Category Archives: Perspectives

Beyond Borno: Islamic State’s Expansion into Southern Nigeria (Jacob Zenn) (February 2024)

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  • Key Takeaways:
  • Although the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) has historically been deeply
    rooted in northeastern Nigeria, recent patterns demonstrate that it is expanding operations
    to the more economically prosperous and majority Christian south.
  • The most plausible explanations for ISWAP’s move south are to “outbid” the rival Sunni
    Muslim Group for Preaching and Jihad (JASDJ); to follow Islamic State (IS) “core” directives
    to attract attention by attacking Christians and other high-profile targets; and to divert
    the Nigerian army’s attention from the north and relieve counterterrorism pressure near
    ISWAP’s main bases.
  • Beyond these heightened risks, ISWAP’s southern expansion threatens U.S. interests in
    Nigeria, Nigeria’s national security, and West African security more broadly

Chinese-Tajikistani Security Cooperation Gaining Momentum (Matthew Stein and Peter Wood) (January 2024)

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Key Takeaways:

  • China and Tajikistan share a 477km border and have an estimated $1.78 billion in bilateral trade, which is significantly imbalanced in favor of China.
  • Recent years have seen a significant improvement in relations between China and Tajikistan, with China constructing a military base in 2016 near Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan and a November 2022 bilateral agreement to increase security cooperation.
  • China’s security cooperation with Tajikistan does not appear to conflict or cause friction with Tajikistan’s main security cooperation partner, Russia, but nevertheless advances Chinese interests in the region at a time when Russian support is limited due to its invasion of Ukraine.

The People’s Liberation Army’s Evolving Close Air Support Capability (Kevin McCauley) (January 2024)

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This monograph examines PLA close air firepower support based on authoritative PLA sources including internal publications, as well as PRC aviation industry research. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF), Army Aviation, and unmanned aerial vehicle close air firepower support, command and control, and the firepower support process are examined.

Turkey as a Drone Superpower: A Case Study of a Mid-Size Power Driving the Operational Environment (Karen Kaya) (March 2023)

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Turkey has emerged as a drone superpower on the world stage. In just the past few years,
Turkey has become one of a select group of countries in the world that can produce, use
and export armed drones extensively, trailing only the United States, Israel, and China.
• Turkey’s innovative use of its cost-effective Bayraktar TB-2 drone involves using drone
squadrons effectively as a mobile air artillery, thereby achieving overmatch by emphasizing
quantity over quality. This strategy has impacted geopolitical outcomes in several regional
conflicts, and has provided a strategy for middle sized powers to emulate. Several such
powers—including Ukraine, Poland, Azerbaijan—are buying these cost-effective systems
from Turkey with a view to do so. Other midsize countries with limited defense budgets
are likely to replicate this approach, changing the nature of local conflicts and even the
calculations of larger observing nations.
• Drones and anti-aircraft technologies that merge ISR with strike capabilities will increasingly
impact the trajectories of conflicts. The entry barriers to these technologies are falling,
making it easier for geopolitical issues to turn to war.

The Evolutionary Russian View of Peacekeeping as Part of Modern Warfare (Matthew Stein) (March 2023)

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Russia views peacekeeping operations as a part of warfare, specifically that they can be
utilized to achieve strategic objectives beyond conflict resolution
• Russia’s past peacekeeping operations have shown how these involved ending the conflict
as quickly as possible and enforcing terms of any cease-fire agreement, including taking
action that favored one of the belligerents as long as Russia remains in the dominant position
• Russia’s Nagorno-Karabakh peacekeeping operation ended a conflict and helped the
Russian government maintain influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States with
a Russian military detachment in place for the foreseeable future, which can help explain
how conflicts involving Russia are likely to end.

Cultivating Joint Talent: PLA Education and Training Reforms (Kevin McCauley)(February 2023)

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Cultivating joint command talent and promoting realistic and complex joint training at
    the campaign and tactical levels is critical to the successful implementation of integrated
    joint operations, transformation efforts, and enhancing the People’s Liberation Army’s
    [PLA] overall combat capabilities. The PLA is implementing a “Triad” military education
    program to address problems with joint talent and training.

  • The implications for the PLA of successful implementation of joint talent cultivation and
    improving joint training are significant for reaching its goal of an advanced military. While
    the PLA’s transformation will likely be a lengthy process, the PLA can still present a lethal
    opponent with its precision long-range strike and information warfare capabilities.

  • The PLA’s modernization effort faces the complex task of integrating mechanized warfare,
    informationized warfare, and intelligent warfare systems and operational methods into the
    force concurrently. Reported difficulties educating officers and staff for informationized
    warfare raise questions about the PLA’s ability to integrate fully intelligent warfare
    technologies and operational methods into the force.

People’s Liberation Army: Army Campaign Doctrine in Transition (Kevin McCauley) (January 2023)

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The PLA develops generic offensive, defensive, and special conditions campaign models
    to support planning and training for operational scenarios it believes are relevant to
    potential conflicts. These generic campaigns provide planning factors, force organization,
    and operational methods for combat.

  • The choice of campaigns reveals that Taiwan and Indian conflict scenarios are the key
    scenarios for which the PLA is planning and training.

  • Some of the campaigns do not appear to represent operational situations the PLA is likely
    to face in the near to mid-term.

  • PLA doctrinal change is evolutionary, and in the past slow. The available PLA sources on
    Army doctrine appear to show incremental change to date due to developing technologies
    such as artificial intelligence or research on operational methods exhibited in recent foreign
    conflicts such as the United States military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“The Islamic State’s “African Turn”: Why the African Continent Is Showing Outsized Importance for IS” (Jason Warner) (November 2022)

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The Islamic State Central is increasingly publicizing the achievements of its affiliated African
    provinces, leading to what the FMSO’s Foreign Perspectives Brief authors call “The Islamic
    State’s African Turn.”
  • The authors detail six potential benefits that IS Central might gain with such an “African
    Turn,” as well as what downsides might also accompany such a turn.
  • Overall, the authors assess that the Islamic State’s African Turn is likely more tied to
    temporary successes of African provinces than it is an attempt to change the Middle Eastern
    character of the group.

“Russia On The Nature Of Future Conflict: Is This An Opening Discussion Of Russia’s New Military Doctrine?” by Timothy Thomas and Harold Orenstein (May 2021)

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

The 1983 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Soviet Union stated that military doctrine “contains two closely interlinked and interdependent aspects—a socio-political aspect and a military-technical aspect.”1 The socio-political aspect contains the greatest stability while the military-technical aspect encompasses matters directly pertaining to military organizational development and technical equipment. It helps determine the forms and methods for conducting operations.2

Likewise, the dictionary states that the character/nature of war is composed of socio- political and military-technical components (the 2007 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, Moscow: Eksmo, did not define the term). The socio-political aspect includes economic and socio-political causes, conflicts which led to war’s occurrence, class thrusts and political aims of belligerents, and the degree to which these aims are in conformity with social progress. This character of the socio- political component may change during a war’s course. The military-technical component of war’s character includes conventional and nuclear military hardware, the forms and methods of the conduct of military operations, and the scope, scale, and duration of war.3 While dated, the definitions offer most of the basic elements of these concepts today. Even though the article that follows is about the nature of future conflict, it should be kept in mind that the analysis is also about how Russian military authors may be sizing up their next version of military doctrine.

“The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense” by Les Grau and Charles Bartles (May 2021)

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

In the practice and application of historical analysis, the Russian General Staff closely examines details of past conflicts – noting what they learned and even unlearned – to keep their military science and training forward-looking. Maneuver defense is one of those lessons. Russia’s strategic defense Russia and the Soviet Union fought successful major wars using strategic defense and withdrawal. Russia defeated Napoleon by initially conducting a strategic defense and multiple withdrawals, followed by decisive counterstrokes.1 Up to his invasion of Russia, Napoleon’s strategy proved superior to that of his enemies and his operations were primarily offensive. Napoleon was often successful in surrounding an enemy army or defeating it in one decisive battle and then occupying its capital city and taking charge of the country.2 Russia defeated Napoleon’s invasion by losing battles, yet maintaining and rebuilding its army throughout successive retreats. As the army retreated, the Russians set fire to their own crops and villages, leaving scorched earth behind. Napoleon seized Moscow, yet Russia still refused to surrender and soon flames consumed Moscow. Napoleon had reached his culminating point, and his supply lines stretched to breaking. Russia was fighting a strategy of “war of attrition,” whereas Napoleon was fighting a strategy of “destruction.”