Category Archives: OE Watch

Russia Demonstrating Power Projection Capabilities With Havana Port Call

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An Admiral Gorshkov class frigate at sea was part of the five Russian warships that paid a port of call to Cuba in June 2024.

“Cuba is Russia’s most important partner in the Western Hemisphere from a purely geopolitical and geostrategic point of view.”

Summary: The Russian government has sent a flotilla of three warships and one nuclear-powered submarine to port in Havana, Cuba. Its stated intentions are both to punish Western countries for supporting Ukraine and to display its own power projection capabilities. 

Latin America holds an important place in Russia’s foreign and defense policy.[i] Most importantly, Latin America is a key battleground for pushing back against the United States’ operations in the European theater—specifically Ukraine.

According to the excerpted article in the Spanish daily El País, the recent port call of four Russian naval vessels in Havana, Cuba should be seen within this context. Prior to arriving in Cuba, the three surface warships and a nuclear-powered submarine participated in missile exercises in the Atlantic Ocean. While Russia’s Navy had been visiting the Caribbean more frequently in the past, COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine have curtailed the number of these visits. El País also reports that once the Russian warships leave Cuba they will conduct exercises in the Caribbean before continuing onwards to Venezuela. The Cuban government was quick to point out that none of the vessels are nuclear armed. However, as reported in the second excerpted article by the Argentine outlet Infobae, Russians assured the media that the submarine carried hypersonic missiles. Furthermore, Infobae concluded that the timing of the visits was not mere coincidence: the visit came approximately one week after Russian President Vladimir Putin mused about placing weapons in countries close to the United States in response to  Washington’s support of Ukraine.

This development is significant because it reaffirms Russia’s close ties with Cuba and Venezuela and indicates that Russia continues to view Latin America as a central region in near-peer competition. It is also notable that regional responses to the visit have been muted. Few Latin American governments have said anything publicly—possibly a harbinger of broader Russian influence in keeping Latin American countries non-aligned on geopolitical issues.[ii]

Sources:

“Llega al puerto de La Habana una flotilla de buques de guerra rusos con un submarino nuclear (A flotilla of Russian warships arrives at the port of Havana with a nuclear submarine),” El País (a Spanish daily with excellent regional coverage), 12 June 2024. https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-12/llega-al-puerto-de-la-habana-una-flotilla-de-buques-de-guerra-rusos-con-un-submarino-nuclear.html

Until June 17, the ships will remain in Cuban waters…Before arriving in Havana, the Russian ships carried out exercises and maneuvers in the Atlantic. These are not the first naval maneuvers involving Cuba and Russia. In July the Russian Navy training ship Perekop spent several days in Havana. The frigate Almirante Gorshkov was there in 2019…Cuba is Russia’s most important partner in the Western Hemisphere from a purely geopolitical and geostrategic point of view and the meaning of this naval presence is not essentially different from the past: Russia wants to demonstrate that its navy is capable of crossing the oceans and reaching the coasts of Florida.

“Cuba profundiza su relación con Rusia: tres buques de guerra y un submarino llegarán a La Habana para ejercicios militares (Cuba deepens its relationship with Russia: three warships and a submarine will arrive in Havana for military exercises),” Infobae (an Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 6 June 2024. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2024/06/06/cuba-profundiza-su-relacion-con-rusia-tres-buques-de-guerra-y-un-submarino-llegaran-a-la-habana-para-ejercicios-militares/  

Although the military maneuvers have been planned in advance, they follow the words of the President of Russia about possible retaliation due to Ukrainian attacks against Russian territory with Western weapons. The president mentioned the possibility of Moscow delivering military material to other countries to carry out ‘attacks against sensitive targets’ of Kyiv’s partners.

Notes:

[i] For more information on how Russia views Latin America, especially in the context of its war against Ukraine, see: Ryan C. Berg et al., “Two Years Later: LAC and Russia’s War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 February 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/two-years-later-lac-and-russias-war-ukraine

[ii] To read more about Russia’s strategy and how Latin America has remained relatively silent on Russia’s recent activities, and especially its war in Ukraine, see: Ryan C. Berg et al., “A Hesitant Hemisphere: How Latin America has been Shaped by the War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 February 27 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/hesitant-hemisphere-how-latin-america-has-been-shaped-war-ukraine

OE Insight Summary:

RUS government sends flotilla of three warships and one nuclear-powered submarine to port in Havana, CUB. Stated intentions are to punish Western countries for support of Ukraine and display power projection capabilities. 

Image:

Image: An Admiral Gorshkov [RG1] class frigate at sea was part of the five Russian warships that paid a port of call to Cuba in June 2024.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_frigate_Admiral_Gorshkov – /media/File:Admiral_Gorshkov_frigate_03.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

 [RG1]WEG Name: Admiral-Gorshkov Class (Project 22350 Class) Russian Frigate

WEG Link: https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/f47d39c5501f875d0c0e85489359679a

Russian Drift Station Vital to Arctic Research Effort

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Admiralty Shipyards in St Petersburg, Russia built the Severny Polyus drift station.

“Since it set out from St.Petersburg in early September 2022, the Severny Polyus (“North Pole”) has drifted more than 3,000 nautical miles through the sea-ice from the East Siberian Sea to the Greenland Sea.”

Summary: Russia is using a large drift station called Severney Polyus (North Pole) in the Arctic to gather information.

The Arctic has always been important to Russia[i] and according to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia is conducting Arctic research using a large drift station, the Severny Polyus, or North Pole.[ii] The Severney Polyus is a self-propelled platform vessel that houses 34 scientists, 15 laboratories, and crew on board and is designed to autonomously drift through Arctic sea ice for up to two years. According to Russian Minister of Natural Resources, Aleksandr Kozlov, the data collected from the Severney Polyus will form the basis for “understanding of climate change and climate prognosis, development of climate adaptation measures, they are important for providing security to shipping on the Northern Sea Route.” The article notes that Russia’s new Marine Doctrine includes the use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes, including not only trawlers and icebreakers, but also platforms like the Severney Polyus. The deployment of the Severney Polyus to conduct Arctic research is yet another indication of Russia’s vision of the operational environment in the Arctic region, giving Russia a continued presence in the vital region.

Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Russia says its North Pole platform is key to understanding climate change,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 23 May 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2024/05/russia-says-its-north-pole-platform-key-understanding-climate-change

Since it set out from St.Petersburg in early September 2022, the Severny Polyus (“North Pole”) has drifted more than 3,000 nautical miles through the sea-ice from the East Siberian Sea to the Greenland Sea. On board has been a crew of 16 and a research team of 34.  The ship in late April made it out of the ice north of Svalbard and in early May sailed southwards.  On the 10th of May it was located to the west of the Ice Fjord at Svalbard and shortly later made it to the waters north of the Bear Island. For unclear reasons, the vessel for several days stayed in the waters of the Bear Island before it proceeded towards Murmansk.

According to Russian Minister of Natural Resources Aleksandr Kozlov, the Severny Polyus offers Russia unique insights into the Arctic.  “With the start of the operations of the self-propelled and ice-protected platform Russia has gotten the possibility to undertake long-term scientific experiments on high latitudes,” Kozlov said in a comment delivered in connection with the arrival of the Severny Polyus in Murmansk.

“The researchers have access to 50 types of research work: from meteorology to geophysics, glaciology, seismology and aerology. The data will form the basis for understanding of climate change and climate prognosis, development of climate adaptation measures, they are important for providing security to shipping on the Northern Sea Route.”  Kozlov has been Minister of Natural Resources since 2000 and was reappointed in May 2024.  He has also been closely engaged in natural resource cooperation with several foreign countries, among them China and North Korea.

…In the course of the 20-month expedition, the geologists took a number of samples from the Arctic seabed.  The samples will be used as part of Russia’s efforts to expand its borders on the Arctic shelf, representatives of the expedition say.

The Severny Polyus is designed to be able to autonomously drift through Arctic sea-ice for up to two years.  On board are 15 labs where researchers can work year-round.  The ship is operated by Russia’s meteorological service Roshydromet…

The research platform has replaced Russia’s Arctic expeditions based on ice floes organized since the 1930s.  The quickly vanishing Arctic sea-ice made it increasingly hard to organize the expeditions and the last real ice station, the “North Pole-40”, was held in the winter of 2012.

Albeit built for research purposes, the Severny Polyus  could ultimately also be applied by the Russian military.  The country’s new Marine Doctrine includes a high stress on use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes.  That could include not only trawler and icebreakers, but also the Severniy Polus.“The researchers have access to 50 types of research work: from meteorology to geophysics, glaciology, seismology and aerology.  The data will form the basis for understanding of climate change and climate prognosis, development of climate adaptation measures, they are important for providing security to shipping on the Northern Sea Route” Kozlov explained….

Notes:

[i] Russia began exploring the Arctic in the 11th century.  Trans-Artic navigation continued into the 16th century during voyages to Spitzbergen-Gruman and Novaya Zemlya. In 1764-1776, Captain Chichagov attempted an expedition across the North Pole to the Pacific Ocean. Chichagov’s attempt failed, but much scientific knowledge on the Arctic waters were gained.

[ii] In 1902, Fritjof Nansen, a famous Norwegian Arctic explorer, proposed the idea of a scientific drifting ice station to chart the Arctic waters. In the 1930s, Soviet scientists conducted studies of the Arctic on drifting ships. In 1937, the Soviets built a drifting ice station, “North Pole 1,” on an Arctic ice floe supported by Soviet aviation, followed by “North Pole 2”and so on until “North Pole 40” was built. North Pole 40 had to be evacuated in 2013 as the ice floe was breaking up.

OE Watch Insight:

RUS is using a large drift station called Severney Polyus (North Pole) in the Arctic to gather information.

Image Information:

Image: Admiralty Shipyards in St Petersburg, Russia built the Severny Polyus drift station
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Admiralty_Shipyards – /media/File:Admiralty_Shipyard.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0

Russia Sees Need for Emphasized “React to Ambush” Training

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Reacting to Ambushes Inside and Outside of 35m, Illustrated. Fig. 1 – 2x BTR Platoons travel along a road; 100m spacing is maintained. Fig. 2 – An enemy initiates an ambush on the rear of the formation. Fig 3 – Within 35m, those in the fire zone immediately return fire and deploy smoke and fragmentation grenades; front and rear elements provide covering fire, allowing those in the fire zone to assault the ambushers position. Fig. 4 – Outside of 35m, those in the fire zone return fire and deploy smoke; the front or rear element assaults a flank or the rear of the ambusher’s position while the other provides covering fire.

“Counter-ambush actions in combat training practice, in our opinion, is not given due importance.”

Summary: Russian military observers have called for more emphasis on “react to ambush” training, which they see as a current weakness.

While few units from any nation’s military can survive an ambush unscathed, an article in the Russian military journal Armeiskii sbornik highlights the need for additional emphasis on “react to ambush drills” in Russian military training programs. These recommendations reflect continuing training deficiencies in basic soldier tasks despite lessons learned in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Ukraine.

The article’s authors recommend adding a sixth task to Chapter 5 of the Russian combat manual “Actions in Armed Conflict, Part 3: Platoon, Squad, Tank.”[i] Titling the task “Educating Personnel on Counter-ambush Activities,” the authors first highlight the need to practice counter-ambush tactics more frequently in individual and collective training. The article further outlines in detail the steps in reacting to an ambush. To begin, commanders must identify likely ambush points and plan accordingly. These points will likely be main avenues of approach containing terrain restricting movement, funneling targets, alongside cover and concealment.

The training recommendations mirror U.S. Army battle drills. Near ambushes are defined by an enemy being within hand grenade range up to 35m. Those caught within the ambush must immediately return fire with all possible weapons, directing fire against enemy positions. Smoke and fragmentation grenades are used to further suppress adversaries and conceal Russian forces in the “fire zone,” enabling assaults on the ambusher’s positions. Russian forces outside the fire zone provide supporting fire. Far ambushes are those outside of 35m. Actions of troops within the fire zone are similar to those in the near-side ambush, except the elements outside the fire zone maneuver to attack the ambusher’s flanks or rear. Those in the fire zone adjust fire as necessary to avoid fratricide. The authors acknowledge the need to train these skills is due to obvious failures and losses in both the initial steps of the Ukrainian invasion in 2022 and the First Chechen War,[ii] both of which were consequences of lack of training. Similar issues also appear in accounts from the Soviet-Afghanistan War,[iii] where Russian forces failed to recognize likely ambush points and hesitated in reacting to ambushes, costing them in men and equipment. Reacting to ambush is the antithesis to the calculated, fires-heavy tactics frequently used by Russian forces and could be a challenge to the Russian largely conscripted ground force.

Sources:

A. Levchenko, “Засада – не приговор (The Ambush is not a Sentence),” Army Review (monthly Russian military periodical), Vol. 6, June 2024. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/publication/470

Pg. 30-31: “The practice of military operations in recent military conflicts showed that any movement of a unit, be it large or small, not to mention single machines, is always associated with maximum risk of being attacked by the enemy from ambush. This was especially true for the first stage of the SVO in Ukraine. So, we need to talk about it, especially since counter-ambush training developments in combat training practice, in our opinion, is not given due importance.

…The word “ambush” has become something like an objective obstacle, “an irresistible force”. Meanwhile, in the overwhelming majority of the analyzed facts of being ambushed and the destruction of columns, commanders’ errors are visible in organizing and conducting a march. Although, according to all governing documents, the responsibility of the unit commander is to train officers and soldiers to act when ambushed.

In our opinion, there is a need to add to Chapter 5 of the Manual for Training for Combined Armed Combat ‘Actions During Armed Conflict’ (Part 3 ‘Platoon, squad, tank’) one more point number 6, entitled ‘Personnel Training in counter-ambush action events.’”

Pg. 31: “The effectiveness of the actions of a unit marching through its territory and ambushed by enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups, directly depends on the degree of training of personnel to fight in data conditions. The response is usually heavy fire on ambush positions,

from all types of weapons, protection of the unit caught in the affected area, and setting up smokescreens and attacking enemy positions… To immediately attack ambush positions from the front, flank or rear, all personnel must be previously trained… Attacking the ambush’s flanks is preferable, as it is easier to organize contact… Responsibilities of the unit commander is to train officers and soldiers to act upon contact with an ambush even without his participation.”

Pg. 80: “Every officer, sergeant and soldiers are trained to act in two situations (regardless of

type of travel). First, the enemy opened fire from a grenade throwing distance (up to 35 m). In this case part of the unit is under strong, concentrated fire from the attackers. Without additional command, this part of the unit responds with maximum fire in the direction of the ambush, throws smoke and fragmentation grenades and attacks enemy positions. Those who are outside affected areas, open fire in the direction of the ambush positions, covering the attack.Second – the enemy opened fire from a distance exceeding the above distance (more than 35 m). Part of the unit that fell into the affected area lies down, puts up a smoke screen and returns fire in the direction of the ambush. The second part of the unit, which does not fall into the affected area, can and must attack the ambush positions from the flank or from rear by fire and maneuver.”

Notes:

[i] The other five tasks within Chapter 5 are “Common Actions (ex. conduct counterterrorism operations, maintain border integrity), Blocking (more similar in definition to the US Army ‘isolating’ tactical task), Searching and Reconnaissance, Serving in a Checkpoint, and Convoys.”

[ii]  For case studies on Chechen ambush tactics during the first and second Chechen wars, see; Dodge Billingsley, “Fangs of the Lone Wolf: Chechen Tactics in the Russian Chechen Wars 1994-2009,” Foreign Military Studies Office and United States Marine Corp’s Studies and Analysis Division. 2012. 

[iii] These include “The Other Side of the Mountain” by LTC(R) Lester Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali which provide insights on mujahadin activities against Soviet and Afghan government forces during the Soviet-Afghan War. Vignettes 1-16, particularly Vignettes 6 and 16, detail mujahadin ambush tactics and Soviet responses. Chapter 5 of “The Bear Went over the Mountain” by LTC(R) Grau discusses from the Soviet perspective reactions to ambushes.

OE Watch Insight:

RUS military observers see the need to improve “react to ambush drill” training, which they see as a current weakeness.

Image Information:

Image: Reacting to Ambushes Inside and Outside of 35m, Illustrated. Fig. 1 – 2x BTR Platoons travel along a road; 100m spacing is maintained. Fig. 2 – An enemy initiates an ambush on the rear of the formation. Fig 3 – Within 35m, those in the fire zone immediately return fire and deploy smoke and fragmentation grenades; front and rear elements provide covering fire, allowing those in the fire zone to assault the ambushers position. Fig. 4 – Outside of 35m, those in the fire zone return fire and deploy smoke; the front or rear element assaults a flank or the rear of the ambusher’s position while the other provides covering fire.
Source: Andrew Fisher
Attribution: Author grants permission to use

Russia Gains Combat Power From Volunteer Service

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Former army colonel and current commander of GROM Kaskad, Dmitrii Sablin.

“The unit [GROM “Kaskad”] is for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line. It is easier to send other children to the war.”

Summary: Russia volunteer formations, such as the GROM Kaskad unmanned aircraft brigade, provide Russia additional avenues of generating combat power.

Russia’s volunteer formations, such as the GROM Kaskad unmanned aircraft brigade, are increasingly providing Russia with additional avenues of generating combat power during its war in Ukraine. However, the ways that such formations are portrayed and understood in Russia and Ukraine vary significantly.

The first accompanying article excerpted from the website of United Russia (Putin’s political party), extols the values of the GROM “Kaskad”unmanned aircraft brigade and features information about a memorial (monument) to its servicemen.[i] GROM “Kaskad” has its roots in October 2022, when Dmitrii Sablin (a retired Colonel, prominent businessman, ‘United Russia’ party member, and Duma deputy) signed a contract with the Russian Armed Forces and created the BARS “Kaskad” UAV unit, a volunteer formation.[ii] In October 2023, the unit was upgraded to a brigade and subordinated to the Russian Aerospace Forces. By March 2024, GROM “Kaskad” reportedly consisted of two reconnaissance-strike UAV battalions, two reconnaissance-strike UAV squadrons, and supporting units—in total, 54 UAV crews, with 10 different types of UAVs. GROM “Kaskad” crews have reportedly destroyed over 7,000 targets and flown 18,000 combat missions.

The second accompanying article excerpted from the pro-Ukrainian Center of Journalistic Investigations, gives a more negative take on GROM “Kaskad,” purporting that the brigade “is for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line.” Although GROM “Kaskad” almost certainly has a lower casualty rate than Russia’s assault detachments, both Ukrainian and Russian UAV operators are often targeted, and are very much “on the front line.” Service in GROM “Kaskad” is likely far safer than other forms of Russia service in Ukraine, but the likely real benefit is that GROM “Kaskad,” and other volunteer formations offer fixed contracts for terms of service that cannot be involuntarily extended or “stop lossed,” unlike contract servicemen, including the involuntarily mobilized, with the Russian Ministry of Defense.

GROM “Kaskad” and other such volunteer formations are showing the innovative ways that Russia is creating and projecting combat power. Aggressive contract service recruitment and partial mobilization have filled Russian ranks showing that centrally managed, top-down control is still needed. But volunteer formations also appear to be important, as they offer more flexibility and provide a more palatable form of service for elites and those with vital technical skills that might otherwise shirk from military service.

Sources:

Alexey Mikhailov, Roman Kretsul, and Vladimir Matveev, “В Москве открыт мемориал бойцам бригады беспилотной авиации ГРОМ «Каскад» (A memorial to the fighters of the GROM “Kaskad” unmanned aircraft brigade has been opened in Moscow),” Yedinaya Rossiya (website of the ‘United Russia’ political party), 31 May 2024.

https://er.ru/activity/news/v-moskve-otkryt-memorial-bojcam-brigady-bespilotnoj-aviacii-grom-kaskad

In Moscow, on the territory of the central headquarters of the “Combat Brotherhood”, a military memorial was opened to the “Stuntmen” – fallen and alive.” It is dedicated to the fighters of the separate GROM “Kaskad” [ГРОМ «Каскад»] unmanned aircraft brigade. The idea of opening the monument was proposed by a colonel, State Duma deputy from United Russia, first brigade commander Dmitry Sablin.

“This monument is not just a perpetuation of the memory of heroes, it is a memorial of true love for one’s Motherland, dedication, and courage. The BARS “Kaskad” detachment, today the GROM “Kaskad” brigade, is first and foremost a symbol of volunteerism. Not only for people with military experience, but also people of civilian professionals.  And, most importantly, those who did not have the obligation to do this by order,” said the First Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko, who took part in the opening ceremony of the memorial.

He noted that Kaskad had seven thousand destroyed targets, behind which stood thousands of saved lives of Russian military personnel and civilians.  “Thank you very much, guys, you are an example of colossal courage and real heroism for us,” said Sergei Kiriyenko…

In turn, Dmitry Sablin noted that the “stuntmen” conducted more than 18 thousand combat missions.  “I want to say words of gratitude to all military personnel, volunteers, who are currently serving in the brigade, and who served in it. Thank you for your courage and fearlessness. We will always remember the fallen and continue our work. Our motto: a “stuntman” is someone who can do what others won’t do. And may this always accompany you in life. Victory will be ours!” – he said…

On October 1, 2023, the GROM “Kaskad” unmanned aviation brigade was created as part of the Russian Aerospace Forces, the commander of which was Colonel, State Duma deputy Dmitry Sablin. The GROM “Kaskad” brigade has at its disposal all currently available UAVs in service with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The unit’s crews are concentrated along the entire front line and destroy enemy equipment, including Western equipment. Many GROM “Kaskad” fighters were awarded state awards, some of them posthumously.

Valentyna Samar and Vladyslav Marchenko “«GROM Kaskad». Who Fights against Ukraine in the First Russian Drone Brigade,” Center of Journalistic Investigations (Pro-Ukrainian website), 18 May 2024. https://investigator.org.ua/en/investigations/266753/

In December 2022, Vladimir Putin awarded Dmitrii Sablin as commander of BARS «Kaskad» with the Order of Courage. The first official report about «Kaskad» by the Russian Ministry of Defence appeared on March 22, 2024, i.e. half a year after its creation. Minister Sergei Shoigu sent greeting telegrams to five Russian military units for their achievements in so-called «special military operation».[i]

Russian telegram channel «ВЧК-ОГПУ» treats BARS «Kaskad» as the unit for Russian parliamentarians who would like to receive «the status of participant of special military operation». The unit is «for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line. It is easier to send other children to the war».

«Kaskad» is full of politicians and high rank officials. Besides Sablin, five members of the Russian State Dume voluntary joined «Kaskad»: Yevgenii Pervyshov, Oleg Golikov, Sergei Sokol, Dmitrii Khubezov and Oleg Kolesnikov. There are also members of legislative assemblies of Russian regions, two «parliamentarians of «Donetsk People’s Republic» and a lot of public officials.

Some of them have served minimum term of three months. Other people served several terms. Many politicians made short visits to «Kaskad». It is interesting that Russian media «The Insider» found that commander of «Kaskad» Dmitrii Sablin relaxed in Turkish resort areas.Major Oleg Alekseevich Kolesnikov is the commander of the 2nd reconnaissance attack battalion of brigade «GROM «Kaskad». He is the member of the Russian State Duma (for the fourth time in a row) and millionaire from Chelyabinsk region of Russia…

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Notes:

[i] (ГРОМ «Каскад»): The term “Kaskad” is likely in reference to the KGB’s “Kaskad” special operations task force in Afghanistan. “Grom” is the Russian word for thunder, but the term is likely used in reference to the well-regarded General Boris Gromov, the commander of the Soviet 40th Army.  General Gromov was the last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan.

[ii] The Special Army Combat Reserve (BARS) [Боевой Армейский Резерв Специальный (БАРС)], in some sources the National Army Combat Reserve (BARS) [Боевой Армейский Резерв Страны (БАРС)] began as an operational reserve program of record for the Russian Armed Forces around 2021.  Since the start of the special military operation, many of Russia’s newly formed units are designated as “BARS” formations.

OE Insight Summary:

RUS volunteer formations, such as the GROM “Kaskad” unmanned aircraft brigade, provide RUS additional avenues of generating combat power.

Image Information:

Image: Former army colonel and current commander of GROM Kaskad, Dmitrii Sablin.
Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Саблин,_Дмитрий_Вадимович#/media/Файл:Дмитрий_Саблин_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: Aleksey Klimov, CC BY-SA 4.0

Taiwan President’s Inaugural Speech Prompts Chinese Military Drills

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A schematic representation of Joint Sword-2024A exercises.

“Lai-style Taiwan independence” will only exacerbate the confrontation and instability across the Straits, inevitably leading to self-overestimation and self-destruction.

Summary: The inauguration of Taiwan’s new pro-independence president prompted Chinese outrage, leading Beijing to conduct large-scale military exercises which represented a “powerful punishment for the separatist forces seeking ‘independence.

During his inaugural speech on 20 May, Taiwan’s eighth president, Lai Ching-te, reaffirmed that Taiwan is a “sovereign, independent nation” and not subordinate to the People’s Republic of China, infuriating Beijing. The first article excerpt, published by Chinese Communist Party flagship newspaper Global Times, blasted Lai’s speech, calling it “a declaration of harm to Taiwan,” and “extremely dangerous.” It warned that China “will inevitably be unified… regardless of changes in the situation on the island or who holds power.”

Three days after Lai’s speech, China’s Eastern Theater Command[i] launched “Joint Sword-2024A,” a series of military exercises surrounding Taiwan and its outer island territories. The second article excerpt, from the Communist Youth League of China’s official newspaper Beijing Youth Daily, describes the exercise as a “powerful punishment for separatist forces seeking ‘independence,’” and a serious warning to external forces against “interfering and provoking” Taiwan. The article noted that “Joint Sword-2024A” focused on joint sea and air combat readiness patrols, joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control, and joint precision attacks on key targets surrounding Taiwan as well as around the four outlying islands. The goals of the exercise varied. Operations south of Taiwan were to strike a heavy blow to the Tainan region[ii] politically and economically: they aimed to attack Taiwan’s largest port and navy base, Kaohsiung Port, and designed to impact Taiwan’s foreign trade. Operations east of Taiwan were intended to block the country’s lifeline to energy imports, an escape route for “Taiwan independence” forces, and a support line for the United States and its allies attempting to provide assistance. At the same time, the Fujian Coast Guard conducted a comprehensive law enforcement exercise to test their joint patrol, rapid response, and emergency handling capabilities around Taiwan-controlled Wuqiu and Dongyin islands, each located within 10 nautical miles of mainland China. These islands are the main transportation routes to the Taiwan Strait and the “most advanced outposts of Taiwan Strait defense operations.” The goal of these exercises was to constrain Taiwan’s military operational capacity. While not the first time Taiwan’s actions have prompted China to launch aggressive military exercises,[iii] according to Beijing Youth Daily, this is the first time the Eastern Theater Command (publicly) mentioned the mission of “Jointly seizing comprehensive control of the battlefield.”

Sources:

“‘Lai-Style Taiwan Independence’ Agenda is a Dead-End: Global Times Editorial,” Global Times, 21 May 2024. https://tinyurl.com/259ntad3

On May 20, Lai Ching-te assumed the role of Taiwan region’s new leader and delivered his inaugural speech. Lai shamelessly stated in his speech that “the Republic of China Taiwan is a sovereign, independent nation” and “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other,” spewing various “Taiwan independence” fallacies and hostile provocations against the Chinese mainland, once again exposing his stubborn nature as “a worker for Taiwan independence.” This speech can be described as a blatant “Taiwan independence manifesto” and “a declaration of harm to Taiwan.” It is extremely dangerous, and the Taiwan compatriots should be particularly vigilant and united in opposition.

“Lai-style Taiwan independence” will only exacerbate the confrontation and instability across the Straits, inevitably leading to self-overestimation and self-destruction.

“东部战区位台岛周边演习，三个罕见表述透露重要信号！(The Eastern Theater Command Conducts Exercises Around Taiwan; Three Rare Statements Revealed Important Signals),” Beijing Youth Daily (Official newspaper of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Communist Youth League of China), 23 May 2024.
https://tinyurl.com/t8c4rsfa

On May 23, Li Xi, a Navy colonel and spokesperson for the Eastern Theater Command, disclosed:

From May 23 to 24, the Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army of China organized the theater army, navy, air force, rocket force and other forces to carry out the “Joint Sword-2024A” exercise around Taiwan Island, focusing on joint sea and air combat readiness patrols, joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control, and joint precision attacks on key targets. Ships and aircraft approached the periphery of Taiwan Island for combat patrols… This is also a powerful punishment for the separatist forces seeking “independence” and a serious warning to external forces for interference and provocation.

On May 23, the Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army continued to carry out training in subjects such as sea assault, land strike, air defense and anti-submarine in the sea and air areas north and south of Taiwan Island, to test the theater troops’ actual combat capabilities in multi-domain coordination and joint strike.

On the same day, Gan Yu, spokesperson for the China Coast Guard, disclosed:… the Fujian Coast Guard organized a fleet of ships to conduct a comprehensive law enforcement exercise in the waters near Wuqiu Island and Dongyin Island to test its joint patrol, rapid response and emergency handling capabilities.

This exercise reflects the integrated design of Taiwan’s main island and outlying islands.

The outer islands cover Kinmen, Matsu Island, Wuqiu Island, and Dongyin Island…

In addition, Zhang Chi from the National Defense University also explained in an interview with CCTV that Wuqiu Island and Dongyin Island are outlying islands of Taiwan Province. Their geographical location is very important. They are the main transportation routes to the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan military regards them as the most advanced outposts of the Taiwan Strait defense operations. ……In recent years, it has become normal practice for the Eastern Theater Command to organize military forces to conduct exercises around Taiwan Island. However, Zhengzhijun sorted out previous public reports and found that several new statements appeared in the Eastern Theater Command’s announcement. Regarding the key exercise subjects, the Eastern Theater Command’s report mentioned for the first time “Jointly seize comprehensive control of the battlefield”… In addition, CCTV News reports on the specific subjects of the first day of the exercise, which was rare as they mentioned “intelligence” many times…

Notes:

[i] China has five theater commands. The Eastern Theater Command is responsible for Taiwan and the East China Sea. For more information on the Eastern Theater Command, see “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2021,” Annual Report to Congress: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2021, p. 98. https://tinyurl.com/jdredmwb

[ii] The article refers to Tainan as “The political base of Taiwan Independence.”

[iii] Previously China launched two separate rounds of exercises around Taiwan. First after former U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan and again after former Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen visited former U.S. Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy in April 2023.

OE Watch Insight:

The inauguration of TWN’s new pro-independence president prompted CHN outrage, leading Beijing to conduct large-scale military exercises which represented a “powerful punishment for the separatist forces seeking ‘independence.’”

Image Information:

Image: A schematic representation of Joint Sword-2024A exercises
Source: Data derived from https://tinyurl.com/yc55e7wd
Attribution: Cindy Hurst

China Creating Undersea Cable Network in Response to United States Isolation Efforts

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Close up section of historical map showing Islands under Taiwan’s control including the Matsu Islands (upper left), the location of a severed undersea cable in early 2023. Taiwan suspected China of cutting the cable as part of its hybrid war against Taiwan.

“The U.S.’s undersea network is its tool to keep its hegemony,” said Wu, the FiberHome executive.

Summary: China will create its own independent network of undersea cables to assert its independence as the United States seeks to isolate China from the current global network.

A battle has recently been playing out between China and the United States in a bid to secure information, particularly in regard to the role of undersea cable networks. According to the excerpted article from the Japan-based Nikkei Asia news agency, Beijing is working around U.S. efforts to isolate China from the global undersea cable network, which carries 95% of the world’s data.[i] According to the article, China is striking deals and building its own network of cables with regional neighbors, recognizing the U.S. is using its political power to pressure the mostly U.S.-based data companies that develop the undersea cable network, to exclude China from access to future undersea cables. A Chinese executive interviewed by Nikkei Asia asserted that “we don’t care about the U.S. blacklisting” and claimed that the United States’ undersea network is its “tool to keep its [U.S.] hegemony.” He concluded that the undersea cable race is really a diplomatic one, noting that China only needs other governments’ consent to link with China. As per the article, there are least three major China-led projects under construction in the Asia-Pacific region, linking China and Hong Kong to multiple Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. Part of China’s ability to develop its own undersea cable network in the region is that they do not require any new or emerging technology. China currently has all the necessary fiber optic technology necessary to lay its own cables and maintain its own network. That ability is one reason the U.S. sees the global undersea cable network as vulnerable to both sabotage[ii] and eavesdropping by China. Last February, Taiwan suspected Chinese vessels of cutting two undersea cables linking Taiwan to its Matsu Islands.[iii] In response, in October, Taiwan announced it was working to back up its communications network to protect itself in the event of a cross-strait conflict.[iv] It is likely that as tensions continue in the region  two independent networks of undersea cables will emerge and require the necessary security attention by each side to ensure against compromise.

Sources:

Cheng Ting-Fang, Lauly Li, Tsubasa Suruga and Shunsuke Tabeta, “China’s undersea cable drive defies U.S. sanctions,” Nikkei Asia (Japanese global and regional business news source), 26 June 2024. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/China-s-undersea-cable-drive-defies-U.S.-sanctions?utm_campaign=IC_editor_in_chief_picks_free&utm_medium=email&utm_source=NA_newsletter&utm_content=article_link&del_type=2&pub_date=20240628153000&seq_num=9&si=91811959-21c4-44f4-9028-13136a8d0104

Stretching 1.4 million kilometers – long enough to wrap around the Earth more than thirty times – the world’s undersea cable network is the backbone of global communications. These cables lie hundreds or even thousands of meters below the waves, carry over 95% of the world’s data and cost billions of dollars each to install. Using companies like FiberHome, China is determined to break America’s grip on the industry.

The U.S. and a handful of its allies have dominated the undersea cable market for decades, and Washington is pushing hard for “clean” communications networks free of Chinese involvement, citing national security risks. But the quiet rise of companies like FiberHome underscores how hard it is for the U.S. to contain China’s progress in an industry that it has become proficient in.

Unlike cutting-edge semiconductors, where U.S. export controls on production tools have set China’s chip industry back by years, experts agree with Wu’s assessment: China has no need for foreign technology in fiber-optic cables. Instead, success in this industry has come to rely more on state-level diplomatic ties, with politics largely determining who has access to crucial markets and who does not.

“The U.S.’s undersea network is its tool to keep its hegemony,” said Wu, the FiberHome executive. “The subsea cable industry is like a membership club, we all need other governments’ consent to link with their countries. … This is a diplomatic race.”

Arguably the most important market is in China’s own backyard. The Asia-Pacific region is the global leader in subsea cable investment, recording more projected spending from 2024 to 2026 than anywhere else in the world, according to data from Washington-based research company TeleGeography. At least three major China-led projects are under construction in the Asia-Pacific region, linking China and Hong Kong with multiple Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.

Notes:

[i] For more information, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Limiting China to Undersea Data Cable Network Threatens To Be a Flashpoint,” OE Watch, 06-2024. (URL when available)

[ii] U.S. officials have warned about potential national-security risks from SBSS, a Chinese undersea cable maintenance company that helps repair broken internet lines, see: “U.S. Fears Undersea Cables Are Vulnerable to Espionage From Chinese Repair Ships,” Wall Street Journal, 19 May 2024. https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-internet-cables-repair-ships-93fd6320

[iii] The Matsu Islands, officially Lienchiang County, are an archipelago of 36 islands and islets in the East China Sea governed by the Republic of China (Taiwan), situated alongside the southeastern coast of mainland China. In early 2023, an undersea cable linking Taiwan to its Matsu Islands was cut effectively disrupting internet connectivity to the Matsu Islands’ 14,000 residents. A Chinese freighter and fishing vessel were suspected of cutting the cable but Taiwan made no formal protest. See: Joe Brock, “U.S. and China wage war beneath the waves – over internet cables,” Reuters, 24 March 2023. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/us-china-tech-cables/

[iv] See, Lawrence Chung, “Taiwan ramps up backup satellite network plans in island defence strategy.” South China Morning Post, 7 October 2023. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3237034/taiwan-ramps-backup-satellite-network-plans-island-defence-strategy

OE Watch Insight:

CHN will create its own independent network of undersea cables to assert its independence as the USA seeks to isolate CHN from the current global network. 

Image Information:

Image: Close up section of historical map showing Islands under Taiwan’s control including the Matsu Islands (upper left), the location of a severed undersea cable in early 2023. Taiwan suspected China of cutting the cable as part of its hybrid war against Taiwan.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matsu_Islands – /media/File:Nationalist_China_-_administrative_divisons._LOC_2007633622.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

China Assures and Warns Japan Regarding Taiwan

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Map illustrates the close proximity between Taiwan and the Japanese Sakishima Islands and Okinawa Islands.

“The Taiwan question is at the core of China’s core interests. It bears on the political foundation of China-Japan bilateral relations and is the red line that must not be crossed [by Japan].”

Summary: China issued both an assurance and a warning to Japan after Tokyo released a plan to evacuate its southern island chains should conflict erupt between China and Taiwan.

In June, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MoD) issued a statement that sought to temper Japanese concerns that any action by Beijing might take to reclaim Taiwan would affect Japanese territory. The statement issued on 27 June and reported across multiple media channels including the official newspaper of the People’s Republic of China’s Central Military Commission, Jiefangjun Bao, came in the aftermath of a report that Japan had issued a draft plan to evacuate residents of Okinawa prefecture and Sakishima islands to Kyushu and Yamaguchi prefectures should China invade Taiwan. The Chinese MoD spokesperson pointed out that “Taiwan is China’s Taiwan” and the Taiwan question had nothing to do with Japan, and thus, “China opposes the Japanese side’s playing up regional tensions under the excuse of the so-called ‘Taiwan contingency.’” The spokesman noted that Japan, which had inflicted countless atrocities against China in the past, “should have reflected on its history of aggression and be prudent about its words and deeds.” The statement also reiterated China’s view of the operational environment in the region, emphasizing that Taiwan is the core of Beijing’s core interests[i] and noting that 1.4 billion Chinese would take action should any person or entity seek to restrict Beijing from its efforts to bring Taiwan under Beijing rule. Collectively, these statements underscore the fact that while China does not seek conflict with Japan, it also insists that Japan not impede any would-be efforts to seize Taiwan. As one of the United States’ most important allies in the Asia-Pacific, the delicate brinkmanship between China and Japan serves as a useful barometer of regional sentiment.

Sources:

“Taiwan Question has nothing to do with Japan: Defense Spokesman,” Chinese Ministry of National Defense as reported by Jiefangjun Bao (official newspaper of the People’s Republic of China’s Central Military Commission), 27 June 2024. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/VOICES/MinistryofNationalDefense_209794/16319219.html

“The Taiwan question is at the core of China’s core interests. It bears on the political foundation of China-Japan bilateral relations and is the red line that must not be crossed, ” said Senior Colonel Wu Qian, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense, at a regular press conference on Thursday.

According to reports, the Japanese government has released a draft plan to evacuate residents of Okinawa prefecture and Sakishima islands to Kyushu and Yamaguchi prefectures. Some analysts believe that Japan’s evacuation plan aims to cope with the so-called “Taiwan contingency”. Not long ago, Chinese Ambassador to Japan said that if Japan ties itself onto the chariot of splitting China, its people will be led into a fire pit.

When being asked to make a comment, the spokesperson first pointed out that Taiwan is China’s Taiwan and the Taiwan question has nothing to do with Japan.

“China opposes the Japanese side’s playing up regional tensions under the excuse of the so-called ‘Taiwan contingency’,” stressed the spokesperson, adding that the biggest threat to cross-Strait peace is the separatist activities for “Taiwan independence” and the connivance and support for such moves from external forces.

“Japan, as a country that had colonized Taiwan for a long time and committed countless atrocities against Chinese people, in particular should have reflected on its history of aggression and be prudent about its words and deeds,” said the spokesperson.

The spokesperson urged the Japanese side to earnestly abide by the spirit of the four political documents between China and Japan and the commitments it has made and stop using the Taiwan question to provoke confrontation.

“More than 1.4 billion Chinese people will take resolute and strong actions against any individual or force that attempts to interfere in China’s internal affairs or hinder China’s reunification,” stressed the spokesperson.

Notes:

[i] In June 2023 Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang, reiterated the same phrase in person to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken while Blinken was on an official visit to the region, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Chinese Officials Justify Reaction To Western Presence In Taiwan Strait,” OE Watch, 07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-officials-justify-reaction-to-western-presence-in-taiwan-strait-2/

OE Watch Insight: 

CHN issued both an assurance and a warning to JPN after JPN released a plan to evacuate its southern island chains should conflict erupt between CNH and TWN.

Image Information:

Image: Map illustrates the close proximity between Taiwan and the Japanese Sakishima Islands and Okinawa Islands.
Source: T.Kambayashi, https://wikitravel.org/shared/File:Japan_Okinawa_map.png
Attribution: CC BY SA 3.0

China Concludes Its Largest Military Drills Near Taiwan

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China’s Eastern Theater Command released posters for ‘Joint Sword-2024A’, showcasing weapons aimed to ‘kill’ Taiwan independence.

“The distance is getting closer and closer, only one step away from the main island of Taiwan, or even a finger away.”

Summary: China concluded its Joint Sword-2024A military drills, the largest and closest-ever drills held near Taiwan. China states these drills test its ability to seize power in Taiwan, reinforcing concerns that future exercises may serve as a pretext for an actual invasion.

On 23-24 May, China conducted its latest large-scale military exercise, Joint Sword-2024A, around Taiwan, including the surrounding Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu, and Dongyin islands. These drills were the largest and closest-ever held to Taiwan and signal an increasingly aggressive Chinese stance.

According to the first excerpted article published by the Central Military Commission via its website www.81.cn, the purpose of Joint Sword-2024A was to punish separatist activities of Taiwan’s independence forces and to issue a serious warning against interference from external forces.[i] Joint Sword-2024A was conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command to enhance its combat capabilities through multi-domain coordination. The exercise involved ships and aircraft conducting joint training near Taiwan’s periphery, including the Taiwan Strait and its northern, southern, and eastern regions.[ii] Activities encompassed rapid deployment of destroyer and frigate formations, integration of intelligence data for sea and air scenarios, target acquisition, and joint strikes. South of Taiwan networks of destroyer, frigate, and anti-submarine formations were established, deploying assets for comprehensive submarine detection. The Air Force deployed fighter jets for combat patrols around Taiwan, engaging in joint intelligence sharing and coordination with surface fleets for target strikes. Meanwhile, the Army and Rocket Force assumed predesignated launch positions, initiating preparation for joint strikes in coordination with naval and air assets.[iii] In the second excerpt, published by the People’s Republic of China newspaper Da Wan News, Major General Meng Xiangqi, a PLA professor from the National Defense University, outlines several significances of the Joint Sword-2024A exercise.[iv] Firstly, conducting battle group exercises from multiple directions very close to Taiwan’s periphery is intended to tightly confine Taiwan’s military defense space. Major General Meng stated the exercise demonstrates that the closer Taiwan independence forces move towards external support, the tighter the squeeze around Taiwan will become. He strongly indicates that PLA forces will inch closer to Taiwan’s periphery with each successive exercise.[v] Secondly, Major General Meng emphasized the significance of the exercise’s focus on the southern and eastern parts of Taiwan. In particular, he highlighted the strategic importance of eastern Taiwan, which has traditionally been considered a refuge and a place to preserve combat power by Taiwan’s military. He dismisses this notion, emphasizing that Joint Sword-2024A demonstrates the PLA’s ability to create a powerful firepower network through the close cooperation of its four major services—land, sea, air, and rocket forces—capable of delivering strikes anywhere, anytime on targets, including eastern Taiwan. Major General Meng also pointed out that if external forces were to intervene, they would likely approach from the east. However, the PLA’s ability to control and block access from the east means that Taiwan independence forces would be unable to escape or receive foreign aid. Thirdly, Major General Meng emphasized the significance of implementing a comprehensive blockade around the island. Such a blockade would halt Taiwan’s energy imports, disrupt domestic exports, and sever aid from the U.S. and its allies, effectively crippling the island.[vi] Ultimately, Joint Sword-2024A demonstrates that military drills are becoming routine to signal displeasure and punish Taiwan. Additionally, it underscores China’s increasing capability to convert these exercises around Taiwan into actual military operations at any time.[vii]

Sources:

Guo Yanfei, “东部战区位台岛周边开展“联合利剑-2024A”演习 (Eastern Theater Command conducts the ‘Joint Sword-2024A’ exercise around Taiwan island), www.81.cn (China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest national defense organization in the PRC), 24 May 2024. http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16310888.html

From May 23 to 24, the Eastern Theater Command of the PLA organized the army, navy, air force, rocket force, and other units to conduct the ‘Joint Sword-2024A’ exercise around Taiwan. The exercise focused on joint sea and air combat readiness patrols, the joint seizure of battlefield comprehensive control, joint precision attacks on key targets, and other objectives. Li Xi, spokesperson for the Eastern Theater Command, stated that this exercise was a powerful punishment for Taiwan separatist forces seeking independence and a serious warning to external forces.

Starting at 0734, the exercise and training began in the Taiwan Strait, as well as in the northern, southern, and eastern parts of Taiwan, including areas around Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu, and Dongyin island. After the mobilization order was given, multiple formations of destroyers and frigates moved at high speed to surround Taiwan. Upon reaching their designated areas, the ships deployed their main and secondary guns, missiles, and other weapon systems, ready to strike. The fleet integrated intelligence information from both the air and sea, captured and locked onto targets, and executed multi-type, multi-dimensional saturation simulated strikes. Additionally, ships and aircraft coordinated anti-submarine operations by using towed sonar and buoys and carried out simulated attacks against underwater targets.

The Eastern Theater Air Force also dispatched dozens of fighters to systematically conduct combat patrols around Taiwan and its outer islands. These fighter jets, relying on joint intelligence support and various tactical maneuvers, approached the periphery of Taiwan for combat patrols. The air force formed multi-type formations with live ammunition and flew to designated airspace to establish strike positions. They coordinated with destroyers, frigates, and missile boats to simulate strikes against high-value targets. Simultaneously, the army and rocket force moved into their designated areas, quickly occupying their launch positions to coordinate with sea and air assault forces for joint strikes.

With the support of the Eastern Theater Command’s joint combat system, the theater command’s troops conducted training in sea assault, land strike, air defense, and anti-submarine operations around Taiwan. This exercise further tested their actual combat capabilities in multi-domain coordination and joint strike operations.

“联合利剑—2024A”演习距台岛很近有何深意？专家解析：这次解放军以压倒性实力反切香肠 (What is the significance of ‘Joint Sword-2024A’ being so close to Taiwan? Experts analyze: this time the PLA is countering incremental steps of Taiwan independence with overwhelming strength),” Xinan Evening News (PRC newspaper created by the Propaganda Department of the Anhui Provincial Committee of the CCP), 25 May 2024. https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1799986237998926830&wfr=spider&for=pc

On May 23, the Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army conducted the ‘Joint Sword-2024A’ exercise around Taiwan, involving sea-air coordination, sea assault, land strikes, and other training activities. The exercise aimed to test multi-domain coordination and organize joint strikes, demonstrating the combat capabilities of the Eastern Theater Command troops. With strong determination, firm will, and robust capabilities, they are poised to resolutely crush the arrogance of Taiwan independence forces. There are three significant aspects of this exercise to note: 1) The proximity of the exercise close to Taiwan. 2) The joint efforts to seize battlefield control and execute precision attacks. 3) The deployment of troops to the eastern part of Taiwan and its strategic implications.

Regarding the proximity of the exercise to Taiwan, Major General Meng Xiangqing, a professor and special commentator at the National Defense University, highlights two key points. First, he notes that the approaching ships and aircraft are increasingly nearing Taiwan, being just a step away from the main island, or even as close as a finger’s reach. Second, he emphasizes that the exercise clearly showcases the PLA’s multi-domain control capabilities, with the depth of this ‘squeeze’ being greater and more unprecedented than before. It can be inferred that the closer Taiwan independence forces move towards external support, the tighter the chain around Taiwan will become.

Regarding joint efforts to seize battlefield control and execute precision attacks, Major General Meng Xiangqing highlighted the 3D animations released by the Eastern Theater Command which demonstrated the focus on striking critical Taiwan independence targets. This involves leveraging strategic advantages by targeting coastal areas and dominating sea, air, and information domains from multiple directions. Additionally, the deployment of naval and air assets across vast areas creates a robust firepower network capable of striking any location harboring Taiwan independence.  Regarding the strategic implication of troop deployments to the eastern part of Taiwan, Major General Meng Xiangqing emphasizes it as a significant shift in perspective. Historically, the Taiwan military underestimated the PLA’s capability to effectively project combat power to the eastern part of the island, considering it a haven to preserve their own combat strength. However, recent demonstrations by the PLA, including simulated multi-directional strikes, have highlighted their ability to swiftly deploy troops to the region and assert control over key routes. Should external forces attempt intervention, they would likely approach from the east. However, the Eastern Theater Command’s capacity to deploy joint formations of naval, air, and land forces indicates that Taiwan independence elements would find it difficult to escape, foreign aid would be effectively blocked, and there would be no vulnerable points in their defense.

Notes:

[i] To watch the PRC’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) official response for conducting Joint Sword-2024A, see the MOD’s video post, Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 24 May 2024. http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/xwfyr/fyrthhdjzw/16310980.html

[ii] For a comprehensive breakdown of PLA activities during Joint Sword-2024A, including composition of PLA forces on each day, see Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense daily report of PLA activities, Ministry of National Defense, R.O.C.  https://www.mnd.gov.tw/PublishTable.aspx?Types=即時軍事動態&title=國防消息&Page=2

[iii] Considering information released by the PLA and public sources, Joint Sword-2024A is recognized by observers as China’s largest and closest military exercise ever conducted near Taiwan. See: Josephine Ma, “Mainland China’s military wraps up Joint Sword-2024A drills near Taiwan,” South China Morning Post, 25 May 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3264093/mainland-chinas-military-wraps-joint-sword-2024a-drills-near-taiwan

[iv] To view a broadcast featuring Major General Meng Xiangqing from the National Defense University and Senior Colonel Tong Zhen from the Academy of Military Sciences discussing the ‘Joint Sword-2024A’ exercise, see the exclusive Xinhuanet video post, Xinhuanet (the official state news agency of the PRC known for propaganda and disinformation), 24 May 2024. https://live.baidu.com/m/media/pclive/pchome/live.html?room_id=9254336688&source=h5pre

[v] A visual released by CNA that compares the 2022 PLA military drills around Taiwan to ‘Joint Sword-2024A’, Central News Agency (Taiwan state-owned news agency), 25 May 2024. https://imgcdn.cna.com.tw/www/WebPhotos/1024/20240524/2000x2000_wmkn_02594021293743_0.jpg

[vi] To watch a clip of Senior Colonel Zhang Chi, Deputy Director at the National Defense University, briefly describing the effects of sieging Taiwan, see China Net Culture video post, China Net Culture (a state-run web portal of the State Council Information Office, part of the CCP Central Propaganda Department), 24 May 2024. https://haokan.baidu.com/v?pd=wisenatural&vid=6554376293806421436

[vii] Nectar Gan, Eric Cheung, Brad Lendon, “China says military drills encircling Taiwan designed to test its ability to ‘seize power,’ CNN, 24 May 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/23/asia/china-military-drills-taiwan-second-day-intl-hnk/index.html

OE Watch Insight:

CHN concluded its ‘Joint Sword-2024A’ military drills, the largest and closest ever held near TWN. CHN states these drills test its ability to seize power, reinforcing concerns that future exercises may serve as a pretext for an actual invasion.

Image Information:

Image: China’s Eastern Theater Command released posters for ‘Joint Sword-2024A’, showcasing weapons aimed to ‘kill’ Taiwan independence.
Source: http://www.81.cn/zq_208553/16310798.html
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Cracks Appear in Maduro Regime

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Tareck El Aissami was once one of the most powerful men in Venezuela and a top Maduro confidant.

“Maduro became a victim in the face of a violent opposition that wanted to kill him. It turns out that some of his own people were behind the attack.”

Recently, the Maduro regime has shown signs of schisms within the ruling Chavista Party,[i] now known as the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). The arrest and prosecution of regime insider, former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami, is a watershed moment for elites in Maduro’s inner circle. According to the first excerpted article from the centrist Colombian daily El Tiempo, Maduro accused El Aissami of being behind the assassination attempt, as well as corruption, pilfering roughly $21 billion from the state-owned oil company while serving as oil minister.[ii] According to the second excerpted article from the Spanish outlet El País, El Aissami, in addition to the assassination accusation, fell for endangering the PSUV’s electoral prospects with his large-scale theft of public resources. . The outlet notes how the arrests of El Aissami and his associates sent a chill through many circles of regime elites. They come in the context of Venezuela’s July presidential election, in which Maduro faces stiff competition from an organized opposition that continues to lead Maduro in the polls. The fact that dozens have been arrested alongside El Aissami indicates a growing crisis of trust within Chavismo’s elite ranks.[iii] Further, the money that El Aissami stole to grease his corruption networks has restricted the Maduro regime from greater social spending during the campaign, contributing to his flagging prospects of winning the election.

Sources:

Source: “Traicionado por su propio círculo? Así fue cómo un ministro cercano a Nicolás Maduro casi implosiona al chavismo (Betrayed by his own circle? This is how a minister close to Nicolás Maduro almost imploded Chavismo),” El Tiempo (a Colombian daily generally considered politically centrist), 30 April 2024. https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/los-conspiradores-estaban-con-maduro-como-un-ministro-casi-implosiona-al-chavismo-3338641

Less than a month ago, El Aissami was seen handcuffed, quite skinny, and with an emaciated appearance…even if it were true that El Aissami had been conspiring against Maduro, his imprisonment could be more related to the accusation than to the ‘loss’ of 21 billion dollars from PDVSA, a plot that leaves more than 60 detainees, all allies of the former minister…With the drone attack story, Maduro became a victim in the face of a violent opposition that wanted to kill him. It turns out that some of his own people were behind the attack.

Source:  “Venezuela detiene al exministro del Petróleo Tareck El Aissami, hasta hace poco un político íntimo de Maduro (Venezuela detains former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami, until recently a close politician of Maduro),” El País (a Spanish outlet with excellent regional coverage), 9 April 2024. https://elpais.com/america/2024-04-09/venezuela-detiene-al-exministro-del-petroleo-tareck-el-aissami-hasta-hace-poco-un-politico-intimo-de-maduro.html

The tectonic plates of Chavismo have received a strong shock this Tuesday. The Venezuelan Prosecutor’s Office has announced the arrest of former minister Tareck El Aissami, a politician who until a year and a half ago belonged to Nicolás Maduro’s circle of trust…The definitive fall of El Aissami—a powerful and feared operator of Chavismo, around whom important layers of current national capital had been organized—seems to close the chapter of an expensive fraud on the nation, orchestrated under the shadow of international sanctions, in a time in which…the country’s oil production and the economy, were completely bankrupt, in the midst of a massive emigration of people. This may be the most radical and merciless purge carried out by Chavismo since it came to power…El Aissami is not taken to prison for ideological differences, but for having endangered the revolution and abusing its authority.

Notes:

[i] Chavismo is the movement of those who follow Huge Chavez, which today is encapsulated in the party formally called PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela, in English). Chavistas are followers of Chavismo.

[ii] To understand more about the unfathomable scale of this theft from PDVSA, and the use of crypto currency and middlemen, see: Marianna Parraga, “Exclusive: Middlemen Have Left Venezuela’s PDVSA with $21.2 billion in Unpaid Bills,” Reuters, 21 March 2023. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/middlemen-have-left-venezuelas-pdvsa-with-212-billion-unpaid-bills-2023-03-21/

[iii] For more information on the opposition’s success in pressuring Maduro despite the long electoral odds, see: Ryan C. Berg, “This Could Be the Last Shot to Restore Democracy in Venezuela,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 4 April 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/could-be-last-shot-restore-democracy-venezuela

Image Information:

Image: Tareck El Aissami was once one of the most powerful men in Venezuela and a top Maduro confidant.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/globovision/6336412991/
Attribution: CC BY-NC 2.0 DEED

Armenia Hints It May Withdraw From Russia-Backed Regional Security Bloc

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Monastery Valley in Armenia

“Armenia will refrain from joining the CSTO Collective Security Council resolution of November 23, 2023 on the CSTO budget for 2024 and from participating in financing the organization’s activity envisaged by this resolution. However, it will not object to adopting this resolution in a curtailed format.”

Armenia recently announced it will no longer pay its dues to the Collective Security Treaty Organizations (CSTO), a Moscow-led security organization comprised of countries from Central Asia and the South Caucasus. According to the first excerpted piece from the Russian state news agency, TASS, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told his countrymen that they can no longer rely on the CSTO and he had no answer to how Yerevan benefits from being a member. The move comes as relations between Yerevan and Moscow have cooled, particularly after a series of clashes over the disputed Nagorno Karabakh region, , last September with neighboring Azerbaijan resulted in the mass expulsion of the enclave’s Armenian population.

Pashinyan, who did not attend the CSTO’s last summit in Minsk in 2023, had hinted that Armenia plans to suspend its participation in the security bloc. Critics of the CSTO claim it is a tool for Moscow to wield military power over former Soviet-bloc countries. The last time CSTO forces were called in to preserve the peace came in January 2022, when roughly 2,500 CSTO peacekeepers – the bulk of them Russian – responded to anti-government rioting in Kazakhstan. But Pashinyan has criticized the alliance for not supporting Armenia during its various clashes with Azerbaijan,accusing Russian peacekeepers of abandoning their positions when Azerbaijani troops crossed into Nagorno-Karabakh.[i] According to the second excerpted article from Armenian TV and radio service Azatutyun, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Armenia is free to withdraw from the organization.[ii]  If Armenia does leave the CSTO, the move could signal a major realignment of the regional balance of power in the Caucasus, as Russia, preoccupied by the war in Ukraine, looks to keep a military presence in the region. Armenia recently held joint drills with the United States, has sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and has expressed interest in one day joining the European Union. If the CSTO were to lose Armenia or other members, it could weaken Russia’s military leverage in the South Caucasus. Alternatively, it could make other regional security blocs like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which also comprises China, more relevant and powerful.

Sources:

Source:  “Armenia to refrain from financing CSTO activity in 2024,” (“Армения воздержится от финансирования деятельности ОДКБ в 2024 году,” TASS (Russian state news agency), 8 May 2024. https://tass.com/world/1785765

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said earlier that his country cannot rely on the CSTO and he cannot answer Armenian society’s question why the country should be its member. In recent time, Yerevan has skipped numerous meeting in a range of integration formats. Thus, Pashinyan did not attend the CSTO summit in Minsk in 2023 and announced that Armenia had suspended its participation in this organization.

CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov told TASS on April 22 that it was a matter of “an independent and sovereign country” to decide whether to take part in the upcoming CSTO summit or not. However, he said that he hoped that many might change for the better before the summit.

Source:  “Armenia Free To Leave Russian-Led Bloc, Says Moscow,” (Армения свободна выйти из возглавляемого Россией блока, заявила Москва), Azatutyun (Armenian TV and Radio service affiliated with U.S. funded RFE/RL) 3 May 2024. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32932373.html#

“We still do not question the sovereign right of our Armenian partners to independently determine their foreign policy course, including in the context of the further work of the organization,” the ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova told a news briefing in Moscow.

“Let me remind you that Article 19 of the [CSTO} Charter establishes the possibility of leaving the alliance,” Zakharova said. “In that case, a member state … must send an official notification no later than six months before the withdrawal date.”

The Armenian government, she said, has taken no steps in that direction so far despite its “constantly circulated accusations against the organization.” This means that Armenia remains for now a full-fledged member of the Russian-led military alliance and must “must fulfill appropriate obligations,” added Zakharova. She did not specify those obligations.Over the past year or so, Yerevan has boycotted high-level meetings, military exercises and other activities of the CSTO in what Pashinian described in February as an effective suspension of Armenia’s CSTO membership. The premier repeatedly said afterwards that he could pull his country out of the alliance of six ex-Soviet states altogether.

Notes:

[i] “Armenian PM Attacks Russian-Led Alliance At Summit In Yerevan,” RFE/RL, 24 November 2022. https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-csto-pashinian-criticism/32145663.html

[ii] During a recent visit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Pashinyan struck an agreement for Russian border guards to withdraw from along the Armenia-Azerbaijani border. See: Gabriel Gavin, “Russia to withdraw troops from Armenia’s border,” Politico.eu, 9 May 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-to-withdraw-troops-from-armenias-border/

Image Information:

Image: Monastery Valley in Armenia
Source: Unsplash, https://unsplash.com/photos/aerial-photo-of-a-village-during-daytime-VQ07UveM3-U
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