Category Archives: FMSO Foreign Perspectives Briefs

Indonesia’s Counterterrorism Successes Highlights Lessons for U.S. Partners (Jacob Zenn) (April 2025)

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Key Takeaways:

  • Indonesia’s creation in 2003 of an elite counterterrorism unit, Detachment 88 (Densus 88), which received financial and training support from the United States and Australia, was a key factor in neutralizing Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and its offshoots.
  • The dual-track approach of combining Densus 88 counterterrorism operations with the National Counterterrorism Agency’s (BNPT) deradicalization program, which reformed several high-level terrorists, has proven remarkably successful.
  • Threats from terrorism, including the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda (AQ)–affiliated groups, have not been eliminated in Indonesia. However, terrorism is at its lowest levels since before Densus 88’s founding and JI modules are increasingly dismantling themselves and accepting the legitimacy of the state. U.S. partners could learn from aspects of Indonesia’s experience in countering their own terrorism threats.

Armenia Struggles To Break Out of Russia’s Orbit (Matthew Stein) (February 2025)

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Key Takeaways:

  • Armenia believes that Russia and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) have failed to fulfill their obligations to Armenia during clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020.
  • Armenia’s decision to leave the CSTO in 2024, limit security cooperation with Russia, and increase security cooperation with Western partners in the past couple of years point to an Armenian pivot away from Russia.
  • While Western partners could be eager to capitalize on Armenia’s pivot away from Russia, an examination of Armenia-Russia bilateral security cooperation and Armenia-Russia economic ties will explain just how difficult it will be for Armenia to disentangle itself from Russia, despite its strong desire to do so.

Russia’s Influence Waning in Former Soviet Republics, While Growing in the Global South (Lionel M. Beehner) (January 2025)

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Key Takeaways:

  • Since launching its February 2022 “special military operation” in Ukraine, Russia has carried out a concerted effort to sway public opinion in its favor through information operations (IO) both in the post-Soviet space and globally, yet it has found unique success in countries in the Global South.
  • While Russia has found a convincing narrative in the Global South, where its discourse taps into issues related to social identity, culture, and anti-colonial sentiment, in Central Asia and the Caucasus, where its discourse focuses primarily on unity, solidarity, and security, younger populations in particular have rejected its IO efforts, due to lingering resentment over Soviet colonialism.
  • This brief suggests that the U.S. and its Allies have new opportunities to engage these post-Soviet populations, while recognizing the new challenges that they face due to Russia’s successful IO campaigns in the Global South.

Wrestling with Complexity: How the PLA Assesses Combat Capability (Kevin McCauley) (December 2024)

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Key Takeaways:

  • New quality combat capabilities [新质战斗力], which Xi Jinping prioritized for development in 2022, feature in many recent People’s Liberation Army (PLA) articles. Changes in warfare, technologies, and production are creating new combat capabilities. This creates the need to develop new combat capability assessment methods based on informationized and intelligent technologies, analysis of new-type operational forces, the expansion of operational domains, and the interaction of civilian production and military technological requirements. While the PLA is searching for improved methods to analyze the complexity of future operations, it appears to fail to factor in important data that could improve the accuracy of current capability assessments.
  • The PLA appears to use many different assessment methods with no standard method and no uniformity of factors used to assess capabilities. Combat capability assessments are important to the PLA for supporting planning, command decisions, conducting operations, modernization, force development, and training, and the evaluation factors and missions included in capability assessments provide insight into planning, operations, and the factors the PLA considers important for successful future operations. Yet some assessments exclude important areas such as training, operational methods, officers’ professional military education level, and environmental factors. The PLA’s lack of a uniform method for assessing combat capability could lead to uneven and inaccurate assessments supporting decision-making for operations. The variation in assessment factors employed in assessments would also appear to lead to variations in accuracy between the evaluations.
  • Future warfare and technological developments are creating a more complex and dynamic battlefield. This is driving PLA researchers to examine more accurate and complex methods for evaluating combat capability. The PLA increasingly seeks data-driven and qualitative features that require accurate assessment methods compared to more traditional subjective and quantitative methods.

Gaza War’s Impact On The Middle East Strategic Landscape (Lucas Winter)(June 2024)

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Key Takeaways:

  • Three de facto strategic coalitions dominate the contemporary Middle East geopolitical landscape: the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance,” the Turkish-led “Political Islam Coalition,” and the U.S.-led “Arab Normalization” Coalition, anchored by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Hamas fits uneasily between the Axis of Resistance and Political Islam Coalitions, receiving tepid support from both but fully trusted by neither. The Arab Normalization Coalition does not support Hamas.
  • Members of the three de facto strategic coalitions responded differently to Hamas’ 7 October attacks and their aftermath: “Axis of Resistance” members contributed calculated, largely symbolic military support; the Political Islam Coalition supported Hamas in media and diplomacy; and the Arab Normalization Coalition sought to maintain a neutral distance from the war in Gaza.
  • Prior to 7 October, the Middle East was in the midst of a new era of regional détente, in which members of the different de facto strategic coalitions were re-engaging and de escalating their conflicts. The War in Gaza shifted the regional strategic calculus in ways that are not yet clear. Three scenarios are presented for how these changes may occur, and how China and Russia may seek to benefit from them. The first scenario involves increased Turkish-Iranian policy convergence, the second a deepening of Turkish-Egyptian relations, and the third a “grand bargain” that includes Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey. Russia is more likely to benefit from the first two scenarios, while China is likely to benefit most from the third.

Beyond Borno: Islamic State’s Expansion into Southern Nigeria (Jacob Zenn) (February 2024)

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Key Takeaways:

  • Although the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) has historically been deeply rooted in northeastern Nigeria, recent patterns demonstrate that it is expanding operations to the more economically prosperous and majority Christian south.
  • The most plausible explanations for ISWAP’s move south are to “outbid” the rival Sunni Muslim Group for Preaching and Jihad (JASDJ); to follow Islamic State (IS) “core” directives to attract attention by attacking Christians and other high-profile targets; and to divert the Nigerian army’s attention from the north and relieve counterterrorism pressure near ISWAP’s main bases.
  • Beyond these heightened risks, ISWAP’s southern expansion threatens U.S. interests in Nigeria, Nigeria’s national security, and West African security more broadly

Chinese-Tajikistani Security Cooperation Gaining Momentum (Matthew Stein and Peter Wood) (January 2024)

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Chinese-Tajikistani Security Cooperation Gaining Momentum (Matthew Stein and Peter Wood) (January 2024)

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Key Takeaways:

  • China and Tajikistan share a 477km border and have an estimated $1.78 billion in bilateral trade, which is significantly imbalanced in favor of China.
  • Recent years have seen a significant improvement in relations between China and Tajikistan, with China constructing a military base in 2016 near Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan and a November 2022 bilateral agreement to increase security cooperation.
  • China’s security cooperation with Tajikistan does not appear to conflict or cause friction with Tajikistan’s main security cooperation partner, Russia, but nevertheless advances Chinese interests in the region at a time when Russian support is limited due to its invasion of Ukraine.

The People’s Liberation Army’s Evolving Close Air Support Capability (Kevin McCauley) (January 2024)

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This monograph examines PLA close air firepower support based on authoritative PLA sources including internal publications, as well as PRC aviation industry research. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF), Army Aviation, and unmanned aerial vehicle close air firepower support, command and control, and the firepower support process are examined.

2023-06-08 An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 2 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles)

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An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 2 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles). Click image to download.

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This study describes how Russian military theorists think about the initial period of war (IPW) concept and its relation to strategic operations, and posits that due to the nature of the special military operation, the IPW concept was likely in no way a part of the operational planning process. While there were likely political motivations for the use of the term “special military operation” instead of “war,” the term “war” was not used for the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, because it was not envisioned to meet the criteria for “war” as understood by Russian military theorists

An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 1 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles)

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An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 1 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles). Click image to download.

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This study describes the historical evolution of the Russian concept of the initial period of war (IPW). The concept has evolved substantially since its inception, which can be traced back to at least the early 1900s, but it generally pertains to the decisive strategic operations that occur during the first few days of war, that set conditions for strategic success, and the activities that occur before the war (period of imminent threat or preparation period in Russian military parlance) that make these strategic operations possible;