Category Archives: OE Watch

Russia Suspected of Distributing Former Syrian Military Assets To Mali

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Mali recently received a number of heavy weapons from Russia including T-72B3 Main Battle Tanks, like this one on display in Moscow, circa 2017. Russia was known to have T-72B3 tanks in Syria, leading to speculation that the tanks arrived in Mali were part of Russia’s Syrian arsenal.

“The most powerful weapons of the latest generation have arrived in Mali, which will strengthen the capacity of the Malian army.”

Officially, Russia has remained silent regarding the whereabouts of its Syrian stockpile of weapons since the fall of the Assad regime. Previous reporting tracked Russian cargo planes loading military equipment, including air defense systems, arrived in Libya shortly after leaving Syria.[i] A 17 January video published by Bamako-based Mali Cap+ on its Facebook page suggests at least a portion of Russia’s Syrian arsenal is now in Mali. According to an analysis of the Mali Cap+ video by South Africa-based news aggregator DefenseWeb, the shipment, which included T-72 tanks, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-82A 8×8 armored personnel carriers, D-30 towed artillery, and a variety of armored personnel carriers, “may have come from Syria.”[ii] The Mali Cap+ journalist notes the convoy arrived from Guinea. If accurate, the convoy could have offloaded by ship to rail in the port city of Conakry. There is a railroad from Conakry to Kanan; in Kanan, the weapons could have been offloaded onto trucks before crossing into Mali.[iii] However, according to the excerpted article from French news service Le Monde, the equipment was put on trucks in Conakry and traveled by road through Siguiri before crossing the border into Mali. Notably, according to Le Monde, the weapons came from Murmansk rather than Syria—aboard two ships, the Alder and the Siyanie Severa. The Alder is operated by a company under U.S. and Western sanctions.

Mali’s military partnership with Russia has increased dramatically following a series of military takeovers of the country, the last one in 2021, and the formal withdrawal of French-led Operation Barkhane in November 2022. Russia’s Africa Corps, formerly the Wagner Group, began operating in Mali prior to the withdrawal of the last French troops. In addition to the implications of how these Russian weapons got to Mali, or how they are used, the arrival of Russian heavy weapons to Mali on 17 January further cements the relationship between Moscow and Mali’s military government.

Sources:

“Bravo Les armements les plus puiss@nts de dernière génération sont arrivés au Mali, ce qui va renforcer la capacité de l’armée malienne (Bravo the most powerful weapons of the latest generation have arrived in Mali, which will strengthen the capacity of the Malian army),” Mali Cap+ Facebook Channel, 17 January 2025. https://www.facebook.com/CapMaliPlus/videos/8603016179803509

The most powerful weapons of the latest generation have arrived in Mali, which will strengthen the capacity of the Malian army.

I think this will be the new format in the fight against terrorism.

“Russia Delivers Military Hardware to Mali,” DefenseWeb (South Africa based defense news portal covering military and security news on the African continent), 17 January 2025. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/african-news/russia-delivers-military-hardware-to-mali/?referrer=newsletter

Russia has delivered over 100 military vehicles to Mali, including tanks, trucks, and infantry fighting vehicles.

It is suspected the shipment may have come from Syria following the departure of Russian troops after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

It appears Mali could be another recipient of this equipment: on 17 January, a convoy of over 100 vehicles arrived in Mali’s capital Bamako, where it was captured on video by local media company Cap Mali+. Half the vehicles in the convoy were trucks (including armoured Kamaz trucks and engineering vehicles) and the remainder included T-72B3M tanks, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-82A 8×8 armoured personnel carriers, and Spartak, Linza, and Tiger 4×4 armoured personnel carriers. Also seen were three D-30 towed artillery pieces, two anti-aircraft cannons, and a couple of boats.

Frontelligence in its analysis of the convoy stated the vehicles were not sourced elsewhere and sold to Mali because they have Cyrillic text and Russian military markings. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD) said markings indicated the equipment had at one point been transported by rail – possibly in Russia.

…Most likely, the equipment will be distributed between the Wagner PMC units and government forces as part of strengthening the counteraction to paramilitary units in the country and terrorist organizations.”

“La Russie livre des dizaines de chars et de blindés au Mali et réorganise son dispositif militaire en Afrique (Russia Delivers Dozens of Tanks and Armored Vehicles to Mali and Reorganizes its Military Deployment in Africa),” Le Monde (major French daily), 24 January 2025. https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2025/01/24/au-mali-la-russie-procede-a-une-importante-livraison-de-blindes-et-reorganise-son-dispositif-militaire_6514120_3210.html

These Russian military vehicles were unloaded at the port of Conakry, in Guinea, before forming the convoy that took the road to Siguiri and the border with Mali. They were probably transported aboard two Russian ships. The first, the Adler, belongs to the company M Leasing LLC, placed under American and European sanctions for its role in Moscow’s military logistics.

This company is suspected of having delivered weapons from North Korea to Russia, according to the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. On December 14, 2024, the Adler left the port of Murmansk in northern Russia and headed for Conakry.

On December 21, a second Russian-flagged cargo ship, the Siyanie Severa, also left Murmansk for Guinea. The ship belongs to the Russian company OJSC Northern Shipping Company, which is also under US sanctions for transporting its country’s military equipment.

According to the records of the port of Conakry, the Adler arrived on January 8 and left on the 12th. On board, 1,182 tons of “goods.” The Siyanie Severa arrived on January 11 with 834 tons of cargo. On an Airbus satellite image that Le Monde was able to consult (but cannot publish), this second cargo ship is still visible at the quay on January 15. From Conakry, it then takes two days of driving, with such a convoy of trucks, to reach the border with Mali, via Siguiri.

Notes:

[i] “Russia Withdraws Air-Defense Systems, Other Advanced Weaponry From Syria to Libya,” The Wall Street Journal, 18 December 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-air-defense-bases-syria-libya-25810db0?st=jD59wk&reflink=article_email_share

[ii] The convoy or arms also included Russian patrol boats that can be used to patrol the important Niger River. There have been attacks on civilian boat traffic in Mali. See: “Mali: The attack against the civilian boat ‘Tombouctou’ constitutes a war crime,” International Federation for Human Rights, 12 September 2023. https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/mali/mali-the-attack-against-the-civilian-boat-tombouctou-constitutes-a

[iii] There are five major ports in Guinea including Conakry and Benti, both capable of receiving larger ships and a variety of cargo. Conakry has a roll-on roll off (ro ro) capability and a railway spur, while Benti intersects vital roadways such as the Trans-West African Coastal Highway that connects all the West African nations including the landlocked nations such as Burkina Faso. For a description of the five major ports, see: “5 Major Ports in Guinea,” Marine Insight, 22 May 2022. https://www.marineinsight.com/know-more/5-major-ports-in-guinea/

Image Information:

Image: Mali recently received a number of heavy weapons from Russia including T-72B3 Main Battle Tanks, like this one on display in Moscow, circa 2017. Russia was known to have T-72B3 tanks in Syria, leading to speculation that the tanks arrived in Mali were part of Russia’s Syrian arsenal.
Source: Vitaly V. Kuzmin, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-72 – /media/File:Alabino05042017-40.jpg
Attribution: CC By-SA 4.0

Taiwan Suspects Chinese Ship of Cutting Undersea Data Cables

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A Taiwanese Coast Guard patrol and rescue ship, the Lian Jiang, is moored in front of the Customs Building on the west bank of Keelung Port.

“China has a long history of sabotaging Taiwanese infrastructure using maritime tactics.”

According to the excerpted article from Taiwan-based Taipei Times, on 3 January, an undersea data cable near Taiwan’s Keeling Harbor was cut by “a Chinese freighter,” the Shunxin-39. Upon the alert that the cable had been cut, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) intercepted the Shunxin-39 north of where the incident took place, demanding that the ship return to Taiwan for inspection. However, the CGA was unable to detain the ship. The incident is the latest suspected cable-cutting incident by ships thought to be affiliated with China but flagged in African countries. The article notes that the Shunxin-39 was flagged out of Cameroon.

The Taipei Times article also notes this is not the first time Chinese vessels have been suspected of sabotaging or cutting Taiwan’s undersea cables, noting, “China has a long history of sabotaging Taiwanese infrastructure using maritime tactics.” A tweet on Special Taiwan on X noted that this was the 21st time Chinese ships have cut Taiwanese undersea cables. However, the tweet did not provide any evidence to support this number of incidents. The tweet also referred to the incident as a “grey zone warfare tactic,” a term widely used to describe sabotage or obstruction without crossing the threshold of armed aggression.[i] Still, as the number of undersea cable-cutting incidents continue to rise, these acts of sabotage should be considered capable of leading to military conflict.[ii]

Sources:

Fang Wei-li and Jake Chung, “Chinese ship cuts cable near Keelung Harbor, Taipei Times. 5 January 2025. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/01/05/2003829674

The Coast Guard Administration (CGA) and Chunghwa Telecom yesterday confirmed that an international undersea cable near Keelung Harbor had been cut by a Chinese ship, the Shunxin-39, a freighter registered in Cameroon.

Chunghwa Telecom said the cable had its own backup equipment, and the incident would not affect telecommunications within Taiwan.

The CGA said it dispatched a ship under its first fleet after receiving word of the incident and located the Shunxin-39 7 nautical miles (13km) north of Yehliu (野柳) at about 4:40pm on Friday.

The CGA demanded that the Shunxin-39 return to seas closer to Keelung Harbor for investigation over the issue, adding that it has forwarded all evidence and statements to prosecutors.

Kuma Academy chief executive officer Ho Cheng-hui (何澄輝) said yesterday that while the incident was pending investigation, China has a long history of sabotaging Taiwanese infrastructure using maritime tactics.

Ho said that the incident was a Chinese ploy to gauge the point at which the international community would draw a red line in an attempt to escalate its “gray zone” tactics.

Ho said such tactics were one reason Taiwan is working to launch its own low and medium Earth orbit satellites and increase telecom resilience.

Special Taiwan @TaiwanSpecial, on X (formerly Twitter), 5 January 2025. https://x.com/TaiwanSpecial/status/1876104109390287285

In what might be a China grey zone warfare tactic against Taiwan, a Cameroonian registered freighter with a Chinese name SHUNXIN39 cut a Chunghwa Telecom undersea cable off Taiwan’s north coast on Saturday. This is the 21st time Chinese ships have cut Taiwanese undersea cables.

Notes:

[i] In the wake of a spat of suspected cable cutting by China, U.S. based Newsweek reported that Chinese scientists may have been trying to standardize undersea cable sabotage.  See: “Exclusive—Chinese Patents Reveal Aim to Cut Undersea Cables,” Newsweek, 10 January 2025. https://www.newsweek.com/china-conflict-undersea-cables-cutting-internet-data-subsea-marine-baltic-taiwan-2012396

[ii] See: Dodge Billingsley, “Potential Flashpoint Stemming From Undersea Data Cable Network Access Restrictions,” OE Watch, 06-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/potential-flashpoint-stemming-from-undersea-data-cable-network-access-restrictions/; and Dodge Billingsley, “Damage to Undersea Cables in Baltic Hint at China – Russia Collusion,” OE Watch, 01-2025. URL PENDING

Image Information: 

Image: A Taiwanese Coast Guard patrol and rescue ship, the Lian Jiang, is moored in front of the Customs Building on the west bank of Keelung Port.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CG_125_Lienchiang_shipped_in_Keelung_20170309.jpg
Attribution: CC0 1.0

The Evolution of Russian Unmanned Vehicle Doctrine in Ukraine

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Orlan-30 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.

“The Russian Armed Forces will form a new branch of arms in armed forces — Unmanned Vehicle Troops — in accordance with the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the major Russian daily newspaper Izvestia discusses how Russians are adapting to the changing character of war as experienced in its special military operation in Ukraine.[i] One feature of this change has been the pervasive use of unmanned vehicles in the air, ground, and sea. As Izvestia explains, Russia will adapt to this change by creating a new branch of arms, Unmanned Vehicle Troops, to operate similar to existing branches of service: infantry, artillery, air defense, etc.[ii] Conceptually, unmanned vehicles and their operators and maintainers will be integrated into the Russian combined arms concept as the infantry, tanks, artillery, etc., just as the Russians have Air Defense Troops in the Ground Forces, Aerospace Forces, and Navy. The Unmanned Vehicle Troops will now be a branch of arms in a similar fashion. This means that unmanned vehicles will have dedicated training, sustainment, and representation in the General Staff. This representation will enhance unmanned vehicle training and doctrine, future capability development, and ensure integration with the other arms branches. This development suggests that in the Russian view, the use of unmanned vehicles is not an aberration but will be a permanent feature of future wars and armed conflicts. It is important to note that this announcement does not mean that unmanned vehicles and their operators and maintainers will be found only in stand-alone unmanned vehicle units; they will still almost certainly be found in other types of units, such as infantry, armor, artillery, logistics, signals, and the like.

Sources:

Yulia Leonova, Vladimir Matveev, Bogdan Stepovoy, “С новым родом: войска беспилотных систем создадут в России (A new branch: Unmanned Vehicle Troops will be created in Russia),” Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 17 December 2024.  https://iz.ru/1808177/ulia-leonova-vladimir-matveev-bogdan-stepovoi/s-novym-rodom-voiska-bespilotnyh-sistem-sozdadut-v-rossii

The Russian Armed Forces will form a new branch of arms in armed forces — Unmanned Vehicle Troops — in accordance with the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. This was announced by the head of the Russian Defense Ministry Andrei Belousov at an extended meeting of the board on December 16.

According to him, their creation will be completed in the third quarter of 2025. “The mass use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has become the most significant breakthrough in the tactics of the Russian Armed Forces,” he emphasized.

In turn, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated the need to increase the production of drones. It is no less important, according to the head of state, to train UAV operators, to prepare them according to programs developed on the basis of combat experience.

Russian troops use more than 3,500 UAVs daily, and this figure is growing, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov said at a departmental board meeting…

As the former commander of the Pacific Fleet, Sergei Avakyants, explained to Izvestia, a branch of arms is an organizational structure, as it is necessary to create a theoretical design of operational art for it. That is, to create a theory and practice of preparing and conducting military actions on an operational scale (operations, battles, strikes), — he noted. — This is a move in the right direction, the main thing is that it is not just a sign on an office door. It is necessary to think through a system of training both sergeants and enlisted personnel, and officers. To do this, it is necessary to make changes to the curricula — to create special faculties or educational institutions of secondary and higher education. The innovations should also affect existing military academies, in particular the General Staff Academy.

During the special military operation, UAVs became so indispensable that we reached the point of needing to form separate units [части] and, perhaps, even large units [соединения] with their own infrastructure that would support the use of UAVs. Military expert Dmitry Kornev told Izvestia about this.

According to him, most likely, units, platoons, and separate battalions will be created that will closely interact with other branches of the military and ensure the use of UAVs in their interests.

— The Unmanned Vehicle Troops will most likely receive a status similar to that of the Air Defense Troops — military expert Vladislav Shurygin told Izvestia. — Their units will be part of the Ground Forces, the Aerospace Forces, and also in the Navy, where, among other things, unmanned boats will be developed. All used unmanned systems will belong to them. It is possible that they will be united by some common structure that will be engaged in design, development, and testing. It was not for nothing that the minister said that inter-service centers will be created to test the latest and most promising systems…

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

[ii] This new force, род войск, is not to be confused with a branch of service; вид вооружённых сил (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.). 

Image Information:

Image: Orlan-30 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baba_Yaga_(aircraft)#/media/File:UA_Vampire_UCAV_01.jpg
Attribution: Mike1979 RussiaCC BY-SA 4.0

Russia Shrugs Off Stricter Energy Sanctions, Promises Retaliation

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A boat next to a large Russian oil platform, taken in July 2017.

“[The US Administration’s decision to impose restrictive measures against Russian energy sector…] is an attempt to inflict at least some damage on the Russian economy even at the cost of destabilizing global markets ahead of the end of the inglorious term of President Joe Biden.”

After the rollout of new energy sector sanctions in January by the United States and United Kingdom, Russia’s Foreign Ministry responded with a mix of indifference and promises of retaliation for the punitive measure. The sanctions target some 200 entities and individuals in Russia, including senior energy officials, and are meant to curb liquefied natural gas projects and curtail the profits of service providers that support the country’s energy industry. This includes Moscow’s vast “shadow fleet” of vessels that ship oil around the world under third parties to avoid sanctions but have come under fire for allegedly carrying out acts of sabotage in the Baltic Sea.[i]

The reaction in Russia has been relative indifference as per the accompanying article from Russia’s official news agency, TASS. The article suggests that the sanctions would not impede Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine but that their effects could be “destabilizing” for global energy markets.[ii] Russia comprises roughly 11 percent of global crude oil production (approximately 10.75 million barrels per day (bpd)) and consumes only 3.68 million bpd. According to a statement by Russia’s Foreign Ministry, Moscow has promised retaliation. “Of course, Washington’s hostile actions will not be left without response and will be taken into consideration during the calculation of our external economic strategy. We will continue to implement the major projects on oil and gas extraction, as well as import replacement, provision of oil-related services, and construction of nuclear power plants in third countries.”

U.S. attempts to apply economic pressure against Russia in response to its war in Ukraine have not had the desired coercive effect, largely because Russia’s energy sector had been spared. Even previous measures, including the imposition of a $60-per-barrel price cap and targeted sanctions against financial institutions such as Gazprombank, did little to shrink Russia’s war chest.[iii]

Sources:

“Russian Foreign Ministry vows response to new US sanctions,” TASS (Russian state news agency), 11 January 2025. https://tass.com/politics/1897999

“Of course, Washington’s hostile actions will not be left without response and will be taken into consideration during the calculation of our external economic strategy,” the ministry said. “We will continue to implement the major projects on oil and gas extraction, as well as import replacement, provision of oil-related services and construction of nuclear power plants in third countries.”

The ministry pointed out that Russia has been and remains a key and reliable actor on the global fuel market, “despite the convulsions in the White House and the machinations of the Russophobic lobby in the West, which seeks to pull the global energy sector into the hybrid war, which the US has initiated against Russia.”

The ministry underscored that, amid the “failure of Washington’s bid on Moscow’s strategic defeat and sanctions pressure, which was supposed to undermine the Russian economy, which has not only survived by continues to develop despite the unprecedented external economic pressure, the efforts of the outgoing White House team aim to complicate or obstruct any bilateral economic ties, including for the American business.”

The ministry added that this process sacrifices interests of US’ European allies, who have to switch to the more expensive and irregular American deliveries, as well as interests of its own people, currently suffering from the massive wildfires in California, whose opinion regarding the fuel price hike, which remained relevant ahead of the elections, now can be completely ignored.

“Therefore, the upcoming president, who is unable to withdraw the abovementioned sanctions without the Congress’ approval, will inherit scorched earth – both literally and figuratively,” the ministry added.

Notes:

[i]  Jake Lapham, “US and UK toughen sanctions on Russian oil industry,” BBC News, 10 January 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn8xlj9kkkmo

[ii] Illya Tsukanov, “US Anti-Russian Energy Sanctions Threaten to Destabilize Global Markets. Here’s How,” Sputnik International, 11 January 2025, https://sputnikglobe.com/20250111/latest-us-anti-russian-energy-sanctions-threaten-to-destabilize-global-markets-heres-how-1121409189.html

[iii]  According to analysis the latest energy sanctions, which target two of Russia’s largest oil companies, Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, and their subsidiaries, could have more of a desired punitive effect, given recent stresses within the Russian economy. See “Five questions (and expert answers) about Biden’s final round of sanctions on Russia,” New Atlanticist, 10 January 2025,  https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/five-questions-and-expert-answers-about-bidens-final-round-of-sanctions-on-russia/

Image Information:

Image: A boat next to a large Russian oil platform, taken in July 2017
Source: https://timelessmoon.getarchive.net/amp/media/russia-oil-platform-rig-travel-vacation-c8289c
Attribution: CC0 1.0 Universal

Chechen Spetnaz Instructors Training Russian Soldiers in the Arctic Region

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President Vladimir Putin visits Russian Special Forces University in Gudermes, Chechnya, in August 2024.

“A key mission for the VOIN is to provide so-called ‘patriotic education’ and combat training for teenage youngsters. The organization has centers in at least 12 regions, among them the two far northern regions of Murmansk and Yamal Nenets Autonomous Okrug.”

The Russian Spetsnaz University in Gudermes, Chechnya, has trained tens of thousands of soldiers from all over the Russian Federation since its establishment in 2013. Soldiers from the Kola peninsula, which borders Norway and is home to Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, are increasingly bringing the skills they pick up in the North Caucasus and applying them to operational environments in the Arctic, according to a recent report in Norway-based The Barents Observer.

Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Chechen Republic, enjoys close ties to the Kremlin. President Vladimir Putin visited Spetsnaz University last August. Kadyrov also exerts influence across Russia’s regions, including its north, through VOIN (“Fighter”), a training military organization with offices expanding across Russia, including in Murmansk and Yamal Nenets Autonomous Okrug in northwestern Siberia and central Russia. Part of VOIN’s mission is to provide “patriotic education” and combat training for Russian teenagers. The former head of Kadyrov’s security detail and combat veteran of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, Daniil Martynov,[i] heads up VOIN’s organizational development. Training conducted by Chechen commanders include drills in sharpshooting and drone flying.

While potentially symbolic of Russia shifting its focus northward, the significance of these reports is unclear. First, fighting in the Arctic does not resemble fighting in the Northern Caucasus, given its extreme climate conditions, poor infrastructure, and important naval components. It is unlikely that Chechen paramilitaries will be fighting in Norway or the Arctic. More intriguing is whether Chechen spetsnaz trainers will influence the “Arctic way of war” in Russia’s far north. Russia recently announced it will be adding up to 50,000 soldiers to its Leningrad Military District, as well as expanding Northern Fleet’s 14th Army Corps into a full Army and establishing a completely new Army Corps in Karelia.[ii]

Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Kadyrov’s militant network is expanding into the Russian north,” The Barents Observer, 7 January, 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/kadyrovs-militant-network-is-expanding-into-the-russian-north/422803

Reportedly, more than 47,000 servicemen have undergone training in Gudermes since 2022. Of them, about 19,000 are so-called volunteers. Among them is Sergei Rezantsev from the town of Olenegorsk in the Kola Peninsula. In December last year, the 43-year-old man was awarded a medal for so-called “bravery” during the war in Ukraine. In a ceremony in Olenegorsk, the local town mayor described Rezantsev as “a true role model for patriotism.” 

In the ceremony, the warrior carried a uniform with the insignia of the Spetsnaz University. Judging from Rezantsev’s social media page, he has long experience from several Russian military operations, including in the North Caucasus.

With the training of soldiers from all over Russia, Ramzan Kadyrov is gradually building a network that includes representatives from major parts of the country. In addition, Kadyrov and his men are also exerting growing influence and power across Russia through the VOIN (“Fighter”), a militant organization that is opening offices in a number of Russian regions.

Notes:

[i] Prior to his position at VOIN, Daniil Martynov was a combat leader of Chechen forces, often referred to as Kadyrovtsy, part of the initial invasion of Ukraine on 22 February 2022.

[ii] Thomas Nilsen, “Kola and in Karelia likely to get tens of thousands of new soldiers,” The Barents Observer, 24 January 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/kola-and-in-karelia-likely-to-get-tens-of-thousands-of-new-soldiers/423579

Image Information:

Image: President Vladimir Putin visits Russian Special Forces University in Gudermes, Chechnya, in August 2024.
Source: Kremlin.RU http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news
Attribution: Public Domain

China Upgrades Strategic Partnership With Nigeria

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The Nigerian army, whose largest base in southern Nigeria is located in Cantonment Ikeja, is upgrading its relationship with the Chinese government, which will support Nigeria’s domestic weapons production. This will allow the Nigerian army to overcome potential procurement restrictions from the West over concerns about Nigerian human rights abuses.

“Nigeria and China have announced a significant military partnership, focusing on local arms production and military training as part of efforts to improve security in Nigeria and across Africa.”

On 10 January, the Chinese foreign ministry reported on a meeting between Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Nigerian Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar in Abuja. According to the first excerpted article, Wang Yi proclaimed three significant results of the meeting: first, upgrading Chinese-Nigerian relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership;” second, holding the inaugural China-Nigeria Intergovernmental Committee; and, third, pledging to work together to promote the development of the Global South. More broadly, despite China’s global influence being far greater than that of Nigeria or other African states, and despite China’s antagonism toward smaller and weaker states in the South China Sea, the Chinese foreign ministry’s narrative remains that China is an ally to the developing world.[i]

As per the second excerpted article from the Nigerian media website newscentral.africa, the upgraded military partnership between the two countries will involve China supporting Nigeria to locally produce more arms to combat Boko Haram, the Islamic State–West Africa Province, and other terrorist and criminal groups more effectively. Although there was no explicit mention of the United States, the article notes that Chinese support for Nigeria’s arms production would help Nigeria bypass delays and regulatory issues associated with international procurement.[ii] China and Russia have gained influence in the region by providing military aid to West African governments without conditions attached.[iii] In the long run, weapons in the hands of undisciplined militaries in West Africa will often be used against civilians, political opponents, or other marginalized groups and lead to resentment against those regimes and their foreign backers. This has been seen in northern Mali, where Fulani and Tuareg groups have sought vengeance against the Malian Army’s Africa Corps backers.[iv]

Lastly, the newscentral.africa article notes that during Wang Yi’s visit to Nigeria, the Chinese foreign ministry committed to train 6,000 troops in Africa and support an African standby force and rapid response force to carry out counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations. This resembles the China-centric Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Central Asia, which has a similar function and has been a means of projecting Chinese military influence in that region.[v] However, RATS has not been a major tool for counterterrorism in Central Asia, and a similar force in Africa may also become an avenue for China to extend its own military influence without any tangible security benefit on the continent. Nonetheless, this African force, according to the article, safeguards African rights and avoids bullyism, which indicates its existence is also part of a Chinese narrative war in Africa against the West.

Sources:

“中国和尼日利亚关系取得三大突出成果(China-Nigeria relations have achieved three outstanding results),” fmprc.gov.cn, (official Chinese-language website of the foreign ministry of the People’s Republic of China), 10 January 2025. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202501/t20250110_11530245.shtml

Wang Yi introduced the circumstances of his visit to Nigeria and stated that under the strategic guidance of President Xi Jinping and President Tinubu the evolution of China-Nigeria relations achieved three outstanding results: First, the two heads of state jointly announced that China-Nigeria relations have been upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership. Second, a new basis for unity and cooperation was established. The first plenary session of the China-Nigeria Intergovernmental Committee was successfully held. Third, international cooperation has reached a new level. The two sides closely coordinated in international and regional affairs and worked together to promote the mutual rise and development and revitalization of the “Global South”.

“Nigeria Partners with China for Local Arms Production, Military Training,” newscentral.africa, (southern Nigerian newspaper focusing on politics and African affairs), 10 January 2025. https://newscentral.africa/nigeria-partners-with-china-for-local-arms-production-military-training/

Nigeria and China have announced a significant military partnership, focusing on local arms production and military training as part of efforts to improve security in Nigeria and across Africa. [Tuggar] expressed the nation’s desire to establish local production of military equipment, which would help bypass the delays and regulatory issues often associated with international procurement. [Wang Yi] pledged a CN¥1 billion military assistance package to help improve peace and security across the continent. The package includes training for 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 police officers from various African countries, including Nigeria.

Notes:

[i] The article and other Chinese foreign ministry statements, for example, portrayed China as seeking “international fairness,” combating “climate injustice” presumably caused by the West, and advocating multipolarity and inclusive economic development in contrast to a supposedly “unilateral” or exploitative Western-led order. Fmprc.gov. “Wang Yi: Set a Benchmark for China-Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era.” 8 January 2025. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202501/t20250108_11529111.html

[ii] The United States has historically prohibited, at least temporarily, the sale of certain weapons to Nigeria, such as AH-1Z Cobra attack helicopters and Super Tucano fighter jets, due to concerns about Nigerian army human rights abuses. Therefore, the article was subtly indicating that China would overlook such concerns.

[iii] See: Andrew Korybko. “Western pressure fails to waver African states’ determination. Global Times. 29 July 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202307/1295280.shtml.

[iv] See: Assala Khettache. “Mercenary Politics: Algeria’s Response to Wagner in Mali,” RUSI. 3 October 2024. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/mercenary-politics-algerias-response-wagner-mali

[v] An article in The Diplomat, for example, argued that “The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) of the SCO remains a mere monument of the organization’s objectives against combating terrorism, but it is toothless in practice.” Syed Hassan, “The SCO Needs To Be More Than a China-Russia Front Against the West.” The Diplomat. 6 August 2024.

Image Information:

Image: The Nigerian army, whose largest base in southern Nigeria is located in Cantonment Ikeja, is upgrading its relationship with the Chinese government, which will support Nigeria’s domestic weapons production. This will allow the Nigerian army to overcome potential procurement restrictions from the West over concerns about Nigerian human rights abuses.
Source: Kaizen Photography, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nigeria_Army_Cantoment_1.jpg
Attribution: CC x 4.0

How China Is Challenging U.S. Maritime Dominance

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The AN/Spy-1 carried on a U.S. guided-missile destroyer. A report published in Chinese magazine Defense Industry Conversion indicates that the AN/Spy-1 is the main target for the PLA’s EW attacks.

“The PLA’s electronic warfare unit … has crafted a technological road map designed to neutralize America’s maritime dominance”.

A recent Chinese report claims the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is preparing a new electronic warfare (EW) strategy to challenge U.S. maritime dominance. While the report, published by Chinese magazine Defense Industry Conversion, which is supervised by the State Administration of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, is not readily available online, various media sources have written about it. The first article excerpt, published on the privately owned, digital Indian-Canadian news site The Eurasian Times, looks at a report on China’s possible plans to challenge maritime dominance through the lens of the outbreak of cross-Strait conflict. It explains that China has been expanding its arsenal of anti-ship ballistic missiles.[i] Understanding the importance of aircraft carriers and destroyers in puncturing through any potential blockade, the article envisions China employing these weapons to prevent U.S. forces from entering the Western Pacific. To further increase its military effectiveness and gain the strategic advantage, the PLA has created a list of targets—a “Kill List”—within U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups to keep the U.S. Navy at bay. Mo Jiaqian, an electronic countermeasures expert with the PLA’s 92728 Unit,[ii] authored the Defense Industry Conversion article. According to him, China will likely target “specifically labeled U.S. military radars, sensors, and communication systems in a hypothetical battle.” This would “disrupt the U.S. carrier group’s defensive abilities and render it vulnerable to attack.” Drones and other platforms might be used to create noise and false targets by approaching key U.S. radars, “significantly reducing its detection accuracy and impacting the overall effectiveness.” They could also hack into key networks to mimic a friendly response or to overload the adversary’s nodes to wreak havoc.

It is unclear whether China actually possesses the capabilities it describes in its “blueprint” to “fundamentally reshape modern naval warfare,” as the second article excerpt, broadcast on YouTube by Indian English language news broadcast WION News, puts it. Perhaps the statements represent the PLA’s vision or an attempt to deter U.S. forces. It is worth noting a past press report, published by the regional English-language pan-Asian digital news platform Asia Times, which claimed China’s EW capabilities are “surging.”[iii] According to the article, the PLA Navy now possesses integrated radar systems and communication strategies that “allow PLA Navy warships to form a ‘kill web’ to counter (U.S.) attacks.” The PLA is clearly seeking ways to gain the upper hand, and the capabilities outlined in the report should not be ignored.

Sources:

Sakshi Tiwari, “China ‘Threatens’ To Paralyze U.S. Aircraft Carriers By Attacking Its Radars & Sensors: Hit Them With ‘Carrier Killer’ Missiles,” The Eurasian Times (a privately owned, digital Indian-Canadian news site), 19 December 2024. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/china-threatens-to-paralyze-u-s-aircraft/#google_vignette

China has a powerful stockpile of anti-ship missiles, and its strategy to prevent U.S. forces from entering the Western Pacific is centered on these weapons.

China’s arsenal of anti-ship ballistic missiles, also known as “carrier killers,” has grown dramatically. China’s primary anti-ship missiles include the DF-21, DF-26, YJ-12, YJ-18, and YJ-83. Moreover, it also has YJ-21 and DF-27 hypersonic missiles that have the potential to penetrate air defenses and destroy U.S. Navy ships. Some of these weapons have been used in simulated strikes on U.S. carriers.

China’s EW “Kill List”

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) electronic warfare unit has created a list of targets for a coordinated attack on U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups.

This was disclosed in the latest issue of the Chinese magazine Defence Industry Conversion, which is supervised by the State Administration of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence. The magazine seeks to promote the involvement of civilian organizations and businesses in military technology and arms production.

Mo Jiaqian, an electronic countermeasures expert with the PLA’s 92728 Unit, states in the report that China’s electronic warfare weapons are likely to target specifically labeled U.S. military radars, sensors, and communication systems in a hypothetical battle—all to disrupt the U.S. carrier group’s defensive abilities and render it vulnerable to attack.

The report further states that the AN/SPY-1 phased array radar on Aegis ships is the main target of the PLA’s electronic warfare attacks.

“China’s Kill List Targets US Carrier Strike Groups,” Posted on Youtube, published by WION (Indian English language news channel), 16 December 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LSfoPYpeDv8

The Chinese Navy is casting an ominous shadow over US naval supremacy in the Pacific. As geopolitical tensions simmer, the People’s Liberation Army unveils a chilling blueprint that could fundamentally reshape modern naval warfare…

The PLA has identified and mapped precise vulnerabilities in US aircraft carrier strike groups, presenting a kill list that sends tremors through Pentagon war rooms. At the heart of this unprecedented revelation lies a meticulously researched strategy targeting the US Navy’s most sophisticated defense systems.

The PLA’s electronic warfare unit has not just created a list, it has crafted a technological road map designed to neutralize America’s maritime dominance…

Gabriel Honrada, “China’s Electronic Warfare Surge Shocks US in South China Sea,” Asia Times (A large, regional English-language pan-Asian digital news platform), 18 July 2024. https://asiatimes.com/2024/07/chinas-electronic-warfare-surge-shocks-us-in-south-china-sea/

China’s cutting-edge electronic warfare (EW) capabilities are transforming the balance of power in the South China Sea, as shown by a recent encounter between US and Chinese forces.

This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported on China’s enhanced EW capabilities by shedding light on a December 2023 incident between a US EA-18 Growler carrier-based EW aircraft and China’s Type 055 cruiser Nanchang in the contested South China Sea.

It (the article) claims that the EA-18G, manufactured by Boeing, has been upgraded since 2021 for future warfare but faces new challenges from the PLA–Navy’s (PLA-N) integrated radar systems and communication strategies.

SCMP notes that these advancements allow PLA-N warships to form a “kill web” to counter the EA-18G’s attacks. It also says that the Nanchang’s reported proactive tactics and successful engagement with US forces illustrate a shift in the PLA-N’s EW approach.

Notes:

[i] The article lists these anti-ship ballistic missiles, known as “carrier killers,” as the DF-21, DF-26, YJ-12, YJ-18, and YJ-83, as well as the YJ-21 and DF-27 hypersonic missiles. For more information on these missiles, see Dmitry Filipoff, “Fighting DMO, P.8: China’s Anti-Ship Firepower and Mass Firing Schemes,” Center for International Maritime Security (A non-partisan website that publishes reader submitted content on international maritime security), 1 May 2023. https://cimsec.org/fighting-dmo-pt-8-chinas-anti-ship-firepower-and-mass-firing-schemes/

[ii] Due to the secretive nature of the PLA, exact details, to include function and location, about Unit 92728 do not appear to be publicly available. However, it appears to be a main, high-tech unit that focuses on electronic warfare. Based on patent applications by Unit 92728, some of the military capabilities they are working on include frequency domain measurement;  electromagnetic radiation interference signal detection and identification; methods for training in multi-aircraft collaboration; detection of satellite navigation deception jamming system; methods of IMINT. They are also developing various storage types for the rapid deployment of clustered drones. Patents viewed on https://www.patentguru.com/.

[iii] It is worth noting that the Asia Times article derived its information from Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, which has been accused of sensationalism as well as being a tool for the Chinese government to spread its propaganda.

Image Information:

Image: The AN/Spy-1 carried on a U.S. guided-missile destroyer. A report published in Chinese magazine Defense Industry Conversion indicates that the AN/Spy-1 is the main target for the PLA’s EW attacks.
Source: RoyKabanlit, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Antenna_of_the_AN_SPY-1_Radar.JPG
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Maduro Shakes Up Top Security Posts in Venezuela Following Disputed Election

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Nicolas Maduro casts his vote in the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election.

“These adjustments occur amid repeated attempts by the opposition to force the Armed Forces to ‘respect’ the results of the elections of July 28, after which the Chavista leader was proclaimed reelected amid allegations of fraud.”

In the aftermath of a deeply contested election, the Maduro regime in Venezuela has undertaken a major reorganization of security positions to consolidate control around the dictator.  

The Maduro regime in Venezuela confronted its toughest challenge yet in July 2024 as it faced a united opposition and a singular candidate in Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia. By most accounts, Maduro did not count the actual votes—which he likely lost by a ratio of more than 2:1—and declared himself the winner through his control of the country’s National Electoral Council.[i] Following the disputed election, the Maduro regime has engaged in a massive campaign of repression, imprisoning thousands.[ii] As reported in the excerpted article from major Spanish daily El País, Maduro has also fired several high-level regime insiders, part of his effort to solidify control. The article reports that Maduro has selected a new head of civilian and military intelligence and that he also fired several high-level generals considered close to the ruling elite.

The excerpted article from Colombian digital outlet NTN24 reports that Alexis Rodriguez Cabello, nephew of regime insider and recently promoted Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, has assumed the role of intelligence chief. The NTN24 article also reports that among other firings and personnel shuffling, the regime reconfirmed Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez to his current position. Lopez has been a loyal regime insider for more than a decade.

The shuffle within the upper ranks of the security forces is an important development for Venezuela’s operational environment. Following the election, which the opposition challenged by uploading to an online platform the polling place tally sheets showing Maduro’s electoral drubbing, Maduro is closing ranks around his regime. In these efforts, we are likely to see further purges and infighting as Maduro seeks to prevent Venezuela’s opposition from exacerbating fractures within the regime. It is highly noteworthy that Maduro has confirmed faith in the current defense minister.

Sources:

“Maduro cambia a sus altos cargos de inteligencia acusados de violaciones a los derechos humanos (Maduro replaces top intelligence officials accused of human rights violations),” El País (the Spanish newspaper of record with excellent regional coverage), 15 October 2024. https://elpais.com/america/2024-10-15/maduro-cambia-a-sus-altos-cargos-de-inteligencia-acusados-de-violaciones-a-los-derechos-humanos.html 

‘I ordered changes to be made to the Higher General Staff of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces,’ Maduro said in a message on Telegram that he accompanied with a video during a visit to the Military Academy where he reported on the appointments. ‘These changes serve to strengthen cohesion, organization, discipline, and Venezuela’s ability to defend itself.’…These adjustments occur amid repeated attempts by the opposition to force the Armed Forces to ‘respect’ the results of the elections of July 28, after which the Chavista leader was proclaimed reelected amid allegations of fraud… Maduro’s government lacks legitimacy after the presidential elections in July and its stability is fundamentally supported by its ironclad control of the military forces.

“Maduro hizo cambios en la Fuerza Armada, ratificó a Padrino y designó a nuevos jefes de la DGCIM y el Sebin (Maduro made changes in the Armed Forces, ratified Padrino and appointed new heads of the DGCIM and the Sebin),” NTN24 (a Colombian digital news outlet with excellent regional coverage), 14 October 2024. https://www.ntn24.com/noticias-politica/maduro-hizo-cambios-en-la-fuerza-armada-ratifico-a-padrino-y-designo-a-nuevos-jefes-de-la-dgcim-y-el-sebin-518953   

On Monday, October 14, Nicolás Maduro ordered changes in the Higher General Staff of the National Armed Forces, however he kept his Minister of Defense, Vladimir Padrino López. General Domingo Antonio Hernández Larez will also remain in his current position as head of the Strategic Operational Command. The brother of the head of CEOFANB, Johan Alexander Hernández Larez, is appointed General Command of the Army…At the head of the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM) and the Presidential Honor Guard (GHP), Major General Javier Marcano Tábata has been appointed. Major General Alexis Rodríguez Cabello heads the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN).

Notes:

[i] For more information on the brazen election theft that occurred in Venezuela in July 2024, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “Can Maduro Pull Off the Mother of All Electoral Frauds?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1 August 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-maduro-pull-mother-all-electoral-frauds

[ii] For more information on the post-electoral crackdown, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “A Question of Staying Power: Is the Maduro Regime’s Repression Sustainable?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 21 August 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/question-staying-power-maduro-regimes-repression-sustainable

Image Information:

Image: Nicolas Maduro casts his vote in the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election.
Source: https://commons.m.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nicol%C3%A1s_Maduro_casting_his_vote_%282024%29.png?uselang=de%7Chttps://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nicol%C3%A1s_Maduro_casting_his_vote_%282024%29.png.   
Attribution: CC BY 3.0

Latin America’s Dictators Scramble To Join BRICS

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The principal members of the BRICS grouping pose for a photo at the 2018 BRICS Summit.

“Venezuela was left out of the final list of countries that aspired to be partners, at the request of Brazil…Venezuela has not commented on Brazil’s refusal to allow it to join the bloc.”

In recent years, the BRICS grouping—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—has emerged as a major challenger to the Western-supported international order.[i] Led by major emerging market economies on five continents, BRICS has increased its influence over matters of global financial governance, reform of multilateral institutions, and support of a Global South agenda. The group has also pushed to expand its ranks and influence, with five countries from the Middle East and the Horn of Africa joining in 2023. At least three Latin American countries, Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia, sought entrance to the organization at the 2024 BRICS Summit, held in Kazan, Russia.[ii]

As CNN en Español notes, the regional outlet of the U.S. media company, the Maduro regime in Venezuela has pushed the hardest to gain entry. The outlet reports that Maduro traveled to Kazan, Russia, to press his country’s case and meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. As the Colombian digital news outlet NTN24 relays, this was Maduro’s first international trip after elections widely considered to be fraudulent and stolen in Venezuela.[iii] Maduro’s intention, the outlet states, is to establish diplomatic partnerships to reduce his international isolation and secure economic lifelines to avoid increasing sanctions. Both outlets report that Brazil vetoed Venezuela’s membership over concerns related to its election conduct in July 2024. For their parts, Bolivia and Cuba, two other autocratic regimes in Latin America, secured “partner status” on their way to membership in the BRICS.

This development signals that dictatorships in Latin America see the BRICS grouping as an economic and political lifeline amid difficult economic and diplomatic moments. Relatedly, the inclusion of a greater number of Latin American countries in BRICS will bring China and Russia further into the Western Hemisphere, where both have been increasing their influence of late.

Sources:

“Maduro se reúne con Putin durante cumbre de los BRICS en Rusia (Maduro meets Putin during BRICS summit in Russia), CNN en Español (the regional outlet of the US network), 23 October 2024. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/10/23/reunion-maduro-putin-cumbre-brics-orix

Putin, who is chairing the meeting, said he supported Venezuela’s aspiration to join the group of emerging economies. The Russian president also highlighted that both nations have several projects to cooperate in economics, politics, science and culture, among other issues. The group, which began with Russia, Brazil, China, India and South Africa, recently included Iran, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Venezuela was left out of the final list of countries that aspired to be partners, at the request of Brazil…Venezuela has not commented on Brazil’s refusal to allow it to join the bloc.

“Maduro llega a Rusia para solicitar sumarse al BRICS en su primer viaje después de las elecciones (Maduro arrives in Russia to request to join BRICS on his first trip after the elections),” NTN24 (a Colombian digital news outlet with excellent regional coverage), 22 October 2024. https://www.ntn24.com/noticias-politica/maduro-llega-a-rusia-para-solicitar-sumarse-al-brics-en-su-primer-viaje-despues-de-las-elecciones-520339  

Maduro’s visit is for the BRICS meeting, in which around twenty countries, including Venezuela, are asking to join the bloc in order to boost their economies. Maduro is traveling on the same day that marks one year since the primary elections that sparked an unprecedented citizen movement to elect the opposition candidate to face Maduro in the presidential election…One of the countries that has demanded that Maduro show the minutes and respect the will of the people [after another fraudulent election] is the president of Brazil, Luis Inacio Lula Da Silva, who is part of the BRICS and said a day earlier that he would refuse to include Venezuela in the BRICS due to what happened in the elections.

Notes:

[i] For more information about the BRICS grouping and its recent efforts at expansion, see: Mariel Ferragamo, “What is the BRICS Group and Why is it Expanding?,” Council on Foreign Relations, 18 October 2024. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brics-group-and-why-it-expanding

[ii] For more analysis on Latin America’s dictatorships seeking entrance into the BRICS, see: Ryan C. Berg, Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Rubi Bledsoe, and Henry Ziemer, “Why Are Latin American Dictators Seeking Membership in BRICS+?,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 28 October 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-are-latin-american-dictators-seeking-membership-brics

[iii] For more information on Venezuela’s July 2024 elections, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “Can Maduro Pull Off the Mother of All Electoral Frauds?,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1 August 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-maduro-pull-mother-all-electoral-frauds

Image Information:

Image: The principal members of the BRICS grouping pose for a photo at the 2018 BRICS Summit.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Brics_Leaders_2016.jpg.  
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Kazakhstan Expands Opportunities for Volunteers To Join the Armed Forces

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A U.S.-produced HMMWV of Kazakhstan’s Ground Forces equipped with a Russian-produced Konkurs anti-tank ground missile on parade.

“Deputies of the Majilis (the lower house of parliament) of Kazakhstan have adopted a bill that allows citizens to volunteer for the army during periods of mobilization, martial law, and also in wartime.”

Kazakhstan’s armed forces began to draw operational and tactical lessons from the war in Ukraine not long after Russia invaded in February 2022.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Fergana Agency reports that Kazakhstan is again using the example of the war in Ukraine to introduce a new law that allows citizens to volunteer for the military in the event of a war. The new law envisions volunteers joining units serving on the front lines or units operating in rear areas.[ii] In addition to the proposed law on volunteers, the article goes on to note that Kazakhstan will potentially set up a reserve force in 2025. The law stipulates that potential reservists will come from a wide age range (18-50 years old for enlisted and NCOs, and up to 60 years old for officers) and that they can serve in their home region. The article points out—as the war in Ukraine has revealed—that solving mobilization issues and having a trained reserve is important in modern armed conflict. In response, the new plan has the potential to draw in significant numbers of volunteers.

Remember, Kazakhstan has been concerned about Russia annexing its northern regions since it became independent in 1991. Following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, a group of Russian officials amplified this concern by suggesting Kazakhstan’s northern regions belong to Russia.[iii] Despite these comments, Kazakhstan and Russia have maintained good overall relations. However, the war in Ukraine and the need to have a force available for a potential conflict are pushing Kazakhstan to adapt and expand opportunities for volunteers to join the armed forces.

Sources:

“В Казахстане появятся «добровольцы» для обороны в военное время (In Kazakhstan there will be “volunteers” for defense in the event of a war),” Fergana Agency (independent Russian-language news website focusing on Central Asia), 30 October 2024.

https://fergana.agency/news/135448

Deputies of the Majilis (the lower house of parliament) of Kazakhstan have adopted a bill that allows citizens to volunteer for the army during periods of mobilization, martial law, and also in wartime…

The document, in particular, introduces the concept of “volunteer” into legislation. “Self-defense formations, which will include volunteers, will be formed on the basis of local military command units and will be directly subordinate to them. In peacetime, a number of activities have already been planned during the preparation process, including the training of volunteers,” — Deputy Minister of Defense Sultan Kamaletdinov reported…

He added that if volunteers carry out combat missions, they will be led by military command units. If they are engaged in “provision” in the rear, they will be subordinate to local executive bodies…

It was previously reported that in 2025 in Kazakhstan a new type of military service could emerge – service in the reserve. Citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan from 18 to 50 years of age (this applies to soldiers and sergeants) and up to 60 years of age for the officer corps will be voluntarily accepted. Only those who have passed the medical examination and special check will be included in the reserve. It is assumed that these will be people who have already completed military service or short-term military training courses, and also studied at military departments at universities.

Reservists will be trained in military units, weapons and military equipment will be assigned to them. They will serve only in their region.

The Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan has begun to propose changes to the concept of service against the backdrop of events in Ukraine. Several years ago, the department noted that modern armed conflicts have revealed a number of problematic issues related to the mobilization of armed forces, the preparation and availability of military-trained reserves, as well as the timely arrival of military personnel from the reserve to replenish losses or rotate personnel.

Notes:

[i] Kazakhstan’s army trained on defending against unmanned aerial systems after observing how Ukraine and Russia utilized them in the first year of the war, while Kazakhstan’s armed forces incorporated several operational and tactical lessons from the war into its annual joint, large-scale exercise in 2023, see: Aygerim Ummat, “Токаеву показали, как проходят военные учения ‘Батыл тойтарыс – 2023’” (Tokayev was shown how the armed forces carried out the exercise “Batyl toytarys – 2023”),” Informburo (a semi-independent Russian-language news website in Kazakhstan), 5 September 2023. https://informburo.kz/novosti/tokaevu-pokazali-kak-proxodyat-voennye-uceniya-batyl-toitarys-2023

[ii] Even as this new legislation takes effect, Kazakhstan has been working to reduce the number of conscripts in the armed forces by enticing those conscripted, through offers of good wages and other benefits, to sign contracts after their one-year conscription period ends. This is part of a long-term effort that began in 2013 to have an all-volunteer force, though no timetable has been set for when this transition will be completed. It is estimated that Kazakhstan’s armed forces are now made up of 70 percent contract soldiers with the rest made up of conscripts.

[iii] A few months after the invasion of Ukraine, several members of Russia’s State Duma (lower house of parliament) questioned whether Kazakhstan’s northern territories belong to Russia, causing concerns in Kazakhstan that the comments could be a pretext to the territory being annexed or invaded, even though nothing further came of it, see: “Токаев выразил недоумение неуместными высказываниями российских деятелей в адрес Казахстана (Toqaev expressed surprise at the inappropriate statements of Russian officials directed at Kazakhstan),” Vlast (an independent Russian-language news website in Kazakhstan, 17 June 2022. https://vlast.kz/novosti/50438-tokaev-vyrazil-nedoumenie-neumestnymi-vyskazyvaniami-rossijskih-deatelej-v-adres-kazahstana.html

Image Information:

Image: A U.S.-produced HMMWV of Kazakhstan’s Ground Forces equipped with a Russian-produced Konkurs anti-tank ground missile on parade.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:HMMWV_Казахстанской_армии_с_установленным_ПТРК_Фагот.JPG
Attribution: CCO 1.0