China Reinvigorates Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia

Kyrgyz Highway A363 towards Chinese border-Xinjiang.


“China firmly supports Uzbekistan in safeguarding its national sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and firmly supports Uzbekistan in choosing its own development path.”


China seeks to strengthen its security cooperation with Central Asian countries to safeguard its core interests in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). According to the first excerpted article from the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, People’s Daily, Chinese President Xi Jinping met his Uzbek counterpart, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, in Beijing and pledged an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” with Uzbekistan. This places Uzbekistan at the highest ranking of China’s foreign relations alongside Pakistan, Belarus, and Venezuela. These elevated diplomatic ties not only pave the way for the advancement of strategic BRI projects but also signal to the BRI stakeholders the urgency of security cooperation in the current turbulent international environment.

To this end, Mirziyoyev places significant emphasis on the One-China principle and strictly opposes external interference in China’s internal affairs, especially with regard to Beijing’s crackdown on Uyghurs in Xinjiang Province in the name of deradicalization. Xinjiang is home to the Muslim Uyghur minority and borders the former Soviet states of Central Asia, serving as the geopolitical linchpin in the success of the rejuvenation of the Silk Road. Mirziyoyev firmly supports China stabilizing Xinjiang by taking repressive­­ measures to eradicate extremism, terrorism, and separatism. This state visit indicates a growing China-Central Asia alliance in security cooperation and soft power development. The day before Mirziyoyev’s visit, China’s State Council Information Office released a whitepaper, cited in the second excerpted article. This white paper articulates the legal basis for countering “The Three Evils,”[i] operation and supervision mechanisms, and China’s vision of security cooperation on a regional and global scale.[ii] With the growing “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” in the region, Beijing is undertaking a more direct engagement in Central Asia’s security and defense capabilities. Overall, China’s multifaceted BRI strategies are likely to intensify the growing Great Power competition in the region.


Sources:

Yijun Yang, “习近平同乌兹别克斯坦总统米尔济约耶夫会谈 (Xi Jinping holds talks with President Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan),” People’s Daily (official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee), 25 January 2024. http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-01/25/nw.D110000renmrb_20240125_1-01.htm

On January 24, President Xi Jinping hosted President Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan at the Great Hall of the People. The two heads of state announced that China and Uzbekistan have decided to develop an all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership, symbolizing an era of a more meaningful and dynamic China-Uzbekistan relationship.

Facing the current complex international situation, the two sides pledged to build a solid foundation for mutual trust and continue with high-quality joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China firmly supports Uzbekistan in safeguarding its national sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and firmly supports Uzbekistan in choosing its own development path.

Mirziyoyev said that he looks forward to the opportunity to further consolidate and deepen mutual trust and expand all-round cooperation under the BRI, including agriculture, green energy, and tourism. Uzbekistan firmly abides by the One-China principle, resolutely opposes external forces interfering in China’s internal affairs, and is willing to firmly support China on issues involving Taiwan, Xinjiang, human rights, and other matters related to China’s core interests. Furthermore, Uzbekistan is ready to work with China to combat the “Three Evilsand safeguard their respective and regional security.


“中国的反恐怖主义法律制度体系与实践 (China’s Legal Framework and Measures for Counterterrorism),” The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 23 January 2024. http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2024-01/23/content_116958678.htm

Terrorism poses a persistent and asymmetric threat to international peace and security. China has found a path of law-based counterterrorism that conforms to its realities by establishing a sound legal framework, promoting strict, impartial, procedure-based law enforcement, and ensuring impartial administration of justice and effective protection of human rights…

Relying on more than 40 years of experience, China has gradually developed a counterterrorism legal framework based on the Constitution. The Counterterrorism Law, in concert with the criminal laws and National Security Law, covers administrative regulations, judicial interpretations, local regulations, and departmental and local government rules…Upholding the vision of a global community of shared future, China is willing to work closely with other countries to push forward counterterrorism cause as part of global governance. On the basis of equality and respect, China will engage in extensive exchanges, cooperation, and mutual learning to facilitate the global effort to counter terrorism.


Notes:

[i] The “Three Evils” (三股恶势力) is a political slogan referencing extremism, terrorism, and separatism.

[ii] Released by China’s State Council Information Office, the white paper consists of chapters such as “An Improving Legal Framework for Counterterrorism,” “Clear Provisions for the Determination and Punishment of Terrorist Activities,” “Standardized Exercise of Power in Fighting Terrorism,” “Protection of Human Rights in Counterterrorism Practices,” and “Effective Protection of People’s Safety and National Security.”


Image Information:

Image: Kyrgyz Highway A363 towards Chinese border-Xinjiang.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kyrgyzstan_(6052094329).jpg
Attribution: CC BY 2.0


Uzbekistan and China Sign Strategic Partnership Agreement

Official portrait of Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev


“According to Xi, the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway should be started as soon as possible and help transform Uzbekistan from a landlocked country into a country connected by land routes.”


Uzbekistan conducts bilateral cooperation across political, economic, or security spheres with several different partners, including Russia, China, and the United States, but rarely engages too closely with any one partner. Despite precedent, the accompanying excerpted article from the independent Russian-language news website Fergana Agency reports that China and Uzbekistan signed an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” in late January 2024 during President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s visit to China. The article includes a quote from President Xi Jinping, who stated that China supports Uzbekistan’s “national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and in choosing its own development path.” In turn, Mirziyoyev stated that Uzbekistan supports the “one China principle.” Uzbekistan has previously stated it supports the one China principle, but Mirziyoyev went on to note that Uzbekistan now firmly supports Beijing on its core[i] interests, including Taiwan. He also noted that Uzbekistan will cooperate with China in the fight against the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Uzbekistan already cooperates with China on “three evils” through the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but this could be a sign of deeper cooperation in this area and might include an increase in bilateral security cooperation. China has already signed similar comprehensive agreements with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in recent years.[ii] Overall, the most recent agreement with Uzbekistan strengthens China’s position in the region.


Sources:

“Узбекистан и Китай повысили отношения до всепогодного всестороннего партнерства (Uzbekistan and China have increased relations to an all-weather comprehensive partnership),” Fergana Agency (independent Russian-language news website focusing on Central Asia), 25 January 2024. https://fergana.agency/news/132723

Uzbekistan and China have increased relations to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership for a new era.” The corresponding joint statement was signed by the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev and the President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping following negotiations in Beijing on January 24…

Xi Jinping noted that 32 years ago, Uzbekistan became the first Central Asian country to establish diplomatic relations with China…“In particular, over the past seven-plus years, we have been working together to establish healthy and prosperous bilateral cooperation in various fields,” the Chinese President said.

China firmly supports Uzbekistan in defending its national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and in choosing its own development path, Xi emphasized…

According to Xi, the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway should be started as soon as possible and help transform Uzbekistan from a landlocked country into a country connected by land routes…

Shavkat Mirziyoyev noted the symbolic significance of choosing China as the first country he visited this year…

Mirziyoyev stated that Uzbekistan:

  • firmly adheres to the “one China principle”
  • resolutely opposes the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of the PRC 
  • [is] ready to firmly support Beijing on issues related to its core interests, including Taiwan, Xinjiang, human rights 
  • [will] cooperate with the PRC in the fight against the “three forces of evil” (terrorism, separatism and extremism) and ensuring security in both countries and the region as a whole.

The parties welcomed the launch of a pilot project to introduce the Lu Ban Workshop, the Chinese vocational education system, in Uzbekistan. During the negotiations, it was noted that by the end of 2023, mutual trade between the two countries had reached $14 billion. The leaders expressed the opinion that in the near future trade turnover could be increased to $20 billion.

Mirziyoyev called on Chinese partners to actively participate in the processes of privatization of state-owned enterprises and banks in Uzbekistan. As a result of the negotiations, over 15 cooperation documents were signed regarding the joint construction of the Belt and Road, economic and technological cooperation, interconnectedness, environmental protection, new energy sources, science and culture…


[i] For additional information on China’s position regarding Taiwan being a “core interest,” see: Dodge Billingsley, “Chinese Officials Justify Reaction to Western Presence in Taiwan Strait,” OE Watch, 07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-officials-justify-reaction-to-western-presence-in-taiwan-strait-2/

[ii] The separate agreements between China and individual Central Asian states exemplify China’s preference for bilateral relations over regional frameworks. For background on China and Tajikistan’s security cooperation agreement, see: Matthew Stein and Peter Wood “Chinese-Tajikistani Security Cooperation Gaining Momentum,” FMSO Foreign Perspective Brief, January 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/chinese-tajikistani-security-cooperation-gaining-momentum-stein-wood/


Image Information:

Image: Official portrait of Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Shavkat_Mirziyoyev_official_portrait_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Sri Lanka Suspends Chinese Research Vessel Visits

Map of South Asia, India featured.


“In the immediate (time frame), it means that China’s third ‘research/spy vessel’ Xiang Yang Hong 3 is not welcome in the first week of the New Year.”


India has been wary of Chinese research vessels docking in Sri Lankan ports and has pushed Sri Lanka to prevent these port calls. China claims the vessels are only for scientific purposes, but the Chinese ships that have docked in Sri Lanka are known to have dual scientific and intelligence-gathering purposes.[i] The accompanying excerpted articles report on Sri Lanka’s recent decision for a one-year moratorium on foreign research vessels docking in the country’s ports beginning 1 January 2024, and demonstrate how Sri Lanka continues to be a focal point in tensions between India and China.

The first excerpted article from India’s independent think tank Observer Research Foundation states that Sri Lanka’s moratorium is an attempt to appease India by not allowing Chinese ships to carry out intelligence gathering activities so close to India under the guise of scientific research. While Sri Lanka has become more economically tied with China over the past several years, it still relies on India as an economic and political partner. Sri Lanka’s ties with India, while strained at times, go back further than its ties with China. An immediate impact of the moratorium resulted in the Chinese ship Xiang Yang Hong 3 being prohibited from docking in Sri Lanka in early January. The author mentions that China sought permission from both Sri Lanka and the Maldives to dock the Xiang Yang Hong 3 late last year. The second excerpted article from India’s English-language daily Deccan Herald reports that in light of the Sri Lankan moratorium, the Maldives is allowing the Xiang Yang Hong 3 docking rights. The purpose of the Chinese visit is for the rotation of personnel and replenishment for the ship, and not for research, according to the article. Nevertheless, the decision by the Maldives enables China a port visit close to India. The article also mentions that there will likely be some political fallout between India and the Maldives over this authorization, though it is unclear how this will play out. Overall, Sri Lanka’s one year moratorium on foreign ships reflects India’s influence in Sri Lanka. However, the docking of the Xiang Yang Hong 3 in the Maldives likewise demonstrates that India’s ability to influence only extends so far, allowing China to project power and maintain a presence near India.


Sources:

N. Sathiya Moorthy, “Decoding Sri Lanka’s moratorium on foreign research vessels,” Observer Research Foundation (independent think-tank in India), 8 January 2024. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/decoding-sri-lanka-s-moratorium-on-foreign-research-vessels

On the face of it, the recent Sri Lankan government’s decision to ‘declare a pause’ on foreign research vessels for one year beginning 1 January 2024 is an attempt to buy peace with the large-hearted Indian neighbour, and also the United States…

In the immediate, it means that China’s third ‘research/spy vessel’ Xiang Yang Hong 3 is not welcome in the first week of the New Year…

“The arrival of these ships creates serious diplomatic tensions, and it (2024) is an election year,” Foreign Minister Ali Sabry said, by way of explanation. “Such ship visits can be highly disruptive for the region and Sri Lanka, because of the pressure the government may come under…” he added…

For instance, Shi Yan 6 was not the first Chinese research/survey ship, otherwise considered a ‘spy ship’, to visit Sri Lanka…A year earlier in 2022, Yuan Wang 5 had berthed at the Chinese-controlled Hambantota Port in the south, unlike Shi Yan 6, which docked at the capital Colombo…

In the case of the new vessel, Xiang Yang Hong 3, China had sought permission from both Sri Lanka and neighbouring Maldives, to dock it in these waters from 5 January to the end of May, a long five-month haul. As the intention was to map the ocean in these parts, the long stay should be a cause for concern for the larger Indian neighbour.

It should be equally so for the US, whose Diego Garcia military base is situated 700 km away…


Anirban Bhaumik, “India wary as Maldives allows China ‘research vessel’ to dock at port,” Deccan Herald (English-language daily newspaper in India), 23 January 2024.

https://www.deccanherald.com/world/india-wary-as-maldives-allows-china-research-vessel-to-dock-at-port-2861168

…President Mohamed Muizzu’s government on Tuesday stated that it had decided to allow Chinese PLAN’s ‘research vessel’ Xiang Yang Hong 3 to dock at Malé, the main port of the Maldives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the government of the Maldives stated that the decision to allow the ship to make the port call followed a diplomatic request from Beijing. It, however, claimed that Xiang Yang Hong 3 would dock at Malé only for the rotation of personnel and replenishment and would not conduct any research as long as it would remain in the territorial waters of the Maldives.New Delhi, however, is not convinced and, according to the sources, would soon convey its concerns to Malé through diplomatic channels. A source in New Delhi told DH that India would use its assets to keep watch on the Xiang Yang Hong 3 during its port call in the Maldives…


Notes:

[i] For background on India pressuring Sri Lanka to prevent Chinese vessels docking in Sri Lankan ports, see: Matthew Stein “India Works To Maintain Sri Lankan Foothold Amid Growing China Presence,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/india-works-to-maintain-sri-lankan-foothold-amid-growing-china-presence/


Image Information:

Image: Map of South Asia, India featured.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:South_Asia._LOC_2001622357.jpg
Attribution: Public domain


China Claims Philippine Navy Seeks External Intervention in South China Sea

Philippine Coast Guard


“China has firmly gained actual control of Second Thomas Shoal and its adjacent waters, but China and the Philippines are in a stalemate.”


On 5 January, an anonymous Chinese analyst published the accompanying excerpted Chinese-language article analyzing the ongoing clashes in the South China Sea between China and the Philippines. The article contends that Philippine warships were illegally resting on the Second Thomas Shoal.[i]. The author claims the Philippines was attempting to send repair materials to those ships, escalating tensions with China. Further, the tensions provided excuses for external forces (specifically the United States and Japan) to intervene on the Philippine side. The author also suggests that the Philippine strategy was to benefit from foreign assistance to establish full control of the Second Thomas Shoal. The author’s outlook mimics the Chinese government’s official position. To that end, the author asserts that China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea, to include the Second Thomas Shoal.[ii] While the author acknowledges that China and the Philippines are in a stalemate over control of the shoal, the author claims the Philippines will also try to provoke China into an action that would undermine its legitimate claims to the shoal. The author claims the Philippine strategy began with the new Marcos administration, which took office in June 2022.[iii] China contends the Philippine government should have removed the broken ships from the shoal instead of trying to repair them. In conclusion, the author insists that dialogue is the best way to manage differences in the South China Sea. However, as the author sees it, there appears to be little prospect for a resolution through dialogue due to the Marcos administration’s provocations.


Sources:

“非法“坐滩”军舰即将解体,菲律宾又想了个馊主意 (The illegal “beach-sitting” warships will soon be ruined, and the Philippines has another bad idea),” sohu.com (Beijing-based internet company providing information on diverse aspects of contemporary Chinese affairs), 5 January 2024. https://www.sohu.com/a/748698907_137871#google_vignette

In the past year, the Philippines has frequently provoked troubles in the South China Sea, and China has decisively counterattacked. In the end, the Philippines failed to obtain any benefits. However, the Philippines will obviously not surrender because its warships illegally on the Second Thomas Shoal beachside are about to be ruined. This is among the main reasons why the Philippines desperately breaks into the Second Thomas Shoal to transport repair materials. In addition, the Philippines intends to escalate tensions in the South China Sea and create excuses for external forces such as the United States and Japan to interfere in the situation in the South China Sea.


Notes:

[i] The Second Thomas Shoal is an atoll in the Spratly Island chain and has been a flashpoint between China and the Philippines, among their other broader disputes in the South China Sea. The Philippines has deployed marines to a broken down navy ship, which was grounded on the shoal in 1999 while attempting to protect Philippine maritime claims. In 2013, China began to increase its presence near the shoal to weaken the Philippines’ control of it. China also claims that former Philippines president, Joseph Estrada (1998-2001), had promised to remove the Philippine Navy ship, but the current Marcos government denies this. “China-Philippines Tensions in the South China Sea,” Congressional Research Service, In Focus, 13 December 2023. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12550/2

[ii] For additional information on the China-Philippines dispute over the Second Thomas Shoal, see: Dodge Billingsley, “China and Philippines Spar Over Grounded Ship in Spratly Islands,” OE Watch, 08-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/china-and-philippines-spar-over-grounded-ship-in-spratly-islands/

[iii] In 2020 and 2021, the Duterte administration began to express concerns about Chinese island reclamation in the South China Sea. Since coming to power in 2022, geopolitical factors have moved the Marcos administration even closer to the United States and farther from China. One reason for this is China’s increasing efforts to terraform islands in the South China Sea, which enables China to assert a greater territorial presence in the sea. Another reason is that the Chinese “fishing militia” has amassed at Whitsun Reef, which demonstrates China’s intent to seize it from Philippine control. Alvina Cambria, “From Aquino to Marcos: political survival and Philippine foreign policy towards China,” China, Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 6 November 2023. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24761028.2023.2281165


Image Information:

Image: A Chinese Coast Guard ship allegedly obstructs the Philippine Coast Guard vessel Malabrigo as it provided support during a Philippine Navy operation near Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed South China Sea, 30 June 2023.
Source: Philippine Coast Guard, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:June_30,_2023_PCG_CCG_encounter_1.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0


China Increases Presence in East China Sea To Change Status Quo

The East China Sea. The pink line represents the both the regular Chinese ADIZ and the ECS ADIZ.


“We can only move forward, not backward. We will never let even 1 millimeter of our territory taken.” -Xi Jinping


China is reportedly deploying multiple warships near the borders of its East China Sea (ECS) air defense identification zone (ADIZ) for at least the next year.[i] The action by the PLA Navy raises concern for nearby Japan. According to the first article excerpt published in one of Japan’s leading newspapers, Yomiuri Shimbun, Japanese sources have observed a Jiangkai II-class [RG1] guided missile frigate and a highly capable air defense missile destroyer in the ECS.[ii] Japan is concerned by China’s operational posture within its unilaterally established ECS ADIZ. As the article explains, instead of allowing freedom of navigation in international airspace recognized in international law, China is operating as if its ECS zone falls under their jurisdiction, often warning foreign aircraft within the ADIZ that it will take “defensive emergency measures” if they do not leave immediately.

Concern surrounding the ECS ADIZ is not new. This zone differs from others as it intentionally overlaps portions of ADIZs maintained by Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.[iii] The overlapping zones could create potential flashpoints, especially in areas in which disputed territories are involved. For example, both ADIZs maintained by China and Japan overlap the highly disputed, Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, located adjacent to Taiwan. According to the second article excerpt, published through Tokyo-based nonprofit news agency Kyodo News, China’s Coast Guard drafted a plan to maintain its presence around the Senkakus, (also known as Diaoyu in China) throughout 2024. This decision came after Chinese President Xi Jinping pointed out the need for China to “constantly strengthen” its efforts to safeguard the sovereignty of the islands. The last excerpted article, also published in Yomiuri Shimbun, points out that China is strengthening its anti-access/area denial strategy while also exerting military pressure on Taiwan.[iv] The article describes China having four ships deployed around the clock, working closely with fighters, and increasing military activities. It adds that China will likely aim to block U.S. and Japan Self Defense Forces aircraft from entering the airspace in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. Meanwhile, an expert cited in the article points out that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could include a concurrent “Senkaku contingency” because China claims the Senkakus are part of Taiwan.


Sources:

“China Deploys Multiple Warships Around Self-Claimed ADIZ,” Yomiuri Shimbun (one of Japan’s five major newspapers), 28 January 2024. https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/defense-security/20240128-165250/
China is deploying multiple warships around the clock in waters near the borders of the air defense identification zone that it has unilaterally established, The Yomiuri Shimbun has learned.

China is operating the zone on the premise that it is Chinese airspace. Aircraft that fly within its ADIZ are told to immediately leave.
Contrary to international custom, China unilaterally demands that aircraft flying in the zone follow Chinese authorities’ instructions. It also claims it will take “defensive emergency measures” if an aircraft fails to do so.

China started deploying at least three navy warships around the clock in waters around its claimed ADIZ, according to Japanese government sources. The three include an air defense missile destroyer, which is the Chinese version of an Aegis-equipped destroyer, and a frigate warship. Equipped with high-performance radar, air defense missile destroyers are highly capable of shooting down aircraft. The Chinese military aircraft repeatedly scramble in response to SDF aircraft, according to the sources. The Chinese military is believed to be strengthening its monitoring of SDF and U.S. military aircraft and warships in the East China Sea.

China’s monitoring capabilities were initially believed to be low, and it was thought that its establishment of the ADIZ would have no substantial impact. However, some observers are warning that China will have its warships, which are deployed around the clock, and fighters work together and increase its military activities. “It’s intended to block the SDF and U.S. military aircraft [from entering the airspace] in the event of contingencies in the Taiwan Strait,” said an SDF source.


“China Plans To Keep Ships Near Senkakus 365 Days in 2024,” Kyodo News (Tokyo-based non-profit news agency), 30 December 2024. https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/12/eb55266c4a9f-china-plans-to-keep-ships-near-senkakus-365-days-in-2024.html?phrase=Senkaku&words=Senkakus,Senkaku

 China plans to keep its ships near the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea for 365 days in 2024 as leader Xi Jinping has called for bolstering Beijing’s sovereignty claim over the islets, sources familiar with the matter said Saturday.

During a rare visit by Xi on Nov. 29 to the command office for the East China Sea area of the China Coast Guard in Shanghai, the president pointed out the need for Beijing to “constantly strengthen” its efforts to safeguard the sovereignty of the islands, which China calls
Diaoyu, the sources said.

Xi, who also heads the Central Military Commission, the highest national defense organization, commented on a bilateral row over the Senkaku Islands, saying, “We can only move forward, not backward. We will never let even 1 millimeter of our territory taken,” the sources added.


“4 Chinese Warships Deployed Around Taiwan, Sources Say; Believe Ships Will Collaborate with Other Warships in East China Sea,” Yomiuri Shimbun (one of Japan’s five major newspapers), 30 January 2024. https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/defense-security/20240130-165702/

China is believed to be using the ships to exert military pressure on Taiwan. If China and Taiwan enter an armed conflict with each other, an envisaged situation known as a Taiwan contingency, China likely will aim to block U.S. and other forces by using the ships in conjunction with other warships nearby. These warships are continually being deployed near the border of China’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), which China has unilaterally declared over an area of the East China Sea.

China is strengthening its anti-access/ area denial (A2/AD) strategy, which restricts the military activities of other countries in its vicinity. The strategy aims to prevent U.S. forces from entering the first island chain that connects the Nansei Islands and the Philippines. The Chinese warships deployed near the ADIZ and around Taiwan are said to be almost in line with the island chain.“There’s a good chance that China will use force to make a move on the Senkakus in the future if Japan lets its guard down,” former Self-Defense Fleet Commander in Chief Yoji Koda said. “Japan needs to be fully prepared.”


Notes:

[i] A buffer zone set up by a country outside its sovereign airspace is intended to help prevent incursions. China’s zones can be broken down into the “China ADIZ” and the “ECS ADIZ,” the latter of which is contested. For more information on China’s ECS Air Defense Identification Zone, see: “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zones: A Primer,” Center for International Maritime Security, 10 November 2022. https://cimsec.org/east-china-sea-air-defense-identification-zones-a-primer/

[ii] While the article does not identify the exact destroyer type, it refers to it as “The Chinese version of an Aegis-equipped destroyer,” which is likely the Type 052D. The Type 052D, is equipped with an advanced active electronically scanned array radar system and a 64-cell missile vertical launch system capable of firing surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles. Liu Xuanzun, “China Launches Two New Type 052D Destroyers: Media,” Global Times, 12 March 2023. globaltimes.cn/page/202303/1287149.shtml  

[iii] Japan established its ADIZ in 1969, while the United States established Taiwan’s after WWII and South Korea’s during the Korean War. Ibid.

[iv] For additional information on China’s position regarding Taiwan, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Chinese Officials Justify Reaction to Western In Taiwan Strait,” OE Watch, 07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-officials-justify-reaction-to-western-presence-in-taiwan-strait-2/


Image Information:

Image: The East China Sea. The pink line represents the both the regular Chinese ADIZ and the ECS ADIZ.
Source: Maximilian Dörrbecker (Chumwa), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Defense_Identification_Zone_(East_China_Sea)#/media/File:JADIZ_and_CADIZ_and_KADIZ_in_East_China_Sea.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0



Iran Rationalizes Russia’s Pro-Arab Position on Disputed Islands

Iranian graphic depicting the strategic location and Iranian control over Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tonb Islands.


“Russia seems to take for granted its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.”


Despite official warmth, Iran has reason to be suspicious of Russia, given Russia’s historic willingness to interfere in Iranian politics and/or infringe on Iranian sovereignty.[i] The excerpted opinion piece from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated news outlet Fararu.ir, highlights that one of the most sensitive sovereignty issues for Iran today revolves around three islands—Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tonb Islands—occupied by Iranian forces in 1971 to prevent the UK from transferring their control to the UAE. While international law sides with the UAE, Iran has been unwilling to return the islands due to their strategic importance overseeing the shipping lanes on the Persian Gulf side of the Strait of Hormuz. Indeed, Abu Musa has become home to a major IRGC base.[ii] The excerpted article seeks to rationalize Russia’s decision to side with the UAE over Iran on questions about the islands’ sovereignty. It argues the UAE is an important outlet for the Russian economy in an era of isolation and sanctions. Russian officials may also believe Tehran has become so dependent on Moscow that Iran has little choice but to accept Russia’s pro-UAE position on the matter. Regardless, short of civil war distracting Iran during any transition following Khamenei’s death, there is little possibility that the UAE could liberate its occupied territories or that Russia could compel Iran to abandon the three islands. Still, Iranians have long memories and are unlikely to forgive the Kremlin for what they see as a betrayal. Iran may tilt more toward China in the future or simply bide its time and lick it wounds. But, when Iranians feel the moment is right, they will use the Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tonbs episode to justify a future betrayal of Russia.


Sources:

“Cherayi Mawzehgiri Russiyeh dar Khasus Jazair She Ganeh” (What Explains Russia’s Position with Regard to the Three Islands?),” Fararu.com (nominally independent web portal close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), 31 December 2023. https://fararu.com/fa/news/695771

Russia is a country that does not make treaty of friendship with anyone but rather pursues only its own interests. To put it simply, from the Russian perspective, there are no strategic enemies or strategic friends. Russians… do not see everything as zero sum game. For example, Russia is now at odds with the West, but it has also maintained cooperation on some issues, openly or covertly.

With this brief preamble, we return to recent Russian behavior with regard to the three islands. First, we need to look at things globally. Everyone knows well that America’s power in the world, if not weak is waning. On the other hand, China, with its strong economic backing and lack of arrogance in the style of the West – now has a positive image in the world. By mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China somehow announced its presence in the region, though it had been in place for many years as an emerging power in the world that is transforming from bipolar to multipolar….Perhaps one of the main reasons for Russia’s recent stance is the oil dollars of Arab countries, which have caught the eye of [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and Russia under sanctions. Moscow is under severe pressure due to Western sanctions, so it seems that with full cooperation with Arabs on the issue of the three Persian Gulf islands, it intends on one hand to influence the circle of America’s Arab allies and on the other hand, take a realistic view of its national and financial interests…. Russia seems to take for granted its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since the West has no place in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kremlin officials have sided with Arab countries without worrying about Iranian reactions.


Notes:

[i] For an earlier discussion of Iran’s the history and development of Iran-Russia relations, see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian Influence Extends to the Mediterranean,” OE Watch, September 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/242569/download

[ii] For background on the island dispute, see: Michael Rubin, “Revolutionary Guard Chief Exacerbates UAE-Iran Island Dispute,” OE Watch, June 2012, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195617


Image Information:

Image: Iranian graphic depicting the strategic location and Iranian control over Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tonb Islands.
Source: https://www.tabnak.ir/files/fa/tags/4706/1674926_155.jpg
Attribution: Tabnak.ir


Russia Continues To Enhance Its Arctic Infrastructure

Map of the Yenisei River showing national borders


“The 5.8 km long pipeline is a key component of Vostok Oil, the biggest industrial project currently unfolding in the Russian Arctic. According to Russian state oil company Rosneft and its subsidiary RN-Vankor, as many as 25 ships have taken part in dredging operations in the Yenisei during summer 2023. As winter approached, the company started laying the pipeline on the riverbed. The new pipeline will cross the Yenisei River near Tochina.”


Amid sanctions, Russia continues to develop the infrastructure necessary to exploit and export its vast natural resources, especially in the Arctic. The Yenisei River is a major river flowing northward that originates in Mongolia and bisects Russia. It is a key economic transport route of vital energy and metals from the industrial city and extraction centers of Norilsk. According to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, products move by rail from Norilsk to the river port of Dudinka, where they are shipped to the Arctic Ocean and then to ports east and west on the Northern Sea Route. Russia is investing heavily in increasing the carrying capacity of the Northern Sea route,[i] already moving energy to its Pacific customers on ice-class LNG carriers and oil tankers. The Dudinka port is at capacity and the riverside village of Tochina is being rapidly expanded. Reportedly, 21 riverside terminals are under construction to handle petroleum exports. Russia’s focus on new routes to its Asian markets, China and North Korea, will help it circumvent the sanctions and survive a protracted war in Ukraine.


Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Oilmen start building of underwater pipeline across the Yenisei,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 19 December 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2023/12/oilmen-start-building-underwater-pipeline-across-yenisey

The 5.8 km long pipeline is a key component of Vostok Oil, the biggest industrial project currently unfolding in the Russian Arctic. According to Russian state oil company Rosneft and its subsidiary RN-Vankor, as many as 25 ships have in taken part in dredging operations in the Yenisei during summer 2023. As winter approached, the company started laying the pipeline on the riverbed. The new pipeline will cross the Yenisey River near Tochina.

The pipes have a 820 mm diameter and wall thickness of 22 mm. The 5,8 km long installation will connect the eastern and western shores of the major Arctic river. Its starting point is in the village of Tochina, about 60 km north of Dudinka.

Rosneft is under great time pressure to build this part of the Vostok Oil project. On a number of occasions, company CEO Igor Sechin has reiterated that the project will produce more than 30 million tons already in 2024. By 2030, the Vostok Oil will produce more than 100 million tons per year, most of it to be exported through the Northern Sea Route to Asian buyers.

A significant number of wells are drilled in the Taymyr Peninsula and several hundred km of pipeline are under construction. The oil will be exported from the Sever Terminal on the coast of the Yenisei Bay.

In the course of summer 2023, more than one million tons of goods have reportedly been shipped to the construction sites along the Yenisei, including 120,000 tons of oil pipes.

Rosneft have developed 21 mooring point for ship deliveries in the area and as many as 402 ships have reportedly been involved in project shipments this year.


Notes:

[i] For additional reporting on Russian activity in the Arctic see: Les Grau, “Russian Arctic Seaports Expand Activity Despite War In Ukraine,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russian-arctic-seaports-expand-activity-despite-war-in-ukraine/


Image Information:

Image: Map of the Yenisei River showing national borders
Source: Kmusser, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yeniseirivermap.png
Attribution: CCA-Share Alike 3.0 Unported


China-Based Oriental Space Launches Its First Medium-Lift Rocket

Gravity-1 launch vehicle


“The trend in Chinese commercial launch companies since 2020 has been to shift towards larger rockets. Orienspace is looking to develop and launch Gravity-2 and Gravity-3 soon. Both rockets having a low earth orbit payload greater than Gravity-1.”


China is making strides in its commercial launch technologies. According to the excerpted article from the Chinese news outlet People’s Daily Online, on 11 January 2024, a Chinese commercial launch vehicle designer called Orienpace[i] successfully launched its first Gravity-1 medium-lift rocket carrying 3 Yunyao-1 (18-20) global weather data satellites into low orbit. The Gravity-1 rocket, (known as “引力-1号,” “Yinli-1,” or simply “YL-1”) has been in development since 2021 and is the launch vehicle for the Yunyao-1 satellites. Several facets of the Gravity-1 make it an important development for China. First, it can support a very large payload of approximately 20-30 low-orbit satellites, which is larger than China’s previous largest rockets’ payloads, the CAS Space’s Kinetica-1 and China Rocket’s Jielong-3. Gravity-1 can provide a payload of 6.5 tons to low orbit, whereas Kinetica-1 can provide a payload of 2 tons and Jielong-3 can provide a payload of 1.5 tons to low orbit. Second, Oriental Space can launch Gravity-1 within 5 hours of manufacturing, giving Oriental Space the capability to address emergency launch requests. Third, Gravity-1 is the lowest price in the current Chinese launch market.[ii] The capabilities of Gravity-1 could provide China with the ability to launch multiple low-earth orbiting satellites at a faster and more cost-effective rate than their competitors enhancing China’s communication, military reconnaissance, and technology testing.


Sources:

“全球运力最大固体运载火箭引力一号首飞成功 (The world’s largest solid launch vehicle Gravity-1 successfully made its maiden flight),” People’s Daily Online (Chinese government news outlet), 12 January 2024. https://finance-people-com-cn.translate.goog/n1/2024/0112/c1004-40157723.html?_x_tr_sch=http&_x_tr_sl=zh-CN&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=sc

“At 13:30 on January 11, my country’s Taiyun Satellite Launch Center used the Gravity-1 Yaoyi commercial launch vehicle in the sea near Haiyang, Shandong, to successfully launch 18-20 Yunyao-1 satellites into the predetermined orbit…Gravity-1 is capable of carrying more than twice that of the previous largest Chinese solid rockets, CAS Space’s Kinetica-1 and China Rocket’s Jielong-3.”


Notes:

[i] See Orienspace’s official website (东方空间). https://www.orienspace.com/

[ii] This is according to Oriental Space’s website and a recent article featured in the American news outlet SpaceNews. See: Andrew Jones, “Orienspace breaks Chinese commercial launch records with Gravity-1 solid rocket,” SpaceNews. 11 January 2024. https://spacenews.com/orienspace-breaks-chinese-commercial-launch-records-with-gravity-1-solid-rocket/


Image Information:

Image: Gravity-1 launch vehicle
Source: https://www.orienspace.com/productPage
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0


Nauru Recognizes China, Further Isolating Taiwan

Map of the Pacific or Oceania region featuring Nauru.


“As a sovereign country, the Republic of Nauru independently made the right choice to announce that it recognizes the one-China principle, breaks the so-called “diplomatic ties” with the Taiwan authorities, and seeks to reestablish diplomatic ties with China. This fully shows that the one-China principle is where global opinion trends and where the arc of history bends.”


On 15 January, a day after the election of a pro-independence presidential candidate in Taiwan, the tiny Pacific Island nation of Nauru announced a switch of diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China.[i] The switch has left Taiwan with official diplomatic ties to only 12 states,[ii] although Taiwan enjoys unofficial support from others, including the United Kingdom and the United States. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning noted that, “China appreciates and welcomes the decision of the government of the Republic of Nauru,” according to the below excerpt from the printout of a press conference. Mao Ning skirted a question about whether Taiwan’s accusation “that China has lured Nauru with monetary support” was true.  There has been broad criticism of China’s tactics insinuating that it bribes nations to turn from Taiwan. According to the excerpted article from Singapore-based Channel News Asia, Taiwan accused China of engaging “in money diplomacy by offering far more money than what Taiwan provides to allies.” The same article also references an official statement from Nauru noting that the move to recognize China is a “significant first step in moving forward with Nauru’s development.” [iii] Regardless, Nauru’s shift towards Beijing is the latest of several countries that have switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China—10 since 2016—and the latest manifestation of China’s long-term strategy to grow its influence in the region and isolate Taiwan.


Sources:

“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 15 January 2024. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202401/t20240115_11224311.html

CCTV: The government of the Republic of Nauru officially announced its decision to recognize the one-China principle, break the so-called “diplomatic ties” with the Taiwan authorities and seek to reestablish diplomatic ties with China. What’s your comment?

Mao Ning: As an independent sovereign country, the Republic of Nauru announced that it recognizes the one-China principle, breaks the so-called “diplomatic ties” with the Taiwan authorities and seeks to reestablish diplomatic ties with China. China appreciates and welcomes the decision of the government of the Republic of Nauru.

There is but one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China. It’s what has been affirmed in Resolution 2758 of the UN General Assembly and is a prevailing consensus among the international community. China has established diplomatic relations with 182 countries on the basis of the one-China principle. The Nauru government’s decision of reestablishing diplomatic ties with China once again shows that the one-China principle is where global opinion trends and where the arc of history bends. China stands ready to work with Nauru to open new chapters of our bilateral relations on the basis of the one-China principle.

NHK: Why did the government of Nauru announce the decision to cut diplomatic relations with the Taiwan authorities after the elections in Taiwan?

Mao Ning: The government of Nauru announced that it recognizes the one-China principle, breaks the so-called “diplomatic ties” with the Taiwan authorities and seeks to reestablish diplomatic ties with China. This is a choice made independently by Nauru as a sovereign country. It shows that the one-China principle is where global opinion trends and where the arc of history bends.

Reuters: A Taiwan official just said that China has lured Nauru with monetary support. May we know how much money is China going to give Nauru?

Mao Ning: As a sovereign country, the Republic of Nauru independently made the right choice to announce that it recognizes the one-China principle, breaks the so-called “diplomatic ties” with the Taiwan authorities and seeks to reestablish diplomatic ties with China. This fully shows that the one-China principle is where global opinion trends and where the arc of history bends.


“CNA Explains: Why tiny Nauru ditched Taipei for Beijing – and why it matters,” Channel News Asia (Singapore based, Asia specific news service), 16 January 2024. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/nauru-taiwan-china-diplomatic-can-explains-4051026

The Nauru government also said in a statement that the move was in the “best interests” of the island nation and its people.

It added that Nauru would be moving to follow the “one China principle” and was seeking a resumption of full diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China – referring to China’s official name.

“This means that the Republic of Nauru will no longer recognise the Republic of China (Taiwan) as a separate country but rather as an inalienable part of China’s territory,” said the statement.

It also called this “a significant first step in moving forward with Nauru’s development.”

China claims Taiwan as part of its territory and sees it as having no right to establish state-to-state ties – a position which Taipei rejects.

Nauru’s move announcement also coincided with a visit to Taiwan by an unofficial delegation from the United States, much to Beijing’s displeasure.

But Mr Sung said while the timing conveniently gave Nauru’s diplomatic switch added significance, the US trip was not the trigger. 

“Moves like this take time to pull off,” he noted.Taiwan also alleged that China had engaged in “money diplomacy” here, by offering Nauru far more money that what Taipei provides to allies.


Notes:

[i] This is not the first time that Nauru has switched allegiances between Taiwan and China. See: China formally restores diplomatic relations with Nauru after Pacific island nation cut Taiwan ties,” AP, 23 January 2024. https://apnews.com/article/china-nauru-taiwan-diplomatic-recognition-23fd9cdd0210a2340b5ae2092d2a85d1

[ii] The 12 entities that continue to maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan are: Marshall Islands, Palau, Tuvalu, Eswatini, Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and the Holy See (Vatican).

[iii] For a discussion of China’s efforts to turn Latin American countries, see: Ryan Berg, “Honduran Presidential Visit Kicks Off New Relations With China,” OE Watch, 07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/honduran-presidential-visit-kicks-off-new-relations-with-china/; and Ryan Berg and Wazim Mowla, “Taiwan’s Future in Latin America and the Caribbean,” The Diplomat, 1 September 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/taiwans-future-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/


Image Information:

Image: Map of the Pacific or Oceania region featuring Nauru.
Source: World Regional Geography, https://open.lib.umn.edu/worldgeography/part/chapter-13-the-pacific-and-antarctica/
Attribution: CCA-NC-SA 4.0 Int


China’s Economic Interests at Risk With Rise of Houthi Shipping Attacks

Chinese container ship off the coast of Los Angeles, California.


China is the customer for 90% of the oil exported by Iran. The chances of the Houthis firing on ships of a state-owned Chinese company are therefore very low, raising questions about the reasons for COSCO’s decision”


The Israel-Hamas conflict and the conflict’s subsequent spread to Yemen and the Red Sea is challenging Chinese economic interests and policy in the region. In early January, Chinese shipping giant China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) and Hong Kong–based subsidiary Overseas Orient Container Line announced that they would cut service to Israeli ports in response to Houthi attacks on ships destined for Israel. According to the first excerpted articles from the Israeli business news publication Globes, China has in effect sacrificed trade with Israel to maintain shipping access to the Red Sea. While the article vilifies the Chinese position, China is in a bind because both Israel and Iran are significant regional trading partners with China. The Houthis are militarily and diplomatically supported by Iran. China must balance its priorities in the region between Iran and Israel—and any regional war would be bad for China’s Middle East interests.[i] In the second excerpt, taken from a speech delivered by China’s UN Ambassador less than a week after the COSCO announcement, the Ambassador noted that “the waters of the Red Sea are an important transportation channel for goods and energy” and called on the Houthis to “to immediately stop harassing merchant ships and respect the navigation rights of merchant ships from all countries in the Red Sea waters, in accordance with international law.”[ii] Not long after, a Houthi official interviewed by Russian news source Izvestia stated that all Russian and Chinese ships would be safe navigating the Red Sea but that ships aligned with Israel would be subject to targeting. The Houthi spokesman continued “Our goal is to raise the economic costs for the Jewish state to stop the carnage in Gaza.” However, despite these assurances, any economic pain that Israel might feel because of reduced shipping to its ports also transfers to China, complicating its economic strategy in the Middle East.


Sources:

“Chinese shipping giant COSCO to stop visiting Israeli ports,” Globes (Israeli business news), 7 January 2024. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-chinese-shipping-giant-cosco-to-stop-visiting-israeli-ports-1001467115

Chinese state-owned shipping giant COSCO Shipping has stopped visiting Israeli ports, “Globes” has learned. The company, the fourth largest container shipping line in the world, with about 11% of world trade, decided on this step even though it is not much threatened in the Red Sea, because of the very fact that it is Chinese, and because of China’s ties with Iran, the patron of the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Besides the effect on trade between the Far East and Israel, COSCO’s decision is significant because it cooperates with Israeli shipping line ZIM, which will have to operate more ships on the Far East routes, which is liable to will lead to higher shipping costs, since XIM will be short of ships.

The second direct effect will be on the Haifa Bayport, which is operated by another state-owned Chinese company, SIPG. The port is dependent on the many COSCO ships that visit it.

The Houthis are threatening to attack vessels of any company that sails to Israel, but China is the customer for 90% of the oil exported by Iran. The chances of the Houthis firing on ships of a state-owned Chinese company are therefore very low, raising questions about the reasons for COSCO’s decision, of which international shippers have yet to be notified.

A pointer to COSCO’s step was the recent announcement by its Hong Kong-based subsidiary OOCL that it was ceasing to sail to Israel because of “operational problems”. That announcement, intended to enable it to sail in the Red Sea without interference by the Houthis, led to wide criticism. In the end, the company caved in, like Singapore-based shipping line ONE (Ocean Network Express).


“常驻联合国代表张军大使在安理会红海局势紧急公开会上的发言 (Speech by Ambassador Zhang Jun, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at the Security Council’s emergency public meeting on the Red Sea situation),” PRC Permanent Mission to the United Nations, published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of China, 12 January 2024. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/zwbd_673032/wjzs/202401/t20240114_11223386.shtml

Mr. President: China thanks Russia for its initiative to hold this emergency meeting and thanks Assistant Secretary-General Kyali for his briefing. The United States, Britain and other countries have carried out air strikes on targets in Yemen, further escalating tensions in the Red Sea region. China expresses serious concern about this.

The waters of the Red Sea are an important transportation channel for goods and energy. For some time, the Houthi armed forces have repeatedly attacked and seized merchant ships in the Red Sea waters, disrupting international trade order and not conducive to regional stability. China has repeatedly called on the Houthis to immediately stop harassing merchant ships and respect the navigation rights of merchant ships from all countries in the Red Sea waters in accordance with international law. China also calls on all parties, especially influential major powers, to play a constructive and responsible role in jointly safeguarding the safety of waterways in the Red Sea.

We regret to see that the brazen military actions taken by relevant countries against Yemen not only caused infrastructure damage and civilian casualties, but also aggravated security risks in the Red Sea waters and did not help protect the safety of commercial ships and freedom of navigation. Relevant military actions may also impact the political process in Yemen. We fail to see how such a military operation could achieve the stated intended objectives.

It must be noted that the Security Council has never authorized any country to use of force against Yemen. The military actions taken by relevant countries run counter to the purpose of Resolution 2722 just adopted by the Security Council. China reiterates that no country shall misinterpret or abuse international law and Security Council resolutions to create new tensions in the Red Sea waters.

Mr. President: The current tensions in the Red Sea are one manifestation of the spillover effects of the conflict in Gaza. Letting the conflict in Gaza prolong while hoping that the conflict will not expand may be wishful thinking. It is even more contradictory and irresponsible to advocate preventing conflicts from spilling over, while at the same time adding fuel to the fire and provoking military confrontation. The Middle East is already on the brink of extreme danger. What we should avoid most at the moment is reckless military adventurism. What we need most is calmness and restraint to prevent further expansion of conflicts. We urge all relevant parties, especially the influential powers, to abide by the UN Charter and international law, adhere to the correct direction of dialogue and consultation, and make practical efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Red Sea and the Middle East. Thank you, Chairman.


В «Ансар Аллах» гарантировали безопасность судам РФ и КНР в Красном море (Ansar Allah guaranteed the safety of Russian and Chinese vessels in the Red Sea),” Izvestia (Russian news source), 19 January 2024. В «Ансар Аллах» гарантировали безопасность судам РФ и КНР в Красном море | Новости мира | Известия | 19.01.2024 (iz.ru)

Representative of the al-Buheiti movement: the Houthis will not attack Russian and Chinese ships

The Yemeni Houthi movement Ansar Allah is attacking US and British ships in the Red Sea; as for other countries, including Russia and China, their shipping in the region is guaranteed safety. A member of the Ansar Allah Politburo, Muhammad al-Buheiti, stated this on January 19 in an interview with Izvestia.

“As for all other countries, including Russia and China, their shipping in the region is not threatened. Moreover, we are ready to ensure the safety of the passage of their ships in the Red Sea, because free navigation plays a significant role for our country,” Al-Buheiti noted.

The politician also added that any Israeli ships or those connected with Israel will not have the slightest opportunity to sail through the Red Sea – attacks on them will continue.

“Ansar Allah does not pursue the goal of capturing or sinking this or that sea vessel. Our goal is to raise the economic costs for the Jewish state to stop the carnage in Gaza. If the crews of the ships that came under our fire had not ignored our warning signals and changed their direction, the further escalation that the American side caused in the interests of protecting Israel could have been avoided,” he said.

Earlier, on January 17, the military representative of the Ansar Allah movement, Yahya Saria, said that it launched a missile attack on the American ship Genco Picardy in the Gulf of Aden. According to him, the Houthis recorded a direct hit on the ship.

On the same day, the UK Navy’s Maritime Trade Coordination Center (UKMTO) reported that a drone attacked a ship off the coast of Aden, Yemen, which led to a fire on board the ship. A previous attack on a ship in the Red Sea was reported the day before. The Houthis then took responsibility for it and confirmed the fact of a missile attack on the bulk carrier Zografia, which was flying the Maltese flag.The Houthis began attacking shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden from November 2023 to protest Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip…


Notes:

[i] For a previous perspective on the conflict in Gaza’s impact on China interests in the region see: “Israel’s close economic ties with China worked well – until the Gaza conflict,” South China Morning Post, 2 November 2023. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3240061/israels-close-economic-relationship-china-worked-well-until-gaza-conflict-revealed-its-limits

[ii] A wide range of global reporting has indicated that China is also said to have put pressure on Iran to rein in the Houthis, while the United States has asked China to take more of a role in mediating the conflict in Israel.


Image Information:

Image: Chinese container ship off the coast of Los Angeles, California.
Source: Corey Seeman
Attribution: CC By-NC-SA 2.0