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This monograph examines PLA close air firepower support based on authoritative PLA sources including internal publications, as well as PRC aviation industry research. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF), Army Aviation, and unmanned aerial vehicle close air firepower support, command and control, and the firepower support process are examined.
Former President Hugo Chávez receives a Chinese delegation. No Latin American leader traveled more to Beijing than Hugo Chávez during his presidency.
“China is Venezuela’s largest creditor…The restructuring of this enormous amount of money has been one of the headaches in relations between both countries.”
Upcoming elections and increasing pressure at home drove Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro to head to China in September 2023 to reignite relations. In the past, China was Venezuela’s greatest benefactor. During the years of President Hugo Chávez (1998-2013), Venezuela received over $60 billion in loans through a combination of sovereign lending, China’s policy banks, and large development projects.[i] However, during Nicolás Maduro’s government (2013-present), Venezuela’s economy fell precipitously through a combination of mismanagement and corruption, causing China to withdraw much of its support in 2015 and 2016. Ever since, Maduro has struggled to return to China’s good graces and convince the Chinese Communist Party that he can be a good steward of Venezuela’s economy. While in China, Spanish daily El País reports Maduro had an agenda aimed at finding solutions to Venezuela’s grave economic crisis and rebuilding robust bilateral ties.
Maduro’s efforts were in vain. As one of Mexico’s main daily newspapers La Jornada states, the two partners signed dozens of agreements, but none of them involved the depth of investment Venezuela received during the Chávez years. Maduro’s trip failed to yield the kind of agreement he needed to reset his economy. The agreements reveal that China no longer sees Venezuela as its principal partner in Latin America to challenge the United States geopolitically. To assuage Maduro, China and Venezuela upgraded their bilateral ties to an “all weather relationship.” While this represents an upgrade in the hierarchy of China’s foreign relations, Maduro’s trip revealed the fundamental distrust that persists in Beijing about its ability to support Caracas monetarily and get a return on its investment.[ii] Lack of Chinese financial support and a presidential election likely upcoming in 2024 suggest Maduro will have to rely on greater repression to hold onto power. Additionally, Maduro’s largely empty-handed return from China may be seen by Russia as an opening to deepen their strategic ties to Venezuala, given Moscow’s desire to use Latin America as a counterpoint to U.S. policy in Europe, and specifically, support for Ukraine.[iii]
Sources:
“Nicolás Maduro visita China para tratar de paliar la crisis económica de Venezuela (Nicolás Maduro visits China to try to alleviate the economic crisis in Venezuela),” El País (Spanish daily with excellent regional coverage of Latin America), 12 September 2023. https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-09-12/nicolas-maduro-visita-china-para-tratar-de-paliar-la-crisis-economica-de-venezuela.html
Maduro arrived with an eminently economic agenda and the intention of finding solutions to the crisis that is shaking the country… The intention is to strengthen ties that have been diluted in recent years and realign interests in an international theater polarized by the tense relationship between the United States and Beijing… China is Venezuela’s largest creditor, the Latin American country that has the largest debt with Beijing: since 2007, it has received about 60 billion dollars in Chinese state loans… The restructuring of this enormous amount of money has been one of the headaches in relations between both countries and was the driver behind Maduro’s last visit to Beijing in 2018.
“Relación China-Venezuela será elevada a su máximo nivel: Xi Jinping (China-Venezuela relationship will be raised to its highest level: Xi Jinping),” La Jornada (one of Mexico’s daily newspapers), 13 September 2023. https://www.jornada.com.mx/notas/2023/09/13/mundo/relacion-china-venezuela-sera-elevada-a-su-maximo-nivel-xi-jinping/ Chinese President Xi Jinping announced this Wednesday in a meeting with his counterpart Nicolás Maduro in Beijing the strengthening of relations with Venezuela, which will be raised to their highest level… “All weather relations” are the highest level of Chinese diplomatic relations. Only a handful of countries (Pakistan, Russia, Belarus) have this status.
Notes:
[i] For more information about China’s role in supporting Hugo Chávez’s government, see: Stephen B. Kaplan and Michael A. Penfold, “China-Venezuela Economic Relations: Hedging Venezuelan Bets with Chinese Characteristics,” Wilson Center for International Scholars. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/china-venezuela-economic-relations-hedging-venezuelan-bets-chinese-characteristics
[ii] For additional analysis on the bind China finds itself in with Venezuela—too important to cut relations, yet too untrustworthy to deepen them—see: “The Future of Sino-Venezuelan Relationship: Make or Break?,” Harvard International Review, December 22, 2021. https://hir.harvard.edu/the-future-of-the-sino-venezuelan-relationship-make-or-break/
[iii] For more information on how Russia views its relations with Latin America as a counterpoint to U.S. policy in Europe, see: Ryan C. Berg, “What Does Russia’s War in Ukraine Mean for Latin America and the Caribbean?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 1, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-russias-war-ukraine-mean-latin-america-and-caribbean
Image Information:
Image: Former President Hugo Chávez receives a Chinese delegation. No Latin American leader traveled more to Beijing than Hugo Chávez during his presidency.
Source: https ://www.flickr.com/photos/chavezcandanga/6396096677
Attribution: Flickr, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
Bank Saint Petersburg sanctioned by the U.S. and UK on 24 February, one of many Russian banks sanctioned in the days following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
“The document contains a list of friendly and neutral states whose credit institutions and brokers will be able to trade on the Russian market for currencies and asset liabilities.”
Russia seeks to make strategic advances in the economic war in which it finds itself as it struggles to gain an operational advantage on the battlefield in Ukraine. Russian moves to end the global dominance of the U.S. dollar have taken on new urgency as the war in Ukraine has exposed how reliant Russia and other nations are on the dollar for their national economies and settlement of global financial transactions.[i] According to the excerpted article from Russian financial news source RI-Centr.ru, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin recently signed a resolution with “more than 30 friendly or neutral states,” including “all Central Asian states” to explore conducting financial settlements in national currencies rather than the dollar. The article acknowledged that the moves away from the dollar contained risks for banks and other financial institutions.
The article from the Russian news outlet политический калейдоскоп (Political Kaleidoscope) noted Indonesia, the world’s seventh-largest economy and fourth-most populous country, has also begun the process of transitioning from the dollar for global trade and financial transactions. According to the article, Jakarta has set up a “National Task Force that will support financial transactions in local currencies.” The article concludes by noting that “Indonesia has become the latest ‘heavyweight’ in the company of fighters against the dominance of the U.S. dollar in the global financial system” and that China, India, and Russia have agreed to switch to national currencies for mutual payments. Finally, the article noted that the BRICS nations[ii] are pursuing a dollar alternative and that Russian President Putin recently emphasized that “de-dollarization is an irreversible process that is gaining inertia.” While the U.S. dollar is still the preferred safe-haven currency worldwide, Russia’s (and China’s) efforts to reduce its dollar dependence would give Russia increased flexibility to conduct trade, especially for commodities such as oil—a tool for financing the war in Ukraine and potential wars elsewhere—without the threat of adverse financial conditions imposed on its economy by a dominant U.S. dollar.[iii]
Sources:
“УТВЕРЖДЁН СПИСОК СТРАН — ПАРТНЁРОВ ПО ВАЛЮТНОЙ ТОРГОВЛЕ (LIST OF CURRENCY TRADING PARTNERS HAS BEEN APPROVED),” RI-Centr.ru (Russian financial news outlet), 21 September 2023. https://ia-centr.ru/publications/utverzhdyen-spisok-stran-partnyerov-po-valyutnoy-torgovle/?utm_source=finobzor.ru
The corresponding order was signed by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin.
The document contains a list of friendly and neutral states whose credit institutions and brokers will be able to trade on the Russian market for currencies and asset liabilities.
There are more than 30 countries on the list, including all Central Asian states. Approval of the list is part of the process of transition to settlements in national currencies.
The approval of the resolution was announced in July 2023. At that time, the list of partner states included 44 countries. In the current message on the government website, 32 countries are mentioned. Israel and Georgia, which were previously named as included in the list, are not among them. This is not the final version of the document.
Russia and the countries of the post-Soviet space are progressively engaged in financial integration. Thus, on April 28, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) published a draft agreement that should simplify the admission of brokers from the union states to the exchanges of the participating countries. In addition, at the end of August, EEC members signed an agreement on bank guarantees in the field of public procurement.
Experts note that the proposed mechanisms do not yet fully solve the problem of risks for banks and other financial players.
Sergey Manukov, “К дедолларизации подключилась одна из крупнейших экономик планеты (One of the largest economies on the planet has joined dedollarization),” Political Kaleidoscope (политический калейдоскоп), 21 September 2023. https://k-politika.ru/k-dedollarizacii-podklyuchilas-odna-iz-krupnejshix-ekonomik-planety/?utm_source=finobzor.ru
There are new additions to the camp of fighters against the dominance of the dollar in the global financial system and trade. Moreover, it is very significant and noticeable. Indonesia has joined the dedollarization process. This, by the way, is the seventh economy in the world, which, without a doubt, in one or two decades will rise another couple of positions in the ranking. In addition, Indonesia ranks fourth in the world in terms of population – approx. 280 million people.
Jakarta has created a National Task Force that will support financial transactions in local currencies (LCT). In Indonesia, remember, this is the Indonesian rupiah. In a statement, the head of the Indonesian central bank, Bank Indonesia, Perry Warjiyo, said that the transition to national currencies in settlements and trade with friendly countries will help not only strengthen the Indonesian financial market, but also stabilize the local rupiah.
“Increasing local currency transactions should help export-import activities, investments and cross-border payment transactions, including QRIS (Indonesia’s domestic settlement standard),” explains a top Indonesian banker.
Indonesia has become the latest “heavyweight” in the company of fighters against the dominance of the US dollar in the global financial system, consisting of China, India and Russia. Beijing, New Delhi and Moscow agreed to switch to national currencies for mutual payments. In addition, BRICS has not abandoned plans to introduce, if not a single currency of the organization, then at least a single payment mechanism. Indonesia has not yet joined BRICS, but its President Joko Widodo attended the group’s recent summit in South Africa as a guest. Speaking at the summit via video link, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized that dedollarization is an irreversible process that is gaining inertia.
Joko Widodo, by the way, not long ago called on local authorities to abandon foreign payment systems and switch to credit cards from local banks. True, he spoke not so much about dedollarization as about the possibility of banning such popular cards as Visa and Mastercard, following the example of what they did with Russia.
In the United States, the plans of China, Russia, India and other developing countries to deprive the dollar of the unofficial title of world currency are, at least outwardly, calmly and they claim that nothing can threaten the “green” in the foreseeable future, at least for several decades.Recently, by the way, Zimbabwe announced its desire to join the bank created by the BRICS countries. As a result, rumors spread that this southern African country also wants to join the de-dollarization. However, according to Zimbabwe’s former finance minister, abandoning the dollar could easily lead to economic disaster.
Notes:
[i] For a Russian perspective on the dollar shortly after its invasion of Ukraine see: Ilya Polonsky, “Россия способна поставить точку в эпохе гегемонии доллара (Russia is able to put an end to the era of dollar hegemony),” Economic Enrichment (экономическое обоэрение) (Russian financial news outlet), 18 March 2022. https://finobzor.ru/116153-rossija-sposobna-postavit-tochku-v-jepohe-gegemonii-dollara.html
[ii] The BRICS nations are Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Coined in 2001, the term was originally BRIC and remained that way until the addition of South in 2010. Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are set to join the bloc and receive full membership on 1 January 2024.
[iii] Historically, when the cost of oil rises the dollar has depreciated. However, since 2022, roughly correlating with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the price of oil and the value of the dollar have moved in tandem. Therefore, high energy costs and a rising dollar have put additional pressure on economies like Russia’s and China’s. For an analysis of what is fueling the new connection between commodity prices and the strength of the U.S. dollar see: Boris Hofmann, Deniz Igan, and Daniel Rees, “The Changing Nexus Between Commodity Prices and the Dollar: Causes and Implications,” BIS Bulletin No. 74, (Switzerland based Bank for International Settlements), 13 April 2023. https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull74.pdf
Image Information:
Image: Bank Saint Petersburg sanctioned by the U.S. and UK on 24 February, one of many Russian banks sanctioned in the days following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Source: Combat Films and Research, Inc.
Attribution: Combat Films and Research, Inc. By permission
Gakkel Ridge highlighted on map of main bathymetric features of the Arctic Ocean, taken mainly from Weber 1983 ‘Maps of the Arctic Basin Sea Floor: A History of Bathymetry and its Interpretation’ on a base of a screenshot taken from the NASA WorldWind software.
“China is determined to participate in Arctic governance and that it has legitimate interests and rights in the region.”
In recent years, China has defined itself as “a near Arctic state.” Official Chinese statements have stressed that the Arctic belongs to the world and that China, as the world’s most populous state, is not content to let the nations of the Arctic Council, of which China is an observer, control the Arctic. As the excerpted article from the Norway-based The Barents Observer notes, China has dispatched the Xuelong-2 [R1] icebreaker ship to the Arctic. China is promoting the expedition as a scientific venture focusing on the Gakkel Ridge. However, recent Arctic initiatives with Russia[i] provide evidence that China is committed to a presence in the Arctic while strengthening China’s claims to Arctic resources.
Sources:
Atle Staalesen, “China’s icebreaker Xuelong-2 is sailing to the North Pole,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 17 August 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2023/08/chinas-icebreaker-xuelong-2-sailing-north-pole
China’s icebreaker Xuelong-2 is sailing to the North Pole
In cooperation with researchers from Russia and Thailand, Arctic experts from the Chinese Polar Institute are sailing 15,500 nautical miles on an expedition to the top of the world. It is the country’s 13th Arctic Ocean scientific expedition and the fourth voyage to the region by Xuelong-2, the new and fully Chinese-built icebreaker. On the 12th of July, the vessel set out from Shanghai. On the 17th of August it was breaking through the sea-ice at 84 °N.
One of the purposes of the expedition, organized by the Chinese Ministry of Natural Resources together with the Polar Institute, is to study geology and geophysics of the Gakkel Ridge. The researchers will also conduct investigations of atmospheric, sea ice, marine, and subsurface environmental surveys, as well as surveys of biomes and pollutants. According to Wang Jinhui, head of the expedition team, a key objective is to collect genetic specimens from the region. “We have isolated 130 strains of bacteria from the seawater and sediments and collected 68 genetic specimens of marine life to further enrich the polar gene bank and specimens of marine life. This also enhanced China’s capability in environmental protection and assessment of marine pollution in the Arctic Ocean,”
The vessel is a new ship with modern facilities for the researchers. The expedition team works in two shifts for 24 hours a day for about 40 days. A library and gym are on board the 122-meter icebreaker. A team of doctors provide medical services, and four chefs provide “a balanced diet for over 100 expedition members.” The expedition is conducted in cooperation with partners from Russia and Thailand. The icebreaker is due to return to Shanghai in late September.
Until 2020, the original Xuelong, an older Russian-built vessel, housed the Chinese Arctic expeditions, some of which proceeded along Russia’s Northern Sea Route, across the central Arctic Ocean, as well as through Canada’s Northwest Passage.During the Arctic Circle China conference in 2019, Chief of China’s State Oceanic Administration underlined that “protecting the Arctic environment is a common responsibility and China will make its contribution to this.” He also stressed that China sees itself as “a near-Arctic state” and it will “actively participate with wisdom and strength to future protection and development.” In early 2018, the country adopted an Arctic policy that highlights joint efforts and cooperative approaches, and at the same time underlines that China is determined to participate in Arctic governance and that it has legitimate interests and rights in the region.
Notes:
[i] For more information on China-Russia initiatives in the Arctic, see: Les Grau, “Russia and China Expanding Coast Guard Cooperation in Arctic,” OE Watch, 07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-and-china-expanding-coast-guard-cooperation-in-arctic/
Image: Gakkel Ridge highlighted on map of main bathymetric features of the Arctic Ocean, taken mainly from Weber 1983 ‘Maps of the Arctic Basin Sea Floor: A History of Bathymetry and its Interpretation’ on a base of a screenshot taken from the NASA WorldWind software.
Source: Mikenorton, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gakkel_Ridge – /media/File:Arctic_Ocean_bathymetric_features.png (modified by Combat Films and Research to feature Gakkel Ridge as permission granted by CC By-SA 3.0
Attribution: CC By-SA 3.0
Map showing the proximity between China and Taiwan
“The CCP wrote the “one country, two systems” formula into its party constitution, which sets more definitive guidance on the party’s Taiwan policy.”
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) is predicting that unification with Taiwan is even higher on Chinese President Xi Jinping’s agenda now that he is in his third five-year term as president. According to Taiwan’s state-run national news agency Zhongyang Tongxunshe (Central News Agency), the MND bases its conclusion on plans and events over the past year. First, during the 20th National Congress in October 2022, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted the “one country, two systems” formula into its party constitution. The MND views this as providing definitive guidance on the CCP’s Taiwan policy. Second, during the 14th National People’s Congress in March 2023, Xi vowed to lead the CCP to “solidly” promote “the great cause of national reunification.”[i]
Finally, the generals appointed as members of the Central Military Commission, the military’s leading authority, have been those with experience in combat, military technology, and handling Taiwan-related matters.[ii] This was evident in the selection of the two vice chairmen, directly subordinate to Xi. First, Zhang Youxia was selected to serve another term as Vice Chairman. Particularly noteworthy is that Zhang’s selection went against China’s retirement norms: while the retirement age for the PLA is 68, Zhang was 72 when selected for this term. The flouting of these conventions is likely because Zhang has combat experience, although dated, from the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War. The second Vice Chairman, He Weidong, recently led the Eastern Theater Command, which is responsible for PLA operations in the East China Sea and Taiwan. These selections underscore Xi’s strategic thinking. Based on the article, it is important to note the MND is not predicting China will use force to unify with Taiwan by 2027. Rather, it assesses that China is ramping up efforts to promote reunification and build its military capability in the event force is used. As the MND points out, the PLA’s Rocket Force plans to establish precision strike capabilities by 2027 in the “first island chain” consisting of Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. However, the PLA also plans to establish a “comprehensive and versatile ground force” and push its naval and air force capabilities by 2035 to the “second island chain” consisting of Japan, Guam, and Micronesia. This will give China more capability to counter a potential offensive in support of Taiwan.
Sources:
Matt Yu and Shih Hsiu-chuan,“Pursuing Taiwan Unification High on Xi’s Third Term Agenda: MND,” Focus Taiwan: CNA English News (the national news agency of the Republic of China), 31 August 2023. https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202308310023
Pursuing unification with Taiwan is likely to be high on the agenda during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) third five-year term that began earlier this year, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) said in a new report.
…At the congress, the CCP wrote the “one country, two systems” formula into its party constitution, which sets more definitive guidance on the party’s Taiwan policy, the MND said.
Another indication was the first speech given by Xi at the 14th National People’s Congress, after he was elected for an unprecedented third term as president, in which he vowed to lead the CCP to “solidly” promote the “great cause of national reunification,” it added.
Xi has prioritized those with expertise in military technology, combat experience and experience handling matters related to Taiwan in the appointing of CMC generals, the MND said.
The MND added that He Weidong (何衛東) was appointed to hold one of the two CMC vice chairmanships because he was well versed with People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military readiness, which would be an asset in the event of a cross-Taiwan Strait conflict.
The MND said the PLA’s Rocket Force aims to establish precise strike capabilities against adversaries in the first island chain by 2027, referring to the chain of islands that make up Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines.It added that the PLA also aims to construct a comprehensive and versatile ground force, to modernize its navy so it is able to counter adversaries spanning from the first island chain to the second island chain by 2035, and to extend the attacking range of the air force to the second island chain by 2035.
Notes:
[i] For recent statements from the current Chinese leadership regarding the importance of Taiwan, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Chinese Officials Justify Reaction To Western Presence In Taiwan Strait,” OE Watch, 07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-officials-justify-reaction-to-western-presence-in-taiwan-strait-2/
[ii] For more information on the CMC’s current leadership, see: Brian Waidelich, “China’s New Military Leadership: Possible Strengths and Weaknesses,” Center for Naval Analyses, 11 November 2022. https://www.cna.org/our-media/indepth/2022/11/chinas-new-miliatry-leadership-possible-strengths-and-weaknesses
Image Information:
Image: Map showing the proximity between China and Taiwan
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995 – /media/File:Taiwan_Strait.png
Attribution: Public Domain
President of TAIWAN Tsai Ing-wen reviews a Marine Corps battalion in Kaohsiung in July 2020
“[The will to fight] depends on our (Taiwan’s) internal conditions. There are differences just on whether to resist China.”
Taiwan might not be prepared to resist a Chinese invasion, according to Shen Po-yang, an associate professor at the Institute of Criminology at Taipei University. The following article excerpt from Taiwan cable TV network Sanlih E-Television News highlights some of Shen’s remarks, which he gave during a meeting held by the World Taiwanese Association and the European Taiwan Association in Vilnius, Lithuania. Shen, who researches Chinese cognitive operations against Taiwan, attributes his conclusion to China’s growing technological capability in disinformation operations and Taiwan’s internal division. He explains that Chinese information operations against Taiwan primarily targets the 20 percent who consider themselves neutral, including those who are undecided on whether Taiwan should commit to war or surrender should the mainland invade. According to the article, a survey of Taiwan’s vulnerability to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) cognitive warfare shows how divided the country is in its beliefs. For example, according to the survey, less than 20 percent of people in Taiwan believe the disinformation comes from external forces; 30 percent believe it comes from China; 20 percent believe it comes from the United States; and 20 percent believe it comes from Japan. According to Shen, “The reality is very far away (from what people believe).” Complementing the technical aspects of Chinese cognitive operations, Shen sees Xi Jinping’s continued emphasis on the “China Dream” as an ideology to win over the people when the economy is bad and he concludes that Taiwan’s will to resist will depend on their internal conditions. A study in the Oxford Journal of Global Security Studies,[i] explains that China’s vast cognitive operations against Taiwan are conducted through various governmental departments and party agencies that deal with Taiwan affairs including the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, the United Front Work Department, the PLA, and Propaganda Department. The CCP’s primary goal is to promote unification and to increase Taiwan’s internal conflict and anti-independence views. The study describes four ways in which China conducts cognitive operations. First, China uses military intimidation as a kind of psychological manipulation to prevent Taiwan from seeking independence. Second, China uses economic and sociocultural factors to increase its influence by promoting bilateral exchange across the Taiwan Strait. Third, China uses Mazuism, a popular folk religion that originated in China but is practiced by 70 percent of Taiwan’s population, to strengthen its connection with Taiwan culturally. Finally, China uses disinformation and content farms on the internet to sway public opinion.[ii]
Sources:
“「台灣抵抗意志不如烏克蘭」學者:恐不及因應資訊戰 (Taiwan’s Will to Resist is Not as Good as Ukraine’s’; Scholar: It May Not Be Able to Cope With Information Warfare),” Sanlih E-Television News (Taiwan cable TV network), 11 September 2023. https://www.setn.com/News.aspx?NewsID=1351592&utm_campaign=viewallnews
Shen Boyang, a scholar who specializes in the CCP’s cognitive operations against Taiwan, said that he is worried that Taiwan does not have enough time to prepare for information warfare, because China’s technology is becoming more and more sophisticated, and Taiwan’s internal divisions have made The lack of will to resist China is different from the situation faced by countries such as Lithuania and Ukraine when facing Russia.
Shen Boyang pointed out at the forum that the main targets of China’s information manipulation on Taiwan are those who consider themselves neutral, neither blue nor green, including those who have not yet made up their minds on whether to commit war or surrender when facing the CCP’s invasion of Taiwan. This group of about 20% of Taiwanese people are gradually being China controls and locks in through cross-strait exchanges or the collection of personal information on the Internet.
His survey showed Taiwan’s vulnerability to the Chinese Communist Party’s cognitive warfare. For example, less than 20% of Taiwanese believe that fake news mainly comes from external forces, of which more than 30% point to China, but 20% each point to the United States or Japan. “With The reality is very far away.”
… there is the emotional aspect. After Xi Jinping came to power, he has continuously emphasized the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” internally, which may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because in the past, the CCP could rely on the economy to stabilize its internal affairs. “When the economy is good, there is no need to talk about great rejuvenation, but when the economy is bad, it must use ideology.”What worries him most is the will of the Taiwanese people to resist. “This depends on our internal conditions. There are differences just on whether to resist China.” …
Notes:
[i] Tzu-Chieh Hung and Tzu-Wei Hung, “How China’s Cognitive Warfare Works: A Frontline Perspective of Taiwan’s Anti-Disinformation Wars,” Journal of Global Security studies, Volume 7, Issue 4, December 2022 https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/7/4/ogac016/6647447
[ii] Social media has an important role in China’s cognitive warfare tactics. Social media can be used to spread “deepfakes” and “accelerationism” to deliberately manipulate emotions and collective consciousness to sway public opinion and exacerbate polarization. For more information, see Cindy Hurst, “Chinese Observations on the Role and Impact of Social Media in Cognitive Warfare,” OE Watch, 05-2022 https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/chinese-observations-on-the-role-and-impact-of-social-media-in-cognitive-warfare/; and Cindy Hurst, “China Wages Cognitive Warfare To Shape Taiwanese Public Opinion,” OE Watch, 02-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/china-wages-cognitive-warfare-to-shape-taiwanese-public-opinion/
Image Information:
Image: President of TAIWAN Tsai Ing-wen reviews a Marine Corps battalion in Kaohsiung in July 2020
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_Marine_Corps – /media/File:President_of_TAIWAN_Tsai_Ing-wen_reviews_a_Marine_Corps_battalion_in_Kaohsiung_in_July_2020_臺灣總統蔡英文校閱海軍陸戰隊九九旅步二營.jpg
Attribution: CC By 2.0
Diagram outlining PLA Command and Control Network
“Mission command advocates fully leveraging the initiative of frontline commanders in a battlefield full of uncertainty and chaos to gain decision-making advantages.”
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) battlefield commanders have historically been constrained by the PLA’s preference for centralized over decentralized command authority.[i] However, a recent article from the PLA Daily, the official newspaper of the PLA, addresses the need to move from centralized to mission command to allow for greater initiative by operational and tactical commanders. Doing so would provide the PLA with greater flexibility and adaptability to address rapidly changing battlefield situations and opportunities. The articles argues that the PLA must “learn from the relevant concepts of mission command, optimize and improve the original command mode, and build a command mode suitable for future information-based and intelligent warfare.”
The article describes that mission command—a concept employed by the U.S. military—leverages frontline commanders’ initiative on uncertain and chaotic battlefields due to their more realistic awareness of on-the-ground realities.[ii] Mission command preserves the superior commander’s operational intent, guidance, tasks, and resources while allowing flexibility to the frontline commander to accomplish the mission. As it notes, “it is necessary to create an open architecture to enhance the system’s ability to flexibly assemble and adapt to changes.” Advancements in command-and-control systems and intelligent decision-making technologies will improve the ability of frontline commanders to make informed decisions. Allowing subordinate commanders to Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) will not only facilitate rapid decision-making but provide for more resilient command if communications with the superior headquarters are disrupted. The author states that mission command provides for greater decentralization of decision-making creating a stronger and more ubiquitous command-and-control system.
Sources:
Fie Paiguo, “从集中式指挥转向任务式指挥——美空军大力推动任务式指挥透视 (From Centralized Command to Mission Command – The U.S. Air Force Vigorously Promotes the Mission Command Perspective),” PLA Daily (official newspaper of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army), 24 August 2023. http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2023-08-24&paperNumber=07&articleid=913630
Learn from relevant operational concepts to optimize and improve the command-and-control organizational model. Under the conditions of modern warfare, it is not easy to organize large-scale, long-term, and high-intensity air operations. If the combat command ability cannot be improved, everything is out of the question. Judging from the development practice of foreign militaries, the contradiction of being constrained by two aspects has become increasingly obvious. First, the operational command and control process is not perfect enough, and the hierarchical command mode is not perfect enough. The second is that the control-based command and control method cannot adapt to modern high-intensity air confrontation. So, facing future wars, how to optimize and improve the command-and-control mode? The effective way is to fully consider the confrontation environments of different intensities, learn from the relevant concepts of mission command, optimize and improve the original command mode, and build a command mode suitable for future information-based and intelligent warfare.Build an open system architecture to lay a solid foundation for the flexible restructuring of the command-and-control system. To achieve mission command, it is necessary to upgrade the command-and-control capabilities of the entire system. On the one hand, it is necessary to create an open architecture to enhance the system’s ability to flexibly assemble and adapt to changes. On the other hand, it is necessary to promote node element transformation and promote the reorganization of digital space combat resources. Realizing the node element of operational entities is to digitize, network, serve, and standardize them, making them easier and more convenient to be called by other platforms.”
Notes:
[i] For further information on PLA modernization efforts see: Kevin McCauley, “PLA Army Efforts Integrate New Technology and Equipment Into Units,” OE Watch, 08-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/421895
[ii] Authoritative PLA publications indicate the need to promote more initiative by commanders, particularly at the tactical level. PLA authors believe this is necessary due to the dynamic and fast pace of modern combat operations as well as the need to take advantage of fleeting, unforeseen battlefield opportunities.
Image Information:
Image: Diagram outlining PLA Command and Control Network.
Source: Liu Xiaoming et al, Battlefield Information Management (战场信息管理), (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2012), 36
Attribution:
Vietnam People’s Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting in 2010.
“The presentations examined many aspects of the East Sea and the issue of Vietnam’s sovereignty over the sea and islands from historical, cultural, political, and legal perspectives.”
In June, the Vietnamese Embassy in France hosted a conference in Paris to reaffirm Vietnamese sovereignty of the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. As reported in the Vietnamese-language publication baotintuc.com, the conference was attended by the Vietnamese Ambassador to France, European scholars on Vietnam, and Vietnamese citizens in Europe who had previously visited the Spratly Islands.[i] Vietnam, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei each lay claim to territory in the island chain.[ii] Conference attendees examined the historical, cultural, political, and legal perspectives on the Spratly Islands, and concluded with a consensus for Vietnam to avoid using force to regain sovereignty over the islands. The scholars stated that historical evidence showed Vietnam had occupied the islands since at least 300 years ago. They urged Vietnam to use diplomacy and negotiations as well as displays of solidarity with allied nations to push forward their territorial claims.[iii] The conference attendees further emphasized the need not just for older Vietnamese to support the Vietnamese Navy and to donate money to the cause, but also for Vietnamese youth and the international Vietnamese community to stand beside Vietnam. Consistent with this diplomatic approach to the Spratly Islands, Vietnam has also avoided direct naval confrontations in the South China Sea.[iv] For example, as the second excerpted Vietnamese-language article from tienphong.com notes, Taiwan conducted live-fire military training drills near the islands. Vietnam responded by announcing its opposition to the drills and demanded that they be canceled, stating that Taiwan was threatening peace in the South China Sea. Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry also asserted it had legal and historical justification to claim sovereignty over the Spratly Islands.[CR1]
Sources:
“Biển Đông và chủ quyền biển đảo Việt Nam dưới góc nhìn của các học giả châu Âu (East Sea and Vietnam’s sovereignty over the sea and islands from the perspective of European scholars)” baotintuc.vn (Vietnamese publication covering hot topics in domestic and international affairs concerning Vietnam), 11 June 2023. https://baotintuc.vn/thoi-su/bien-dong-va-chu-quyen-bien-dao-viet-nam-duoi-goc-nhin-cua-cac-hoc-gia-chau-au-20230611102242092.htm
On June 10, in Paris, France, a scientific conference with the theme “East Sea and Vietnam’s sovereignty issues” took place with the participation of a large number of Vietnamese scholars and admirers of the sea and islands. On this occasion, a meeting between overseas Vietnamese who had visited the Spratlys was held together with an exhibition of photos and artifacts about this archipelago. Speaking at the opening ceremony, Vietnamese Ambassador to France, Dinh Toan Thang, highly appreciated the efforts of individuals and associations contributing to organizing the workshop.
The situation in the East Sea, and solutions to handle disputes and options for marine economic development, were mentioned by the speakers. Mr. Patrice Jorland, professor of History and former president of the France-Vietnam Friendship Association, stated that, according to the law of the sea and international law, Vietnam has a large exclusive economic zone. Mr. Jorland claimed Vietnam has sovereignty in the East Sea. Regarding sovereignty over Truong Sa and Hoang Sa, he said that historical evidence shows that Vietnam has asserted sovereignty over these two archipelagoes, especially Hoang Sa, since the late 18th century, under the Nguyen Dynasty.
As for Ms. Malgorzata Pietrasiak, a professor at the University of Lodz in Poland, an expert on Vietnam, she highly respected Vietnam’s method of handling issues at sea, which she calls “hedging.” According to her, this is a wise, flexible, and peaceful strategy devoid of tension, but also is not giving in…. With 14 presentations, the workshop contributed to bringing to the public perspectives and initiatives for mutual building and developing on the basis of respecting each other’s sovereignty and territory.
“Việt Nam phản đối Đài Loan tập trận ở Trường Sa (Vietnam opposes Taiwanese drills in Truong Sa)” tienphong.vn(Government-owned Vietnamese daily newspaper), 8 June 2023. https://tienphong.vn/viet-nam-phan-doi-dai-loan-tap-tran-o-truong-sa-post1541256.tpoOn June 7, Taiwan conducted a live-fire drill in the waters around Ba Binh in the Spratly archipelago of Vietnam. Vietnam strongly opposes this and demands that Taiwan cancel illegal activities. On June 8, in response to a reporter’s question about Vietnam’s response to this activity, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Pham Thu Hang stated “Vietnam has a full legal basis and historical evidence to assert its sovereignty over the Truong Sa archipelago…. Therefore, Taiwan holding a live-fire drill in the waters around Ba Binh in the Spratly archipelago of Vietnam is a serious violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty over this archipelago and threatens peace, stability, safety, and maritime security, while creating tensions and complicating the situation in the East Sea.”
Notes:
[i] Although the South China Sea is the name most associated with the body of water shared by Vietnam, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, Vietnam refers to this body of water as the East Sea. A similar naming dispute occurs between South Korea, North Korea, and Japan. Japan refers to the body of water separating itself from the Korean Peninsula as the Sea of Japan, whereas North Korea refers to it as the Korea East Sea while South Korea refers to it simply as the East Sea. The naming of these bodies of water is entangled in the struggle for territory and sovereignty over the regions in question. Regarding Korea and Japan, U.S. officials have historically referred to the waterway as the Sea of Japan, at times raising the ire of South Korean leaders.
[ii] China, Taiwan, and Vietnam all claim sovereignty over the entirety of the Spratly Islands. The Philippines, in contrast, only claims sovereignty over several features in the Kalayaan Island Group, while Malaysia also claims only some features and Brunei claims one reef. In terms of control, Vietnam occupies 26 features in the Spratly Islands, while the Philippines occupies nine, China occupies seven, Malaysia occupies five, and Taiwan occupies one. The contesting parties have officially sought to settle the dispute through bilateral agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but all efforts have ended without a permanent solution. See Hasan, Monjur and Jian, He, “Spratly Islands Dispute in the South China Sea: Potential Solutions,” Journal of East Asia and International Law, 2019, 12(1), pp. 145-168.
[iii] Vietnam claims its occupation of the Spratly Islands can be traced to the Nguyen lords, who from the 1600s annually sailed to the Bai Cat Vang island groups to retrieve shipwrecked goods and remained in the archipelago for up to six months. During the reign of the Nguyen emperors from the early 1800s, there is documentation that identified the Truong Sa archipelago from the Hoang Sa Islands in the Spratly Islands as Vietnamese possessions. It was not until the French protectorate was established over Vietnam in 1884 that sovereignty over the islands became contested. Kelly, Todd C., “Vietnamese Claims to the Truong Sa Archipelago,” Explorations in Southeast Asian Studies, Fall 1999, 3, pp. 1-21.
[iv] For a short video documentary on tensions in the South China Sea, see: South China Sea, Chinaboundaries.com. https://chinaboundaries.com/map/south-china-sea/; and Eric Hyer, Pragmatic Dragon: China’s Grand Strategy and Boundary Settlements, UBC Press (2015), Chapter 12 (pages 236-262).
Image Information:
Image: Vietnam People’s Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting in 2010.
Source: Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison, U.S. Air Forcehttps://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vietnam_People%27s_Navy_honor_guard_at_ASEAN_defense_ministers_meeting_2010-10-12_1.jpg
Attribution: (CC x 2.0)
Soldier from Ukrainian 25th Air Assault Brigade employing Small bomb carrying UAV.
“Low altitude is the “junction” connecting airspace and land. With the rapid development and large-scale application of low-altitude combat equipment such as helicopters, small and medium-sized unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles, the low-altitude battlefield has become increasingly important, and low-altitude control has become one of the comprehensive dominances that must be seized in future land warfare.”
A recent PLA Daily article discusses the importance of low-altitude air control for ground operations and its difference from traditional concepts of air dominance.[i] The article appears to be influenced by recent conflicts such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Seizing low-altitude air control requires an integrated air defense and distributed, networked, system of systems integrating ground and low-altitude air systems with modular, mobile, multi-domain capabilities. The importance of seizing low-altitude air control[ii] is based on the large-scale use of small and medium unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), helicopters, and cruise missiles. Traditional air dominance[iii] cannot guarantee low-altitude air control due to the sundry of small arms and short-range systems that threaten low flying airframes. The author argues that traditional air dominance operations are generally more centralized, while low-altitude air control is an ongoing, independent, and decentralized tactical operation that seizes control in a certain location for a limited time. Decentralized low-altitude air defense operations to seize control require accurate intelligence with the capability to distinguish between friend and foe, coordinated communications, and timely warning of air threats.
Achieving the capability to control the low-altitude air space even for short periods will threaten an adversary’s ability to employ UAVs and fixed and rotary winged aviation. The author urges the PLA to accelerate the development of intelligent air control UAVs with swarming capabilities, loitering munitions, detection systems to identify low, slow, micro-targets, and innovative tactics to seize low-altitude air control in the critical place and time to influence ground combat. . The capability to control the low-altitude air space would give the PLA a significant advantage protecting its forces and critical infrastructure.
Source:
夺取未来陆战低空制权 (Seize the low-altitude dominance of future land warfare),” PLA Daily (official PRC military newspaper), 23 May 2023. http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2023-05-23&paperNumber=07&articleid=906414
“Low-altitude control is a relatively independent and decentralized tactical-level space control. Low altitude control cannot be achieved and controlled through a single operation or a stage of centralized air control operations. Seizing low altitude control power will run through the entire process of combat, displaying a “distributed, discrete” form with strong tactical, regional, mobile, and full process characteristics. Even without the guarantee of traditional air supremacy, through active actions, it is possible to seize low-altitude supremacy in a certain area and within a certain time limit, forming a low-altitude combat advantage.
To seize low altitude dominance, we should focus on the characteristics of the struggle for low altitude control, establish the concept of “relying on ground control, dynamic control, precise control, and flexible use of air”, and follow the basic principle of “whoever uses it seizes it, seizes it as needed, and manages it as needed”. By seizing it in combat, maneuvering, and using it, we can respectively seize low-altitude control power in the task area through relatively independent and dispersed low-altitude combat and low-altitude air defense operations. At the same time, it is necessary to dynamically implement low altitude airspace monitoring and management, establish a low altitude multi-means and multi-mode monitoring system, fully grasp low altitude situations, strengthen collaborative communication, accurately distinguish between enemy and friendly platforms, timely warning, quickly strike and destroy enemy air combat equipment and air control equipment, accurately handle our air conflicts, and ensure effective control of low altitude and ultra-low altitude airspace.
The low-altitude power struggle in future intelligent warfare will become more intense. The Army’s field air defense system should continuously improve the comprehensive combat effectiveness of the low-altitude airspace, attach great importance to the construction of a distributed low-altitude operational system of systems based on the network, and rely on the network to build air-ground integration, the combination of detection, attack and defense, and mobility, modular low-altitude operational system of systems. Focus on strengthening the research and development of low-altitude detection and monitoring platforms to achieve rapid network deployment and low-altitude ultra-low-altitude high-sensitivity dynamic monitoring, and improve the ability to detect “low, slow and small” aircraft; accelerate the development of intelligent air-controlling UAVs, loitering missiles, and “swarms” to enrich the air-to-ground and multi-mode guidance, multi-mechanism killing, and multi-domain attack capabilities; Continue to improve the ability to detect and attack low-altitude small and micro targets, accelerate the development of new mechanism combat equipment, and form a low-altitude combat capability that covers multiple levels of campaigns, tactics, and operational units.
Notes:
[i] For additional information and perspective, see: Thomas Shrimpton, “Chinese Perspective on Manned-Unmanned Coordinated Operations on the Modern Battlefield,” OE Watch, 06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-perspective-on-manned-unmanned-coordinated-operations-on-the-modern-battlefield/
[ii] The ability to neutralize enemy air defenses and other weapons systems that could attack low flying aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, and cruise missiles would appear difficult to achieve since these weapons would include small arms and short-range gun and missiles systems.
[iii] The PLA defines air dominance or “command of the air” as the Air Force and other services controlling the battlespace for a period of time. Presumably this encompasses offensive and defensive operations, including electronic and information warfare, to neutralize the enemy’s air defense capabilities. The reference to “a period of time” likely indicates the difficulty of sustaining command of the air.
Image Information:
Image: Soldier from Ukrainian 25th Air Assault Brigade employing Small bomb carrying UAV.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:UA_25th_DShV_Bde_Mavic_3_bomber_01.jpg
Attribution: CC By 4.0
Chinese soldiers on parade in 2015.
“Psychological service work is a regular basic task in the military, and the psychological health of officers and soldiers directly affects the combat effectiveness of the troops.”
There has been an increase in attention to psychological issues within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in recent years. It is not clear if this is an indication of increased psychological problems among the troops or simply increased reporting. Some issues involve recruits born as late as 1995 having trouble adjusting to the regimentation of the military, difficult training conditions, and isolated garrison locations.
The military’s approach to psychological problems within its ranks is discussed in a recent PLA Daily article. A brigade in the 74th Group Army in the Southern Theater has an embedded Psychological Service Team, which is a recent development. The counselors, apparently also found at the battalion and company level, seek to identify and help personnel with possible psychological problems.
The chief of the brigade’s combat service planning section reported that all personnel in the unit were psychologically screened. The brigade’s party committee conducted investigations at the battalion and company level to ensure that the psychological counseling was achieving results. The investigation concluded that there was a general lack of attention to mental health, and that problems remained. In response to the investigation, the brigade created a psychological work supervisory mechanism office led by a psychologist and military doctor to provide professional support for the psychological services for the brigade. Psychological issues within the PLA are not isolated to the one brigade. The article recounts similar stories in other units, and psychological stations established in new medical buildings. These efforts have reportedly significantly reduced the rate of mental illness among officers and soldiers. The PLA is concerned that psychological issues in the force during a future high-intensity conflict will adversely affect combat capabilities and contribute to noncombat attrition of the units.
Sources:
“一个心理服务队的“心力量 (The ‘Heart Power’ of a Psychological Service Team),” PLA Daily (Official PRC Military Newspaper), 31 May 2023. http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2023-05-31&paperNumber=05&articleid=907041
“…Under the new situation and new tasks, we must raise awareness, improve work guidance, change “passive defense” into “active force”, and effectively improve the psychological immunity of officers and soldiers against negative emotions and mental illness.
… The psychological response to wartime stress has a significant impact on non-combat attrition. According to the annual education plan, it is necessary to strengthen the popularization of psychological health knowledge among all officers and soldiers, educate and guide them to face psychological problems, overcome the “disease shame” of turning pale when talking about psychological issues, be good at discovering their psychological problems, actively seek external help, and effectively build a strong psychological defense line; By combining major combat readiness, training, exercises, stationed training, and other tasks, we aim to build a dedicated combat environment, promote advanced models of military training and preparation, strengthen the cultivation of officers and soldiers’ combat spirit, and forge a solid spiritual core.…The future war will be a high-end war with high force, high intensity, high confrontation, and high intelligence. The strength of the psychological qualities of officers and soldiers directly affects the success or failure of combat operations. At all levels, it is necessary to actively carry out psychological adjustment and motivation training for personnel at different levels, task situations, and regional environments, under the guidance of a professional psychological backbone, using real-life construction, VR simulation, and other technical means. It is also necessary to rely on facilities and equipment such as psychological behavior training fields to regularly organize military physical fitness and skills coherent training and assessment. At the same time, it is also necessary to combine the execution of major tasks, strictly temper officers and soldiers under similar actual combat conditions, and cultivate their strong psychological endurance.”
Image Information:
Image: Chinese soldiers on parade in 2015.
Source: https://tcatmon.com/wiki/멀티캠
Attribution: Creative Commons Int