Daily Archives: December 6, 2024

The Evolution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Ukraine

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A Russian First-Person-View UAV with small payload attached.

“One of the main military-technical components of combat actions in the special military operation in Ukraine is the mass use of unmanned — aircraft and robotic systems.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the monthly journal of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Voyennaya Mysl, discusses the evolution of UAV use since the inception of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine.[i] The article notes that, early in the conflict, UAV use was primarily characterized by reconnaissance and strike missions, carried out by larger UAVs, such as the large Turkish Bayraktar TB2. As the conflict progressed, these types of UAVs were supplanted by small and relatively cheap UAVs, such as the Chinese-manufactured DJI family of commercial drones, also used for reconnaissance or modified to carry explosive devices. Those drones were then complemented by a new class of first-person view (FPV) kamikaze/suicide UAVs that have recently dominated UAV use on the battlefield. Bayraktar TB2 Turkish Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).

Undoubtedly, UAV use is one of the most salient aspects of the current conflict in Ukraine, and it is clear small and relatively cheap UAVs will play a part in future armed conflict. The wide-scale use of UAVs solves a wide range of problems in modern war, such as: providing situational awareness; acquiring and lasing targets; signal retransmission; electronic reconnaissance and warfare; isolating a given area; interfering with supplies, rotations, and evacuations; destroying stationary and moving targets; supporting assault operations; mining, demining of terrain and water obstacles; and resupply. Although large weapon systems have certainly proved their value in Ukraine, these UAVs show that there is also an important role for relatively cheap electronics in the hands of innovative personnel.

Sources:

N.A. Sokolov, “Анализ тенденций применения беспилотных платформ в специальной военной операции (Analysis of trends in the use of unmanned platforms in the special military operation),” Voyennaya Mysl, (Monthly journal of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces),August 2024.  https://vm.ric.mil.ru/upload/site178/PWOpmGbLL3.pdf

The experience of military conflicts and crisis situations of recent decades, the analysis of the actions of terrorist organizations, testify to the increasing role of promising means of conducting armed conflict. One of the main military-technical components of combat actions in the special military operation in Ukraine is the mass use of unmanned ­aircraft and robotic systems.

A special feature of the use of ­unmanned platforms at the initial stage of the special military operation was the widespread use of reconnaissance and strike systems created on the basis of operational-tactical unmanned aircraft of the medium-altitude class.  As in the conflicts in Libya, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh.  The strike loitering munitions class of UAVs were also used ­as part of mixed groups for reconnaissance ­and strike UAVs (Orion, Bayraktar TB2).

Currently, the main ­emphasis in methods and technical means of development and application has shifted towards the mini class and micro class of UAVs, which is due to the massive use of affordable consumer components, and so are being seen in all environments — air, land, and sea.

Small attack UAVs were used to some extent in Libya, Syria, etc. (mainly of Israeli, Turkish, Chinese manufacture), but in the conditions ­of the special military operation, they became the very means that changed the situation on the battlefield.  The increase in the share of aerial UAVs began with the use of civilian products from the well-known Chinese ­company DJI. At the initial ­stage, these UAVs had a number of advantages (flight time, altitude, modular high-resolution optical-electronic modules), but they also had disadvantages associated with their built-in software, which significantly limited their use. The relatively high cost of DJI UAV kits also ­dictated the requirements for their reusability, limiting the range of tasks to observation and one-time drops of combat loads.

The situation with DJI changed with ­the appearance of alternative factory firmware, which removed the altitude restrictions, no-fly zones, and added additional functionality for flight in difficult weather conditions and at night.  The modified firmware currently supports the entire Mavic 3 series of DJI UAVs, including the Classic Рrо, Епterprise, and Matrice 30. After reprogramming, the DJI UAVs are usually used as relatively reusable reconnaissance and surveillance assets (day and night); as part of reconnaissance and strike loops, including systems that have wired power sources that can provide constant situational awareness; electronic warfare systems; and repeaters for other UAVs…

However, the most widespread class of airborne UAVs during the special military operation are the kamikaze UAVs, also known as FPV UAV (from English – “first person view”), or simply FPV. From the point of view of an external observer, these devices are controlled by their operator as an “avatar”, from the point of view of the operator himself — immersively, with the operator immersed in reality, as broadcast “from the point of view” of the UAV. FPV UAVs are used, as a rule, together with homemade munitions or standard munitions, which are modified for use with UAVs.  The use of FPV UAVs is characterized by flight ranges up to 20 km (with a repeater), and with an average aloft time of up to 10 minutes. 

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Russian First-Person-View UAV with small payload attached.
Source: https://tinyurl.com/44sn36pk

Russian Duma to Strengthen Pro-Kremlin Youth Movements

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First meeting of the patriotic youth movement called Yunarmiya 2 June 2016.

“One of the areas of youth policy will be devoted to developing the readiness of young people to fulfill their constitutional duty to protect the Fatherland.”

The Russian State Duma announced on Telegram it will be transforming its Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, or Rosmolodyozh, into a larger body to strengthen and consolidate the country’s youth ideological education initiatives, from kindergarten to higher education. According to the excerpted 12 September post, the Duma introduced a draft law titled “On Systematizing the Sphere of Youth Policy” to instill “a willingness in young people to fulfill their constitutional duty to defend the Fatherland.” The restructuring may signal a need to whip up patriotism and pro-Kremlin ideology in younger generations, as the Kremlin looks to rally more support for its “special military operation” in Ukraine, especially after the Ukrainian Army’s incursion into Kursk and the potential use of longer-range missiles into Russian territory.

Modern Russian state support of youth movements has historical roots and contemporary benefits. The youth movements are a modern analog to the Soviet-era “pioneer camps” that indoctrinated young Russians with Leninist dogma. In recent years, a number of patriotic youth movements backed by the Ministry of Defense emerged to educate youth about Russian and Soviet history.[i] In Fall 2023, the Kremlin held a nationwide school lesson to teach children that Russian elections were free and fair.[ii]  Prior to that, in 2022, the Russian government launched an outfit called The Movement of the First, a pro-Kremlin youth movement aimed at “preparing children and youth for a full-fledged life in society, including shaping their world views on the basis of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” and instilling “love and respect for the Homeland.”[iii] The former head of this movement, Grigory Gurov, will lead the newly restructured Rosmolodyozh.[iv] The latest restructuring may indicate an unease among Russian leaders about the “forever war” in Ukraine and the need to recruit more young conscripts. The move could also signal flagging domestic support for the war. Surveys suggest that two out of three Russians support it,[v] yet these polls may not reflect the true sentiment of most Russians, including Russian youth.

Sources:

Artem Metelev (a member and spokesperson of the State Duma), post on Telegram (a social messaging app) from 2 September 2024. https://t.me/artemmetelev/7162

The special military operation and modern challenges make logical adjustments to the state youth policy. Patriotic education of youth has always been a priority. We propose to reflect new tasks and work tools in federal legislation.

After the adoption of our law this fall:

• Patriotic clubs, historical and local history and search organizations, specialized military-patriotic centers will receive priority support from the state;

• One of the areas of youth policy will be devoted to developing the readiness of young people to fulfill their constitutional duty to protect the Fatherland;

• The effectiveness of patriotic work will be analyzed as part of annual monitoring;

• A set of measures to educate youth in citizenship, patriotism, respect for history and readiness to serve their country will be approved at the federal and regional levels.

Notes:

[i] Evan Gershkovich, Russia’s Fast-Growing ‘Youth Army’ Aims to Breed Loyalty to Fatherland,” The Moscow Times, 17 April 2019. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/17/russias-fast-growing-youth-army-aimst-to-breed-loyalty-to-the-fatherland-a65256

[ii] Pyotr Kozlov, “As Putin’s Re-election Looms, Kremlin Pushes to Indoctrinate a New Generation of Voters,” The Moscow Times, 29 September 2023. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/09/29/as-putins-re-election-looms-kremlin-pushes-to-indoctrinate-a-new-generation-of-voters-a82580

[iii] Website of Movement of the First. http://wefirst.ru

[iv] Maxim Ivanov, Elena Mukhametshina, “Новым начальником Росмолодежи может стать глава «Движения первых» Григорий Гуров” (“The head of the ‘Movement of the First’ Grigory Gurov may become the new head of Rosmolodezh”), Vedemosti (Moscow-based business newspaper) 12 September 2024. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2024/09/12/1061695-novim-glavoi-rosmolodezhi-mozhet-stat-glava-dvizheniya-pervih

[v] Vladimir Milov, “How Strong is Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine?”Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert blog, 9 January 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-strong-is-russian-public-support-for-the-invasion-of-ukraine-2/

Image Information:

Image: First meeting of the patriotic youth movement called Yunarmiya 2 June 2016.
Source: Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, https://tinyurl.com/2×725577

Russia Conducts Its Largest Naval Exercise in More Than 30 Years

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Russian Buyan-M corvette Uglich of the Caspian Flotilla firing countermeasures during maneuvers part of Ocean-2024. Note the letter “Z” in reference to forces involved in the invasion of Ukraine. The Caspian is essentially a Russian lake, the only other significant naval power in the Caspian is Iran and most of Iran’s naval forces are deployed and focused on the contentious Middle East.

“The maneuvers… involve more than 400 warships, submarines and auxiliary fleet support vessels, more than 120 aircraft and helicopters of the naval aviation of the Navy and the Aerospace Forces, about 7,000 units of weapons, military and special equipment, as well as more than 90 thousand personnel.”

Russia conducted its largest naval exercise in more than 30 years, likely to dispel the notion of its failures against Ukraine in the Black Sea.[i] According to the excerpted article by Russian flagship news outlet Ria Novosti, the exercise, known as Ocean-2024 strategic command and staff exercise, took place across the globe, with maneuvers in the Pacific and Arctic Oceans, the Mediterranean, Caspian, and Baltic Seas.[ii]

The Novosti article claims Ocean-2024 maneuvers involved more than 400 vessels and more than 90,000 personnel. Four Chinese naval vessels also participated in Ocean-2024, part of the Pacific Fleet maneuvers. Scenarios included fighter interception of hostile aircraft intent on bombing the surface fleet. In the case highlighted, the attack aircraft was an IL-38 anti-submarine maritime patrol aircraft—no match for the MiG-31BMs sent to intercept. The tactics practiced were tried-and-true naval drills, reflecting long-standing naval threats that still exist but do not consider the ongoing evolution in naval warfare, including drone and counter-drone scenarios, the types of naval warfare that have proved devastating to Russia’s Navy in the Black Sea. While prudent to train in general naval combat operations, Moscow’s failure to reset the exercise to reflect the current and future threat environment begs the question if Ocean-2024 was more a public relations operation, especially in the wake of the U.S.-led RIMPAC naval exercise earlier in the year.  Russia’s Ocean-2024 is likely serves as a morale booster for its Navy at a time when it has not been able to restore any operational capability in the Black Sea.

Sources:

“МиГ-31БМ перехватили условного противника на учениях “Океан-2024” (MiG-31BM intercepted a mock enemy during the Ocean-2024 exercises),” Ria Novosti (mainstream Russian media outlet), 15 September 2024. https://ria.ru/20240915/istrebiteli-1972773873.html

MOSCOW, 15 Sep – RIA Novosti. A pair of MiG-31BM interceptors intercepted a mock enemy over the neutral waters of the Sea of Japan as part of the Ocean-2024 exercises, the Russian Defense Ministry reported.

“A pair of high-altitude MiG-31BM interceptor fighters, while performing a flight mission to provide fighter-air cover for the Pacific Fleet’s naval strike group over the neutral waters of the Sea of Japan, intercepted a mock enemy as part of the Okean-2024 strategic command and staff exercise,” the statement said.

It is noted that as part of the exercise, the role of an airspace violator was played by an Il-38 aircraft, which attempted to approach a detachment of naval ships to launch a bomb strike on it. And the crews of the MiG-31BM interceptor fighters, having received coordinates from the radio engineering units, took off from one of the airfields, reached the designated area and independently classified the target, after which they launched long-range tactical air-to-air missiles at it.

“After completing the task, the crews of the fighters practiced elements of air combat with mock enemy fighters performing cover missions “enemy” bombers,” the ministry added.

Russian Navy formations and units began the Okean-2024 strategic command and staff exercises on Tuesday, which will last until September 16. The exercises are being held in a bilateral format under the general leadership of the Navy Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Alexander Moiseyev.

The maneuvers, which will take place in the waters of the Pacific and Arctic Oceans, the Mediterranean, Caspian and Baltic Seas, involve more than 400 warships, submarines and auxiliary fleet support vessels, more than 120 aircraft and helicopters of the naval aviation of the Navy and the Aerospace Forces, about 7,000 units of weapons, military and special equipment, as well as more than 90 thousand personnel.

“Ocean” is the code name for naval exercises conducted by the General Command of the USSR Navy in 1970, 1975, 1977, 1983 and 1985. The “Ocean” exercises (maneuvers) were the largest operational and combat training events of the USSR Navy in the post-war period and the largest in world history for their time.

Notes:

[i] For a western perspective on Ocean-2024, see: “Ocean-2024 – Russian Navy Flexes Its Muscles, China Assists,” Naval News (Europe based naval focused news service), 13 September 2024. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/ocean-2024-russian-navy-flexes-its-muscles-china-assists/

[ii] Notably, no maneuvers took place in the Black Sea, once a naval strongpoint for Russia built upon its Black Sea Fleet, but now under constant threat from Ukrainian naval drones. Ukrainian surface drones have wreaked enough havoc and forced Moscow to redeploy and scatter its Black Sea Fleet to various ports on the eastern Black Sea.

Image Information:

Image: Russian Buyan-M corvette Uglich of the Caspian Flotilla firing countermeasures during maneuvers part of Ocean-2024. Note the letter “Z” in reference to forces involved in the invasion of Ukraine. The Caspian is essentially a Russian lake, the only other significant naval power in the Caspian is Iran and most of Iran’s naval forces are deployed and focused on the contentious Middle East.
Source: Russian Ministry of Defence, published by Naval News, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/ocean-2024-russian-navy-flexes-its-muscles-china-assists/

Chinese Icebreaker Makes Port Call in Murmansk

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Chinese icebreaker Xue Long 2 docked at Victoria Harbour, Hong Kong, 2024.

“The research icebreaker that is owned and managed by the Chinese Polar Institute is on its annual Arctic expedition…. But the state-owned vessel is also on a political mission.  The visit to Murmansk is the first ever of its kind and comes as relations between Murmansk and Beijing get increasingly intimate.”

China keeps pushing itself into the Arctic, and Russia is partnering in the effort. The excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer notes that the Chinese icebreaker Xue Long 2 recently visited the Russian Arctic port of Murmansk for the first time. The article notes that the Xue Long 2 is on a scientific mission but also suggests that there is a political mission and that the port call reflects the deepening of relations between Moscow and Beijing. China is eager to expand its presence in the Arctic and have access to its resources.[i] The docking of the Xue Long 2 will likely not be the last Chinese vessel in Russia’s Arctic waters: “Beijing is increasingly interested in the Arctic and is building new vessels designed for shipping through the remote and icy waters.”[ii]Under diplomatic, military, and economic pressure, Russia has thus far been pleased to oblige, granting China more access than before to Russian Arctic waters and ports.

Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Chinese icebreaker makes port call in Murmansk,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 29 August 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2024/08/chinese-icebreaker-makes-port-call-murmansk

The Russian Arctic region actively seeks to strengthen ties with Beijing. This week, a Chinese icebreaker for the first time paid a visit to Murmansk.  The Xue Long 2 set out from the Chinese port city of Qingdao on the 7th of July and subsequently set course for the Bering Strait.  Following its passage into the Chukchi Sea, the 122-meter-long ship is believed to have sailed towards the North Pole.  One and a half months later it sailed into the Kola Bay and moored in a downtown port.  Locals in the Russian Arctic city could see the vessel being assisted by tugs into the harbor area on the 28th of August.

The research icebreaker that is owned and managed by the Chinese Polar Institute is on its annual Arctic expedition. About 100 expedition members take part in research geology and geophysics of the Arctic seabed and conduct investigations of atmospheric, sea ice and marine environments.

But the state-owned vessel is also on a political mission.  The visit to Murmansk is the first ever of its kind and comes as relations between Murmansk and Beijing get increasingly intimate.  In May 2023, Murmansk Governor Andrei Chibis paid a visit to Shanghai as part of a major Russian delegation to the China-Russia Business Forum.  During the event, a special emphasis was made on the development of the Northern Sea Route and new joint industries, among them in production and processing of minerals.

In September 2023, Chibis welcomed a Chinese business delegation to Murmansk. “We are entering a new level of partnership with China,” the regional leader said during the visit.  The Chinese businessmen representing port and shipping companies stated that they were interested in the development of the Northern Sea Route.  In August 2024, the Chinese MCC International Incorporation Ltd will join the development of the Kolmozerskoye lithium resources in the Kola Peninsula.

Beijing is increasingly interested in the Arctic and is building new vessels designed for shipping through the remote and icy waters. In early July this year, Chinese authorities officially commissioned its new icebreaking research vessel, the Jidi (“Polar”). At the same time, China is expanding its research activities in the far northern region, including in the Norwegian Arctic Archipelago of Svalbard.

Notes:

[i] See: Les Grau, China and Russia in Joint Venture To Mine Lithium in Arctic, OE Watch, 08-2024. (URL not yet available)

[ii] See: Les Grau, “Chinese Icebreaker Sails To The Arctic,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-icebreaker-sails-to-the-arctic/

Image Information:

Image: Chinese icebreaker Xue Long 2 docked at Victoria Harbour, Hong Kong, 2024.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Xue_Long_2 – /media/File:202404_Xuelong-2_in_Hong_Kong.jpg

Possible New Chinese Frigate Offers Clues on Future Weapons Testing

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A People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 8 round HQ-10 short range surface to air missile system shown on a Type 056 corvette used by both PLAN and Chinese Coast Guard. Other sources note this image as the 8 round FL-3000N short range surface to air missile. However, the FL-3000N is basically the export version of the PLAN HQ-10, with relatively the same capabilities.

“The fact is that this frigate is more like a technology verification platform. Through it, the PLA can test new technologies and designs on a smaller scale and accumulate experience for future large stealth ships.”

An image of a new stealth corvette or possibly light frigate[i] moored to a pier appearing on Chinese social media and blogs has drawn significant attention and speculation. According to the excerpted article published in the popular pro-government Chinese website Sohu, some observers speculate that the new warship will be classified as a Type-057 frigate and replace the Type-056. Despite being smaller than the Type-056, the Type-057 frigate incorporates a unique stealth design, featuring an integrated mast design that can significantly reduce enemy radar detection. The hull’s surface is smooth and inclined, with no edges or corners, which gives it a smaller optical and infrared signature, making it difficult to detect.[ii]

Notably, the ship fields what looks to be the Hongqi-10 short-range air defense missile launcher. However, according to the second excerpted article published on the tightly regulated website hosted by China’s largest multinational technology conglomerate, Tencent, some sources believe the apparatus could be a ship-borne laser weapon system used to counter threats from drones, missiles, and small speedboats. Laser weapons can attack targets at the speed of light, as the first article points out, which significantly improves the response time. Additionally, a high-energy weapon system operates without emitting detectable electromagnetic signals during operation, which further reduces the likelihood of being detected by the adversary, increasing its survivability.[iii]

However, the Type-057 likely lacks combat effectiveness because of its smaller design, which allows limited space for weapons. Hence, as the excerpted article from Sohu speculates, the ship’s existence could serve as a platform to test some of China’s newer technologies on a smaller scale and to gain experience for future large stealth ships, but at a lower cost. There is no evidence that the PLAN will ultimately populate its fleet with this new stealth frigate. However, at the very least, its presence, according to the Tencent article, has “already given people a glimpse of future warfare.”

Sources:  

“我国再添重器，解放军057隐形护卫舰再次亮相！台媒眼馋：科幻产物 (my country adds another heavy weapon, the PLA 057 stealth frigate makes its debut again! Taiwanese media are jealous: a science fiction product),” sohu.com (popular pro-government Chinese-language website targeting a youth and gaming readership), 1 September 2024. https://roll.sohu.com/a/805465679_121966179

It is speculated that this new warship will be named 057 frigate and will shoulder the heavy responsibility of replacing 056 frigate…

The biggest feature of this frigate is It is its unique stealth design – the surface of the hull is inclined and smooth, with almost no edges or corners. This design can not only effectively reduce the exposure of optical and infrared signals, but also significantly reduce the chance of being detected by radar and sonar. When facing enemy reconnaissance, it can almost “come without a trace and go without a trace”.

From a distance, it seems to be equipped with Hongqi 10 short-range air defense missiles. But upon closer inspection, this is most likely an advanced ship-borne laser weapon. This configuration will greatly enhance its survivability and combat capabilities in complex battlefield environments.

The introduction of laser cannons is actually a revolutionary advancement. This weapon is launched at the speed of light and hits the target instantly, which is a perfect solution for the modern battlefield that requires rapid response…

So, what is the significance of the existence of the Type 057? The fact is that this frigate is more like a technology verification platform. Through it, the PLA can test new technologies and designs on a smaller scale and accumulate experience for future large stealth ships. This approach not only reduces the risk of testing new technologies on full-scale warships, but also saves costs.

Source: Meng Yan, “解放军新型护卫舰亮相，一大装置让台媒直呼科幻 (The PLA Unveiled Its New Frigate, Large Device Prompts Taiwanese Media to Call It Science Fiction),” Tencent (China’s largest multinational technology conglomerate, operating within a tightly regulated media and tech environment), 08 September 2024. https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20240906A07E7Z00

At the same time, the frigate adopts an integrated mast design. This integrated structure can significantly reduce radar reflection signals and improve stealth performance.

The most important thing is that an “unprecedented” device appeared on this stealth frigate, which looks similar to the HQ-10 ship-to-air missile launcher. U.S. media speculated that this might be a ship-borne laser cannon weapon system. Generally speaking, light stealth frigates undertake regional defense and maritime patrol missions and may face threats from drones, missiles and small speedboats. If equipped with laser cannons, they can attack targets at the speed of light, further improving the response speed.

Some analysts said that the emergence of this new stealth frigate not only means technological progress, but also a concrete manifestation of the strategic transformation of the Chinese Navy. Now that the Chinese Navy is shifting from coastal defense to blue water escort, this type of ship with advanced stealth technology and equipped with more lethal weapons will become an important pillar of the PLA’s future operations.

But it is different as a test ship. By testing and verifying key technologies such as the ship design and stealth design of the new generation of ships on board, it can lay the foundation for the birth of more advanced ships in the future.

Notes:

[i] There have been differing opinions on what type of ship this is. Some observers are referring to it as a corvette class and others as a frigate. The difference between the two classifications is that

[ii] For more information and an image of the ship, please see “China’s New Stealth Warship Unveiled: Possible Laser Weapon Testing Sparks Speculation,” Army Recognition Group website, 6 September 2024. https://armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2024/chinas-new-stealth-warship-unveiled-possible-laser-weapon-testing-sparks-speculation

[iii] An earlier report published on bulgarianmilitary.com, talks about China putting high-energy weapons on it Type 057 warship. See Boyko Nikolov, “China is Putting High-Energy Weapons on Its Type 057 Warship,” bulgarianmilitary.com, 8 February 2024. https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2024/02/08/china-is-putting-high-energy-weapons-on-its-type-057-warship/

Image Information:

Image: A People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 8 round HQ-10 short range surface to air missile system shown on a Type 056 corvette used by both PLAN and Chinese Coast Guard. Other sources note this image as the 8 round FL-3000N short range surface to air missile. However, the FL-3000N is basically the export version of the PLAN HQ-10, with relatively the same capabilities.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HQ-10 – /media/File:Type_056_corvette_FL-3000N_8-round_SAM_launcher.jpg

China Conducts First Live-Fire Exercise Integrating Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Assault Ships

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“The biggest threat to China from the US Navy is nuclear submarines. Therefore, the inclusion of the Type 075 amphibious assault ship into the Shandong carrier group is a rehearsal for such a scenario.”

On 9 September, Chinese TV reported that the PLA Navy’s Shandong carrier group recently conducted combat exercises in the South China Sea and the West Pacific. The report highlighted vessels frequently seen escorting the carrier, such as the Type-055 destroyer, the Type-052D destroyer, and the Type-901 combat support ship, but more notably, it featured the first-time inclusion of the Hainan Type-075 amphibious assault ship.[i]

The first excerpted article, published on ifeng, an internet distribution channel for majority state-owned news network Phoenix TV, highlights three distinctive combat capabilities the Type-075 amphibious assault ship adds to this carrier group. First, the Type 075 can be equipped with powerful carrier-based aviation assets for combat deployment across air, sea, and land. These aviation assets can also provide electronic warfare capabilities and other important support functions, expanding the carrier group’s power projection abilities, amphibious operations, and threat response.[ii] Second, the amphibious assault ship’s aviation assets can take on some responsibilities of Shandong’s air wing, allowing the air wing to focus on other crucial sea and air operations. In a contingency, the amphibious assault ship can replace Shandong as a command vessel, ensuring continuity of operations. Lastly, the amphibious assault ship can deploy multi-role helicopters such as the Z-8 and Z-9, which significantly enhance the carrier group’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities.  The article emphasizes that the greatest threat to the PLA Navy beyond the second island chain is not U.S. aircraft carriers but U.S. nuclear submarines.[iii] These helicopters improve the carrier group’s ability to search, track, and neutralize enemy submarine activities, thereby securing unrestricted maneuvering. The second excerpted article by Professor Jiang Fuwei of Dalian Maritime University, published on one of China’s largest internet platforms, NetEase, highlights the addition of the Type-075 to the Shandong carrier group as a significant milestone for the PLA Navy and positions China to better address two key hotspots: the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. In the event of conflict with the U.S. and Philippines in the South China Sea, the PLA would be able to execute more diversified military operations on Philippine territory, such as air assaults and amphibious lift. Similarly, in a potential conflict over Taiwan, the Shandong carrier group is now better equipped for amphibious beach landings, raids, and securing key areas of operation, particularly along Taiwan’s east coast, which could complicate and delay U.S. military intervention. The Type-075 Amphibious Assault Ship is a critical addition for the PLA Navy’s carrier group, improving its ability to conduct anti-submarine and amphibious operations while expanding its capacity to execute long range expeditionary missions far from China’s shores.[iv]

Sources:

Zheng Jiyong, “南海演习编入075，能在最坏情况替山东舰挂帅，中方已准备好摊牌 (The Type 075 Is Incorporated into the South China Sea Exercise, it can Replace the Shandong Aircraft Carrier in the Worst Case Scenario, China is Ready to Show Its Cards),” iFeng (an internet distribution channel for Phoenix TV, a majority state-owned news network), 12 September 2024. https://news.ifeng.com/c/8coKnWTiFwi

The Chinese military recently released a report showing the Shandong aircraft carrier group conducting live-fire exercises in the South China Sea. Notably, the Type 075 amphibious assault ship, Hainan, was integrated into this group for the first time. The Type 075 has a displacement of 40,000 tons and is the largest surface combat ship in the Chinese Navy, following its aircraft carriers. It features a full-length flight deck and hangar and can carry at least 30 helicopters for various combat roles. The addition of this ship to the carrier group is akin to adding another quasi-aircraft carrier, which is significant for China’s strategic positioning in the South China Sea.

Within the second island chain, the PLA’s current capabilities are sufficient to handle any adversary. However, beyond the second island chain, the greatest threat to the PLA Navy is not US aircraft carriers, but US nuclear submarines. These submarines are difficult to detect, and their advanced performance presents a significant challenge to the PLA in the South China Sea.

This is why the Type 075 amphibious assault ship has been integrated into the Shandong aircraft carrier group. The Type 075 is equipped with powerful aviation assets, including anti-submarine helicopters designed to locate US nuclear submarines. Additionally, its air assets can take over some of the Shandong air wing’s responsibilities, allowing the carrier to focus more on sea and air operations. Lastly, in a contingency scenario, the Type 075 can serve as a replacement for the Shandong as the command vessel.

The Philippines is persistently challenging China’s position in the South China Sea. To address the issue with the Philippines comprehensively, we must be prepared to confront the US, which supports them. The primary threat from the US Navy to China comes from nuclear submarines. Consequently, the integration of the Type 075 amphibious assault ship into the Shandong aircraft carrier group serves as a rehearsal for such a scenario.

The essence of the South China Sea dispute is not a conflict between China and the Philippines, but rather a power struggle between China and the US. China is committed to safeguarding its sovereignty in the South China Sea and ensuring that Chinese ships can navigate the area freely without obstruction. The US aims to use the Philippines to destabilize the South China Sea, thereby controlling vital shipping routes and leveraging advantageous positions to constrain China.

Source: Jiang Fuwei, “西方卫星突然发现，航母两攻都在向南海集结，解放军将有大动作 (Western Satellites Suddenly Detect Both Aircraft Carrier and Amphibious Assault Ship are Gathering in the South China Sea, is the PLA Preparing for a Major Operation?),” Netease, (one of China’s largest internet companies, subject to regulatory oversight and censorship by China’s cyberspace Administration), 12 September 2024. https://www.163.com/dy/article/JBT3EB7605532V6O.html

Last week, the PLA released footage showing the Shandong carrier and the Hainan Type 075 amphibious assault ship conducting joint combat training. For the Southern Theater Command, this joint operational capability marks a milestone for our naval forces in addressing potential situations in both the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

The greatest advantage of aircraft carriers is their high tactical flexibility, enabling a carrier strike group to launch attacks, exploit weaknesses in enemy defenses—particularly against adversaries with limited maritime situational awareness—and reposition as needed. However, aircraft carriers are not designed to sustain continuous, large-scale blockades over a single area. As a result, carrier-based operations often follow a hit-and-run strategy, striking and then withdrawing to regroup for subsequent attacks.

When facing a significantly weaker adversary like the Philippines, the Shandong carrier can capitalize on its superiority in intelligence and situational awareness to carry out precise ‘surgical strikes,’ maximizing the effectiveness of its air wing. However, against a more capable opponent like the Taiwanese military, the carrier’s air wing may cause substantial damage, but the extended intervals between attacks would allow the Taiwanese military time to regroup. As a result, amphibious operations and providing cover for landing forces exert a greater strategic impact than relying solely on airpower.

For instance, if a conflict between China and the US were to break out in the South China Sea, the PLA would need to find ways to neutralize US Typhoon missile systems in northern Philippines. The problem is that the area is densely covered in tropical rainforests, making it difficult for satellites and aerial reconnaissance to be effective, rendering carrier-based air strikes inefficient. Therefore, the most effective method would be to deploy and attack from the ground. Similarly, in a Taiwan Strait conflict, the Shandong carrier group, equipped with amphibious landing ships, could act as a surprise force, conducting small-scale landing operations to disrupt Taiwan’s defensive posture.

Once the PLA begins organizing landings in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan’s forces will inevitably concentrate on the island’s western coast, leaving the eastern coast largely undefended. At this point, the Shandong carrier group could conduct landings on Taiwan’s eastern coast, targeting and destroying facilities, thus undermining any hopes of delaying the conflict until US intervention.

With the addition of the Hainan Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship, it will play a crucial role not only in landing operations but also in anti-submarine warfare. The Hainan can establish an anti-submarine network around the fleet, making it nearly impossible for even US submarines, despite their world-class technology, to evade detection. This capability will significantly reduce the likelihood of US submarines launching surprise attacks on the PLA fleet.

Given time, the Shandong carrier group will not only serve as a vanguard for China’s blue-water operations but will also function as an aerial guardian for frontline landing forces during amphibious operations.

Notes:

[i] To watch the CCTV-7 news report on the Shandong carrier group exercise, see CCTV-7 China Defense and Military channel, CCTV, 9 September 2024. https://tv.cctv.com/2024/09/09/VIDEPTsqIV4ywN1OtwIHnDRe240909.shtml

[ii] Matthew P. Funaiole and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “China’s New Amphibious Assault Ship Sails into the South China Sea,” CSIS (Center for Strategic & International Studies), 24 November 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-new-amphibious-assault-ship-sails-south-china-sea

[iii] Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup,” CSIS, 5 June 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-chinas-naval-buildup

[iv] Conor M. Kennedy and Daniel Caldwell, “China Maritime Report No. 23: The Type 075 LHD: Development, Missions, and Capabilities,” US Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute, 07 October 2022.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/23/

The China-Africa Cooperation Forum Focuses on Chinese Military Expansion in Africa

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First held in Beijing in 2000, FOCAC has grown significantly over the past two decades and is now the largest diplomatic event organized by China.

“Many countries have serious security problems in society, and there is a growing trend of heinous crimes against Chinese-funded companies and employees as well as overseas Chinese.”

51 African heads of state attended, the tri-annual Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing from 4-6 September. While China currently has one base in Africa on the Djibouti coast, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s FOCAC speech bolstered other reports about China’s ambitions to expand its military footprint on the continent, including possibly establishing other military bases.[i] Xi Jinping vowed that China would train 6,000 African soldiers and 1,000 African law enforcement officers, welcome 500 African military officers to China, commence joint patrols, mine clearance, and other military activities with African partners, and provide security for joint projects with African security officials.[ii] This latter objective was underscored in the article, where it noted the growing trend of violent crimes against Chinese-funded enterprises and employees and overseas Chinese in Africa, which are often seen as exploitative. Only 20 African countries currently have police cooperation agreements with China, a fact the article lamented and stated needs to increase. This suggests a correlation in the future between Chinese economic activities in Africa, which will inevitably lead to security incidents and Chinese security cooperation with African countries.[iii] The FOCAC and Xi Jinping’s speech, therefore, signal a growing Chinese military and security presence in Africa.

Sources:

“中非合作论坛峰会召开：为双边关系良性发展“提质增效”提供契机 (The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation is held: An opportunity is provided to ‘improve the quality and efficiency’ for the healthy development of bilateral relations)” thepaper.cn (Communist Party-affiliated Chinese-language newspaper that appeals to youths and has more editorial freedom than most Chinese media), 5 September 2024. https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_28634922

It is relevant to note that 51 of the African leaders who attended the summit are heads of state or government, which is far higher than other “Africa + 1” meetings, such as the US-Africa summit. Against the background of serious changes in Sino-US relations and Sino-EU relations, the importance of the “Global South” in China’s diplomatic grand strategy is rising sharply.

China’s large-scale financing and loans in Africa have become the focus of public criticism for a long time under the smearing and discrediting by the United States and Europe. In fact, this has had a negative impact on the reputations of both China and Africa.

Many countries have serious security problems, and there is a rising trend of heinous crimes against Chinese-funded companies and employees as well as overseas Chinese. At present, only more than 20 African countries have signed relevant police cooperation agreements with China, so the cooperation between the two sides in the field of police law enforcement needs to be improved.

Notes:

[i] See: Jacob Zenn, “China’s Initiates Push To Establish a Military Base in Gabon,” OE Watch, 04-2024, 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/chinas-initiates-push-to-establish-a-military-base-in-gabon/

[ii] “Full text: Xi Jinping’s speech at opening ceremony of 2024 FOCAC summit,” CGTN, 5 September 2024, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2024-09-05/Full-text-Xi-s-speech-at-opening-ceremony-of-2024-FOCAC-summit-1wDYKL8FhxC/p.html

[iii] On Chinese private military contractors in Africa, see Paul Nantulya, “Chinese Security Firms Spread along the African Belt and Road,” ACSS, 15 June 2021. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chinese-security-firms-spread-african-belt-road/

Image Information:

Image: First held in Beijing in 2000, FOCAC has grown significantly over the past two decades and is now the largest diplomatic event organized by China.
Source: Stephen Wallis, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Forum_on_China-Africa_Cooperation.jpg

Egypt is Rumored To Have Signed Purchase Agreement for Chinese J-10C Fighters

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PLAAF J-10C in action during the 2023 Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace (LIMA) Exhibition in Malaysia.

“The decision [to acquire Chinese J-10C fighter aircraft] comes at a time of geopolitical realignment for Egypt.”

Unconfirmed reports indicate that the Egyptian Air Force may soon acquire the export variant of China’s J-10C fighter aircraft.[i] If confirmed, this would represent a clear deepening of Egypt-China military ties amidst growing regional uncertainty due to the conflict in Gaza.[ii] Although the deal remains unconfirmed by either side, various English- and Arabic-language media outlets are treating the acquisition as a fact.[iii] Many analysts and commentators, noting Egypt’s recent accession into BRICS, portray these developments as signaling an ongoing shift in Egypt’s security partnerships from the United States toward closer relations with Russia and China. The first two accompanying articles, from defense-arabic.com—an Arabic-language defense news website and discussion forum—and RT Arabic—a Russian media outlet—illustrate the kind of reporting driving this narrative. For its part, the defense-arabic.com article suggests that Egypt’s decision to do so “reflects Cairo’s intention to diversify the sources of its military equipment and thus reduce its dependence on American defense systems.” Interestingly, the RT Arabic article sources its story from an Israeli news site, nziv.net, whose reporting has portrayed Egypt as a latent security threat to Israel.[iv] Global and regional actors are likely to use this story regardless of the finalization of the deal, to further broaden agendas, particularly the notion of a growing rift between the United States and Egypt.

The strategic implications of Egypt acquiring Chinese fighter jets may be less dramatic than some predict, as suggested in the third accompanying excerpt from the prominent daily al-Araby al-Jadeed. Egypt has long pursued a policy of diversifying its arms suppliers, and it has considered upgrading its fighter aircraft through deals with Europe, the United States, and Russia. However, the region’s heightened tensions and increasing geopolitical competition could interpret even relatively routine actions as strategically significant, warranting closer attention.

Sources:

مصر تعلن رسميا اختيارها للمقاتلات الصينية J-10C لتحل محل مقاتلات F-16 الأمريكية

“Egypt officially announces its choice of Chinese J-10C to replace it’s American F-16s,” defense-arabic.com (defense news and discussion forum), September 11, 2024. https://tinyurl.com/vyfmemsj

Egypt has officially announced that it will replace its aging fleet of American F-16s with Chinese J-10C “Vigorous Dragon” fighters, after discussions that have continued over the past few months. The decision, announced during Egypt’s first international air show, reflects Cairo’s intention to diversify the sources of its military equipment, and thus reduce its dependence on American defense systems…

The decision comes at a time of geopolitical realignment for Egypt, which recently joined the BRICS bloc alongside major players such as China, Russia and India. In recent years, Egypt has also acquired defense equipment from Russia and France, including the MiG-29M and Dassault Rafale. The Chinese J-10C is set to become a key part of Egypt’s diverse arsenal.

Source:

“مصر تستبدل مقاتلات F-16 بمقاتلات صينية متطورة”.. الإعلام العبري يتحدث عن الصفقة المنتظرة

“Egypt replaces its F-16 with advanced Chinese fighter jets… Hebrew media speaks on the presumed deal,” RT Arabic (Russian media outlet), September 9, 2024. https://tinyurl.com/p9nk35mf

According to Hebrew media, the Egyptian Ministry of Defense has placed its first-ever order to purchase Chinese fourth-generation fighter jets, with an unspecified number of J-10C aircraft ordered on August 19. According to the Israeli news website “nziv”, this development comes at a time when Cairo continues to strengthen strategic and economic relations with Beijing, after joining the BRICS bloc earlier this year…

The website added: “With the exception of three squadrons of MiG-29M fighter jets that Egypt ordered from Russia in 2015, all of Egypt’s fourth-generation fighter jets are of Western origin, and the purchase of the J-10C is seen as a potential turning point for Egypt.” The Hebrew website report explained that Egypt is seeking to gradually stop relying on American weapons, especially since the United States had previously refused to sell the latest F-15 aircraft to Cairo, while it agreed to sell them to Israel, which angered the Egyptians. The website pointed out that the United States may stop the annual grant of billions of dollars to Egypt if it buys fighter jets from China.

Source:

هل تتجه مصر نحو اقتناء مقاتلات صينية؟

“Is Egypt moving toward purchasing Chinese fighter jets?” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), September 15, 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/هل-تتجه-مصر-نحو-اقتناء-مقاتلات-صينية

However, Dr. Merit Mabrouk, director of the Egypt Program at the Middle East Institute in Washington, believes that Egypt cannot replace the United States with China and Russia in terms of its total reliance on armaments. She explained to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that “as for Russia, Egypt cannot buy weapons from it, because American law stipulates that military aid is not granted to countries that buy weapons from Russia, and Egypt is one of the largest countries that receive American military aid.” She added that “as for China, Egypt’s cooperation with it in the military field is not a replacement for the United States, but rather a kind of completion and diversification of weapons sources.”

“The United States was and will remain Egypt’s favorite, and it is Cairo’s first partner in this field, but it decided some time ago to expand its contacts and partnerships, and that it will not limit itself to one partner, because it is not in its interest,” Mabrouk said. “The idea is that Cairo gives itself the right not to be forced to deal with Washington alone in this field, despite its strong desire to deal with it, and this is not only for Egypt but for many other countries,” she added. 

Notes:

[i] In 2022, Pakistan became the first country to obtain the Chengdu J-10 (NATO reporting name is Firebird). If the rumors are confirmed, Egypt would become the second country to acquire the J-10. The J-10 is a relatively old aircraft, declared operational in 2003, and designed primarily for air-to air combat. However, the J-10 can also perform and participate in strike missions. In January 2024 Pakistan J-10CE’s escorted drones on a strike mission against Baloch separatists in Southeastern Iran.

[ii] In late August, Egypt hosted its first-ever International Military Airshow, where the J-10C was prominently displayed, and an alleged agreement was reportedly finalized. Egypt’s interest in the J-10C has been public for over a year, and negotiations seem to have accelerated in recent months. See for instance this May 2023 article mentioning Egypt’s interest in the fighter jets: “China in advanced negotiations for major arms deals with Egypt and Saudi Arabia,” The New Arab, 25 May 2023. https://www.newarab.com/news/china-advanced-talks-major-saudi-egypt-arms-deals; Last July, the Egyptian Air Force commander visited Beijing for discussions with his Chinese counterpart. See:

قائد القوات الجوية يلتقى نظيره الصينى

“Air Force commander meets his Chinese counterpart,” Egyptian Ministry of Defense, 16 July 2024. https://tinyurl.com/ycj3yb6t

[iii] In addition to Arabic-language outlets, an article in The National Interest reported the sale as a fact without providing evidence. See: “The Mighty F-16 Fighter Just ‘Lost’ to China’s J-10 (But Not in Battle),” The National Interest, 13 September 2024. https://tinyurl.com/6kcmcywy

[iv] See for instance: “Israel spreads false allegations to downplay severity of its military setbacks: Source,” Egypt Independent, 30 May 2024. https://www.egyptindependent.com/israel-spreads-false-allegations-to-downplay-severity-of-its-military-seStbacks-source/ and “Egypt ‘preparing for another Yom Kippur War,’ warns Israeli media site,” Middle East Monitor, 16 July 2024. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240716-egypt-preparing-for-another-yom-kippur-war-warns-israeli-media-site/

Image Information:

Image: PLAAF J-10C in action during the 2023 Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace (LIMA) Exhibition in Malaysia.
Source: https://commons.m.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:J-10C_LIMA_2023.jpg

Chinese Marines Participate in Brazil’s Military Exercise for the First Time

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“The People’s Liberation Army will take part in joint military exercises in Brazil, a rare step for the Chinese military in the western hemisphere.”

The participation of Chinese Marines in Operation Formosa, a multinational military exercise hosted by Brazil’s Navy, caps off a diplomatically busy summer between China and Brazil.[i] However, Chinese media coverage of the military exercise was muted. The excerpted article in the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported on a single statement from the Chinese Defense Ministry, which noted the exercise would “deepen friendship and cooperation between the Chinese and participating militaries and enhance their ability to jointly respond to security risk challenges.” The SCMP article noted the focus of the exercise was joint landing and anti-landing combat drills—the same type of exercises the U.S. is engaging in across the nations of the South China Sea, to include the Philippines. The SCMP article did acknowledge that the Chinese military participation in Brazil was unusual given that Chinese military exercises are overwhelmingly focused on the South China Sea.

The exercise received different coverage in the Brazilian press. According to the excerpted article in Brazilian flagship news outlet Globo, the annual exercise featured 3,000 military personnel from Brazil, 63 U.S. Marines, and 32 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Marines. Eight additional countries sent military observers.[ii] The U.S. had participated in the same exercise in previous years, but it was the first time for PLA personnel. While Brazil heralded the trilateral military exercise as significant for bringing the United States and China together, U.S. defense officials confirmed that U.S. troops participating in the exercise did not train nor participate alongside the contingent of PLA Marines participating in the exercise.[iii] No further explanations were publicized.

While minimal in scope, the participation of Chinese PLA Marines in Operation Formosa is but one of a host of other diplomatic collaborations between China and Brazil. This includes Brazil’s July pronouncement that it would like to participate in China’s Belt and Road Initiative; the joint commemoration of the 50-year anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil in August; and Brazil and Chinese participation at the recent BRICS summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, in September.[iv] Seen in conjunction with these other events and pronouncements, the participation of Chinese Marines in Operation Formosa adds to the body of evidence of a deepening China-Brazil relationship.

Sources:

Yuanyue Dang,“In rare shift, China will send marine corps to Brazil for joint military exercise,” South China Morning Post, 6 September 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3277473/rare-shift-china-will-send-marine-corps-brazil-joint-military-exercise?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article

The People’s Liberation Army will take part in joint military exercises in Brazil, a rare step for the Chinese military in the western hemisphere.

A detachment of the PLA Marine Corps will travel to take part in Exercise Formosa 2024 at the invitation of the Brazilian military, the Chinese defence ministry said on Thursday.

The exercises, with a focus on joint landing and anti-landing combat drills, would “deepen friendship and cooperation between the Chinese and participating militaries and enhance their ability to jointly respond to security risk challenges”, the ministry said in a statement on its website.

In recent years, China has hosted military medicine forums, senior military officer seminars and defence forums for Latin American countries, but it is not common for the Chinese military to travel to the region to take part in operations.

This year has seen an improvement in relations between China and Brazil.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva announced in July that his administration planned to join the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s flagship infrastructure and investment project.

Also in July, Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun met visiting Brazilian army commander Tomás Ribeiro Paiva in Beijing.

Dong said during the meeting that the two militaries should “strengthen exchanges and learn from each other” to “jointly improve capabilities and take military relations to a new level”.

Source: Filipe Vidon, “Marinha une tropas dos EUA e China pela 1ª vez em operação militar no Brasil; veja fotos (Navy unites US and Chinese troops for the first time in a military operation in Brazil; see photos),” Globo, 11 September 2024. https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2024/09/11/marinha-une-tropas-dos-eua-e-china-pela-1a-vez-em-operacao-militar-no-brasil-veja-fotos.ghtml?fbclid=IwY2xjawFOo7tleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHeVMuBtcSg4CrxXj-qkWNDCN23gW46nn_DjRQtSe3RH3p3C5Vzl6nPBQTg_aem_Q98CjbLroQQSbos97saIrg

63 US Marines and 32 Chinese Marines are participating in the exercise simultaneously.

The Brazilian Navy has achieved a feat: uniting US and Chinese troops on the same side of the “battle”. This is not a preparation for an imminent war, but rather Operation Formosa 2024, an annual military training operation that began on the 4th and will run until September 17, in Goiás.

“Foreign military personnel, together with Brazilian troops, conduct workshops to exchange experiences, known as Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE). During this exchange, various military subjects are addressed, promoting greater integration between Brazil and friendly nations,” the Navy told Globo.

As columnist Ancelmo Gois anticipated, the rivalry between the two countries is not only international, but also 63 US Marines and 32 Chinese Marines are participating in the exercise simultaneously. The Armed Forces will act together, simulating an amphibious operation, considered the most complex of military operations. All weapons used will use live ammunition. The training also aims to promote integration between the Brazilian Navy, Army and Air Force. The objective of the exercise is to prepare Brazilian military personnel to act together in live-fire activities, in controlling airspace and in executing the maneuver during the so-called “Operation of Replacement by Overtaking”. In this phase of the training, responsibilities are transferred between the Armed Forces, which take turns in controlling the actions to achieve the proposed mission. Armored vehicles from the Marine Corps (CFN), such as the JLTV, the ASTROS system, the Piranha, the Amphibious Tracked Car (CLAnf), the UNIMOG truck, in addition to the AF-1 Skyhawk fighter and Navy helicopters. The FAB’s KC-390 Millenium, A-29 Super Tucano and R-99 aircraft, as well as the Army’s ASTROS, Guarani and M60 Combat Car, will also be on display in the operation.

“The holding of major military exercises, such as the Specific Joint Training for Combined Weapons Employment, is essential for optimizing the operations of the Brazilian Armed Forces, promoting efficient integration between the Navy, Army and Air Force. These exercises are designed to improve the coordination and execution of joint operations, addressing crucial aspects such as: fire support, airspace control, command and control, maneuver and logistics,” says the Navy.

Notes:

[i] Operation Formosa has nothing to do with the island of Formosa, otherwise known as Taiwan. Brazil named the annual operation “Formosa” in the 1990s, reflecting its proximity to the Brazilian city of Formosa in the state of Goiás, near the capitol of Brasilia.

[ii] Eight countries sent military observers to Operation Formosa 2024; Argentina, France, Italy, Pakistan, South Africa, Congo, Mexico and Nigeria. See: “Marinha une tropas dos EUA e China pela 1ª vez em operação militar no Brasil (Navy joins US and Chinese troops for the first time in military operation in Brazil),” Globo (mainstream Brazilian news service), 11 September 2024. https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2024/09/11/marinha-une-tropas-dos-eua-e-china-pela-1a-vez-em-operacao-militar-no-brasil-veja-fotos.ghtml

[iii] For additional information on the U.S. position regarding Chinese PLA Marines participating in Operation Formosa, and statement by Pentagon official noting that “U.S. Marines were only at Formosa to train with their Brazilian partners,” see: “Chinese troops to join Brazil’s military drills with US forces,” Reuters, 10 September 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/china-joins-brazilian-military-exercises-alongside-us-troops-2024-09-10/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=mil-ebb

[iv] For reporting on the meeting commemorating 50 years of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil, see: “Chinese vice president attends reception for 50th anniversary of China-Brazil diplomatic ties,” XinhuaNet (English language Chinese Media), 14 September 2024. https://english.news.cn/20240914/2a6daa8898ef41d29115085d83858256/c.html; for additional reading on the recent Meeting of BRICS High-Ranking Officials Responsible For Security Matters/National Security Advisors in St Petersburg Russia, see: “China welcomes more Global South partners to join BRICS—senior Chinese official,” XinhuaNet, 12 September 2024. https://english.news.cn/20240912/4f0d08a4cd98443694fa4fc8a4ddfcf0/c.html