Tag Archives: Russia

People’s Liberation Army Discusses Low-Altitude Air Control

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Soldier from Ukrainian 25th Air Assault Brigade employing Small bomb carrying UAV.

“Low altitude is the “junction” connecting airspace and land. With the rapid development and large-scale application of low-altitude combat equipment such as helicopters, small and medium-sized unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles, the low-altitude battlefield has become increasingly important, and low-altitude control has become one of the comprehensive dominances that must be seized in future land warfare.”

A recent PLA Daily article discusses the importance of low-altitude air control for ground operations and its difference from traditional concepts of air dominance.[i] The article appears to be influenced by recent conflicts such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Seizing low-altitude air control requires an integrated air defense and distributed, networked, system of systems integrating ground and low-altitude air systems with modular, mobile, multi-domain capabilities.  The importance of seizing low-altitude air control[ii] is based on the large-scale use of small and medium unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), helicopters, and cruise missiles. Traditional air dominance[iii] cannot guarantee low-altitude air control due to the sundry of small arms and short-range systems that threaten low flying airframes. The author argues that traditional air dominance operations are generally more centralized, while low-altitude air control is an ongoing, independent, and decentralized tactical operation that seizes control in a certain location for a limited time. Decentralized low-altitude air defense operations to seize control require accurate intelligence with the capability to distinguish between friend and foe, coordinated communications, and timely warning of air threats.

Achieving the capability to control the low-altitude air space even for short periods will threaten an adversary’s ability to employ UAVs and fixed and rotary winged aviation. The author urges the PLA to accelerate the development of intelligent air control UAVs with swarming capabilities, loitering munitions, detection systems to identify low, slow, micro-targets, and innovative tactics to seize low-altitude air control in the critical place and time to influence ground combat. . The capability to control the low-altitude air space would give the PLA a significant advantage protecting its forces and critical infrastructure.

Source:

夺取未来陆战低空制权 (Seize the low-altitude dominance of future land warfare),” PLA Daily (official PRC military newspaper), 23 May 2023. http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2023-05-23&paperNumber=07&articleid=906414

“Low-altitude control is a relatively independent and decentralized tactical-level space control. Low altitude control cannot be achieved and controlled through a single operation or a stage of centralized air control operations. Seizing low altitude control power will run through the entire process of combat, displaying a “distributed, discrete” form with strong tactical, regional, mobile, and full process characteristics. Even without the guarantee of traditional air supremacy, through active actions, it is possible to seize low-altitude supremacy in a certain area and within a certain time limit, forming a low-altitude combat advantage.

To seize low altitude dominance, we should focus on the characteristics of the struggle for low altitude control, establish the concept of “relying on ground control, dynamic control, precise control, and flexible use of air”, and follow the basic principle of “whoever uses it seizes it, seizes it as needed, and manages it as needed”. By seizing it in combat, maneuvering, and using it, we can respectively seize low-altitude control power in the task area through relatively independent and dispersed low-altitude combat and low-altitude air defense operations. At the same time, it is necessary to dynamically implement low altitude airspace monitoring and management, establish a low altitude multi-means and multi-mode monitoring system, fully grasp low altitude situations, strengthen collaborative communication, accurately distinguish between enemy and friendly platforms, timely warning, quickly strike and destroy enemy air combat equipment and air control equipment, accurately handle our air conflicts, and ensure effective control of low altitude and ultra-low altitude airspace.

The low-altitude power struggle in future intelligent warfare will become more intense. The Army’s field air defense system should continuously improve the comprehensive combat effectiveness of the low-altitude airspace, attach great importance to the construction of a distributed low-altitude operational system of systems based on the network, and rely on the network to build air-ground integration, the combination of detection, attack and defense, and mobility, modular low-altitude operational system of systems. Focus on strengthening the research and development of low-altitude detection and monitoring platforms to achieve rapid network deployment and low-altitude ultra-low-altitude high-sensitivity dynamic monitoring, and improve the ability to detect “low, slow and small” aircraft; accelerate the development of intelligent air-controlling UAVs, loitering missiles, and “swarms” to enrich the air-to-ground and multi-mode guidance, multi-mechanism killing, and multi-domain attack capabilities; Continue to improve the ability to detect and attack low-altitude small and micro targets, accelerate the development of new mechanism combat equipment, and form a low-altitude combat capability that covers multiple levels of campaigns, tactics, and operational units.

Notes:

[i] For additional information and perspective, see: Thomas Shrimpton, “Chinese Perspective on Manned-Unmanned Coordinated Operations on the Modern Battlefield,” OE Watch, 06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-perspective-on-manned-unmanned-coordinated-operations-on-the-modern-battlefield/

[ii] The ability to neutralize enemy air defenses and other weapons systems that could attack low flying aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, and cruise missiles would appear difficult to achieve since these weapons would include small arms and short-range gun and missiles systems.

[iii] The PLA defines air dominance or “command of the air” as the Air Force and other services controlling the battlespace for a period of time. Presumably this encompasses offensive and defensive operations, including electronic and information warfare, to neutralize the enemy’s air defense capabilities. The reference to “a period of time” likely indicates the difficulty of sustaining command of the air.

Image Information:

Image: Soldier from Ukrainian 25th Air Assault Brigade employing Small bomb carrying UAV.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:UA_25th_DShV_Bde_Mavic_3_bomber_01.jpg
Attribution: CC By 4.0

Malian Special Forces Sustain Collaboration With Russia’s Wagner Group

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Russian security IN Bangui

“The BAFS was the gateway for Wagner’s mercenaries into the center of the country.”

On 29 May, Le Monde, the French-language publication covering international affairs in France and Francophone countries, reported on the Malian Autonomous Special Forces Battalion (BAFS), which is the conduit for Russian Wagner mercenaries to support the Malian army. BAFS became widely known among Mali observers when one of its members, Colonel Assimi Goita, launched a coup in 2020 that brought himself into power. According to the article, BAFS’ importance increased after it participated in the military coup in 2020 and then helped topple the transitional government in 2021.[i] After this second coup, relations with France and other Western countries soured and the new coup leaders welcomed Wagner Group to support BAFS. Wagner now has 1,600 troops in Mali and its current objective is ostensibly to fight alongside the BAFS in counterterrorism operations in central Mali, according to the Le Monde article. However, the article claims summary executions have occurred when BAFS and Wagner Group operate together. Malian leaders claim “only terrorists” are killed in these operations and have vociferously rejected any criticisms of BAFS’ cooperation with Wagner Group, indicating that Wagner will remain in Mali.[ii]

Sources:

“Massacre de Moura au Mali: ce que l’on sait des deux militaires sanctionnés par les Etats-Unis (Massacre of Moura in Mali: what we know about the two soldiers sanctioned by the United States)” lemonde.fr (French daily with a focus on analysis and opinion and with socialist leanings), 29 May 2023. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/05/29/massacre-de-moura-au-mali-ce-que-l-on-sait-des-deux-militaires-sanctionnes-par-les-etats-unis_6175335_3212.html

Mali remains plagued by both security and political instability: the military retook power from civilians after two coups in August 2020 and May 2021.

The BAFS was the gateway for Wagner’s mercenaries into the center of the country. Deployed in Mali to help Bamako fight terrorism, the Russian private security group, which now has nearly 1,600 men on the ground, gained a foothold in the center of the country in early 2022.

It is from this locality that Wagner and the FAMA conduct a large part of their anti-terrorist operations in the center and during which several instances of abuses against civilians have been noted by humanitarian and human rights organizations.

The Malian government maintains that only “terrorist fighters” were killed by the army in Moura and it persists, moreover, in denying the presence of Wagner in the country, despite confirmations of the deployment of the group in Mali emanating from the Russian authorities.

Notes:

[i] Mali’s first military coup occurred in 2020 when a group of soldiers from the Malian army mutinied and arrested President Ibrahim Boubakar Keita and forced him to resign and dissolve the government and National Assembly. Although the mutinying soldiers promised to hold elections and reinstate the constitutional system, no clear path for transition emerged. Subsequently, nine months later, in 2021, Mali’s military arrested the interim civilian president and prime minister whose appointments the previous military coup leaders had overseen, but now the coup leaders claimed that the cabinet formed by the civilian leaders violated the terms of Mali’s transition charter. Although that charter called for new democratic elections to be held in February 2022 to fully restore Mali to civilian rule, the coup leaders have not held those elections and remain in power. This has led to deteriorating relations with the West and has coincided with closer relations with Russia. See Ena Dion, “After Two Coups, Mali Needs Regional Support to Bolster Democracy,” United States Institute of Peace, 9 December 2021. https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/12/after-two-coups-mali-needs-regional-support-bolster-democracy

[ii] The mutiny by Wagner Group CEO Yevgeny Prigozhin in June 2023 seems to have little effect on Wagner’s presence in Africa, including in Central African Republic (CAR), where its force is larger than in any other African country. The Russian Ambassador to CAR has claimed there are 1,890 “Russian instructors” in the country, who are reportedly “running” the country alongside the CAR government and have “displaced” the former colonial and post-colonial power, France. See Al-Jazeera, “Russian envoy says 1,890 Russian ‘instructors’ are in CAR,” 3 February 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/3/russian-envoy-says-1890-russian-instructors-in-central-african-republic-ria

Image Information:

Image: RussiansecurityBangui
Source: Corbeau News Centrafrique, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Russian_mercenaries_in_Koundili.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Iran’s Proposed Maritime Security Alliance Draws Mixed Reviews

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North Arabian Sea (Jan. 19, 2021)

“Iran’s actual and real success in forming [the new naval alliance] is an imposition of a new deterrence theory and a great challenge to the United States of America and its hegemony in the region, which it is slowly losing.”

In early June 2023, Iran’s navy commander suggested that Tehran was on the verge of establishing a regional naval security alliance that would include India, Pakistan, and several Arab Gulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia.[i] Reactions in Arabic-language media were mixed. Outlets affiliated with or supportive of China, Iran, and Russia portrayed the announcement as a highly consequential move that would further erode, if not fully negate, U.S. regional influence. However, the announcement was essentially ignored by mainstream Arabic-language Gulf media outlets from the countries purported to form the alliance’s backbone, most notably Saudi Arabia.

The first accompanying source, an excerpt from Russia’s Sputnik Arabic, characterizes the proposed alliance as a one-time “fantasy” that has become an imminent reality made possible by the U.S. failure to provide regional maritime security. The second accompanying source, from a report in China’s CGTN Arabic, argues that the China-brokered Saudi-Iran détente has created favorable conditions for regional security cooperation between Iran and the Arab Gulf states.[ii] The third accompanying source, an opinion piece in the pro-Iranian Lebanese media outlet al-Mayadeen, describes how this new alliance constitutes Iran’s “imposition of a new deterrence theory and a great challenge to the United States of America and its hegemony in the region,” as well as “a practical reality, a fatal blow to the strategic interests of Israel.” Although not a tacit rejection of the idea, other Gulf media outlets have been less enthusiastic and officials from the Arab states involved have not commented. Prominent Saudi media outlets, such as al-Sharq al-Awsat and al-Riyadh, have also kept quiet. By contrast, Saudi media outlets have vocally expressed new alignment with Iran on regional matters, most notably Syrian normalization since Saudi Arabia’s May 2023 détente with Iran. Iran’s inclusion in the Russo-Chinese “Maritime Security Belt” exercises in the Indian Ocean, most recently in March 2023, indicate the possibility of a Russo-Chinese role in encouraging a regional naval coalition that marginalizes the United States’ role. Chinese interest in and encouragement of this Iranian-led security mechanism, if genuine, suggests that Saudi leadership might take the idea more seriously than the lack of media coverage would otherwise suggest.

Sources:

“تحالف بحري بين إيران والخليج… لماذا أصبح من الضروري أن تحافظ دول المنطقة على أمنها بنفسها؟

(Naval alliance between Iran and the Gulf… Why did it become necessary for regional countries to guarantee their own security?),” Sputnik Arabic (Russian Arabic-language media outlet), 5 June 2023. https://sputnikarabic.ae/20230605/تحالف-بحري-بين-إيران-والخليج-لماذا-أصبح-من-الضروري-أن-تحافظ-دول-المنطقة-على-أمنها-بنفسها-1077771292.html

A few weeks ago, talk of an alliance including Iran and the Gulf countries together was a fantasy, but it has become a reality with the announcement of the imminent formation of a naval alliance that includes the countries of the region… Hassan Ibrahim Al-Nuaimi, an Emirati political analyst, considered that the countries of the region suffered from maritime threats, while foreign countries failed to secure the seas in the region. Thus, it became clear to the Arab Gulf states that these foreign countries only pursue their own agendas, and do not care about the interests of other countries.

“إيران تخطط لتشكيل تحالف بحري وسط تحسين العلاقات في الشرق الأوسط

(Iran plans naval alliance amidst improving relations in Middle East),” CGTN Arabic (Chinese Arabic-language media outlet), 6 June 2023. https://arabic.cgtn.com/news/2023-06-06/1666049661388214273/index.html

Iran’s proposal for a security alliance or coordination mechanism with Gulf countries is completely natural. Iran had the idea, and it is not a new one, but conditions were not adequate in the past…

” تحالف دولي.. إيران في مواجهة هيمنة أميركا على المنطقة

(International alliance… Iran confronting American regional hegemony),” al-Mayadeen (pro-Iran Lebanese media outlet), 12 June 2023. https://www.almayadeen.net/articles/تحالف-دولي-إيران-في-مواجهة-هيمنة-أميركا-على-المنطقة

Iran’s actual and real success in forming it is an imposition of a new deterrence theory and a great challenge to the United States of America and its hegemony in the region, which it is slowly losing… The international naval alliance is a joint security project for Iran and the Gulf states, the realization of which constitutes a practical reality, a fatal blow to the strategic interests of “Israel” in that region…

Notes:

[i] In addition to Pakistan and India, Iran’s proposed alliance is to include Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Iraq.

[ii] The CGTN video report cites Dr. Niu Xinchun, the Director of Middle East Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). http://www.cicir.ac.cn/NEW/en-us/Institution.html?subtype=Middle%20East&&type=region

Image Information:

Image:  North Arabian Sea (Jan. 19, 2021)
Source: Photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Jose Madrigal, https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6493578/nimitz-transits-arabian-sea  
Attribution: Public Domain

Armenia Questions Continuing Its Membership in Russia-Led Regional Security Body

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Before the meeting of the leaders of the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. From left to right: CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas, Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, and President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon

“After Russia’s refusal to intervene in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020, Armenia’s confidence in the benefits of participating in the Collective Security Treaty Organization has weakened to the point of threats to leave the CSTO.” 

Armenia has long considered ending its membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) due to a perceived lack of support from the organization following numerous clashes with its neighbor Azerbaijan, which is not a CSTO member. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s statement on 22 May that Armenia is considering leaving the organization marked the latest in a series of disputes between Armenia and CSTO leadership that could be a turning point for its role in the organization. The accompanying excerpted article from the independent, Caucasus-focused website Kavkazskiy Uzel provides a look at the issues Armenia has with the CSTO. The article notes “the degree of Armenia’s unfriendly rhetoric towards Russia has been rising” since the CSTO refused to intervene in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. In the fall of 2021, Pashinyan made a comment that “Armenia was not going to consider the possibility of leaving” the CSTO, but this position has changed since then. The article notes how the organization and Russia responded to recent incidents between Armenia and Azerbaijan. From Armenia’s perspective, clashes over Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2022 should have triggered the CSTO’s collective defense clause, but the organization declined to intervene. This damaged Armenia’s already tenuous relations with the CSTO in addition to straining Armenian-Russian relations, as Armenian officials believed Russia has failed to pressure Azerbaijan to stop attacks against their country.[i] The article also notes that Pashinyan refused to sign a CSTO declaration in December 2022, declined to host a previously planned CSTO joint military exercise in Armenia in 2023,[ii] and refused to host CSTO observers. Armenia’s relations with the CSTO have become bad enough that the CSTO Secretary General became concerned that Armenia will withdraw from the organization.

Sources:

“Главное о критике Арменией ОДКБ и Кремля (The crux of Armenia’s criticism of the CSTO and the Kremlin),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website), 23 May 2023. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/386973/

After Russia’s refusal to intervene in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020, Armenia’s confidence in the benefits of participating in the Collective Security Treaty Organization has weakened to the point of threats to leave the CSTO. The “Caucasian Knot” has prepared a report on how the degree of Armenia’s unfriendly rhetoric towards Russia has been rising… 

During the aggravation of the Karabakh conflict in 2020, Armenia turned to the CSTO for help. In response, Moscow stated that it could not help, since the borders of Armenia were not violated, the war took place on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. During the 2020 war, the Kremlin limited itself to political support for Yerevan, and then sent peacekeepers to the Karabakh conflict zone…In the fall of 2021, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, commenting on Armenia’s criticism of the CSTO in connection with Russia’s position on the conflict in Karabakh, stated that Armenia was not going to consider the possibility of leaving this organization. However, two years later, Armenia’s rhetoric on this issue changed.  

In the spring of 2022, Nikol Pashinyan accused the CSTO of not properly responding to the actions of the Azerbaijani military in the Sotk-Khoznavar sector. “The way the CSTO reacted to what happened was a failure for the organization itself. Contrary to existing procedures, the CSTO has not decided to conduct monitoring at the site at the moment, justifying the long-standing fears of the Armenian public that an organization important for the security of Armenia will not do anything at the right time,” said the Armenian Prime Minister… 

According to Pashinyan, during the discussion of security issues in the CSTO, he received clear assurances that the Armenian border was a “red line” for the organization, but “it turned out that red lines exist only in words.” “This is important not only for Armenia, but also for the CSTO, because if you say that there is no border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, then there is no CSTO, because the CSTO has a zone of responsibility, which is defined by borders. If there is no border, then there is no area of responsibility; if there is no area of responsibility, then there is no organization,” Pashinyan said. 

On November 23, 2022, Nikol Pashinyan refused to sign the declaration of the Collective Security Council (CSC) of the CSTO and the draft decision on assistance to Yerevan. The reason was the lack of a clear political position of the organization on the issue of Azerbaijan’s actions… 

In January 2023, Nikol Pashinyan stated that Yerevan considers it inappropriate to hold CSTO exercises in Armenia. “The Armenian Defense Ministry has already informed the CSTO Joint Headquarters in writing that we consider it inappropriate to conduct exercises in Armenia in the current situation…” he said.  

Commenting on the possibility of Armenia’s withdrawal from the CSTO, Nikol Pashinyan replied that the Armenian side would be guided by the state interests in this decision…“When the CSTO Secretary General arrived in Armenia in 2022, he told me that the CSTO was concerned that Armenia would withdraw from the Organization. I said that this concern is out of place, but there is another concern that the CSTO may withdraw from Armenia. My assessment now is this: the CSTO, willingly or not, is leaving Armenia. And this worries us,” Pashinyan repeated… 

On May 22, 2022, Nikol Pashinyan confirmed at a press conference that the issue of Armenia’s withdrawal from the bloc remains on the agenda… 

He also explained why Armenia refused CSTO observers, being a member of this military bloc. “The CSTO mission does not operate on the territory of Armenia for the simple reason that, in fact, the organization does not indicate its vision of the territory and borders of Armenia. 90 percent of the problems stem from this,” the prime minister said.

Notes:

[i] For more background on the strained relations between Armenia and Russia, see: Matthew Stein “Armenia Acquires Indian Multiple Rocket Launcher System Amid Delays in Russian Deliveries,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

[ii] For more background on Armenia’s refusal to sign the CSTO declaration, see: Matthew Stein “Armenia Takes Another Step Away From Russia,” OE Watch, 2-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: Before the meeting of the leaders of the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. From left to right: CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas, Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, and President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CSTO_Summit_2022_01.jpg   
Attribution: CCA 4.0 

Russia Possibly Courting Eritrea for Red Sea Naval Base

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Massawa harbour

“The [Russian and Eritrean] leaders plan to discuss the prospects for the development of Russian-Eritrean relations in various fields, as well as topics of regional and international concern.”

On 31 May, the Russian government-affiliated TASS news agency, published the excerpted article about Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki’s visit to Moscow to meet with Russian President Putin. According to the article, the leaders discussed Russia’s war in Ukraine and other issues, such as academic exchanges and trade. Russia is interested in Eritrea because of its location adjacent to the Red Sea and its demonstrations of loyalty to the Kremlin, according to a second article from the Ukrainian publication focus.ua. This article notes that Eritrea was the only African country to vote against a UN General Assembly decision for Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine in March 2022.[i] Russia had previously signed an agreement with Sudan to base four Russian ships and 300 soldiers in Port Sudan, seeking a foothold on the Red Sea, according to the focus.ua article. The article notes that Sudan has not ratified the agreement, and the country’s ongoing conflict and Western pressure may cause the country’s authorities to reverse the deal. Eritrea, which borders Sudan, would provide Russia with an alternate base location near the Red Sea should the Sudan agreement not materialize. The Red Sea has strategic importance for Russia. Not only does 10 percent of global maritime traffic pass through it, but Russia’s competitors and other major powers, such as the United States and China, have naval bases along the Red Sea in Djibouti, which borders Eritrea to the south.[ii] However, Russia’s naval presence near one of the world’s major trade arteries represents expansionist intentions from the Ukrainian perspective represented in the article.

“Путин начал переговоры с президентом Эритреи (Putin Begins Discussions with the President of Eritrea),” tass.ru (Russian government-affiliated publication), 31 May 2023. https://tass.ru/politika/17892945

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the head of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki, who is in Russia on an official visit. The leaders plan to discuss the prospects for the development of Russian-Eritrean relations in various fields, as well as topics of regional and international concern. The current talks were the first meeting between the leaders of the two countries. 

According to data for 2022, the trade turnover between Russia and Eritrea amounted to $13.5 million, while exports from Russia to Eritrea accounted for $12.7 million. Since 2015, Eritreans have been provided with scholarships to study at Russian universities.

“Завоевание Африки. Зачем Кремлю военная база в Красном море (Why a Russian Base on the Red Sea?),” focus.ua (Russian and Ukrainian language Ukrainian magazine focusing on global economics), 16 February 2023. https://focus.ua/world/550262-zavoevanie-afriki-zachem-kremlyu-voennaya-baza-v-krasnom-more

Russia does not abandon attempts to expand control over African states.

Wherever there are “Wagners”, companies associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin gain access to the natural resources of these countries and a certain political influence on them (usually they are authoritarian regimes). There is information about the presence of this group of mercenaries in Mali, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Madagascar, Libya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and possibly Eritrea. 

Most likely, the military authorities of Sudan intend to receive weapons from the Russian Federation for their army, and also consider Russia’s military presence as one of the factors guaranteeing the preservation of the political processes in the country after the presidential and parliamentary elections. For Russia, hosting a base carries a wide range of political benefits. First of all, it is a presence in a region that is strategically important for the entire planet. The Red Sea has played an important role in world trade since the beginning of navigation. Now 10% of all maritime trade passes through it.We are mentioning that at a hypothetical military base (most likely it will be in Port Sudan) no more than four ships and 300 soldiers can be located at the same time. Time will tell how Sudan behaves in such circumstances. However, the growing influence of Russia in Africa, especially in the area of important trade routes, should be a wake-up call for the democratic part of the world.

Notes:

[i] In March 2023, five countries, including Belarus, North Korea, Syria, Eritrea, and Russia itself, voted against the UN General Assembly resolution that “demand[ed] that Russia “immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.” Sudan, in contrast, was one of 35 countries that abstained from the vote. See UNGA, “General Assembly resolution demands end to Russian offensive in Ukraine,” 2 March 2022. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152

[ii] The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) opened a “logistical support facility” in Djibouti in 2017 with the potential to support China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and protect Chinese interests and nationals in Africa and the Middle East more broadly. Chinese ambitions in Djibouti were also reflected in China’s desire to compete with Russia, which itself had strengthened its base in Tartus, Syria during the Syrian civil war. Jean-Pierre Cabestan (2020), “China’s Military Base in Djibouti: A Microcosm of China’s Growing Competition with the United States and New Bipolarity,” Journal of Contemporary China, 29:125, 731-747.

Image Information:

Image: Massawa harbour
Source: Reinhard Dietrich, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Massawa_harbour.JPG
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Russia and China Expanding Coast Guard Cooperation in Arctic

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“Cooperation on Coast Guard tasks is both a concrete action and often seen as more harmless than military cooperation. The Coast Guard’s work is about protecting sovereign rights at sea, like fishing resources and access to oil and gas. Letting China in when it comes to fisheries inspections would be a big step in practical cooperation that has a security element to it.”

A new agreement with Russia’s Coast Guard will give China greater access to the Arctic, according to the following excerpted article in Norway-based The Barents Observer.This is something China has sought as a “near Arctic” nation. China has long claimed a special status in Arctic relations since its proclamation that the “Arctic belongs to the world and China has the largest portion of the earth’s population.” Cooperation between the Russian and Chinese Coast Guards can be an important step in China’s ability to gain more access to Arctic waters. The agreement on joint coastal operations could also give China a stronger voice in dictating Arctic policy. An analyst quoted in the article sees this as a significant policy shift for Russia, concluding that “Russia is generally skeptical about letting China get too close in the Arctic, but the Ukraine war might have changed those calculations.” The article suggests the presence of Chinese Coast Guard vessels patrolling Arctic waters, should it come to that, will make Norway’s cooperation with Russia’s Coast Guard even more difficult.

Sources:

Thomas Nilsen, “Russia’s Coast Guard cooperation with China is a big step, Arctic security expert says”, The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 28 April 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/04/russias-arctic-coast-guard-cooperation-china-big-step-expert

On 24 April, a groundbreaking memorandum on extensive cooperation in Artic waters was signed with FSB Coast Guard. The Chinese Coast Guard was then invited to observe the long-planned “Arctic Patrol 2023” maritime security exercise. On 27 April, Governor Andrei Chibis met Chinese diplomats and discussed a roadmap for increased business, shipbuilding and Northern Sea Route developments. Amid the Ukraine war and halt in cooperation with the other seven Arctic nations, Russia turns east for new partners. Opening the door for China is a significant geopolitical change.

“Cooperation on Coast Guard tasks is both a concrete action and often seen as more harmless than military cooperation,” explained Andreas Østhagen, an expert on Arctic security with the Firdtjof Nansen Institute. “The Coast Guard’s work is about protecting sovereign rights at sea, like fishing resources and access to oil and gas. Letting China in when it comes to fisheries inspections would be a big step in practical cooperation that has a security element to it,” Osthagen stated. Government officials in Beijing have for years said China is a “near-Arctic state,” but so far, its presence up North has been limited to participating in conferences, annual research voyages, some few investments in Russia’s natural resource developments, and a few Asia-Europe shipments along the Northern Sea Route.

“China’s Polar Silk Road project seems to be more wait-and-see,” write researchers Frédéric Lasserre and Hervé Baudu in a report  published in April about the consequences of the war in Ukraine in the Arctic. The report, however, underlines that China is readily credited with great Arctic ambitions, but for now, mainly focused on securing hydrocarbon supplies from Siberia.  China has its own projects under construction. Barges for two additional floating nuclear power plants for the north coast of Siberia and a nuclear-powered icebreaker are currently under construction at a yard in China.

The Russia-China memorandum signed in Murmansk opens the opportunity for joint efforts to combat terrorism, illegal migration, fighting smuggling of drugs and weapons, as well as stopping illegal fishing. The deal was signed by top leaders with FSB Border Guards and the Chinese Coast Guard.

“This testifies that Russia actively wants to invite China into the kind of tasks we have thought Russia would safeguard,” Andreas Østhagen states, finding this a significant shift in policy. “We have thought that Russia is generally skeptical about letting China get too close in the Arctic, but the Ukraine war might have changed those calculations,” He notes that the future of China-Russian Arctic cooperation is difficult to predict, but he makes one comparison: “This reminds me a bit of when my mother-in-law wants to stay with us for a couple of weeks “until she finds something else.”

For Russia, the exercise showcasing FSB Border Guards’ maritime capabilities for the Chinese visitors wasn’t aimed at fishery inspections in the Barents Sea. This was hard-core security, as previously instilled by strongman Ramzan Kadyrov’s special Rosgvardia forces in the Arctic, including at the nuclear icebreaker base in Murmansk.

The exercise scenario was FSB fighting terrorists that had attacked Rosatomflot’s nuclear transport ship “Rosita” in Kola Bay. “All the inputs worked out during the practical maritime exercise confirmed the readiness of interdepartmental structures to solve problems in the waters of the Northern Sea Route,” said acting director of Atomflot Leonid Irlitsa.

Rosatomflot oversees Russia’s Northern Sea Route Directorate. The state-owned company is currently boosting the number of nuclear icebreakers and support infrastructure, key to President Putin’s great Arctic ambitions.  For neighboring Norway, FSB Coast Guards’ new cooperation with China could pose a challenge.“Although I think we are far away from seeing Chinese Coast Guard or naval vessels performing tasks in the Barents Sea, for Norway that would entail a new security challenge and make cooperation with the Russian Coast Guard (FSB) even more difficult,” says Andreas Østhagen. Norwegian-Russian Coast Guard cooperation in the Barents Sea is one of very few areas of contact that has not been officially called off by Oslo after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year.

Russia Positions Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Belarus

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President Putin and Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, Eurasian Economic Forum, 24 May 2023

“Belarus is now becoming Russia’s “nuclear queen” on the borders with NATO and Ukraine.”

The current Russian leadership appears to be taking concrete measures to reposition non-strategic nuclear weapons into Belarus to support its military operations in Ukraine, according to the pro-Kremlin site Century. A key element of the Kremlin’s propaganda over the past decade has been its focus on its huge nuclear weapon arsenal, which it interprets to symbolize Russia’s superpower status. Not surprisingly, the Kremlin’s nuclear rhetoric escalated after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since then, senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly threatened to use these weapons to achieve their objectives in Ukraine.,

The transfer of Russian nuclear weapons into Belarus was not altogether unexpected. President Lukashenko of Belarus has increasingly become dependent upon Kremlin support over the past several years.[i] Belarus’s economic, defense, and foreign policies largely follow those of Russia. Lukashenko has permitted the Russian military to use Belarus as a staging area while  managing to prevent his soldiers from directly participating in the Ukrainian conflict.. To maintain the fiction of Belarus’ agency and independence, the article declares that “Lukashenko has long asked to place Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of his country.” While these nuclear weapons will remain under Russian control, President Putin addressed the training of Belarusian crews to deliver these bombs via Su-24 [RG1] aircraft or the Iskander-M [RG2] operational-tactical missile systems which belong to Belarus.[ii] According to the article, Putin argues that Russia is merely answering the United States in a “mirror way,” since “America stores 200 tactical nuclear weapons, mostly atomic bombs…in six European countries.” The article concludes with a quotation  from former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who claims that “the horsemen of the apocalypse are already on their way,” and that if Ukraine tries to recapture Crimea, it “would be grounds for Russia to use any weapon.”

Sources:

Alexander Pronin, “Ядерный ферзь России; Растущая милитаризация Европы и наш комплексный ответ (Nuclear Queen of Russia; The Growing Militarization of Europe and Our Comprehensive Response),” Century (pro-Kremlin site), 10 May 2023. https://www.stoletie.ru/rossiya_i_mir/jadernyj_ferz_rossii_537.htm

President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko has repeatedly raised the issue of deploying Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in the republic with the Russian leadership. The last time – in March of this year. His request is finally granted….

According to Putin, President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko has long asked to place Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of his country. He publicly announced this desire even before the start of Russia’s special operation in Ukraine, in 2021…

…The next public discussion of the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus took place in June 2022 during the talks between Lukashenka and Putin.

The Russian leader noted that at that moment in six European countries – NATO members – the Americans stored 200 tactical nuclear weapons, mostly atomic bombs….

“On July 1, we are completing the construction of a special storage facility for tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus,” Vladimir Putin said in March 2023 in Pavel Zarubin’s program.

…And he added that the training of Belarusian crews will begin on April 3. According to him, there are already carriers of (Russian) nuclear weapons in Belarus: these are the Su-24s, the Iskander-M operational-tactical missile systems, modified by agreement with Minsk, as well as our MiG-31s [RG1] ​​with Kinzhals, all this is covered modern air defense systems, including the transferred S-400 anti-aircraft missiles….

Thus, Belarus is now becoming Russia’s “nuclear queen” on the borders with NATO and Ukraine….

By the way, special ammunition will be stored and controlled by the Russian army…. The President of Russia made it clear that the decision of Moscow and Minsk is a response to the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, organized by the West.

“Each day of deliveries of foreign weapons to Ukraine ultimately brings this same nuclear apocalypse closer. This does not mean that it will definitely take place. But the horsemen of the apocalypse are already on their way and continue their movement, you can rest assured,” Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Head of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, commented on the decisions taken by NATO. In addition, Medvedev warned that Ukraine’s attempt to retake Crimea would be grounds to use any weapon, including those provided for by the “fundamentals of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.” He believes that an attempt to “split off part of the state” is equal to “an encroachment on the existence of the state itself.”

Notes:

[i] On paper, at least, Russia and Belarus have formed a “Union State.” The strength of this union improved after President Lukashenko appealed for Kremlin assistance in the summer of 2020. Lukashenko had falsified presidential election results, and when large protests broke out, Russia provided economic and security assistance to quell the demonstrations. Since then, Lukashenko’s room to maneuver has been limited.

[ii] Russia has repeatedly promised to move an airbase into western Belarus for the past several years. There has been some speculation that Russia will use this base as the storage site for its non-strategic nuclear weapons. For background, see: Ray Finch, “Russia Deploying Anti-NATO Air Assets in Belarus Under Guise of Training,” OE Watch, July 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: President Putin and Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, Eurasian Economic Forum, 24 May 2023
Source: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71198/photos/71199
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Intl

The Splitting of the Russian Western Military District

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Sukhoi Su-25 [RG1] of the Russian Air Force landing at Vladivostok

“A new air and air defense army will be deployed against NATO…”

Russia announced plans for a large expansion of the Russian Armed Forces at an extended session of the collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense held in December 2022.1Part of this plan involved the creation of two military districts and a new air and air defense army. The accompanying excerpted article from the pro-Kremlin daily newspaper Izvestiya discusses how Russian plans to create these two military districts and suggests how the new air and air defense army will be created. The Western Military District, which was created during the ‘New Look’ reforms, will be split into two new military districts that restore the previously abolished Moscow and Leningrad military districts.[i] The 6th Air and Air Defense Army in St. Petersburg will likely remain at its present location, and the new air and air defense army will likely be assigned to the Moscow Military District. The preponderance of the new air and air defense army’s combat power will be drawn from units currently in the 6th Air and Air Defense Army.

Sources:

Roman Kretsul Alexey Ramm, “Полетный рубеж: новая армия ВВС и ПВО прикроет западные границы России Ее развернут в Московском или Ленинградском военном округе (Flight milestone: the new army of the Air Force and Air Defense will cover the western borders of Russia It will be deployed in the Moscow or Leningrad military district),” Izvestiya (Pro-Kremlin daily newspaper), 6 June 2023. https://iz.ru/1523908/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/poletnyi-rubezh-novaia-armiia-vvs-i-pvo-prikroet-zapadnye-granitcy-rossii

A new air and air defense army will be deployed against NATO, sources in the Russian Defense Ministry told Izvestia. It will be formed in the Western strategic direction as part of the Moscow or Leningrad military district. It will consist of several fighter regiments, a bomber regiment, an army aviation brigade, as well as air defense units and radiotechnical troops. According to experts, the strengthening of the western borders by the Aerospace Forces is especially important against the backdrop of the entry into NATO of Finland and, in the near future, Sweden…

In early June, the head of the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate (GOMU) of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Yevgeny Burdinsky, confirmed that two military districts would be created this year. He also announced plans to create two armies – combined arms and air and air defense. The direction where they will be formed, Burdinsky did not specify…

Currently, the Western Military District includes the 6th Air and Air Defense Army. It consists of one composite aviation division, several helicopter regiments, and an army aviation brigade. Also, this formation has two air defense divisions equipped with S-300 [RG1] and S-400 [RG2] anti-aircraft systems. The zone of responsibility of the 6th Army is one of the biggest. It covers the territory of Russia from Karelia to Voronezh…This is not the first time in recent memory that the Ministry of Defense has strengthened the aviation component in the western strategic direction. As Izvestia earlier reported, this year ground attack aviation units, equipped with the famous ‘Rooks’, of the Su-25 attack family, should appear here. Until recently, there was not a single strike aviation regiment in the Western Military District. The task of the “Rooks” will be the direct support of the Ground Forces on the battlefield. The attack aircraft will also coordinate with army aviation helicopters…

Notes:

[i] The ‘New Look’ reforms were a series of major Russian military reforms that occurred from 2009-2012.

Image Information:

Image: Sukhoi Su-25 [RG1] of the Russian Air Force landing at Vladivostok
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukhoi_Su-25#/media/File:Sukhoi_Su-25_of_the_Russian_Air_Force_landing_at_Vladivostok_(8683076150).jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0

India Takes a Step Away from the Russian Defense Industry

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Abstract

India and Russia have had a long-standing security cooperation partnership, with India relying heavily on Russian weapons and equipment for its armed forces. However, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the Make in India initiative in 2014 to develop the country’s defense industry and reduce dependence on imports. The war in Ukraine has caused India to accelerate this process and end negotiations or cancel agreements with Russia on several weapon system acquisitions. Indian officials cited Russia’s logistical problems in delivering new systems as the reason for the cancellations. This article examines how the conflict in Ukraine has impacted one of Russia’s key security cooperation partnerships and how India’s defense industry is developing to produce replacements for these systems. The study provides insights into the challenges and opportunities for India to achieve its goal of self-reliance in defense production.

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2023-06-08 An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 2 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles)

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An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 2 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles). Click image to download.

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This study describes how Russian military theorists think about the initial period of war (IPW) concept and its relation to strategic operations, and posits that due to the nature of the special military operation, the IPW concept was likely in no way a part of the operational planning process. While there were likely political motivations for the use of the term “special military operation” instead of “war,” the term “war” was not used for the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, because it was not envisioned to meet the criteria for “war” as understood by Russian military theorists