Tag Archives: Global Operational Environment

Gaza War’s Impact On The Middle East Strategic Landscape (Lucas Winter)(June 2024)

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Key Takeaways:

  • Three de facto strategic coalitions dominate the contemporary Middle East geopolitical landscape: the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance,” the Turkish-led “Political Islam Coalition,”
    and the U.S.-led “Arab Normalization” Coalition, anchored by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Hamas fits uneasily between the Axis of Resistance and Political Islam Coalitions, receiving
    tepid support from both but fully trusted by neither. The Arab Normalization Coalition does not support Hamas.
  • Members of the three de facto strategic coalitions responded differently to Hamas’ 7 October attacks and their aftermath: “Axis of Resistance” members contributed calculated, largely symbolic military support; the Political Islam Coalition supported Hamas in media and diplomacy; and the Arab Normalization Coalition sought to maintain a neutral distance from the war in Gaza.
  • Prior to 7 October, the Middle East was in the midst of a new era of regional détente, in which members of the different de facto strategic coalitions were re-engaging and de-escalating their conflicts. The War in Gaza shifted the regional strategic calculus in ways that are not yet clear. Three scenarios are presented for how these changes may occur, and how China and Russia may seek to benefit from them. The first scenario involves increased Turkish-Iranian policy convergence, the second a deepening of Turkish-Egyptian relations, and the third a “grand bargain” that includes Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey. Russia is more likely to benefit from the first two scenarios, while China is likely to benefit most from the third.

India’s Plan To Counter China and Sustain Maritime Sphere of Influence

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The Indian Navy has been deployed in in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and Gulf of Aden, but the former is increasingly seeing competition with China.

“Modi government’s strategy [is] to use [Indian] island territories to project power in the Indo-Pacific in support of maritime security of the region.”

As China seeks to gain more prominence in the Indian Ocean, India is pushing back with a number of its own efforts to sustain its sphere of influence. According to the excerpted article from the Indian nationalist publication Hindustan Times, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh recently announced the inauguration of naval bases, which will be on islands in the Indian territory of the Lakshadweep archipelago, near the states of the Maldives and Sri Lanka. The article describes the bases as a “game-changer” and notes how they are part of a broader strategy of the Modi administration to project power into the Indo-Pacific. Specifically, according to the article, India seeks to counter the Chinese Navy and make it “think twice” about hostile actions towards India.

India considers China’s “String of Pearls” strategy in the Indian Ocean as an attempt to encircle and contain India, including with Chinese naval bases in Cambodia, Sri Lanka, [i] and Pakistan and a port in Myanmar, which can be converted to a base in the future. China can use naval bases to monitor India’s Navy and naval training exercises and, in the event of war, strike Indian ships capable of firing nuclear weapons, which would limit India’s nuclear deterrent.[ii] China claims that India is exaggerating the threat from China and is interfering in the sovereignty of India’s neighbors in the Indian Ocean, such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives, by pressuring them to disallow even Chinese “scientific research vessels”[iii] to dock at their ports.[iv] However, India disregards China’s claims. Rather, to meet the threat India perceives from China, the least India can do is to increase own naval bases to match, if not necessarily even exceed, the Chinese port and base presence in the Indian Ocean. India considers the Indian Ocean its own sphere of influence and is, therefore, building up its naval infrastructure to meet its security needs.

Sources:

“India to build naval bases in Agatti and Minicoy Islands,” Hindustan Times (Delhi-based weekly covering issues in India and around the world from nationalist angles),14 January 2024. hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-to-build-naval-bases-in-agatti-and-minicoy-islands-101707884042309.html

After Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Lakshadweep, India has decided to firmly extend its naval footprint by establishing naval bases in Agatti and Minicoy Islands along with air bases in order to secure the vital sea lanes of communication.

This decision dovetails into Modi government’s strategy to use its islands territories to project power in the Indo-Pacific in support of maritime security of the region. The geographical location of Lakshadweep and Minicoy Islands and the Andamans and Nicobar Islands is such that India can safeguard the maritime trade routes while countering the challenge of rapidly expanding Chinese Navy and their supplicants in the Indian Ocean…. Such level of force projection has never been seen in the past and will make the adversary [China] and its supplicants think twice before playing mischief in the Indian Ocean region.

Notes:

[i] An overlooked reason why China has gained increasing influence in Sri Lanka is that India’s domestic Tamil population has exerted pressure on India’s government to pressure the Sri Lankan government on treating Tamil civilians better during the civil war and in Sri Lanka. Although India did not directly intervene, it “warned” Sri Lanka about its human rights conduct, while the U.S suspended aid to Sri Lanka for its human rights violations. China, in contrast, took advantage of the situation to offer crucial aid, armaments, and diplomatic support to the Sri Lankan government without any criticism of its human rights record. See A. Jathindra, “Revisiting Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy Balance under the Shadow of the Space Dragon,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, July-August 2023. https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/28/2003270082/-1/-1/1/JATHINDRA_COMMENTARY.PDF

[ii] See, for example, Firstpost.com, “’String of Pearls’: How China-made Kyaukphyu Port in Myanmar threatens India’s nuclear attack submarine base,” 8 January 2024, https://www.firstpost.com/world/string-of-pearls-how-china-made-kyaukphyu-port-in-myanmar-threatens-indias-nuclear-attack-submarine-base-13588512.html.

[iii] The Washington D.C-based think tank, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), from 2020 to 2024, 64 Chinese “oceanographic missions” using “research vessels” were observed from satellite imagery, and 80% of them “demonstrated suspect behavior or possessed organizational links suggesting their involvement in advancing Beijing’s geopolitical agenda.” Indis would, therefore, rightly be suspicious of their activities in the Indian Ocean. See “China’s Research Vessels Carry Out Covert Missions for PLA,” The Maritime Executive, 14 January 2024. https://maritime-executive.com/article/study-china-s-research-vessels-carry-out-covert-missions-for-pla

[iv] See, for example, “印度海军潜艇到访斯里兰卡，印媒炒作“击败中国 (Indian navy submarine visits Sri Lanka, and Indian media exaggerates defeating China),” guancha.cn (privately owned Chinese-language website with nationalist tendencies), 5 February 2024. https://www.guancha.cn/internation/2024_02_05_724626.shtml

Image: The Indian Navy has been deployed in in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and Gulf of Aden, but the former is increasingly seeing competition with China
Source: Government of India https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Indian_Navy_QRT_deployed_in_North,_Central_Arabian_Sea_and_Gulf_of_Aden.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Inaction on Gaza Underscores “Arab Street’s” Presumed Powerlessness

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Jordan map showing major cities as well as parts of surrounding countries.

“Gaza not only exposed the failure of the Arab and Islamic regimes in its historical test, but also exposed the silent failure of their peoples, revealed their deteriorating reality, and their weak and shameful positions, and carried the corpse of Arabism to its final resting place.”

“The Arab Street”—a broad term referring to Arab civil society sentiment—is strongly and uniformly opposed to Israeli actions in Gaza, according to several reputable opinion polls.[i] Yet, there has been little to no domestic popular pressure on Arab governments to take meaningful steps to curtail the Israeli campaign.[ii] The first two accompanying excerpts, from the pro-Palestinian daily al-Quds al-Arabi and the pro-Palestinian news website al-Rai al-Yaum, illustrate a perspective that considers the Palestine issue as primarily an Arab—rather than Muslim or nationalist—affair. By this view, the lack of Arab support for Palestine is a simultaneous indictment of Arab governments and the Arab public, both of which are seen as weak and powerless. This state of affairs, one of the authors remarks, has had the effect of “[carrying] the corpse of Arabism to its final resting place.” The assumed powerlessness of Arab citizens and their governments notwithstanding, the “Arab Street” is nevertheless seething. Scenes from Gaza continue flooding traditional and social media, broadcasting what the third accompanying excerpt, also from al-Quds al-Arabi, describes as “a live, terrible, and heartbreaking picture.” Arab governments’ denunciations and symbolic actions against Israel have not turned the Arab public’s focus away from Gaza, which remains a topic of daily discussion. Among Arab governments, Jordan is arguably the most vulnerable to popular pressure due to its large Palestinian population and shared border with the West Bank. The fourth accompanying article, from the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, explains in detail the balancing act played by the Jordanian government, which is seeking to placate popular pressure to push back against Israel without enflaming the situation or otherwise “[raising] the ambitions of the angry street.” There is no indication that Gaza will fade from the center of Arab public discourse anytime soon. The relative quiescence of Arab publics and governments vis-à-vis the conflict, therefore, should not obscure the continued pressures that are building on both to take meaningful action as the conflict in Gaza drags on.

Sources:

العدوان على غزة وغياب الصوت العربي الرسمي “The aggression against Gaza and the absence of an official Arab voice,” al-Quds (pro-Palestinian daily), 26 January 2024. https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1

There is no significant influence of Arab activity on the aggression and other things taking place in Gaza…

The Arab Street does not know how this issue is being discussed between Arab leaders and officials, with their counterparts in the world or among themselves, other than what their media circulates about rejection, denunciation, and repudiations, or descriptions of international impotence without holding themselves accountable for this impotence …

Officially, all Arabs reject the aggression that Gaza is being subjected to, and everyone rejects the occupation’s plans, from destruction to displacement to killing. However, the Palestinians have not witnessed any Arab actions to prevent these plans from occurring…

غزة تشيع الشارع العربي إلى مثواه الأخير “Gaza brings the Arab street to its final resting place,” Rai al-Youm (Pro-Palestinian news website), 8 December 2023. https://www.raialyoum.com/%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D9%8A/

Gaza not only exposed the failure of the Arab and Islamic regimes in its historical test, but also exposed the silent failure of their peoples, revealed their deteriorating reality, and their weak and shameful positions, and carried the corpse of Arabism to its final resting place.

غزة تمثل مأزقا للنظام العربي وسط تململ الشارع الغاضب واحتمالات عودة الإسلاميين “Gaza represents a dilemma for the Arab regime amid the angry street restlessness and the possibilities of the return of the Islamists,” al-Quds (pro-Palestinian daily), 2 December 2023. https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AB%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84/

But the greatest repercussions of the Gaza war are brewing in Arab countries whose screens have not stopped broadcasting a live, terrible and heartbreaking picture of what is happening in the Gaza Strip. The plight of the Palestinians has become part of dialogues on social media platforms and meetings over dinner and in the workplace. This all despite the efforts made by Arab countries to denounce what Israel is doing in Gaza and show political, diplomatic and humanitarian support for the Palestinians in the form of relief convoys, field hospitals, and tolerance for protests. However, the Arab street is seething with anger at the situation, and sometimes uses demonstrations of solidarity with the Palestinians, as it has in the past, to express grievances against the ruling regimes.

الغضب الشعبي والرسمي يكشف مخاوف الأردنيين “Popular and official anger reveal Jordanian fears,” al-Sharq al-Awsat (Saudi daily), 1 December 2023. https://aawsat.com/%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%82/%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B9/4702941-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%B6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86

The inevitability of the intensification of the war on Gaza, and the possibilities of expanding the scope of the current conflict in the Palestinian territories to the West Bank, are real Jordanian fears that are revealed with daily developments…

Indeed, analysts do not disagree that there is a sharp division among the official elites in their assessment of the situation. There are fears that the statements of Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi will raise the ambitions of the angry street, especially after he described the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty law as “a document on a shelf with dust” …

On the other hand, traditional elites called for “early recognition of an imminent danger.” The statements of former representatives and ministers Mamdouh Al-Abadi and Samir Al-Habashna and academic Sabri Rabihat received wide popular acceptance when they called on various occasions to “arm the Jordanian people” and prepare public opinion “for a possible military confrontation with Israel, which does not adhere to the values of the peace treaty with Jordan, and is even trying to tamper with it” …

An unknown future awaits Amman on its western border with the occupying state…

Notes:

[i] These polls also generally express strong disapproval of U.S. support for Israel and general approval of the actions of Iran-backed “Resistance Axis” members in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. The polls include:

“Wide public support for Hamas’ offensive on October the 7th, but the vast majority denies that Hamas has committed atrocities against Israeli civilians,” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 13 December 2023. https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/963

“How the Israel-Hamas War in Gaza Is Changing Arab Views,” Arab Barometer, 14 December 2023. https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/how-the-israel-hamas-war-in-gaza-is-changing-arab-views/ 

“New Poll Sheds Light on Saudi Views of Israel-Hamas War,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21 December 2023. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-poll-sheds-light-saudi-views-israel-hamas-war

“Arab Public Opinion about the Israeli War on Gaza,” Doha Institute, 10 January 2024. https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/arab-opinion-war-on-gaza-press-release-en.pdf

[ii] Some protests have occurred in Arabic-speaking countries, but none has been significant or created any meaningful pressures on governments. For Palestinian support in North Africa see: Jason Warner, “North African Wave of Support for Palestinians at Onset of Israel-Hamas War,” OE Watch, 01-2024.  https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/north-african-wave-of-support-for-palestinians-at-onset-of-israel-hamas-war/

Image Information:

Image: Jordan map showing major cities as well as parts of surrounding countries.
Source: https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/jordan/map
Attribution: Public Domain

Sudanese Leader Sees Rwandan Model for Post-Conflict Sudan

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RSF-fighters-cross-Hantoub-bridge-after-the-withdrawal-of-the-Sudanese-forces-on-December-18-2023

“The war our country is experiencing today must be the last war.”

On 6 January, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the leader of the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) (a paramilitary force formerly overseen by the Government of Sudan which has since defected), known as “Hemedti,” wrote the excerpted post in Arabic language on X (formerly Twitter) about his trip to Rwanda to meet President Kagame, and visit the Genocide Memorial Museum in Kigali. Hemedti’s remarks about the trip framed his own objectives in Sudan as mirroring those he perceives Kagame has achieved in Rwanda. Hemedti stated that Rwandans faced their problems after their civil war and genocide with courage and found radical solutions, such as gacaca,[i] which Hemedti compared to judiya,[ii] or traditional mediation, in Darfur, Sudan. It appears Hemedti is open to an elder council in Sudan that would oversee conflict resolution in the country but, the council would ensure Hemedti’s paramilitary faction retaining power over the rival Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).[iii]

Hemedti was initially seen as the underdog in the conflict with the SAF, Sudan’s officially recognized Army. However, his fighters’ brutal guerilla warfare tactics, honed when they operated as the notorious janjaweed in Darfur in the 2000s, have outmaneuvered the more conventional SAF. Moreover, Hemedti’s and his fighters’ humble beginnings—at least until they began monopolizing gold and other resource-rich mines in Darfur—may have endeared them to sectors of the embattled Sudanese population, which views the SAF as hopelessly corrupt and elitist and a continuation of the now-defunct Islamist regimes of previous decades. Hemedti added during his visit to Kigala that the ongoing Sudanese civil war must be the country’s “last war” and the experiences of other countries, particularly Rwanda, where Kagame has remained in power since the end of the Rwandan civil war, could inform Sudan’s own next steps. Hemedti’s remarks come as the Arabic-language website of the British newspaper, The Independent, published the second excerpted article about the SAF’s rejection of an invitation to attend the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s East African Summit in Uganda, which would involve mediation between the SAF and RSF. The article notes the RSF would be negotiating with the SAF from a position of strength having continuously seized territory in Sudan. This may be why Hemedti has been touring Rwanda, among other East African nations, in anticipation of the RSF’s taking control of more parts of Sudan. Further, Hemedti is seemingly planning a Rwandan-style post-conflict transitional justice system in Sudan that, like with Rwanda’s Kagame, would see Hemedti remain in power for years to come.[iv]

Sources:

 “زرت اليوم المتحف التذكاري للإبادة الجماعية بالعاصمة الرواندية كيجالي(Today I Visited the Genocide Memorial Museum in the Rwandan Capital, Kigali),” Twitter.com (@GeneralDagllo) (U.S social media website allowing users to freely post text, images, and videos known as “tweets”), 6 January 2024. https://twitter.com/GeneralDagllo/status/1743703088676897259

Today I visited the Genocide Memorial Museum in the Rwandan capital, Kigali. It is one of the most important landmarks in human history, because it witnessed a period of suffering and tragedy…. The Rwandans themselves faced their problems with courage and found radical solutions through the experience of gacaca, which is similar to judiya in Sudan. This system established the principles of transitional justice in society, realized the idea of no impunity, and changed history from division to unity.

We, Sudanese, must learn from Rwanda. The war our country is experience today must be the last war, and we must work to create a fair and sustainable peace for ourselves and for the future for our coming generations. 

“السودان يعلق وساطة “إيغاد” وسط احتدام المعارك” (Sudan suspends IGAD mediation amid increasing battles),” independentarabia.com (Arabic-language website jointly administered by Media Arabia, and The Independent, which focuses on social and humanitarian evens in the Middle East) 16 January 2024. https://www.independentarabia.com/node/538051/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%82-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83

The Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Sudan has suspended its dealings with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) of East African Countries, which has mediated the months-long fighting between the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). IGAD offered to mediate between the army commanders and the RSF.

Notes:

[i] “Gacaca” courts played a role in transitional justice in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide and were known for being community-based and for providing lighter sentences to perpetrators who showed remorse and repentance and sought reintegration into their communities.

[ii] “Judiya” has been the main mechanism for traditional mediation, reconciliation and justice in Darfur, Sudan, where “al-Jaweed,” or respected elders and traditional leaders, engage in third-party mediation with the approval of conflict actors. Although it is yet to be fully established in Darfur, advocates remain optimistic that it could bring a new sense of “humanitarian diplomacy” to that region, see: Yasir Elfatih Abdelrahim Elsanousi, “Traditional Judiya Leaders in Sudan as Actors of Humanitarian Diplomacy: Are They Eligible to Fulfill These Roles in the Darfur Humanitarian Crisis?,” Journal of African Studies and Development, Vol 3 (2), July 2017. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329100692_Traditional_Judiya_Leaders_in_Sudan_as_Actors_of_Humanitarian_Diplomacy_Are_They_Eligible_to_Fulfill_These_Roles_in_the_Darfur_Humanitarian_Crisis

[iii] In Sudan, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which are led by General Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, are in conflict with Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitaries, which are led by “Hemedti.” When al-Burhan became the Sudanese leader after long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir was overthrown in 2019, he failed to rein in and incorporate Hemedti’s RSF into the SAF. This ultimately resulted in a power struggle when, in April 2023, al-Burhan called the RSF a “rebel” movement and formally dissolved it. The two military factions have been at war since then and have received backing from external powers, but as of early 2024, the RSF has the upper hand in the fighting. See: Andrew McGregor, “Gold, Arms, and Islam: Understanding the Conflict in Sudan,” Terrorism Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 9 April 2023. https://jamestown.org/program/gold-arms-and-islam-understanding-the-conflict-in-sudan/

[iv] Besides Rwanda, Hemedti has also met with leaders in Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, Djibouti since the start of the war with the SAF in April 2023.

Image Information:

Image: RSF-fighters-cross-Hantoub-bridge-after-the-withdrawal-of-the-Sudanese-forces-on-December-18-2023
Source: The Sudan Tribune,https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RSF-fighters-cross-Hantoub-bridge-after-the-withdrawal-of-the-Sudanese-forces-on-December-18-2023.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Ecuador Faces Reprisals for Indirect Support to Ukraine

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A Russian military Mi helicopter of the kind Ecuador was prepared to donate to Ukraine.

“The decision unleashed the fury of the Kremlin, which defended the parts sold to Ecuador years ago.”

Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, Latin American and Caribbean countries have been reticent to get involved.[i] Specifically, they have resisted calls to send Russian military equipment stockpiles to support either side of the conflict. For this reason, Ecuador stood out when, following the recent declaration of an “internal armed conflict,” Spanish wire agency EFE reports that President Noboa expressed his country’s desire to trade Soviet-era military equipment for a $200 million security package of new equipment from the United States. This security package is meant to bolster the government’s position in the current domestic security crisis.[ii] The Soviet-era equipment, six Mi-8 [RG1] helicopters, a rocket launcher, and anti-aircraft systems, from previous arms deals with Russia would then be transferred to Ukraine.  To avoid provoking the ire of Russia by signaling overt support for Ukraine’s cause, EFE reports that the Noboa government has referred to this equipment, as inoperative “junk.” Nevertheless, Russia responded angrily and referred to original contracts for the equipment, which allegedly prohibit the export of this equipment to third parties. In addition, following Noboa’s announcement, according to the second excerpted article from the Argentine regional outlet Infobae, Russia’s phytosanitary agency halted imports of Ecuadorian bananas, claiming an uptick in flies. The article also notes that Russia is Ecuador’s second-largest customer for banana exports, and a halt in Russia’s imports of Ecuadorian bananas will hurt Ecuador economically and force it to quickly divert exports to other countries. While the quantity and types of weapons Ecuador plans to send to the United States (and eventually on to Ukraine) will not, by themselves, change Ukraine’s fortunes on the battlefield, the decision is a potential watershed moment for Latin America because its governments have generally pursued a studious policy of “non-alignment,” with several regional leaders declining to send Soviet-era equipment in their stockpiles.[iii] It is possible that Ecuador may pave the way for the region to assist Ukraine despite the threat of economic reprisals.

Sources:

“EE.UU. confirma que equipos soviéticos de Ecuador irán a Ucrania para guerra contra Rusia (The US confirms that Soviet equipment from Ecuador will go to Ukraine for war against Russia),” EFE (Spanish wire agency), 8 February 2024. https://es-us.finanzas.yahoo.com/noticias/ee-uu-confirma-equipos-sovi%C3%A9ticos-215123186.html

The president of Ecuador, Daniel Noboa, described the equipment as ‘scrap’ so his country will receive new equipment worth about 200 million dollars…the Russian government transmitted to the Ecuadorian government its position regarding these supplies, ‘indicating the specific points of the agreements and contracts’ linked to Russian military supplies to Ecuador that the South American nation would violate if it re-exported them.

“Ecuador se ve obligado a buscar nuevos mercados para sus bananas tras el cese de exportaciones a Rusia (Ecuador is forced to look for new markets for its bananas after the cessation of exports to Russia),” Infobae (Argentine regional outlet), 14 February 2024. https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/02/14/ecuador-se-ve-obligado-a-buscar-nuevos-mercados-para-sus-bananas-tras-el-cese-de-exportaciones-a-rusia/ 

The decision unleashed the fury of the Kremlin, which defended the parts sold to Ecuador years ago…The measure ordered by Vladimir Putin will considerably affect Ecuadorian exporters and, consequently, the profits that the Ecuadorian government receives from bananas. Now, Noboa must campaign to relocate one of its top products in the world, outside of nations that interpose their political interests on commercial ones. At the same time, the president continues with his war against gangs, launched in early January, which he hopes to promote with new equipment.

Notes:

[i] For greater detail on how the region has remained “non-aligned,” see: Ryan C. Berg, Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Juliana Rubio, Henry Ziemer, and Rubi Bledsoe, “A Hesitant Hemisphere: How Latin America has been Shaped by the War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 27 February 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/hesitant-hemisphere-how-latin-america-has-been-shaped-war-ukraine

[ii] For more, see: Ryan Berg “Rising Violence Prompts Ecuador To Declare ‘Internal Armed Conflict’,” OE Watch, 02-2024. Need Link

[iii] For more on Latin America’s response to the war in Ukraine, read: Ryan C. Berg, Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Juliana Rubio, Henry Ziemer, and Rubi Bledsoe, “Two Years Later: LAC and Russia’s War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 22, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/two-years-later-lac-and-russias-war-ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Russian military Mi helicopter of the kind Ecuador was prepared to donate to Ukraine.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mil_Mi-8MTV-5_Hip_82_yellow_%288587491042%29.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0 DEED

India Looking to Alternative Arms Suppliers Because of Delays From Russia

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The next generation M4 rifle from Swiss Arms, the Sig Sauer SG 516 is a newborn assault rifle manufactured by the SIGARMS GmbH, Switzerland. The rifle is based on an American-made Colt Defense M4 Carbine but combined with gas piston/op-rod system, based on the SIG 550 series system.

“This deficit surfaced visibly in the inability of the Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited (IRRPL) joint venture (JV), instituted in late 2021, to deliver the first batch of around 5,000 AK-203 7.62x39mm rifles to the Indian Army, by March 2024.”

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the impact on the Russian defense industry’s deliveries of weapons and equipment to numerous countries, including India, is well documented.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website The Wire reports on a Russian-Indian joint venture failing to meet an early 2024 delivery deadline of a batch of assault rifles for India’s Armed Forces. While this marked a small item that Russia has failed to deliver to India compared to the larger systems that have been delayed, the article notes that India has already found an alternative. The article reports that the Indian Army recently acquired 73,000 SIG Sauer rifles from the United States, similar to a purchase of SIG Sauer rifles a few years ago to meet a short notice operational requirement.[ii] The article notes delays of a few other Russian systems, including two S-400 [R1] surface-to-air missile systems and two guided missile frigates. India is not likely to quickly find alternatives to the S-400s or frigates, considering the cost and delivery timeline for these types of systems. However, India’s purchase of SIG Sauer rifles shows that it is willing to look for alternative partners whenever possible.

Sources:

Rahul Bedi, “Russian Rifle Delays Raise Concerns Over Deliveries from Moscow,” The Wire (an independent English-language news website), 15 December 2023. https://thewire.in/security/indias-assault-rifle-induction-woes-continue-with-delays-in-indigenous-ak-203-production

Delays in the indigenous licensed manufacture of Russian Kalashnikov AK-203 [R1] assault rifles at a dedicated facility in Korwa near Amethi in Uttar Pradesh, has further raised concerns in domestic military circles over Moscow’s ability to deliver assorted contracted-for platforms and other materiel to India on time, or if at all.

Despite the sanguinity expressed periodically by Russian officials and diplomats to their Indian counterparts – over the fact that their military-industrial complex remained robust and was ‘on stream’ to vindicate its equipment delivery schedules, US-led sanctions on Moscow for invading Ukraine have, in reality severely jeopardised its capacities in this regard.

This deficit surfaced visibly in the inability of the Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited (IRRPL) joint venture (JV), instituted in late 2021, to deliver the first batch of around 5,000 AK-203 7.62x39mm rifles to the Indian Army, by March 2024. Instead, at the Indian Army’s prompting, the Ministry of Defence recently approved the add-on import of around 73,000 ‘Patrol’ Sig Sauer assault rifles from the US…

No official statement on this postponement in supplying the AK-203s to the Indian Army units has been forthcoming, from either IRRPL, the Indian Army or the Ministry of Defence. But industry sources said that the economic and technological sanctions on Russia, were together responsible for deferrals in even an industrially low-end project entailing the licensed manufacture of assault rifles. The IRRPL was formed, amidst much fanfare, to manufacture some 750,000 AK-203 rifles…

Russia’s defence industrial complex seems to concur, as it recently conceded its inability in continuing to deliver military kit to its many clients, including India, as it needed to prioritise ‘manufacturing and supplying products to the Russian Army’…

Meanwhile, apart from the deferred AK-203 project, India has three other major Russian platforms on order, all of which were plagued by delays, and possibly an ambiguous future.

These included the delivery of two of five Almaz-Antey S-400 Triumf self-propelled surface-to-air missile systems, acquired for the Indian Air Force (IAF) in a deal signed in October 2018 for $5.5 billion, constructing two Project 1135.6M Admiral Grigorovich guided missile frigates worth an estimated $950 million at Russia’s Yantar Shipyard at Kaliningrad…Between 2021 and March 2023 Russia had delivered three S-400 systems, and Rosonboronexport’s Mikheyev had recently told the country’s state-owned news agency TASS, that the remaining two air defence systems would arrive by end-2023, which has not happened…

Notes:

[i] For more information on Russian military equipment delays to India since the war in Ukraine began, see: Matthew Stein, “India Takes a Step Away from the Russian Defense Industry,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 31 July 2023. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3475660/india-takes-a-step-away-from-the-russian-defense-industry/

[ii] See: Matthew Stein, “Bypassing the “Make in India” Initiative,” OE Watch, May 2020. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-21393-00-00-00-35-96-47/2020_2D00_05_2D00_01-Bypassing-the-_1C20_Make-in-India_1D20_-Initiative-_2800_Stein_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true

Image Information:

Image: The next generation M4 rifle from Swiss Arms, the Sig Sauer SG 516 is a newborn assault rifle manufactured by the SIGARMS GmbH, Switzerland. The rifle is based on an American-made Colt Defense M4 Carbine but combined with gas piston/op-rod system, based on the SIG 550 series system.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SIG_SG_516_14.5%E2%80%B3.jpg
Attribution: CCA 3.0

Venezuela’s Maduro Regime Threatens Annexation of Guyanese Territory

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Maduro pushed the December 3rd referendum, partially as a distraction from his abysmal poll numbers.

“The Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, ordered the immediate exploration and exploitation of oil, gas and mines in the territory of Essequibo, an area in dispute with Guyana, just one day after the ‘yes’ victory was announced in the referendum that claimed sovereignty over the territory.”

In December 2023, the Maduro regime of Venezuela oversaw a referendum about a long-disputed region called the Essequibo, which represents more than two-thirds of neighboring Guyana’s territory.[i] The Essequibo region—roughly the size of the state of Florida—has been administered by Guyana for more than 100 years, according to an arbitral award in Paris in 1899. The Maduro regime announced that 95 percent of Venezuelans who voted approved all five questions on the referendum.  This included an explicit rejection of the recent jurisdiction granted to the International Court of Justice upon referral of the case by the UN’s Secretary General, as well as a commitment by the Venezuelan state to recover the territory by all means necessary “within the law.”[ii] Accordingly, the first excerpted article from Chilean news outlet La Nación reported that Maduro announced the creation of a new Venezuelan state called Guayana Esequiba, constituted by the territory of Essequibo. Maduro followed the announcement by encouraging state-owned enterprises to exploit the natural resources of the Essequibo area, as well as a small mobilization of troops and equipment near the border.[iii] According to La Nación, this has given rise to the possibility of inter-state conflict, a rare worry in Latin America.  However, many countries in the region, as well as Venezuela’s political opposition, have interpreted Maduro’s threats to annex the Essequibo as a domestic ploy aimed at distraction. In the excerpted article from Argentina’s Urgente24, Venezuelan opposition leaders claimed that the referendum was a nationalistic distraction. The outlet says that Maduro is looking for a change in narrative after the recent successes of the country’s opposition, including the election of María Corina Machado, as the unified opposition candidate to face Maduro. Distraction or not, Maduro’s actions have engendered an environment that is rife with possibilities for miscalculation as both sides stake out maximalist positions.[iv]

Sources:

“Maduro propone ley que busca anexar esequibo a Venezuela: Pide explotar recursos naturales (Maduro proposes a law that seeks to annex Essequibo to Venezuela: He asks to exploit natural resources),” La Nación (a Chilean daily with over one hundred years reporting on the region), 6 December 2023. https://www.lanacion.cl/maduro-propone-ley-que-busca-anexar-esequibo-a-venezuela-pide-explotar-recursos-naturales/

The Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, ordered the immediate exploration and exploitation of oil, gas and mines in the territory of Essequibo, an area in dispute with Guyana, just one day after the ‘yes’ victory was announced in the referendum that claimed sovereignty over the territory. Through a government act broadcast on radio and television, the president ordered that they immediately proceed ‘to grant operating licenses for the exploration and exploitation of oil, gas and mines in the entire area of our Guayana Esequiba.’

“Referéndum y nueva ‘Guyana Esequiba:’ Maduro distrae (Referendum and new ‘Guyana Esequiba:’ Maduro distracts),” Urgente24 (an Argentine outlet with both opinion and news) 6 December 2023. https://urgente24.com/mundo/referendum-y-nueva-guyana-esequiba-maduro-distrae-n564799

For her part, the Venezuelan presidential candidate María Corina Machado, who won the opposition primaries and who could dethrone Maduro if there is no fraud, spoke about it…and described it as a distraction from the success of the opposition primaries. ‘It is a way to distract attention from the monumental success that the primaries were and create cohesion in the different sectors of the ruling party around an element that awakens patriotic sentiment but that had a very low participation rate.’

Notes:

[i] For more information and background on the manufactured crisis and Venezuela’s claims, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “The Entirely Manufactured and Dangerous Crisis over the Essequibo,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 December 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/entirely-manufactured-and-dangerous-crisis-over-essequibo

[ii] For more information on the referendum questions and the dispute itself, see: Julia Symmes Cobb, “Explainer: What is the border dispute between Venezuela and Guyana?,” Reuters, 6 December 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/what-is-border-dispute-between-venezuela-guyana-2023-12-06/

[iii] For more information on troop and equipment deployments to the border with Guyana, bolstered with satellite imagery analysis, see: Christopher Hernandez-Roy et al., “Miscalculation and Escalation over the Essequibo: New Insights Into the Risks of Venezuela’s Compellence Strategy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 9, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/miscalculation-and-escalation-over-essequibo-new-insights-risks-venezuelas-compellence.

[iv] In response to the possibility of conflict, Brazil brought both parties to the table on the island nation of St. Vincent, negotiating the Argyle Declaration, which commits both sides to a peaceful resolution of the border dispute. However, the Maduro regime abrogates agreements frequently. For more information on the Argyle Declaration, see: “The Joint Declaration of Argyle for Dialogue and Peace between Guyana and Venezuela,” Government of Barbados, 14 December 2023. https://www.foreign.gov.bb/the-joint-declaration-of-argyle-for-dialogue-and-peace-between-guyana-and-venezuela/.

Image Information:

Image:  Maduro pushed the December 3rd referendum, partially as a distraction from his abysmal poll numbers.
Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/125816678@N05/39329361431 
Attribution: Flickr, CC BY-NC 2.0 DEED

Israel’s Operation in Gaza Compounding Logistical Delays for India’s Armed Forces

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Indian Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the India-Israel Business Summit, in New Delhi on January 15, 2018

“Consequently, in light of the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and now in Gaza, Russia and Israel, he warned, could well end up either failing to meet India’s numerous materiel requirements or delaying deliveries interminably.”

Two months after Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, India began to experience delays in deliveries of weapons and equipment from Russia. The Israeli operations in Gaza have only compounded the delays.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the independent English-language news website The Wire reports on the ongoing delays of military equipment from not only Russia, but now Israel, as it carries out its Gaza operation. The article examines how two of India’s main suppliers of weapon systems and equipment, Russia and Israel, are currently engaged in conflicts. It also notes how Israel has not provided India with major platforms or systems like Russia has but provided components for various systems as well as different munitions. These components have been implemented into systems of all branches of the Indian Armed Forces making it difficult to quantify the number of Israeli systems in Indian platforms. The author of the article ends by mentioning that Russia’s and Israel’s conflicts could motivate India to pursue alternatives to continue building its defense industry. While the article does not offer specifics on how India will deal with the delays, the situation may push India to seek other partners to find short and long-term solutions to grow the country’s defense industry.

Sources:

Rahul Bedi, “Ukraine and Gaza May Impact Russia and Israel’s Ability to Sustain Materiel Exports to India,” The Wire (an independent English-language news website in India), 14 October 2023. https://thewire.in/security/ukraine-gaza-materiel-exports-to-india

The involvement of India’s two principal materiel providers – Russia and Israel – in their respective wars and conflicts has the potential to impact the inflow of defence equipment supplies into the country, warned a cross-section of service veterans and military analysts.

…This equalled a whopping 55% or so of Russian and Israeli military imports for India…

Retired Brigadier Rahul Bhonsle of the Security Risks Asia consultancy in Delhi said that while the BJP-led government had launched the atamnirbhar initiative to indigenise Indian military needs, Delhi still topped the global list of defence equipment importers.

Consequently, in light of the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and now in Gaza, Russia and Israel, he warned, could well end up either failing to meet India’s numerous materiel requirements or delaying deliveries interminably.

Unlike Russia, Israel does not provide India any major platforms, but supplies critical and innovative force multipliers like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), assorted missile, guidance and avionics systems, precision-guided munitions, diverse sensors and surveillance and targeting radars, amongst other equipment.

Most of this was fitted onto combat aircraft, helicopters, warships, submarines and armoured vehicles.

But such equipment and component diversity made it difficult to quantify the exact or even near-precise percentages of Israeli military equipment in service with India’s armed forces.

…(though) Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza against Hamas was ‘unlikely’ to impact military hardware and spares supplies to India in the short term, they cautioned that an extended conflict could jeopardise deliveries.

…Once diplomatic ties with Israel were instituted under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1992, the two sides fast-tracked their strategic and defence relationship based on mutual security and commercial interests.

Israel, for its part, rightly perceived a commercial opportunity, while India looked upon Tel Aviv as a reliable and ‘no-questions-asked’ materiel provider, especially of varied ammunition and missile systems which India’s military badly lacked, and still does.

Nonetheless, it still took another six-odd years and the BJP’s ascent to power under Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee for Israel’s defence machinery to definitively establish itself in India…

However, it was the 11-week long Kargil war with Pakistan in 1999 that catapulted Israel’s defence industry to centre stage domestically.

As the seriousness of the deadly conflict unfolded, commercially savvy Israel dug deep into its military reserves to supply India high-end hardware, especially badly-needed 155mm rounds for its FH-77B Bofors howitzers, laser-guided munitions and other ordnance that contributed largely to the Pakistan Army vacating the mountainous region’s siege and ending hostilities.

Two decades later, the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) Mirage 2000H fighters in their attack on a Pakistani militant training camp at Balakot in Pakhtunkhwa in February 2019, fired specifically configured Israeli Crystal Maze Mk2 missiles (variants of the Rafael Advanced Defence Systems AGM-142 Raptor Have Nap/Popeye missile)…

…And though India had reduced its dependence on Russia for military equipment by some 33% between 2011 and 2020 in an effort to diversify its network of materiel suppliers, switching entirely to alternate sources was not an option military-planners in Delhi desired, as it entailed colossal expenditure, reworked infrastructure, inordinate delays and doctrinal changes.Perhaps the individual wars in Ukraine and Gaza and the constraints these could impose on Russia and Israel’s ability to export defence equipment may end up providing alternative routes to sustain and modernise India’s military through indigenous efforts.

Notes:

[i] For more information on India’s issues with deliveries of ordnance since the war in Ukraine began, see: Matthew Stein “India Takes a Step Away from the Russian Defense Industry,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 31 July 2023. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3475660/india-takes-a-step-away-from-the-russian-defense-industry/

Image Information:

Image: Indian Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the India-Israel Business Summit, in New Delhi on January 15, 2018
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Prime_Minister,Shri_Narendra_Modi_and_the_Prime_Minister_of_Israel,_Mr._Benjamin_Netanyahu_at_the_India-Israel_Business_Summit,_in_New_Delhi_on_January_15,_2018(2).jpg
Attribution: Government Open Data License – India (GODL)

Niger Sees Wave of International Departures Post-Coup

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Forces Armées Nigeriennes (Niger Armed Forces) personnel complete a training course in February 2020. Following the coup d’état in July 2023, the Nigerien military junta has seen a wave of international departures from the country.

“The regime in Niger…ordered the UN coordinator…to leave it within three days, denouncing in particular the ” obstructions” of the United Nations to its international recognition.”

The military junta that took over Niger in July 2023 is consolidating its power, kicking out numerous international entities, and severing relationships with others. As the first article from the pan-African news aggregator AfricaNews.fr relays, after several contentious months, French troops are leaving Niger via Chad. Soon after the military takeover by General Tiani, Niger began to annul security cooperation agreements with France, which to that point, had relied on Niger as its most reliable ally after being ousted from other African states. When Paris was slow to initiate the request to move its 1,500 soldiers out of the country, the Nigerien government accused France, and other West African states, of colluding to launch an armed intervention to reinstall the ousted president, Mohamed Bazoum.[i] Anti-French sentiment, especially as regards Paris’ role in military and security affairs, has been a marker of the political ethos in West Africa for several years.[ii]

France is not the only entity to be ousted. As per the second article, also from AfricaNews.fr, in mid-October the military junta in Niger demanded the departure of the UN’s country coordinator and its highest-ranking member in the country, Canadian Louise Aubin. The junta decried the “obstructions” that the United Nations had placed on it being an internationally recognized government. Niger’s anti-UN stance is in line with its new ally Mali, which recently demanded the end of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) mission in Mali. The article noted that the absence of a UN coordinator will worsen humanitarian conditions in Mali where an estimated 4.3 million people are in need of humanitarian aid. In addition to the physical departure of French troops and the UN coordinator, other entities in Niger are leaving of their own volition. In October, the United States formally declared the transition of power to be a coup and suspended more than $300 million in aid. Algeria, which has been leading the mediation efforts between the junta and the deposed president, also asserted in mid-October that it would suspend its efforts. In an official statement, Algeria noted that the decision came as “official and public declarations from Nigerien authorities have raised legitimate questions as to their real willingness to follow up on their acceptance of Algerian mediation.” The Prime Minister of the new government in Niger has called the attempts by Algeria “manipulation.”[iii]

Sources:

“Niger: départ des forces françaises en direction du Tchad (Niger: departure of French forces towards Chad),” AfricaNews.fr (pan-African new aggregator), 11 October 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/10/11/niger-depart-des-forces-francaises-en-direction-du-tchad/

French soldiers left their bases in Niger on Tuesday in a first land convoy under local escort, heading “in the direction of Chad” indicated the military regime in power in Niamey since the end of July.

“The troops based in Ouallam (west) left their base today. These are operations for the departure of the first land convoy towards Chad under escort of our Defense and Security Forces,” specifies the regime of Niamey, in a press release read Tuesday evening on national television.

In addition to this departure by land, “three special flights” were recorded at Niamey airport , two for the departure of “97 special forces elements” and one “dedicated to logistics.”

The regime which had assured that it wanted this withdrawal to take place “in complete safety” specified that the disengagement will continue in accordance with “the timetable agreed by both parties.”

The withdrawal of the French was quickly demanded by the Nigerien generals after their arrival in power and French President Emmanuel Macron announced their departure at the end of September.

“Niger: l’ONU “regrette” l’ordre d’expulsion de sa représentante (Niger: the UN “regrets” the order to expel its representative),” AfricaNews.fr (pan-African new aggregator), 12 October 2023. https://www.africanews.com/2023/10/12/niger-the-un-regrets-the-order-to-expel-its-representative/

United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres “deeply regrets” the order to expel the UN coordinator in Niger given by the military regime, which will “hinder” humanitarian operations, his spokesperson said on Wednesday.

This expulsion of Louise Aubin, requested within 72 hours by the regime resulting from a coup d’état in July, “will hinder the ability of the UN to fulfill its mandate and disrupt essential work” in Niger where “4.3 million people need humanitarian aid, mainly women and children,” insisted Stéphane Dujarric, adding that this order was contrary to international rules applicable to United Nations representatives.

The regime in Niger on Wednesday ordered the UN coordinator in this country, Canadian Louise Aubin, to leave it within three days, denouncing in particular the ” obstructions” of the United Nations to its international recognition. He had previously denounced the “perfidious actions” of Secretary General Antonio Guterres for, according to him, hindering the participation of the representative of Niger in this event and “undermining any effort to end the crisis.”

“Crise au Niger: l’Algérie suspend sa mediation (Crisis in Niger: Algeria suspends its mediation),” AfricaNews.fr (pan-African new aggregator), 10 October 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/10/10/crise-au-niger-lalgerie-suspend-sa-mediation/

Algeria announced on Monday that it was “suspending” its mediation intended to put an end to the crisis that has shaken Niger since the takeover by the military…

But the exchanges between the two chancelleries on “the program and content of this visit” were not “conclusive”, added the press release.

Algeria also deplores that “official and public declarations from Nigerien authorities have raised legitimate questions as to their real willingness to follow up on their acceptance of Algerian mediation.”The Prime Minister of Niger, Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine, declared that he had learned of the acceptance of this mediation on social networks, half-heartedly accusing Algeria of “manipulation.”

Notes:

[i] See: Jason Warner, “West African States Split On Potential Intervention In Niger,” OE Watch 08-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-split-on-potential-intervention-in-niger/

[ii] See: Jason Warner, “Anti-French Sentiment Undergirds Overthrow Of Nigerien Government,” OE Watch 08-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/anti-french-sentiment-undergirds-overthrow-of-nigerien-government/; Jason Warner, “French Researchers Respond To Wave Of Anti-French Sentiment In Africa,” OE Watch 07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/french-researchers-respond-to-wave-of-anti-french-sentiment-in-africa/; Jason Warner, “CAR Joins Mali In Accusing France Of Funding Terrorists,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/car-joins-mali-in-accusing-france-of-funding-terrorists/

[iii] “Algeria ‘postpones’ its mediation in Niger”, AfricaNews.com, 10 October 2023. https://www.africanews.com/2023/10/10/algeria-postpones-its-mediation-in-niger//

Image Information:

Image: Forces Armées Nigeriennes (Niger Armed Forces) personnel complete a training course in February 2020. Following the coup d’état in July 2023, the Nigerien military junta has seen a wave of international departures from the country.
Source: https://nara.getarchive.net/media/forces-armees-nigeriennes-niger-armed-forces-personnel-65f554
Attribution:  Public Domain Dedication.

Military Junta Led Sahelian States Create New Collective Security Organization

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The leader of junta currently ruling Mali, COL Assimi Goita, recently tweeted an announcement about the new mutual defense pact between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.

“The military regimes led by Assimi Goïta in Mali, Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso and Abdourahamane Tiani in Niger signed a charter on Saturday establishing a defensive alliance.”

With the string of coups d’état that have engulfed the African continent over the past three years, a steady drumbeat of alliances has been growing among military juntas.[i] As per the article from leading Africa-focused French language publication Jeune Afrique, the increasing amity between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has coalesced into a formalized mutual security cooperation organization. Called the “Alliance of Sahelian States,” the grouping is a defensive alliance that commits each country to respond to the aid of the others in the event of any “attack on the sovereignty or integrity of the territory” of one of its members. Additionally, the Alliance of Sahelian States also includes economic dimensions (likely to help each of the regimes, all of which have faced threats of economic sanctions for unconstitutional transfers of power) and counterterrorism dimensions (as the three collectively constitute the epicenter of jihadist violence undertaken by Al-Qaeda and Islamic State-linked groups).[ii] While Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have been getting closer since 2022 – often with support from Russia[iii] – the real impetus for the formalization of the Alliance of Sahelian States was Niger’s July 2023 coup. In the aftermath, West Africa’s primary regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), threatened to launch a military intervention to restore power to the democratically elected president. This proposal starkly divided West African states, with Nigeria, Benin, and Senegal falling on one side, and Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Algeria, on the other. Mali and Burkina Faso intuitively aligned behind Niger given the vulnerabilities that other military juntas would face if ECOWAS made good on its word. Whether or not the Alliance of Sahelian States is more than a paper tiger remains to be seen. However, the spate of military coups overtaking the region is having serious implications for patterns of alliances and rivalries.

Sources:

“Le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le Niger scellent ‘l’Alliance des États du Sahel’ (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger seal ‘The Alliance of Sahelian States’),” Jeune Afrique (centrist pan-African news outlet), 16 September 2023. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1483586/politique/le-mali-le-burkina-et-le-niger-scellent-lalliance-des-etats-du-sahel/   

The military regimes led by Assimi Goïta in Mali, Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso and Abdourahamane Tiani in Niger signed a charter on Saturday establishing a defensive alliance.This “Charter of Liptako-Gourma” creates “the Alliance of Sahel States” (AES), wrote on X (former Twitter), the head of the junta in Mali, Assimi Goïta. Its goal is “to establish an architecture of collective defense and mutual assistance,” he stressed. The charter provides (art. 6) that “any attack on the sovereignty and integrity of the territory of one or more contracting parties will be considered as an aggression against the other parties and will engage a duty of assistance and relief of all parties, individually or collectively, including the use of armed force to restore and ensure security within the area covered by the Alliance.Since the July 26 coup in Niger, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has maintained a consistent position: the military authorities must “restore constitutional order immediately” by releasing deposed President Mohamed. Bazoum and reinstalling him in his functions. The West African organization has repeatedly threatened armed intervention and imposed heavy economic sanctions on Niger.“This alliance will be a combination of military and economic efforts between the three countries,” Malian Defense Minister Abdoulaye Diop told journalists. “Our priority is the fight against terrorism in the three countries,” he added.

Notes:

[i] For more on the growing ties between these three countries, see: Jason Warner, “’Axis’ of Military Regimes Strengthens In West Africa, With Support From Russia,” OE Watch,09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/axis-of-military-regimes-strengthens-in-west-africa-with-support-from-russia/; Jason Warner, “West African States Split On Potential Intervention In Niger,” OE Watch, 08-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-split-on-potential-intervention-in-niger/; Jason Warner, “West African States Ruled By Military Leaders Seek To Circumvent Future Sanctions,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-ruled-by-military-leaders-seek-to-circumvent-future-sanctions/; Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Leaders In Mali, Burkina Faso, And Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/

[ii] For more on the differing approaches that West African states have taken in dealing with these groups, see: Jason Warner, “As Sahelian Jihadists Expand South, Côte d’Ivoire Stands As Model Of Success,” OE Watch,09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/as-sahelian-jihadists-expand-south-cote-divoire-stands-as-model-of-success/;  Jason Warner, “Sahelian Countries Divided On Negotiating With Al-Qaeda, Islamic State Militants,” OE Watch,07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/sahelian-countries-divided-on-negotiating-with-al-qaeda-islamic-state-militants/; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Claims Disguised Jihadists, Not Military, Responsible For Civilian Killings,” OE Watch, 06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/burkina-faso-claims-disguised-jihadists-not-military-responsible-for-civilian-killings/; Jason Warner, “Vast Majority Of Malians Express Confidence In Russia’s Ability To Address Jihadist Violence,” OE Watch,06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/vast-majority-of-malians-express-confidence-in-russias-ability-to-address-jihadist-violence/

[iii] For more on Russia’s role with these three countries, see: Jason Warner, “’Axis’ of Military Regimes Strengthens In West Africa, With Support From Russia,” OE Watch,09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/axis-of-military-regimes-strengthens-in-west-africa-with-support-from-russia/; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Claims Disguised Jihadists, Not Military, Responsible For Civilian Killings,” OE Watch, 06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/burkina-faso-claims-disguised-jihadists-not-military-responsible-for-civilian-killings/; Jason Warner, “Vast Majority Of Malians Express Confidence in Russia’s Ability To Address Jihadist Violence,” OE Watch, 06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/vast-majority-of-malians-express-confidence-in-russias-ability-to-address-jihadist-violence/; Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Leaders In Mali, Burkina Faso, And Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/

Image Information:

Image: The leader of junta currently ruling Mali, COL Assimi Goita, recently tweeted an announcement about the new mutual defense pact between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
Source: https://t.co/IjT43NHrKs
Attribution: BY-SA 4.0