله نیستند (The Zionists are not capable of an all-out battle with Hezbollah),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 10 September 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00I9ou.

According to IRIB News Agency, Brigadier General [Mohammad] Akraminia, in an interview regarding the Zionist authorities’ threat of a full-scale attack on Lebanon, stated: “Given the failure of the Zionist regime in achieving its declared goals, including the release of prisoners, the destruction of Hamas, and the inability to stop Hezbollah’s attacks, the authorities of this regime are constantly threatening the Lebanese resistance forces.”

The Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization added: “The Zionist regime is trying to expand the war in the region in order to draw actors such as the U.S. and Europeans into the battlefield, hoping to save itself from the Gaza quagmire.”

Noting that the Zionist regime is battling the Resistance Axis on several fronts, Brigadier General Akraminia said: “The Zionists alone lack the capability to open a new front in the region, and the continuation of the Gaza war is not feasible for them and will not achieve anything for them.”

The Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization stated that the Gaza battle is being fought directly with U.S. and Western countries’ military aid and remarked: “Considering the upcoming U.S. presidential elections, it is unlikely that they would support a full-scale attack on Lebanon and the opening of a new front in the region.”

Brigadier General Akraminia stressed the precision of Hezbollah’s missiles and drones and their success in various operations against the Zionists, stating: “The Zionists are well aware of Lebanese Hezbollah’s capabilities, and we only witnessed a small part of these capabilities during the Arbaeen operations,” referring to Fuad Shukr retaliation.

The Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization, referring to the Zionist officials’ acknowledgment of Hezbollah’s high capabilities, noted: “Internal issues and high casualties in the Gaza war have left the occupiers with no choice but to retreat and accept a ceasefire.”


Notes:

[i] Ronen Bergman, Adam Rasgon, Euan Ward, Farnaz Fassihi, and Hwaida Saad, “Israel Says It Killed Hezbollah Commander in Airstrike Near Beirut,” New York Times, 30 July 2024.https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/30/world/middleeast/israel-hezbollah-lebanon.html


Image Information:

Image: Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization, Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia, speaking out against Israel on 10 September 2024.
Source: IRIB (Iranian media outlet) https://www.iribnews.ir/00I9ou


Iran Is Building a Wall Along Its Afghan Border

“The length of this wall is extensive, and it takes time, but these security plans are being implemented at the border with the cooperation of the caretaker government.”


As border tensions between Iran and neighboring Afghanistan continue, Tehran has started building a border wall. Per the excerpted article by the Iranian state broadcaster IRIB, Brigadier General Kiumars Heydari of the Iranian Army’s ground forces visited the Iran-Afghanistan border on 11 September, where the army’s engineering units are building the “physical blockade.” This news comes as Iran struggles with an influx of Afghan refugees, drug trafficking, and border disputes.

According to the second excerpted article by IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Supreme National Security Council support the 330-kilometer wall being built in Razavi Khorasan province, reinforcing how the project is a critical national security issue. The border wall, which is in collaboration between the IRGC and the Army, has been a topic of discussion for months. In February, the brigadier general declared, “We intend to block our borders, and no one can object why we erect a fence near their border. This is not unjust to neighboring countries, as it is common practice in all countries,” an indirect reference to Pakistan’s border wall with Afghanistan.[i] At the time, Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi described it as “not a wall” but a “border blockade that is being pursued according to the plan.”[ii]

Iran appears to be being building the border wall for several national security reasons. Since the Taliban took over Afghanistan in 2021, tensions have been at an all-time high between the eastern neighbors over the Helmand River, which flows from Afghanistan into Iran, leading to numerous clashes on the border and political tensions.[iii] However, the second excerpted article states, “these security plans are being implemented at the border with the cooperation of the caretaker government,” referring to the Taliban, which Tehran doesn’t recognize.

At the same time that it is building this wall, Iran is now the largest host for refugees in the world, with the majority coming from Afghanistan, though Tehran has expelled approximately 100,000 refugees since the beginning of the year.[iv] While drug smuggling has always been a contentious issue, Iranian officials are also thinking about the reality that its eastern neighbor is now host to an array of terrorist groups—including the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham-Khorasan Province and al-Qaeda—raising concerns about their potential to launch attacks into Iran.

With anti-Afghan sentiment at an all-time high in Iran, Tehran’s building of a border wall may appease some Iranians. Nevertheless, this project demonstrates the complex relationship between Tehran and Kabul since the Taliban takeover and how Iran has evolved its thinking about its national security to prevent further escalation.


Sources:

بازدید فرمانده نیروی زمینی ارتش از طرح انسداد مرزهای شرقی (Visit of the commander army ground forces to the plan to block the eastern border),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 11 September 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00IA6v

According to IRIB, the commander of the army’s ground forces, during his trip to the eastern borders of the country, visited this morning the construction sites where Iran-Afghanistan border is being physically blocked by army engineering units.

During the visit, he inspected the progress of the project and reviewed the activities of the army’s engineering combat units involved in the construction. The visit also included assessments of the military and operational readiness of soldiers stationed along the border, with a focus on enhancing security measures in the region.

Amir Brigadier General [Kiumars] Heydari also visited the bases of the 277th Mobile Assault Brigade of Shahid Tolaei in order to check the military and operational preparations of the soldiers and had a conversation with them at the border’s zero point.

The deputy commander of the Northeast Regional Headquarters, the commander of the 77th Division of Saman Al-Aimeh/Eighth Imam Division, the commander of the 277th Mobile Assault Brigade, and Shahid Tolaei Brigade, accompanied Brigadier Heydari on this visit and business trip.

The project of physical blocking the eastern borders of the country for a length of 330 km in Razavi Khorasan is being implemented by four engineering brigades.

The Islamic Republic of Iran shares a 945-kilometer common border with Afghanistan, where the provinces of Razavi Khorasan, South Khorasan, and Sistan and Baluchistan are situated.

Source:

جزئیات انسداد فیزیکی مرز با افغانستان

(Details of the physical blockade of the border with Afghanistan),” Tasnim News Agency (IRGC), 13 September 2024. https://tn.ai/3155310

According to the foreign policy correspondent of Tasnim [News Agency], Hassan Kazemi Qomi, the acting head of the Iranian embassy in Afghanistan, explained in a discussion regarding the plan to physically block the border with Afghanistan: We in Afghanistan with the caretaker government have the same border security issue, which is the issues of fighting terrorism, drug trafficking, and similar issues.

He added: One of the issues is that the caretaker government supports the plan to physically block the border. The work has already begun along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and fortunately it is in line with the directives of the Supreme National Security Council and orders of the Supreme Leader, as commander-in-chief. 

The special representative of the president for Afghanistan affairs stated: The general staff of the armed forces started this movement in collaboration with the IRGC and the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Of course, the length of this wall is extensive, and it takes time, but these security plans are being implemented at the border with the cooperation of the caretaker government.


Notes:

[i] “Iran Insists On Its Right To Block Borders With Afghanistan,” Iran International, 16 February 2024. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202402167106.

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Christina Goldbaum, “At Least Three Are Killed in Clashes on Iranian-Afghan Border,” New York Times, 28 May 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/28/world/asia/afghanistan-iran-border-clashes.html

[iv] Ayaz Gul, “Taliban: Pakistan, Iran expelled over 400,000 Afghan refugees so far in 2024,” VOA, 10 June 2024. https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-pakistan-iran-expelled-over-400-000-afghan-refugees-so-far-in-2024/7650196.html


Iran Exports Important Nanotechnology to Russia

A sampling of nano-tech catalysts.


Energy imbalance should be considered one of the major national challenges.”


As Iran’s oil fields decline due to decades of use and mismanagement, nanotechnology and the production of industrial catalysts become more important in enabling the extraction of the oil essential for the regime’s survival and the funding of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[i] The excerpted article from semi-official Mehr News Agency is remarkable for its blunt assessment of the current state of Iran’s hydrocarbon extraction industry and its assessment that, absent nanotech catalysts, Iran’s oil production could decline precipitously. The Iranian leadership will be hard-pressed to increase, let alone hold production steady, without laying 2,000 new wells, each of which requires more than a half-year to drill. The recognition of this looming shortfall combined with the Iranian regime’s failure to so far plug the gap either suggests decades-long incompetent management at the highest level and/or that the Iranian oil fields are far more past their prime than the Iranian regime publicly acknowledge.

The Iranian leadership appears in control of the decision to produce certain nanocatalysts. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps controls most of the factories established to produce catalysts reinforces the military’s dominance of Iran’s economy. This highlights the extent to which the command economy controls Iranian development.

The decision to export $20 million in nanocatalysts to Russia is significant for two reasons. First, it reflects the breadth of the military-industrial trade between the two states. Previously, Russia had provided Iran with nuclear technology in support of the Bushehr reactor; now, Iran is returning the favor. Second, Iran and Russia openly collude in efforts to evade sanctions, Iran for terrorism and Russia for its war in Ukraine. Such collusion exposes a loophole when countries respond to adversaries using targeted sanctions. As Iran works increasingly with Russia, North Korea, and perhaps Venezuela, it can conduct sanctioned research or production outside its territory to evade inspectors; likewise, its allies can relocate their own work to Iranian territory to do the same.


Sources:

” صادرات ۲۰ میلیون دلاری نانوکاتالیست‌های ایرانی به روسیه”

(Export of $20 million in Iranian nanocatalysts to Russia),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news agency owned by Iranian government’s Islamic Development Organization), 2 August 2024. https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6182966

The Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution approved the National Document for the Development of Science and Nanotechnology in November 2022. The Development Headquarters for Nano- and Micro-technologies has now published the report on the implementation of this plan through the end of Persian year 1402 [19 March 2024] in six chapters. Considering the importance of technology in the country’s economic development and its great role in improving productivity and creating added value, policy programs have long considered the development of technological capabilities.

Governments employ different policies to develop research and technology. These policies can be divided into two categories. The first are functional or diffusional policies that promote innovation capacity and improve scientific and technological capabilities. The second are targeted or mission-oriented policies that support precise research or the development of needed technology or solve specific problems…. 

“Improving the competitiveness of the oil, gas, and petrochemical industries using nanotechnology” is one of the special missions of the nano-tech headquarters…. Energy imbalance should be considered one of the major national challenges that is becoming increasingly sensitive and complex due to the increasing growth of energy consumption in the country. Achieving a daily production of 5.8 million barrels of oil by 2029 requires the drilling 2,000 new wells in order to resolve the energy imbalance, which is unattainable given the high cost of investment ($160 billion) and the time-consuming drilling (at least 200 days to drill each well). Therefore, there is no choice but to increase the extraction from operational wells, which requires the use of advanced technologies such as nanotechnology. The sanctions imposed on the country and consequently, the lack of supply of catalysts needed by refineries and petrochemicals from abroad, also caused the prioritization of support of projects that solve the aforementioned challenges….

The export of Iranian nanocatalysts to Russia is estimated at $20 million, experts of a knowledge-based company in three Russian steel and petrochemical complexes are setting up catalyst production units for this country, and the world’s largest petrochemical producer of urea and ammonia is also supposed to enter the production circuit with Iranian catalysts. The world’s only catalyst for ethylene production is an acetylene hydrogenation catalyst. This catalyst was placed at the top of the sanctioned goods, and the purpose of this sanction was to hit value-creating companies in the petrochemical industry. The advantages of producing these catalysts in the country are reducing the purchase price (compared to foreign catalysts), increasing the knowledge of Iranian experts, and increasing the production efficiency of important products such as urea, ammonia, and methanol in the country.


Notes:

[i] For previous discussion of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ economic wing, see: Michael Rubin, “The IRGC Wins Multi-Billion Dollar Economic Contracts,” OE Watch, August 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/274485


Image Information:

Image: A sampling of nano-tech catalysts
Source: https://img9.irna.ir/d/r2/2021/05/03/4/166253257.jpg


Iran Increasing Lithium Battery Production

The Yuz, Iran’s domestically-manufactured electric vehicle, unveiled in November 2021.


We must make progress to make up for this backwardness.”


The Iranian government appears to be doubling down on investment and production of lithium batteries. According to a report published by Young Journalist Club, on 8-9 July, Iran University of Science and Technology in Tehran hosted a conference to highlight local developments in the lithium battery field. Press reports suggest the conference was attended by academic and commercial representatives, but also military officers and politicians. In fact, both Iranian politicians and military personnel appear increasingly engaged in Iran’s lithium and battery industry. In March 2024, Reza Shojaei, the deputy head of the Iranian Defense Ministry’s Department of Energy Resources, claimed Iran had the technology to build electric vehicle batteries and said that the Defense Ministry would increase production by 35 percent to preclude the need to import lithium batteries. Defense officials attending the conference told Iranian journalists that they would not only commercialize electric vehicles, but also expand research laboratories and invest in lithium mining.[i]

The significance of the report is not so much a continuing emphasis on the development of electric vehicles, an item the Iranian press began reporting upon in November 2021,[ii] but rather to show the supremacy of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics if not the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on the development of new and cutting-edge technology.[iii] University professors and research centers subordinate themselves to the Iranian military. This reality has ramifications as many Iranians seeking degrees in the West focus their studies on science and technology and may come under pressure if they return to Iran to work directly or indirectly for sanctioned entities.

Domestic lithium production and an indigenous lithium industry can also have a profound impact on the operational environment. If the IRGC controls its mining, it would like profit disproportionately from its sale to foreign partners such as China. Advanced military technology also increasingly integrates lithium batteries into drones and both terrestrial and submarine robots. Given Iran’s proliferation of new weaponry to its proxies, an increased battery production capability could enable the Houthis and Hezbollah to upgrade their own weaponry and capabilities in the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.


Sources:

“توسعه حوزه لیتیوم نیازمند توجه و همکاری‌های چندگانه”(Developing the Lithium Field Will Require Dedication),” Young Journalist Club (an official center established by the political affairs bureau of the official Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting to train journalists), 9 July 2024. https://www.yjc.ir/fa/amp/news/8774326

Yesterday [8 July 2024], the Iran University of Science and Technology hosted the first international conference and the second national conference on lithium batteries, representing a big step in the development of the battery industry. Shojaei Fard, Director of the Automotive Research Institute of Tehran University of Science and Technology and Secretary of the conference, highlighted the dependence of the automobile industry on the field and how initially, we were working on batteries but lithium batteries were also a new thing. “We launched the lithium battery research and innovation center, and from there the project to examine the future of lithium batteries and technology and challenges began. Despite the fact that this conference is so specialized, we had over 180 papers submitted, though we rejected a few. We also have a training workshop today that a Chinese instructor will teach, a four more workshops tomorrow. During the program, we will review top articles. We will also announce the result of a review into which is the industry-leading lithium battery… We will have four parallel meetings over two days so we can review 80 articles.”

Naderi Sharif, the chief of the Energy Resources Development Organization, stated that there are two approaches to the development of battery technology. Some favor and some oppose.

Opponents of the development of lithium battery cell technology cite reasons such as the need for heavy investment, rapid changes in cell technology and diversity in cell products. Proponents of lithium battery development also believe that lithium batteries are a strategic technology and product and that the development of the energy sector depends on this product. Cheap fossil fuel has led to the backwardness of energy supply and production and related technologies. 

Naderi Sharif emphasized,”We shouldn’t just watch the world’s progress in this field, we must make progress to make up for this backwardness.”


Notes:

[i] Iran’s lithium industry has developed significantly over the past two years. In March 2023, Iranian officials announced discovery of 8.5 million tons of lithium deposits inside Iran near the Western city of Hamedan. If true, this would be the second largest lithium find after a 9.2 million ton reserve in the salt flats of Chile. Rumors also swirl in Iran that the Iranian government is both purposely allowing Lake Urmia in the West Azerbaijan province to evaporate in order to extract lithium and that it works with China to do so. The Iranian government has denied both rumors in the Persian press.

[ii] For a Persian language discussion of Iran’s domestic Yuz electric vehicle, see: “یوز در خیابان‌‌های تهران (Yuz on the streets of Tehran)” Fars News Agency, 2 November 2021. https://www.farsnews.ir/news/14000811000836

[iii] The same pattern exists with Iran’s satellite program. For a previous discussion of the involvement of universities in Iran’s satellite program, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Preparing for Zafar III Satellite Launch,” OE Watch, July 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/284140/download


OE Insight Summary:

IRN continues to put lithium battery production on a fast track perhaps foreshadowing development of a new generation of drones and robots as the Revolutionary Guards take the industrial lead.


Image Information:

Image: The Yuz, Iran’s domestically-manufactured electric vehicle, unveiled in November 2021.
Source: https://media.farsnews.ir/Uploaded/Files/Images/1400/08/11/14000811000831_Test_PhotoN.jpg
Attribution: Fars News Agency


Belarus and Iran Broaden Military Cooperation

“Commander of the Iranian army, Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi, shakes hands with the commander of the Belarusian Air Force, Major General Andrei Yulianovich Lukyanovich, in Tehran,” Tasnim News Agency (IRGC-affiliated news source), 7 August 2024.


“The political, military, and defense officials of the two countries are determined to develop and deepen cooperation.”


A meeting between Iranian and Belarusian military officials underscores the strengthening of ties between the two internationally isolated countries. In the excerpted article by state broadcaster IRIB, the commander of the Iranian Army, MAJ GEN Mousavi, said “The political, military, and defense officials of the two countries are determined to develop and deepen cooperation.” During the 7 August meeting in Tehran, his counterpart, GEN Lukanovich, echoed this sentiment, noting “We also seek to expand and deepen military relations and exchange and benefit from the valuable experiences of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” The visit highlights Tehran and Minsk’s intent to bolster their strategic partnership.

Just months prior, in March, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko visited Iran for the first time in seventeen years.[i] Since the Ukraine War began in February 2022, Iran has expanded its ties with Russia through an impending defense pact that already includes selling its Shahed drones and, most recently, ballistic missiles to Moscow.[ii] It’s only natural that Belarus, a top Russian ally and shares a border with Ukraine, would also want to deepen its ties with Tehran. As MAJ GEN Mousavi pointed out during his discussion with his counterpart, Iran and Belarus have “common threats and interests” as the two countries are under Western sanctions.

In the meeting cited in the IRIB article, the Iranian Army commander also said, “Belarus holds a strategic and special position and is a strong barrier against NATO expansion. We, along with regional countries, are also opposed to NATO’s expansion.”

During his March visit, the Belarusian dictator met with then-President Ebrahim Raisi and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and signed seven memorandums of understanding, including one in trade and transportation, with a target of $100 million in trade.[iii] MAJ GEN Lukyanovich’s August visit appears to be an extension of that bilateral cooperation, which includes economic as well as military ties. With Iran isolated by the United States and the West, the strengthening of relations with other internationally isolated countries like Belarus is a mutually beneficial opportunity for Tehran in the realms of trade and military cooperation to survive economic pressure via sanctions.


Sources:

“آمادگی نیروی پدافند هوایی ارتش برای توسعه همکاری‌ها با بلاروس (The readiness of the army air defense to develop cooperation with Belarus),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 7 August 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00I3RX.

According to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Major General Andrei Yulianovich Lukyanovich, commander of the air force and air defense of the Republic of Belarus, met and held discussions with Major General [Abdolrahim] Mousavi at the General Staff Headquarters of the Armed Forces.

In this meeting, the army commander described Iran and Belarus as two countries with common threats and interests, under the unjust sanctions of America and the West, and possessing independence and non-dependence.

General Mousavi, while appreciating Belarus’ chivalrous and independent stance on the issue of the assassination of [Hamas political chief] martyr Ismail Haniyeh, stated: “Belarus holds a strategic and special position and is a strong barrier against NATO expansion. We, along with regional countries, are also opposed to NATO’s expansion.”

Referring to the unilateral sanctions imposed by global arrogance against Iran since the victory of the Islamic Revolution [referring to the West], the army commander added: “We have tried to make the most of this threat and not make our country’s defense dependent on external powers…”

The army commander emphasized: “The political, military, and defense officials of the two countries are determined to develop and deepen cooperation, and a clear example of this is the visit of the president of Belarus, Mr. [Aleksandr] Lukashenko, to Iran and his meeting with the late dear martyr President [Ebrahim] Raisi, which laid the foundation for relations and joint commissions…”

General Lukanovich said: “We also seek to expand and deepen military relations and exchange and benefit from the valuable experiences of the Islamic Republic of Iran…”Referring to Iran’s defensive capabilities to defend against enemy threats, General Lukanovich invited the army commander to visit Belarus and observe the country’s capabilities.


Notes:

[i] “Iran, Belarus Vow To “Strengthen Cooperation” During Lukashenko’s Visit,” IranWire, 13 March 2024. https://iranwire.com/en/politics/114738-iran-belarus-vow-to-strengthen-cooperation-during-lukashenkos-visit/

[ii] Natasha Bertrand and Kylie Atwood, “Iran transfers ballistic missiles to Russia, sources say,” CNN, 7 September 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/06/politics/iran-transfers-ballistic-missiles-russia/index.html

[iii] Maziar Motamedi, “Iran and Belarus sign cooperation roadmap in Lukashenko visit,” Al Jazeera, 13 March 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/13/iran-and-belarus-sign-cooperation-roadmap-in-lukashenko-visit


OE Insight Summary:

BYS air force commander visits IRN to expand military ties despite regional tensions.


Image Information:

Image: “Commander of the Iranian army, Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi, shakes hands with the commander of the Belarusian Air Force, Major General Andrei Yulianovich Lukyanovich, in Tehran,” Tasnim News Agency (IRGC-affiliated news source), 7 August 2024.
Source: https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2024/08/07/3135937/generals-urge-promotion-of-iran-belarus-ties
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.


Iranian Military Equipment Integrating Artificial Intelligence

“Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri speaking,” Student News Network (Iranian media outlet), 31 July 2024.


“Artificial intelligence technology has been utilized in the new equipment, and we are currently witnessing its results.”


As the international community enters the world of artificial intelligence (AI) warfare, Iran is integrating and developing this technology into its military equipment.[i] As reported by Iranian state broadcaster IRIB, Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGC-N) said during a ceremony in the southwestern port city of Bandar Abbas on 9 August, “Artificial intelligence technology has been utilized in the new equipment, and we are currently witnessing its results.” Tangsiri claims 2,654 new missile systems, drones, and other equipment have been integrated with AI to enhance precision, acquisition, and capabilities in its military hardware—demonstrating Tehran’s top focus is AI.

In January, General Hossein Salami, commander of the IRGC, made similar claims about the country’s drone fleet.[ii] Progress appears to be limited, as little public information is available on the subject, except for comments from high-ranking officials in the military apparatus. It’s also worth noting that Tehran has a history of making outlandish claims to boast its abilities. Nevertheless, Iran is thinking about how to further integrate and develop this technology by investing in training on how to integrate AI into its array of military equipment.[iii]

According to the IRIB article, RADM Tangsiri noted: “In the equipment and facilities that we put into operation today, we paid special attention to innovation and technical creativity.” He explained that AI has been a top priority and applied to systems used by the defense ministry and the specialized missile sites of the IRGC-N.

Not only does AI improve Tehran’s capabilities and support its top priority of regime preservation, the integration into its military hardware is a selling point on the arms market as Iran becomes a global exporter to Russia, Ethiopia, Venezuela, Sudan, and other countries.[iv]


Sources:

“استفاده از هوش مصنوعی در تجهیزات جدید سپاه (Use of artificial intelligence in the new IRGC equipment),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 9 August 2024.

https://www.iribnews.ir/00I3a3

According to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri stated during the ceremony for adding new equipment to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Navy (IRGC-NV): “210 systems out of 2,654 products in the field today were showcased, demonstrating every wave of new equipment joining the arsenal is large and meaningful.”

The commander of the IRGC-N added: “In terms of the equipment intelligence and countering electronic warfare, systems were introduced in this ceremony that were practically handed over to the forces by the IRGC’s top commander.”

Commander Tangsiri said: “In the equipment and facilities that we put into operation today, we paid special attention to innovation and technical creativity.”

The commander of the IRGC-N emphasized that: “In these added equipment and systems, we saw an increase in accuracy, aim, and targeting, which increased the confidence of using these weapons in the electronic warfare environment, adding to the capabilities of the equipment.”

Rear Admiral Tangsiri also stressed that the application of artificial intelligence in developing these systems has been a priority, both in the Defense Ministry and the specialized missile centers of the IRGC-N, and the results of these efforts are now evident.Commander Tangsiri stressed the importance of using artificial intelligence in the construction of equipment, whether in the Defense Ministry or the specialized missile center of the IRGC, saying: “Artificial intelligence technology has been utilized in the new equipment, and we are currently witnessing its results.”


Notes:

[i] Mahmoud Javadi, “Heavy Thunder, No Rain: Defense AI in Iran,” The Very Long Game. Contributions to Security and Defense Studies, 19 July 2024. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-58649-1_19

[ii] See: Michael Rubin, “Iran Announces Integration Of Artificial Intelligence Into Drone Fleet,” OE Watch, 10-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/iran-announces-integration-of-artificial-intelligence-into-drone-fleet/

[iii] Mahmoud Javadi, “Heavy Thunder, No Rain: Defense AI in Iran,” The Very Long Game. Contributions to Security and Defense Studies, 19 July 2024. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-58649-1_19

[iv] Danny Citrinowicz. “Iran is on its way to replacing Russia as a leading arms exporter. The US needs a strategy to counter this trend,” IranSource, Atlantic Council, 2 February 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-drone-uavs-russia/


OE Insight Summary:

Commander of IRGC-N says AI has been implemented into new IRN military equipment.

Image Information:

Image: “Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri speaking,” Student News Network (Iranian media outlet), 31 July 2024.
Source: https://snn.ir/fa/news/1160582/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D9%88-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%DB%B3%DB%B0%DB%B9%DB%B3%DB%B9-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%AC%D9%88-%D9%88-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA-%D8%B4%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%AA-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF-%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D9%85
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.