Russia Expanding Its Military Influence in Equatorial Guinea

Only five years after Russia’s Ministry of Defense, which was then led by Sergei Shoigu, engaged in talks with officials from Equatorial Guinea in 2020, Africa Corps fighters have now landed in Equatorial Guinea to train the country’s armed forces.


“The parties discussed the prospects for the development of military and military-technical cooperation between the two countries, as well as security issues.”


Equatorial Guinea is now a target for Russian military influence and expansion on the African continent, according to the excerpted article from a Russian-language website covering Africa Corps and Russian security affairs, afrinz.ru. The article reports that Deputy Defense Minister and Africa Corps commander, Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, visited Equatorial Guinea, where he met with President Teodoro Obiang and Minister of Defense Victoriano Bibanga Nsue Okomo.[i] According to the article, Yevkurov has been enhancing military cooperation between Russia and Equatorial Guinea since October 2024.

This bilateral military cooperation follows the already agreed-upon training of soldiers from Equatorial Guinea by Russian military instructors.[ii] The training is consistent with the Africa Corps’ other activities on the continent. This training is often accompanied by Russian illicit extraction of mineral resources, specialized security for authoritarian rulers, and human rights abuses during counterinsurgency operations. Equatorial Guinea, with its authoritarian government, lacks any insurgency or security crisis around its borders but possesses petroleum, natural gas, timber, gold, diamonds, and other minerals. As a result, the Africa Corps model for Equatorial Guinea will likely follow the model of support for the Equatorial Guinea leadership in return for resource extraction rights for Africa Corps.

Equatorial Guinea is the latest West Africa country where Russia is expanding its military influence and “replacing” French or Western influence through deploying Africa Corps to those countries.[iii] The article noted the burgeoning military partnership between Russia and Equatorial Guinea followed previous talks between the Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yevkurov and the leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Togo. Although Togo is anomalous to these countries because it remains a parliamentary democracy, the country is under pressure from al-Qaeda–affiliated militants and was being “courted” by Yevkurov in late 2024 when he visited the capital, Lome.[iv]

Russia’s push into Equatorial Guinea comes amid Chinese attempts to court another West African country, Gabon, for a potential new—and what would be China’s first—military base in that region.[v] Russia, like China, considers the West as rivals and supports autocratic regimes in the region. Therefore, Russia’s activities in Equatorial Guinea and West Africa more generally have become one component of a broader competition for military influence in Africa between Russia and China on one end and the West on the other end.


Sources:

“Российская делегация провела переговоры с руководством Экваториальной Гвинеи (Russian delegation held talks with Equatorial Guinea leadership),” afrinz.ru, (pro-Russian Russia-language website tracking Russian military affairs, and especially Africa Corps, in Africa), 2 December 2024. https://afrinz.ru/2024/12/rossijskaya-delegacziya-provela-peregovory-s-rukovodstvom-ekvatorialnoj-gvinei/

On December 1, a Russian Defense Ministry delegation headed by Deputy Minister Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov held talks with the President of the Republic Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and the Minister of Defense of Equatorial Guinea Victoriano Bibanga Nsue Okomo. During the meetings, the parties discussed the opportunities for the furthering of military cooperation between the two countries, as well as security issues. In addition, the participants addressed the issues of training military specialists and instructors for the Armed Forces of Equatorial Guinea.

Russia and Equatorial Guinea have been cooperating in this area since 2011, when an intergovernmental agreement on military-technical cooperation was signed and a commission on military-technical cooperation was created. Earlier, a delegation of the Russian Defense Ministry leadership held similar talks in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Togo.


Notes:

[i] Russian media reported on Yevkurov taking over command of Africa corps in February 2023. See, for example: Ilya Lakstigal, “Что известно об «Африканском корпусе» России (What is known about Russia’s “Afrika Korps”). Vedimosti.ru, 22 February 2023. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2023/12/22/1012398-chto-izvestno-ob-afrikanskom-korpuse-rossii

[ii] See: Russia Today, “Russian instructors to train African military personnel.” 10 June 2024. https://www.rt.com/africa/599072-equatorial-guinea-russia-train-armed-forces/

[iii] Reports in Russian-language media of 200 Russian military instructors seen on the streets of Equatorial Guinea’s capital, Malabo, in September 2024, provide additional evidence of Russia’s increasing militarily involvement in Equatorial Guinea. See: Gregory, Sissoev, “Что известно об отношениях России и Экваториальной Гвинеи (What is known about relations between Russia and Equatorial Guinea),” TASS (Russian state news service), 26 September 2024. https://tass.ru/info/21961363

[iv] See: BBC Monitoring, “Briefing: Russia’s Africa Corps chief discusses military cooperation with Togo.” 1 December 2024. https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0002vxf

[v] See: Jacob Zenn, “China’s Initiates Push To Establish a Military Base in Gabon,” OE Watch, 06-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/chinas-initiates-push-to-establish-a-military-base-in-gabon/


Image Information:

Image: Only five years after Russia’s Ministry of Defense, which was then led by Sergei Shoigu, engaged in talks with officials from Equatorial Guinea in 2020, Africa Corps fighters have now landed in Equatorial Guinea to train the country’s armed forces.
Source: Mil.ru, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Russia-Equatorial_Guinea_military_talk_2020.jpg
Attribution: CC x 4.0


Russia Suspected of Distributing Former Syrian Military Assets To Mali

Mali recently received a number of heavy weapons from Russia including T-72B3 Main Battle Tanks, like this one on display in Moscow, circa 2017. Russia was known to have T-72B3 tanks in Syria, leading to speculation that the tanks arrived in Mali were part of Russia’s Syrian arsenal.


“The most powerful weapons of the latest generation have arrived in Mali, which will strengthen the capacity of the Malian army.”


Officially, Russia has remained silent regarding the whereabouts of its Syrian stockpile of weapons since the fall of the Assad regime. Previous reporting tracked Russian cargo planes loading military equipment, including air defense systems, arrived in Libya shortly after leaving Syria.[i] A 17 January video published by Bamako-based Mali Cap+ on its Facebook page suggests at least a portion of Russia’s Syrian arsenal is now in Mali. According to an analysis of the Mali Cap+ video by South Africa-based news aggregator DefenseWeb, the shipment, which included T-72 tanks, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-82A 8×8 armored personnel carriers, D-30 towed artillery, and a variety of armored personnel carriers, “may have come from Syria.”[ii] The Mali Cap+ journalist notes the convoy arrived from Guinea. If accurate, the convoy could have offloaded by ship to rail in the port city of Conakry. There is a railroad from Conakry to Kanan; in Kanan, the weapons could have been offloaded onto trucks before crossing into Mali.[iii] However, according to the excerpted article from French news service Le Monde, the equipment was put on trucks in Conakry and traveled by road through Siguiri before crossing the border into Mali. Notably, according to Le Monde, the weapons came from Murmansk rather than Syria—aboard two ships, the Alder and the Siyanie Severa. The Alder is operated by a company under U.S. and Western sanctions.

Mali’s military partnership with Russia has increased dramatically following a series of military takeovers of the country, the last one in 2021, and the formal withdrawal of French-led Operation Barkhane in November 2022. Russia’s Africa Corps, formerly the Wagner Group, began operating in Mali prior to the withdrawal of the last French troops. In addition to the implications of how these Russian weapons got to Mali, or how they are used, the arrival of Russian heavy weapons to Mali on 17 January further cements the relationship between Moscow and Mali’s military government.


Sources:

“Bravo Les armements les plus puiss@nts de dernière génération sont arrivés au Mali, ce qui va renforcer la capacité de l’armée malienne (Bravo the most powerful weapons of the latest generation have arrived in Mali, which will strengthen the capacity of the Malian army),” Mali Cap+ Facebook Channel, 17 January 2025. https://www.facebook.com/CapMaliPlus/videos/8603016179803509

The most powerful weapons of the latest generation have arrived in Mali, which will strengthen the capacity of the Malian army.

I think this will be the new format in the fight against terrorism.

“Russia Delivers Military Hardware to Mali,” DefenseWeb (South Africa based defense news portal covering military and security news on the African continent), 17 January 2025. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/african-news/russia-delivers-military-hardware-to-mali/?referrer=newsletter

Russia has delivered over 100 military vehicles to Mali, including tanks, trucks, and infantry fighting vehicles.

It is suspected the shipment may have come from Syria following the departure of Russian troops after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

It appears Mali could be another recipient of this equipment: on 17 January, a convoy of over 100 vehicles arrived in Mali’s capital Bamako, where it was captured on video by local media company Cap Mali+. Half the vehicles in the convoy were trucks (including armoured Kamaz trucks and engineering vehicles) and the remainder included T-72B3M tanks, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-82A 8×8 armoured personnel carriers, and Spartak, Linza, and Tiger 4×4 armoured personnel carriers. Also seen were three D-30 towed artillery pieces, two anti-aircraft cannons, and a couple of boats.

Frontelligence in its analysis of the convoy stated the vehicles were not sourced elsewhere and sold to Mali because they have Cyrillic text and Russian military markings. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD) said markings indicated the equipment had at one point been transported by rail – possibly in Russia.

…Most likely, the equipment will be distributed between the Wagner PMC units and government forces as part of strengthening the counteraction to paramilitary units in the country and terrorist organizations.”

“La Russie livre des dizaines de chars et de blindés au Mali et réorganise son dispositif militaire en Afrique (Russia Delivers Dozens of Tanks and Armored Vehicles to Mali and Reorganizes its Military Deployment in Africa),” Le Monde (major French daily), 24 January 2025. https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2025/01/24/au-mali-la-russie-procede-a-une-importante-livraison-de-blindes-et-reorganise-son-dispositif-militaire_6514120_3210.html

These Russian military vehicles were unloaded at the port of Conakry, in Guinea, before forming the convoy that took the road to Siguiri and the border with Mali. They were probably transported aboard two Russian ships. The first, the Adler, belongs to the company M Leasing LLC, placed under American and European sanctions for its role in Moscow’s military logistics.

This company is suspected of having delivered weapons from North Korea to Russia, according to the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. On December 14, 2024, the Adler left the port of Murmansk in northern Russia and headed for Conakry.

On December 21, a second Russian-flagged cargo ship, the Siyanie Severa, also left Murmansk for Guinea. The ship belongs to the Russian company OJSC Northern Shipping Company, which is also under US sanctions for transporting its country’s military equipment.

According to the records of the port of Conakry, the Adler arrived on January 8 and left on the 12th. On board, 1,182 tons of “goods.” The Siyanie Severa arrived on January 11 with 834 tons of cargo. On an Airbus satellite image that Le Monde was able to consult (but cannot publish), this second cargo ship is still visible at the quay on January 15. From Conakry, it then takes two days of driving, with such a convoy of trucks, to reach the border with Mali, via Siguiri.


Notes:

[i] “Russia Withdraws Air-Defense Systems, Other Advanced Weaponry From Syria to Libya,” The Wall Street Journal, 18 December 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-air-defense-bases-syria-libya-25810db0?st=jD59wk&reflink=article_email_share

[ii] The convoy or arms also included Russian patrol boats that can be used to patrol the important Niger River. There have been attacks on civilian boat traffic in Mali. See: “Mali: The attack against the civilian boat ‘Tombouctou’ constitutes a war crime,” International Federation for Human Rights, 12 September 2023. https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/mali/mali-the-attack-against-the-civilian-boat-tombouctou-constitutes-a

[iii] There are five major ports in Guinea including Conakry and Benti, both capable of receiving larger ships and a variety of cargo. Conakry has a roll-on roll off (ro ro) capability and a railway spur, while Benti intersects vital roadways such as the Trans-West African Coastal Highway that connects all the West African nations including the landlocked nations such as Burkina Faso. For a description of the five major ports, see: “5 Major Ports in Guinea,” Marine Insight, 22 May 2022. https://www.marineinsight.com/know-more/5-major-ports-in-guinea/


Image Information:

Image: Mali recently received a number of heavy weapons from Russia including T-72B3 Main Battle Tanks, like this one on display in Moscow, circa 2017. Russia was known to have T-72B3 tanks in Syria, leading to speculation that the tanks arrived in Mali were part of Russia’s Syrian arsenal.
Source: Vitaly V. Kuzmin, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-72 – /media/File:Alabino05042017-40.jpg
Attribution: CC By-SA 4.0


The Evolution of Russian Unmanned Vehicle Doctrine in Ukraine

Orlan-30 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.


“The Russian Armed Forces will form a new branch of arms in armed forces — Unmanned Vehicle Troops — in accordance with the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.”


The accompanying excerpted article from the major Russian daily newspaper Izvestia discusses how Russians are adapting to the changing character of war as experienced in its special military operation in Ukraine.[i] One feature of this change has been the pervasive use of unmanned vehicles in the air, ground, and sea. As Izvestia explains, Russia will adapt to this change by creating a new branch of arms, Unmanned Vehicle Troops, to operate similar to existing branches of service: infantry, artillery, air defense, etc.[ii] Conceptually, unmanned vehicles and their operators and maintainers will be integrated into the Russian combined arms concept as the infantry, tanks, artillery, etc., just as the Russians have Air Defense Troops in the Ground Forces, Aerospace Forces, and Navy. The Unmanned Vehicle Troops will now be a branch of arms in a similar fashion. This means that unmanned vehicles will have dedicated training, sustainment, and representation in the General Staff. This representation will enhance unmanned vehicle training and doctrine, future capability development, and ensure integration with the other arms branches. This development suggests that in the Russian view, the use of unmanned vehicles is not an aberration but will be a permanent feature of future wars and armed conflicts. It is important to note that this announcement does not mean that unmanned vehicles and their operators and maintainers will be found only in stand-alone unmanned vehicle units; they will still almost certainly be found in other types of units, such as infantry, armor, artillery, logistics, signals, and the like.


Sources:

Yulia Leonova, Vladimir Matveev, Bogdan Stepovoy, “С новым родом: войска беспилотных систем создадут в России (A new branch: Unmanned Vehicle Troops will be created in Russia),” Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 17 December 2024.  https://iz.ru/1808177/ulia-leonova-vladimir-matveev-bogdan-stepovoi/s-novym-rodom-voiska-bespilotnyh-sistem-sozdadut-v-rossii

The Russian Armed Forces will form a new branch of arms in armed forces — Unmanned Vehicle Troops — in accordance with the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. This was announced by the head of the Russian Defense Ministry Andrei Belousov at an extended meeting of the board on December 16.

According to him, their creation will be completed in the third quarter of 2025. “The mass use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has become the most significant breakthrough in the tactics of the Russian Armed Forces,” he emphasized.

In turn, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated the need to increase the production of drones. It is no less important, according to the head of state, to train UAV operators, to prepare them according to programs developed on the basis of combat experience.

Russian troops use more than 3,500 UAVs daily, and this figure is growing, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov said at a departmental board meeting…

As the former commander of the Pacific Fleet, Sergei Avakyants, explained to Izvestia, a branch of arms is an organizational structure, as it is necessary to create a theoretical design of operational art for it. That is, to create a theory and practice of preparing and conducting military actions on an operational scale (operations, battles, strikes), — he noted. — This is a move in the right direction, the main thing is that it is not just a sign on an office door. It is necessary to think through a system of training both sergeants and enlisted personnel, and officers. To do this, it is necessary to make changes to the curricula — to create special faculties or educational institutions of secondary and higher education. The innovations should also affect existing military academies, in particular the General Staff Academy.

During the special military operation, UAVs became so indispensable that we reached the point of needing to form separate units [части] and, perhaps, even large units [соединения] with their own infrastructure that would support the use of UAVs. Military expert Dmitry Kornev told Izvestia about this.

According to him, most likely, units, platoons, and separate battalions will be created that will closely interact with other branches of the military and ensure the use of UAVs in their interests.

— The Unmanned Vehicle Troops will most likely receive a status similar to that of the Air Defense Troops — military expert Vladislav Shurygin told Izvestia. — Their units will be part of the Ground Forces, the Aerospace Forces, and also in the Navy, where, among other things, unmanned boats will be developed. All used unmanned systems will belong to them. It is possible that they will be united by some common structure that will be engaged in design, development, and testing. It was not for nothing that the minister said that inter-service centers will be created to test the latest and most promising systems…


Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

[ii] This new force, род войск, is not to be confused with a branch of service; вид вооружённых сил (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.). 


Image Information:

Image: Orlan-30 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baba_Yaga_(aircraft)#/media/File:UA_Vampire_UCAV_01.jpg
Attribution: Mike1979 RussiaCC BY-SA 4.0


Russia Shrugs Off Stricter Energy Sanctions, Promises Retaliation

A boat next to a large Russian oil platform, taken in July 2017.


“[The US Administration’s decision to impose restrictive measures against Russian energy sector…] is an attempt to inflict at least some damage on the Russian economy even at the cost of destabilizing global markets ahead of the end of the inglorious term of President Joe Biden.”


After the rollout of new energy sector sanctions in January by the United States and United Kingdom, Russia’s Foreign Ministry responded with a mix of indifference and promises of retaliation for the punitive measure. The sanctions target some 200 entities and individuals in Russia, including senior energy officials, and are meant to curb liquefied natural gas projects and curtail the profits of service providers that support the country’s energy industry. This includes Moscow’s vast “shadow fleet” of vessels that ship oil around the world under third parties to avoid sanctions but have come under fire for allegedly carrying out acts of sabotage in the Baltic Sea.[i]

The reaction in Russia has been relative indifference as per the accompanying article from Russia’s official news agency, TASS. The article suggests that the sanctions would not impede Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine but that their effects could be “destabilizing” for global energy markets.[ii] Russia comprises roughly 11 percent of global crude oil production (approximately 10.75 million barrels per day (bpd)) and consumes only 3.68 million bpd. According to a statement by Russia’s Foreign Ministry, Moscow has promised retaliation. “Of course, Washington’s hostile actions will not be left without response and will be taken into consideration during the calculation of our external economic strategy. We will continue to implement the major projects on oil and gas extraction, as well as import replacement, provision of oil-related services, and construction of nuclear power plants in third countries.”

U.S. attempts to apply economic pressure against Russia in response to its war in Ukraine have not had the desired coercive effect, largely because Russia’s energy sector had been spared. Even previous measures, including the imposition of a $60-per-barrel price cap and targeted sanctions against financial institutions such as Gazprombank, did little to shrink Russia’s war chest.[iii]


Sources:

“Russian Foreign Ministry vows response to new US sanctions,” TASS (Russian state news agency), 11 January 2025. https://tass.com/politics/1897999

“Of course, Washington’s hostile actions will not be left without response and will be taken into consideration during the calculation of our external economic strategy,” the ministry said. “We will continue to implement the major projects on oil and gas extraction, as well as import replacement, provision of oil-related services and construction of nuclear power plants in third countries.”

The ministry pointed out that Russia has been and remains a key and reliable actor on the global fuel market, “despite the convulsions in the White House and the machinations of the Russophobic lobby in the West, which seeks to pull the global energy sector into the hybrid war, which the US has initiated against Russia.”

The ministry underscored that, amid the “failure of Washington’s bid on Moscow’s strategic defeat and sanctions pressure, which was supposed to undermine the Russian economy, which has not only survived by continues to develop despite the unprecedented external economic pressure, the efforts of the outgoing White House team aim to complicate or obstruct any bilateral economic ties, including for the American business.”

The ministry added that this process sacrifices interests of US’ European allies, who have to switch to the more expensive and irregular American deliveries, as well as interests of its own people, currently suffering from the massive wildfires in California, whose opinion regarding the fuel price hike, which remained relevant ahead of the elections, now can be completely ignored.

“Therefore, the upcoming president, who is unable to withdraw the abovementioned sanctions without the Congress’ approval, will inherit scorched earth – both literally and figuratively,” the ministry added.


Notes:

[i]  Jake Lapham, “US and UK toughen sanctions on Russian oil industry,” BBC News, 10 January 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn8xlj9kkkmo

[ii] Illya Tsukanov, “US Anti-Russian Energy Sanctions Threaten to Destabilize Global Markets. Here’s How,” Sputnik International, 11 January 2025, https://sputnikglobe.com/20250111/latest-us-anti-russian-energy-sanctions-threaten-to-destabilize-global-markets-heres-how-1121409189.html

[iii]  According to analysis the latest energy sanctions, which target two of Russia’s largest oil companies, Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, and their subsidiaries, could have more of a desired punitive effect, given recent stresses within the Russian economy. See “Five questions (and expert answers) about Biden’s final round of sanctions on Russia,” New Atlanticist, 10 January 2025,  https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/five-questions-and-expert-answers-about-bidens-final-round-of-sanctions-on-russia/


Image Information:

Image: A boat next to a large Russian oil platform, taken in July 2017
Source: https://timelessmoon.getarchive.net/amp/media/russia-oil-platform-rig-travel-vacation-c8289c
Attribution: CC0 1.0 Universal


Chechen Spetnaz Instructors Training Russian Soldiers in the Arctic Region

President Vladimir Putin visits Russian Special Forces University in Gudermes, Chechnya, in August 2024.


“A key mission for the VOIN is to provide so-called ‘patriotic education’ and combat training for teenage youngsters. The organization has centers in at least 12 regions, among them the two far northern regions of Murmansk and Yamal Nenets Autonomous Okrug.”


The Russian Spetsnaz University in Gudermes, Chechnya, has trained tens of thousands of soldiers from all over the Russian Federation since its establishment in 2013. Soldiers from the Kola peninsula, which borders Norway and is home to Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, are increasingly bringing the skills they pick up in the North Caucasus and applying them to operational environments in the Arctic, according to a recent report in Norway-based The Barents Observer.

Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Chechen Republic, enjoys close ties to the Kremlin. President Vladimir Putin visited Spetsnaz University last August. Kadyrov also exerts influence across Russia’s regions, including its north, through VOIN (“Fighter”), a training military organization with offices expanding across Russia, including in Murmansk and Yamal Nenets Autonomous Okrug in northwestern Siberia and central Russia. Part of VOIN’s mission is to provide “patriotic education” and combat training for Russian teenagers. The former head of Kadyrov’s security detail and combat veteran of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, Daniil Martynov,[i] heads up VOIN’s organizational development. Training conducted by Chechen commanders include drills in sharpshooting and drone flying.

While potentially symbolic of Russia shifting its focus northward, the significance of these reports is unclear. First, fighting in the Arctic does not resemble fighting in the Northern Caucasus, given its extreme climate conditions, poor infrastructure, and important naval components. It is unlikely that Chechen paramilitaries will be fighting in Norway or the Arctic. More intriguing is whether Chechen spetsnaz trainers will influence the “Arctic way of war” in Russia’s far north. Russia recently announced it will be adding up to 50,000 soldiers to its Leningrad Military District, as well as expanding Northern Fleet’s 14th Army Corps into a full Army and establishing a completely new Army Corps in Karelia.[ii]


Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Kadyrov’s militant network is expanding into the Russian north,” The Barents Observer, 7 January, 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/kadyrovs-militant-network-is-expanding-into-the-russian-north/422803

Reportedly, more than 47,000 servicemen have undergone training in Gudermes since 2022. Of them, about 19,000 are so-called volunteers. Among them is Sergei Rezantsev from the town of Olenegorsk in the Kola Peninsula. In December last year, the 43-year-old man was awarded a medal for so-called “bravery” during the war in Ukraine. In a ceremony in Olenegorsk, the local town mayor described Rezantsev as “a true role model for patriotism.” 

In the ceremony, the warrior carried a uniform with the insignia of the Spetsnaz University. Judging from Rezantsev’s social media page, he has long experience from several Russian military operations, including in the North Caucasus.

With the training of soldiers from all over Russia, Ramzan Kadyrov is gradually building a network that includes representatives from major parts of the country. In addition, Kadyrov and his men are also exerting growing influence and power across Russia through the VOIN (“Fighter”), a militant organization that is opening offices in a number of Russian regions.


Notes:

[i] Prior to his position at VOIN, Daniil Martynov was a combat leader of Chechen forces, often referred to as Kadyrovtsy, part of the initial invasion of Ukraine on 22 February 2022.

[ii] Thomas Nilsen, “Kola and in Karelia likely to get tens of thousands of new soldiers,” The Barents Observer, 24 January 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/kola-and-in-karelia-likely-to-get-tens-of-thousands-of-new-soldiers/423579


Image Information:

Image: President Vladimir Putin visits Russian Special Forces University in Gudermes, Chechnya, in August 2024.
Source: Kremlin.RU http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news
Attribution: Public Domain


Russian Volunteer Force Highlights the Evolution of UAV Missions in Ukraine

Ukrainian Soldiers handling a Baba Yaga UAV.


“Now everything that concerns combat UAVs is developing rapidly, if you stop, you fall behind.”


The accompanying excerpted article from the Russian daily newspaper Izvestia discusses the activities of the Volunteer Corps of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s Española Brigade. The Española Brigade—currently numbering no more than 100 individuals, according to the founder—began as a volunteer formation of soccer enthusiasts, which now provides trained UAV operators and UAVs to support Russia’s conventional force in the special military operation in Ukraine.[i] According to the Izvestia article, the Española Brigade operates its own UAV training center and is developing its own UAVs for use in Ukraine. Although state UAV development programs are entrenched in both Russia and Ukraine, the development of UAV technologies by volunteer units and their personnel in the field also appears to be increasingly common on both sides of the front. It would now seem that the traditional model of governments procuring defense articles from private industry and then supplying these materials to the military is simply no longer effective given UAVs’ rapidly evolving technology and newfound tactical uses. Indeed, both the Russian and Ukrainian militaries are now collaborating closely with industry to quickly deliver new capabilities to the battlefield as the requirements are recognized.

The article also mentions the importance of the Baba Yaga class of large UAVs. The primary mission of the Baba Yaga-class of UAVs is not reconnaissance or bomb dropping, but logistics support. This development illustrates the expanding role of UAVs on the modern battlefield—UAVs are no longer being used just as a means of reconnaissance (intelligence) and/or fires. UAVs are now becoming key capabilities to enable success for other war-fighting functions.

Overall, although volunteer formations like Russia’s Española Brigade are relatively small, they help fill critical shortages of UAV expertise that the conventional force would be hard-pressed to stand up on its own.[ii]


Sources:

Dmitry Korneev, “«Птичья» школа: как в бригаде «Эспаньола» готовят операторов дронов

БПЛА (“Bird” school: how the “Espanola” brigade trains drone operators),” Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 7 November 2024.  https://iz.ru/1786422/dmitrii-korneev/ptica-skola-kak-v-brigade-espanola-gotovat-operatorov-dronov

The volunteer “Española Brigade”, the backbone of which is football fans, has a unique UAV combat training center…the commander and founder of the UAV Combat Training Center is respectfully called Petrovich…“With the start of the special operation, the idea came to organize a UAV combat training center. But it didn’t work out right away. It only opened in May 2023.  He notes that a wide variety of people came to the center.  “We invited those who had experience working with UAVs, even if it was minimal,” he recalls…They started training and preparing people on “commercial” UAVs. Gradually training switched to FPV [first-person-view] UAVs. The trainees first master the theory, and then go to the training grounds. The final stage of the program involves training on a relatively calm section of the front…There, people receive their first combat experience.  The center itself is relatively small. Its resources are designed mainly for the Española Brigade, Petrovich emphasizes…“We have been operating for only a year and a half. However, during this time, we have trained more than 100 qualified UAV operators in various areas” says Petrovich…

“Española”, like many other volunteer units, received special weapons manufactured by the so-called people’s defense industry, that is, developed and released outside the framework of the defense order…Now everything that concerns combat UAVs is developing rapidly, if you stop, you fall behind…, – Petrovich points out, moving on to the scientific and practical activities of the center’s employees.  At Española, they work with the entire spectrum of UAVs…In cooperation with a young design bureau, we are currently developing and conducting experimental tests on two types of d UAVs: a night reconnaissance UAV and a high-speed Baba Yaga UAV.  Due to the abundance of FPV [first-person-view] UAVs, the enemy has problems supplying units on the front line.  “Five, seven, ten kilometers is a dead zone”, he explains.  The fact is that people who sit directly at the front, paradoxically, are sometimes safer than those who are trying to resupply them from the rear. And so the first request for such a Baba Yaga [class UAV] came from such rear detachments.

Petrovich says that the troops needed a fast “bird” that could carry a good load and do it quickly.  The primary mission is supplying provisions, ammunition, and medicine.  The secondary mission is to carry powerful munitions.  A load capacity of, for example, 10 kg allows you to transport an anti-tank mine. Moreover, ammunition can be varied. Now there is a whole line [of UAV munitions]. We call this project “Kikimora”. The active testing phase is underway…The center is also working on countering enemy electronic warfare…The second UAV currently being developed at the center is a night reconnaissance UAV. “It can stay in the air for up to an hour and a half…in terms of range, it’s at least 12 km, we want to increase it to 15-17 km”


Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

[ii] Additional Russian volunteer units have filled critical positions in Russia’s war in Ukraine, especially in the field of UAVs. See Charles Bartles, “Russia Gains Combat Power From Volunteer Service,” OE Watch, 07-2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-gains-combat-power-from-volunteer-service/


Image Information:

Image: Ukrainian Soldiers handling a Baba Yaga UAV
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baba_Yaga_(aircraft)#/media/File:UA_Vampire_UCAV_01.jpg 
Attribution: АрміяІнформCC BY-SA 4.0


Russia Expands Its Arctic Research Capabilities

Russian President Vladimir Putin at Admiralty Shipyards to inspect the Petropavlovsk Kamchatsky submarine, the Ivan Papanin icebreaker patrol ship, and the Viktor Chernomyrdin icebreaker in 2019. Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg is the sight of construction of the newly announced Ivan Frolov Arctic capable research vessel.


“Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Patrushev underlined that the new vessel is aimed at strengthening Russia’s positions in the polar regions.”


In October, Russia announced the construction of its latest Arctic-capable research vessel, the Ivan Frolov. According to the first excerpted article from the Norway-based The Barents Observer, the Ivan Frolov, set for completion in 2028, will be the largest Arctic research vessel of its kind in the world and “the new flagship of Russia polar science.”[i] Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Patrushev noted the Ivan Frolov will collect data “for the development of navigation on the Northern Sea Route and to clarify the boundaries of the continental shelf of Russia.”

According to the second excerpted article from The Barents Observer, Russia’s research platform, the Severny Polyus, commissioned in 2022, recently began its second polar expedition.[ii] The expedition, “North Pole-42,” is expected to continue until 2026. This article also notes that while the Severny Polyus is a scientific research vessel,[iii] it could also serve Russian military purposes, as Russia’s new marine doctrine “includes a high stress on the use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes.” This doctrinal emphasis not only affects the Severny Polus and the forthcoming Ivan Frolov but also all other nations with Arctic exposure.

Together, these developments underscore Russia’s continued focus on the Arctic region at a time when all nations with an Arctic foothold are also dedicating resources to the area.


Sources:

Elizaveta Vereykina, “Construction begins on a “new flagship of Russian polar research,”The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 30 October 2024. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/construction-begins-on-a-new-flagship-of-russian-polar-research/419705

On 29 October, the Russian Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute reported on an official ceremony held at the Admiralty shipyards in St Petersburg to start the construction of a new scientific vessel named the Ivan Frolov.   The vessel – with a length of 165 meters and displacement about 25,000 tons – is planned to be able to accommodate up to 240 people. In addition to the announced 20 scientific laboratories on board, it will also have a helicopter platform.

“In 2028, the vessel will join the fleet of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute and become the new flagship of Russian polar science,” the news report says. At the ceremony, the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Patrushev underlined, that the new vessel is aimed at strengthening Russia’s positions in the polar regions:

“The vessel will have powerful scientific equipment that will allow conducting research even in the harshest conditions, including research on the ocean floor, in the atmosphere and space,” – “The study of the Arctic and Antarctic is one of the key areas of activity of the Russian Environmental Monitoring Service. More than 20 expeditions are already carried out annually.  They allow tracking climate change, collecting data for the development of navigation of the Northern Sea Route and clarifying the boundaries of the continental shelf of Russia”.

The Governor of St Petersburg, Alexander Beglov, called the new ship “the largest scientific research vessel in the world”. The two well-known large scientific -the RV Kronprins Haakon (Norway) or RRS Sir David Attenborough (UK), are smaller than the new Russian vessel. The technology used in the construction has previously been tested at the floating Arctic research station “North Pole” [“Severny Polyus”], according to the head of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute Alexander Makarov.

Atle Staalesen, “With the North Pole platform, Russia has returned to the Arctic for good,” The Baltic Observer,(independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 17 September 2024. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/arctic/with-the-north-pole-platform-russia-has-returned-to-the-arctic-for-good/142846

Russia’s North Pole (Severny Polyus) research platform has started its second comprehensive Arctic expedition.  The 83-meter-long vessel this week set out from Murmansk with course for the high Arctic.  It will sail into the polar sea-ice north of the New Siberian Islands and drift with the currents for the next two years.  Experts at the Russian Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute are now scanning satellite images for the most suitable icefloe for the drift. The search will continue as the vessel approaches the area.

“With the expeditions of the ice-protected self-propelled platform Severny Polyus Russia has returned to the Arctic for good,” says Aleksandr Kozlov, the Russian Minister of Natural Resources.  According to the minister, who is also known for his key role in Russia’s cooperation with North Korea, the researchers will gather materials of great importance for the protection of Arctic ecology, understanding of climate change, as well as safe sailing on the Northern Sea Route.  The expedition is named “the North Pole-42” and is expected to continue until 2026.

The Severny Polyus has the shape of a bathtub and is often referred to as a platform. It has a ship crew of 16 and a research team of up to 34 people. Ship operator is Roshydromet, the Russian state meteorological service.  The Severny Polyus is capable of geological, acoustic, geophysical and marine research under the harshest Arctic conditions.  In temperatures down to minus 50°C it is reportedly able to provide comfortable living and working conditions for researchers and crew.

On board are 15 labs where researchers can work year-round.  The research platform has replaced Russia’s Arctic expeditions based on ice floes organized since the 1930s. The quickly vanishing Arctic sea-ice has made it increasingly hard to organize the expeditions and last real ice station, the “North Pole-40”, was held in the winter of 2012.  Albeit built for research purposes, the vessel could ultimately also be applied by the Russian military. The country’s new Marine Doctrine includes a high stress on use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes. That could include not only trawlers and icebreakers, but also the Severniy Polus.


Notes:

[i] The Soviet Union and its successor state, Russia, have conducted a sustained Arctic maritime research effort since the 1930s and a sustained Antarctic research effort since 1955. The Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Research Institute (Арктический и антарктический научно-исследовательский институт) was founded in 1920 and still heads the country’s polar exploration with close to a thousand land and sea expeditions to its credit.

[ii] For additional reporting on the Severny Polyus, see: Les Grau, “Russian Drift Station Vital To Arctic Research Effort,” OE Watch, 07-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russian-drift-station-vital-to-arctic-research-effort/

[iii] For additional reporting on Russian research efforts in the Arctic, see: Les Grau, “China and Russia Expand Agreement For Arctic Strategic Resource Development,” OE Watch, 08-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/china-and-russia-expand-agreement-for-arctic-strategic-resource-development/


Image Information:

Image: Russian President Vladimir Putin at Admiralty Shipyards to inspect the Petropavlovsk Kamchatsky submarine, the Ivan Papanin icebreaker patrol ship, and the Viktor Chernomyrdin icebreaker in 2019. Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg is the sight of construction of the newly announced Ivan Frolov Arctic capable research vessel.
Source: Office of the Russian President, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62143
Attribution: Public Domain


Russia Offers Financial Incentives To Meet Troop Recruiting Targets

Russian soldiers fast-rope from helicopter during Centre 2019 strategic command-and-staff exercises.


“Russians are actively signing contracts with the Russian Defense Ministry for service in the special operation zone.”


In September, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for the “mobilization” of an additional 180,000 new service members. However, the meaning of “mobilization” appears to be a question of semantics: Russian media has reported that there is no talk in Moscow of a partial mobilization similar to the one conducted in the autumn of 2022, which led to tens of thousands of Russians fleeing the country. According to the first excerpted article from the pro-Kremlin Russian news source Izvestia, the press secretary for the Russian president, Dmitry Peskov, stated in November that “there is no talk of mobilization,” instead claiming that Russians are actively signing contracts for service in Ukraine.

Russia is mobilizing troops, not by traditional forced means, but financial inducements are now a key component of Russia’s recruitment tactics. According to the second excerpted article from the Russian news agency Interfax, a new debt law is the most recent incentive passed to encourage participation in the military. The new law allows up to 10 million rubles ($96,000) of outstanding debt facing collection, previously incurred by a recruit and/or his or her spouse, to be written off if a recruit joins the force.[i] Further, according to the third excerpted article from the Russian news tabloid Ragnum News Agency, on 25 November, Russia extended a one-time 400,000 ruble ($3,800) payment to those who sign a contract with the Russian Guard (Rosgvardiya) “for participation in the special military operation” in Ukraine.

The combination of financial incentives, which amounts to a windfall for many Russians, dead or alive, may well help the Russian armed forces continue to meet its recruiting goals, extending the war in Ukraine.[ii]


Sources:

“Песков сообщил об отсутствии планов по проведению мобилизации в России (Peskov reported no plans to conduct mobilization in Russia),” Izvestia (pro-Kremlin Russian news source), 23 November 2024. https://iz.ru/1795673/2024-11-23/peskov-soobshchil-ob-otsutstvii-planov-po-provedeniiu-mobilizatcii-v-rossii

Russia is not planning to conduct mobilization. This was announced on November 23 by the press secretary of the Russian president, Dmitry Peskov.

The official representative of the Kremlin added that at present, Russians are actively signing contracts with the Russian Defense Ministry for service in the special operation zone.

“There are a lot of these people — hundreds of people sign contracts every day and go to a special military operation,” Peskov noted.

Assembly point: Putin announced the completion of mobilization within two weeks

At the same time, the president emphasized that the conscription process needs to be improved.

Earlier, on October 27, when the agency asked whether there were enough volunteers and whether mobilization might be required, Peskov also answered that there was no talk of mobilization in Russia.

Before that, in May, Peskov stated that there was no need for mobilization in Russia, commenting on an article in the Financial Times (FT) that the country was actively recruiting volunteer contract soldiers.

“Правительство доработало программу списания кредитов военнослужащих (The government has finalized the program for writing off military personnel’s loans),” Interfax (Russian news agency), 15 November 2024. https://www.interfax.ru/russia/992965

The government proposes to write off overdue loans of up to 10 million rubles for which judicial collection has already begun for mobilized personnel, conscripts (except for cadets) and military contract soldiers during military service to perform the tasks of the Air Defense Forces, from December 1, 2024, follows from the amendments submitted to the State Duma.

We are talking about writing off obligations under loan agreements that were concluded before December 1, 2024 and for which a court order on debt collection has already entered into legal force or enforcement proceedings have been initiated. Up to 10 million rubles can be written off for a certain category of citizens – these are conscripts for military service upon mobilization; conscripted military personnel (except for cadets of military schools or universities); other citizens who are not undergoing military service, but who concluded a contract for military service for a period of one year or more to perform the tasks of a special military operation no earlier than December 1, 2024. The write-off also applies to spouses of this category of citizens.

“The obligations of a citizen called up for military service upon mobilization into the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, a serviceman who has served in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation by conscription (except for a serviceman holding a military position as a cadet in a military professional educational organization, a military educational organization of higher education under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation), another citizen who is not serving in the military, who concluded no earlier than December 1, 2024, a contract for military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for a period of one year or more to perform the tasks of a special military operation, and (or) his (her) spouse, arising from a loan agreement, if before December 1, 2024 a judicial act on the collection of debt on these obligations entered into legal force and (or) in order to fulfill such obligations, a writ of execution was issued to a bank or other credit organization and (or) enforcement proceedings were initiated based on the applications of the said organizations (the writ of execution was presented for execution), shall be terminated in parts, not exceeding in total 10 million rubles, from the date of conclusion of the said contract,” the text of the amendment says.

“Путин распространил на Росгвардию разовую выплату в 400 тыс. Рублей (Putin Extends One-Time Payment of 400,000 Rubles to the Russian Guard),” Regnum News Agency (Russian tabloid), 25 November 2024. https://regnum.ru/news/3931489?utm_source=iz&utm_campaign=vidjet&utm_medium=8&utm_content=3931489

The Russian Guard has been extended a one-time payment of ₽400,000 upon signing a contract with the Ministry of Defense.

Russian President Vladimir Putin extended the provision on a one-time payment of 400,000 rubles to the Russian Guard upon signing a contract for participation in a special military operation. The corresponding decree was published on November 25.

“This decree shall enter into force on the date of its signing and shall apply to legal relations that arose from August 1, 2024,” the document says.

Putin introduced a payment of 400 thousand rubles for participants in the special operation who signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense for a period of one year or more in August. Foreign citizens who decided to go to the combat zone also received the right to it.

The press secretary of the Russian president Dmitry Peskov explained that the payment is aimed at supporting the fighters of the special operation. He emphasized that this does not mean a change in the goals of the SVO.


Notes:

[i] In April 2024, the Russian government clarified its position vis-a-vie Russian banks regarding debt and interest reduction for those serving in Ukraine. As per when the article was written, the price tag for the debt forgiveness would be in the neighborhood of 11 billion rubles, half of which will be paid by the banks. The other half would be paid for by the government, adding an additional 5-6 billion rubles to defense expenditures. See: “Принят закон о компенсации банкам 50% потерь от списания процентов по кредитам военных (A law has been adopted to compensate banks for 50% of losses from writing off interest on military loans),” Interfax (Russian news agency), 2 April 2024. https://www.interfax.ru/russia/953642

[ii] For reporting on the positive economic impact of financial payment to family members of deceased service members, see: Georgi Kantchev and Matthew Luxmoore, “The ‘Deathonomics’ Powering Russia’s War Machine,” The Wall Street Journal, 13 November 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-ukraine-war-military-death-pay-6cfe936e?mod=world_lead_pos3


Image Information:

Image: Russian soldiers fast-rope from helicopter during Centre 2019 strategic command-and-staff exercises.
Source: Russian Office of the President, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61584
Attribution: Public Domain


Russia and Belarus To Strengthen Security Guarantees

The Polish-Belarusian border, photo taken on 11 November 2021.


“This is also a very important strategic document. Work on these two documents has been completed, and we plan, together with the Secretariat of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, to submit [them] for approval by the heads of our states at the Supreme State Council.”


Russia and Belarus have nearly finalized a “Treaty on Security Guarantees of the Union State,” according to an interview with Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic Alexander Wolfovich in Izvestia, a pro-Kremlin Russian newspaper. The document, which will be sent for ratification by the Supreme State Council in December, will replace the 1999 union concept. Belarus will receive substantial security guarantees, including the use of nuclear and conventional weapons, “due to external threats.”

The intention of the original treaty was to achieve a federation not unlike the Soviet Union, whereby Belarus and Russia would share a head of state, legislature, flag, currency, coat of arms, anthem, and other insignia of a unified state.[i] The full extent of the Union State never came to fruition, largely because both leaders of the federation, Presidents Boris Yeltsin (Russia) and Alexander Lukashenko (Belarus), quickly lost interest in the provisions of the treaty because both feared it would weaken their own power. Belarus suspended the customs union a few years later, and they never developed a common currency. 

The revised treaty comes amid heightened tensions along Belarus’ borders with Ukraine and Poland, due to a migrant crisis (involving asylum-seekers from the wider Middle East),[ii] nuclear drills conducted on Belarusian territory summer 2024,[iii] and rumors that Belarusian soldiers may be sent to fight in Ukraine.[iv] The security guarantees of the new document suggest that an attack against Belarus, conventional or otherwise, would be considered an attack against Russia.

Interestingly, the original intention of signing the 1999 treaty was economic, not security related. Back then, commercial and economic interests trumped security concerns.[v] Going back to the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has been Belarus’ largest economic and political partner. Vladimir Putin has sought greater integration of the two countries’ economies. As reported by Izvestia, trade between the two neighbors in the first half of 2024 ($25 billion) was up 6.4 percent from the same time last year, with some 133 investment projects underway in the fields of agriculture, energy, tourism, IT, medicine, and pharmaceuticals, according to Deputy Minister of Economic Development of Russia Dmitry Volvach. The revised treaty should strengthen economic integration and trade between the two neighbors.

More importantly, the revised Union State treaty signals greater security cooperation and guarantees between Minsk and Moscow. Belarus has long acted as a strategic buffer zone between Russia and NATO. Although President Alexander Lukashenko sought greater autonomy after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, a disputed election in 2020 and a popular uprising forced the Belarusian leader to seek greater integration with Russia. The revised Union State treaty will further isolate Belarus from Europe and make it more dependent on Russia for its security, both internal and external. While the long-term consequences of the revised Union State remain uncertain, given that Russia and Belarus have both sought to maintain their post-Soviet era borders and independence, greater military cooperation between Belarus and Russia is expected, including closer economic and potential territorial integration and even Belarus playing a larger role in the war in Ukraine, beyond just hosting Russian nuclear and military assets.


Sources:

Elizaveta Borisenko, “Взаимное действие: Москва и Минск подготовили договор о гарантиях безопасности (Union proposal: Moscow and Minsk strengthen cooperation against Western pressure),” Izvestia (a pro-Kremlin Russian newspaper), 11 November 2024. https://iz.ru/1787861/elizaveta-borisenko/vzaimnoe-deistvie-moskva-i-minsk-podgotovili-dogovor-o-garantiah-bezopasnosti

According to [Wolfovich], the provisions of the document will be published in the near future. The document will include the principle of the use of nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as other methods of protecting the Union State. “What our president recently said, what Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin recently said that, God forbid, there will be some aggressions towards the Republic of Belarus, is all true. If today it has the character of protecting the joint and protection of Belarus through the deployment of nuclear weapons on our territory, de facto in December, by the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on the establishment of the Union State, this treaty will already be legally signed,” Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov said earlier.

Russia previously decided to amend the nuclear doctrine, which was last updated in 2020. In particular, we are talking about the expansion of scenarios in which the Russian authorities reserve the right to use nuclear weapons. In the updated version of the document, aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state, but with the participation or support of nuclear, is proposed to be considered as their joint attack on the Russian Federation. In addition, there are provisions that concern Belarus.

“We reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in case of aggression against Russia and Belarus as a member of the Union State. All these issues have been agreed with the Belarusian side and the President of Belarus. Including if the enemy, using conventional weapons, creates a critical threat to our sovereignty,” Vladimir Putin said on September 25.

As for the new concept of the security of the Union State, which will replace the document adopted back in 1999, it will enshrine a provision on joint counteraction to the policies of the United States, unfriendly NATO states and the European Union to achieve strategic goals for mutually beneficial and equal international cooperation. Such strengthening of cooperation in the field of security is primarily related to the foreign policy situation, Dmitry Zhuravlev, scientific director of the Institute of Regional Problems, associate professor of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, tells Izvestia.


Notes:

[i] “The Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation signed the Union State Treaty on 8 December 1999,” Press Service of the President of the Republic of Belarus, https://president.gov.by/en/belarus/economics/economic-integration/union-state?TSPD_101_R0=08eaf62760ab20008e25be59f2426da6e735002c3eb769d3b553a73ed46fd82fa95c1f4983143a0a086c7a2488143000ed156aeeac2db1eb09822ff7aca3ea7bcda21c0e8cb9ef3c1a0b6b7c0271930783b0b327184c7aa97f0896aae08327fc

[ii] See: “Poland to temporarily suspend asylum rights amid Belarus border tensions,” Al-Jazeera, 12 October 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/12/poland-to-temporarily-suspend-asylum-rights-amid-belarus-border-tensions

[iii] See: “Belarus launches nuclear drills a day after Russia announces them amid tensions with West,” AP News, 7 May 2024. https://apnews.com/article/russia-belarus-nuclear-drills-ukraine-war-144422347bb168878cebc0b78071dd99

[iv] See: Mark Temnycky, “Will Belarus join North Korea in fighting Russia’s war?” The Hill, 17 November 2024. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4993006-ukraine-north-korean-fighting/

[v] For analysis, see Helene Alstad Dyndal, “The Union State of Russia and Belarus at the present stage,” Strategem, 11 April 2024 https://www.stratagem.no/the-union-state-of-russia-and-belarus-at-the-present-stage/


Image Information:

Image: The Polish-Belarusian border, photo taken on 11 November 2021.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/premierrp/51674607554
Attribution: Irek Dorozanski


Russia Accused of Interference in Moldovan and Georgian Elections

Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili has called for protests in response to what she and opposition parties have claimed is Russian interference in parliamentary elections. Protests have been a semi-common occurrence in Georgia for years for a variety of causes. In this photo Georgians protest the arrest and imprisonment of those involved in violent attacks on journalists in July 2021.


“Pro-Western Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili, who has broken with the ruling Georgian Dream party, said she will not recognize the results of parliamentary elections held on October 26 and alleged that the country has been the ‘victim of a Russian special operation.’”


Election interference allegations against Russia have disrupted Moldova and Georgia’s progress towards EU integration. According to the excerpted article from independent but partially U.S.-funded FRE/RL’s Georgian Service, Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili declared that “as the only remaining independent institution,” she would not recognize the election results. According to Zurabishvili, Georgia was the “victim of a Russian special operation.” However, according to the excerpted article from the Russian daily Izvestia, the pro-Moscow Georgian Dream party,[i] won approximately 90 of the 150 seats in Georgian parliamentary elections, giving it “the opportunity to once again form a one-party government.” The Izvestia article confirms that the election was marred by tensions, intimidation, and physical violence but implies that Western observers present in Georgia, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “recognized the elections as legitimate.” Multiple opposition parties, which had hoped to build a pro-Western coalition government, secured only 37 percent of the vote as a bloc and have vowed to challenge the election results.

Meanwhile, Moldova also held an election for president and a referendum on EU integration in October. According to the excerpted article from RFE/RL’s Moldova Service, the election was also marred by Russian election interference, including a vote-buying scheme orchestrated by Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor.[ii] Shor is a convicted criminal and fugitive in Moldova and is thought to be residing in Russia. Pro-EU Moldovan President Maia Sandu, who failed to secure enough votes to win reelection outright and will now have to face a pro-Moscow candidate in a runoff election, accused “foreign forces” of the outcome.[iii] In response, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called on Sandu to “‘produce proof’ to back up her accusations.”

If substantiated, election interference in both Georgia and Moldova is a clear indication of Russia’s ability to influence areas using what has loosely been referred to as hybrid operations, non-lethal operations, or influence operations, all of which fall short of actual armed conflict, but which are very difficult to counter.


Sources:

“Georgian President Won’t Recognize Vote Results, Calls For Protests, Alleges Russian Interference,” RFE/RL’s Georgian Service (independent but partially U.S. funded news service), 27 October 2024. https://www.rferl.org/a/33175194.html?utm_source=onesignal&utm_medium=pn-msg&utm_campaign=2024-10-27-Crisis-In-Georg

Pro-Western Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili, who has broken with the ruling Georgian Dream party, said she will not recognize the results of parliamentary elections held on October 26 and alleged that the country has been the “victim of a Russian special operation.”

Zurabishvili did not present any evidence to back up her claim in a brief statement to the media in Tbilisi on October 27.

“As the only remaining independent institution in this state, I want to say that I do not recognize this election. It cannot be recognized. It would be the same as recognizing Russia’s entry here — Georgian subordination to Russia,” she said.

“I didn’t come to Georgia for [Russian domination]. Our ancestors did not live for this. We will not tolerate this. It cannot be taken away from Georgia — its European future,” she added.

She called for street protests starting on October 28 at 7 p.m. in the South Caucasus nation, which has seen mass demonstrations in recent months against the ruling Georgian Dream party, which critics accuse of being pro-Russian and of having eroded democratic norms.

She blasted what she called a “Russian special operation — one of the new forms of hybrid warfare carried out on our people, our country.”

The Georgian Dream party celebrated an apparent win in the vote, but the pro-Western opposition cried foul and election monitors said that “critical violations took place,” including voter intimidation and physical violence.

Western observers also demanded an investigation into alleged irregularities.

The vote was seen as a crucial test of the EU-candidate country’s democratic credentials, and one that Brussels had said could determine Georgia’s chances of joining the bloc.

The OSCE also decried recorded instances of vote buying, double voting, physical violence, and intimidation.

Antonio Lopez-Isturiz White, the head of the European Parliament monitoring delegation, said Georgian Dream used hostile rhetoric and “promoted Russian disinformation” and conspiracy theories ahead of the election in an attempt to “undermine and manipulate the vote.”

“During our observation, we noted cases of vote buying and double voting before and during elections, especially in rural areas,” said Romanian lawmaker Iulian Bulai, head of the delegation sent by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), speaking at a joint news conference held in Tbilisi by heads of election-observation missions.

“Давняя «Мечта»: готова ли Грузия к смене внешнеполитического курса после выборов (Long-standing “Dream”: Is Georgia Ready to Change Its Foreign Policy Course After the Elections),” Izvestia (long running Russian daily newspaper, sanctioned by the EU in May 2024 for spreading propaganda), 27 October 2024. https://iz.ru/1781219/elizaveta-borisenko/davniaia-mechta-gotova-li-gruziia-k-smene-vneshnepoliticheskogo-kursa-posle-vyborov

The Georgian Dream, which has ruled the country since 2012, managed to win a convincing victory. According to the Central Election Commission, it gained almost 54% of the votes in the parliamentary elections held on October 26, almost the same as in the previous elections in 2020. This gives it the opportunity to claim about 90 of the 150 seats in parliament and once again form a one-party government.

Nevertheless, the defeated united opposition actively tried to destabilize the situation. They planned to form a coalition government, but gained only half as many votes as the Georgian Dream, about 37%. Of the 18 registered political forces, in addition to the Dream, only four overcame the five percent barrier [to be represented in parliament].

OSCE observers recognized the elections as legitimate, but warned that “they will observe how the new government will adhere to the European path.” Later, the recognition of the elections as legitimate was confirmed by the Georgian Prime Minister, who called the OSCE’s conclusions quite logical.

It is not entirely clear how the relationship between the Georgian Dream and President Salome Zurabishvili, who openly supports the opposition, will develop. The head of state is exclusively in favor of the country’s European integration, and the government and parliament are in favor of balanced relations with both the West and the Russian Federation…

The question of how Georgia’s relations with Western countries will develop after the victory of the Georgian Dream also remains open. It is worth noting that the dialogue between Tbilisi and the West sharply worsened in the spring, when the authorities initiated the adoption of the law “On the transparency of foreign influence”, which provides for assigning the status of a foreign agent to an NPO or media outlet if a “foreign force” receives more than 20% of its income from abroad during a calendar year… In addition, at the instigation of the “Dream”, a law banning LGBT propaganda was adopted in Georgia. Then, at the stage of opening negotiations on joining the union, the EU announced the suspension of the country’s integration.

…If the West decides to push Georgia away, the political vector may change. So far, there is no clear political line on tearing the republic away from the West, says Vadim Mukhanov.

As for relations with Russia, they are unlikely to change significantly. After the elections, Irakli Kobakhidze said that Georgia does not plan to restore diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation due to the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Tbilisi considers its territories. It is worth noting that on the eve of the elections, the Georgian Dream promised to “apologize” to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

“Moldovan Police Accuse Pro-Russian Oligarch Of $39M Vote-Buying Scheme.” RFE/RL’s Moldovan Service (partially U.S. State Department funded but independent regional news service), 25 October 2024.

https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-police-accuse-shor-russia-oligarch-39m-vote-buying/33172951.html

Moldovan police have accused convicted fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor of transferring $39 million into the bank accounts of thousands of Moldovans over the past two months allegedly to buy votes for the pro-Russian camp in a referendum and the first round of presidential elections last week.

Investigators said on October 25 that they uncovered about 1 million bank transfers, which reached the personal accounts of Moldovan citizens in September and October through the Russian bank Promsvyazbank (PSB), Moldovan police chief Viorel Cernauteanu told a news conference in Chisinau.

He added that some 500 people had already been fined for “passive electoral corruption,” without clarifying what that means. No direct evidence of vote buying has been released, but under Moldovan law, it is illegal to accept large sums of money from abroad for political purposes.

Despite expectations of a landslide “yes,” the October 20 referendum on Moldova’s integration into the European Union only passed by a razor-thin margin of less than 1 percentage point…

The referendum was held simultaneously with a presidential vote, won by incumbent Sandu with some 42.5 percent of the vote — less than the 50 percent plus one vote needed to avoid a runoff.

She will face pro-Moscow ex-Prosecutor-General Alexandr Stoianoglo in a crucial runoff on November 3.

On October 21, Sandu indicated that the stronger-than-expected showing of the pro-Moscow camp in both elections was due to what she said was an “unprecedented” assault from “criminal groups,” which she said tried to buy off as many as 300,000 votes with tens of millions of euros in an attempt to “undermine the democratic process.”

Russia has denied any interference, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov calling on Sandu to “produce proof” to back up her accusations.

The police investigation found that, in September, PSB bank, which has been under international sanctions for its support of Russia’s war in Ukraine, sent $15 million followed by a further $24 million this month. Cernauteanu said investigators had established the identities of some 138,000 Moldovan citizens in whose bank accounts the money ended up. The real number of those allegedly bribed by Shor, however, “is even higher” than the 300,000 mentioned by Sandu, because transfers made to one account were then shared between more people, he said.


Notes:

[i] Georgian Dream party, founded in 2012, won the general election the same year as part of a coalition. It proceeded to win the 2016 and 2020 general elections as an independent party as well. Upon establishment, Georgian Dream was largely considered favorable to EU integration. However, it is now considered to be pro-Moscow by Georgian opposition parties and the current Georgian President, Salome Zourabichvili, based on its support of a number of controversial laws and the dissemination of anti-Western narratives. Georgian Dream leadership dispute this vilification claiming that their current platform seeks to look to both Russia and the West equally.

[ii] Shor, who also holds Russian and Israeli citizenship, was sentenced in absentia to 15 years in prison by a Moldovan court in April 2023 over a $1 billion bank fraud. He is believed to be in Russia.

[iii] See: “Еврореферендум и выборы сделали Санду политическим трупом, считает эксперт (The Euroreferendum and elections have turned Sandu into a political corpse, says expert),” Ria Novosti (Russian daily), 23 October 2024. https://ria.ru/20241023/sandu-1979672826.html


Image Information:

Image: Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili has called for protests in response to what she and opposition parties have claimed is Russian interference in parliamentary elections. Protests have been a semi-common occurrence in Georgia for years for a variety of causes. In this photo Georgians protest the arrest and imprisonment of those involved in violent attacks on journalists in July 2021.
Source: Jelger Groeneveld, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Protest_in_Tbilisi_against_arrest_of_journalists_(26_Sept_2021).jpg
Attribution: CC BY-2.0