Tag Archives: Russia

Iran Exports Important Nanotechnology to Russia

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A sampling of nano-tech catalysts.

“Energy imbalance should be considered one of the major national challenges.”

As Iran’s oil fields decline due to decades of use and mismanagement, nanotechnology and the production of industrial catalysts become more important in enabling the extraction of the oil essential for the regime’s survival and the funding of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[i] The excerpted article from semi-official Mehr News Agency is remarkable for its blunt assessment of the current state of Iran’s hydrocarbon extraction industry and its assessment that, absent nanotech catalysts, Iran’s oil production could decline precipitously. The Iranian leadership will be hard-pressed to increase, let alone hold production steady, without laying 2,000 new wells, each of which requires more than a half-year to drill. The recognition of this looming shortfall combined with the Iranian regime’s failure to so far plug the gap either suggests decades-long incompetent management at the highest level and/or that the Iranian oil fields are far more past their prime than the Iranian regime publicly acknowledge.

The Iranian leadership appears in control of the decision to produce certain nanocatalysts. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps controls most of the factories established to produce catalysts reinforces the military’s dominance of Iran’s economy. This highlights the extent to which the command economy controls Iranian development.

The decision to export $20 million in nanocatalysts to Russia is significant for two reasons. First, it reflects the breadth of the military-industrial trade between the two states. Previously, Russia had provided Iran with nuclear technology in support of the Bushehr reactor; now, Iran is returning the favor. Second, Iran and Russia openly collude in efforts to evade sanctions, Iran for terrorism and Russia for its war in Ukraine. Such collusion exposes a loophole when countries respond to adversaries using targeted sanctions. As Iran works increasingly with Russia, North Korea, and perhaps Venezuela, it can conduct sanctioned research or production outside its territory to evade inspectors; likewise, its allies can relocate their own work to Iranian territory to do the same.

Sources:

” صادرات ۲۰ میلیون دلاری نانوکاتالیست‌های ایرانی به روسیه”

(Export of $20 million in Iranian nanocatalysts to Russia),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news agency owned by Iranian government’s Islamic Development Organization), 2 August 2024. https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6182966

The Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution approved the National Document for the Development of Science and Nanotechnology in November 2022. The Development Headquarters for Nano- and Micro-technologies has now published the report on the implementation of this plan through the end of Persian year 1402 [19 March 2024] in six chapters. Considering the importance of technology in the country’s economic development and its great role in improving productivity and creating added value, policy programs have long considered the development of technological capabilities.

Governments employ different policies to develop research and technology. These policies can be divided into two categories. The first are functional or diffusional policies that promote innovation capacity and improve scientific and technological capabilities. The second are targeted or mission-oriented policies that support precise research or the development of needed technology or solve specific problems…. 

“Improving the competitiveness of the oil, gas, and petrochemical industries using nanotechnology” is one of the special missions of the nano-tech headquarters…. Energy imbalance should be considered one of the major national challenges that is becoming increasingly sensitive and complex due to the increasing growth of energy consumption in the country. Achieving a daily production of 5.8 million barrels of oil by 2029 requires the drilling 2,000 new wells in order to resolve the energy imbalance, which is unattainable given the high cost of investment ($160 billion) and the time-consuming drilling (at least 200 days to drill each well). Therefore, there is no choice but to increase the extraction from operational wells, which requires the use of advanced technologies such as nanotechnology. The sanctions imposed on the country and consequently, the lack of supply of catalysts needed by refineries and petrochemicals from abroad, also caused the prioritization of support of projects that solve the aforementioned challenges….

The export of Iranian nanocatalysts to Russia is estimated at $20 million, experts of a knowledge-based company in three Russian steel and petrochemical complexes are setting up catalyst production units for this country, and the world’s largest petrochemical producer of urea and ammonia is also supposed to enter the production circuit with Iranian catalysts. The world’s only catalyst for ethylene production is an acetylene hydrogenation catalyst. This catalyst was placed at the top of the sanctioned goods, and the purpose of this sanction was to hit value-creating companies in the petrochemical industry. The advantages of producing these catalysts in the country are reducing the purchase price (compared to foreign catalysts), increasing the knowledge of Iranian experts, and increasing the production efficiency of important products such as urea, ammonia, and methanol in the country.

Notes:

[i] For previous discussion of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ economic wing, see: Michael Rubin, “The IRGC Wins Multi-Billion Dollar Economic Contracts,” OE Watch, August 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/274485

Image Information:

Image: A sampling of nano-tech catalysts
Source: https://img9.irna.ir/d/r2/2021/05/03/4/166253257.jpg

The Evolution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Ukraine

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A Russian First-Person-View UAV with small payload attached.

“One of the main military-technical components of combat actions in the special military operation in Ukraine is the mass use of unmanned — aircraft and robotic systems.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the monthly journal of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Voyennaya Mysl, discusses the evolution of UAV use since the inception of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine.[i] The article notes that, early in the conflict, UAV use was primarily characterized by reconnaissance and strike missions, carried out by larger UAVs, such as the large Turkish Bayraktar TB2. As the conflict progressed, these types of UAVs were supplanted by small and relatively cheap UAVs, such as the Chinese-manufactured DJI family of commercial drones, also used for reconnaissance or modified to carry explosive devices. Those drones were then complemented by a new class of first-person view (FPV) kamikaze/suicide UAVs that have recently dominated UAV use on the battlefield. Bayraktar TB2 Turkish Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).

Undoubtedly, UAV use is one of the most salient aspects of the current conflict in Ukraine, and it is clear small and relatively cheap UAVs will play a part in future armed conflict. The wide-scale use of UAVs solves a wide range of problems in modern war, such as: providing situational awareness; acquiring and lasing targets; signal retransmission; electronic reconnaissance and warfare; isolating a given area; interfering with supplies, rotations, and evacuations; destroying stationary and moving targets; supporting assault operations; mining, demining of terrain and water obstacles; and resupply. Although large weapon systems have certainly proved their value in Ukraine, these UAVs show that there is also an important role for relatively cheap electronics in the hands of innovative personnel.

Sources:

N.A. Sokolov, “Анализ тенденций применения беспилотных платформ в специальной военной операции (Analysis of trends in the use of unmanned platforms in the special military operation),” Voyennaya Mysl, (Monthly journal of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces),August 2024.  https://vm.ric.mil.ru/upload/site178/PWOpmGbLL3.pdf

The experience of military conflicts and crisis situations of recent decades, the analysis of the actions of terrorist organizations, testify to the increasing role of promising means of conducting armed conflict. One of the main military-technical components of combat actions in the special military operation in Ukraine is the mass use of unmanned ­aircraft and robotic systems.

A special feature of the use of ­unmanned platforms at the initial stage of the special military operation was the widespread use of reconnaissance and strike systems created on the basis of operational-tactical unmanned aircraft of the medium-altitude class.  As in the conflicts in Libya, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh.  The strike loitering munitions class of UAVs were also used ­as part of mixed groups for reconnaissance ­and strike UAVs (Orion, Bayraktar TB2).

Currently, the main ­emphasis in methods and technical means of development and application has shifted towards the mini class and micro class of UAVs, which is due to the massive use of affordable consumer components, and so are being seen in all environments — air, land, and sea.

Small attack UAVs were used to some extent in Libya, Syria, etc. (mainly of Israeli, Turkish, Chinese manufacture), but in the conditions ­of the special military operation, they became the very means that changed the situation on the battlefield.  The increase in the share of aerial UAVs began with the use of civilian products from the well-known Chinese ­company DJI. At the initial ­stage, these UAVs had a number of advantages (flight time, altitude, modular high-resolution optical-electronic modules), but they also had disadvantages associated with their built-in software, which significantly limited their use. The relatively high cost of DJI UAV kits also ­dictated the requirements for their reusability, limiting the range of tasks to observation and one-time drops of combat loads.

The situation with DJI changed with ­the appearance of alternative factory firmware, which removed the altitude restrictions, no-fly zones, and added additional functionality for flight in difficult weather conditions and at night.  The modified firmware currently supports the entire Mavic 3 series of DJI UAVs, including the Classic Рrо, Епterprise, and Matrice 30. After reprogramming, the DJI UAVs are usually used as relatively reusable reconnaissance and surveillance assets (day and night); as part of reconnaissance and strike loops, including systems that have wired power sources that can provide constant situational awareness; electronic warfare systems; and repeaters for other UAVs…

However, the most widespread class of airborne UAVs during the special military operation are the kamikaze UAVs, also known as FPV UAV (from English – “first person view”), or simply FPV. From the point of view of an external observer, these devices are controlled by their operator as an “avatar”, from the point of view of the operator himself — immersively, with the operator immersed in reality, as broadcast “from the point of view” of the UAV. FPV UAVs are used, as a rule, together with homemade munitions or standard munitions, which are modified for use with UAVs.  The use of FPV UAVs is characterized by flight ranges up to 20 km (with a repeater), and with an average aloft time of up to 10 minutes. 

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Russian First-Person-View UAV with small payload attached.
Source: https://tinyurl.com/44sn36pk

Russian Duma to Strengthen Pro-Kremlin Youth Movements

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First meeting of the patriotic youth movement called Yunarmiya 2 June 2016.

“One of the areas of youth policy will be devoted to developing the readiness of young people to fulfill their constitutional duty to protect the Fatherland.”

The Russian State Duma announced on Telegram it will be transforming its Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, or Rosmolodyozh, into a larger body to strengthen and consolidate the country’s youth ideological education initiatives, from kindergarten to higher education. According to the excerpted 12 September post, the Duma introduced a draft law titled “On Systematizing the Sphere of Youth Policy” to instill “a willingness in young people to fulfill their constitutional duty to defend the Fatherland.” The restructuring may signal a need to whip up patriotism and pro-Kremlin ideology in younger generations, as the Kremlin looks to rally more support for its “special military operation” in Ukraine, especially after the Ukrainian Army’s incursion into Kursk and the potential use of longer-range missiles into Russian territory.

Modern Russian state support of youth movements has historical roots and contemporary benefits. The youth movements are a modern analog to the Soviet-era “pioneer camps” that indoctrinated young Russians with Leninist dogma. In recent years, a number of patriotic youth movements backed by the Ministry of Defense emerged to educate youth about Russian and Soviet history.[i] In Fall 2023, the Kremlin held a nationwide school lesson to teach children that Russian elections were free and fair.[ii]  Prior to that, in 2022, the Russian government launched an outfit called The Movement of the First, a pro-Kremlin youth movement aimed at “preparing children and youth for a full-fledged life in society, including shaping their world views on the basis of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” and instilling “love and respect for the Homeland.”[iii] The former head of this movement, Grigory Gurov, will lead the newly restructured Rosmolodyozh.[iv] The latest restructuring may indicate an unease among Russian leaders about the “forever war” in Ukraine and the need to recruit more young conscripts. The move could also signal flagging domestic support for the war. Surveys suggest that two out of three Russians support it,[v] yet these polls may not reflect the true sentiment of most Russians, including Russian youth.

Sources:

Artem Metelev (a member and spokesperson of the State Duma), post on Telegram (a social messaging app) from 2 September 2024. https://t.me/artemmetelev/7162

The special military operation and modern challenges make logical adjustments to the state youth policy. Patriotic education of youth has always been a priority. We propose to reflect new tasks and work tools in federal legislation.

After the adoption of our law this fall:

• Patriotic clubs, historical and local history and search organizations, specialized military-patriotic centers will receive priority support from the state;

• One of the areas of youth policy will be devoted to developing the readiness of young people to fulfill their constitutional duty to protect the Fatherland;

• The effectiveness of patriotic work will be analyzed as part of annual monitoring;

• A set of measures to educate youth in citizenship, patriotism, respect for history and readiness to serve their country will be approved at the federal and regional levels.

Notes:

[i] Evan Gershkovich, Russia’s Fast-Growing ‘Youth Army’ Aims to Breed Loyalty to Fatherland,” The Moscow Times, 17 April 2019. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/17/russias-fast-growing-youth-army-aimst-to-breed-loyalty-to-the-fatherland-a65256

[ii] Pyotr Kozlov, “As Putin’s Re-election Looms, Kremlin Pushes to Indoctrinate a New Generation of Voters,” The Moscow Times, 29 September 2023. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/09/29/as-putins-re-election-looms-kremlin-pushes-to-indoctrinate-a-new-generation-of-voters-a82580

[iii] Website of Movement of the First. http://wefirst.ru

[iv] Maxim Ivanov, Elena Mukhametshina, “Новым начальником Росмолодежи может стать глава «Движения первых» Григорий Гуров” (“The head of the ‘Movement of the First’ Grigory Gurov may become the new head of Rosmolodezh”), Vedemosti (Moscow-based business newspaper) 12 September 2024. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2024/09/12/1061695-novim-glavoi-rosmolodezhi-mozhet-stat-glava-dvizheniya-pervih

[v] Vladimir Milov, “How Strong is Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine?”Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert blog, 9 January 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-strong-is-russian-public-support-for-the-invasion-of-ukraine-2/

Image Information:

Image: First meeting of the patriotic youth movement called Yunarmiya 2 June 2016.
Source: Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, https://tinyurl.com/2×725577

Russia Conducts Its Largest Naval Exercise in More Than 30 Years

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Russian Buyan-M corvette Uglich of the Caspian Flotilla firing countermeasures during maneuvers part of Ocean-2024. Note the letter “Z” in reference to forces involved in the invasion of Ukraine. The Caspian is essentially a Russian lake, the only other significant naval power in the Caspian is Iran and most of Iran’s naval forces are deployed and focused on the contentious Middle East.

“The maneuvers… involve more than 400 warships, submarines and auxiliary fleet support vessels, more than 120 aircraft and helicopters of the naval aviation of the Navy and the Aerospace Forces, about 7,000 units of weapons, military and special equipment, as well as more than 90 thousand personnel.”

Russia conducted its largest naval exercise in more than 30 years, likely to dispel the notion of its failures against Ukraine in the Black Sea.[i] According to the excerpted article by Russian flagship news outlet Ria Novosti, the exercise, known as Ocean-2024 strategic command and staff exercise, took place across the globe, with maneuvers in the Pacific and Arctic Oceans, the Mediterranean, Caspian, and Baltic Seas.[ii]

The Novosti article claims Ocean-2024 maneuvers involved more than 400 vessels and more than 90,000 personnel. Four Chinese naval vessels also participated in Ocean-2024, part of the Pacific Fleet maneuvers. Scenarios included fighter interception of hostile aircraft intent on bombing the surface fleet. In the case highlighted, the attack aircraft was an IL-38 anti-submarine maritime patrol aircraft—no match for the MiG-31BMs sent to intercept. The tactics practiced were tried-and-true naval drills, reflecting long-standing naval threats that still exist but do not consider the ongoing evolution in naval warfare, including drone and counter-drone scenarios, the types of naval warfare that have proved devastating to Russia’s Navy in the Black Sea. While prudent to train in general naval combat operations, Moscow’s failure to reset the exercise to reflect the current and future threat environment begs the question if Ocean-2024 was more a public relations operation, especially in the wake of the U.S.-led RIMPAC naval exercise earlier in the year.  Russia’s Ocean-2024 is likely serves as a morale booster for its Navy at a time when it has not been able to restore any operational capability in the Black Sea.

Sources:

“МиГ-31БМ перехватили условного противника на учениях “Океан-2024” (MiG-31BM intercepted a mock enemy during the Ocean-2024 exercises),” Ria Novosti (mainstream Russian media outlet), 15 September 2024. https://ria.ru/20240915/istrebiteli-1972773873.html

MOSCOW, 15 Sep – RIA Novosti. A pair of MiG-31BM interceptors intercepted a mock enemy over the neutral waters of the Sea of Japan as part of the Ocean-2024 exercises, the Russian Defense Ministry reported.

“A pair of high-altitude MiG-31BM interceptor fighters, while performing a flight mission to provide fighter-air cover for the Pacific Fleet’s naval strike group over the neutral waters of the Sea of Japan, intercepted a mock enemy as part of the Okean-2024 strategic command and staff exercise,” the statement said.

It is noted that as part of the exercise, the role of an airspace violator was played by an Il-38 aircraft, which attempted to approach a detachment of naval ships to launch a bomb strike on it. And the crews of the MiG-31BM interceptor fighters, having received coordinates from the radio engineering units, took off from one of the airfields, reached the designated area and independently classified the target, after which they launched long-range tactical air-to-air missiles at it.

“After completing the task, the crews of the fighters practiced elements of air combat with mock enemy fighters performing cover missions “enemy” bombers,” the ministry added.

Russian Navy formations and units began the Okean-2024 strategic command and staff exercises on Tuesday, which will last until September 16. The exercises are being held in a bilateral format under the general leadership of the Navy Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Alexander Moiseyev.

The maneuvers, which will take place in the waters of the Pacific and Arctic Oceans, the Mediterranean, Caspian and Baltic Seas, involve more than 400 warships, submarines and auxiliary fleet support vessels, more than 120 aircraft and helicopters of the naval aviation of the Navy and the Aerospace Forces, about 7,000 units of weapons, military and special equipment, as well as more than 90 thousand personnel.

“Ocean” is the code name for naval exercises conducted by the General Command of the USSR Navy in 1970, 1975, 1977, 1983 and 1985. The “Ocean” exercises (maneuvers) were the largest operational and combat training events of the USSR Navy in the post-war period and the largest in world history for their time.

Notes:

[i] For a western perspective on Ocean-2024, see: “Ocean-2024 – Russian Navy Flexes Its Muscles, China Assists,” Naval News (Europe based naval focused news service), 13 September 2024. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/ocean-2024-russian-navy-flexes-its-muscles-china-assists/

[ii] Notably, no maneuvers took place in the Black Sea, once a naval strongpoint for Russia built upon its Black Sea Fleet, but now under constant threat from Ukrainian naval drones. Ukrainian surface drones have wreaked enough havoc and forced Moscow to redeploy and scatter its Black Sea Fleet to various ports on the eastern Black Sea.

Image Information:

Image: Russian Buyan-M corvette Uglich of the Caspian Flotilla firing countermeasures during maneuvers part of Ocean-2024. Note the letter “Z” in reference to forces involved in the invasion of Ukraine. The Caspian is essentially a Russian lake, the only other significant naval power in the Caspian is Iran and most of Iran’s naval forces are deployed and focused on the contentious Middle East.
Source: Russian Ministry of Defence, published by Naval News, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/ocean-2024-russian-navy-flexes-its-muscles-china-assists/

Nigerian Security Services Crackdown on Russian Flag Protesters

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Protests against the corruption of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Lagos in the past resemble the current protests across Nigeria over hardship and hunger, but the sight of Russian flags as an anti-government symbol in the north is a radically new development.

“The nationwide protests against hardship and hunger took a dangerous dimension, with protesters in some Northern states waving the Russian flag….”

Russian influence in Francophone West African countries that have experienced military coups in the last few years is a clear trendline. One of the most notable examples of this influence has been the expansion of the Wagner Group – or Africa Corps as the company is now known – in the region. However, the excerpted punch.ng report about Russian flags being seen at anti-government protests in northern Nigeria is a new and unexpected development, and a possible indication that Russian information operations are contributing to a positive image of Russia in parts of Nigeria. This is despite Russia’s dubious counter-insurgency record in the Sahel and its support for anti-democratic military juntas in West Africa.[i] According to the article, certain northern elite politicians provided Russian flags to #EndBadGovernance protesters, who are disappointed with the government’s inability to address hunger and hardship in the country. The article further suggests that these elites seek to remove the current Nigerian president, Bola Tinubu, from power. The Russian flags served as a threat to Tinubu’s administration that what happened to leaders deposed in coups in Francophone West Africa could occur in Nigeria as well. According to the article, the response of the Nigerian military to these Russian flags could lead to an excessive reaction towards the flag holders and their alleged sponsors. The military has a history of cracking down on dissent with excessive violence.[ii] The article quotes top military officials as stating the protesters holding the Russian flags are treasonous could indicate harsh action will be taken against them, including at least 10 protesters and flag makers who have already been arrested.

Sources:

“Russian flag: FG probes four northern political bigwigs,” punch.ng (Lagos-based publication with a southern Nigerian perspective often critical of the government and northern Nigerian powerbrokers) 7 August 2024. https://punchng.com/russian-flag-fg-probes-four-northern-political-bigwigs/

The nationwide protests against hardship and hunger took a dangerous dimension, with protesters in some Northern states waving the Russian flag as they chanted “Tinubu must go.” Russia, an Eastern power currently mired in a cold war with the West, has been blamed for several unconstitutional changes of government in West African countries such as Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and among others. The Nigerian military said persons flying the Russian flag were committing treason and will, therefore, be “prosecuted”.

This act not only disrespects our national symbols but also commits treasonable felony and related offences. Hence, 10 suspects were arrested flying Russian flags,” Public Relations Officer ASP Buhari Abdullahi stated while parading the suspects.

Notes:

[i] See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Mali: Army, Wagner Group Atrocities Against Civilians,” 28 March 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/28/mali-army-wagner-group-atrocities-against-civilians

[ii] Just five years ago, in 2019, for example, the Nigerian military cracked down on the Shia Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and killed several dozen of its members who had been protesting in the streets and nearly killed their leader, Ibrahim al-Zakaky. He was forced to recover from his injuries while under long-term house arrest. See Faiza Mawani, “Persecution of the Shia Islamic Movement of Nigeria,” October 19, 2020, UAB Institute for Human Rights Blog. https://sites.uab.edu/humanrights/2020/10/19/persecution-of-the-shia-islamic-movement-of-nigeria/

OE Watch Insight:

NGA protesters with RUS flags during anti-govt protests indicate desire to remove NGA president from office as has occurred in other Sahelian states. NGA mil officials allege northern elites sponsor the flags but risk excessively cracking down on flagholders for their “treason.”


Image Information:

Image: Protests against the corruption of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Lagos in the past resemble the current protests across Nigeria over hardship and hunger, but the sight of Russian flags as an anti-government symbol in the north is a radically new development.
Source: TobiJamesCandids, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Protest_against_the_Special_Anti-Robbery_Squad_(SARS)_in_Lagos,_Nigeria.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Armenia Continuing Its Move Away From Russian Reliance

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French Caesar self-propelled howitzer fires into the Middle Euphrates River Valley, 2 December 2018.

“Yerevan and Paris signed a contract for the supply of Caesar self-propelled artillery units, French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said.”

Armenia continues taking steps away from Russia by working with other partners. The majority of Armenia’s weapons inventory is made up of Russian systems, leaving the Armenian government largely reliant on Russia. However, the accompanying excerpted articles report that Armenia reached a military-technical cooperation agreement with France in June 2024. The first excerpted article from the independent Russian-language news website Eurasia Daily reports that Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyansigned a military-technical cooperation agreement with the French company KNDS during his visit to France in June. The article notes that Papikyan also met with his French counterpart during his visit, but the details of their meeting were not disclosed. It is also mentioned that Armenia purchased French armored personnel carriers and radar systems in the past year, with negotiations still underway for Armenia to acquire the Mistral 3 short-range air defense system.

The second excerpted article from the independent news website Kavkazskiy Uzel reports that the meeting between the defense ministers of Armenia and France resulted in an agreement for Armenia to purchase an unknown number of French CAESAR 155mm self-propelled artillery systems. The article also includes a statement from Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan that Armenia has significantly reduced its military-technical cooperation with Russia since 2020.[i] Overall, Armenia’s recent acquisition of the French CAESAR 155mm artillery provides another system of non-Russian origin for the country’s inventory in the short-term, while the military-technical agreement with France could provide additional systems over the next several years. Both will help Armenia rely less on Russia going forward.[ii]

Sources:

“Армения и Франция достигли новых договорённостей в сфере ВТС (Armenia and France reached a new agreement on military-technical cooperation),” Eurasia Daily (an independent Russian-language news website), 18 June 2024.

https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2024/06/18/armeniya-i-franciya-dostigli-novyh-dogovoryonnostey-v-sfere-vts

As part of a working visit of Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan to France, an agreement on military-technical cooperation (MTC) was signed between the Ministry of Defense of the Armenia and the military-industrial company KNDS on 17 June…

Before that, Suren Papikyan met with his French counterpart Sebastien Lecornu…The parties noted the importance of military-technical cooperation, around which new agreements were reached, the Armenian Defense Ministry reported, without disclosing their content…

In October 2023, in Paris, the Ministers of Defense of Armenia and France signed agreements on the supply of weapons to Armenia. France has already supplied Armenia with 24 Bastion armored personnel carriers, with another 26 combat vehicles in the production stage. Yerevan has also placed an order for three GM200 radars, and negotiations are underway on the supply of Mistral 3 portable anti-aircraft missile systems…

“Армения договорилась с Францией о поставке самоходок Caesar (Armenia reached an agreement with France on the delivery of the self-propelled Caesar),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website reporting on the Caucasus), 18 June 2024.

https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/401043

Yerevan and Paris signed a contract for the supply of Caesar self-propelled artillery units, French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said. The document was signed during the visit of Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan to France…

The Caesar self-propelled artillery unit is equipped with a 155-mm cannon and is capable of hitting targets at a distance of 40 kilometers…

In March, Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan noted that since 2020, Russia’s share in military-technical cooperation has decreased from 96% to less than 10%…

Notes:

[i] In the years since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in November 2020, the government of Armenia stated that it will reduce the number of weapon systems it acquires from Russia, because it does not believe Russia has been a reliable partner.

[ii] Armenia has acquired a few weapon systems from India in the years since, but these were not part of a long-term agreement with India. The systems from India included counter battery radar, multiple rocket launchers, and towed 155mm artillery. For more information on Armenia’s acquisitions of new weapon systems from India, see: Matthew Stein, “Armenia Takes Another Step Away From Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023.
https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/armenia-takes-another-step-away-from-russia/

OE Insight Summary:

In June 2024, ARM signed a military-technical agreement with FRA, including for the purchase of CAESAR artillery systems. The move marked another example of ARM moving away from RUS as a security cooperation partner since 2023.

Image Information:

 Image: French Caesar self-propelled howitzer fires into the Middle Euphrates River Valley, 2 December 2018.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:French_Caesar_self-propelled_howitzer_in_Iraq.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Russia’s Africa Corps Personnel Redeploy From the Sahel to Kursk

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Russian Wagner fighters have been active along the border of Belarus since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2021, but now they are operating along the border with Ukraine, including some who reportedly returned to Russia from Africa.

“He emphasized that the Wagner fighters are returning to Russia, which means that they are being transferred from foreign missions.”

On 28 July, Tuareg rebels in the Coordination of Azawad Movements, a mostly secular Tuareg ethnonationalist militant and political coalition, together with the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), massacred dozens of Africa Corps fighters (formerly the Wagner Group) and Malian soldiers in northern Mali near the Algerian border.[i] This was the most severe loss of life in a battle for Africa Corps since the mercenary contingent increased its presence on the continent in 2020. It would be politically untenable for Russia to reveal weakness and pressure Africa Corps to fully cut and run from its mission in Mali. However, this disaster in northern Mali and the simultaneous difficulties Russia is facing in responding to the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk on Russian territory could lead to the redeployment of Africa Corps fighters from Mali and the Sahel region to Kursk. This, in turn, could result in a reduction of Russian counter-insurgency support to Mali and Sahelian states, which are already being engulfed by JNIM and its rival Islamic State in Greater Sahara.

This possibility is furthered in the pro-Russian government Russian-language website gazeta.ru, which reported that the Ukrainian offensive into Russia’s Kursk oblast is requiring Russia to call for assistance from Africa Corps. The article notes that Wagner Group, forces are returning from missions abroad to Ukraine and highlights how many Africa Corps fighters died in the ambush by Tuareg rebels and JNIM in Mali on 28 July. It further implies, based on a message from a prominent Russian Telegram user, that Africa Corps fighters who participated in conflicts in Africa would be among those transferred to Kursk. While details about this transfer are scant in the gazeta.ru article, such reports have also emerged from Russian-language websites critical of the Russian government. The second excerpted article in the Moscow Times also claims that Africa Corps fighters are being transferred from Africa to Kursk. The article emphasized that Africa Corps forces were previously sent to “distant” African countries, including Mali, where the junta leader extended the group’s contract. However, after the Russian Army’s encirclement in Kursk, those same forces are needed on the Russian home front. It remains unclear how this massacre and the fighting in Kursk will ultimately affect Africa Corps, but it is likely Africa Corps’ presence—and certainly its confidence—is less sustainable now than at any time in the recent past.

Sources:

“Бойцы «ЧВК Вагнер» прибыли в Курскую область. Что происходит в регионе на четвертые сутки боев? (Wagner ‘PMC fighters’ arrived in Kursk Oblast. What is happening in the region on the fourth day of fighting?),” www.gazeta.ru (Russian-language website that tends to be pro-Russian government but with a focus on social issues often more than politics) 9 August 2024. https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2024/08/09/19545865.shtml

Wagner PMC fighters and Akhmat special forces arrived in Kursk Oblast to join the battles against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The situation in the region is tense: a State of Smergency was declared, and border area residents of were evacuated. President Putin ordered that help be provided to the population.

Wagner PMC fighters arrived in Kursk Oblast and entered into battles against the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Sudzha, the SHOT Telegram channel reported. The total number of fighters sent to the combat zone was not specified. According to the channel, brigades of the Ministry of Defense’s volunteer corps are also joining in the fighting.

Military correspondent Yegor Guzenko, who publishes under the pseudonym Thirteenth, also reported that fighters from Wagner PMC were sent to the Kursk region. He emphasized that the fighters are returning to Russia, which means that they are being transferred from foreign missions. Recently, Wagner PMC fighters participated in African conflicts, and especially fought against the Tuaregs in Mali. As a result of these battles, the PMC endured losses, which numbered several dozen people.

В Курскую область начали перебрасывать бойцов «Вагнера» из Африки (Wagner fighters from Africa began being transferred to Kursk region), Moscow Times (independent Russian bi-lingual on-line newspaper previously located in Russia, but since relocated to Amsterdam to avoid government sensorship), 8 August 2024. https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2024/08/08/vkurskuyu-oblast-nachali-perebrasivat-boitsov-vagnera-izafriki-a138964

Russia is transferring Wagner PMC fighters from Africa to the Kursk region amid a successful offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the region, Z-blogger and the Telegram channel “Novorossiya Militia Reports” claim.

At the end of July in Mali, a contingent of government troops and Russian Wagner fighters near the border with Algeria were ambushed by Tuareg rebels. During the battle, Wagner and government troops were destroyed, and the losses of the Russian PMCs alone, according to various sources, may have reached 80 people.

Notes:

[i] Both al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM and the Tuareg rebel group Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) claimed the massacre of Wagner and Malian army fighters. However, both groups denied any cooperation with each other due to their conflicting Islamist and secular ethno-nationalist ideologies, respectively, if not also the CMA’s desire to receive international support for its cause, which would be jeopardized by any association with an al-Qaeda affiliate. See “Au Mali, le lourd revers des mercenaires russes de Wagner (In Mali, a large setback for Wagner’s Russian mercenaries),” Le Figaro, 29 July 2024. lefigaro.fr/international/au-mali-le-lourd-revers-des-mercenaires-russes-de-wagner-20240729

OE Watch Insight:

Former RUS Wagner paramilitary forces, now referred to as Africa Corps, have been redeployed from MLI to RUS in wake of UKR invasion of RUS’s Kursk region.


Image Information:

Image: Russian Wagner fighters have been active along the border of Belarus since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2021, but now they are operating along the border with Ukraine, including some who reportedly returned to Russia from Africa.
Source: Информационное агентство БелТА, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PMC_wagner_in_belarus_3.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

China and Russia Expand Agreement for Arctic Strategic Resource Development

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Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker, the Sabir, in Arctic waters. The Sabir is operated by Rosatom, which was appointed administrative control of the Northern Sea Route infrastructure in 2018.

“The Chinese company will be a main partner in the development of the major lithium field located in the far northern Russian region.”

Russia has signed an agreement with China to partner in the development of a major lithium field in Russia’s far north according to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer. It is likely that Russia would like to mine its lithium fields on its own, but the contract demonstrates Russia’s need for a partner. China has already partnered with Russia for Arctic development of oil, LNG, and other resources. The agreement gives China some latitude to exploit territory it would not otherwise have access. At the same time, Russia would be hard-pressed to develop the lithium field without outside capital investment that only China can provide at this time. The partnership agreement also comes at a time when China has shown it is eager to expand its presence in the Arctic and gain access to unexploited Arctic resources.[i]

Sources:

Atle Staalesen and Denis Zagore, “Chinese Developers come to mine lithium in Murmansk”, The Berents Observer,(independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 1 August 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2024/08/chinese-developers-come-lithium-mine-murmansk

The company MCC International Incorporation Ltd will join the development of the Kolmozerskoye lithium resources in the Kola Peninsula. The Chinese company will be a main partner in the development of the major lithium field located in the far northern Russian region. The company will take part in exploration of resources, development of technology, as well as production, the Russian license holder stated. The accompanying Nornickel Telegram photo is captioned “Hun Ventao, Vice President of Chinese company MCC International Incorporation Ltd signs deal with Igor Demidov, head of the Polar Lithium.”

The Russian edition of the Barents Observer reports that the Kolmozerskoye field is owned by Polar Lithium, a company controlled by Nornickel and Rosatom’s ore mining division. Nornickel’s Telegram channel stated that “The MCC International knows how to project mine processing plants, it possesses its own ore enrichment and lithium production technology.”

The Chinese company will reportedly also take part in the development of battery production.  “The experienced Chinese partner will help us more quickly create a high-tech battery industry in Russia,” according to Nornickel.

According to the developers, the new mine and processing plant are planned to be ready for production in year 2030. It is to be able to annually process up to 2 million tons of ore and produce 45,000 tons of lithium hydroxide and carbonate.

Nornickel is running the major nickel and copper mines and metallurgical plants in and around Monchegorsk, Kola Peninsula. The joint venture with Rosatom’s ore mining division was established in 2021.

Notes:

[i] See: Les Grau, “Chinese Icebreaker Sails to The Arctic,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-icebreaker-sails-to-the-arctic/

OE Insight Summary:

CHN and RUS will partner to mine lithium in the Arctic, giving CHN additional access to the Arctic, while providing RUS a much-needed partner.

Image Information:

Image: Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker, the Sabir, in Arctic waters. The Sabir is operated by Rosatom, which was appointed administrative control of the Northern Sea Route infrastructure in 2018.
Source: https://c4.wallpaperflare.com/wallpaper/645/918/543/the-ocean-sea-icebreaker-the-ship-wallpaper-preview.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Russian Security Forces Face Rise of Domestic Terrorism Threats

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Russian Ministry of Emergency firefighters standing outside Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, site of a March 2024 terrorism attack.

In June, the FSB’s director, Aleksandr Bortnikov, revealed that the agency had prevented a total of 134 acts of terrorism and sabotage in central Russia alone since the outbreak of the conflict between Moscow and Kiev in February 2022. The country’s security agencies have also dismantled 32 international terrorist cells operating in the country over this period, he stated.

Russia’s Investigative Committee and the Federal Security Service (FSB) announced in early August it had foiled a plot by two Russian religious preachers to recruit fighters of the Islamic State (formerly ISIS) to carry out terrorist attacks inside the country. The plan was to enlist 19 Russian nationals living in the Tyumen region to join a jihadi movement in Syria. According to the excerpted article in the pro-Kremlin Russian news site RT, one of the suspects made public statements condoning terrorism and they urged Russians to send donations to ISIS, which violates Russian laws on material support of terrorism.

This comes amid a new report by the Interior Ministry of the highest number of terrorist crimes in Russia recorded in over two decades, as reported in the second excerpted article, also published by RT. Between January and June of 2024, some 1,651 crimes were reported, a nearly 40 percent spike over the same period the previous year.  In June the director of the FSB, Aleksandr Bortnikov, announced that his agency had foiled 134 acts of terrorism or sabotage this year in central Russia alone, as well as 32 international terrorist cells operating in the country. Even a youth wrestling coach born in Tajikistan was arrested in July for suspicion of abetting terrorist groups.[i] The following month, Ukrainian forces launched an incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, what constituted, according to Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “acts of terrorism.”[ii] Prior to that, last March, one of the deadliest terror attacks in Russia’s history occurred, after four gunmen shot up a concert venue outside Moscow, killing 145, before setting the building on fire. The gunmen were linked to a terrorist outfit known as Islamic State-Khorasan.

The rise in jihadi attacks is due to several factors, including an overextension of Russia’s roughly 360,000-strong Rosgvardiya, or Russian National Guard, a number of whom were carrying out rear-guard missions in Ukraine even before the latest incursion into Kursk.[iii]  The ability to respond to Ukrainian operations and simultaneously address Islamist extremist groups will stretch the Rosgvardiya and Russia’s domestic intelligence services even further.

Sources:

“ISIS recruiters arrested in Russia – security officials,” RT (formerly Russia Today, a Kremlin-back news outlet), 5 August 2024. https://www.rt.com/russia/602155-isis-recruiters-arrested-siberia/

The arrest warrants were executed in Tyumen Region in Western Siberia, Russia’s Investigative Committee and the Federal Security Service (FSB) jointly reported. The two individuals are accused of committing crimes between February 2015 and November 2022.

According to investigators, the pair convinced 19 people living in the region to join jihadists in Syria. One of the suspects allegedly made public statements condoning terrorism. Both urged people to send donations to IS, which amounted to material support of terrorism under Russian law, the statements claimed. Footage released by the FSB indicated that the suspects did not resist arrest. Neither agency has named them.

IS originated from radical Islamist forces in Iraq and came to international prominence after gaining strength in 2014, when it capitalized on the lack of security in the country as well as the turmoil in neighboring Syria. The jihadists’ lightning offensive that year allowed them to capture Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, as well as large swathes of territory in Syria.

The group has since been largely defeated militarily and fractured under local and international pressure, though some splinters remain active, particularly in Afghanistan. Terrorist cells affiliated with IS remain a threat in southern parts of Russia.

“Russia reports record level of terrorism,” RT, (formerly Russia Today, a Kremlin-back news outlet), 3 August 2024. https://www.rt.com/russia/602085-russia-terrorism-crimes-surge/

According to a document posted to the ministry’s official website earlier this week, 1,651 crimes classified as terrorism were recorded in the country in January-June 2024, a nearly 40% increase over the same period in 2023. The ministry noted that for the same period from 2006 to 2023, the figure did not reach 1,400. The previous record high was registered in the first half of 2022, when 1,332 terrorism-linked crimes were recorded.

Crimes associated with extremist activities have also reached a record high. From January to June, 819 such crimes were registered, a nearly 12% increase year-on-year. This figure had not surpassed 800 since 2018.

Crimes designated as terror-linked in Russia include making preparations for carrying out a terrorist attack, public calls for terrorism and justification of terrorism, as well as hostage-taking. Extremist crimes include those committed on the basis of political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred, or enmity towards any social group.

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) routinely makes public information on foiled terror plots, often describing the suspects as people linked with either Islamist terrorist groups or Ukrainian nationalists or collaborators.

In June, the FSB’s director, Aleksandr Bortnikov, revealed that the agency had prevented a total of 134 acts of terrorism and sabotage in central Russia alone since the outbreak of the conflict between Moscow and Kiev in February 2022. The country’s security agencies have also dismantled 32 international terrorist cells operating in the country over this period, he stated.Russia saw one of the deadliest terror attacks in its history this past March, when four gunmen went on a shooting rampage at the Crocus City Hall concert venue outside Moscow. The attackers shot everyone in sight before setting the building on fire. The tragedy left 145 people dead and over 500 injured. A terrorist organization known as Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K) claimed responsibility for the attack, but the FSB has alleged that Kiev was behind the massacre, possibly using Islamists as proxies.

Notes:

[i] “Russian youth wrestling coach changed with terrorism offenses,” RT, 4 July 2024. https://www.rt.com/russia/600432-russian-wrestling-coach-terrorism/

[ii] “Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s comment on events around Ukraine,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 14 August 2024. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1965546/

[iii] Mark Galeotti, “In Moscow’s Shadows,” Episode 153: Geopolitics, Nepotism, Terrorism, and Sabotage, 30 June 2024. https://inmoscowsshadows.buzzsprout.com/1026985/15334481-in-moscow-s-shadows-153-geopolitics-nepotism-terror-and-assassination-all-the-nice-things

OE Insight Summary: 

The breakup of an alleged Islamic State recruitment ring in western Siberia has rattled RUS security forces, given the country’s recent spike in terrorist attacks.

Image Information:

Image: Russian Ministry of Emergency firefighters standing outside Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, site of a March 2024 terrorism attack.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2024_Crocus_City_Hall_terrorist_attack_5.jpg
Attribution: Пресс-служба Губернатора Московской области (Press Office for Governor of Moscow Oblast)

Russia Creating New Officer Academies to Support Armed Forces Expansion

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Saratov Higher Artillery Command School.

“Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order to establish the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School.”

In December 2022, Russia announced that it would increase the number of uniformed personnel in the Ministry of Defense from approximately 1 million to 1.5 million personnel at a Collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense, attended by President Putin, former Minister of Defense General Shoigu, and Chief of the General Staff General Gerasimov.[i]  At this event, and by way of subsequent pronouncements, Russia has made it clear that it will not revert back to its previous end strength when its special military operation ends.[ii] Although Russia has had to resort to partial mobilization to fill its ranks for the ongoing war in Ukraine, permanently raising the end-strength to 1.5 million will almost certainly entail recruiting more contract personnel and increasing the standard one-year conscription period to two years. It will also involve adding additional officers. In the Soviet/Russian system, inducting and training enlisted personnel can be done relatively quickly, but officer accessions are a different matter. Officers are typically only trained at specialized 4-to-5-year academies making the officer creation pipeline a long one.  This is problematic for Russia, as it shuttered many officer academies during major reforms in the early 2010s, so it does not have institutional training capacity to train the necessary number of officers for a 1.5 million personnel force.  The accompanying excerpted article from Russian newspaper Izvestiya, discusses how Russia is reopening military officer academies to support an expansion of the force that will likely not be fully implemented until well after the special military operation ends.

Sources:

“Мишустин поручил создать Саратовское высшее артиллерийское командное училище (Mishustin orders creation of Saratov Higher Artillery Command School),” Izvestiya (daily Russian newspaper), 8 July 2024.  https://iz.ru/1724553/2024-07-08/mishustin-poruchil-sozdat-saratovskoe-vysshee-artilleriiskoe-komandnoe-uchilishche

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order to establish the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School. The document was signed on July 6 and published on the official legal information portal on July 8.

“To create a federal state military educational institution of higher education, the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School, of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation,” the document states.

The staffing level of military and civilian personnel at the school should be 6,000 personnel…Several more military academies may be created in Ulyanovsk. As Governor Alexey Russkikh reported on social networks in February, the issue has already been discussed with representatives of the Ministry of Defense. Thus, an inter-university military training center may be created in the city. Its base may be the former educational building of the Suvorov School in Krasnoznamenny Lane. In addition, a higher school of military transport aviation is planned to be located in Ulyanovsk on the basis of a former technical school.

Notes:

[i] “Изменение призывного возраста и увеличение армии. Путин и Шойгу выступили в Минобороны (Changing the conscription age and increasing the size of the Army: Putin and Shoigu spoke at the Ministry of Defense),” TASS, 21 December 2022.  https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/16655079

[ii] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

OE Insight Summary:

RUS creating new officer academies to support expansion of the Russian Armed Forces to 1,500,000 uniformed personnel.

Image Information:

Image: Saratov Higher Artillery Command School
Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Саратовское_высшее_военное_командно-инженерное_училище_ракетных_войск#/media/Файл:Артиллерийская_ул_2_Саратов.jpg 
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0