Kazakhstan Imposes New Language Requirements for Citizens

Statue of man and camels from Türkistan, Kazakistan.


“Knowledge of the language is necessary,” Interior Ministry spokesman Shyngys Alekeshev told reporters, adding that the new amendments were similar to those in countries like Germany, Canada and Turkey.”


Summary: Kazakhstan imposes stricter language requirements for naturalized citizens to reduce the role of Russia in Kazakhstani society.


Kazakhstan has made it stricter for noncitizens to become naturalized citizens by requiring applicants to pass a series of history and language tests. According to the excerpted article from state-run news outlet Kazinform, “ignorance of the state language… as well as the basics of the history and Constitution… can become grounds for refusal to admit citizenship.” The move is part of a broader push by the government to promote and preserve the Kazakh language and possibly distance itself from Russian influence. The move comes amid remarks made by Russian commentators and academics who have called into question the legitimacy and sovereignty of Kazakhstan as a country. It may be interpreted as a move to reduce the role of the Russian language in schools, business, and other aspects of Kazakhstani life. In January, a Russian historian, Mikhail Smolin, claimed on Russia’s state-owned television that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan did not exist as nations.[i] The charge drew widespread condemnation in the region.

The new language rules, under the leadership of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, are just one manifestation of Kazakstan’s pivot away from Russia toward other regional powers like China. Part of the Soviet legacy, particularly along its northern border with Russia, large portions of Kazakhstan’s population do not speak Kazakh. There are proposals underway to regulate the country’s media to require that a majority (55 percent) of all content on radio and television be broadcast in Kazakh by 2025. The widely heard phrase “Qazaqsha soyle” (Speak Kazakh) is now commonly heard on the street and has even emerged as an internet meme.

Tokayev has defined his “multi-vector” foreign policy as one of pragmatism defined by “national interests and strategic tasks.”[ii] Russian soft power and influence is arguably on the wane in Kazakhstan, whose youthful population – half of its population is under the age of 30 – did not grow up under the Soviet Union and have absorbed the “de-colonization” discourse ascendant among other countries in the Global South.[iii]


Sources:

“Ignorance of the state language at the elementary level can prevent admission to citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan – Ministry of Internal Affairs,” (Незнание госязыка на элементарном уровне может помешать в приеме в гражданство РК- МВД),” Kazinform (Kazakhstani state news agency) 20 May, 2024. https://www.inform.kz/ru/neznanie-gosyazika-na-elementarnom-urovne-mozhet-pomeshat-v-prieme-v-grazhdanstvo-rk-mvd-0aabd6

“Ignorance of the state language at the elementary level, as well as the basics of the history and Constitution of our country can become grounds for refusal to admit citizenship. The elementary level will be determined by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. The purpose of the amendments is rapid adaptation and integration into society. Knowledge of the language is first of all necessary for the citizens themselves who want to obtain our citizenship in order to quickly join society and participate in the life of the state,” said Shyngys Alekeshev at a briefing in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

“To prevent dual citizenship, a new basis for registering the loss of citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan is being introduced. Citizenship of our country will be lost if the passports of another state are used after acquiring citizenship of Kazakhstan. Previously, it was planned to lose citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan only for the acquisition of citizenship of a foreign state,” added Shyngys Alekeshev.


Notes:

[i] “Russian historian Mikhail Smolin: ‘Uzbekistan did not exist at all before the revolution’,” Anhor.uz (online Uzbek newspaper), 23 January 2024. https://anhor.uz/news/there-were-no-uzbeks/

[ii] “President Tokayev: Kazakhstan Continues Constructive, Balanced Foreign Policy Considering National Interests,” The Astana Times (English-language weekly), 3 January 2024.

https://astanatimes.com/2024/01/president-tokayev-kazakhstan-continues-constructive-balanced-foreign-policy-considering-national-interests

[iii] In May 2022, months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, not a single leader of Central Asia commemorated Victory Day in Moscow—a symbolic blow to the Kremlin and a demonstration of the region’s growing autonomy. See: Temur Umarov, “Kazakhstan is Breaking out of Russia’s Grip,” Foreign Policy, 22 September 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/16/kazakhstan-russia-ukraine-war/


OE Insight Summary: 

KAZ is set to impose tougher Kazakh language requirements to obtain citizenship, which some interpret as a slight at Moscow and a move to assert greater autonomy.


Image Information:

Image: Statue of man and camels from Türkistan, Kazakistan
Source: Ekrem Osmanoglu, Unsplash, https://unsplash.c om/photos/statue-of-man-and-camels-during-daytime-2qbAZ7RGPNM
Attribution: Free to use under the Unsplash License


Armenia Hints It May Withdraw From Russia-Backed Regional Security Bloc

Monastery Valley in Armenia


“Armenia will refrain from joining the CSTO Collective Security Council resolution of November 23, 2023 on the CSTO budget for 2024 and from participating in financing the organization’s activity envisaged by this resolution. However, it will not object to adopting this resolution in a curtailed format.”


Armenia recently announced it will no longer pay its dues to the Collective Security Treaty Organizations (CSTO), a Moscow-led security organization comprised of countries from Central Asia and the South Caucasus. According to the first excerpted piece from the Russian state news agency, TASS, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told his countrymen that they can no longer rely on the CSTO and he had no answer to how Yerevan benefits from being a member. The move comes as relations between Yerevan and Moscow have cooled, particularly after a series of clashes over the disputed Nagorno Karabakh region, , last September with neighboring Azerbaijan resulted in the mass expulsion of the enclave’s Armenian population.

Pashinyan, who did not attend the CSTO’s last summit in Minsk in 2023, had hinted that Armenia plans to suspend its participation in the security bloc. Critics of the CSTO claim it is a tool for Moscow to wield military power over former Soviet-bloc countries. The last time CSTO forces were called in to preserve the peace came in January 2022, when roughly 2,500 CSTO peacekeepers – the bulk of them Russian – responded to anti-government rioting in Kazakhstan. But Pashinyan has criticized the alliance for not supporting Armenia during its various clashes with Azerbaijan,accusing Russian peacekeepers of abandoning their positions when Azerbaijani troops crossed into Nagorno-Karabakh.[i] According to the second excerpted article from Armenian TV and radio service Azatutyun, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Armenia is free to withdraw from the organization.[ii]  If Armenia does leave the CSTO, the move could signal a major realignment of the regional balance of power in the Caucasus, as Russia, preoccupied by the war in Ukraine, looks to keep a military presence in the region. Armenia recently held joint drills with the United States, has sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and has expressed interest in one day joining the European Union. If the CSTO were to lose Armenia or other members, it could weaken Russia’s military leverage in the South Caucasus. Alternatively, it could make other regional security blocs like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which also comprises China, more relevant and powerful.


Sources:

Source:  “Armenia to refrain from financing CSTO activity in 2024,” (“Армения воздержится от финансирования деятельности ОДКБ в 2024 году,” TASS (Russian state news agency), 8 May 2024. https://tass.com/world/1785765

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said earlier that his country cannot rely on the CSTO and he cannot answer Armenian society’s question why the country should be its member. In recent time, Yerevan has skipped numerous meeting in a range of integration formats. Thus, Pashinyan did not attend the CSTO summit in Minsk in 2023 and announced that Armenia had suspended its participation in this organization.

CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov told TASS on April 22 that it was a matter of “an independent and sovereign country” to decide whether to take part in the upcoming CSTO summit or not. However, he said that he hoped that many might change for the better before the summit.


Source:  “Armenia Free To Leave Russian-Led Bloc, Says Moscow,” (Армения свободна выйти из возглавляемого Россией блока, заявила Москва), Azatutyun (Armenian TV and Radio service affiliated with U.S. funded RFE/RL) 3 May 2024. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32932373.html#

We still do not question the sovereign right of our Armenian partners to independently determine their foreign policy course, including in the context of the further work of the organization,” the ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova told a news briefing in Moscow.

“Let me remind you that Article 19 of the [CSTO} Charter establishes the possibility of leaving the alliance,” Zakharova said. “In that case, a member state … must send an official notification no later than six months before the withdrawal date.”

The Armenian government, she said, has taken no steps in that direction so far despite its “constantly circulated accusations against the organization.” This means that Armenia remains for now a full-fledged member of the Russian-led military alliance and must “must fulfill appropriate obligations,” added Zakharova. She did not specify those obligations.Over the past year or so, Yerevan has boycotted high-level meetings, military exercises and other activities of the CSTO in what Pashinian described in February as an effective suspension of Armenia’s CSTO membership. The premier repeatedly said afterwards that he could pull his country out of the alliance of six ex-Soviet states altogether.


Notes:

[i] “Armenian PM Attacks Russian-Led Alliance At Summit In Yerevan,” RFE/RL, 24 November 2022. https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-csto-pashinian-criticism/32145663.html

[ii] During a recent visit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Pashinyan struck an agreement for Russian border guards to withdraw from along the Armenia-Azerbaijani border. See: Gabriel Gavin, “Russia to withdraw troops from Armenia’s border,” Politico.eu, 9 May 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-to-withdraw-troops-from-armenias-border/


Image Information:

Image: Monastery Valley in Armenia
Source: Unsplash, https://unsplash.com/photos/aerial-photo-of-a-village-during-daytime-VQ07UveM3-U
Attribution: Free to use under the Unsplash License


Russian-Finnish Tensions Rise Amidst Border Closures and “Hybrid” Tactics

Russian border crossing at Paljakka, Kuusamo, Finland. In light of rising tensions, Finland shut down its border with Russia.


“There are hundreds and possibly thousands of people close to Finland’s border on the Russian side that could be instrumentalized against Finland.”


In December 2023, Finland closed its 800-mile border with Russia, which included three maritime crossings for smaller boats, in the wake of Finland formally joining NATO. These closures have heightened tensions between Russia and Finland.

According to the first article from the Norway-based The Barents Observer, the closure includes three maritime border crossings for smaller boats, which will impact leisure boating in the Barents Sea.  As per a second article, also from The Barents Observer, Finland had been overwhelmed with over a thousand migrants and asylum seekers from the Middle East and Africa. According to the article, Moscow has orchestrated the influx of migrants in a deliberate “hybrid” tactic by the Russian government – so-called “instrumentalized immigration” – to overwhelm the country and its border police as a punishment for closing the border to Russians. Authorities in Moscow have organized flows of asylum seekers on Finland’s eastern border since last fall, the Finish prime minister has argued. A representative for the Finnish border guard said that the maritime border was important to close because reaching Finland by sea is “life threatening,” given the Baltic Sea’s much harsher conditions than the Mediterranean.[i]

In response, the European Union has voiced its support for Finland. The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, paid a visit to the Finnish-Russian border in April to say that “Europe stands by your side” as it seeks to secure its border against such “hybrid attacks.”[ii] With the weather warming up, officials there expect an even larger influx of migrants and asylum seekers in the weeks and months ahead. For the latter half of the 20th century, following a war between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1939, relations between the two neighbors were relatively peaceful. The recent rise in tensions and border closures have drawn concerns that Russia, beyond staging hybrid operations like “instrumentalized immigration,” could stage a false-flag border intervention to test NATO resolve and its Article Five protections.


OE Insight Summary:

As the RUS-FIN border remains indefinitely closed, RUS has employed hybrid tactics and ‘instrumentalized immigration’ to protest FIN joining NATO.


Sources:

“Finland’s eastern border to remain shut indefinitely (Восточная граница Финляндии останется закрытой на неопределенный срок),” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 8 April 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/ru/granicy/2024/04/vostochnaya-granica-finlyandii-ostanetsya-zakrytoy-na-neopredelennyy-srok

In the past, the closure has been reconsidered every couple of months, but this time the decision is open-ended…

With warmer weather on the way, this time the decision also covers border crossing points at three small-boat harbours: Haapasaari, an island off the southeastern city of Kotka, Santio, an island in Virolahti, Finland’s southeasternmost municipality, and Nuijamaa lake harbour in Lappeenranta on the Russian border. They will be closed to pleasure boat traffic from mid-April. “By closing border crossing points for maritime traffic to leisure boating, the Government is preparing for the possibility that instrumentalised migration could expand to maritime traffic as spring progresses,” the Interior Ministry said in a statement.

“This would be dangerous to people seeking to enter Finland and would burden maritime search and rescue,” it went on to say.

The frontier has been closed since December, when Finnish authorities accused Russia of orchestrating the flow of third-country asylum seekers across the border as a means of hybrid influence.

Nearly two months ago, the government led by Prime Minister Petteri Orpo (NCP) extended the closure until 14 April. Another extension was widely expected, with officials predicting that favourable spring weather conditions would spur more arrivals across the border.

The cabinet also plans to ask Parliament soon to approve a more stringent border law that would allow migrants deemed to have no grounds for seeking asylum to be immediately sent back to Russia. That bill, which was still being finalised on Thursday, has come under criticism for violating international border treaties.


Atle Staalesen, “As Helsinki prepares new measures against Russian hybrid operations, President Stubb makes visit to the border,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 27 March 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/borders/2024/03/helsinki-prepares-new-measures-against-russian-hybrid-operations-president-stubb

Together with his wife, President Alexander Stubb on Wednesday arrived at Niirala checkpoint where he met with representatives of the Finnish Border Guard. Captain of the border guard station Mikko Sorasalmi gave the president an introduction to equipment applied by the border patrols. On site were also representatives of the EU border agency Frontex and the discussion took place in Finnish, English and German, Yle reports.

The Niirala border-crossing point used to be site buzzing with travellers, but since mid-December the border between Finland and Russia has been closed and travellers forced to use checkpoints in the Baltic states or northern Norway. The closure came after several thousands of migrants flocked from Russia and into the Schengen zone through the Finnish border-crossing points. Finnish authorities are confident that the migrant flows were orchestrated by Moscow as part of a hybrid influence operation. 

This week’s visit of Alexander Stubb comes as Finland is preparing new measures to counter Russian hybrid influence on the country. Last week, the government completed a draft law that is aimed at preventing asylum seekers from entering the country. The bill aims at preventing asylum seekers from entering the country. The acceptance of asylum applications would be significantly limited. The bill is balancing between national security concerns and international human rights consideration, representatives of the government admit … It is aimed at influencing Finland’s national security and public order, the government leader underlines. “We have to prepare for the fact that the situation may get more difficult when spring arrives,” he said in last Friday’s press conference. “The authorities need tools to manage the terrain border.”


Notes:

[i] Mariia Yemets, “Finland closes sea checkpoints near border with Russia until mid-April,” Ukrainska Pravda, 5 April 2024. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/5/7449951/

[ii] Doug Cunningham, “Ursula von der Leyen visits border to stand by Finland against Russian ‘hybrid attacks’,” UPI, 19 April 2024. https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2024/04/19/Finland-EU-Russian-hybrid-attacks/1921713541719/


Image Information:

Image: Russian border crossing at Paljakka, Kuusamo, Finland. In light of rising tensions, Finland shut down its border with Russia.
Source: Fanny Schertzer, (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Finland-Russia_border#/media/File:Finnish-Russian_border,_Paljakka-2.jpg)
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0


Russia Celebrates 10th Anniversary of Crimean Annexation

A view of the Crimean (Kerch) Bridge, linking Crimea to Russia.


“[The railway] will be another, alternative road instead of the Crimean Bridge,” said President Vladimir Putin.


On 18 March, Russians celebrated the tenth anniversary of their “reunification” with Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. One of the Kremlin’s major priorities for the peninsula was the construction of a $2.5 billion land bridge, known as the Kerch Bridge, to link the annexed region with the Russia-controlled provinces of eastern Ukraine. At 19 kilometers (11.8 miles), the bridge is Europe’s longest. The excerpted feature article in pro-Kremlin newspaper Kommersant, celebrated Russia’s modernization of the peninsula, including a gleaming new $350 million international airport at Simferopol shaped like a sea wave; the extension of a new water pipeline; a large mosque for Crimea’s Tatars; and refurbished statues to commemorate what Russians call the “Crimean Spring.” The article notes that the Kerch Bridge has come under attack by Ukraine at least twice during the special military operation. As an insurance policy—announced at a rally on Red Square to honor President Vladimir Putin’s March presidential victory and the 10th anniversary of the annexation of Crimea—Russia will restore a railway linking Rostov-on-Don with Donetsk and Mariupol, eventually reaching Sevastopol, according to the excerpted article in nationalist online newspaper Lenta.ru. The announced railway connection could suggest that the Russian authorities are concerned about the vulnerability of the Kerch Bridge to attack. Some Western analysts have called on Ukraine’s military to target it with advanced missiles[i] The railway extension project could simply be meant to symbolize the connection of mainland Russia with its annexed peninsula. Either way, the Ukrainian military will have an additional target as it seeks to take back Crimea and weaken Russia’s grip on the peninsula.


Sources:

“Крым десятилетней выдержки: Как обжился полуостров в составе России, (Crimea after 10 Years of Improvements: How the Peninsula has Taken Shape within Russia),” Kommersant.ru (center-right Kremlin newspaper), 17 March 2024. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6535646

After the “Crimean Spring” the peninsula was in a land blockade, so the construction of a transport corridor through the Kerch Strait was declared a priority. On March 19, 2014, President Vladimir Putin instructed to connect new entities with the “big land” by rail and roads. The construction of the bridge worth 228 billion rubles began in February 2016 and lasted a little more than two years. The 19 km long structure was the longest in Europe. After the start of the special operation, the crossing was twice attacked by Ukraine.


“Путин анонсировал появление альтернативы Крымскому мосту” (Putin announced the emergence of an alternative to the Crimean Bridge), Lenta.ru (right-wing nationalist online newspaper), 18 March 2024. https://lenta.ru/news/2024/03/18/putin-anonsiroval-poyavlenie-alternativy-krymskomu-mostu/

The restored railway from Rostov-on-Don to DonetskMariupol and Berdyansk will be an alternative to the Crimean Bridge. Its appearance was announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin at a rally-concert in honor of the tenth anniversary of the reunification of Crimea with Russia, his words are quoted by the TASS agency.

The Head of State noted that the country will continue to restore the railway, which goes from the Rostov region through Donbass and Novorossiya. The President promised that the railway trains would soon go to Sevastopol. “And it will be another, alternative road instead of the Crimean Bridge,” he added. Putin also stressed that Russia and Crimea will go together and further hand in hand. He pointed out that this will be proved not in words, but in deeds, which will only make the country and the peninsula stronger.In November, Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin reported that the new railway from the Rostov region to Crimea, which will become an alternative to the route along the Crimean Bridge, is at the design stage.


Notes:

1 Ben Hodges, Led Klosky, Robert Person, Eric Williamson, “Putin’s Weak Link to Crimea: Kyiv Should Target the Kerch Bridge—but Needs Missiles to Take It Out,” Foreign Affairs, 5 December 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/putins-weak-link-crimea


Image Information:

Image: A view of the Crimean (Kerch) Bridge, linking Crimea to Russia.
Source: Rosavtodor.ru https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Crimean_Bridge#/media/File:Крымский_мост_13_сентября_2019_года_(1).jpg
Attribution: CC By 4.0


Russia Developing Sixth-Generation Combat Aircraft

Rendition of BAE Systems Tempest 6th generation fighter.


“Currently, we are thinking about the concept of a sixth-generation aircraft, conducting search research, exchanging views with military specialists. Such an aircraft should appear sometime by 2050, but already now it is necessary to understand what the armed conflicts of the future will be like.” – Evgeny Fedosov, Scientific Director of the State Research Institute of Aviation Systems.”


Russia hopes to have a sixth-generation combat aircraft prototype by 2050, according to the excerpted analysis of a report written by Evgeny Fedosov of the Russian Academy of Sciences published by state news agency TASS.  Sixth-generation aircraft, still in their early phase of development, are expected to have advanced digital features like artificial intelligence (AI) integration and data fusion, as well as other enhanced command, control, and communication (C3) capabilities. The aircraft would be similar to fifth-generation combat aircraft—designed for greater air-to-air capability, battlefield survivability in anti-access/area denial environments, and ground support—but with greater focus on enhanced integration of AI systems and less focus on close-in dogfighting, which is a less common feature of current and future war scenarios.  This is not the first time that the Russians have announced plans to develop a sixth-generation combat aircraft. TASS first reported these developments in 2017[i] and the article touts Russia’s Su-57 [RG1] Felon as “almost” possessing capabilities or easy upgradable features to become a sixth-generation aircraft. These capabilities include supercruise (i.e. sustained supersonic flight without use of an afterburner) and advanced avionics (i.e. an aircraft’s communications, navigation, and flight control systems). 

The second excerpted article from the The EurAsian Times is a commentary on Fedosov’s report. It notes that AI technology will provide the aircraft with advanced digital and C3 capabilities, as well as data fusion and remote or autonomous piloting. Fedosov expects the pilot to be integrated into the airframe, with cockpits and helmet-mounted displays allowing for 360-degree vision similar to the F-35 [RG2] . Stealth, as before, will continue to play a huge role in sixth-generation aircraft capabilities. Several other nations have announced plans to develop sixth-generation combat aircraft to include Turkey[ii] as well as the UK, Italy, and Japan, which announced a joint plan to develop a similarly advanced fighter.[iii] The Russian military’s development of advanced combat aircraft has been notorious for delays, cost overruns, and faulty features evident in the deployment of its fifth-generation Su-57 aircraft. Discussing the aircraft, Fedosov acknowledged the complication of designing future combat aircraft as they become larger, heavier, and costlier to make. The TASS article suggests that the U.S. Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance plan to roll out a sixth-generation combat aircraft to replace its F-22 Raptor fighters by 2030 is unlikely to be eclipsed by the Russians anytime soon.[iv] The report further highlights divisions among the engineers, strategists, and aviators of Russia’s ministry of defense, over which capabilities to emphasize. The main divide is whether to focus on producing fighters designed for beyond visual range engagement or models (not unlike its previous Sukhoi or Mikoyan versions) capable of close-range dogfights, but there is also major disagreement over whether future models should be manned or unmanned.[v]


Sources:

“Боевой самолет шестого поколения может появиться в России к 2050 году (A Sixth-Generation Combat Aircraft may Appear in Russia by 2050),” TASS (Russian state news agency), 25 February 2024. https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/20081017

A sixth-generation combat aircraft may appear in Russia by 2050, now there is an exchange of views with the military regarding its concept. This is written in a column for TASS by the scientific director of the State Research Institute of Aviation Systems (GosNIIAS), Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Evgeny Fedosov.

“Currently, we are thinking about the concept of a sixth-generation aircraft, conducting search research, exchanging views with military specialists. Such an aircraft should appear sometime by 2050, but already now it is necessary to understand what the armed conflicts of the future will be like,” he writes.

Touching upon the design of future aircraft, Fedosov suggested that “to go further according to the logic of complication is a vicious practice.” He also pointed out that combat aircraft are becoming more complex from generation to generation and, as a result, becoming heavier. “And the larger and heavier the plane, the more expensive it is,” the academician concluded.

GosNIIAS is a leading center in the development of on-board aviation systems and equipment. The founder of modeling methods for designing automatic systems of any degree of complexity. The Institute participates in the creation of aircraft at all stages: from the development of the concept of aircraft creation to modernization during operation. 


Ashish Dangwal, “Russia’s 6th-Gen Fighter Jet to be Deployed by 2050; Will not Dump Pilots for Robots – GosNIIAS,” The EurAsian Times (a privately owned digital news site specializing in defense and global news) 26 February 2024. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/russias-6th-gen-fighter-jet-to-be-deployed-by-2050/

According to state media TASS, Russia is actively setting its sights on developing a sixth-generation fighter jet that could be deployed by 2050.

The development was disclosed by Evgeny Fedosov, Scientific Director of the State Research Institute of Aviation Systems (GosNIIAS) and a distinguished member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Fedosov outlined the initiative in a column published by TASS, shedding light on the ongoing discussions and research surrounding the conceptualization of the sixth-generation aircraft.

According to Fedosov, the development process involves extensive consultation and collaboration with military specialists to anticipate the demands of future armed conflicts.

“Currently, we are thinking about the concept of a sixth-generation aircraft, conducting research and exchanging views with military specialists,” he said. Fedosov, however, highlighted a critical concern regarding the design complexity of next-generation combat aircraft, describing it as a potentially “vicious practice.”

He pointed out that with each successive iteration of military aviation, the size and weight tend to increase, inevitably impacting the cost of such equipment.

He also added that the sixth-generation combat aviation group will include both manned aircraft and unmanned vehicles.

“There is an opinion that the air group should be mixed and consist of drones and manned aircraft. Such a mixed park, in principle, can exist,” Fedosov remarked. He said that the size and speed of the drones would enable them to function as wingmen within a group.

Building upon the success of fifth-generation platforms, sixth-generation fighters would be designed to adapt to evolving trends in aerial warfare, where traditional dogfighting scenarios are giving way to long-range engagements utilizing beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile capabilities.

In recent years, numerous countries have declared their intention to embark on the development of indigenous sixth-generation aircraft programs, illustrating a global push toward advancing military aviation capabilities.

The United States Air Force is a key player in this arena, actively advancing its efforts to develop a next-generation fighter jet through the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) stealth fighter program.

Multinational initiatives have also emerged, reflecting a strategic approach to leveraging shared resources and expertise while mitigating development costs.

China is also believed to be in the process of developing its sixth-generation fighter jet, having previously demonstrated its capabilities with the construction of the fifth-generation J-20 fighter jet.On the other hand, Russia has encountered difficulties in deploying its stealth fighter jet, the Su-57, in large numbers. Moreover, discussions concerning the development of a sixth-generation fighter jet have previously faced obstacles.


Notes:

 [i] “Russia may upgrade advanced Su-57 aircraft to 6th-generation fighter jet,” TASS, 1 November 2017. https://tass.com/defense/973625

 [ii] Dilara Aslan Ozer, Türkiye starts works on AI-backed 6th-generation fighter jet,” Daily Sabah, 12 January 2024. https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/turkiye-starts-works-on-ai-backed-6th-generation-fighter-jet

[iii] Josh Luckenbaugh, “UK-Italy-Japan Cite Steady Progress Developing Next-Gen Jet Fighter,” National Defense, 30 October 2023. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/10/30/uk-italy-japan-cite-steady-progress-developing-next-gen-jet-fighter

[iv] Ryan Finnerty, “US defense spending bill could expose new details of sixth generation fighter development,” FlightGlobal, 19 December 2023. https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/us-defence-spending-bill-could-expose-new-details-of-sixth-generation-fighter-development/156256.article

[v] Boyko Nikolov, “Su-57 Felon is a step towards the 6th-gen, but Russians are at odds,” BulgarianMilitary.com, 24 November 2023. https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2023/11/24/su-57-felon-is-a-step-towards-the-6th-gen-but-russians-are-at-odds/


Image information:

Image: Rendition of BAE Systems Tempest 6th generation fighter
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BAE_Systems_Tempest#/media/File:Team_tempest.jpg
Attribution: Fair Use


Former Wagner Troops Integrated Into Chechen Unit Fighting in Ukraine

State Border Guard Service of Ukraine


“A platoon dubbed Kamerton (Tuning Fork) consisting of fighters from the now-defunct Wagner Private Military Company (PMC), who had been incorporated into the ranks of the Akhmat special forces group, has carried out a successful assault on a Ukrainian-occupied elevated point.”


On 12 December 2023, a platoon of former fighters from the disbanded Wagner Group carried out an operation in Ukraine-controlled Bakhmut. The operation, a successful assault on the town, marked one of the few times that the official Russian news agency, TASS, has mentioned the Wagner Group after its failed mutiny in 2023 and the death of its mercurial leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin.

While the article does not provide significant detail about the operation itself, it confirms that remnants of Wagner are still actively fighting in Ukraine. The platoon, called Kamerton (or “Tuning Fork”), is under the command of the Akhmat Special Forces, a 12,000-strong Chechen special forces unit that is part of the Russian National Guard.[i] Roughly 1,200 Akhmat fighters are estimated to be fighting in Ukraine, though their poor discipline has drawn criticisms (they have been dubbed the “TikTok Army” for their social media posts).[ii]

The second excerpted article from TASS, published on 1 December 2023, provides more detail about Kamerton’s operational capability. It describes the platoon as having both an assault and artillery capability, which supports previous reporting that Akhmat forces not only engaged in trench clearing operations but also provided artillery support to assist Russia’s 4th Brigade and other forces in the disputed Donets region. Adding a platoon with artillery capability to Akhmat would fill a void in the unit structure as the Chechens are traditionally equipped and trained as light infantry or paramilitary combatants. Still, even if Kamerton includes an artillery component, it would be relatively small given the unit is described as a platoon.   Assuming the TASS stories are accurate, they provide preliminary evidence on the whereabouts of a small handful of Wagner fighters, how they are being used in Ukraine, and their current capabilities. The Akhmat battalion is a logical unit for former Wagner fighters as they were close and shared the same battlespace during the battle for Bakhmut in early 2023. Incorporating Wagner remnants into Akhmat units may also plug a capability gap and be easier than trying to integrate the former Wagner fighters into a standard Russian Army infantry or artillery unit.[iii] However, it remains unclear how the remnants of Wagner, or another private military company, will fill the void Wagner left in other parts of the world.[iv]


Sources:

“Собранный из бойцов ‘Вагнера’ отряд ‘Камертон’ провел первый штурм к западу от Артемовска, (Platoon formed from ex-Wagner PMC fighters carries out first assault near Artyomovsk),” TASS (official news agency of Russian government), 12 December 2023. https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/19516415

A platoon dubbed Kamerton (Tuning Fork) consisting of fighters from the now-defunct Wagner Private Military Company (PMC), who had been incorporated into the ranks of the Akhmat special forces group, has carried out a successful assault on a Ukrainian-occupied elevated point near the western outskirts of Artyomovsk, the platoon commander, who goes by the call sign “Press,” told TASS.

“Prior to this, it was everyday routine [frontline activities] – reconnaissance and fire strikes. Yet, this was precisely an assault on a key elevated point in this sector directly by the Kamerton platoon with support from the 4th brigade. In six minutes, Kamerton’s assault groups entered the elevated point and engaged in combat in a trench. They wiped out the enemy and opened up space for the operations of their neighboring platoons,” the commander said.

According to him, the positions taken will help develop further progress in this sector of the line of contact. “The 4th brigade and other Russian forces in this area are being covered by Kamerton’s artillery,” he clarified…


“Командир собранного из бойцов “Вагнера” отряда рассказал о выполнении задач в ходе СВО (The commander of the detachment assembled from Wagner fighters spoke about the implementation of tasks during the Northern Military District),” TASS (Russian state media), 1 December 2023. https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/19427897

According to the head of “Kamerton”, which is part of “Akhmat”, its fighters are engaged in “the whole range of tasks.”

The Kamerton detachment, which consists of former fighters of the Wagner PMC and is part of the Akhmat special forces, performs a full range of tasks in the area of the special military operation. The detachment commander with the call sign Press reported this to TASS.

“Tuning Fork” includes both assault groups and armored and artillery formations.

“Taking into account experience and past operations, we are faced with the whole range of tasks, as well as other Akhmat special forces units. From training personnel, combat coordination to carrying out combat missions on the line of combat contact,” Press said.

He clarified that Akhmat is a self-sufficient division with its own approaches and methods. According to the Press, Akhmat’s management has allowed Kamerton to fully exploit its strengths.“Tuning fork” inherited and brought with it in full all the best qualities inherent in “musicians” (fighters of the Wagner PMC – TASS note), both in matters of corporate ethics and in direct approaches to solving combat missions. PMC fighters in the Akhmat special forces are a unique alloy,” added the unit commander.


Notes:

[i] Akhmat Special Forces operating in Ukraine, led by Chechen commander, Apti Alaudinov, operated closely with Wagner Group prior to Prigozhin’s mutiny and siege of Russian military HQ in Rostov. Although the relationship changed, it would not be far-fetched for Wagner personnel to be incorporated the Chechen ranks as the units and personnel worked together. Also of importance, the Akhmat Special Forces was initially a predominantly Chechen unit. Over time the unit has become home to many ethnicities from the Russian Federation and prides itself as multicultural, multi-religious, comprised of Jews, Muslims and Christians—according to mulitiple statements from its commander Apti Alaudinov posted to his Telegram channel.

[ii] Borzou Daragahi, “Putin’s lapdog wears Prada: Chechen leader Kadyrov poses on TikTok while his men kill civilians in Ukraine,” The Independent, 7 April 2022. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/kadyrov-chechen-putin-ukraine-chechnya-b2052357.html

 [iii] To see more on Wagner Group activities around the world, see FMSO’s archives here: https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/tag/wagner-group/

[iv] A recent report by the Center for New American Security suggests that the Wagner Group has created a new “model that other Russian opportunistic actors will seek to replicate,” especially given the lack of financial resources for Russia’s military and civilian elite. See: Kimberly Marten, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Carisa Nietsche, “Potential Russian Uses of Paramilitaries in Eurasia,” CNAS, 17 January 2024. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/potential-russian-uses-of-paramilitaries-in-eurasia


Image Information:

Image: Southwestern part of Bakhmut (Donetsk region of Ukraine) during the battle for the city in Spring 2023.
Source: State Border Guard Service of Ukraine https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bakhmut_during_the_battle_(2023-04-05),_frame_16531.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Int


Russia Denies that North Korea Is Supplying It With Weapons for Use in Ukraine

Meeting of Russian and North Korean Defense Ministers at Sunan International Airport in Pyongyang on 25 July 2023.


“The accusations made by the ‘collective West’ of ‘illegal’ military-technical cooperation between Russia and North Korea are unfounded and unsubstantiated.”


Relations between Russia and North Korea are drawing concern as new evidence emerges that Pyongyang has supplied Moscow with conventional munitions and missiles for use in Ukraine. Satellite activity from October 2022 revealed that North Korea supplied an arsenal of weapons – including short-range ballistic missiles, anti-tank missiles, and portable anti-air missiles as well as rifles, rocket launchers, mortars and shells.[i] If confirmed, North Korean sales of weapons to Russia would violate several UN Security Council resolutions  (1718, 2270, and 2321) going back to 2006, which ban the sales of all arms, ballistics systems, and related materials to and from Pyongyang. 

It is estimated Russia received some 350,000 artillery shells from North Korea. At a rate of fire of 10,000 per day at its high at the time of this writing (down from an estimated peak of 60,000 per day in 2022[ii]), that gives Russia just short of a two months’ supply. To put that figure in comparison, given American production levels of 24,000 artillery shells per month, that is more than the US produces in an entire year. The slower pace of Russian missiles fired (based on the 10,0000 per shells per day statistic) on Ukrainian cities could reflect its lack of supply, or it could be a sign of stockpiling in anticipation of a winter offensive, as some analysts suspect.[iii]  

For its part, Russia’s foreign ministry has vehemently denied any violations. According to the excerpted article in the pro-Kremlin news site Sputnik News, Russia denies any “illegal” weapons transfers. Yet satellite imagery starting in August 2023 captures some 1,000 containers leaving North Korea’s Rajin port bound for an ammunition dump near Ukraine’s border.[iv] Indeed, as of October 2023, research from CSIS indicates that cross-border activity at North Korea’s Tumangang Rail Facility has spiked to its highest levels since before the pandemic.

In exchange, Russia has reportedly provided technical support to North Korea’s nascent space program, as well as ICBM technology. Such assistance is likely needed given Pyongyang’s two previous attempts to launch reconnaissance satellites failed due to booster malfunctions. Theodore Postol of MIT has suggested that Russia also supplied North Korea with the Topol-M [R1] ICBM, the basis for its solid-fuel Hwasong-18 [RG2] missile.[v] Though these reported arms transfers are notable, the Russia-North Korean nexus is not new. After the Cold War, observers raised fears that out-of-work Russian nuclear scientists were assisting Pyongyang to develop nuclear weapons. Today, fears of an arms race are rising in Seoul.[vi] That has prompted South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. to begin sharing real-time missile warning data emanating from North Korea.[vii] Experts disagree whether the Russia-North Korea nexus is a sign of Russian weakness (Russia is badly in need of arms) or strength (Moscow has allies and an arsenal it can call on rapidly for arms). Whatever the assessment, this nexus bears attention from the U.S. Army.


Sources:

“МИД РФ отрицает нарушение резолюций СБ ООН по Северной Корее (Russian Foreign Ministry Denies Violating UNSC Resolutions on North Korea),” Sputnik News (pro-Kremlin news outlet directed at foreigners), 11 November 2023. https://sputnikglobe.com/20231111/russian-foreign-ministry-denies-violating-unsc-resolutions-on-north-korea-1114884101.html  

“The accusations made by the ‘collective West’ of ‘illegal’ military-technical cooperation between Russia and North Korea are unfounded and unsubstantiated … Russia is responsible in fulfilling its international obligations, including Security Council resolutions. This does not prevent us from deepening traditional relations of friendship and cooperation with our neighbors, including North Korea,” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova was quoted as saying by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Russian Foreign Ministry Ambassador at Large Oleg Burmistrov told Sputnik that Russia thoroughly abides by its international obligations towards Pyongyang within the Security Council’s resolutions.

Earlier in the day North Korean Foreign Ministry said in a statement distributed by the Korean media that friendship between Russia and North Korea will only strengthen in the future, and the United States will face a “powerful and coordinated response” if it attempts to disrupt stability in the region.“Relations of friendship and cooperation between two countries – Korea and Russia, striving for independence, peace and friendship, will unshakably strengthen and develop, and any attempts by the United States and its satellites aimed at disrupting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region will face a powerful and coordinated response from independent sovereign states,” the statement said. It said the US administration should get used to the “new realities of Korean-Russian relations.”


Notes:

[i] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun, “Ongoing Arms Transfer Activity at Najin Port,” Beyond Parellel, CSIS, 17 October 2023. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/ongoing-arms-transfer-activity-at-najin-port/

 [ii] Jeff Schogol, “Russia is hammering Ukraine with up to 60,000 artillery shells and rockets every day,” Taks and Purpose. 13 June 2022. https://taskandpurpose.com/news/russia-artillery-rocket-strikes-east-ukraine/

[iii] Dara Massicot, “Putin’s Cannon Fodder: Foreign Affairs Interview,” Foreign Affairs, 2 November 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D2sUEB_rRhA

[iv] The shipment came shortly before the leaders of Russia and North Korea met for five hours at Russia’s Vostochny Spaceport, according to TASS, the Russian News Agency. See: Five hours at Vostochny Spaceport: Putin, Kim Jong Un meet again four years later,” TASS (Russia’s main state news agency), 13 September 2023. https://tass.com/politics/1674459: The satellite imagery is further backed up by recent analysis by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) that found that two Russian vessels made at least five round trips between North Korea and Russia, believed to be arms transfers. See: Song Sang-Ho, “2 Russian ships made 5 trips between N. Korea, Russia since mid-Aug. in suspected arms transfers,” YonHap News Agency (South Korea’s leading news agency) 17 October 2023. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20231017000351315

 [v] Theodore Postol of MIT suggests that Russia also had supplied North Korea with the Topol-M ICBM, the basis for its solid-fuel Hwasong-18 missile. See: Theodore Postol, “The Transfer of a Russian ICBM to North Korea?” Beyond Parallel, 17 August 2023. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/the-transfer-of-a-russian-icbm-to-north-korea/

[vi] Simon Hutagalung, “Russia and North Korea relations in transition,” Korea Times (English-language newspaper in Seoul), 5 November, 2023. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2023/11/137_362456.html

[vii] Anastasia Kostina, “Учения обстоятельств: США и Южная Корея отработают оборону от КНДР (Exercises of circumstances: the United States and South Korea will practice defense against the DPRK: How Pyongyang and Beijing react to the maneuvers of Washington and Seoul),” Izvestia (Russian news outlet), 30 October 2023. https://iz.ru/1596255/anastasiia-kostina/ucheniia-obstoiatelstv-ssha-i-iuzhnaia-koreia-otrabotaiut-oboronu-ot-kndr


Image Information:

Image: Meeting of Russian and North Korean Defense Ministers at Sunan International Airport in Pyongyang on 25 July 2023.
Source: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Meeting_of_Russian_and_North_Korean_Defense_Ministers_(2023)_01.png
Attribution: CCA 4.0