Admiralty Shipyards in St Petersburg, Russia built the Severny Polyus drift station.

“Since it set out from St.Petersburg in early September 2022, the Severny Polyus (“North Pole”) has drifted more than 3,000 nautical miles through the sea-ice from the East Siberian Sea to the Greenland Sea.”

Summary: Russia is using a large drift station called Severney Polyus (North Pole) in the Arctic to gather information.

The Arctic has always been important to Russia[i] and according to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia is conducting Arctic research using a large drift station, the Severny Polyus, or North Pole.[ii] The Severney Polyus is a self-propelled platform vessel that houses 34 scientists, 15 laboratories, and crew on board and is designed to autonomously drift through Arctic sea ice for up to two years. According to Russian Minister of Natural Resources, Aleksandr Kozlov, the data collected from the Severney Polyus will form the basis for “understanding of climate change and climate prognosis, development of climate adaptation measures, they are important for providing security to shipping on the Northern Sea Route.” The article notes that Russia’s new Marine Doctrine includes the use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes, including not only trawlers and icebreakers, but also platforms like the Severney Polyus. The deployment of the Severney Polyus to conduct Arctic research is yet another indication of Russia’s vision of the operational environment in the Arctic region, giving Russia a continued presence in the vital region.

Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Russia says its North Pole platform is key to understanding climate change,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 23 May 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2024/05/russia-says-its-north-pole-platform-key-understanding-climate-change

Since it set out from St.Petersburg in early September 2022, the Severny Polyus (“North Pole”) has drifted more than 3,000 nautical miles through the sea-ice from the East Siberian Sea to the Greenland Sea. On board has been a crew of 16 and a research team of 34.  The ship in late April made it out of the ice north of Svalbard and in early May sailed southwards.  On the 10th of May it was located to the west of the Ice Fjord at Svalbard and shortly later made it to the waters north of the Bear Island. For unclear reasons, the vessel for several days stayed in the waters of the Bear Island before it proceeded towards Murmansk.

According to Russian Minister of Natural Resources Aleksandr Kozlov, the Severny Polyus offers Russia unique insights into the Arctic.  “With the start of the operations of the self-propelled and ice-protected platform Russia has gotten the possibility to undertake long-term scientific experiments on high latitudes,” Kozlov said in a comment delivered in connection with the arrival of the Severny Polyus in Murmansk.

“The researchers have access to 50 types of research work: from meteorology to geophysics, glaciology, seismology and aerology. The data will form the basis for understanding of climate change and climate prognosis, development of climate adaptation measures, they are important for providing security to shipping on the Northern Sea Route.”  Kozlov has been Minister of Natural Resources since 2000 and was reappointed in May 2024.  He has also been closely engaged in natural resource cooperation with several foreign countries, among them China and North Korea.

…In the course of the 20-month expedition, the geologists took a number of samples from the Arctic seabed.  The samples will be used as part of Russia’s efforts to expand its borders on the Arctic shelf, representatives of the expedition say.

The Severny Polyus is designed to be able to autonomously drift through Arctic sea-ice for up to two years.  On board are 15 labs where researchers can work year-round.  The ship is operated by Russia’s meteorological service Roshydromet…

The research platform has replaced Russia’s Arctic expeditions based on ice floes organized since the 1930s.  The quickly vanishing Arctic sea-ice made it increasingly hard to organize the expeditions and the last real ice station, the “North Pole-40”, was held in the winter of 2012.

Albeit built for research purposes, the Severny Polyus  could ultimately also be applied by the Russian military.  The country’s new Marine Doctrine includes a high stress on use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes.  That could include not only trawler and icebreakers, but also the Severniy Polus.“The researchers have access to 50 types of research work: from meteorology to geophysics, glaciology, seismology and aerology.  The data will form the basis for understanding of climate change and climate prognosis, development of climate adaptation measures, they are important for providing security to shipping on the Northern Sea Route” Kozlov explained….

Notes:

[i] Russia began exploring the Arctic in the 11^th century.  Trans-Artic navigation continued into the 16^th century during voyages to Spitzbergen-Gruman and Novaya Zemlya. In 1764-1776, Captain Chichagov attempted an expedition across the North Pole to the Pacific Ocean. Chichagov’s attempt failed, but much scientific knowledge on the Arctic waters were gained.

[ii] In 1902, Fritjof Nansen, a famous Norwegian Arctic explorer, proposed the idea of a scientific drifting ice station to chart the Arctic waters. In the 1930s, Soviet scientists conducted studies of the Arctic on drifting ships. In 1937, the Soviets built a drifting ice station, “North Pole 1,” on an Arctic ice floe supported by Soviet aviation, followed by “North Pole 2”and so on until “North Pole 40” was built. North Pole 40 had to be evacuated in 2013 as the ice floe was breaking up.

OE Watch Insight:

RUS is using a large drift station called Severney Polyus (North Pole) in the Arctic to gather information.

Image Information:

Image: Admiralty Shipyards in St Petersburg, Russia built the Severny Polyus drift station
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Admiralty_Shipyards – /media/File:Admiralty_Shipyard.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0

Reacting to Ambushes Inside and Outside of 35m, Illustrated. Fig. 1 – 2x BTR Platoons travel along a road; 100m spacing is maintained. Fig. 2 – An enemy initiates an ambush on the rear of the formation. Fig 3 – Within 35m, those in the fire zone immediately return fire and deploy smoke and fragmentation grenades; front and rear elements provide covering fire, allowing those in the fire zone to assault the ambushers position. Fig. 4 – Outside of 35m, those in the fire zone return fire and deploy smoke; the front or rear element assaults a flank or the rear of the ambusher’s position while the other provides covering fire.

“Counter-ambush actions in combat training practice, in our opinion, is not given due importance.”

Summary: Russian military observers have called for more emphasis on “react to ambush” training, which they see as a current weakness.

While few units from any nation’s military can survive an ambush unscathed, an article in the Russian military journal Armeiskii sbornik highlights the need for additional emphasis on “react to ambush drills” in Russian military training programs. These recommendations reflect continuing training deficiencies in basic soldier tasks despite lessons learned in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Ukraine.

The article’s authors recommend adding a sixth task to Chapter 5 of the Russian combat manual “Actions in Armed Conflict, Part 3: Platoon, Squad, Tank.”[i] Titling the task “Educating Personnel on Counter-ambush Activities,” the authors first highlight the need to practice counter-ambush tactics more frequently in individual and collective training. The article further outlines in detail the steps in reacting to an ambush. To begin, commanders must identify likely ambush points and plan accordingly. These points will likely be main avenues of approach containing terrain restricting movement, funneling targets, alongside cover and concealment.

The training recommendations mirror U.S. Army battle drills. Near ambushes are defined by an enemy being within hand grenade range up to 35m. Those caught within the ambush must immediately return fire with all possible weapons, directing fire against enemy positions. Smoke and fragmentation grenades are used to further suppress adversaries and conceal Russian forces in the “fire zone,” enabling assaults on the ambusher’s positions. Russian forces outside the fire zone provide supporting fire. Far ambushes are those outside of 35m. Actions of troops within the fire zone are similar to those in the near-side ambush, except the elements outside the fire zone maneuver to attack the ambusher’s flanks or rear. Those in the fire zone adjust fire as necessary to avoid fratricide. The authors acknowledge the need to train these skills is due to obvious failures and losses in both the initial steps of the Ukrainian invasion in 2022 and the First Chechen War,[ii] both of which were consequences of lack of training. Similar issues also appear in accounts from the Soviet-Afghanistan War,[iii] where Russian forces failed to recognize likely ambush points and hesitated in reacting to ambushes, costing them in men and equipment. Reacting to ambush is the antithesis to the calculated, fires-heavy tactics frequently used by Russian forces and could be a challenge to the Russian largely conscripted ground force.

Sources:

A. Levchenko, “Засада – не приговор (The Ambush is not a Sentence),” Army Review (monthly Russian military periodical), Vol. 6, June 2024. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/publication/470

Pg. 30-31: “The practice of military operations in recent military conflicts showed that any movement of a unit, be it large or small, not to mention single machines, is always associated with maximum risk of being attacked by the enemy from ambush. This was especially true for the first stage of the SVO in Ukraine. So, we need to talk about it, especially since counter-ambush training developments in combat training practice, in our opinion, is not given due importance.

…The word “ambush” has become something like an objective obstacle, “an irresistible force”. Meanwhile, in the overwhelming majority of the analyzed facts of being ambushed and the destruction of columns, commanders’ errors are visible in organizing and conducting a march. Although, according to all governing documents, the responsibility of the unit commander is to train officers and soldiers to act when ambushed.

In our opinion, there is a need to add to Chapter 5 of the Manual for Training for Combined Armed Combat ‘Actions During Armed Conflict’ (Part 3 ‘Platoon, squad, tank’) one more point number 6, entitled ‘Personnel Training in counter-ambush action events.’”

Pg. 31: “The effectiveness of the actions of a unit marching through its territory and ambushed by enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups, directly depends on the degree of training of personnel to fight in data conditions. The response is usually heavy fire on ambush positions,

from all types of weapons, protection of the unit caught in the affected area, and setting up smokescreens and attacking enemy positions… To immediately attack ambush positions from the front, flank or rear, all personnel must be previously trained… Attacking the ambush’s flanks is preferable, as it is easier to organize contact… Responsibilities of the unit commander is to train officers and soldiers to act upon contact with an ambush even without his participation.”

Pg. 80: “Every officer, sergeant and soldiers are trained to act in two situations (regardless of

type of travel). First, the enemy opened fire from a grenade throwing distance (up to 35 m). In this case part of the unit is under strong, concentrated fire from the attackers. Without additional command, this part of the unit responds with maximum fire in the direction of the ambush, throws smoke and fragmentation grenades and attacks enemy positions. Those who are outside affected areas, open fire in the direction of the ambush positions, covering the attack.Second – the enemy opened fire from a distance exceeding the above distance (more than 35 m). Part of the unit that fell into the affected area lies down, puts up a smoke screen and returns fire in the direction of the ambush. The second part of the unit, which does not fall into the affected area, can and must attack the ambush positions from the flank or from rear by fire and maneuver.”

Notes:

[i] The other five tasks within Chapter 5 are “Common Actions (ex. conduct counterterrorism operations, maintain border integrity), Blocking (more similar in definition to the US Army ‘isolating’ tactical task), Searching and Reconnaissance, Serving in a Checkpoint, and Convoys.”

[ii]  For case studies on Chechen ambush tactics during the first and second Chechen wars, see; Dodge Billingsley, “Fangs of the Lone Wolf: Chechen Tactics in the Russian Chechen Wars 1994-2009,” Foreign Military Studies Office and United States Marine Corp’s Studies and Analysis Division. 2012. 

[iii] These include “The Other Side of the Mountain” by LTC(R) Lester Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali which provide insights on mujahadin activities against Soviet and Afghan government forces during the Soviet-Afghan War. Vignettes 1-16, particularly Vignettes 6 and 16, detail mujahadin ambush tactics and Soviet responses. Chapter 5 of “The Bear Went over the Mountain” by LTC(R) Grau discusses from the Soviet perspective reactions to ambushes.

OE Watch Insight:

RUS military observers see the need to improve “react to ambush drill” training, which they see as a current weakeness.

Image Information:

Image: Reacting to Ambushes Inside and Outside of 35m, Illustrated. Fig. 1 – 2x BTR Platoons travel along a road; 100m spacing is maintained. Fig. 2 – An enemy initiates an ambush on the rear of the formation. Fig 3 – Within 35m, those in the fire zone immediately return fire and deploy smoke and fragmentation grenades; front and rear elements provide covering fire, allowing those in the fire zone to assault the ambushers position. Fig. 4 – Outside of 35m, those in the fire zone return fire and deploy smoke; the front or rear element assaults a flank or the rear of the ambusher’s position while the other provides covering fire.
Source: Andrew Fisher
Attribution: Author grants permission to use

Former army colonel and current commander of GROM Kaskad, Dmitrii Sablin.

“The unit [GROM “Kaskad”] is for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line. It is easier to send other children to the war.”

Summary: Russia volunteer formations, such as the GROM Kaskad unmanned aircraft brigade, provide Russia additional avenues of generating combat power.

Russia’s volunteer formations, such as the GROM Kaskad unmanned aircraft brigade, are increasingly providing Russia with additional avenues of generating combat power during its war in Ukraine. However, the ways that such formations are portrayed and understood in Russia and Ukraine vary significantly.

The first accompanying article excerpted from the website of United Russia (Putin’s political party), extols the values of the GROM “Kaskad”unmanned aircraft brigade and features information about a memorial (monument) to its servicemen.[i] GROM “Kaskad” has its roots in October 2022, when Dmitrii Sablin (a retired Colonel, prominent businessman, ‘United Russia’ party member, and Duma deputy) signed a contract with the Russian Armed Forces and created the BARS “Kaskad” UAV unit, a volunteer formation.[ii] In October 2023, the unit was upgraded to a brigade and subordinated to the Russian Aerospace Forces. By March 2024, GROM “Kaskad” reportedly consisted of two reconnaissance-strike UAV battalions, two reconnaissance-strike UAV squadrons, and supporting units—in total, 54 UAV crews, with 10 different types of UAVs. GROM “Kaskad” crews have reportedly destroyed over 7,000 targets and flown 18,000 combat missions.

The second accompanying article excerpted from the pro-Ukrainian Center of Journalistic Investigations, gives a more negative take on GROM “Kaskad,” purporting that the brigade “is for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line.” Although GROM “Kaskad” almost certainly has a lower casualty rate than Russia’s assault detachments, both Ukrainian and Russian UAV operators are often targeted, and are very much “on the front line.” Service in GROM “Kaskad” is likely far safer than other forms of Russia service in Ukraine, but the likely real benefit is that GROM “Kaskad,” and other volunteer formations offer fixed contracts for terms of service that cannot be involuntarily extended or “stop lossed,” unlike contract servicemen, including the involuntarily mobilized, with the Russian Ministry of Defense.

GROM “Kaskad” and other such volunteer formations are showing the innovative ways that Russia is creating and projecting combat power. Aggressive contract service recruitment and partial mobilization have filled Russian ranks showing that centrally managed, top-down control is still needed. But volunteer formations also appear to be important, as they offer more flexibility and provide a more palatable form of service for elites and those with vital technical skills that might otherwise shirk from military service.

Sources:

Alexey Mikhailov, Roman Kretsul, and Vladimir Matveev, “В Москве открыт мемориал бойцам бригады беспилотной авиации ГРОМ «Каскад» (A memorial to the fighters of the GROM “Kaskad” unmanned aircraft brigade has been opened in Moscow),” Yedinaya Rossiya (website of the ‘United Russia’ political party), 31 May 2024.

https://er.ru/activity/news/v-moskve-otkryt-memorial-bojcam-brigady-bespilotnoj-aviacii-grom-kaskad

In Moscow, on the territory of the central headquarters of the “Combat Brotherhood”, a military memorial was opened to the “Stuntmen” – fallen and alive.” It is dedicated to the fighters of the separate GROM “Kaskad” [ГРОМ «Каскад»] unmanned aircraft brigade. The idea of opening the monument was proposed by a colonel, State Duma deputy from United Russia, first brigade commander Dmitry Sablin.

“This monument is not just a perpetuation of the memory of heroes, it is a memorial of true love for one’s Motherland, dedication, and courage. The BARS “Kaskad” detachment, today the GROM “Kaskad” brigade, is first and foremost a symbol of volunteerism. Not only for people with military experience, but also people of civilian professionals.  And, most importantly, those who did not have the obligation to do this by order,” said the First Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko, who took part in the opening ceremony of the memorial.

He noted that Kaskad had seven thousand destroyed targets, behind which stood thousands of saved lives of Russian military personnel and civilians.  “Thank you very much, guys, you are an example of colossal courage and real heroism for us,” said Sergei Kiriyenko…

In turn, Dmitry Sablin noted that the “stuntmen” conducted more than 18 thousand combat missions.  “I want to say words of gratitude to all military personnel, volunteers, who are currently serving in the brigade, and who served in it. Thank you for your courage and fearlessness. We will always remember the fallen and continue our work. Our motto: a “stuntman” is someone who can do what others won’t do. And may this always accompany you in life. Victory will be ours!” – he said…

On October 1, 2023, the GROM “Kaskad” unmanned aviation brigade was created as part of the Russian Aerospace Forces, the commander of which was Colonel, State Duma deputy Dmitry Sablin. The GROM “Kaskad” brigade has at its disposal all currently available UAVs in service with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The unit’s crews are concentrated along the entire front line and destroy enemy equipment, including Western equipment. Many GROM “Kaskad” fighters were awarded state awards, some of them posthumously.

Valentyna Samar and Vladyslav Marchenko “«GROM Kaskad». Who Fights against Ukraine in the First Russian Drone Brigade,” Center of Journalistic Investigations (Pro-Ukrainian website), 18 May 2024. https://investigator.org.ua/en/investigations/266753/

In December 2022, Vladimir Putin awarded Dmitrii Sablin as commander of BARS «Kaskad» with the Order of Courage. The first official report about «Kaskad» by the Russian Ministry of Defence appeared on March 22, 2024, i.e. half a year after its creation. Minister Sergei Shoigu sent greeting telegrams to five Russian military units for their achievements in so-called «special military operation».[i]

Russian telegram channel «ВЧК-ОГПУ» treats BARS «Kaskad» as the unit for Russian parliamentarians who would like to receive «the status of participant of special military operation». The unit is «for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line. It is easier to send other children to the war».

«Kaskad» is full of politicians and high rank officials. Besides Sablin, five members of the Russian State Dume voluntary joined «Kaskad»: Yevgenii Pervyshov, Oleg Golikov, Sergei Sokol, Dmitrii Khubezov and Oleg Kolesnikov. There are also members of legislative assemblies of Russian regions, two «parliamentarians of «Donetsk People’s Republic» and a lot of public officials.

Some of them have served minimum term of three months. Other people served several terms. Many politicians made short visits to «Kaskad». It is interesting that Russian media «The Insider» found that commander of «Kaskad» Dmitrii Sablin relaxed in Turkish resort areas.Major Oleg Alekseevich Kolesnikov is the commander of the 2nd reconnaissance attack battalion of brigade «GROM «Kaskad». He is the member of the Russian State Duma (for the fourth time in a row) and millionaire from Chelyabinsk region of Russia…

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Notes:

[i] (ГРОМ «Каскад»): The term “Kaskad” is likely in reference to the KGB’s “Kaskad” special operations task force in Afghanistan. “Grom” is the Russian word for thunder, but the term is likely used in reference to the well-regarded General Boris Gromov, the commander of the Soviet 40^th Army.  General Gromov was the last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan.

[ii] The Special Army Combat Reserve (BARS) [Боевой Армейский Резерв Специальный (БАРС)], in some sources the National Army Combat Reserve (BARS) [Боевой Армейский Резерв Страны (БАРС)] began as an operational reserve program of record for the Russian Armed Forces around 2021.  Since the start of the special military operation, many of Russia’s newly formed units are designated as “BARS” formations.

OE Insight Summary:

RUS volunteer formations, such as the GROM “Kaskad” unmanned aircraft brigade, provide RUS additional avenues of generating combat power.

Image Information:

Image: Former army colonel and current commander of GROM Kaskad, Dmitrii Sablin.
Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Саблин,_Дмитрий_Вадимович#/media/Файл:Дмитрий_Саблин_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: Aleksey Klimov, CC BY-SA 4.0