Tag Archives: Russia

Russia Details Plan To Overcome Military Drone Deficiencies

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Russia and Ukraine are engaged in a drone war.  Here, an unidentified Ukrainian Special Forces soldier with small quadcopter UAV that will be modified to carry a small explosive charge.

“The military still faces a serious shortage of drones for strategic reconnaissance and subsequent strikes over fairly long distances. Saturating the troops with them would greatly increase our ability to identify and destroy enemy equipment accumulations and other priority targets.”

The use of unmanned armed vehicles (UAVs), or drones, on the battlefields of Ukraine has increased dramatically since the conflict began in February 2022. While Ukraine may have held the initial advantage, Russia continues to prioritize its drone capabilities.[i] In a recent meeting of the Ministry of Defense regarding weapons procurement, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu detailed the state of military drone procurement. According to the excerpted article from the Russian online publication Free Press, Shoigu noted that “Russia has trained 93,000 specialists to service the latest types of weapons, a significant part [of this workforce] of which are drone operators.” Shoigu also noted that drone operators were being trained at several military training centers “at universities,” and that the number of these training centers would soon rise from only 16 in 2022 to 139, although no timeline was given as to when all 139 training centers would be operational. The Free Press article also included an interview with Igor Korotchenko, the editor-in-chief of National Defense,[ii] a magazine focused on Russian defense and security issues, who noted that although Russian front-line troops were being “saturated” with drones, “the military still faces a serious shortage of drones for strategic reconnaissance and subsequent strikes over fairly long distances.” Korotchenko also noted that drones with these capabilities are being delivered to the frontlines but “the task is to saturate our battle formations with them as much as possible.” Finally, the article notes that at the end of 2022, Putin had declared Russia would boost spending on its military drone program from 4.4 billion rubles (approximately $48 million) to 92 billion rubles (approximately $1 billion) effective immediately, increasing spending up to 200 billion rubles (approximately $2.2 billion) by 2030.

Sources:

“СВО: Российской армии срочно нужны дроны для наступления. По мере изменений тактики будут видоизменяться и модели боевых БПЛА (SVO: The Russian army urgently needs drones for the offensive. As tactics change, combat UAV models will also change),” Free Press (Russian socio-political online publication specializing in political, socio-economic and cultural news), 21 November 2023. https://svpressa.ru/war21/article/395461/ 

Supplies of unmanned aerial vehicles to the army have increased 16 times compared to the beginning of last year. Sergei Shoigu announced this at a meeting of the Ministry of Defense dedicated to state defense procurement. The head of the military department also cited other figures: the number of basic types of missile and artillery weapons in the troops increased by 4.9 times, high-precision long-range missiles by 5 times, and armored weapons by more than 3 times. In total, the supply of the army with various means of defeating the enemy has been increased 12 times. At the same time, the state defense order for the needs of the Northern Military District is clarified and adjusted 2-3 times a month depending on the needs of the front. The breakthrough in the field of unmanned aircraft can be considered a special achievement because before the SVO, we paid practically no attention to this type of weapons, and in the first months of the operation, the superiority of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in this component looked deafening. Our soldiers had to make do mainly with Chinese quadcopters, which caring citizens bought for the front in regular stores. Sergei Shoigu also said that in 2023, Russia has trained 93 thousand specialists to service the latest types of weapons, a significant part of which are drone operators. A certain percentage of them are now serving in the Northern Military District zone. Students at military training centers at universities are also learning to control combat drones. The number of such centers will soon reach 139, although the first 16 were created only last year. Igor Korotchenko, editor-in-chief of the National Defense magazine, told Free Press about which drones are currently being used by our military in the Northern Military District zone, and which ones are in greatest need. Thus, the time when soldiers and officers had to master the control of quadcopters directly in combat conditions is over. And the drones that are now going into the army are no longer a mishmash of different Chinese toys. They are collected in Russia and are sufficiently standardized. — The Northern Military District zone is being massively saturated, first of all, with tactical-class drones, which are used for reconnaissance and attack operations against the enemy on the line of contact and the front line. These are mainly quadcopters. They can conduct surveillance and then be used like kamikazes. Such UAVs are most intensively used by the troops today,” says a military analyst. “The military still faces a serious shortage of drones for strategic reconnaissance and subsequent strikes over fairly long distances. Saturating the troops with them would greatly increase our ability to identify and destroy enemy equipment accumulations and other priority targets. The most important task is to hit vehicles with weapons and ammunition in a timely manner. And if we consider that our enemies are now preparing to redeploy F-16 [R1] fighters and ATACMS missiles with a range of more than 300 km to Ukraine, which can be launched from HIMARS[R2]  installations, then our strategic drones must be able to identify and destroy such targets. This task is now No. 1 for our engineers and designers. Until the end of 2022, drones remained in short supply in our troops. In December, Vladimir Putin instructed the government to prepare a national project for the development of unmanned aircraft. And in April, the president visited the capital’s Rudnevo technology park, which became a cluster for the production of UAVs. A meeting was also held there with the government and drone manufacturers. The talk in the open part was about unmanned civil aviation, but it is clear that any aircraft or copter initially has a dual use. During the meeting, the president gave a number of instructions. Among them is to increase the portfolio of government orders for unmanned aerial vehicles from 4.4 billion rubles to 92 billion, and by 2030 to 200 billion.

Technoparks for the production of UAVs, similar to the Moscow one, should be organized in all federal districts, and better yet, in all regions. Begin organized training and retraining of specialized specialists in the production and operation of UAVs.

Notes:

[i] For additional reading on Russia’s increasing use of drones on the battlefield, see: Charles Bartles, “Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons To Engineer Units,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-plans-to-add-remote-mining-uav-platoons-to-engineer-units/

[ii] National Defense magazine is tied to Russia’s military industry complex and bills itself as covering a “wide spectrum of problems related to safeguarding Russia’s National Security.” For more information about National Defense, see its website: https://oborona.ru/

Image Information:

Image: Russia and Ukraine are engaged in a drone war.  Here, an unidentified Ukrainian Special Forces soldier with small quadcopter UAV that will be modified to carry a small explosive charge.
Source: Combat Films and Research
Attribution: By permission of Combat Films and Research

Russian Military Working To Respond to U.S. “Multi-Domain Operations”

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“The main difficulty in conducting defense in the context of the enemy’s implementation of the “multi-domain battle” concept is that units, occupying strong points, positions and areas, are not able to quickly and effectively respond to enemy actions, especially when changing the direction of action and carrying out flanking maneuvers.”

Russia is working to understand the U.S. Army’s “multi-domain operations” (MDO) concept,[i] Which can roughly be described as the coordinated employment of the domains of war (land, air, sea, space, cyber, etc.) to achieve an operational-level objective.  The accompanying excerpted article from the monthly Russian military periodical, Armeisky Sbornik, discusses the Russian Armed Forces’ understanding of the U.S. MDO concept, the potential effects of MDO if employed against the Russian Ground Forces, and what course of action a Russian Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) should execute to best overcome it.[ii] The authors believe that a successful first strike on a Russian BTG by a U.S. Army MDO Brigade could be decisive due to the attrition of the BTG’s command and control and combat capabilities. The authors posit that the best defense for a BTG against an attacking MDO Brigade is the use of positional defense (as opposed to maneuver defense), and a preemptive attack. To achieve this, up to one-third of the combined arms subunits in the BTG should act as flanking or raiding detachments and conduct preemptive actions to hinder the enemy. These actions might include defeating artillery, air defense systems, and command posts, and disrupting command and control and logistics, thereby disrupting the MDO Brigade’s ability to conduct a decisive counter-attack. It is important to note that the authors, and many other Russian commentators, see the so-called “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine as not only a testing ground for new Russian military technologies and tactics, but also as a testing ground for new U.S./NATO technologies and tactics by way of Ukrainian proxies. As such, this article will likely be the first of many analyses discussing the best ways for the Russian Armed Forces to counter  U.S. military technology and tactics based on the lessons from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Sources:

R. Shaykhutdinov, I. Starodubtsev, “Оборона батальонной тактической группы в условиях «многосферного сражения» (The conduct of a defense by a battalion tactical group under conditions of «multi-domain battle»),” Armeisky Sbornik (monthly Russian military periodical), October 2023. https://army.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/521356/

Against the background of strengthening the military power of Russia and China, the United States began to develop new approaches that would ensure the superiority of its troops in military conflicts with an enemy of comparable combat capabilities. The basic principles and procedures for conducting combat operations as part of interservice and coalition groupings of troops in various operational environments at the strategic, operational and tactical levels were formulated…

Military experts F.I. Ladygin, S.V. Afanasyev and A.V. Khomutov argue that such a model provides for the creation in the US ground forces of “a new type of formations deployed in advance in forward areas – “ multi-domain brigade tactical groups”, which will be able to operate in all environments, in isolation from the main grouping of troops, in conditions of constant contact with the enemy to identify his vulnerabilities and ensure the involvement of the main forces in them”…

The main difficulty in conducting defense in the context of the enemy’s implementation of the “multi-domain battle” concept is that units, occupying strong points, positions and areas, are not able to quickly and effectively respond to enemy actions, especially when changing the direction of action and carrying out flanking maneuvers. Also significant is the inevitable disunity of battalion defensive strong points during defense — when on a wide front these strong points cannot provide mutual fire support to one another, which can allow the enemy to employ flanking and raid actions to infiltrate the battalion’s combat formation….

The analysis of the views of the US and NATO command on the offensive and the experience of conducting a special military operation in Ukraine raises the need to search for new ways of conducting combat actions at the tactical level. The enemy’s use of modern weapons supplied by the united West, especially during shelling of Donetsk, Lugansk and other liberated areas, requires improved methods of action of combined arms formations when defeating the enemy.

The extreme saturation of modern armies with guided anti-tank weapons, air defense and missile defense systems has sharply increased the importance of the positional defense. The combat formation of a battalion tactical group in positional defense is built primarily in one echelon and includes: the first echelon, combined arms reserve, artillery units, air defense units, anti-tank reserve, as well as regular and attached units and fire assets that remain directly subordinate to the commander of the battalion tactical group…

An analysis of the possible distribution of forces and means of a battalion tactical group shows that with a “typical distribution” of forces and means of a battalion, taking into account the fact that before an attack the enemy will inevitably lay indirect and direct fires, shows that most of the fire will fall on strong points of the first echelon companies (on 50–60% of the battalion’s forces). Losses of the battalion tactical group can reach up to 70%.  Consequently, the existing methods of conducting the defense of a battalion tactical group raise questions regarding the capabilities of successfully completing a combat mission.  To increase the effectiveness of the defense of a battalion tactical group, it must conduct “preemptive actions”.

The method is based on active use of offensive actions when conducting defense, going beyond the front line. At the same time, up to 1/3 of combined arms subunits, acting as flanking and raiding detachments, carry out preemptive actions against the enemy, such as defeating artillery, air defense systems, command posts, and disrupting command and control and logistics.The essence of preemptive attack is to defeat enemy targets by flanking and raid groups of combat vehicles operating forward of the front line of defense in order to prevent further enemy offensive actions…

Notes:

[i] “The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 concept proposes a series of solutions to solve the problem of layered standoff. The central idea in solving this problem is the rapid and continuous integration of all domains of warfare to deter and prevail as we compete short of armed conflict. If deterrence fails, Army formations, operating as part of the Joint Force, penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems; exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to defeat enemy systems, formations and objectives and to achieve our own strategic objectives; and consolidate gains to force a return to competition on terms more favorable to the U.S., our allies and partners.” TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations – 2028 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2018), iii. https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-3-1.pdf

[ii] For an in-depth analysis of the Russian Battalion Tactical Group (BTG), see: Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, “Getting to Know the Russian Battalion Tactical Group,” Royal United Service Institute, 14 April 2022. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/getting-know-russian-battalion-tactical-group

Chinese-Tajikistani Security Cooperation Gaining Momentum (Matthew Stein and Peter Wood) (January 2024)

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Chinese-Tajikistani Security Cooperation Gaining Momentum (Matthew Stein and Peter Wood) (January 2024)

(Click image to download brief.)

Key Takeaways:

  • China and Tajikistan share a 477km border and have an estimated $1.78 billion in bilateral trade, which is significantly imbalanced in favor of China.
  • Recent years have seen a significant improvement in relations between China and Tajikistan, with China constructing a military base in 2016 near Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan and a November 2022 bilateral agreement to increase security cooperation.
  • China’s security cooperation with Tajikistan does not appear to conflict or cause friction with Tajikistan’s main security cooperation partner, Russia, but nevertheless advances Chinese interests in the region at a time when Russian support is limited due to its invasion of Ukraine.

Côte d’Ivoire’s Stance On Military Interventions Prioritize Democratic Principles

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Members of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center honor guard stand in formation during a welcoming ceremony for Ivory Coast Gen. Soumaila Bakayoko.

“If ECOWAS chooses a particular option to resolve the regional crisis, Côte d’Ivoire will follow this option in solidarity with other member states.”

On 29 September, the Turkish website of Anadolu News Agency published the excerpted French-language article on Côte d’Ivoire’s intention to comply with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) if the organization military intervenes in Niger. The article notes that ECOWAS has threatened to intervene militarily in Niger to reinstall deposed president Mohamed Bazoum to power. A spokesperson for Côte d’Ivoire’s government confirmed that the country will not make any decision regarding Niger unilaterally but will respect the outcomes of ECOWAS member states’ debates.

The decision to follow ECOWAS into battle in Niger differs from Côte d’Ivoire’s announcement in November 2022 that it would withdraw its forces from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), despite MINUSMA’s continued counterinsurgency efforts against al-Qaeda and Islamic State-loyal militants. According to the excerpted French-language article in tvmonde5.com, Côte d’Ivoire’s withdrawal from MINUSMA came after Mali’s coup leaders alleged that Ivorian troops who entered Mali to operate with a German contingent were “mercenaries.”[i] Côte d’Ivoire’s commitment to ECOWAS and reduction in military support to MINUSMA can be interpreted as a reflection of how opposition parties have been permitted to participate in Ivorian politics and how other reforms have improved electoral competition since 2020.[ii] Côte d’Ivoire is willing to support military efforts to restore democratically elected civilian rulers, such as Bazoum, to power. However, the country is refraining from offering its troops for regional military efforts to support governments, such as in Mali, that refuse to return power to democratically elected leaders and that express allegiance towards Russia, including its proxy, Wagner Group.

Sources:

“L’option d’une intervention militaire de la Cédéao au Niger reste possible (The option of ECOWAS military intervention in Niger remains possible),” Anadolu News Agency (Turkish state-run news agency aligned with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)), 29 September 2023. https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/loption-dune-intervention-militaire-de-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao-au-niger-reste-possible/3003520

The option of military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Niger remains on the table and Côte d’Ivoire will comply with the decisions adopted collectively by the community “if ECOWAS decides on this option,” said Ivorian government spokesperson Amadou Coulibaly. The government spokesperson affirmed that Côte d’Ivoire is a member that respects its commitments in ECOWAS.

In Niger, members of the presidential guard took power on July 26, pushing aside President Mohamed Bazoum and announcing the suspension of the Constitution and the formation of a National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland. ECOWAS threatened to intervene militarily to enable Bazoum to regain power and considered this an option ready to be implemented alongside strict punitive measures.

“La Côte d’Ivoire va retirer progressivement ses soldats du Mali (Ivory Coast will withdraw its soldiers from Mali gradually),” tvmonde5.com (French public television broadcaster’s website focusing on worldwide affairs affecting France), 16 November 2022. https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/la-cote-divoire-va-retirer-progressivement-ses-soldats-du-mali-1424754

Côte d’Ivoire indicates that the soldiers and other elements active within MINUSMA will not be relieved in August 2023.Relations between Côte d’Ivoire have become significantly strained in recent months, particularly after the arrest last July of 49 Ivorian soldiers in Bamako.

Notes:

[i] The bilateral dispute between Côte d’Ivoire and Mali reached a culmination in January 2023 when Côte d’Ivoire honored 49 soldiers after they were released from detention in Mali, where there were held for half a year, and returned home. Only weeks before their release from detention, a Bamako court had sentenced most of the Ivorian soldiers to 20 years in prison and others to death for being “mercenaries”. Although Ivorian soldiers had been invited to Mali by the German contingent of MINUSMA, the Malian coup leaders alleged the “Sahel Aviation Service (SAS),” which is a private company, transported the Ivorian soldiers. In contrast, the Wagner Group, which is affiliated to the Russian government, was welcomed into Mali by the Malian coup leaders. It is possible that the Ivorian and German governments’ criticism of the coup in Mali and lack of transition back to democracy underscored the Malian coup leaders’ initial actions to detains the Ivorian soldiers. See; “Mali detains Ivorian soldiers, accuses them of being mercenaries,” Rfi.fr, 12 July 2022. https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20220712-mali-detains-ivorian-soldiers-accuses-them-of-being-mercenaries

[ii] The U.S. State Department notes that since the Ivorian president’s election to a third term in 2020, the country’s democratic processes have been “generally considered free.” Similarly, the election monitoring group, New Dawn, assessed that the latest Ivorian local and regional elections in September 2023 “had gone smoothly.” Consistent with these democratic trends, Ivorian foreign policy has become increasingly aligned with ECOWAS and its member-states’ oppositions to military coups in West Africa. See; “2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cote d’Ivoire,” U.S. Department of State, 2023. https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cote-divoire. See also; “Sweeping win for ruling party in Ivory Coast local and regional elections,” france24.com, 5 September 2023. https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230904-sweeping-win-for-ruling-party-in-ivory-coast-local-and-regional-elections

Image Information:

Image: Members of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center honor guard stand in formation during a welcoming ceremony for Ivory Coast Gen. Soumaila Bakayoko.
Source: MSG Montigo White https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/43/Members_of_the_Kofi_Annan_International_Peacekeeping_Training_Center_honor_guard_stand_in_formation_during_a_welcoming_ceremony_for_Ivory_Coast_Gen._Soumaila_Bakayoko%2C_the_Economic_Community_of_West_African_130626-A-ZZ999-016.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Russia Uses Diplomacy To Increase Military Influence In Libya

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Russian military assets in Al Khadim airfield, Libya, 2020

“Libya offers at least two advantages to Russia: its ports are only about an hour’s flight from the European coast, and its air bases in the south are very close to Sudan and the African Sahel countries…”

A series of recent diplomatic visits involving Russian officials and Libyan military leader Khalifa Haftar could eventually lead to deepening bilateral military relations, according to regional press coverage.[i] In August, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov led the first-ever Russian military delegation to visit Haftar.[ii] Yevkurov went back less than a month later, in mid-September, quickly followed by a visit to Moscow by Haftar, where he met with Russian President Putin and Defense Minister Shoigu. According to the first excerpt from al-Araby al-Jadeed, a Qatari-aligned daily newspaper, Haftar is seeking a more formal defense relationship with Russia, which would include official political recognition for Haftar and his allies, as well as sustained military support for forces under Haftar’s control. In exchange, per the second accompanying excerpt, from the Turkish news agency Anadolu Agency, Russia would establish a long-term aerial and naval military presence in eastern Libya, similar to its current presence in Syria.As the excerpt notes, Libya’s proximity to Europe, the Sahel, and Sudan gives it unique geopolitical value to Russia, creating a corridor of influence linking its bases in Syria to territories ruled by friendly governments in the African Sahel. Although the discussions remain nothing more than talks at the moment, the intensity of Russia’s military-diplomatic efforts signals Moscow’s growing interest in increasing its military influence in eastern Libya.

Sources:

“حفتر يجري لقاءات مكثفة مع مسؤولين في روسيا: بحث عن شراكة عسكرية معلنة؟

(Haftar holds intensive meetings with Russian officials: Seeking over military partnership?),” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 28 September 2023. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/حفتر-يجري-لقاءات-مكثفة-مع-مسؤولين-روس-بحث-عن-شراكة-عسكرية-معلنة

In other details about Haftar’s discussions in Moscow, sources’ information agreed that Haftar asked Moscow to upgrade the level of bilateral relations by signing a defense and security agreement stipulating that he would obtain more military equipment, such as Russian air defense systems, drones, and the establishment of advanced workshops to maintain his militia’s military equipment, most of which are Russian-made.

According to the same sources, Moscow summoned Haftar after he repeated his request during Yevkirov’s two visits to Benghazi, last August and the week before last. The sources confirmed that the discussions are still in early stages, as Moscow is still unwilling to officially announce its presence in Libya by signing any official and announced agreement.

“حفتر بين مطرقة العقوبات الأمريكية وسندان الدعم الروسي

(Haftar between the hammer of US sanctions and the anvil of Russian support),” Anadolu Agency (Turkish news agency), 2 October 2023. https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/التقارير/حفتر-بين-مطرقة-العقوبات-الأمريكية-وسندان-الدعم-الروسي-إضاءة/3005791

… Haftar has not abandoned Russian support and is asking for a price in return, not the least of which is recognition of his legitimacy and the provision of heavy and advanced weapons such as combat aircraft, drones, and air defense systems… [Russia] is still prepared to provide more weapons and training to his soldiers, and maintain military equipment in exchange for establishing its military presence on the southern front of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This makes it difficult for Haftar to choose between US sanctions and Russian military and diplomatic support…

Libya offers at least two advantages to Russia: its ports are only about an hour’s flight from the European coast, and its air bases in the south are very close to Sudan and the African Sahel countries. Although Wagner elements were deployed in several Libyan air bases in the east and south, such as Al-Jufra (central), Al-Kharrouba (east), Brak Al-Shati and Tamanhint (south), they have not yet been able to have an independent naval base in Sirte nor an air base in Al-Jufra (east of Tripoli)—as is the case with the Hmeimim air base and Tartus naval base in Syria—due to American pressure on Haftar. Therefore, observers expect that Moscow will seek to seize more than one military base in Libya, and connect them to its air supply line from Russia to Syria, passing through Libya and from there to its allies in Sudan and the African Sahel countries, all the way to the Central African Republic.

Notes:

[i] For additional reporting and context, see: “Russia Seeks to Expand Naval Presence in the Mediterranean,” Wall Street Journal, 15 September 2023. https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/russia-seeks-to-expand-naval-presence-in-the-mediterranean-b8da4d; “Libya: The security relationship between Khalifa Haftar and Moscow is intensifying,” Le Monde, 11 October 2023. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/10/11/libya-the-security-relationship-between-khalifa-haftar-and-moscow-is-intensifying_6162923_124.html; and “After Libya’s floods, Russia throws its weight behind Haftar,” The New Arab, 9 October 2023. https://www.newarab.com/analysis/after-libyas-floods-russia-throws-its-weight-behind-haftar

[ii] The Russian Defense Ministry’s Telegram channel reported on it being the first-ever such visit https://t.me/mod_russia/29689. Yevkurov first visit was on 22 August, the day before the head of the Wagner Group was killed in an airplane crash and in the context of reassuring African countries with Wagner presence that the PMC was now under government control. Yevkurov returned to Libya on 17 September, in the aftermath of the Derna floods. Haftar traveled to Moscow on 28 September. 

Image Information:

Image:  Russian military assets in Al Khadim airfield, Libya, 2020
Source: US AFRICOM Public Affairs, https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/33034/russia-and-the-wagner-group-continue-to-be-in  
Attribution: Public Domain

Poland And The Baltic States Express Concern About Regional Stability

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Members of the Wagner group training Belarusian troops in summer 2023.

“It can be expected that the Wagner troops will be used for border provocations against Polish uniformed services… It also cannot be ruled out that some of the mercenaries will try to infiltrate Poland and other countries mainly on the Eastern Flank.”

Since the Wagner Group, a private Russian military company known for its brutality and criminal activities, began training in Belarus in July, concerns amongst the neighboring states have steadily risen regarding regional border security. Belarussian President Lukashenko offered the Wagner Group employment in Belarus — with the goal of increasing the effectiveness of the Belarusian military — following its attempted run on the Russian capital in June of 2023.[i]

As the excerpted publication from the Polish Institute of International Affairs (Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych) indicates, despite interacting under the auspices of improving Belarusian military readiness and effectiveness, Belarus’s neighbors fear that Belarus is readying additional means of offense against its neighbors. Poland’s concern is that as Belarus’ offensive forces become better trained, they may create instability in the delicate border peace that the two countries have reached. Furthermore, the article suggests that the Wagner Group’s location in Belarus suggests the possibility of a larger-scale engagement within Poland and other border countries like Lithuania. In essence, Belarussian “Wagner-trained fighters” could enter the open border zones with a Belarussian passport with the intent to identify viable targets in Poland, specifically within the critical infrastructure.[ii]  Additionally, the statement requests the Wagner Group be declared a terrorist organization. Such a designation would significantly broaden the legal bounds of recourse and response available to both Poland and NATO, both as a preventative measure to increase border security but also as a guarantee of support from NATO should Belarus pursue further provocative actions. As expressed in the second excerpted piece, a joint statement from Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia released on Poland’s Ministry of Internal Affairs X (formerly Twitter) feed, Belarus, by collaborating with Wagner and, more broadly, with Russia, is taking deliberate steps to destabilize the region. The joint statement declares that the four nations would take decisive and swift action should further provocation occur, noting that any border infractions would result in the immediate shutdown of all Belarussian border crossings. In addition, the governments called for the immediate removal of all Wagner Group members and holdings from Belarussian borders. Their statement asserts that the Wagner Group poses a threat not only to each country’s respective national security but to the security of the free world as well.

Sources:

Anna Maria Dyner, “Grupa Wagnera na Białorusi – potencjalne zagrożenia dla Polski (Wagner Group Arrives in Belarus – Potential Threats to Poland),” Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych (official website of Polish Institute of International Affairs), 27 July 2023. https://pism.pl/publications/wagner-group-arrives-in-belarus-potential-threats-to-poland

The mercenaries in Belarus give the Belarusian and Russian authorities additional tools for hybrid action against NATO countries, in particular Poland and Lithuania. It can be expected that the Wagner troops will be used for border provocations against Polish uniformed services, including the possible use of arms or attempts to destroy barriers. They may also be used to coordinate and command operations at the border. It also cannot be ruled out that some of the mercenaries will try to infiltrate Poland and other countries mainly on the Eastern Flank (both illegally and, for example, with the use of Belarusian passports) with the task of identifying critical infrastructure facilities. Some of them may also be prepared to carry out acts of sabotage on Polish soil. … These activities will increase tensions and have a psychological impact on Polish society in the context of, among other things, the Belarusian-Russian military exercise Union Shield, scheduled for the end of September, or the October parliamentary elections in Poland.

It may also be necessary to recognize the Wagner Group as a terrorist organization. This would allow the use of the Anti-Terrorist Activities Act, which, among other things, broadens the spectrum of activities that can be undertaken by the relevant security services and authorities against persons suspected of seeking to carry out terrorist activities. In addition, Poland may hold consultations within NATO and propose a common approach by Alliance members to the Wagner Group, chiefly by pointing out that they are being used by Belarus and Russia as a tool of hybrid action that requires a coordinated response from the Alliance, for example, in the form of an increased Allied presence at the border.

At the same time, Poland and NATO should announce that they will use all available instruments to fight the Wagner Group mercenaries if they pose a threat, with Belarus and Russia fully responsible for their actions on the border.

Mariusz Kamiński, Angé Bilotaité, Māris Kučinskis, Lauri Läänemets, “Oświadczenie Ministrów Spraw Wewnętrznych Polski,  Litwy, Łotwy i Estonii po spotkaniu konsultacyjnym w Warszawie (Statement by the Ministers of the Interiors of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia after the consultation meeting in Warsaw),” Twitter@MSWiA_GOV_PL, 28 August 2023. https://twitter.com/MSWiA_GOV_PL/status/1696123142249283636

We emphasize that the actions taken by Russia and Belarus cooperating as an attempt to deliberately destabilize the situation in the region. We declare we are determined to oppose this together. Our answer will be joint, decisive and appropriate to the current situation- up to the possibility of further isolating both regimes by closing border crossings. We are determined to defend the borders of the democratic world, leaving access to our territories for the…Belarussian oppositionists.In this regard we call on the Belarussian regime to remove the “Wagner” group from the territories of Belarus…

Notes:

[i] For a Belarussian perspective on the Wagner Group’s presence, as well as their views regarding Polish and neighboring states reactions, see: “Тенденции военно-политической обстановки и обновленную Концепцию нацбезопасности обсудили в Витебске (Trends in the military-political situation and the updated National Security Concept were discussed in Vitebsk)” Белта (A news service of Belarus), 13 September 2023. https://www.belta.by/amp/regions/view/tendentsii-voenno-politicheskoj-obstanovki-i-obnovlennuju-kontseptsiju-natsbezopasnosti-obsudili-v-587792-2023/

[ii] For more information on the operational tactics of Wagner Group from their previous engagements in Ukraine, see: Charles Bartles, “The Composition And Tactics Of Wagner Assault Detachments,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/the-composition-and-tactics-of-wagner-assault-detachments/

Image Information:

Image: Members of the Wagner group training Belarusian troops in summer 2023.
Source: https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&url=https%3A%2F%2Fcommons.wikimedia.org%2Fwiki%2F, File%3APMC_wagner_in_belarus_2.png&psig=AOvVaw3nFw9Wep8soItuzbytxYTa&ust=1695536938589000&source=images&cd=vfe&opi=89978449&ved=2ahUKEwi799i4jcCBAxUeW_EDHdRvBoQQjRx6BAgAEAw
Attribution: CC By 3.0 Deed

The Evolution Of Russia’s Peacekeeping Mission In Nagorno-Karabakh

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Map of the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh war showing Azerbaijan day-to-day advances.

“The conditions under which the Russian peacekeeping contingent was introduced into the region in 2020 have been seriously adjusted.”

On 19 September 2023, Azerbaijani forces launched an operation against the breakaway republic of Artsakh, and within days, succeeded in ending ethnic Armenian control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The excerpted article from the independent news website Kavkazskiy Uzel reports on how Azerbaijani control of Nagorno-Karabakh has impacted the Russian peacekeeping mission.[i] The article notes that Russian peacekeepers dismantled a few observation posts and established new ones, some of which were set up with Azerbaijan to jointly protect the weapons and equipment surrendered by the armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh. The dismantled observation posts were situated in eastern Nagorno-Karabakh near Azerbaijan. The article also notes, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that its peacekeepers will adapt to the new situation, even as a large percentage of the population in Nagorno-Karabakh has left the region. The mandate of the Russian peacekeeping mission runs through November 2025 and will be automatically extended for another five years unless the governments of Armenia or Azerbaijan request to terminate it. The article notes that the Armenian government signed a declaration recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan two weeks after Azerbaijan took control of the region, essentially ending support for the breakaway republic. While one of the main tasks of the Russian peacekeeping mission has changed, it appears likely that Russia will continue to operate in the region.

Sources:

“МИД России пояснил смену постов миротворцев адаптацией к новым условиям (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia explained the change to the posts of peacekeepers as adapting to the new conditions),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website reporting on the Caucasus), 10 October 2023. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/393302

Peacekeepers are adapting to new conditions against the backdrop of a mass exodus of the population from the region, reported Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova.

As t“e “Caucasian K”ot” wrote, on October 5, peacekeepers reported on the dismantling of observation posts in the Askeran, Martakert and Shusha regions, and on October 8, the Russian peacekeeping contingent dismantled posts in the Martuni and Martakert regions…

A day earlier, the Russian peacekeeping contingent reported that the Russian peacekeeping contingent had set up 25 guard posts in the North (seven posts) and South (18 posts) areas of responsibility, including 14 jointly with the Azerbaijani side. Peacekeepers are taking part in the protection of warehouses with ammunition, weapons, military and special equipment surrendered by the armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh, as stated in the bulletin dated October 9.

The activities of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh will adapt to new conditions against the backdrop of a mass exodus of the population from the region, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said today…

As a result of the virtual capitulation of Stepanakert, Azerbaijan gained control over the region. On September 28, the President of Nagorno-Karabakh signed a decree ending the existence of the republic. After the military operation carried out by Azerbaijan on September 19-20, almost all residents left Nagorno-Karabakh, in which, according to various sources, about 120 thousand people lived…If the Russian peacekeeping contingent leaves Nagorno-Karabakh, it must return to Russia, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said today in an interview with the Public TV Channel when asked about the possibility of deploying peacekeepers in Armenia…On October 5, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed a declaration recognizing the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, including the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh…

Notes:

[i] Russian peacekeepers were deployed as part of the ceasefire agreement that ended the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. For background on the Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh and how Russia uses peacekeeping missions to achieve strategic objectives beyond conflict resolution, see: Matthew Stein “The Evolutionary Russian View Of Peacekeeping As Part Of Modern Warfare,” FMSO’s Foreign Perspectives Brief, 24 March 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/2023-03-24-the-evolutionary-russian-view-of-peacekeeping-as-part-of-modern-warfare-matthew-stein-update/

Image Information:

Image: Map of the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh war showing Azerbaijan day-to-day advances.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2023_Nagorno-Karabakh_War.svg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Russia Signs Agreement To Open Naval Base In Abkhazia

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Map of Russian Black Sea naval bases Sevastopol and Novorossiysk and the proposed base at Ochamchira on disputed Georgian territory.

“The interaction between Moscow and Sukhum in terms of military-technical cooperation is aimed at increasing the level of defense capability of both Russia and Abkhazia, says Bzhania.”

Abkhazia has signed a bilateral agreement to host a Russian naval base near the southern Abkhazian city of Ochamchira. Western observers have interpreted the announcement as proof Ukraine is having success driving Russia’s Black Sea Fleet out of Crimea, while the Russian and Abkhazian press are focused on the regional implications of the proposed Russian naval base.

According to the first excerpted article from the Russian daily Izvestia,[i] the agreement is intended to increase defense cooperation between Russia and Abkhazia, recognized as an independent state by Russia.[ii] However, the second excerpted article from the regionally focused Echo Kavkav points out, Russian coastal patrol boats already use the port at Ochamchira. This port is small in comparison to Novorossiysk, the naval port to which Russia has moved much of its Black Sea fleet after Ukraine demonstrated it is capable of attacking naval assets at Sevastopol on Crimea. According to political figure and Hero of Abkhazia[iii], Aslan Kobakhia, the announcement is part of the information war between pro-Russian Abkhazians and those Abkhazians who prefer a more independent political path for Abkhazia. He noted there has been talk of an expanded base in Ochamchira for years, further observing that “no matter how deep you go, it’s a small port, only a few ships can be there at a time, and large ships cannot base there.” However, Kobakhia did conclude an expanded port at Ochamchira could be used as a vital refueling hub for Russia’s Navy. According to Giva Kvarchia, as quoted in the third excerpted article from the Abkhaz diaspora media website Abkhaz World, the base in Abkhazia would be mutually beneficial as it would be an economic boon to Abkhazia and provide a military advantage to Russia. A base at Ochamchira would also serve as a deterrent against any future military action by Georgia to take back Abkhazia. Kvarchia acknowledged that the base would be provocative and both “a protection and a potential threat.” A Russian naval base in Abkhazia presents an interesting security dilemma for the region. Ukraine has proven capable of attacking Russian naval vessels in Novorossiysk, Russia, and Sevastopol, on the Ukrainian Crimean Peninsula, which has been annexed by Russia. Given that Abkhazia is not Russian territory, any decision to engage the Russian Navy there would necessarily be seen as an attack on the territory.[iv] While, the announcement of the Russian naval base in Abkhazia is merely that, the positioning of additional Russian assets there could impact the operational environment of the whole eastern Black Sea region.

Sources:

“Бжания сообщил о размещении в Абхазии пункта постоянного базирования ВМФ РФ (Bzhania announced the deployment of a permanent base for the Russian Navy in Abkhazia), Izvestia (pro-Kremlin daily newspaper), 05 October 2023. https://iz.ru/1584377/2023-10-05/bzhaniia-soobshchil-o-razmeshchenii-v-abkhazii-punkta-postoiannogo-bazirovaniia-vmf-rf

A new permanent base for the Russian Navy will appear on the Black Sea coast in Abkhazia; a corresponding agreement between Russia and Abkhazia has already been signed, Abkhaz President Aslan Bzhania said in an interview with Izvestia.

“Two states, but we have a common Fatherland”

“On the day of our holiday [in honor of the 30th anniversary of Victory Day in the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992–1993 and Independence Day, which was celebrated on September 30], a small missile ship came to us, we boarded it – a very modern ship with serious combat capabilities . We have signed an agreement, and in the near future there will be a permanent base for the Russian Navy in the Ochamchira region,” Bzhania said.

In addition, the President of the Republic noted that Russia continues to provide support, providing the opportunity for Abkhaz specialists to undergo advanced training in educational institutions of the Russian Federation.

The interaction between Moscow and Sukhum in terms of military-technical cooperation is aimed at increasing the level of defense capability of both Russia and Abkhazia, says Bzhania.

From August 21 to September 1, 2023, joint Russian-Abkhaz military special-purpose, flight and tactical exercises were held in four regions of Abkhazia, aimed at increasing the level of field training of troops and forces, coordinating their actions when performing combat missions.

Russia recognized the sovereignty of Abkhazia on August 26, 2008. This year, ceremonial events were held in the republic in honor of the 15th anniversary of this event. Currently, the Russian and Abkhaz military jointly ensure the security of the republic. Also, the borders of Abkhazia are guarded by the border service of the Russian FSB.

Vitaly Shariya, “Аслан Кобахия: «Шум вокруг Очамчырского морпорта – буря в стакане воды» (Aslan Kobakhia: ‘The noise around the Ochamchira seaport is a storm in a teacup’),” Ekho Kavkaza (regionally specific news source), 12 October 2023. https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/32634876.html

“I’ve been there several times. No matter how deep you go…’It’s a small port. Only a few ships can be there at a time. There are no such opportunities that some people are talking abo–t – they left Sevastopol, they left Novorossiysk… The Russian fleet cannot leave either Sevastopol or Novorossiysk, there are no such opportunities. Five percent of those ships will not fit on the territory of Abkhazia. You need to know a little to speak. There is no place to base large ships there. Ships can enter there, refuel, and go back to sea. The Russian Federation doesn’t comment at all, but here we start, you know, creating a storm in a teacup… Why, I can’t understand.”

“Givi Kvarchia: ‘Military Bases: A Double-Edged Sword of Protection and Threat,’ Abkhaz World (pro-Abkhaz web news service run by Abkhaz diaspora in Europe), 6 October 2023. https://abkhazworld.com/aw/interview/2536-givi-kvarchia-military-bases-a-double-edged-sword-of-protection-and-threat?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

[Q]. Aslan Bzhania also made a statement indicating that Sukhum is prepared to deepen its military-technical cooperation with the Russian Federation, and that a new permanent base for the Russian Navy will be established on the Black Sea coast in Abkhazia. Could you comment on this matter?

[Givi Kvarchia].  As for the enhanced military-technical cooperation between our nations, it is already outlined in the broader alliance and strategic partnership agreement, as well as in interdepartmental agreements between our defence ministries. This ’sn’t a new development; it has been in planning for a long time. Perhaps it h’sn’t proceeded at the pace’we’d desire, especially in terms of military-technical cooperation. Regarding the Ochamchira port and the basing of certain Black Sea Fleet ships or a portion of it there, this ’sn’t new in Abkhazian politics either. Discussions and negotiations about the joint use of the Ochamchira port by the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia have been ongoing for years, and as far as I know, an agreement has been reached to use this port on mutually beneficial terms.

[Q]. Givi, could you elaborate on the essence of the“e “mutually beneficial te”ms”?

[Givi Kvarchia]. The crux of it is that a portion of this port will be used by the Abkhazian side for economic purposes. Meanwhile, another portion will tilizedsed by the Russian Federation for military objectives.

[Q]. Givi, considering the war in Ukraine and recent information that a drone made its way to Sochi, a’en’t you concerned that a Naval base in Ochamchira might pose a security threat to the citizens or the country as a whole? What are your thoughts?[Givi Kvarchia]. Any military base or basing point can serve as both protection and a potential threat. However, our discussions about the Ochamchira port began before the military operation in Ukraine unfolded. To put it simply,’it’s a double-edged sword, but from our perspective, it represents more of a security measure than a threat, in my view.

Notes:

[i] Although Russian media outlet Izvestia broke the story of the proposed Russian naval base at Ochamchira, there was very little additional Russian coverage of the topic. In a separate article from Izvestia, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov deferred on the topic, noting that it was a military issue and inferring that questions about the basing agreement should be directed to the Russian Ministry of Defense, see: “Песков переадресовал вопрос о размещении ВМФ в Абхазии в Минобороны (Peskov forwarded the question about the deployment of the Navy in Abkhazia to the Ministry of Defense), Izvestia, 5 October 2023. https://iz.ru/1584547/2023-10-05/peskov-pereadresoval-vopros-o-razmeshchenii-vmf-v-abkhazii-v-minoborony

[ii] Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, are break-away republics within the Republic of Georgia. Georgia considers both territories occupied by Russia, which is not factually accurate, especially in the case of Abkhazia which has fought to be recognized as an independent state and maintains its own security apparatus. Only a handful of countries have recognized Abkhazia’s independence: Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru and Syria.

[iii] Hero of Abkhazia, much like Hero of the Russian Federation, is a title given to Abkhazians who have performed a heroic deed in the service of the state, usually veterans of the war between Abkhazia and Georgia (1992-1993).

[iv] For more on current Russia-Abkhazia relations see: Dodge Billingsley “Abkhazia Pushes Back Against Russia’s Suggestion Of Incorporation,” OE Watch, 08-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/abkhazia-pushes-back-against-russias-suggestion-of-incorporation/

Image Information:

Image: Map of Russian Black Sea naval bases Sevastopol and Novorossiysk and the proposed base at Ochamchira on disputed Georgian territory.
Source: Combat Films and ResearchAttribution: Combat Films and Research by permission using map data from OpenStreetMap

Russia Continues Investment In Arctic Route Expansion

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“The Russian government decided that a terminal for shipment of zinc and lead will be built in the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya and the Seaport of Arkhangelsk will have its capacity tripled.”

Despite fighting in Ukraine and Western sanctions, Russia continues to push the expansion of its Northern Sea route’s capacity. According to the excerpted article from the Norway-based The Barents Observer, the Russian state’s push followed a significant investment in Arctic infrastructure development by sanctioned Russian oligarch Andrei Patrushev.[i] According to the article, Patrushev will take an ownership stake in the Archangelsk Seaport. Much of the shipping currently goes east to the Russian Far East and China, but many non-European countries are expanding trade with Russia. In the past, President Putin set increased shipping goals for the North Sea Route which have been met. Still, this current goal to increase from 34 million metric tons to 83 million metric tons is quite ambitious. Who the intended customers are, where the demand exists, and what type of goods are still unknown. Much of this cargo will continue to be LNG, coal, oil, timber, grain, and processed metals. Indeed, Russia is investing in its north for the long term, and the Patrushev family seems convinced that it is a good place to invest. Their financing, in tandem with state investment, may provide insight into the relationship between the oligarchs that keep Russia’s economy functioning and the Russian political state.

Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Following Andrei Patrushev’s infrastructure investment comes a major government development plan for seaports in Arkhangelsk and Novaya Zemlya,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 2 October 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2023/10/following-andrei-patrushevs-infrastructure-investment-comes-major

The Russian government decided that a terminal for shipment of zinc and lead will be built in the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya and the Seaport of Arkhangelsk will have its capacity tripled. “The Government continues to systematically develop the Northern Sea Route,” Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin underlined this week as he presented a new infrastructure plan for the north Russian region of Arkhangelsk.

According to the document, the local seaport will have its capacity tripled by 2035.  While it handled 6,5 million tons of goods in 2022, it will be able to handle 25 million tons in 2040.  This should involve major dredging operations in the Northern Dvina river and improved railway connections to the seaport. The construction of the new terminal will be started no later than 2026 and it is to be completed in 2031.  The key commodities  for the new port in Arkhangelsk will be zinc and lead concentrates.  The plan also includes the construction of a terminal in Novaya Zemlya, which is to be ready for operations in 2026.  The construction of the new infrastructure will be covered by non-budgetary funds.

The terminal in the far northern and heavily-militarised archipelago has been under planning for several years. It is due to be built in the Bezimyannaya Bay, not far from the local nuclear weapon test sites.  It will handle ores and concentrate from the Pavlovskoye mine. State nuclear power company Rosatom and its subsidiary First Ore Mining Company are behind the project.

The Russian government’s approval of the infrastructure plan comes only few months after Andrei Patrushev acquired an ownership stake in the Seaport of Arkhangelsk. Andrei Patrushev is the son of Russian national security strongman Nikolai Patrushev.

In early 2023, Patrushev bought a 10 percent stake in the seaport. With the acquisition, Patrushev teamed up with port owners TD Bulat-SBS, Investment Industrial Partner and Vaiz Invest.  The latter reportedly controls 60 percent of the port.

Andrei Patrushev is the youngest son of Nikolai Patrushev, the Russian Security Council Secretary. The Patrushev family is closely associated with the FSB. Andrei Patrushev is a major owner of the Gazprom Shelf Project, a company that has management responsibility for several of Russia’s best Arctic drilling rigs and vessels.  He also controls a major share of Arctic exploration company Marine Arctic Geo Exploration Expedition (MAGE).

Arkhangelsk is one of Russia’s biggest Arctic seaports.  It is extensively used for shipments of goods and construction materials to far northern industrial projects like the Syradasayskoye coal field and Rosneft’s Vostok Oil.As the new federal plan was approved in Moscow, a Chinese cargo ship loaded forestry products from the terminal.  According to regional Governor Aleksandr Tsybulsky, Chinese furniture manufacturers are ready to start shipping up to one million cubic meters of wood products on the Northern Sea Route. The first shipload includes 300 containers sent on the Chinese ship Xin Xin Hai 1

Notes:

[i] See: “The West has imposed a barrage of sanctions on top Russian figures. See how they’re connected to Putin,” The Washington Post, 15 March 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/15/putin-inner-circle-russia/ and the official U.S. government notice; U.S. Treasury Announces Unprecedented & Expansive Sanctions Against Russia, Imposing Swift and Severe Economic Costs, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, 24 February 2022. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0608

Russian Influence Fades in Southern Syria

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A Druze man photographed in Suweida Syria, 2008.

“In the last two years, the decline of the Russian role within Syrian territories has become clear…”

Russia’s fading presence and loss of influence in southern Syria was on display during recent antiregime protests by the ethnoreligious Druze minority group in the Syrian province of Suweida.[i] As of mid-September, the protests had been going on for over a month. Russia, which had previously mediated between the regime and the Druze, was nowhere to be seen.[ii] Suweida’s protest movement—which has ebbed and flowed throughout the civil war—was motivated by longstanding deterioration in living conditions.

A prominent Druze leader, speaking to protesters who had been injured by regime forces in mid-September, placed blame for the unrest on local Iranian agents and allies. As reported in the first excerpt, from the Lebanese news website al-Modon, he accused them of stealing Syrian wealth and brainwashing its citizens with a “subversive” ideology. Russia’s absence from the volatile situation in Suweida is as noteworthy as are the strident accusations made against Iran and its local allies. In 2018, Russia had established itself as an effective mediator between the Syrian regime and Sunni rebels from Daraa, the province immediately to the west of Suweida. Russia did so by bringing rebel factions into a Russia-controlled proxy force known as the “5th Corps.” Two years ago, as reported in the second accompanying excerpt, from Qatar’s al-Jazeera, Russia began handing control of its southern proxies to the Syrian regime, and Iran took advantage of this situation through its influence in Syrian Military Intelligence and the Syrian Army’s 4th Division.[iii] Druze discontent with Iran’s influence rose due to Iranian proxies and allies in the regime extracting scarce resources from Suweida’s economy—including lucrative cross-border smuggling routes into Jordan and the Gulf. In 2022, a group of Druze leaders sought Russian assistance in curbing Iran’s local influence, on the assumption that Russia maintained sway in this part of Syria. In response, Russia sent a group of lowly military police with no decision-making powers, in what was a clear hint of waning Russian influence.[iv] The situation has only become starker with the Suweida protest movement. Indeed, as of mid-September, the Kremlin had made no official statement on the protests in Suweida, and Russian government-linked media blamed them on the United States, as noted in the third accompanying excerpt, also from al-Modon. The Kremlin is no longer able to provide even the illusion of influence in this part of Syria. Iran, for its part, appears to have solidified its influence in the south, but in doing so has made itself increasingly unpopular.

Sources:

“السويداء:الهجري يدعو للجهاد ضد إيران وميليشياتها..بعد استهداف المتظاهرين بالرصاص

(Suweida: al-Hajiri calls for jihad against Iran and its militias… after protesters shot at),” al-Modon (Lebanese news website), 13 September 2023. https://www.almodon.com/arabworld/2023/9/13/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AB-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B9-%D8%A5%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA

He considered that the “security movement” that opened fire on demonstrators in Suwayda was the product of the “corrupt” security services that have been tampering with Syria for years, stressing that the demonstrators should not be drawn into the plan of these agencies to attack the people of Suwayda…

He considered that the authority in Iran is “racist and corrupt” and entered Syria in order to “steal the country and its wealth and change people’s minds in a direction they are not convinced of,” stressing that Iran, its militias, and the Lebanese Hezbollah are “occupiers and we do not accept their presence in Syria…and we announce this publicly.”

كعكة الأسد.. هل يقوي مقتل بريغوجين نفوذ إيران في سوريا؟

(Assad’s cake… will the killing of Prigozhin strengthen Iranian influence in Syria),” al-Jazeera (Qatari news outlet), 6 September 2023. https://www.aljazeera.net/midan/reality/politics/2023/9/6/صراع-حول-كعكة-الأسد-هل-يقوي-مقتل

In the last two years, the decline of the Russian role within Syrian territories has become clear. This was not limited to the disappearance of Russian hopes for reaching a political solution to the war that has been going on for more than ten years, but it also amounted to cutting off Russian support for many of Moscow’s agents in Syria…

The Iranians took advantage of this opportunity in order to remove Russia relatively from the scene and capture former proxies whom the Kremlin could no longer support militarily and financially. This happened with the Syrian regime’s Eighth Brigade, one of the most loyal units to Russia within the armed forces in southern Syria, which was reduced. Russia halved the salaries of its members, and in 2022 it completely stopped communicating with the brigade, which prompted the brigade to work for the Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate, one of Iran’s most powerful agents. At the same time, the National Defense Forces militias east of Deir ez-Zor, led by Hassan al-Ghadhban, separated from Moscow. In favor of the Iranian-backed Fourth Division, after Moscow failed to pay the salaries of the members for a full six months.

“موسكو تقرأ إنتفاضة السويداء..من لبنان

(Moscow reads the Suweida uprising… from Lebanon),” al-Modon (Lebanese news website), 5 September 2023. https://www.almodon.com/opinion/2023/9/5/%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%83%D9%88-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A3-%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86

Although more than two weeks have passed since the Suweida uprising, the Kremlin remains silent about it. 

…

What is relatively new this time in accusing the West of being behind the Suweida uprising is the claim of an American plan to destabilize the region by controlling the network of financial flows linked to the crisis in the Lebanese banking system…

On the first of this month, the Topwar website, which is linked to the Russian Ministry of Defense, published a text regarding the Suwayda uprising entitled “The Syrian Protests and the US Strategy in Lebanon”…

Notes:

[i] The Druze are an esoteric, monotheistic ethnoreligious group that constitute 3 percent of Syria’s population, concentrated in Suweida Province. There are also Druze communities on the Syria-Israel border and in Lebanon. Unlike neighboring Sunni-majority Daraa Province—the heartland of Syria’s rebellion—the Druze-majority province of Suweida carved out an effective position of neutrality in Syria’s civil war. By staking out a neutral position, the Druze effectively became “strategic bedfellows” of the Assad regime. See: Fabrice Balanche. “The Druze and Assad: Strategic Bedfellows,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 20 October 2016. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/druze-and-assad-strategic-bedfellows

[ii] See for instance: “Syrian government releases detainees with Russian mediation in Syria’s Suwayda,” North Press Agency, 11 July 2020. https://npasyria.com/en/44220/

[iii] For more see: Lucas Winter. ”Growing Iranian Influence Near the Border with Israel in Southwest Syria,” OE Watch, March 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/368233

[iv] Key Druze leaders refused to meet with the powerless Russian delegation, which consisted of military police. See: Sources: Eight Demands to Russian Delegation in Suweida,” al-souria.net (Syrian opposition news website) via The Syrian Observer (Syrian media aggregator), 9 August 2022. https://syrianobserver.com/news/77992/sources-eight-demands-to-russian-delegation-in-suweida.html and

السويداء: حركة رجال الكرامة ترفض استقبال وفد روسي

“Suweida: Men of Dignity refuses to meet Russian delegation,” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 10 August 2022. https://tinyurl.com/4tsmy3t2

Image Information:

Image: A Druze man photographed in Suweida Syria, 2008.
Source: CharlesFred, Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/charlesfred/
Attribution: CC 2.0