Tag Archives: Tajikistan

Turkey Conducts Counterterrorism Operations Against the Islamic State

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Turkish Army vehicles in south-eastern Turkey. In light of recent regional attacks by the Islamic State, Turkey is ramping up counterterror measures in the country, especially targeting Tajiks.

“Turkish security services have carried out continuous campaigns against the [terrorist] cells and members of the organization, which resulted in the arrest of thousands, in addition to the deportation of nearly 3,000.”

Turkey’s Anti-Terrorism Division continues its offensive against the Islamic State (IS) and other groups as the government attempts to restrict Tajik nationals access after a string of international attacks. Turkey is actively attempting to disrupt the remaining cells of the IS in the country after several deadly terrorist attacks linked to the group have occurred throughout the globe. Over a week period in January 2024, IS conducted bombings in Kerman, Iran, conducted a shooting at the Santa Maria Catholic Church in Istanbul, Turkey, and finally, the group killed over 130 people during an attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, Russia. According to the first excerpted article from the Saudi-owned international newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, in April 2024, the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Division personnel arrested 48 IS members in Istanbul. Thirty of those arrested were said to be connected to the Santa Maria Catholic church attack. 18 additional members were arrested in Ankara, many of whom are Tajik. The article also notes that at least two of the perpetrators of the Crocus attack in Moscow spent time in Istanbul immediately before the attack. IS fighters traveling through Turkey or using the country as a temporary place to stay is not a new phenomenon, as thousands of fighters and recruits have passed through Turkish borders since 2013. IS fighters and supporters have consistently used Turkey as a hub, despite counter-terrorism efforts. Many IS-affiliated individuals will cross the border from Syria, and Ankara’s primary countermeasure has been deportation to the country of origin with over 9,000 deported to date.[i] According to the second excerpted article from the Turkish-based news outlet TürkRus, Tajik nationals now face deportation and rescinded visa exemptions as a result of the Tajik connection to the recent terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, the Santa Maria Catholic church attack, and a planned attack in Istanbul. Tajiks in Turkey were given a deadline of 20 April 2024 to leave or be under the threat of being forcibly expelled. Although Tajikistan is a small former Soviet republic just north of Afghanistan, approximately half of IS fighters are recruited there. A combination of poverty, lack of religious freedom, and an oppressive dictatorial regime give citizens few options, which IS has capitalized on. Through primarily online recruitment methods, IS appears to have been able to appeal to many Tajik’s grievances with Russia and the West. As for Turkey, the effects of its most recent countermeasures for Tajik nationals are yet to be seen.

OE Insight Summary:

TUR’s Anti-Terrorism Division continues its offensive against the Islamic State and other groups as the government attempts to restrict access to Tajik nationals after a string of international attacks.

Sources:

Saeed Abdul Razik, “طاجيكستان دون تأشيرة تركيا توقف العشرات من «داعش» وتلغي دخول مواطني (Turkey arrests dozens of ISIS members and cancels visa-free entry of Tajik citizens),” Asharq Al-Awsat (Saudi news site), 6 April 2024. https://aawsat.com/شؤون-إقليمية/4952726-تركيا-توقف-العشرات-من-داعش-وتلغي-دخول-مواطني-طاجيكستان-دون-تأشيرة

Counter-terrorism forces in Turkey arrested 48 members of the terrorist organization ISIS, including 30 members linked to the perpetrator of the attack on the Santa Maria Catholic Church in Istanbul on January 28. 18 members of the terrorist organization were also arrested in the Turkish capital, Ankara.

Last February, a Turkish court decided to imprison 25 defendants and conditionally release 9 others who were involved in the armed attack on the Santa Maria Church in the Sariyer district of Istanbul, which was carried out by two ISIS members: the Tajikist Amerjon Khalikov and the Russian David Tandev, who were charged. They were charged with: “belonging to a terrorist organization” and “premeditated murder.” They were among 60 Russian and Tajik suspects who were arrested in connection with the attack, and 26 of them were referred to deportation centers outside the country.

The Turkish security forces arrested 147 ISIS members as part of the investigations, and 17 members of what is known as the “Khorasan Province” affiliated with ISIS were arrested after their identities were identified by Turkish intelligence and the Anti-Terrorism Division in the Istanbul Security Directorate. Confirming their connection to the armed attack on the church and planning to establish an entity to train and deploy ISIS militants in Middle Eastern countries. ISIS, which Turkey has classified as a terrorist organization since 2013 and which was responsible for or attributed to the killing of more than 300 people in attacks in Turkey between 2015 and 2017.

Turkish security services have carried out continuous campaigns against the cells and members of the organization, which resulted in the arrest of thousands of them, in addition to the deportation of nearly 3,000, and preventing the entry of more than 5,000 into the country.

“Turkey 20 Nisan’dan itibaren Tacikistanlıları deport edecek (Turkey will deport Tajikistan citizens as of April 20),” TurkRus (Turkish news site), April 7, 2024. https://www.turkrus.com/3167873-turkiye-20-nisandan-itibaren-tacikistanlilari-deport-edecek-xh.aspx

After the terrorist attack in Moscow, it was revealed that the terrorists were Tajik nationals. Turkey also recently announced that it has lifted visa liberalization for Tajikistan. Turkey announced that it had lifted visa liberalization with Tajikistan. Speaking to Sputnik, Turkish diplomatic sources stated that Turkish officials informed the Tajikistan authorities that Tajik nationals who did not leave the country as of April 20 would be deported from the country.

It is noteworthy that the decision was taken after it was announced that some of the defendants, who were Tajik citizens, who were announced to have carried out the terrorist attack in Crocus City in Moscow, had traveled to and from Turkey before this action, and after many news about this issue appeared in the Russian press.It was noted that Tajikistan is considering the issue of imposing a visa requirement for Turkish citizens in accordance with the principle of reciprocity.

Notes:

[i] The International Crisis Group provides a detailed analysis of the overall challenge Türkiye faces with ISIS-linked foreigners in Türkiye. For more information, see:

“An Enduring Challenge: ISIS-Linked Foreigners in Turkiye,” International Crisis Group, 28 February 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkiye/267-enduring-challenge-isis-linked-foreigners

Image: Turkish Army vehicles in south-eastern Turkey. In light of recent regional attacks by the Islamic State, Turkey is ramping up counterterror measures in the country, especially targeting Tajiks.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Turkish_Army_vehicles_in_south-eastern_Turkey.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Resolve Border Dispute

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President Sadyr Zhaparov of the Kyrgyz Republic and President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan forged a bi-lateral agreement regarding shared disputed borders, outside the CSTO framework.

“Chairman of the State Committee for National Security Kamchybek Tashiev said that more than 90% of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border has been agreed upon. He made this statement on December 12 after a meeting with his Tajik counterpart Saimumin Yatimov.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Kloop reports that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan recently reached a bilateral agreement to demarcate most of their shared border separate from efforts by Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to resolve the border dispute. The CSTO is a political-military organization made up of former Soviet republics, including Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan that works to provide security in the Eurasia region. The Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan dispute stems from borders that were not demarcated when the two countries became independent. The lack of clear boundaries has been a source of contention and became particularly acute after a series of clashes took place in 2022.[i] The largest and deadliest clash took place in September 2022 and threatened to undermine cooperation within the CSTO as it marked the first time relations between two member states resulted in open armed conflict.[ii] According to the Kloop article, the heads of the National Security Committees of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in December and agreed to demarcate a large section of their border. The agreement includes demarcating some of the more controversial sections of the border near the location of previous clashes. The article also notes that the agreement is not finalized, but it will likely fulfill the promise by Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov to resolve the border issue by the spring of 2024. It remains to be seen whether this agreement will prevent any future border clashes from taking place or if they do, whether Russia or the CSTO will get involved. While the fact that neither Russia nor the CSTO were involved in the mediations is noteworthy given the regional role of Russia and the fact that the CSTO, the development is not necessarily a sign of waning Russian interest. Russia has offered to mediate following border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan over the years, but nothing came of it. Also, the CSTO claims it is ready and capable of providing security in the region but could not prevent two of its member states from clashing. Instead, the agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan reflects the fact that governments in the region have taken more initiative[iii]  in regard to their own security affairs, rather than looking to outside partners.

Sources:

“Ташиев и Ятимов сообщили о согласовании более 90% кыргызско-таджикской границы (Tashiyev and Yatimov reported on the agreement of more than 90 percent of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border),” Kloop (independent Russian-language news website in Kyrgyzstan), 13 December 2023.

Chairman of the State Committee for National Security Kamchybek Tashiev said that more than 90% of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border has been agreed upon. He made this statement on December 12 after a meeting with his Tajik counterpart Saimumin Yatimov.

Tashiev and Yatimov are the chairmen of the government delegations of the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan on the delimitation and demarcation of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border…

According to him, the sections starting from Kayragach, Kulundu, Maksat, Arki-1, Arki-2, Zhany-zher and up to Zhiydelik have been fully agreed upon. Sections from Kara-Bak, Lakko to the “junction of the point of three states” have also been agreed upon.

“That is, at the moment we have almost completed all controversial issues [on the border]. There are only a few meetings left to finally finalize the issue with the state border,” concluded the head of the State Committee for National Security…

Earlier, President Sadyr Japarov promised that the issue of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border would be resolved before the spring of 2024.

The total length of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border is 972 kilometers. As of 2022, a total of 664 kilometers of border have been agreed upon…

Due to undefined borders, conflicts periodically arise in the territories adjacent to Tajikistan in the Batken and Osh regions…

The last large-scale conflict occurred on September 14-17, 2022. Fights and clashes took place along the entire perimeter of the state border. As a result of the conflict, 63 Kyrgyzstanis were killed and another 206 people were injured. The Tajik authorities noted that 41 people were killed and more than 20 people were injured in that conflict…

Notes:

[i] For background on Russian efforts following the September 2022 clashes, see (in Russian): Mirayim Almas, “«Богатый опыт»: Россия готова помочь Кыргызстану и Таджикистану в решении пограничных споров (‘Rich experience’: Russia is ready to help Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in resolving the border disputes),” Kloop, 15 September 2022. https://kloop.kg/blog/2022/09/15/bogatyj-opyt-rossiya-gotova-pomoch-kyrgyzstanu-i-tadzhikistanu-v-reshenii-pogranichnyh-sporov/

[ii] Kyrgyzstan cancelled a CSTO exercise set to take place in October 2022 following the border clash with Tajikistan. See: Matthew Stein “Members Of Collective Security Treaty Organization Show Less Support For Russia-Led Body,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/members-of-collective-security-treaty-organization-show-less-support-for-russia-led-body/

[iii] For more on Central Asian states cooperating on security issues, see: Matthew Stein “Central Asian States Take the Initiative in Security Cooperation,” OE Watch, 01-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/central-asian-states-take-the-initiative-in-security-cooperation/

Image Information:

Image: President Sadyr Zhaparov of the Kyrgyz Republic and President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan forged a bi-lateral agreement regarding shared disputed borders, outside the CSTO framework.
Sources: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Official_Photo_of_the_President_of_the_Kyrgyz_Republic_H.E._Mr._Sadyr_Zhaparov.jpg and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_Tajikistan – /media/File:2021_Moscow_Victory_Day_Parade_037_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: Modified (combined photos) as per rights granted: CC BY SA 4.0

Chinese-Tajikistani Security Cooperation Gaining Momentum (Matthew Stein and Peter Wood) (January 2024)

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Chinese-Tajikistani Security Cooperation Gaining Momentum (Matthew Stein and Peter Wood) (January 2024)

(Click image to download brief.)

Key Takeaways:

  • China and Tajikistan share a 477km border and have an estimated $1.78 billion in bilateral trade, which is significantly imbalanced in favor of China.
  • Recent years have seen a significant improvement in relations between China and Tajikistan, with China constructing a military base in 2016 near Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan and a November 2022 bilateral agreement to increase security cooperation.
  • China’s security cooperation with Tajikistan does not appear to conflict or cause friction with Tajikistan’s main security cooperation partner, Russia, but nevertheless advances Chinese interests in the region at a time when Russian support is limited due to its invasion of Ukraine.

Kyrgyzstan Acquires Turkish UAS, Showing Less Reliance on Russia

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A Turkish TAI Aksungur twin-engine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle on demonstration at Teknofest 2019.

“For 2.5 years, Kyrgyzstan has allocated 125 billion soms ($1.422 billion) to upgrade equipment.”

Kyrgyzstan has relied on Russian security assistance to help upgrade weapon systems and equipment for its armed forces. When the government announced in late 2021 that it had purchased two Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 unmanned aerial systems (UAS) for the country’s border guards, it marked a partial shift away from Russian systems that has continued with newer acquisitions.[i] The excerpted article from the independent news website Fergana Agency reports that Kyrgyzstan spent $1.4 billion over the past two-and-a-half years on its armed forces. The article notes that Kyrgyzstan acquired Bayraktar, Aksungur, and Akinci UAS from Turkey, as well as Pechora surface-to-air missile systems and Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters from Russia. It is unclear if the TB-2s are additional systems, but the Aksungur and Akinci and Russian systems are new acquisitions.[ii] The article also discusses the numerous conflicts that have taken place on the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border in recent years, suggesting one possible motivation for Kyrgyzstan’s desire to upgrade its systems. According to the article, last September both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan brought up additional forces during one clash that killed dozens, demonstrating how clashes in recent years have increased in scale. Overall, Kyrgyzstan’s military acquisitions are not a shift in the balance of power in the region, but it provides it an edge that Tajikistan does not have.

Sources:

“За 2,5 года Кыргызстан потратил на обновление вооруженной техники почти $1,5 млрд (For 2.5 years Kyrgyzstan has spent almost $1.5 billion on upgrading military equipment),” Fergana Agency (independent Russian-language news website focusing on Central Asia), 21 July 2023. https://fergana.agency/news/130812/

For 2.5 years, Kyrgyzstan has allocated 125 billion soms ($1.422 billion) to upgrade equipment. This was announced by the head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) Kamchybek Tashiev at a government meeting…

Tashiyev noted that in 2005-2020, Kyrgyzstan spent 3-5 billion soms ($34-56.9 million) for the same purposes. For comparison, he listed that in 2021 alone, the country’s authorities allocated 32 billion soms ($364 million) to upgrade weapons, in 2022 – 53 billion soms ($603 million), for six months of 2023 – more than 40 billion soms ($455 million).

…According to Tashiev, Bayraktar, Aksungur, Akinci drones, the Pechora anti-aircraft missile system, Mi-8, Mi-17 helicopters were purchased.

“We didn’t receive all this as a gift, all this was purchased with state budget funds,” Tashiev stressed. …in recent years there have been numerous border conflicts between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The biggest one happened in September last year. Artillery and heavy armored vehicles were involved in the battles on both sides.

Notes:

[i] For background on Kyrgyzstan’s acquisition of Bayraktars in 2021, see: Matthew Stein “Kyrgyzstan Conducts Exercise with Its New Bayraktars,” OE Watch, 05-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

[ii] One of the deliveries of new Russian helicopters took place a few weeks before the announcement by Tashiev, see: Kseniya Timofeeva, “Кыргызстан получил новый вертолет Ми-17. От России, но за свои средства (Kyrgyzstan received a new Mi-17 helicopter. From Russia, but bought on its own),” Kaktus, 23 June 2023. https://kaktus.media/doc/482847_kyrgyzstan_polychil_novyy_vertolet_mi_17._ot_rossii_no_za_svoi_sredstva.html

Image Information:

Image: A Turkish TAI Aksungur twin-engine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle on demonstration at Teknofest 2019.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TAI_Aksungur_Teknofest2019_(1).jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Russia Strengthens Its Military Presence in Central Asia

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201st Military Base.

201st Military Base.

“Russia decided to increase the readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of “US attempts to restore its military presence in Central Asia.”

Russia’s military bases in Central Asia have always been important to its strategic goals in the region, particularly for dealing with potential instability in Afghanistan. While the Russian government initially accepted U.S. airbases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan beginning in 2001 to support operations in Afghanistan, it later pressed both governments to evict U.S. forces. The United States left the Kharshi-Khanbad airbase (known as K2) in Uzbekistan in 2005[i] and left the Transit Center at Manas in Kyrgyzstan in 2014. Russian officials have claimed that U.S. security cooperation with Central Asian states in the 2000s took place as part of an effort to establish permanent military bases in the region, though the United States has not used a regional military facility since it left Manas.

The accompanying excerpted article from Kyrgyzstan’s independent news website Kloop reports on a statement by Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on 28 April 2023 in New Delhi, India about increasing the combat readiness of Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Shoigu noted that Russia made this decision to increase combat readiness because the United States is trying “to restore its military presence in Central Asia…under the pretext of helping in the fight against terrorism.” However, the article also notes that Shoigu did not offer facts to substantiate this this claim. When Russian officials announced measures to strengthen its military bases in Central Asia in the past, they noted specific increases in capabilities, like the transfer of S-300 [RG1] air defense systems to Tajikistan in 2019.[ii] Shoigu also stated that requests from members of the SCO to host military facilities is a “direct threat to stability in the SCO space.” Shoigu did not mention which SCO member would potentially host the U.S. military, but SCO members in Central Asia include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. There have been no reports that any of the three have been negotiating to host U.S. forces, but Shoigu is warning fellow SCO members that Russia will consider hosting the United States as a threat. The article also usefully provides a reminder of the current Russian military bases in Central Asia. These include the Kant airbase outside Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and the 201st Russian military base, home of the 201st Motor Rifle Division, in Tajikistan, the latter of which is Russia’s largest military facility outside its borders. The article ends by noting that Ukraine claimed it destroyed a tactical group from the 201st military base last year, though this has not been verified. While Russia claims it is strengthening its bases in Central Asia as a measure to maintain its presence in the region, without any specific information on how this will take place, it is possible that Russia is doing this to replace losses of the of the 201st in Tajikistan suffered in Ukraine.

Source:

Munduzbek Kalykov, “Шойгу: Россия повышает боеготовность своих военных баз в Кыргызстане и Таджикистане (Shoigu: Russia will increase the combat readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan),” Kloop (an independent Russian-language news website in Kyrgyzstan), 29 April 2023. https://kloop.kg/blog/2023/04/29/shojgu-rossiya-povyshaet-boegotovnost-svoih-voennyh-baz-v-kyrgyzstane-i-tadzhikistane/

Russia decided to increase the readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of “US attempts to restore its military presence in Central Asia.” This was stated by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu as reported by RIA Novosti.

According to Shoigu, “the United States and its allies, under the pretext of helping in the fight against terrorism, are trying to restore their military presence in Central Asia.” However, he did not provide specific facts.

“We regard requests to the countries of the region to deploy military infrastructure as a direct threat to stability in the SCO space…” Shoigu said on April 28 at meeting of defense ministers of the SCO member states in New Delhi.

A Russian military base has existed in Kyrgyzstan since the early 2000s. Its main forces are located in the small town of Kant, not far from Bishkek – these are Su-25 [RG1] attack aircraft and Mi-8 [RG2] helicopters. The Russian joint military base also includes a test site at Issyk-Kul, where Russian sailors test underwater torpedoes.

The 201st Russian military base is located in Tajikistan, and the garrison is deployed in the cities of Dushanbe and Bokhtar. This is Russia’s largest military facility outside its borders. The base includes motorized rifle artillery, reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile and other units, as well as an air group……in mid-April 2022, the Ukrainian army announced the destruction of the tactical group of the 201st Russian military base, which has a permanent deployment in Tajikistan…

Notes:

[i] The withdrawal of U.S. forces from K2 cannot be solely attributed to Russian pressure. In May 2005, the Uzbek military forcefully put down public demonstrations in the Ferghana Valley, killing numerous civilians and drawing the ire of the Bush administration regarding human rights. This began a diplomatic row between the United States and Uzbekistan, which resulted in an Uzbekistani demand that the United States leave the base within six months, eventually withdrawing from K2 in November 2005.

[ii] For more background on Russia’s transfers of S-300s to Tajikistan, see: Matthew Stein “Russia Transfers S-300s to Tajikistan,” OE Watch, December 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: 201st Military Base.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:201_military_base_09.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Key Arab Countries Join Chinese-Led Regional Body as Dialogue Partners

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Shanghai Cooperation Organization Secretariat (2022).

Shanghai Cooperation Organization Secretariat (2022).

“… The group’s expansion, however, should not be interpreted as meant to pose a challenge to the West, but rather as a means to provide an alternative…”

A growing number of Arab countries are joining the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as “dialogue partners.” The SCO was established in the early 2000s as a mechanism for deepening political, economic, and security cooperation between countries of Central and South Asia. It has eight member nations (China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) and over a dozen “observer” and “dialogue partner” nations, which may send delegates to SCO meetings and negotiate with the bloc on particular issues but do not have voting rights or official sway within the organization.

In the past year, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have all been officially granted “dialogue partner” status, with Bahrain expected to follow suit. With this, roughly two-thirds of countries in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility have joined the SCO in some capacity.[i] While these developments bear watching, SCO partnership is—at least for now—not necessarily at odds with existing security commitments and arrangements.[ii] Instead, engagement with the SCO is seen as part of a strategic diversification approach being pursued by Arab countries in response to emerging multipolarity. Arabic-language media largely sees these moves through an economic lens and as part of what the first accompanying excerpt, published in the Qatari-aligned daily al-Araby al-Jadeed, considers China’s “efforts to consolidate a new multipolar world economic order.” Arab countries’ interest in the SCO, however, should not be dismissed as a purely economic phenomenon bereft of potential strategic implications. According to a former Egyptian diplomat cited in the second accompanying article, published last September in the prominent Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, Russia will seek to use the SCO “as an additional point in its confrontations with the West.” Russian attempts to use the SCO for strategic leverage against NATO would likely cause friction within the organization, clashing not only with China’s more regional and economic focus but also with the strategic interests of other SCO members. Nonetheless, growing Russo-Chinese geostrategic alignment may eventually enable the SCO’s orientation to gradually shift toward global geopolitics, particularly if its membership begins extending beyond Central and South Asia. Especially noteworthy in this regard is Iran’s interest in full SCO membership (it is currently an observer country). This interest, combined with the recent China-mediated Saudi-Iranian détente, makes the SCO a potential venue through which Iran may seek to compete with the United States. Last April, Iran was for the first time invited to participate in the SCO defense ministers’ meeting in New Delhi. As reported in the third accompanying excerpt, from the pro-Iranian Lebanese media outlet al-Mayadeen, Iran’s Defense Minister called for the establishing of a “Shanghai Maritime Security Belt” and more broadly using the SCO to promote a “balance of power.” Iranian ambitions notwithstanding, the SCO remains an “alternative” rather than a “challenge” to the West, as articulated by an Indian journalist cited in the fourth accompanying excerpt, from the Saudi English-language daily Arab News. Still, in a competitive world, today’s alternatives may become tomorrow’s challenges. Present Arab involvement in the SCO remains limited and largely economic in nature, but the potential for this involvement to morph in a way that that erodes U.S.-Arab security partnerships, while not imminent, is worthy of consideration.

Sources:

“منظمة شنغهاي.. ترسيخ الصين لاقتصاد التعددية القطبية يتمدّد عربياً

(Shanghai Organization.. China’s consolidation of the multipolar economy is expanding in the Arab world),” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 16 April 2023. https://tinyurl.com/muamystt

China is seeking to attract a larger number of economically active countries to membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as part of its efforts to consolidate a new multipolar world economic order.

“ماذا يعني انضمام 5 دول عربية إلى منظمة «شنغهاي»؟

(What does the accession of 5 Arab countries to the ‘Shanghai Organization’ mean?).” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 17 September 2022. https://tinyurl.com/bdf9f2v8


Ambassador Raouf Saad, the former Egyptian assistant foreign minister and former Egyptian ambassador to Moscow, acknowledged that Russia will work to exploit the matter as an additional point in its confrontations with the West. However, he stressed the constants of Egyptian foreign policy, which refuses to “enter into alliances directed at the expense of its interests.”

“وزير الدفاع الإيراني: يجب تفعيل حزام الأمن البحري لمنظمة “شنغهاي

(Iranian Defense Minister: The ‘Shanghai Organization’ maritime security belt must be activated,)” al-Mayadeen (pro-Iran Lebanese media outlet), 29 April 2023. https://tinyurl.com/35dfp45z

Today, Saturday, the Iranian Minister of Defense, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, proposed adopting the “Shanghai Maritime Security Belt” mechanism with the aim of maintaining the security of communication lines and collectively guaranteeing global trade with the participation of the armed forces of member states…

During his remarks at the meeting of defense ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states in New Delhi, India, Ashtiani said that the achievements of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization “should promote global multilateralism and balance of power.”

“Middle Eastern participation grows in China-led security bloc as new countries join,” Arab News (English-language Saudi daily), 5 May 2023. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2298341/world
“It is a question of moving the weight or the center of gravity from the Western world — the US and EU combined — to the Eastern world, the place where the population of the world actually now exists overwhelmingly, the place where the fastest-growing economies are also present,” Suhashini Haidar, diplomatic editor at the English-language daily the Hindu, told Arab News. The group’s expansion, however, should not be interpreted as meant to pose a challenge to the West, but rather as a means to provide an alternative, she said.

Notes:

[i] Of the 21 countries in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility, only eight (Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Yemen) do not have any status in the SCO. However, Iraq, Israel, and Syria have all applied for dialogue partner status, while Turkmenistan has attended SCO summits as a guest attendee. That leaves Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, and Yemen as the only countries with no relationship to the SCO.

[ii] SCO partnership alone means little in terms of defense commitments: Turkey, a NATO member, is an SCO dialogue partner.  Full membership in the SCO should also not be equated to membership in a defense alliance, such as NATO, given that both India and Pakistan are full members. Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have an adversarial relationship with one another, are both dialogue partners.

Image Information:

Image: Shanghai Cooperation Organization Secretariat (2022).
Source: N509FZ, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Shanghai_Cooperation_Organization_Secretariat_%2820220909162501%29.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

Tajikistan and China Deepen Security Cooperation

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Gorno-Badakhshan map

Gorno-Badakhshan map.

“A temporary exercise control department is being created to prepare and conduct the exercises.”

The government of Tajikistan has, in recent years, only rarely released information about its security cooperation activities with China.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from Tajikistan’s independent news website Asia Plus reports on a recent agreement signed by the governments of Tajikistan and China to carry out a series of joint biennial exercises focusing on counterterrorism. While the Tajik government again provided few details about the agreement, there is enough information to gauge how it fits within broader expectations of Tajik-Chinese security cooperation going forward. The article reports that the agreement calls for joint counterterrorism exercises between Tajikistan and China to take place “at least once every two years” and that their purpose is “to strengthen and develop a comprehensive strategic partnership.” The article also mentions that both sides are looking to increase coordination between special forces units as well as tactical skills for counterterrorism. Special purpose units from Tajikistan and China have carried out a handful of joint exercises over the past seven years, all focusing on a counterterrorism scenario, though none of them had been part of a series of exercises.[ii] 

The article goes on to note that a “temporary exercise control department is being created to prepare and conduct the exercises” and that both sides will “not disclose details about the timing, location, scale, and leadership of the exercises before the start of the exercise.” It is likely that each side will release some information about future exercises after they take place, but this aspect of the agreement demonstrates how Tajikistan continues to develop a deeper partnership with China. Lastly, the article provides a reminder that China provided 55 million Chinese yuan (around $8 million) last year for a facility for Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. This new facility appears to be for Tajikistan and is not another Chinese base. Ultimately, Tajikistan’s agreement with China to carry out joint counterterrorism exercises may not appear as significant as Tajikistan’s partnership with Russia, but it does signal a more consistent effort from both sides to develop the partnership.

Source:

Mazhab Juma, “Не реже одного раза в два года. Таджикистан и Китай договариваются, как проводить антитеррористические учения (‘No fewer than one time every two years’. Tajikistan and China agreed to carry out counterterrorism exercises),” Asia-Plus (independent news website in Tajikistan), 21 November 2022. 

https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/security/20221121/ne-rezhe-odnogo-raza-v-dva-goda-tadzhikistan-i-kitai-dogovarivayutsya-kak-provodit-antiterroristicheskie-ucheniya

Tajikistan intends to carry out counterterrorism exercises with China at least once every two years. The text of the agreement between the governments of Tajikistan and China, published on the information and legal portal of the (Tajik) Ministry of Justice), states that the purpose of the exercise is to strengthen and develop a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Another goal is to increase the level of coordination between the special counterterrorism units, the level of interaction between the units, and the training and tactical skills of the two countries…

… It is also noted that a temporary exercise control department is being created to prepare and conduct the exercises… the parties will take strict secrecy measures and will not disclose details about the timing, location, scale, and leadership of the exercises before the start of the exercise.

…in October last year, the Parliament of Tajikistan approved an agreement in which China is building a special base in the Wakhan Gorge of the Gorno Badakhsahn Autonomous Oblast… The base will be built in accordance with an agreement between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan and the Ministry of Public Security of China. “As part of the cooperation agreement between the two countries, China will provide grant assistance for the construction of the base for the rapid response team of the Organized Crime Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan…

The cost of building the base is 55 million Chinese yuan (approximately 100 million somoni)…

Notes:

[i] For instance, the 2019 revelation that China had established a base in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakshan region near the Tajik-Afghan border only came out after a Western journalist had traveled to the remote region.

[ii] For more information on joint Tajik-China exercises, see: Matthew Stein, “Compendium of Central Asian Military and Security Activity,” 20 January 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/360801

Image Information:

Image: Gorno-Badakhshan map
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gorno_badakhshan_map.png
Attribution: Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication

Iran Asks Tajikistan Not To Use Iranian Drones in Dispute With Kyrgyzstan

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The Ababil-2 drone which the Islamic Republic of Iran exported to Tajikistan

The Ababil-2 drone which the Islamic Republic of Iran exported to Tajikistan.

“The drones should not be used in conflicts between the two countries…”

In September 2022, fighting erupted along the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border for the fifth in less than a year between the two Central Asian states. Several dozen soldiers and civilians were killed on each side. While both states have pulled forces from the un-demarcated border, tensions remain high and neither state is prepared to renounce its claims.

The excerpted article from popular, reform-leaning Iranian news source Entekhab.ir, highlights another angle to the conflict—Iranian drones. Iran has long sought to cultivate allies across Central Asia, a region with which Iran has traditionally had deep ties. In recent months, this has paid dividends with Kyrgyzstan, who voted in favor if Iran joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. However, the good relationship between Kyrgyzstan and Iran could be under pressure given Bishkek’s accusations, according to the Entekhab.ir article, that Tajikistan has used Iranian Ababil-2 drones along the disputed border. In an October 2022 statement released via Telegram, Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security said there were at least 10 instances of Tajik drones violating its airspace along the border since in recent weeks. Tajikistan, meanwhile, has accused Kyrgyzstan of using Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones against Tajik forces and civilian targets.

Iran has become a drone-exporting power in recent years. and is unique compared to other drone exporters—principally Israel, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates—in that it allows client countries to manufacture its drones under license. Such outsourcing affords Iran a modicum of plausible deniability in case there is blowback regarding their use by Iranian proxies or others. In this case, however, the use of drones by one Iranian ally against another country to which Iran seeks close ties has escalated into a diplomatic headache. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri, the Iranian Army Chief of Staff, sought to allay Kyrgyzistani concerns by saying the Ababil-2 was merely a surveillance drone, and it is unclear whether the drone might have broader functions, such as suicide operations. Forfeiting operational control might have once been an attractive tactic for Iran, but client autonomy can have a cost when its target holds Iran, rather than the client, accountable for the use of Iranian drones.

Source:

“Sarlashkar Bagheri: Pehpadha-ye Ababil-2-e Iran dar Dargiri Morzi Tajikistan va Qirqizstan Istifadeh Namishavad (Major General Bagheri: Iranian Ababil-2 Drones are not Used in Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan Border Dispute),” Entekhab.ir (popular reform-leaning Iranian website), 8 November 2022. https://www.entekhab.ir/fa/news/702471

Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri, chief of staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Armed Forces, spoke by phone with Kyrgyz Defense Minister Gen. Baktybek Bekbolotov about important issues in the region…. The Chairman of the General Staff of the Armed Forces said, “Given the border disputes and conflicts between Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in September [2022], the Islamic Republic of Iran has always stated its readiness for any assistance in order to resolve peacefully and prevent any conflict. Referring to the issue of sending Iranian drones to Tajikistan, Maj. Gen. Bagheri noted, “The Ababil-2 drones are only capable of reconnaissance, and such drones are not equipped with weapons and offensive equipment. In the border conflict between the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Iranian armed forces have always emphasized to the Tajik armed forces that the drones should not be used in conflicts between the two countries.

Notes:

[1] The Telegram statement can be found here: https://t.me/s/pogrankg/416.  

[2] For background on the Iranian drone program and its exports, see: Michael Rubin, “A Short History of the Iranian Drone Program,” American Enterprise Institute, August 2020. https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/A-short-history-of-the-Iranian-drone-program.pdf?x91208

[3] For background, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Opens New Drone Plant in Tajikistan,” OEW, July 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/420285

Image Information:

Image: The Ababil-2 drone which the Islamic Republic of Iran exported to Tajikistan.
Source: https://img9.irna.ir/d/r2/2022/05/17/4/169684358.jpg?ts=1652774226121
Attribution: Islamic Republic News Agency

Central Asian Forces Boosting UAV Capabilities

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TAI Anka at Teknofest 2019.

TAI Anka at Teknofest 2019.

“Maintenance and repairs of the UAV will be carried out at a joint venture in Kazakhstan.”

In March 2022, Kyrgyzstan’s Border Guards carried out an exercise with their recently acquired Turkish Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).  Shortly after that, Tajikistan’s defense minister visited Turkey and met with representatives from Baykar, the makers of the Bayraktar TB2 being used in Ukraine with much fanfare.  The meeting triggered speculation that Tajikistan is planning to acquire the Bayraktar TB2, but Tajik officials did not confirm this.  The accompanying excerpted articles report on drone-related developments in Central Asia and provide insight into the role they could play in the region over the next several years.

The excerpted article from independent Tajik news website Asia Plus reports on the establishment of an enterprise in Tajikistan for the production of Iranian Ababil-2 UAVs.  The article provides no additional details about the production capacity of the facility, but notes that the Ababil is used mostly for reconnaissance and that it can be equipped as a loitering munition.  The article also quotes U.S. Ambassador to Tajikistan as recently saying that the United States “would provide Puma reconnaissance UAVs to the Tajik border guards.”

The excerpted article from independent news website Fergana Agency reports that a new joint Turkish-Kazakh enterprise will produce Turkish Aerospace Industries’ ANKA UAVs in Kazakhstan.  The article notes how Kazakhstan “will become the first foreign country to establish the production of ANKA attack drones” and that the Kazakh government bought three of the UAVs last year.  The early variants of the ANKA were only for reconnaissance, but recent variants can be equipped with a munition and it appears Kazakhstan will use one of these systems.

Neither article states whether Tajikistan or Kazakhstan will put their jointly produced UAVs into service with their respective ministries or another security force.  The governments of Central Asia have always put a high priority on border security forces and if Kyrgyzstan serves as an example, the border guards of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan could be the recipients of the new UAVs.  Regardless, the announcements of two new UAV production facilities shows how much of a priority governments in the region are putting on UAV capabilities.

Source:

“В Таджикистане открылось предприятие по производству иранских беспилотников (An enterprise for the production of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles opened in Tajikistan),” Asia Plus (an independent news website in Tajikistan), 17 May 2022. https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/security/20220517/v-tadzhikistane-otkrilos-iranskoe-predpriyatie-po-proizvodstvu-bespilotnikov

…an enterprise for the production of Iranian Ababil-2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has opened in Tajikistan. Tajik Defense Minister Sherali Mirzo and Chief of the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Mohammad Bokiri attended the opening…

IRNA reports that the enterprise was built “in order to strengthen and expand joint defense and military cooperation between the two countries thanks to the efforts and assistance of specialists from the Ministry of Defense and support of the Iranian Armed Forces.”…Details about the production capacity of the facility were not reported…

The Ababil is designed primarily for reconnaissance missions… The system can also be equipped with up to 40 kg of explosives, turning it into a loitering munition…

Previously, the U.S. Ambassador to Tajikistan, John Mark Pommersheim, stated at a press conference that the U.S. would provide Puma reconnaissance UAVs to the Tajik border guards…

Source: “В Казахстане наладят производство турецких беспилотников ANKA (Production of the Turkish unmanned aerial vehicle ANKA is being set up in Kazakhstan),” Fergana Agency (an independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 11 May 2022. https://fergana.agency/news/126095/

The Turkish ANKA unmanned aerial vehicle will be produced in Kazakhstan. This was reported by Andolu Agency, referring to the producer of the drones – Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ)…

Maintenance and repairs of the UAV will be carried out at a joint venture in Kazakhstan. Thus, it will become the first foreign country to establish the production of ANKA attack drones…

Last year, a contract was signed with the Kazakh side for the supply of ANKA UAVs to the republic. It was reported that Turkey, under this agreement, sold three systems to Kazakhstan…

Image Information:

Image: TAI Anka at Teknofest 2019.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TAI_Anka_Teknofest2019_(1).jpg
Attribution: CC BY YA 4.0

Iran Opens New Drone Plant in Tajikistan

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Tajik Minister of Defense Shir Ali Mirza with Mohammed Bagheri, chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces.

Tajik Minister of Defense Shir Ali Mirza with Mohammed Bagheri, chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces.

“God willing, in the future we will see more cooperation and interaction from all levels of military defense between Iran and Tajikistan.”

The excerpted article from one of Iran’s major economic newspapers, Eghtesad News, illustrates how Iran uses drones to secure diplomatic objectives.  The article discusses Iran’s Army Chief of Staff General Mohammed Bagheri’s recent visit to Tajikistan, where he attended the inauguration of the Ababil-2 [RG1] drone plant in Dushanbe.  In meetings with Tajik officials, Bagheri also discussed common defense of the border against the Taliban. Tehran appears not to have offered Tajikistan the rights to manufacture the Ababil-3 presumably to maintain its own qualitative military edge among regional states and because of Tajikistan’s continued warm relationship with the United States.  The Ababil-3 is larger, has a reported flight endurance of eight hours, and a maximum ceiling of 15,000 feet.

While some countries, such as Turkey, export drones to cement partnerships with countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, Iranian strategy differs as Iran authorizes the manufacture of its drones abroad.  In addition to providing drones to allies, this strategy also gives Iran plausible deniability in the case of nonstate actors like Lebanon’s Hezbollah or Yemen’s Houthis using Iranian-made drones.  It also creates international clients for ongoing military equipment and hardware sales.

Iran may have turned to drone diplomacy with Tajikistan for several reasons.  Iran has long considered Tajikistan within its own cultural circle because of the common language—Tajik is a dialect of Persian (Farsi), the official language of Iran.  However, Iran-Tajikistan relations have not always been smooth.  Emomali Rahmon, who has dominated Tajikistan since 1994, resented Iran’s backing of the Islamic opposition during the civil war that dominated the first decade of Tajik independence.  For its part, Tajikistan has buried its frustration with Iran and other regional states to make common cause against the Taliban in recent years.

Source:

“Eftetah-e Karkhaneh Tavalid-e Pehpad-e Irani Ababil-2 dar Tajikistan (Inauguration of the Iranian Ababil-2 UAV plant in Tajikistan), Eghtesad News (major Iranian economic newspaper), 17 May 2022. https://www.eghtesadnews.com/بخش-اخبار-سیاسی-57/495755-افتتاح-کارخانه-تولید-پهپاد-ایرانی-ابابیل-در-تاجیکستان

Inauguration of Ababil-2 UAV Plant in Tajikistan
In order to strengthen and develop joint defense and military cooperation between the two countries and with the efforts of defense industry experts of the Ministry of Defense and the support of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Ababil-2 UAV plant was inaugurated in Dushanbe in the presence of General Bagheri and Minister of Defense Shir Ali Mirza and a high-ranking group of commanders in the Tajikistan capital of Dushanbe.

General Bagheri pointed out that the Islamic Republic of Iran, with the efforts of its committed specialists and scientists and using its internal capabilities, has been able to have a significant growth in all military and defense dimensions, especially drones. “Today we are in a position where we can export military equipment to allied and friendly countries in addition to meeting domestic needs in order to increase security and lasting peace,” he said. The Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces described the opening of the Ababil-2 plant in Tajikistan as a turning point in military cooperation between the two countries, adding: “God willing, in the future we will see more cooperation and interaction from all levels of military defense between Iran and Tajikistan.”

Image Information:

Image: Tajik Minister of Defense Shir Ali Mirza with Mohammed Bagheri, chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces
Source: EghtesadNews; https://shorturl.at/hoFNW
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