Monthly Archives: April 2024

Belarus Agrees To Host Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons

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Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko (Left) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (Right) at a joint press conference.

“As a part of the response to possible threats to the military security of our country, we clearly defined and communicated the views of Belarus on the use of the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in our territory.”

Belarus has agreed to allow Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) to be deployed in the country, a decision that has led it to revise its national military doctrine. According to the first excerpted article from Russian state-managed RIA News, presidents Lukashenko and Putin confirmed the successful deployment of Russian TNWs onto Belarusian soil in December 2023. Under the agreement, Russian TNWs in Belarus would remain under Russian control.[i] The placement of these weapons in Belarus would put them close enough to strike NATO members.

As a result of this move, in January 2024, Belarus revised its military doctrine, which is now known as the New Military Doctrine. Belarus’s newly revised military doctrine is unequivocal in declaring the West as an aggressor actively seeking to disrupt the integrity of Belarussian national security. Notably, the New Military Doctrine states that the Russian TNWs are an acceptable means of national defense, citing a willingness to work with Moscow to deploy these weapons against perceived threats from the West. Belarus’s New Military Doctrine underscores its willingness to use TNWs, citing reasons of national security and an explicit list of enemies, including the United States and NATO, with Poland and the Baltic states as its primary adversaries. The excerpted article from Belarus Today, a government publication closely linked to the Belarussian presidential administration, points out that the “Aggressive nature of the military policy of Western nations has ceased to be masked by formulations about the exclusively defensive orientation of their military doctrines. These national and coalition documents establish claims to global and regional dominance. They openly name states that are hostile to them, including Belarus.” For Russia, the move to station TNWs in Belarus has expanded its strategic footprint.[ii] Furthermore, as detailed in the third excerpted article, from the Belarusian state-run media organization BELTA –News of Belarus, Belarus has revised its doctrine to increase its defense by focusing on Belarussian military strategy in the likelihood of escalating conflicts with neighboring states such as Poland. Russia arming its ally with nuclear devices, Belarus revising its military doctrine to allow for deployment of Russian TNWs and explicitly naming enemies serves to further heighten regional tensions, especially between Poland and Belarus.[iii]

Sources:

RIA News, “Лукашенко назвал последствия появления ядерного оружия в Белоруссии (Lukashenko identifies the consequences of the appearance of nuclear weapons in Belarus),” RIA News (One of Russia’s largest state news agencies), 19 January 2024. https://ria.ru/20240119/belorussiya-1922400028.html

In March (of 2023) Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that Moscow and Minsk had agreed to put tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. … In June the President of Russia communicated that in accordance with Belarussian-Russian plans the first nuclear charges had been delivered to Belarus. In December (of 2023), Lukashenko informed journalists that all Russian tactical nuclear weapons, agreed upon by the two countries, had been delivered to the (Belarussian) Republic, and were “in place, in good condition,” and that the military is training daily.

Nikolai Buzin, “На чем сделан акцент в проекте новой Военной доктрины Беларуси (What is the emphasis of the New Military Doctrine of Belarus),” Belarus Today (official government news channel), 24 January 2024. https://www.sb.by/articles/v-mire-uvazhayut-silnykh.html

“As a part of the assessment of trends in the development of the military-political situation (we have) clearly named the sources of military threat to Belarus. (These are) the United States, NATO, Poland and the Baltic nations. In particular, article 9 states that the “aggressive nature of the military policy of Western nations has ceased to be masked by formulations about the exclusively defensive orientation of their military doctrines. These national and coalition documents establish claims to global and regional dominance. They openly name states that are hostile to them…, which includes the Republic Belarus.”

“Какой будет новая Военная доктрина Беларуси. Хренин раскрыл подробности документа (What will be the new Military doctrine of Belarus. Khrenin revealed the details of the document),” BELTA – News of Belarus (official government news channel), 6 January 2024. https://www.belta.by/society/view/kakoj-budet-novaja-voennaja-doktrina-belarusi-hrenin-raskryl-podrobnosti-dokumenta-610049-2024/

Among important innovations, (Viktor Khrenin) describes, for instance, targeting, that is, a clear indication of the sources of military threats to Belarus. At the same time, unlike NATO countries, which in their war documents explicitly name (their) enemies, listing specific countries, Belarus states likely sources of threats. “We expressly name sources of threats and from the countries which they emanate.” – explained Viktor Khrenin. He also brought attention to the strengthened concepts of national security. “For existing challenges of military security there is a clearly formulated line of threats.” The head of the Ministry of Defense explained. “Based on this, we have formulated measures that the state will take in case of risks, challenges, and threats. We have clearly defined what government agencies should do and what functions they will perform. As a part of the response to possible threats to the military security of our country, we clearly defined and communicated the views of Belarus on the use of the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in our territory.”

Notes:

[i] TNWs are designed for the battlefield and can greatly range in impact. A tactical nuclear weapon is any nuclear weapon not classified as “strategic” by U.S.-Russian arms control agreements, such as SALT. For more information, see: “What are ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons?,” The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), https://www.icanw.org/what_are_tactical_nuclear_weapons; Most TNWs have a maximum range of 500km if land-based or 600km if airborne. For additional information, see: “Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW),” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 30 April 2002. https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/tactical-nuclear-weapons/

[ii] Previous reporting notes that the withdrawal of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons would only be negotiable if the United States were to completely withdraw American nuclear arms from the European continent. See: RIA News (one of Russia’s largest state news agencies), 31 July 2023. https://ria.ru/20230731/tyao-1887278977.html

[iii] For the Polish perspective on Belarus’s tactical nuclear weapons, see: Andrezj Wilk and Piotr Zochowski, “Russian nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus: the consequences,” Center for Eastern Studies (Warsaw based think tank) 6 June 2023. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2023-06-06/russian-nuclear-weapons-deployed-belarus-consequences

Image Information:

Image: Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko (Left) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (Right) at a joint press conference.
Source: Kremlin.ru, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66648
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Russia Developing Sixth-Generation Combat Aircraft

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Rendition of BAE Systems Tempest 6th generation fighter.

“Currently, we are thinking about the concept of a sixth-generation aircraft, conducting search research, exchanging views with military specialists. Such an aircraft should appear sometime by 2050, but already now it is necessary to understand what the armed conflicts of the future will be like.” – Evgeny Fedosov, Scientific Director of the State Research Institute of Aviation Systems.”

Russia hopes to have a sixth-generation combat aircraft prototype by 2050, according to the excerpted analysis of a report written by Evgeny Fedosov of the Russian Academy of Sciences published by state news agency TASS.  Sixth-generation aircraft, still in their early phase of development, are expected to have advanced digital features like artificial intelligence (AI) integration and data fusion, as well as other enhanced command, control, and communication (C3) capabilities. The aircraft would be similar to fifth-generation combat aircraft—designed for greater air-to-air capability, battlefield survivability in anti-access/area denial environments, and ground support—but with greater focus on enhanced integration of AI systems and less focus on close-in dogfighting, which is a less common feature of current and future war scenarios.  This is not the first time that the Russians have announced plans to develop a sixth-generation combat aircraft. TASS first reported these developments in 2017[i] and the article touts Russia’s Su-57 [RG1] Felon as “almost” possessing capabilities or easy upgradable features to become a sixth-generation aircraft. These capabilities include supercruise (i.e. sustained supersonic flight without use of an afterburner) and advanced avionics (i.e. an aircraft’s communications, navigation, and flight control systems). 

The second excerpted article from the The EurAsian Times is a commentary on Fedosov’s report. It notes that AI technology will provide the aircraft with advanced digital and C3 capabilities, as well as data fusion and remote or autonomous piloting. Fedosov expects the pilot to be integrated into the airframe, with cockpits and helmet-mounted displays allowing for 360-degree vision similar to the F-35 [RG2] . Stealth, as before, will continue to play a huge role in sixth-generation aircraft capabilities. Several other nations have announced plans to develop sixth-generation combat aircraft to include Turkey[ii] as well as the UK, Italy, and Japan, which announced a joint plan to develop a similarly advanced fighter.[iii] The Russian military’s development of advanced combat aircraft has been notorious for delays, cost overruns, and faulty features evident in the deployment of its fifth-generation Su-57 aircraft. Discussing the aircraft, Fedosov acknowledged the complication of designing future combat aircraft as they become larger, heavier, and costlier to make. The TASS article suggests that the U.S. Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance plan to roll out a sixth-generation combat aircraft to replace its F-22 Raptor fighters by 2030 is unlikely to be eclipsed by the Russians anytime soon.[iv] The report further highlights divisions among the engineers, strategists, and aviators of Russia’s ministry of defense, over which capabilities to emphasize. The main divide is whether to focus on producing fighters designed for beyond visual range engagement or models (not unlike its previous Sukhoi or Mikoyan versions) capable of close-range dogfights, but there is also major disagreement over whether future models should be manned or unmanned.[v]

Sources:

“Боевой самолет шестого поколения может появиться в России к 2050 году (A Sixth-Generation Combat Aircraft may Appear in Russia by 2050),” TASS (Russian state news agency), 25 February 2024. https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/20081017

A sixth-generation combat aircraft may appear in Russia by 2050, now there is an exchange of views with the military regarding its concept. This is written in a column for TASS by the scientific director of the State Research Institute of Aviation Systems (GosNIIAS), Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Evgeny Fedosov.

“Currently, we are thinking about the concept of a sixth-generation aircraft, conducting search research, exchanging views with military specialists. Such an aircraft should appear sometime by 2050, but already now it is necessary to understand what the armed conflicts of the future will be like,” he writes.

Touching upon the design of future aircraft, Fedosov suggested that “to go further according to the logic of complication is a vicious practice.” He also pointed out that combat aircraft are becoming more complex from generation to generation and, as a result, becoming heavier. “And the larger and heavier the plane, the more expensive it is,” the academician concluded.

GosNIIAS is a leading center in the development of on-board aviation systems and equipment. The founder of modeling methods for designing automatic systems of any degree of complexity. The Institute participates in the creation of aircraft at all stages: from the development of the concept of aircraft creation to modernization during operation. 

Ashish Dangwal, “Russia’s 6th-Gen Fighter Jet to be Deployed by 2050; Will not Dump Pilots for Robots – GosNIIAS,” The EurAsian Times (a privately owned digital news site specializing in defense and global news) 26 February 2024. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/russias-6th-gen-fighter-jet-to-be-deployed-by-2050/

According to state media TASS, Russia is actively setting its sights on developing a sixth-generation fighter jet that could be deployed by 2050.

The development was disclosed by Evgeny Fedosov, Scientific Director of the State Research Institute of Aviation Systems (GosNIIAS) and a distinguished member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Fedosov outlined the initiative in a column published by TASS, shedding light on the ongoing discussions and research surrounding the conceptualization of the sixth-generation aircraft.

According to Fedosov, the development process involves extensive consultation and collaboration with military specialists to anticipate the demands of future armed conflicts.

“Currently, we are thinking about the concept of a sixth-generation aircraft, conducting research and exchanging views with military specialists,” he said. Fedosov, however, highlighted a critical concern regarding the design complexity of next-generation combat aircraft, describing it as a potentially “vicious practice.”

He pointed out that with each successive iteration of military aviation, the size and weight tend to increase, inevitably impacting the cost of such equipment.

He also added that the sixth-generation combat aviation group will include both manned aircraft and unmanned vehicles.

“There is an opinion that the air group should be mixed and consist of drones and manned aircraft. Such a mixed park, in principle, can exist,” Fedosov remarked. He said that the size and speed of the drones would enable them to function as wingmen within a group.

Building upon the success of fifth-generation platforms, sixth-generation fighters would be designed to adapt to evolving trends in aerial warfare, where traditional dogfighting scenarios are giving way to long-range engagements utilizing beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile capabilities.

In recent years, numerous countries have declared their intention to embark on the development of indigenous sixth-generation aircraft programs, illustrating a global push toward advancing military aviation capabilities.

The United States Air Force is a key player in this arena, actively advancing its efforts to develop a next-generation fighter jet through the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) stealth fighter program.

Multinational initiatives have also emerged, reflecting a strategic approach to leveraging shared resources and expertise while mitigating development costs.

…

China is also believed to be in the process of developing its sixth-generation fighter jet, having previously demonstrated its capabilities with the construction of the fifth-generation J-20 fighter jet.On the other hand, Russia has encountered difficulties in deploying its stealth fighter jet, the Su-57, in large numbers. Moreover, discussions concerning the development of a sixth-generation fighter jet have previously faced obstacles.

Notes:

 [i] “Russia may upgrade advanced Su-57 aircraft to 6th-generation fighter jet,” TASS, 1 November 2017. https://tass.com/defense/973625

 [ii] Dilara Aslan Ozer, Türkiye starts works on AI-backed 6th-generation fighter jet,” Daily Sabah, 12 January 2024. https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/turkiye-starts-works-on-ai-backed-6th-generation-fighter-jet

[iii] Josh Luckenbaugh, “UK-Italy-Japan Cite Steady Progress Developing Next-Gen Jet Fighter,” National Defense, 30 October 2023. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/10/30/uk-italy-japan-cite-steady-progress-developing-next-gen-jet-fighter

[iv] Ryan Finnerty, “US defense spending bill could expose new details of sixth generation fighter development,” FlightGlobal, 19 December 2023. https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/us-defence-spending-bill-could-expose-new-details-of-sixth-generation-fighter-development/156256.article

[v] Boyko Nikolov, “Su-57 Felon is a step towards the 6th-gen, but Russians are at odds,” BulgarianMilitary.com, 24 November 2023. https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2023/11/24/su-57-felon-is-a-step-towards-the-6th-gen-but-russians-are-at-odds/

Image information:

Image: Rendition of BAE Systems Tempest 6th generation fighter
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BAE_Systems_Tempest#/media/File:Team_tempest.jpg
Attribution: Fair Use

Russian Engineer Troops Gain Assault Combat Mission

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Universal Armored Engineer Vehicle (UBIM)

“The engineer troops are being transformed from a support role into an independent strike force capable of participating in a modern war.”

In most militaries, engineer units are combat enablers (support units) for maneuver units (infantry, armor, etc). Due to Russia’s combat experience in Ukraine, this may be changing, as Russia is envisioning engineer units assuming a combat role, capable of accomplishing independent assault operations in addition to typical engineer missions. The accompanying excerpted article from the Russian newspaper Izvestia attributes this change to the fact that Russian troops have frequently had to assault heavily fortified areas.  The article also delves into how this reform will be implemented, to include organizational changes such as forming “assault detachments” in engineer units and engineer reconnaissance-assault brigades in combined arms armies, as well as the addition of new types of equipment such as the universal armored engineer vehicle. If this effort is perceived as a success, it is possible other militaries will consider emulating such reforms.

Source:

Alexey Mikhailov, Yulia Leonova, Andrey Fedorov, “В дело с техникой: инженерные войска переориентируют на штурмовые действия: Их оснащают боевыми машинами для разведки и разрушения долговременных укреплений (In business with technology: The engineer troops are reoriented to assault operations:), Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 23 January 2024. https://iz.ru/1638123/aleksei-mikhailov-iuliia-leonova-andrei-fedorov/v-delo-s-tekhnikoi-inzhenernye-voiska-pereorientiruiut-na-shturmovye-deistviia

The Russian Ministry of Defense has approved a program to increase the combat capabilities of engineer regiments and brigades – this year they will get new units equipped with specialized assault and reconnaissance equipment…We are talking about universal armored engineer vehicles (UBIM) [Универсальная бронированная инженерная машина (УБИМ)]

From the first months of the special military operation, Russian troops were faced with the need to regularly storm fortified areas of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[i]  Particularly strong field fortifications were encountered in the Donbass that were erected over the course of eight years. This required Russian troops to adapt to new conditions and change tactics. Specialized assault detachments were formed with weapons and equipment to break through enemy defenses. Since last year, the military department decided to scale up this experience and create [engineer] reconnaissance-assault brigades in combined arms armies.In recent years, the Ministry of Defense has been carrying out a large-scale reform of the engineer troops. The engineer troops are being transformed from a support role into an independent strike force capable of participating in a modern war. The actions of the engineers are no longer limited to the construction of field fortifications, route clearance, and bridge building — now they also storm fortified areas, covertly place mines, and quickly conduct ​​explosive ordinance disposal.

Note:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: Universal Armored Engineer Vehicle (UBIM)
Source: https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/Military/ARMY-2021-Static-part-3/i-PfWbh5c/A 
Attribution: Vitaly Kuzmin, CC BY-SA 4.0

Russia Increases Defense Spending for 2024

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Early variant of the 152mm self-propelled gun 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV on parade in Moscow, 2015. The Koalitsiya-SV is set to be fielded in 2024.

“It became clear that a large-scale war requires a lot of equipment. It needs to be constantly improved, adapting to new weapons that the enemy has, damaged vehicles need to be repaired somewhere. And the priority in rearmament shifted towards the army.”

According to the 10 January excerpted article from the Russian state-owned domestic news outlet RIA Novosti, Russia will increase its defense spending in keeping with the release of Russia’s federal budget in October 2023 that dedicated “almost 11 trillion rubles” ($117 billion) to the armed forces.[i] The article notes plans to grow the armed forces by nearly half a million men, while most of the funds will be earmarked for weapons and equipment, whose procurement is informed by lessons learned in Ukraine. The emphasis is on ground forces but includes new spending on air and naval assets. As it articulates: “In recent decades, the ground forces of many countries have been financed on a residual basis—the United States relied on the Air Force and Navy. Russia was no exception in this regard, but the Ukrainian conflict put everything in place.”

Increasing the quantity and quality of its armor, tanks, and artillery is a primary focus, according to the article. Russia will ramp up production of improved variants of the T-90M Proryv [RG1] , T-72B3M [RG2] , and T-80BVM [RG3] main battle tanks. Artillery is also being updated with the introduction of the upgraded 152-mm Msta-S [RG4] self-propelled gun[ii] and the latest Malva [RG5] -wheeled howitzer, which entered service in late 2023.[iii] Russia’s newest artillery system, the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV [RG6] , is projected to be fielded in 2024. The weapon systems and upgrades reflect immediate application of lessons learned from the Ukrainian battlefield. Ukraine seemed to have an edge when NATO-manufactured long-range weapons arrived on the battlefield and Russian units were forced to move their command and logistic lines farther from the front lines. The article notes that the Koalitsiya-SV “will become the longest-range weapon in the Russian Army, able to fire a “high-explosive fragmentation projectile at a range of 40 kilometers, and a guided projectile at 70 kilometers…more than enough [distance] for effective counter-battery warfare.” Drones are also featured in Russia’s defense plans for this year.[iv] The “long-awaited Izdeliye-53, another version of the Lancet [RG7] kamikaze drone,” is projected to be fielded in 2024. Like long-range artillery, the Izdeliye-53 could have an immediate battlefield impact as it is said to have a range of more than 60 kilometers. The much-publicized increase in Russian defense spending, and the types of weapons Russia will field, based on lessons learned in Ukraine, could put additional pressure on Ukraine and its Western partners just to maintain the status quo.

Sources:

Andrey Kots, “Приоритеты на будущее. Чем вооружат армию России в 2024-м (Priorities for the future. What will the Russian army be armed with in 2024?)” RIA Novosti (Russian state-owned domestic news outlet), 9 January 2024. https://ria.ru/20240109/perevooruzhenie-1917044593.html?in=t

… Earlier, back in January 2023, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced an increase in the size of the army to one and a half million people by 2026.

…

At the end of October, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov announced the total amount of defense spending in 2024 – almost 11 trillion rubles. The lion’s share will go to the purchase of military equipment. The domestic defense industry has to work hard: it is necessary to saturate not only new units, but also units on the front line with everything necessary.

“Taking into account additional budgetary allocations in 2024, the volume of purchases and repairs of weapons and military equipment will increase,” Sergei Shoigu said at the end of November. “In the current conditions, it is necessary to ensure an advanced supply of weapons, military and special equipment to the troops, as well as to increase the production capabilities of enterprises military-industrial complex for the production and repair of the most popular models.”

In recent decades, the ground forces of many countries have been financed on a residual basis – the United States relied on the Air Force and Navy. Russia was no exception in this regard, but the Ukrainian conflict put everything in place. It became clear that a large-scale war requires a lot of equipment. It needs to be constantly improved, adapting to new weapons that the enemy has, damaged vehicles need to be repaired somewhere. And the priority in rearmament shifted towards the army.

The Ground Forces will continue to receive modern main battle tanks. First of all, the T-90M Proryv, T-72B3M and T-80BVM, which have proven themselves well in combat. New tanks are significantly different from pre-war ones. They received additional armor, equipment to suppress UAVs, and modern communications equipment. Many are equipped with a factory “visor” – a lattice superstructure over the turret with dynamic protection modules for defense against “roof-killing ATGMs” and kamikaze drones.

Motorized rifle units will receive vehicles, BTR-82A [RG1] armored personnel carriers, BMP-3 [RG2] infantry fighting vehicles and modernized BMP-2M [RG3] . The latter began to enter the troops only in 2020. Their difference from the early “twos” is the Berezhok combat module, equipped with a 30-mm automatic cannon, an automatic grenade launcher, a machine gun and four Kornet ATGMs. The vehicle has an updated fire control system, ensuring round-the-clock use, automatic target tracking and increased shooting accuracy.

The artillerymen will receive 152-mm Msta-S [R4]  self-propelled guns and the latest Malva wheeled howitzers, which first entered service with the troops in the fall of 2023. What’s even more important: next year, the promising self-propelled gun “Coalition-SV,” which the troops have been waiting for a long time, will go into serial production. It will become the longest-range weapon in the Russian army… .In 2024, the long-awaited Izdeliye-53, another version of the famous Lancet kamikaze drone, should go into service with the troops. All that is known about the new UAV is that its range is over 60 kilometers and it will be designed to operate in a “flock.”

Notes:

[i] For more information regarding defense spending within Russia’s new federal budget, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Russia’s Federal Budget Puts Economy on War Footing,” OE Watch, 01-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russias-federal-budget-puts-economy-on-war-footing/

[ii] For a look back at Russian efforts to increase the effective firing range of the Msta, see: Charles Bartles, “New Artillery Rounds Will Extend Russian Artillery Range,” OE Watch, January 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/294224

[iii] The Msta-S is an old system introduced in 1989. For information on recent modifications and upgrades, see: “Artillery of the future: modernization of the ACS 2S19 “Msta-S” and its prospects,” Military Review, 16 December 2023. https://military-review.com/12479016-artillery-of-the-future-modernization-of-the-acs-2s19-msta-s-and-its-prospects; the 2S43 Malva wheeled artillery is also a legacy system but previous Russian claims refer to the new variant as the Russian HYMARS, although the effective range as been disputed. See: Ellie Cook, “What Is 2S43 Malva? Soviet Self-Propelled Howitzer Dubbed ‘Russian HYMARS’,” Newsweek, 17 August 2023. https://www.newsweek.com/russia-military-2s43-malva-howitzer-ukraine-himars-artillery-1820411

[iv] Drones, or UAVs, have become ubiquitous in the war in Ukraine at every level. For additional insight on Russia’s use of drones, see: Charles Bartles, “Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons To Engineer Units,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-plans-to-add-remote-mining-uav-platoons-to-engineer-units/; see also, Dodge Billingsley, “Russia Details Plan To Overcome Military Drone Deficiencies,” OE Watch, 01-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-details-plan-to-overcome-military-drone-deficiencies/

Image Information:

Image: Early variant of the 152mm self-propelled gun 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV on parade in Moscow, 2015. The Koalitsiya-SV is set to be fielded in 2024.
Source: Vitaly Kuzman, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2S35_Koalitsiya-SV – /media/File:9may2015Moscow-35_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA BY-SA 4.0

Inaction on Gaza Underscores “Arab Street’s” Presumed Powerlessness

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Jordan map showing major cities as well as parts of surrounding countries.

“Gaza not only exposed the failure of the Arab and Islamic regimes in its historical test, but also exposed the silent failure of their peoples, revealed their deteriorating reality, and their weak and shameful positions, and carried the corpse of Arabism to its final resting place.”

“The Arab Street”—a broad term referring to Arab civil society sentiment—is strongly and uniformly opposed to Israeli actions in Gaza, according to several reputable opinion polls.[i] Yet, there has been little to no domestic popular pressure on Arab governments to take meaningful steps to curtail the Israeli campaign.[ii] The first two accompanying excerpts, from the pro-Palestinian daily al-Quds al-Arabi and the pro-Palestinian news website al-Rai al-Yaum, illustrate a perspective that considers the Palestine issue as primarily an Arab—rather than Muslim or nationalist—affair. By this view, the lack of Arab support for Palestine is a simultaneous indictment of Arab governments and the Arab public, both of which are seen as weak and powerless. This state of affairs, one of the authors remarks, has had the effect of “[carrying] the corpse of Arabism to its final resting place.” The assumed powerlessness of Arab citizens and their governments notwithstanding, the “Arab Street” is nevertheless seething. Scenes from Gaza continue flooding traditional and social media, broadcasting what the third accompanying excerpt, also from al-Quds al-Arabi, describes as “a live, terrible, and heartbreaking picture.” Arab governments’ denunciations and symbolic actions against Israel have not turned the Arab public’s focus away from Gaza, which remains a topic of daily discussion. Among Arab governments, Jordan is arguably the most vulnerable to popular pressure due to its large Palestinian population and shared border with the West Bank. The fourth accompanying article, from the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, explains in detail the balancing act played by the Jordanian government, which is seeking to placate popular pressure to push back against Israel without enflaming the situation or otherwise “[raising] the ambitions of the angry street.” There is no indication that Gaza will fade from the center of Arab public discourse anytime soon. The relative quiescence of Arab publics and governments vis-à-vis the conflict, therefore, should not obscure the continued pressures that are building on both to take meaningful action as the conflict in Gaza drags on.

Sources:

العدوان على غزة وغياب الصوت العربي الرسمي “The aggression against Gaza and the absence of an official Arab voice,” al-Quds (pro-Palestinian daily), 26 January 2024. https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1

There is no significant influence of Arab activity on the aggression and other things taking place in Gaza…

The Arab Street does not know how this issue is being discussed between Arab leaders and officials, with their counterparts in the world or among themselves, other than what their media circulates about rejection, denunciation, and repudiations, or descriptions of international impotence without holding themselves accountable for this impotence …

Officially, all Arabs reject the aggression that Gaza is being subjected to, and everyone rejects the occupation’s plans, from destruction to displacement to killing. However, the Palestinians have not witnessed any Arab actions to prevent these plans from occurring…

غزة تشيع الشارع العربي إلى مثواه الأخير “Gaza brings the Arab street to its final resting place,” Rai al-Youm (Pro-Palestinian news website), 8 December 2023. https://www.raialyoum.com/%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D9%8A/

Gaza not only exposed the failure of the Arab and Islamic regimes in its historical test, but also exposed the silent failure of their peoples, revealed their deteriorating reality, and their weak and shameful positions, and carried the corpse of Arabism to its final resting place.

غزة تمثل مأزقا للنظام العربي وسط تململ الشارع الغاضب واحتمالات عودة الإسلاميين “Gaza represents a dilemma for the Arab regime amid the angry street restlessness and the possibilities of the return of the Islamists,” al-Quds (pro-Palestinian daily), 2 December 2023. https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AB%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84/

But the greatest repercussions of the Gaza war are brewing in Arab countries whose screens have not stopped broadcasting a live, terrible and heartbreaking picture of what is happening in the Gaza Strip. The plight of the Palestinians has become part of dialogues on social media platforms and meetings over dinner and in the workplace. This all despite the efforts made by Arab countries to denounce what Israel is doing in Gaza and show political, diplomatic and humanitarian support for the Palestinians in the form of relief convoys, field hospitals, and tolerance for protests. However, the Arab street is seething with anger at the situation, and sometimes uses demonstrations of solidarity with the Palestinians, as it has in the past, to express grievances against the ruling regimes.

الغضب الشعبي والرسمي يكشف مخاوف الأردنيين “Popular and official anger reveal Jordanian fears,” al-Sharq al-Awsat (Saudi daily), 1 December 2023. https://aawsat.com/%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%82/%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B9/4702941-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%B6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86

The inevitability of the intensification of the war on Gaza, and the possibilities of expanding the scope of the current conflict in the Palestinian territories to the West Bank, are real Jordanian fears that are revealed with daily developments…

Indeed, analysts do not disagree that there is a sharp division among the official elites in their assessment of the situation. There are fears that the statements of Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi will raise the ambitions of the angry street, especially after he described the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty law as “a document on a shelf with dust” …

On the other hand, traditional elites called for “early recognition of an imminent danger.” The statements of former representatives and ministers Mamdouh Al-Abadi and Samir Al-Habashna and academic Sabri Rabihat received wide popular acceptance when they called on various occasions to “arm the Jordanian people” and prepare public opinion “for a possible military confrontation with Israel, which does not adhere to the values of the peace treaty with Jordan, and is even trying to tamper with it” …

An unknown future awaits Amman on its western border with the occupying state…

Notes:

[i] These polls also generally express strong disapproval of U.S. support for Israel and general approval of the actions of Iran-backed “Resistance Axis” members in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. The polls include:

“Wide public support for Hamas’ offensive on October the 7th, but the vast majority denies that Hamas has committed atrocities against Israeli civilians,” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 13 December 2023. https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/963

“How the Israel-Hamas War in Gaza Is Changing Arab Views,” Arab Barometer, 14 December 2023. https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/how-the-israel-hamas-war-in-gaza-is-changing-arab-views/ 

“New Poll Sheds Light on Saudi Views of Israel-Hamas War,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21 December 2023. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-poll-sheds-light-saudi-views-israel-hamas-war

“Arab Public Opinion about the Israeli War on Gaza,” Doha Institute, 10 January 2024. https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/arab-opinion-war-on-gaza-press-release-en.pdf

[ii] Some protests have occurred in Arabic-speaking countries, but none has been significant or created any meaningful pressures on governments. For Palestinian support in North Africa see: Jason Warner, “North African Wave of Support for Palestinians at Onset of Israel-Hamas War,” OE Watch, 01-2024.  https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/north-african-wave-of-support-for-palestinians-at-onset-of-israel-hamas-war/

Image Information:

Image: Jordan map showing major cities as well as parts of surrounding countries.
Source: https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/jordan/map
Attribution: Public Domain

Sudanese Leader Sees Rwandan Model for Post-Conflict Sudan

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RSF-fighters-cross-Hantoub-bridge-after-the-withdrawal-of-the-Sudanese-forces-on-December-18-2023

“The war our country is experiencing today must be the last war.”

On 6 January, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the leader of the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) (a paramilitary force formerly overseen by the Government of Sudan which has since defected), known as “Hemedti,” wrote the excerpted post in Arabic language on X (formerly Twitter) about his trip to Rwanda to meet President Kagame, and visit the Genocide Memorial Museum in Kigali. Hemedti’s remarks about the trip framed his own objectives in Sudan as mirroring those he perceives Kagame has achieved in Rwanda. Hemedti stated that Rwandans faced their problems after their civil war and genocide with courage and found radical solutions, such as gacaca,[i] which Hemedti compared to judiya,[ii] or traditional mediation, in Darfur, Sudan. It appears Hemedti is open to an elder council in Sudan that would oversee conflict resolution in the country but, the council would ensure Hemedti’s paramilitary faction retaining power over the rival Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).[iii]

Hemedti was initially seen as the underdog in the conflict with the SAF, Sudan’s officially recognized Army. However, his fighters’ brutal guerilla warfare tactics, honed when they operated as the notorious janjaweed in Darfur in the 2000s, have outmaneuvered the more conventional SAF. Moreover, Hemedti’s and his fighters’ humble beginnings—at least until they began monopolizing gold and other resource-rich mines in Darfur—may have endeared them to sectors of the embattled Sudanese population, which views the SAF as hopelessly corrupt and elitist and a continuation of the now-defunct Islamist regimes of previous decades. Hemedti added during his visit to Kigala that the ongoing Sudanese civil war must be the country’s “last war” and the experiences of other countries, particularly Rwanda, where Kagame has remained in power since the end of the Rwandan civil war, could inform Sudan’s own next steps. Hemedti’s remarks come as the Arabic-language website of the British newspaper, The Independent, published the second excerpted article about the SAF’s rejection of an invitation to attend the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s East African Summit in Uganda, which would involve mediation between the SAF and RSF. The article notes the RSF would be negotiating with the SAF from a position of strength having continuously seized territory in Sudan. This may be why Hemedti has been touring Rwanda, among other East African nations, in anticipation of the RSF’s taking control of more parts of Sudan. Further, Hemedti is seemingly planning a Rwandan-style post-conflict transitional justice system in Sudan that, like with Rwanda’s Kagame, would see Hemedti remain in power for years to come.[iv]

Sources:

 “زرت اليوم المتحف التذكاري للإبادة الجماعية بالعاصمة الرواندية كيجالي(Today I Visited the Genocide Memorial Museum in the Rwandan Capital, Kigali),” Twitter.com (@GeneralDagllo) (U.S social media website allowing users to freely post text, images, and videos known as “tweets”), 6 January 2024. https://twitter.com/GeneralDagllo/status/1743703088676897259

Today I visited the Genocide Memorial Museum in the Rwandan capital, Kigali. It is one of the most important landmarks in human history, because it witnessed a period of suffering and tragedy…. The Rwandans themselves faced their problems with courage and found radical solutions through the experience of gacaca, which is similar to judiya in Sudan. This system established the principles of transitional justice in society, realized the idea of no impunity, and changed history from division to unity.

We, Sudanese, must learn from Rwanda. The war our country is experience today must be the last war, and we must work to create a fair and sustainable peace for ourselves and for the future for our coming generations. 

“السودان يعلق وساطة “إيغاد” وسط احتدام المعارك” (Sudan suspends IGAD mediation amid increasing battles),” independentarabia.com (Arabic-language website jointly administered by Media Arabia, and The Independent, which focuses on social and humanitarian evens in the Middle East) 16 January 2024. https://www.independentarabia.com/node/538051/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%82-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83

The Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Sudan has suspended its dealings with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) of East African Countries, which has mediated the months-long fighting between the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). IGAD offered to mediate between the army commanders and the RSF.

Notes:

[i] “Gacaca” courts played a role in transitional justice in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide and were known for being community-based and for providing lighter sentences to perpetrators who showed remorse and repentance and sought reintegration into their communities.

[ii] “Judiya” has been the main mechanism for traditional mediation, reconciliation and justice in Darfur, Sudan, where “al-Jaweed,” or respected elders and traditional leaders, engage in third-party mediation with the approval of conflict actors. Although it is yet to be fully established in Darfur, advocates remain optimistic that it could bring a new sense of “humanitarian diplomacy” to that region, see: Yasir Elfatih Abdelrahim Elsanousi, “Traditional Judiya Leaders in Sudan as Actors of Humanitarian Diplomacy: Are They Eligible to Fulfill These Roles in the Darfur Humanitarian Crisis?,” Journal of African Studies and Development, Vol 3 (2), July 2017. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329100692_Traditional_Judiya_Leaders_in_Sudan_as_Actors_of_Humanitarian_Diplomacy_Are_They_Eligible_to_Fulfill_These_Roles_in_the_Darfur_Humanitarian_Crisis

[iii] In Sudan, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which are led by General Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, are in conflict with Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitaries, which are led by “Hemedti.” When al-Burhan became the Sudanese leader after long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir was overthrown in 2019, he failed to rein in and incorporate Hemedti’s RSF into the SAF. This ultimately resulted in a power struggle when, in April 2023, al-Burhan called the RSF a “rebel” movement and formally dissolved it. The two military factions have been at war since then and have received backing from external powers, but as of early 2024, the RSF has the upper hand in the fighting. See: Andrew McGregor, “Gold, Arms, and Islam: Understanding the Conflict in Sudan,” Terrorism Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 9 April 2023. https://jamestown.org/program/gold-arms-and-islam-understanding-the-conflict-in-sudan/

[iv] Besides Rwanda, Hemedti has also met with leaders in Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, Djibouti since the start of the war with the SAF in April 2023.

Image Information:

Image: RSF-fighters-cross-Hantoub-bridge-after-the-withdrawal-of-the-Sudanese-forces-on-December-18-2023
Source: The Sudan Tribune,https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RSF-fighters-cross-Hantoub-bridge-after-the-withdrawal-of-the-Sudanese-forces-on-December-18-2023.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Ecuador Faces Reprisals for Indirect Support to Ukraine

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A Russian military Mi helicopter of the kind Ecuador was prepared to donate to Ukraine.

“The decision unleashed the fury of the Kremlin, which defended the parts sold to Ecuador years ago.”

Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, Latin American and Caribbean countries have been reticent to get involved.[i] Specifically, they have resisted calls to send Russian military equipment stockpiles to support either side of the conflict. For this reason, Ecuador stood out when, following the recent declaration of an “internal armed conflict,” Spanish wire agency EFE reports that President Noboa expressed his country’s desire to trade Soviet-era military equipment for a $200 million security package of new equipment from the United States. This security package is meant to bolster the government’s position in the current domestic security crisis.[ii] The Soviet-era equipment, six Mi-8 [RG1] helicopters, a rocket launcher, and anti-aircraft systems, from previous arms deals with Russia would then be transferred to Ukraine.  To avoid provoking the ire of Russia by signaling overt support for Ukraine’s cause, EFE reports that the Noboa government has referred to this equipment, as inoperative “junk.” Nevertheless, Russia responded angrily and referred to original contracts for the equipment, which allegedly prohibit the export of this equipment to third parties. In addition, following Noboa’s announcement, according to the second excerpted article from the Argentine regional outlet Infobae, Russia’s phytosanitary agency halted imports of Ecuadorian bananas, claiming an uptick in flies. The article also notes that Russia is Ecuador’s second-largest customer for banana exports, and a halt in Russia’s imports of Ecuadorian bananas will hurt Ecuador economically and force it to quickly divert exports to other countries. While the quantity and types of weapons Ecuador plans to send to the United States (and eventually on to Ukraine) will not, by themselves, change Ukraine’s fortunes on the battlefield, the decision is a potential watershed moment for Latin America because its governments have generally pursued a studious policy of “non-alignment,” with several regional leaders declining to send Soviet-era equipment in their stockpiles.[iii] It is possible that Ecuador may pave the way for the region to assist Ukraine despite the threat of economic reprisals.

Sources:

“EE.UU. confirma que equipos soviéticos de Ecuador irán a Ucrania para guerra contra Rusia (The US confirms that Soviet equipment from Ecuador will go to Ukraine for war against Russia),” EFE (Spanish wire agency), 8 February 2024. https://es-us.finanzas.yahoo.com/noticias/ee-uu-confirma-equipos-sovi%C3%A9ticos-215123186.html

The president of Ecuador, Daniel Noboa, described the equipment as ‘scrap’ so his country will receive new equipment worth about 200 million dollars…the Russian government transmitted to the Ecuadorian government its position regarding these supplies, ‘indicating the specific points of the agreements and contracts’ linked to Russian military supplies to Ecuador that the South American nation would violate if it re-exported them.

“Ecuador se ve obligado a buscar nuevos mercados para sus bananas tras el cese de exportaciones a Rusia (Ecuador is forced to look for new markets for its bananas after the cessation of exports to Russia),” Infobae (Argentine regional outlet), 14 February 2024. https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/02/14/ecuador-se-ve-obligado-a-buscar-nuevos-mercados-para-sus-bananas-tras-el-cese-de-exportaciones-a-rusia/ 

The decision unleashed the fury of the Kremlin, which defended the parts sold to Ecuador years ago…The measure ordered by Vladimir Putin will considerably affect Ecuadorian exporters and, consequently, the profits that the Ecuadorian government receives from bananas. Now, Noboa must campaign to relocate one of its top products in the world, outside of nations that interpose their political interests on commercial ones. At the same time, the president continues with his war against gangs, launched in early January, which he hopes to promote with new equipment.

Notes:

[i] For greater detail on how the region has remained “non-aligned,” see: Ryan C. Berg, Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Juliana Rubio, Henry Ziemer, and Rubi Bledsoe, “A Hesitant Hemisphere: How Latin America has been Shaped by the War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 27 February 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/hesitant-hemisphere-how-latin-america-has-been-shaped-war-ukraine

[ii] For more, see: Ryan Berg “Rising Violence Prompts Ecuador To Declare ‘Internal Armed Conflict’,” OE Watch, 02-2024. Need Link

[iii] For more on Latin America’s response to the war in Ukraine, read: Ryan C. Berg, Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Juliana Rubio, Henry Ziemer, and Rubi Bledsoe, “Two Years Later: LAC and Russia’s War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 22, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/two-years-later-lac-and-russias-war-ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Russian military Mi helicopter of the kind Ecuador was prepared to donate to Ukraine.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mil_Mi-8MTV-5_Hip_82_yellow_%288587491042%29.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0 DEED

Iraqi Shia Militia Attacks Create Atmosphere of Uncertainty

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Photo of Al-Nujaba Movement forces (from PMF) in the Makhul Mountains of Salah al-Din province, one kilometer from the ISIL Front, 6 July 2016.

“Anxiety is rising in Iraq in general… [prompting] the faction leaders to change their tactics and movements and attempt to take stricter security measures to avoid being targeted by America.…”

Strikes and counterstrikes involving U.S. forces and so-called Iraqi “Islamic Resistance” factions of Shia militias may lead militant leaders to seek cover with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in ways that would likely strain U.S.-ISF relations. The first accompanying report, from the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed, claims that Islamic Resistance factions are seeking to safeguard their weapons from U.S. strikes by transferring them to ISF bases under Iraqi Defense Ministry control. The Islamic Resistance is a branding name used by various Iran-led militant Shia Iraqi groups, most prominently Kataib Hezbollah (KH) and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HAN).[i] These militias exert substantial influence in Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which are an appendage of the ISF akin to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[ii] As PMF units, the Islamic Resistance factions are part of the Iraqi state, but their interests and actions are rarely aligned or coordinated with those of the State apparatus writ large. Since the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel, the Islamic Resistance has conducted regular attacks on U.S. positions in Syria and Iraq. The attacks escalated in late January 2024, when an unmanned aerial vehicle attributed to KH killed three U.S. Army soldiers stationed in Jordan. In response, U.S. forces killed Abu Baqir al-Saadi, a KH official involved in planning the attacks. The strike followed an earlier one targeting a HAN leader. Both strikes occurred in Baghdad, prompting Iraqi government officials to publicly denounce them as violations of national sovereignty. Islamic Resistance and other Iraqi Shia militias in turn intensified pressure on their government to negotiate a withdrawal of U.S. troops and launch an investigation into the targeted killings. As reported in the second accompanying article, also from al-Araby al-Jadeed, KH also launched an investigation aimed at identifying and rooting out U.S. collaborators within the Islamic Resistance. As noted in the third accompanying article, from the pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, the Islamic Resistance’s attacks and threats may be used to sow distrust between the United Stats and ISF partner forces. The escalatory tit-for-tat between the Islamic Resistance and U.S. forces is ushering in an atmosphere of increasing uncertainty and distrust in Iraq, further complicating what is already a tangled and potentially volatile security environment.

Sources:

العراق: فصائل مسلحة تضغط لنقل مستودعات أسلحتها إلى قواعد الجيش لتجنّب القصف الأميركي

“Iraq: Armed factions are pressing to transfer their weapons depots to army bases to avoid American bombing,” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 6 January 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B6%D8%BA%D8%B7-%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4

Today, Sunday, Iraqi security sources in Baghdad revealed to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense was under pressure to transfer ammunition depots belonging to armed factions to Iraqi army bases and camps to prevent them from being targeted in the future by American aircraft.

العراق: تحقيقات سرية بحثاً عن “متعاونين” مع واشنطن بتنفيذ عمليات الاغتيال “Iraq: Secret investigations in search of “collaborators” with Washington in carrying out the assassination operations,” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 11 February 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B0-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA

The source told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, on condition that his name not be mentioned, that “the accuracy of choosing the targets and the accuracy of carrying out the assassination operations indicated the presence of a dangerous infiltration and collaborators who provided accurate information to Washington to carry out its strikes”… 

Anxiety is rising in Iraq in general, and among the factions in particular, which fear assassinations and other strikes that may be carried out by the United States of America, whose drones roam the skies of Baghdad on an almost daily basis. This has prompted the faction leaders to change their tactics and movements and attempt to take stricter security measures to avoid being targeted by America.

عزل أميركي للعراقيين خشية «الاختراق»: المقاومة تضمّ «السفارة» إلى بنك الأهداف “American isolation of the Iraqis for fear of ‘infiltration’: The resistance includes the ‘embassy’ in the target bank,” al-Akhbar (pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily), 9 February 2024. https://al-akhbar.com/Palestine/374023

…an Iraqi military official from the security crews residing inside the Ain al-Assad base (west of Baghdad), in an interview with Al-Akhbar, recounts his observations. Since the beginning of the base being subjected to missile strikes, he said, “The American forces have dealt with us with constant caution, and have their own security protocol in terms of inspecting all those entering and leaving the base. But after the recent attacks, it increased its measures in a way that we did not witness even two years ago, when Iran bombed the base with a large number of ballistic missiles”…

He explains that “the American side deals with the Iraqi side with suspicion in terms of exchanging information, for fear of it being leaked to parties linked to the armed factions.” 

Notes:

[i] Of the two, HAN has been by far the most hardline and active member of the “Islamic Resistance” since 7 October. See: “Who Are Nujaba and Why Did the U.S. Just Strike Them?” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 4 January 2024. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-are-nujaba-and-why-did-us-just-strike-them In late January, KH vowed to suspend attacks against the United States. HAN, in contrast, vowed to continue its attacks. See: “Explaining Apparent Muqawama De-Escalation Since January 28,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7 February 2024. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/explaining-apparent-muqawama-de-escalation-january-28

[ii] “KH operates the state-funded 45th, 46th, and 47th Brigades of the PMF. Chain of command nominally runs through the KH-dominated Popular Mobilization Committee in the Prime Minister’s Office. In practice, KH’s PMF brigades frequently disobey the government chain of command while legally remaining organs of the Iraqi state.” See: “Profile: Kataib Hezbollah,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 April 2021. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-kataib-hezbollah

For an up-to-date overview on Iraq’s militia landscape, see: “Iraq’s New Regime Change: How Tehran-Backed

Terrorist Organizations and Militias Captured the Iraqi State,” CTC Sentinel, December 2023. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/iraqs-new-regime-change-how-tehran-backed-terrorist-organizations-and-militias-captured-the-iraqi-state/

Image Information:

Image:  Photo of Al-Nujaba Movement forces (from PMF) in the Makhul Mountains of Salah al-Din province, one kilometer from the ISIL Front, 6 July 2016.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Harakat_Hezbollah_al-Nujaba_in_2016_(24).jpg
Attribution: Fars Media Corporation, CC BY 4.0

Mexican Truckers Protest Rise in Cartel’s Cargo Theft

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A port of entry on the U.S.-Mexico border, where most Mexican truckers are bound with their cargo.

“49 assaults on cargo drivers in Mexico are recorded daily, situations that not only put their physical integrity at risk but, in some cases, have resulted in fatal tragedies.”

Since the beginning of Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s presidential term in 2018, 85,000 trucks have been targeted for cargo theft by transnational criminal organizations operating in Mexico.[i] In protest, truckers organized a national strike blocking highways around the country. According to the first excerpted article in the business-focused daily El Financiero, truckers have demanded an action plan from the Ministry of Interior, as well as greater protection from Mexico’s National Guard. According to the article, an average of 49 truckers per day are subject to hijacking, kidnapping, and even murder, while their trucks are seized by criminal groups, emptied for content, and stripped and sold for parts. The second excerpted article in digital news platform Eje Central notes that cargo thefts now cost companies $400,000,000 per year. With this pressure, the Mexican government has acknowledged truckers’ insecurity and committed to reinforcing highway security with 2,000 new patrols, 620 National Guard units, and 800 more Interior Ministry agents. The rise in cargo theft and truck hijackings in Mexico displays a concerning shift in the behavior of transnational criminal organizations. Whereas previously groups exercised territorial control to dominate drug and human trafficking routes, cargo theft has become one of the rising sources of cartel income derived from the loss of territorial control by the Mexican government, especially in rural areas.[ii]

Sources:

“Paro Nacional de Transportistas ‘sigue en pie:’ En estas carreteras hay protestas hoy 5 de febrero (National Strike of Transporters ‘still standing:’ There are protests on these roads today, February 5),” El Financiero (business daily), 5 February 2024. https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/2024/02/05/paro-nacional-de-transportistas-sigue-en-pie-en-estas-carreteras-se-movilizan-hoy-5-de-febrero/

The drivers of heavy vehicles confirmed that their mobilization is still ‘on’ and they will concentrate in various parts of the country this Monday, February 5…about 150,000 drivers are expected to participate…the Security Ministry agreed to the installation of a dialogue to continue the conciliation work and thereby reach agreements regarding the demands of the transporters, who ask for solutions on the issue of extortion and the insecurity they suffer in their daily work…According to the members of the blockade, 49 assaults on cargo drivers in Mexico are recorded daily, situations that not only put their physical integrity at risk but, in some cases, have resulted in fatal tragedies. Cargo drivers mainly demand safety guarantees to carry out their daily operations without putting their lives at risk.

“Transportistas levantan protesta contra inseguridad en carreteras de México (Transporters raise protest against insecurity on Mexican roads),” Eje Central (digital news platform), 15 February 2024. https://www.ejecentral.com.mx/transportistas-levantan-protesta-contra-inseguridad-en-carreteras-de-mexico/ The union agreed with the government of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to increase surveillance on the main roads.The Ministry of the Interior indicated in a statement that security would be reinforced with 2,000 new patrols and 620 National Guard troops. In addition, he added that 800 more agents will join in July. Thefts from cargo transportation cost more than 7 billion pesos each year, according to the Confederation of Industrial Chambers of Mexico.

Notes:

[i] For more information on cargo thefts and their impact on Mexico’s economic performance, see: Ryan C. Berg, “Will Mexico’s Insecurity Scuttle Its Nearshoring Moment?,” in Bringing Supply Chains Back to Mexico, Center for Strategic & International Studies, pgs. 24-26 October 2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/bringing-supply-chains-back-mexico

[ii] For estimates on the loss of the government’s territorial control in Mexico, see: “AMLO has adopted a passive attitude towards cartels,” The Yucatan Times, 28 April 2021, https://www.theyucatantimes.com/2021/04/amlo-has-adopted-a-passive-attitude-towards-cartels-chris-landau/

Image Information:

Image: A port of entry on the U.S.-Mexico border, where most Mexican truckers are bound with their cargo.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/36205567@N07/7314437264
Attribution: CC BY 2.0.

Iran Warns United States Against Attacking Ships in Red Sea

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“The Story of the Behshad’s Mission for Maritime Security,” Telegram video screenshot.

“Those engaging in terrorist activities against Behshad or similar vessels jeopardize international maritime routes, security, and assume global responsibility for potential future international risks.”

Iran has warned the United States against targeting cargo ships that the United States and others believe to be Iranian support ships feeding intelligence to Houthi rebels in Yemen. “Those engaging in terrorist activities against Behshad or similar vessels jeopardize international maritime routes, security, and assume global responsibility for potential future international risks,” the Iranian Army declared in an English-language video recently posted on its Telegram channel Aja Media, clips of which are included in the first excerpted post. The Behshad is a cargo vessel widely believed by Western intelligence officials to be a spy ship operated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC is said to be passing electronic intelligence to Yemen’s Houthi rebels—armed with drones and ballistic missiles—to spot and target ships passing in the Red Sea region in reaction to the ongoing Gaza war.[i]

In the video, the narrator describes Behshad and other cargo ships like it—including the Saviz and Behzad—as “floating armories” stationed in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to prevent the hijacking of Iranian ships by pirates—a problem that began in the 1980s. According to the video, 93 squadrons have been dispatched to the region and thwarted 183 piracy attempts against Iranian ships. To maintain the ship’s innocence and its respect for international law, the video goes as far as to cite the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, claiming the ships are storage and support centers offshore.[ii] Very little information is available on the Behshad and other cargo ships in Iranian state media coverage. However, as per the second excerpted article, in April 2021, the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that the Saviz had been the target of a limpet mine attack allegedly by Israel because it was believed to be “Iran’s naval base” for the Houthi rebels.[iii] The third excerpted article published by the Iranian daily newspaper Hamshari reported that the United States and UK media coverage of the cargo ships in recent weeks were adopting “more hostile positions” because the media wanted to provoke the United States into a war with Iran.

Sources:

“رسانه ارتش جمهوری اسلامی ایران ‘آجامدیا’ (Media of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army ‘Aja Media’),” “The Story of the Behshad’s Mission for Maritime Security,” Telegram video post, 4 February 2024. https://t.me/aja_media/3797

Since the late 1980s, with the rise of piracy in the Bab el-Mandeb region, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea leading to the hijacking of several Iranian ships by pirates, the Iranian military, like many other countries, decided to deploy squadrons to this area in order to protect its commercial vessels and ensure the security of its shipping crew and commercial cargo. To date, ninety-three squadrons of the Iranian navy have been dispatched to this region and have prevented 183 piracy attempts against Iranian ships before the pirates could reach them… Those engaging in terrorist activities against Behshad or similar vessels jeopardize international maritime routes, security, and assume global responsibility for potential future international risks.

“گزارش تسنیم| مأموریت کشتی ساویز در دریای سرخ چه بود؟ (Tasnim Report: What was the Saviz ship’s mission in the Red Sea?),” Tasnim News Agency (IRGC-affiliated news source), 7 April 2021. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1400/01/18/2480574/%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AA-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B2-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AE-%DA%86%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF

This ship was the Iranian ship Saviz that was in the region for a long time already, and while some sources reported that it might have been hit by a missile or torpedo, a Tasnim reporter informed that likely this scenario is because of the explosion of magnetic and sticky mines on the body of the ship. After the publication of this news, there were different discussion s about the Saviz ship’s mission in the Red Sea, and some incorrectly—or on purpose—considered it to be Iran’s naval base to support the resistance of Yemen.

“واکنش سخنگوی وزارت دفاع آمریکا به کلیپ رسانه ارتش ایران در خصوص شناور بهشاد (The reaction of the U.S. Defense Department spokesperson to the media clip of the Iranian Army regarding the Behshad float),” Akharin Khabar (News aggregator with Telegram account), 12 February 2024. https://akharinkhabar.ir/story/9941219

The Pentagon spokesperson regarding the Behshad vessel: We have heard things about the mission of this vessel, but it is Iran’s right to have a vessel in the Red Sea and conduct operations. We are not looking for a naval confrontation with Iran.

A journalist told him during a press conference: Iran has issued a warning and told America that you are not allowed to target this ship. Iran has announced that it is an anti-piracy ship.

“ایران درباره کشتی بهشاد و ساویز به آمریکا هشدار داد؟ (Iran warned America about Behshad and Saviz ships?),” Hamshahri (Iran daily newspaper), 4 February 2024. https://www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/830282/%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B2-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF

Some American and British media continue to create a media space to provoke the United States to attack Iran… Iran issued a warning to the United States on Sunday about the potential targeting of two ships in the Middle East long suspected of serving as operations bases for Iranian commandos… It seems that Iran’s statement about the Behshad and Saviz shows Tehran’s growing concern that the American attacks in the past days in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen that targeted militias supported by the Islamic Republic.

Notes:

[i] Keir Simmons, Mo Abbas, Dan De Luce, and Matthew Mulligan, “Iran goes public with stark warning over suspected spy ship as U.S. refuses to rule out more strikes,” NBC News, 6 February 2024. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-goes-public-stark-warning-suspected-spy-ship-us-strikes-rcna137150

[ii] The vessels were sanctioned by the previous U.S. Administration in 2018. See: “Non-Proliferation Designations; Iran-related Designations Updates,” Office of Foreign Assets Control, 8 June 2020. https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20200608

[iii] According to Western media reports, the attack was apparently by Israel in retaliation for Iranian strikes on a Liberian-flagged ship owned by an Israeli shipping billionaire. See: Oren Liebermann, “U.S. watching as Iran quietly replaces Red Sea spy ship damaged in April attack” CNN, 6 August 2021. https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/06/politics/us-monitor-iran-spy-ships/index.html

Image Information:

Image: “The Story of the Behshad’s Mission for Maritime Security,” Telegram video screenshot
Source: https://t.me/aja_media/3797
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.