Iranian Military Equipment Integrating Artificial Intelligence

“Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri speaking,” Student News Network (Iranian media outlet), 31 July 2024.


“Artificial intelligence technology has been utilized in the new equipment, and we are currently witnessing its results.”


As the international community enters the world of artificial intelligence (AI) warfare, Iran is integrating and developing this technology into its military equipment.[i] As reported by Iranian state broadcaster IRIB, Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGC-N) said during a ceremony in the southwestern port city of Bandar Abbas on 9 August, “Artificial intelligence technology has been utilized in the new equipment, and we are currently witnessing its results.” Tangsiri claims 2,654 new missile systems, drones, and other equipment have been integrated with AI to enhance precision, acquisition, and capabilities in its military hardware—demonstrating Tehran’s top focus is AI.

In January, General Hossein Salami, commander of the IRGC, made similar claims about the country’s drone fleet.[ii] Progress appears to be limited, as little public information is available on the subject, except for comments from high-ranking officials in the military apparatus. It’s also worth noting that Tehran has a history of making outlandish claims to boast its abilities. Nevertheless, Iran is thinking about how to further integrate and develop this technology by investing in training on how to integrate AI into its array of military equipment.[iii]

According to the IRIB article, RADM Tangsiri noted: “In the equipment and facilities that we put into operation today, we paid special attention to innovation and technical creativity.” He explained that AI has been a top priority and applied to systems used by the defense ministry and the specialized missile sites of the IRGC-N.

Not only does AI improve Tehran’s capabilities and support its top priority of regime preservation, the integration into its military hardware is a selling point on the arms market as Iran becomes a global exporter to Russia, Ethiopia, Venezuela, Sudan, and other countries.[iv]


Sources:

“استفاده از هوش مصنوعی در تجهیزات جدید سپاه (Use of artificial intelligence in the new IRGC equipment),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 9 August 2024.

https://www.iribnews.ir/00I3a3

According to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri stated during the ceremony for adding new equipment to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Navy (IRGC-NV): “210 systems out of 2,654 products in the field today were showcased, demonstrating every wave of new equipment joining the arsenal is large and meaningful.”

The commander of the IRGC-N added: “In terms of the equipment intelligence and countering electronic warfare, systems were introduced in this ceremony that were practically handed over to the forces by the IRGC’s top commander.”

Commander Tangsiri said: “In the equipment and facilities that we put into operation today, we paid special attention to innovation and technical creativity.”

The commander of the IRGC-N emphasized that: “In these added equipment and systems, we saw an increase in accuracy, aim, and targeting, which increased the confidence of using these weapons in the electronic warfare environment, adding to the capabilities of the equipment.”

Rear Admiral Tangsiri also stressed that the application of artificial intelligence in developing these systems has been a priority, both in the Defense Ministry and the specialized missile centers of the IRGC-N, and the results of these efforts are now evident.Commander Tangsiri stressed the importance of using artificial intelligence in the construction of equipment, whether in the Defense Ministry or the specialized missile center of the IRGC, saying: “Artificial intelligence technology has been utilized in the new equipment, and we are currently witnessing its results.”


Notes:

[i] Mahmoud Javadi, “Heavy Thunder, No Rain: Defense AI in Iran,” The Very Long Game. Contributions to Security and Defense Studies, 19 July 2024. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-58649-1_19

[ii] See: Michael Rubin, “Iran Announces Integration Of Artificial Intelligence Into Drone Fleet,” OE Watch, 10-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/iran-announces-integration-of-artificial-intelligence-into-drone-fleet/

[iii] Mahmoud Javadi, “Heavy Thunder, No Rain: Defense AI in Iran,” The Very Long Game. Contributions to Security and Defense Studies, 19 July 2024. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-58649-1_19

[iv] Danny Citrinowicz. “Iran is on its way to replacing Russia as a leading arms exporter. The US needs a strategy to counter this trend,” IranSource, Atlantic Council, 2 February 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-drone-uavs-russia/


OE Insight Summary:

Commander of IRGC-N says AI has been implemented into new IRN military equipment.

Image Information:

Image: “Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri speaking,” Student News Network (Iranian media outlet), 31 July 2024.
Source: https://snn.ir/fa/news/1160582/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D9%88-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%DB%B3%DB%B0%DB%B9%DB%B3%DB%B9-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%AC%D9%88-%D9%88-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA-%D8%B4%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%AA-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF-%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D9%85
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.


China and Russia Expand Agreement for Arctic Strategic Resource Development

Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker, the Sabir, in Arctic waters. The Sabir is operated by Rosatom, which was appointed administrative control of the Northern Sea Route infrastructure in 2018.


“The Chinese company will be a main partner in the development of the major lithium field located in the far northern Russian region.”


Russia has signed an agreement with China to partner in the development of a major lithium field in Russia’s far north according to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer. It is likely that Russia would like to mine its lithium fields on its own, but the contract demonstrates Russia’s need for a partner. China has already partnered with Russia for Arctic development of oil, LNG, and other resources. The agreement gives China some latitude to exploit territory it would not otherwise have access. At the same time, Russia would be hard-pressed to develop the lithium field without outside capital investment that only China can provide at this time. The partnership agreement also comes at a time when China has shown it is eager to expand its presence in the Arctic and gain access to unexploited Arctic resources.[i]


Sources:

Atle Staalesen and Denis Zagore, “Chinese Developers come to mine lithium in Murmansk”, The Berents Observer,(independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 1 August 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2024/08/chinese-developers-come-lithium-mine-murmansk

The company MCC International Incorporation Ltd will join the development of the Kolmozerskoye lithium resources in the Kola Peninsula. The Chinese company will be a main partner in the development of the major lithium field located in the far northern Russian region. The company will take part in exploration of resources, development of technology, as well as production, the Russian license holder stated. The accompanying Nornickel Telegram photo is captioned “Hun Ventao, Vice President of Chinese company MCC International Incorporation Ltd signs deal with Igor Demidov, head of the Polar Lithium.”

The Russian edition of the Barents Observer reports that the Kolmozerskoye field is owned by Polar Lithium, a company controlled by Nornickel and Rosatom’s ore mining division. Nornickel’s Telegram channel stated that “The MCC International knows how to project mine processing plants, it possesses its own ore enrichment and lithium production technology.”

The Chinese company will reportedly also take part in the development of battery production.  “The experienced Chinese partner will help us more quickly create a high-tech battery industry in Russia,” according to Nornickel.

According to the developers, the new mine and processing plant are planned to be ready for production in year 2030. It is to be able to annually process up to 2 million tons of ore and produce 45,000 tons of lithium hydroxide and carbonate.

Nornickel is running the major nickel and copper mines and metallurgical plants in and around Monchegorsk, Kola Peninsula. The joint venture with Rosatom’s ore mining division was established in 2021.


Notes:

[i] See: Les Grau, “Chinese Icebreaker Sails to The Arctic,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-icebreaker-sails-to-the-arctic/


OE Insight Summary:

CHN and RUS will partner to mine lithium in the Arctic, giving CHN additional access to the Arctic, while providing RUS a much-needed partner.

Image Information:

Image: Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker, the Sabir, in Arctic waters. The Sabir is operated by Rosatom, which was appointed administrative control of the Northern Sea Route infrastructure in 2018.
Source: https://c4.wallpaperflare.com/wallpaper/645/918/543/the-ocean-sea-icebreaker-the-ship-wallpaper-preview.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain


Russian Security Forces Face Rise of Domestic Terrorism Threats

Russian Ministry of Emergency firefighters standing outside Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, site of a March 2024 terrorism attack.


In June, the FSB’s director, Aleksandr Bortnikov, revealed that the agency had prevented a total of 134 acts of terrorism and sabotage in central Russia alone since the outbreak of the conflict between Moscow and Kiev in February 2022. The country’s security agencies have also dismantled 32 international terrorist cells operating in the country over this period, he stated.


Russia’s Investigative Committee and the Federal Security Service (FSB) announced in early August it had foiled a plot by two Russian religious preachers to recruit fighters of the Islamic State (formerly ISIS) to carry out terrorist attacks inside the country. The plan was to enlist 19 Russian nationals living in the Tyumen region to join a jihadi movement in Syria. According to the excerpted article in the pro-Kremlin Russian news site RT, one of the suspects made public statements condoning terrorism and they urged Russians to send donations to ISIS, which violates Russian laws on material support of terrorism.

This comes amid a new report by the Interior Ministry of the highest number of terrorist crimes in Russia recorded in over two decades, as reported in the second excerpted article, also published by RT. Between January and June of 2024, some 1,651 crimes were reported, a nearly 40 percent spike over the same period the previous year.  In June the director of the FSB, Aleksandr Bortnikov, announced that his agency had foiled 134 acts of terrorism or sabotage this year in central Russia alone, as well as 32 international terrorist cells operating in the country. Even a youth wrestling coach born in Tajikistan was arrested in July for suspicion of abetting terrorist groups.[i] The following month, Ukrainian forces launched an incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, what constituted, according to Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “acts of terrorism.”[ii] Prior to that, last March, one of the deadliest terror attacks in Russia’s history occurred, after four gunmen shot up a concert venue outside Moscow, killing 145, before setting the building on fire. The gunmen were linked to a terrorist outfit known as Islamic State-Khorasan.

The rise in jihadi attacks is due to several factors, including an overextension of Russia’s roughly 360,000-strong Rosgvardiya, or Russian National Guard, a number of whom were carrying out rear-guard missions in Ukraine even before the latest incursion into Kursk.[iii]  The ability to respond to Ukrainian operations and simultaneously address Islamist extremist groups will stretch the Rosgvardiya and Russia’s domestic intelligence services even further.


Sources:

“ISIS recruiters arrested in Russia – security officials,” RT (formerly Russia Today, a Kremlin-back news outlet), 5 August 2024. https://www.rt.com/russia/602155-isis-recruiters-arrested-siberia/

The arrest warrants were executed in Tyumen Region in Western Siberia, Russia’s Investigative Committee and the Federal Security Service (FSB) jointly reported. The two individuals are accused of committing crimes between February 2015 and November 2022.

According to investigators, the pair convinced 19 people living in the region to join jihadists in Syria. One of the suspects allegedly made public statements condoning terrorism. Both urged people to send donations to IS, which amounted to material support of terrorism under Russian law, the statements claimed. Footage released by the FSB indicated that the suspects did not resist arrest. Neither agency has named them.

IS originated from radical Islamist forces in Iraq and came to international prominence after gaining strength in 2014, when it capitalized on the lack of security in the country as well as the turmoil in neighboring Syria. The jihadists’ lightning offensive that year allowed them to capture Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, as well as large swathes of territory in Syria.

The group has since been largely defeated militarily and fractured under local and international pressure, though some splinters remain active, particularly in Afghanistan. Terrorist cells affiliated with IS remain a threat in southern parts of Russia.

“Russia reports record level of terrorism,” RT, (formerly Russia Today, a Kremlin-back news outlet), 3 August 2024. https://www.rt.com/russia/602085-russia-terrorism-crimes-surge/

According to a document posted to the ministry’s official website earlier this week, 1,651 crimes classified as terrorism were recorded in the country in January-June 2024, a nearly 40% increase over the same period in 2023. The ministry noted that for the same period from 2006 to 2023, the figure did not reach 1,400. The previous record high was registered in the first half of 2022, when 1,332 terrorism-linked crimes were recorded.

Crimes associated with extremist activities have also reached a record high. From January to June, 819 such crimes were registered, a nearly 12% increase year-on-year. This figure had not surpassed 800 since 2018.

Crimes designated as terror-linked in Russia include making preparations for carrying out a terrorist attack, public calls for terrorism and justification of terrorism, as well as hostage-taking. Extremist crimes include those committed on the basis of political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred, or enmity towards any social group.

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) routinely makes public information on foiled terror plots, often describing the suspects as people linked with either Islamist terrorist groups or Ukrainian nationalists or collaborators.

In June, the FSB’s director, Aleksandr Bortnikov, revealed that the agency had prevented a total of 134 acts of terrorism and sabotage in central Russia alone since the outbreak of the conflict between Moscow and Kiev in February 2022. The country’s security agencies have also dismantled 32 international terrorist cells operating in the country over this period, he stated.Russia saw one of the deadliest terror attacks in its history this past March, when four gunmen went on a shooting rampage at the Crocus City Hall concert venue outside Moscow. The attackers shot everyone in sight before setting the building on fire. The tragedy left 145 people dead and over 500 injured. A terrorist organization known as Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K) claimed responsibility for the attack, but the FSB has alleged that Kiev was behind the massacre, possibly using Islamists as proxies.


Notes:

[i] “Russian youth wrestling coach changed with terrorism offenses,” RT, 4 July 2024. https://www.rt.com/russia/600432-russian-wrestling-coach-terrorism/

[ii] “Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s comment on events around Ukraine,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 14 August 2024. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1965546/

[iii] Mark Galeotti, “In Moscow’s Shadows,” Episode 153: Geopolitics, Nepotism, Terrorism, and Sabotage, 30 June 2024. https://inmoscowsshadows.buzzsprout.com/1026985/15334481-in-moscow-s-shadows-153-geopolitics-nepotism-terror-and-assassination-all-the-nice-things


OE Insight Summary: 

The breakup of an alleged Islamic State recruitment ring in western Siberia has rattled RUS security forces, given the country’s recent spike in terrorist attacks.


Image Information:

Image: Russian Ministry of Emergency firefighters standing outside Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, site of a March 2024 terrorism attack.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2024_Crocus_City_Hall_terrorist_attack_5.jpg
Attribution: Пресс-служба Губернатора Московской области (Press Office for Governor of Moscow Oblast)


Russia Creating New Officer Academies to Support Armed Forces Expansion

Saratov Higher Artillery Command School.


“Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order to establish the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School.”


In December 2022, Russia announced that it would increase the number of uniformed personnel in the Ministry of Defense from approximately 1 million to 1.5 million personnel at a Collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense, attended by President Putin, former Minister of Defense General Shoigu, and Chief of the General Staff General Gerasimov.[i]  At this event, and by way of subsequent pronouncements, Russia has made it clear that it will not revert back to its previous end strength when its special military operation ends.[ii] Although Russia has had to resort to partial mobilization to fill its ranks for the ongoing war in Ukraine, permanently raising the end-strength to 1.5 million will almost certainly entail recruiting more contract personnel and increasing the standard one-year conscription period to two years. It will also involve adding additional officers. In the Soviet/Russian system, inducting and training enlisted personnel can be done relatively quickly, but officer accessions are a different matter. Officers are typically only trained at specialized 4-to-5-year academies making the officer creation pipeline a long one.  This is problematic for Russia, as it shuttered many officer academies during major reforms in the early 2010s, so it does not have institutional training capacity to train the necessary number of officers for a 1.5 million personnel force.  The accompanying excerpted article from Russian newspaper Izvestiya, discusses how Russia is reopening military officer academies to support an expansion of the force that will likely not be fully implemented until well after the special military operation ends.


Sources:

Мишустин поручил создать Саратовское высшее артиллерийское командное училище (Mishustin orders creation of Saratov Higher Artillery Command School),” Izvestiya (daily Russian newspaper), 8 July 2024.  https://iz.ru/1724553/2024-07-08/mishustin-poruchil-sozdat-saratovskoe-vysshee-artilleriiskoe-komandnoe-uchilishche

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order to establish the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School. The document was signed on July 6 and published on the official legal information portal on July 8.

“To create a federal state military educational institution of higher education, the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School, of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation,” the document states.

The staffing level of military and civilian personnel at the school should be 6,000 personnel…Several more military academies may be created in Ulyanovsk. As Governor Alexey Russkikh reported on social networks in February, the issue has already been discussed with representatives of the Ministry of Defense. Thus, an inter-university military training center may be created in the city. Its base may be the former educational building of the Suvorov School in Krasnoznamenny Lane. In addition, a higher school of military transport aviation is planned to be located in Ulyanovsk on the basis of a former technical school.


Notes:

[i] “Изменение призывного возраста и увеличение армии. Путин и Шойгу выступили в Минобороны (Changing the conscription age and increasing the size of the Army: Putin and Shoigu spoke at the Ministry of Defense),” TASS, 21 December 2022.  https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/16655079

[ii] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.


OE Insight Summary:

RUS creating new officer academies to support expansion of the Russian Armed Forces to 1,500,000 uniformed personnel.


Image Information:

Image: Saratov Higher Artillery Command School
Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Саратовское_высшее_военное_командно-инженерное_училище_ракетных_войск#/media/Файл:Артиллерийская_ул_2_Саратов.jpg 
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0


China Introduces New Unmanned Systems in Combat Exercises

China’s DJI Mavic Air 2 drone in flight.


In many exercises during the second half of this year, there will be more intelligent AI armaments unveiled.”


China introduced and employed some of its unmanned systems during recent combat exercises, highlighting how it plans to dominate the future battlefield. In the exercise, “Peace Unity-2024,” Chinese participants worked closely with Tanzanian military personnel on new drone combat techniques.[i] According to the article excerpt, published by the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology’s official newspaper Science and Technology Daily, the exercise involved combatting a group of (imaginary) armed terrorists infiltrating town blocks to carry out attacks and take hostages. Reconnaissance, armored personnel, special warfare, artillery, and other combat units from both China and Tanzania worked together, while relying on infantry fighting vehicles, assault vehicles, and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft to locate and eliminate the “terrorists.” The article explains that once the drones took off, the Chinese reconnaissance team was able to transmit intelligence to the joint command post for Tanzanian and Chinese commanders to analyze and determine the battlefield situation. A Tanzanian reconnaissance team guided Chinese special forces in from the sea undetected. Once on station, blockading the perimeter, they used a “multi-channel concentric attack” approach to attack the terrorists at multiple points, expelling and eliminating them.

In a previous exercise, “Golden Dragon-2024,” which took place with Cambodia in May, the PLA featured a combat robot dog. Equipped with an automatic rifle, these battery-operated robot dogs could one day replace soldiers. A video published by the Chinese majority state-owned television network Phoenix News Media, shows the combat robot dog entering a building with soldiers. As described in the video transcript, the robot dog can reportedly navigate obstacles and fire at targets. Another video[ii] claims that the combat robot dog can even plan routes, approach targets, and avoid obstacles, making it ideal for urban combat operations. The first video also showcased an unmanned combat vehicle. The combat vehicle is said to have the same type of rifle and machine gun weapon stations as the robot dog.[iii] It also reportedly can be equipped with grenade launchers, bomb disposal arms and other mission-related features. A heavy-lift drone can airdrop it to the enemy’s rear, where it can work in coordination with the combat robot dog. While the robot dog is responsible for clearing buildings and alleys, able to go up and down stairs, the combat vehicle would be responsible for outdoor operations.[iv] While these systems can now be used for remote surveillance and attack, in the future, China envisions using unmanned systems to develop and deploy logistics, transporting supplies, and other items. In short, as the CCTV video explains, we can expect to see unmanned weapons systems appear more and more in future Chinese combat exercise scenarios.


Sources:

Zhang Qiang et al., “‘平团结-2024’联合演习——东非演兵场打出联合反恐’组合拳’ (Peace Unity 2024 Joint Exercise: Joint Anti-Terrorism ‘Combination Punch’ Launched on the East African Military Training Ground),” Keji Ribao (Official newspaper of the PRC’s Ministry of Science and Technology), 20 August 2024. https://www.stdaily.com/web/gdxw/2024-08/20/content_216923.html

During the operation and training phase of reconnaissance equipment, the Chinese participants demonstrated different drone combat and reconnaissance operations… and worked closely with Tanzanian officers and soldiers on new drone combat operations…

During the “Peace and Unity-2024” joint exercise… Chinese participants displayed a lot of the new equipment.

As the drones took off, the Chinese reconnaissance team took the lead and sent intelligence back to the command post. In the joint command center, Chinese and Tanzanian commanders jointly analyzed and assessed the battlefield situation and ordered the joint combat group to advance quickly from the left and right sides, using “ground assault, elite troops, information blocking” and other means to attack the imaginary enemy. At the same time, Chinese special forces took the approach of infiltrating from the sea to engage the enemy covertly. Guided by the Tanzanian reconnaissance team, they effectively located and identified suspicious targets. After completing the joint reconnaissance and perimeter blockade, participating troops from both sides collaborated to adopt a “multi-channel concentric attack” approach, attacking the [imaginary] “terrorists” stationed at multiple points and the eliminating them.

“This joint exercise has a large amount of a wide variety of equipment, including some new domains of equipment such as unmanned and special warfare equipment, which is a distinct feature.”

“解放军8月持续实弹演习 凸显人工智能军事化 (The PLA’s continued live-fire exercises in August highlight the militarization of artificial intelligence),” Phoenix News Media (a majority state-owned television network that serves mainland China, Honk Kong, Macau, and other Chinese-language viewers), 17 August 2024. https://mil.ifeng.com/c/8c41qSICUbG 

The [“Peace and Unit-2024”] joint exercise between China and Tanzania focused on exploring Chinese and foreign joint performances…(they called it) A new model of joint training…

In many exercises during the second half of this year, there will more intelligent AI armaments unveiled. According to Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily, a variety of unmanned equipment developed by China has been put into actual combat exercise. For example, equipped with an automatic rifle, the assault robot dog is able to accurately snipe targets…

In the future, the PLA will use unmanned equipment in field search and rescue operations. According to Hong Kong South China Morning Post the PLA is exploring integrating unmanned equipment into combat operations. A greatly improved special operations team will have battlefield awareness and fire-strike capabilities.

In May of this year, China’s PLA unveiled the intelligent unmanned combat robot dog during the joint Cambodian “Golden Dragon-2024” Exercise, which attracted much attention… some analysts pointed out that a robot dog equipped with automatic rifle in military drills demonstrates that China is changing its traditional battlefield rules… The four-legged robot dog… conducted reconnaissance first and fired upon discovering the enemy. He is a new member of our offensive and defensive operations. In the future, (unmanned systems might) develop and deploy logistics to treat the wounded, transport supplies and other items, even be directly linked to satellites. Integrated AI armaments for remote surveillance and attack might appear in future PLA combat exercises.


Notes:

[i] Peace Unity-2024,” was a joint exercise with Mozambique and Tanzania that took place late-July through mid-August 2024.

[ii] Mikhaila Friela, “China’s Latest Weapon of War is a Gun-Toting Robot Dog,” Business Insider, 28 May 2024. https://www.businessinsider.com/china-weapon-war-machine-gun-toting-robot-dog-military-drills-2024-5

[iii] “前方高能!国产新型战斗无人车曝光 演示视频发布!搭载战斗机器狗同型步枪 可由无人机空投至“敌”后方! (High Energy Ahead! New Domestic Unmanned Vehicle Exposed, Released Video Demonstration! Equipped With the Same Type of Rifle as the Combat Robot Dog, It Can Be Airdropped by a Drone to the Enemy Rear, Military Fans World),” CCTV Youtube channel (Chinese Government News Network), 12 July 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=poHfVmg0QAg

[iv] See also CCTV Youtube video, 12 July 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=poHfVmg0QAg


OE Watch Insight:

Autonomous systems, such as a unmanned combat vehicles and robotic dogs are becoming increasingly prominent in CHN’s combat training exercises.


Image Information:

Image: China’s DJI Mavic Air 2 drone in flight.
Source: Data derived from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DJI_-_Drohne_Mavic_Air_2.JPG
Attribution: C. Stadler/Bwag, CC-BY-SA-4.0


China Conducts Joint South China Sea Combat Patrol Near Huangyan Island

“If we do not strengthen our countermeasures against the Marcos government, the Philippines, relying on support of countries outside the region, will only become more arrogant in stirring up trouble.”


On 7 August, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command conducted a joint combat patrol in the South China Sea near Huangyan Island. The patrol coincided with a four-nation military exercise conducted by the United States, Canada, Australia, and the Philippines in the same region and aimed to “test the theater troops’ reconnaissance and early warning, rapid mobility, and joint strike capabilities.”[i]

The first excerpted article, published by the Global Times, a Chinese nationalistic tabloid, features Colonel Zhang Junshe, from the Naval Military Academic Research Institute, and Dr. Ding Duo, Deputy Director from China’s Institute of South China Sea Studies.[ii] In the article, Colonel Zhang emphasizes two points. Firstly, the joint combat patrol confidently showcases procedures to include quick threat detection, rapid deployment, control of both sea and air through joint strikes, seize the initiative, and launch further strike operations. Secondly, Colonel Zhang criticizes the coinciding four-nation military exercise as merely symbolic due to the limited number of participating ships.[iii] Colonel Zhang emphasizes that the Philippines involves non-regional countries in the South China Sea to embolden themselves to undertake more “provocative” actions. Dr. Ding Duo continues the rhetoric, accusing the United States of being the biggest external factor disrupting regional stability. He asserts that future multinational exercises will only serve to strengthen China’s determination and commitment to its interest in the region. The second excerpt, published by Direct News, a news agency controlled by the propaganda department of the Chinese Communist Party, features Shi Hong, a frequent special commentator. Shi Hong also places the blame for escalating tensions on the Philippines and the United States.[iv] He strongly advocates the PLA to intensify “countermeasures” against the Philippines as its military continues to participate in joint exercises. The Philippines has emerged as a primary contender against China in the South China Sea, with both sides engaging in multiple hostile confrontations.[v] While China has traditionally used its coast guard to assert its claims in the region, the recent PLA joint combat patrol signals a potentially more aggressive approach aimed at intimidating and demonstrating strength. The timing of this joint combat patrol is clearly intended to send a message of discontent. The trend of patrols may become more frequent, signaling China’s dissatisfaction with the Philippines’ growing collaboration with its allies and partners.[vi]


Sources:

“南部战区位黄岩岛附近海空域组织联合战巡,军事专家:消息中的“三种能力”内涵丰富 (The Southern Theater Command organized a joint combat patrol in the sea and air near Huangyan Island, military experts say the “three capabilities” in the report are rich in meaning),” Global Times (a Chinese tabloid known for reporting international issues from a nationalistic perspective), 7 August 2024. https://hqtime.huanqiu.com/article/4IvXI4qwGPn

The People’s Liberation Army Southern Theater Command announced on the 7th that they conducted a joint combat patrol near Huangyan Island in the South China Sea. This patrol aimed to test the theater troops’ reconnaissance and early warning, rapid mobility, and joint strike capabilities. Experts interviewed by the Global Times noted that these three capabilities demonstrate the PLA’s ability to implement targeted countermeasures against provocative actions.

Colonel Zhang Junshe, a researcher at the Naval Military Academic Research Institute, stated that the PLA’s three key capabilities—reconnaissance and early warning, rapid mobility, and joint strikes—are part of its combat procedures designed to defend national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity. He explained that these procedures enable the PLA to quickly detect threats, maneuver rapidly, and conduct joint strikes against acts of aggression. This approach allows the PLA to maintain control of sea and air, seize the initiative, and launch further strike operations.

Coincidentally, the Philippines, the United States, Canada, and Australia began a two-day multilateral maritime exercise on the 7th, which was reported as the first joint exercise among these four countries. This marks the third exercise that the Philippines has conducted with non-regional countries within ten days; On July 31st, the Philippine and US navies held a joint maritime exercise in the South China Sea, and on August 2nd, the Philippines and Japan conducted a joint military exercise in the same region.

Dr. Ding Duo, Deputy Director of the Institute of Marine Law and Policy at the China Institute of South China Sea Studies, stated that the Philippines’ continual attempts to involve non-regional countries in joint exercises have only emboldened their confidence for provocative actions in the South China Sea. Dr. Ding Duo firmly believes that not only is the Philippines bringing danger upon itself, but it is also destabilizing ASEAN’s regional stability.

Dr. Ding Duo asserts that the United States is the biggest external factor disrupting regional stability. He criticizes the U.S. for promoting multilateral mechanisms and exhibiting a Cold War mentality against China. Dr. Ding Duo states, ‘The United States does not have many means to intervene in South China Sea affairs. It can only demonstrate deterrence through joint patrols and joint military exercises. However, history and reality have shown that this approach will not affect China; instead, it will only strengthen China’s determination to safeguard its sovereignty, security, and development interests in the South China Sea.”

Furthermore, public reports indicate that the exercises conducted by the Philippines with non-regional countries in the South China Sea are mostly symbolic. In the most recent exercises, very few ships and aircraft were involved. From the Philippines’ perspective, its ships and systems are far behind those of friendly and allied countries, making it unable to effectively carry out its own joint operations. The Philippines hopes that through these multinational exercises, the United States and its allies will support it and increase its confidence in continuing provocative actions. Colonel Zhang Junshe criticizes this approach, stating, ‘ …. the United States and Japan are capable of lending a helping hand to the Philippines, but neither of them is willing enough. They just want the Philippines to charge into battle, and they will not participate in it themselves.’

“解放军联合战巡南海 这一次在黄岩岛附近 (The PLA South China Sea joint patrol is near the Huangyan Island),” Direct News (news agency controlled by the propaganda department of the Chinese Communist Party), 7 August 2024. https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1806726604086346646&wfr=spider&for=pc

On August 7th, the Southern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army organized a joint combat patrol in the sea and airspace near Huangyan Island in the South China Sea to test the theater troops’ reconnaissance and early warning, rapid mobility, and joint strike capabilities. The Southern Theater Command stated that “all military activities that disrupt the South China Sea, create hotspots, and undermine regional peace and stability are under control.”

Shi Hong, a special commentator for Zhi News (Direct News), states that this joint combat patrol serves as a deterrent signal. He notes that the Philippines is frequently disrupting regional stability in the South China Sea and has actively involved non-regional countries to further destabilize the region. The four-nation exercise involving the Philippines, the United States, Canada, and Australia is the Philippines’ third naval exercise with non-regional countries in ten days.

“If we do not intensify our countermeasures against the Marcos government of the Philippines, the Philippines, relying on support from non-regional countries, will become more arrogant in destabilizing the region,” Shi Hong said. “Now the PLA Southern Theater Command is organizing its own joint patrols near Huangyan Island in the South China Sea, which serves as a strong warning to the Philippines and its allies. If they interfere in the South China Sea and challenge China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the PLA is fully capable of defeating all provocations.”


Notes:

[i] To read the official statement on the joint combat patrol released by China’s Southern Theater Command, see their official Weibo post, Weibo, 7 August 2024. https://m.weibo.cn/u/7468777622?jumpfrom=weibocom

[ii] To watch the Global Times report on the joint combat patrol, see Global Times’ official Baidu post, Baidu, 8 August 2024. https://haokan.baidu.com/v?vid=10881733893047848551

[iii] The four-nation exercise involving the US, Australia, Canada, and the Philippines included only four ships, with Australia contributing a single Boeing Poseidon reconnaissance aircraft, Asian News Network (news coalition organization headquartered in Singapore), 8 August 2024. https://asianews.network/philippines-starts-4-nation-naval-drills-with-us-australia-canada/

[iv] To watch a clip of special commentator Shi Hong briefly outlining his points, see Direct News’ video post, Direct News, 08 August 2024. https://haokan.baidu.com/v?vid=2234121559770488262&collection_id=

[v] Nectar Gan and Kathleen Magramo “‘Only pirates do this’: Philippines accuses China of using bladed weapons in major South China Sea escalation,” CNN, 20 June 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/20/asia/philippines-footage-south-china-sea-clash-china-intl-hnk/index.html

[vi] Agence France-Presse, “China launches air, sea patrols near flashpoint reef as US holds joint drills,” VOA, 7 August 2024. https://www.voanews.com/a/china-launches-air-sea-patrols-near-flashpoint-scarborough-shoal/7733012.html


OE Watch Insight:

CHN conducted a joint combat patrol in the South China Sea to enhance reconnaissance, early warning, and joint strike capabilities. This heightens regional tensions and underscores CHN’s intent to assert its territorial claims, challenging freedom of navigation.


Image Information:

Image: This photo, taken on 12 May 2024, shows Chinese Coast Guard vessels training in the waters near Huangyan Island.
Source: httpswww.chinadaily.com.cna20240516WS66455301a31082fc043c7542_2.html
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.


China’s Southern Theater Command Strained by Growing Operational Requirements

Map of China’s five Theater Commands. The Southern Theater Command has responsibility for the borders all countries and coastline touched by its jurisdiction.


“With instability on the Myanmar border and rising tensions in the South China Sea, the PLA Southern Theatre Command is stretched to the limit.”


Multiple press reports emanating from Southeast Asia suggest China’s Southern Theater Command is being stretched to its operational limits.[i] According to the excerpted article from India media aggregator First Post, instability on the China-Myanmar border due to the on-going internal conflict in Myanmar between government and insurgent forces, and continued tension in the South China Sea, could push the command to the brink of its operational capabilities. The First Post article was published on the heels of China’s announcement that it would conduct three days of live fire drills and patrols on the border with Myanmar beginning on 27 August and ending 29 August. The military exercises took place across a small portion of China’s roughly 1,240-mile-long border with Myanmar and are the latest military operations by the PLA on the Myanmar border. According to the First Post article, the military exercises were conducted to “maintain the safety and stability of the border areas.”  According to the second excerpted article from Singapore-based Central News Asia (CNA), China justified the frontier training exercises and patrols in the wake of recent battles between Myanmar’s military and non-government forces spilling over onto Chinese territory and the conflict generally threatening Chinese infrastructure projects on its frontier.

To the east, the PLA Navy’s Southern Fleet and accompanying air assets, operating under the Southern Theater Command, is tasked with carrying out China’s many interests in the South China Sea as China battles a variety of counterclaims on the features of the area.[ii]

The third excerpted article from Xinhau and published on Chinese military-focused news aggregator Chinamilitary.com noted that in addition to border security and continued operations in the South China Sea, the Southern Theater Command is frequently tasked to help with natural disasters such as the participation of 700 PLA Army personal to assist in the response to flooding in central China’s Hunan Province in July. None of the excerpted articles suggest the operational tempo of the Southern Theater Command would threaten the viability of the command itself, nor that China would be unable to reinforce the command from the other four theater commands if necessary. Still, the articles highlight a myriad of flashpoints within the jurisdiction of the Southern Theater Command that show no sign of abating as natural disasters, the conflict in Myanmar, and challenges to Chinese claims in the South China Sea are sure to continue.


Sources:

“Myanmar crisis to South China Sea tensions: Is PLA’s Southern Theatre Command stretched?”, First Post (India-based news service covering the region), 26 August 2024. https://www.firstpost.com/world/myanmar-instability-to-south-china-sea-tensions-is-plas-southern-theatre-command-stretched-13808289.html – goog_rewarded

With instability on the Myanmar border and rising tensions in the South China Sea, the PLA Southern Theatre Command is stretched to the limit.

China’s People’s Liberation Army Southern Theatre Command is facing an unprecedented strain as it prepares for a three-day live-fire drill on the Chinese side of the China-Myanmar border. This drill, set to commence on Tuesday, is a critical test of the command’s capabilities as it grapples with the increasing instability in Myanmar, which poses a significant threat to China’s border security and strategic interests.

The Yunnan provincial government announced that the drill would take place in several key locations including Ruili city near the townships of Huyi and Wanting, Zhenkang county near Mengdui township and the autonomous county of Gengma Dai and Wa near Mengding town. These areas are close to the nearly 2,000-kilometre border that Yunnan shares with Myanmar making them particularly vulnerable to the spillover effects of the ongoing civil war in Myanmar.

The Southern Theatre Command of the People’s Liberation Army is unique in that it must manage operations across multiple domains simultaneously. This includes land-based operations along the Myanmar border, maritime security in the South China Sea and air operations that support both naval and land operations.

The PLA Navy’s Southern Fleet, operating under the Southern Theatre Command, is tasked with a wide array of missions from routine patrols to potential conflict scenarios with foreign navies. The fleet must also be prepared to enforce China’s maritime claims often involving standoffs with vessels from other nations including the United States. The PLA Air Force units under the Southern Theatre Command are similarly stretched. They must conduct regular reconnaissance missions enforce airspace control over contested areas and provide rapid response capabilities in case of escalation…

This includes protecting Chinese investments in Myanmar, ensuring the security of critical infrastructure projects and supporting China’s strategic ambitions in the region.

China’s investments in Myanmar, particularly those related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are of strategic importance. The Southern Theatre Command is tasked with ensuring the security of these projects, which include pipelines, roads and ports that are critical to China’s access to the Indian Ocean. Protecting these assets from potential threats, whether from internal conflict in Myanmar or external interference, adds another layer of responsibility to the command’s already heavy workload.

“China’s military to conduct armed patrols, live-fire exercises near Myanmar border,” Channel News Asia (Singapore-based media service), 26 August 2024. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/chinas-military-conduct-armed-patrols-live-fire-exercises-near-myanmar-border-4567376

China’s military said on Monday (26 Aug) it had organised army units and joint air-ground police patrols near its border with Myanmar to maintain security and stability as fighting between Myanmar’s ruling junta and rebel forces escalates.

The patrols will focus on areas around Ruili, Zhenkang and other frontline sections in China, the military said in a statement.

Major fighting has occurred in northern Kachin and Shan states in Myanmar, with artillery shells injuring people and damaging property on the Chinese side, and also threatening infrastructure projects in China.

The Southern Theatre of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is organising army units to test troops’ ability to “quickly move, block and control, and strike together, and maintain security and stability in the border areas”, the military said.

A unit of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is also scheduled to organise live-fire exercises on the Chinese side of the China-Myanmar border from Aug 27-29, according to a separate statement from China’s military.

Exercises will be held in areas located south of Ruili, and in other areas around Zhenkang county and Gengma Dai and Va autonomous county in west Yunnan province, the military said.

China said the conflict was having a negative effect on stability and social order on the China-Myanmar border.

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi also said recently that China would continue “its commitment to restore peace and stability in Myanmar”.

“Over 700 officers, soldiers of PLA Southern Theater Command head for flood-hit region,” 7 July. Chinamilitary.com (Chinese military-focused news aggregator) http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/ARMEDFORCES/SouthernTheaterCommand/News_209144/16322315.html

More than 700 officers and soldiers from the airforce of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command departed for Yueyang, central China’s Hunan Province, on Sunday to undertake flood relief and rescue operations.

Carrying 46 vehicles, they are scheduled to arrive at designated areas before midnight on Sunday, with the tasks of inspecting dikes, reinforcing embankments and assisting in the restoration of local production and daily life.Heavy and prolonged rainfall has resulted in flooding in various regions of China, notably causing a breach in the dike of Dongting Lake, the country’s second-largest freshwater lake, located in a county administered by the city of Yueyang.


Notes:

[i] China’s Theater Commands can be likened to the U.S. Combatant Commands but rather than a global focus, their areas of responsibility (AOR) are officially within China itself and the international borders respective to the individual command. China’s Southern Theater Command’s AOR borders Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam (Mainland Southeast Asia) and the South China Sea, and as such the Southern Theater Command has responsibility for this long frontier. It is also anticipated that the Southern Theater Command would support the Eastern Theater Command in any major amphibious operation against Taiwan.

[ii] The Southern Military Command’s air assets also engage in air interdiction missions. See: PLA Southern Theater Command drives away Philippine aircraft illegally intruding into China’s Huangyan Dao, China Military Online, 10 August 2024. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/16330462.html


OE Watch Insight:

The high operational mission tempo on CHN’s Southern Theater Command has observers assessing that the command is being stretched to its operational limits.


Image Information:

Image: Map of China’s five Theater Commands. The Southern Theater Command has responsibility for the borders all countries and coastline touched by its jurisdiction.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theater_command_(China) – /media/File:Map_of_Theatres_of_PLA_en.svg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0


China’s South China Sea Strategy Complimented by Civilian Infrastructure

Nautical chart of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, with Woody Island highlighted in yellow.


“China has opened a hardware store on a disputed South China Sea island, according to the local government, as Beijing ramps up efforts to expand civilian facilities and cement claims in the strategically important waterway.”


Building civilian infrastructure and populating the newly built islands of the South China Sea is part of a cycle of building, populating, and defending that population and infrastructure that China is growing throughout the disputed islands.  A recent article in Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post (SCMP) focused on a strategic but otherwise mundane-seeming event—the opening of Xinyi Hardware Store on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea.[i] According to the SCMP article, the opening of the hardware store reflects the growing number of civilians and civilian enterprises China is moving to its newly created territories in the South China Sea. The article notes that the hardware store serves both Chinese military and civilians in Shansha City, which was established in 2012 to be the administrative center of Chinese efforts to control the islands and features of the South China Sea. Shansha City is also focal point of Chinese naval and coast guard assets in the region. Today Shansha City boasts a population of more than 2,300 civilians, an undisclosed number of military personnel, a civil-military airport, a 5,000-ton wharf, a post office, banks, schools, library, parks, hospitals, and power plant—all the trappings of a modern city.[ii]

The move has also encouraged other nations with claims in the South China Sea to follow suit. Vietnam is building up its presence in the Paracel Islands and has increased its efforts to solidify its position on Barque Canada Reef, a narrow, 18-mile atoll on the southern end of the Spratlys. Vietnam has doubled the size of the Barque Canada Reef to 492 acres since November 2023.[iii] Chinese and Vietnamese efforts to populate the islands within their control do not change the operational environment – they create the operational environment – and should be recognized as tactics used to gain legitimacy for claims to control parts of the South China Sea.


Sources:

“South China Sea: Beijing opens hardware store on disputed Woody Island,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong-based English language media outlet), 3 August 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3273082/south-china-sea-beijing-opens-hardware-store-disputed-woody-island

China has opened a hardware store on a disputed South China Sea island, according to the local government, as Beijing ramps up efforts to expand civilian facilities and cement claims in the strategically important waterway.

Covering an area of about 100 square metres (1,076 square feet), the Xinyi Hardware Store is located on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands, a contested archipelago known in Chinese as the Xisha Islands and in Vietnamese as the Hoang Sa Islands.

The store, situated next to the cargo terminal of the Sansha Yongxing Airport, opened for business on Thursday, according to the government of Sansha city, which oversees the Paracels as well as the Macclesfield Bank and the Spratly Islands – another disputed archipelago known as the Nansha Islands in Chinese.

Located about 300km (186 miles) from the southern Chinese island province of Hainan, Woody Island – known as Yongxing Island in China – is the largest outcrop among the 30 or so islands that make up the Paracels. The archipelago is controlled by Beijing but also claimed by Taipei and Hanoi.To assert its claims to the resource-rich waters, Beijing in 2012 announced the establishment of Sansha city on Woody Island to administer the disputed South China Sea islands and features.


Notes:

[i] Like most of the features of the South China Sea, the Paracel Islands are jointly claimed. The Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam and China each claims jurisdiction and hold on to shoals and islands under their respective control. All nations with a claim are building out infrastructure to cement control over territory held.

[ii] The opening of the hardware store on Shansha city is the most recent in a number of media publicized opennings. In April 2023 China opened the Kuanzhai Xiangzi hotpot restaurant in Shansha City on Woody Island. See: “South China Sea: Beijing opens hotpot restaurant on Woody Island in disputed Paracels chain,” South China Morning Post, 30 April 2023. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3218912/south-china-sea-beijing-opens-hotpot-restaurant-woody-island-disputed-paracels-chain?module=inline&pgtype=article

[iii] For a recent U.S. media perspective on Vietnam’s herculean effort to dredge the sea floor, fill in land, fortify barriers and erect new structures on Barque Canada Reef, see: “Vietnam accelerates island building to challenge China’s maritime claims,” The Washington Post, 9 August 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2024/vietnam-south-china-sea-islands-growth/


OE Insight Summary:

CHN practices its own version of nation-building as it expands its territories by moving civilians and civilian infrastructure onto disputed islands in the South China Sea.


Image Information:

Image: Nautical chart of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, with Woody Island highlighted in yellow.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paracel_Islands – /media/File:Asia_-_South_China_Sea_-_Mui_Da_Nang_to_Shen-Ch’uan_Chiang_including_Hai-Nan_Tao_and_Paracel_Islands_(Paracel_Islands_cropped).jpg
Attribution: Public Domain, yellow highlight by author


Rumors of Russian Military Cargo Activity Underscore Tunisia’s Eastward Turn Away From the United States

Tunisian President Kais Saied on Inauguration Day, 23 October 2019.


Kais Saied is a ripe fruit waiting to fall into the hands of the Russians”


Summary: Recent rumors of Russian military cargo flights into Tunisia highlight President Kais Saied’s “eastward turn”— including toward China and Iran — and the potential erosion of Tunisia’s security partnership with the United States.


On 19 May, the Italian daily La Repubblica published a report claiming that Russia may be using a Tunisian airport to transport military equipment, raising questions about Moscow’s designs in the country. Russia exerts substantial military influence in both Libya and Algeria, Tunisia’s neighboring countries.[i] Tunisia, however, is a historical Western security partner in which Russia has traditionally had little to no military influence. The rumors of Russian activities in Tunisia may not amount to much, but they should nonetheless be taken seriously in light of evident Russian attempts to deepen its influence in Libya and the Sahel,[ii] along with Tunisian President Kais Saied’s seeming “eastward turn.”

The report suggests that entities linked to Russia’s Wagner Group had flown equipment and personnel into the international airport of Djerba, a southern Tunisian island popular with local travelers and European package tourists.[iii] There is no open-source evidence supporting claims of Russian military-related movements in Djerba, but speculation among Tunisians is nonetheless rife, as noted in the first accompanying excerpt, from the Qatari-aligned English-language daily al-Araby al-Jadeed. Theories on Russian activities in Djerba include that former Wagner personnel are vacationing in Djerba; that Russia is “transporting migrants to overwhelm Tunisia’s border crossing points”; or that the planes are transporting “personnel and crates of vodka for Russian soldiers on leave in Tunisia.” The Russian embassy was quick to ridicule claims of any military connection to these flights, as shown in the second accompanying excerpt, from the Russian Embassy in Libya’s Facebook page. The week after the publication on Russian flights to Djerba, President Saied flew to Tehran to attend Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi’s state funeral. The last time a Tunisian head of state visited Iran was 1965. The following week, Saied flew to Beijing to attend the China-Arab Cooperation Forum. While Saied’s recent engagement with Iran and China has been more overt than any gestures toward Russia, most analysts see these developments as part of a broader eastward turn in Saied’s foreign policy. Saied’s eastward turn, particularly toward China, as largely motivated by economics explains a Tunisian political activist cited in the third accompanying excerpt, from Qatar’s al-Jazeera. However, there are also ideological affinities between members of Saied’s inner circle and Iranian political leadership.[iv] This confluence of circumstances, according to a Tunisian researcher cited in the fourth accompanying excerpt, from the Kuwaiti daily al-Jarida, makes Saied’s Tunisia a “ripe fruit waiting to fall into the hands of the Russians.”


Sources:

“Tunisia: alleged Russian military activity in Djerba raises concerns,” The New Arab (Qatari-aligned daily), 24 May 2024, https://www.newarab.com/news/tunisia-alleged-russian-military-activity-raises-concerns

Theories on the suspicious events at Djerba airport have become a “culture de trottoir” in Tunisia for months. Some speculate it involves Wagner personnel, while others suggest it’s about vodka shipments. According to some Tunisian analysts, these aircraft are believed to be “cargo planes” and civilian “charters,” not the military aircraft mentioned by La Repubblica. Some sources claim that the aircraft transported Russians affiliated with the former security company Wagner (now “Africa Corps”), who came to rest on the island of Djerba. Others suggest they transported personnel and crates of vodka for Russian soldiers on leave in Tunisia. A far more speculative hypothesis suggests that some aircraft might be transporting migrants to overwhelm Tunisia’s border crossing points, thereby creating a crisis. Wagner’s presence in neighbouring Libya mainly fueled all these rumours… While rumours continue circulating, one thing may seem to be agreed on: Russian aircraft have been seen on Djerba Island. President Kais Saied, known for publicly addressing rumours targeting his country, has refrained from commenting on the situation at Djerba airport.

Russian Embassy in Libya, Facebook Page, 20 May 2024, https://www.facebook.com/RussEmbLib/posts/122143879226177351

Now the Italian “La Repubblica,” having clearly decided to keep up with the task of creating and replicating horror stories about “Wagner,” scares the inexperienced reader with the idea of ​​​​Russian combat aircraft at the airport of the tourist island of Djerba in Tunisia, neighboring Libya. One can only envy their imagination. But as a reaction, we have to say: this is a lie and a fake. A complete lack of respect for the reader, whether in Italy or abroad.

توجه تونس شرقا.. خطة للانسلاخ من الغرب أم مناورة؟

“Tunisia’s eastward orientation… a plan to ditch the West or a maneuver?” al-Jazeera (Qatari news channel), 4 June 2024, https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2024/6/4/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A7-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AE-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8

Political activist Ahmed Al-Kahlawi views the Tunisian-Chinese rapprochement as an important step taken by President Saied to revive historical relations with China, stressing that the Tunisian orientation towards the East was dictated by the economic difficulties that the country is experiencing as a result of dysfunctional cooperation to benefit the interests of Western powers. Al-Kahlawi told Al-Jazeera Net that President Saied chose to lead Tunisia to establish new partnerships with the East because he was certain that Tunisia would reap many economic and investment advantages, especially with China, the rising economic power, considering that Tunisia would achieve great growth that would free it from the hegemony of Western countries.

تونس بين التوجه شرقاً أو الحفاظ على حلفها مع الغرب

“Tunisia between an eastward turn and maintaining its alliance with the West,” al-Jarida (Kuwaiti daily), 30 May 2024, https://www.aljarida.com/article/64205For his part, Tunisian researcher at the Institute for Defense and Security Studies, Jalal Harchaoui, explained that in a context characterized by Russian penetration of the Sahel region and Libya, “Kais Saied is a ripe fruit waiting to fall into the hands of the Russians.”


Notes:

[i] See: Lucas Winter, “Russia Uses Diplomacy To Increase Military Influence In Libya,” OE Watch, 10-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-uses-diplomacy-to-increase-military-influence-in-libya/; Lucas Winter, “Algeria Seeks Non-Alignment By Preserving Russia Ties While Welcoming NATO Overtures,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/algeria-seeks-non-alignment-by-preserving-russia-ties-while-welcoming-nato-overtures/; Lucas Winter, “Algerian Military Deepening Ties To Russia,” OE Watch, 09-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/algerian-military-deepening-ties-to-russia/

[ii] See: Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Amelia Cheatham. “Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Burkina Faso,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, January 2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/burkina-faso-russia-m-dime-report/;  Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Amelia Cheatham. “Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in Burkina Faso,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, January 2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/burkina-faso-china-m-dime-report/; Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Christopher Betts. “Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Mali,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, June 2024, Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Christopher Betts. “Instruments of Chinee Military Influence in Mali,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, June 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/mali-china-m-dime-report-2/

[iii] The La Repubblica article is unavailable without a subscription. It can be found at: https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2024/05/19/news/aerei_militari_russi_tunisia_allarme_usa_migranti_saied_timori_governo_meloni-423030975

[iv] Per Le Monde, “certain circles surrounding Saied have long-standing links with the Islamic Republic,” in particular his brother Naoufel Saied. “Tunisia: Kais Saied’s inclination to turn to Iran,” Le Monde, 25 May 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/05/25/tunisia-kais-saied-s-inclination-to-turn-to-iran_6672647_124.html


OE Insight Summary:

Recent rumors of RUS military cargo flights into TUN highlight President Kais Saied’s seeming “eastward turn”— including toward CHN and IRN— and the potential erosion of TUN’s security relationship with USA.

Image Information:

Image: Tunisian President Kais Saied on Inauguration Day, 23 October 2019.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kaïs_Saïd_2.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.


Turkey Deploying Syrian Private Security Contractors to Niger

Turkey and Niger have increased their military cooperation since 2020, including through using Libya as a gateway.


“The defense component of the relationship between Niger and Turkey has become more prominent with the signing of a military cooperation agreement in 2020 and the sale of armed drones.”


Summary: Turkey is deploying Syrian militants to Niger to protect economic interests. While their desire for money presents challenges of commitment and resembles Russia’s Wagner mercenaries in West Africa, the Syrian militants operate more like private security contractors and have a lesser counter-insurgency role.


Russia’s Wagner Group, and its successor Africa Corps, have received significant international attention and notoriety because of their operations propping up of post-coup military regimes in West Africa. While their objectives ostensibly include combating Islamist militants and protecting mining and other extractive industries whose exports benefit Russia, they have also partaken in the excessive killing of civilians during counter-insurgency operations.[i] The excerpted French-language article in L’Orient Le Jour highlights Turkey’s recent programs to deploy militants to West Africa, whose activities can be juxtaposed against those of Wagner and Africa Corps.

According to the article, the program involves hundreds of pro-Turkish Syrians—and not Turks themselves—from the Sultan Murad brigade.[ii] This differs from Russia’s Wagner and Africa Corps, whose members are primarily Russians, despite recent evidence of an African member in Wagner ranks in Ukraine.[iii] The Syrians have been contracted by a Turkish private military company, which has paid the Syrian fighters up to $1,500 per month. This is almost ten times more than they had received when fighting in Turkish-controlled areas of Syria. Like with Wagner and Africa Corps members, remuneration is, therefore, a primary incentive for the Syrians to travel to Niger.

The exact activities of these Turkish mercenaries remain unclear. On one hand, the article asserts that their main role is to protect Turkish interests and projects in Niger, including mining operations. In this sense, they would be functioning much like private security contractors, rather than mercenaries. On the other hand, one of the Syrian contractors interviewed for the article noted that the outfit was deployed to combat Boko Haram. If true, this would likely mean that they were based in southeastern Niger near Lake Chad, where iron ore and other minerals are mined, where Boko Haram factions have pillaged villages and even taken over military outposts in the last few years. If this were the outfit’s primary role, it would appear to function more closely to Wagner, though without the regime protection efforts.

Although the interviewee states that his cohorts arrived in Niger only around one year ago, the article claims Turkey had been preparing for their deployment by sending Syrian fighters to train in Libya for several years. This provided the fighters with combat experience in Africa and a gateway for further travel to Niger. In addition, in 2020, Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement with Niger, which involved the sale of armed drones from Turkey to Niger. However, this may have since evolved into the additional deployment of these pro-Turkish Syrians to Niger as well.

The article does not indicate the Syrians in Niger will play as significant of a counter-insurgency role as Wagner or Africa Corps in West Africa, which also means their presence in the country is less likely to generate international concerns on humanitarian grounds. However, the Syrians’ primary motivation of remuneration and the challenging security environment in Niger, including with Boko Haram and other al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated fighters in their midst, raises questions about their ability to successfully defend Turkish interests, let alone enhance security in the region. Another question lingers about whether friction will develop between Turkey and Russia in West Africa through their deployment of fighters to protect their respective interests in similar areas.


Sources:

“Le Niger, nouvel Eldorado des mercenaires proturcs de Syrie (Niger, the new Eldorado of pro-Turkish mercenaries from Syria),” www.lorientlejour.com (Lebanon-based French-language publication covering Francophone international affairs, including coverage of Islamist militancy) 3 May 2024. https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1413977/le-niger-nouvel-eldorado-des-mercenaires-proturcs-de-syrie-enquete.html

A thousand Syrian fighters from areas under Turkish control have left for Niger for a year to protect Turkish interests and projects. In the areas of northern Syria controlled by Turkey, where recruitment into pro-Ankara factions is the main driver, according to Omar, his monthly salary never exceeded $46. “Here in Niger, we are paid $1,500,” added the young man, who supports his mother and brothers and sisters.

At the group’s headquarters, they signed six-month contracts with a private Turkish military consulting company that protects Turkish interests, including mines, in Niger.

The military regime of Niger, as a result of a coup d’état perpetrated on July 26, 2023, has reoriented its foreign policy and denounced military cooperation agreements with France and the United States, while Russia is advancing its interests in this country. For its part, Turkey has increased its influence in Niger over the past decade through humanitarian aid, development and trade. The defense component of the relationship between Niger and Turkey has become more prominent with the signing of a military cooperation agreement in 2020 and the sale of armed drones.


Notes:

[i] For an analysis of Russia’s Africa Corps, please see: (last Zenn OE Watch)

[ii] The Sultan Murad brigade in Syria was comprised primarily of ethnic Turkmen from Syria and specialized in fighting Islamic State (IS) forces, as opposed to forces loyal to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. The brigade was part of the Jaysh al-Fateh (“Army of Victory”) coalition, which was backed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey and reached its peak in 2015 before suffering from internal factional disputes. See: Fabrice Balanche, “The Battle of Aleppo Is the Center of the Syrian Chessboard,” WINEP, 5 February 2016.

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/battle-aleppo-center-syrian-chessboard

[iii] See, for example, Jacob Zenn, “Russia’s Africa Corps Appears to Be Recruiting African Militants,” Terrorism Monitor, July 9, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/brief-russias-africa-corps-appears-to-be-recruiting-african-militants/


OE Insight Summary:

TUR is deploying militants from SYR to NER to protect econ interests. While their desire for money presents challenges of commitment and resembles RUS Wagner mercenaries in WA, the SYR militants operate more like private security contractors and have a lesser counter-insurgency role.


Image Information:

Image: Turkey and Niger have increased their military cooperation since 2020, including through using Libya as a gateway.
Source: Saotura, https://commons.wikim edia.org/wiki/File:Niger_Turkey_Locator.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0