Tag Archives: Russia

Russian Interference in Colombian Election Roils the Region

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Colombia President Gustavo Petro’s campaign received strong support from Russian bots and disinformation campaigns.

Colombia President Gustavo Petro’s campaign received strong support from Russian bots and disinformation campaigns.

“Gustavo Petro’s presidential campaign received a strong boost from Russia with fake accounts, orchestrated hashtags and mentions that sought to position the then candidate of the Historical Pact.”

Russia’s digital influence operations are robust throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. In the past, Russian bots and other digital interference strategies have worked to amplify divisive messages and pour fuel on social movements and protests in the regions.[i] More recently, Russia has engaged in robust propaganda and disinformation campaigns regarding the war in Ukraine.[ii] Recently, Colombia’s largest weekly magazine, Semana, published a report on Twitter’s release of materials about the country’s 2022 presidential campaign. Those materials, the outlet reports, show a strong level of support for then-candidate Gustavo Petro and false news about Petro’s principal rivals for the presidency. Moreover, they also amplified anti-U.S. and anti-Western rhetoric. Further, many of the message regarding Petro revolved around security cooperation and the so-called war on drugs, amplifying his message of the previous administration’s failure.[iii] The second excerpted article from Medellin’s leading daily newspaper, El Colombiano, states that Russia’s support for Petro included bots and fake accounts, orchestrated hashtags, mentions, and use of its outlets like Russia Today to support the candidate’s election and sow propaganda. The disclosures generated wide reaction among Colombia’s political class and generated further division between parties. Russia’s strong influence on Latin America’s information environment highlights its capacity to place propaganda in Spanish and Portuguese and elevate the messaging of fringe candidates who threaten constitutional order and stability throughout the hemisphere. Colombia is certainly not an isolated case. Latin American governments are often poorly equipped to deal with these challenges and for their parts, social media entities are often slower to take down fake news in Spanish and Portuguese than they are in English.

Sources: 

“Twitter desclasifica archivos secretos y estalla polémica contra el Gobierno: hubo injerencia indebida desde Rusia a favor de campaña de Gustavo Petro (Twitter declassifies secret files and controversy erupts against the Government: there was undue interference from Russia in favor of Gustavo Petro’s campaign),” Semana (Colombia’s largest weekly magazine and major news source in the country), 3 January 2023. https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/atencion-archivos-secretos-de-twitter-revelan-injerencia-indebida-desde-rusia-a-favor-de-la-campana-presidencial-de-gustavo-petro/202343/  

Gustavo Petro’s presidential campaign received a strong boost from Russia with fake accounts, orchestrated hashtags and mentions that sought to position the then candidate of the Historical Pact. This is evidenced by secret Twitter documents that were recently declassified by order of the CEO of the social network, Elon Musk… During the campaign, it was discovered that Sebastián Guanumen, one of the leaders of Petro’s digital strategy, gave the order to ‘run the ethical line’ to discredit then-candidate Petro’s main contenders. In this sense, digital narratives were created in which lies, insults and slander were then amplified.

“La campaña de Petro en Twitter tuvo ayuda rusa (Petro’s Twitter campaign had Russian help),” El Colombiano (the city of Medellín’s leading daily newspaper), 4 January 2023. https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/politica/rusia-habria-influido-en-las-elecciones-presidenciales-para-apoyar-a-petro-KJ19760596  

In one of the confidential texts, it was stated that in the midst of monitoring Twitter activity in South America, with special analysis in Venezuela, Cuba and Colombia, accounts were discovered that talked about the Petro campaign… In addition to the alleged support of Russian bots, the presidential campaign of the candidate of the Historical Pact was also involved in other controversies. The one that caused the most commotion was that of the ‘Petrovideos,’ in which conversations about communication strategies were recorded so that Petro would stand out by discrediting his competitors.

Notes:

[i] For more on Russia’s attempt to sow chaos and social division in Latin America, especially when protests break out, see: Lara Jakes, “As Protests in South America Surged, So Did Russian Trolls on Twitter, U.S. Finds,” New York Times, 29 January 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/19/us/politics/south-america-russian-twitter.html

[ii] For more details on Russia’s propaganda campaign and disinformation operations in Latin America regarding its war in Ukraine, see: Jessica Brandt and Valeria Wirtschafter “Working the Western Hemisphere: How Russia Spreads Propaganda about Ukraine in Latin America and the Impact of Platform Responses,” Brookings Institution, December 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/research/working-the-western-hemisphere/

[iii] For more information on President Petro’s drug policies and critique of the war on drugs, see coverage of his inaugural speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2022: “Irrational War on Drugs, Destruction of the Amazon, Expose Humanity’s Failures, Colombia’s Petro tells the U.N.,” United Nations, 20 September 2022. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/09/1127151

Image Information:

Image: Colombia President Gustavo Petro’s campaign received strong support from Russian bots and disinformation campaigns.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/gustavopetrourrego/21474562099 
Attribution: CC BY-NC 2.0

Russia Justifies Bringing Back T-62 Tank

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T-62M Tank.

T-62M Tank.

T-62M Tank.

T-62M Tank.

“…there is little doubt that the SMO could become a prelude to a more serious armed conflict with countries that have more advanced militaries. And that is why more modern and advanced vehicles should be reserved for this hypothetical war, since the modernized T-62 is more than enough for the current stage of the SMO.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the official logistics publication of the Russian Ministry of Defense, MTO Journal, discusses Russian reasoning for bringing the T-62 tank back into service for use in Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. The T-62 [R1] was retired from active service in the Russian Armed Forces after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War because it was seen as outdated and obsolete compared to newer tanks. In considering the T-62’s reintroduction, the author argues that the move is not due to recent massive tank losses, or the impact of international sanctions on the ability of UralVagonZavod, Russia’s tank manufacturer, to produce modern tanks such as the T-72B3[R2] , T-80BVM[R3] , and T-90M[R4] . Instead, he says that it is because in 2021, even before the start of its conflict in Ukraine, Russia had already established a new refurbishment program for the T-62[R5] . Furthermore, the author posits that more modern tanks should be conserved in the event of “a more serious armed conflict with countries that have more advanced militaries.” T-62 Russian Medium Tank

Source:

Boris Dzherelievsky, “Т-62: ветеран снова в строю (T-62: The Veteran Returns to the Ranks),”

MTO Journal (official logistics publication of the Russian Ministry of Defense), January 2023.  https://mto.ric.mil.ru/upload/site193/3jW5JVFpXH.pdf

The launch of UralVagonZavod’s large-scale modernization program of the Soviet-era T-62 main battle tank has been the cause of interpretations by both potential and real opponents. Almost all of these interpretations stem from the fact that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, due to “huge losses of armored vehicles” in the SMO (special military operation), can only produce old vehicles, since the production of modern models has stopped due to sanctions. In fact, the production of the T-72B3M, T-80BVM, T-90M MBTs (main battle tanks) did not stop. And, by the way, the losses of our tanks in the SMO in comparison with other campaigns is not so great. In addition, the modernization program for the T-62 MBT was launched long before the SMO and is more likely associated with military operations in the Middle East, as well as with certain export plans…

It should be noted that the statements about the “complete obsolescence” of this tank are nothing more than a myth. The T-62 is the same age as the American M-60, which is still in service with Israel, Turkey, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Spain and many other countries, while surpassing it in most parameters. It is quite possible to compare it with the German Leopard MBT (adopted for service 4 years later than the T-62), the supply of which from Germany, Spain and Greece is being sought by the Kyiv regime. It is worth noting that our vehicle also surpasses this tank in a number of parameters, for example, in terms of gun power. The T-62 can hit the frontal armor of the “Leopard” from a distance of 3 km, while the German tank still needs to close to a distance of 1.5-2 km in order to break through the armor of the “62”…

The modernization program, launched by Uralvagonzavod in 2021, includes equipping the tank with a multispectral gyro-stabilized electro-optical system, an electromechanical mast and a new thermal imaging sight with a 1PN-96MT-02 laser rangefinder. The new thermal imager allows the tank gunner to detect targets at a distance of up to 3,000 meters. The dynamic protection “Kontakt-1” and lattice screens are installed on the sides of the vehicle.  According to experts, the first modernized T-62M[R1] s sent to the SMO zone were supposed to only be used in the second echelon, as well as to protect stationary objects or in “self-propelled gun mode” to support the advancing infantry, so they are not intended to be “dueling” with more modern MBTs with 125 mm guns. However, at the moment, most (Ukrainian) T-64[R2] s and T-72[R3] s have been knocked out, and the enemy is happy to use T-55[R4] s received from the countries of Eastern Europe, or even various infantry fighting vehicles including the old American M113[R5]  armored personnel carrier. It is clear that in such a situation, the modernized “62” can become a real king of the battlefield.  To this we can add that it is much easier to train reservists called up for partial mobilization on these vehicles, especially since many of the reservists served on them while they were in military service. Finally, there is little doubt that the SMO could become a prelude to a more serious armed conflict with countries that have more advanced militaries. And that is why more modern and advanced vehicles should be reserved for this hypothetical war, since the modernized T-62 is more than enough for the current stage of the SMO.

Image Information:

Image 1: T-62M Tank
Source: https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/T-62M-in-Kubinka-Tank-Museum/i-pr9rCnS/0/a00d74a4/X2/T-62M-Kubinka-04-X2.jpg  
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Image 2: T-62M Tank
Source: https://photos.smugmug.com/photos/i-6jZc4FQ/0/X3/i-6jZc4FQ-X3.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Russia’s Ukraine Narratives Find Appeal in Arab Countries

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RT Arabic Logo.

RT Arabic Logo.

Sputnik Arabic Logo.

Sputnik Arabic Logo.

“… The war saved everyone from the Corona virus, which was prepared in Ukrainian laboratories. President Putin struck those laboratories and ended the virus. If this had not happened, the virus would not have ended, because America wants to reduce the global population …”

The “Arab street” has largely supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine several polls indicating that Arabs are more likely to blame the conflict on Ukraine or the West than on Russia.[i] Russian influence campaigns have almost certainly played a role given ample evidence that Russia’s Arabic-language outlets have deliberately sought to shape perceptions vis-à-vis Ukraine. There is also data showing that Russian Arabic-language media outlets RT and Sputnik Arabic are more popular than their Western counterparts, such as BBC Arabic or the U.S.-funded al-Hurra.[ii]Several national news agencies in the Middle East have signed content sharing agreements with these Russian outlets. However, focusing primarily on Russian influence operations misses the important social contexts in which these pro-Russian opinions are being formed.

The first accompanying excerpt, from the Arabic-language news website of the German media outlet Deutsche Welle, cites an Egyptian media expert who highlights the extent to which Arabs are registering “protest support” for Russia, based on opposition to Western policies that are seen as biased against Arabs and Muslims. Russian influence campaigns, he argues, need not be particularly strong, as “the audience is more susceptible and obedient to Russian counter-propaganda, without this meaning that the propaganda is good or effective.” The second accompanying excerpt, from the Arabic-language news website al-Bawaba, illustrates the extent to which Russian misinformation has spread to new segments of the Arab public. The excerpt is from an interview with an archbishop in Egypt’s Coptic Church. When asked about the impact of the Ukraine conflict on Egypt, he claims that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has ended COVID-19, which was purportedly created by the United States in Ukrainian laboratoriese to trim the global population to 2 billion people. 

According to the third accompanying excerpt, an opinion piece published in the Qatar-aligned English-language news website The New Arab, the current global environment has “opened a floodgate of misinformation tainted with apocalyptic thinking and metaphysical explanations.”  The author notes how the combined effects of COVID-19, extreme weather events, and war in Ukraine have led many in the region to seek answers in scripture. Arab skepticism toward the U.S. role in Ukraine is neither novel nor surprising, since narratives portraying the United States as a latent source of regional conflict and instability are pervasive. What is new, however, is that fanciful, apocalyptic-tinted anti-U.S. narratives—made popular last decade by Islamic State ideologues—may be pushing their way into the region’s Christian minority populations with a little help from Russian media outlets.

Sources:

“غزو أوكرانيا.. هل ربحت روسيا حرب المعلومات في الشرق الأوسط؟

(Ukraine invasion… did Russia win the information war in the Middle East?),” Deutsche Welle Arabic (German media outlet), 25 August 2022. https://tinyurl.com/49783hk2

Yasser Abdel Aziz, an international lecturer and Egyptian media expert… says: “I believe that this support is ‘protest support’ because there are large segments of the Arab public who feel that the Western media is biased and that the West in general is biased against Arab and Islamic issues. There is historical and other bitterness, and because of this the audience is more susceptible and obedient to Russian counter-propaganda, without this meaning that this propaganda is good or effective… Abdel Aziz added, “The West has the right to feel resentment in light of this situation, because its effective and successful communication tools and its prestigious and venerable media outlets are sometimes unconvincing, while the ‘miserable’ Russian media tools, or others that do not have the same luster or capabilities, find popularity at times.

“الأنبا بنيامين مطران المنوفية: الزواج استشهاد دون سفك دماء..

(Anba Benjamin, Bishop of Monofia: Marriage is martyrdom without blood…).” al-Bawaba (Arabic-language news website), 20 October 2022. https://www.albawabhnews.com/4674878

Q: The Ukrainian-Russian crisis. How do you see its impact on the world and Egypt in particular?

A: The war saved everyone from the Coronavirus, which was prepared in Ukrainian laboratories. President Putin struck those laboratories and ended the virus. If this had not happened, the virus would not have ended, because America wants to reduce the global population, there are 7.5 billion people and they want to reduce it to 2 billion.

Emad Mousa. “MENA’s misguided climate change schadenfreude towards Europe,” The New Arab (Qatari-aligned English-language news website), 19 October 2022. https://english.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/menas-misguided-climate-change-schadenfreude-towards-europeBecause the unusual weather conditions came shortly after a global pandemic and coincided with the Ukraine war and a global economic meltdown, it opened a floodgate of misinformation tainted with apocalyptic thinking and metaphysical explanations – similar to the height of the Covid-19 global emergency. During the pandemic, Egyptians reportedly ranked highest in Google searches

Notes:

[i] Per the May 2022 ArabNews/YouGov poll on who is responsible for the Ukraine conflict (https://www.arabnews.com/sites/default/files/anyg_rusukr_report_web_compressed.pdf), 24 percent of respondents hold NATO responsible; 13 percent hold the current U.S. President responsible; 16 percent hold Russia responsible; six percent hold Ukraine responsible; and 42 percent do not know or are unsure who is responsible. Per the September 2022 Arab Youth Survey on who is responsible for the Ukraine conflict (https://arabyouthsurvey.com/en/findings/#my-global-citizenship-10),

31 percent of respondents hold the United States/NATO responsible; 18 percent hold Russia responsible; 15 percent hold Ukraine responsible; and 37 percent do not know or cannot say who is responsible.

[ii] According to a 2015 Nielsen study, RT’s Arabic-language news channel had higher daily audiences than BBC Arabic, Sky News Arabia, al-Hurra and China’s CCTV in Arabic in Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE and Iraq. (https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rt-arabic-is-among-top-3-most-watched-news-channels-in-6-arabic-countries-300039119.html)

See also: Norman Cigar, “COVID-19 and the Arab World: Opportunity for Russian Anti-American Disinformation?” MES Insights, Volume 11, Issue 2, The Krulak Center at Marine Corps University, April 2020. https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/MES/Insights/MES%20Insights%20Volume%2011%20Issue%202%20April%202020.pdf?ver=2020-05-01-133622-630

Image Information:

Image 1:  RT Arabic Logo
Source: Twitter, https://twitter.com/RTarabic/photo
Attribution: Fair Use

Image 2:  Sputnik Arabic Logo
Source: Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=293803939457940
Attribution: Fair Use

Russian-Led Military Alliance in Central Asia Weakening Amid Quagmire in Ukraine

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Main Cathedral CSTO Summit 02.

Main Cathedral CSTO Summit 02.

“In particular, it directly hits the unity within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), as a result of which the Indestructible Brotherhood exercises in Kyrgyzstan were canceled…”

The excerpted article from the Moscow-based, Russian-language newspaper Kommersant discusses deepening fissures within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) military alliance in Central Asia. First, the ongoing border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan resulted in Kyrgyzstan withdrawing from the CSTO’s upcoming exercises in Tajikistan, which have a collective defense scenario.[i] Moreover, according to the article, Kyrgyzstan postponed the exercises that are scheduled to take place in Kyrgyzstan next year, arguing that not taking part is within its rights as a CSTO member-state. However, the article notes that Russia appreciated that Kyrgyzstan requested that Russia mediate its conflict with Tajikistan because it preserved Russia’s central role in the CSTO and Central Asian affairs generally. The article emphasizes how this role is especially important for Russia because the war in Ukraine has placed it in a difficult situation geopolitically and the CSTO remains Russia’s Central Asian security linchpin considering growing competition in the region over the past two decades from the United States, Turkey, and China.[ii]

Finally, the article asserts that countries like Tajikistan can now take advantage of Russia’s vulnerable position resulting from the war in Ukraine. For example, in a recent speech at the Russia-Central Asia Summit, Tajikistani President Emomali Rahmon placed subtle demands on Russia to support Tajikistan. Tajikistan could, like Kyrgyzstan, decrease engagement with the CSTO and seek closer ties with China or other countries.

Source:

“Киргизия и Таджикистан громко ссорятся (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Fight Loudly),” kommersant.ru (Moscow-based Russian-language daily focusing on business and politics), 17 October 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5619937

The conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which developed for many years, but previously concerned only the residents of the border regions of the two countries, became an important factor for the entire post-Soviet space. In particular, it directly effects the unity in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which resulted in the Indestructible Brotherhood exercises in Kyrgyzstan being canceled, and the Frontier-2022 maneuvers that began today in Tajikistan taking place without the Kyrgyz military. In this context, the statement of the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon that Moscow allegedly does not respect its partners in the region sounded as strong as possible.

The Kyrgyz side formally stated that it would not participate in the [exercises], which is completely within its rights. As for the exercises that were supposed to take place in Kyrgyzstan, it was requested in Bishkek for them to be postponed to the next year…. Moscow liked that Bishkek was ready to see it as a mediator in resolving the conflict, while Dushanbe strongly demanded on a bilateral format.

According to a Kyrgyz source of Kommersant, the President of Tajikistan made a somewhat harsh speech at the “Russia-Central Asia Summit….” He recalled that the Russian language is being studied in the republic “from kindergarten” and a Russian military base is located there.

Notes:

[i] Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have had several intermittent clashes related to each country’s territorial exclaves within the other’s borders, creating competition regarding issues such as boundary demarcation and water and electricity use. Although these clashes often begin with local villagers using improvised weapons, in recent years the national armies have become involved, raising the risk that one of these localized clashes will eventually spiral into a national-level conflict. For more, see Matthew Stein, “Resolution to Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Problems?,” OE Watch, Issue 3, March 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/353586

[ii] Turkey’s assistance to Azerbaijan during its 2020 military victory against Armenia over disputed territories in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as its military performance in Syria and Libya in the years prior, has resulted in Central Asian states, such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, seeking Turkish support for their military modernization programs, especially related to unmanned aerial vehicles.


Image Information:

Image: Main Cathedral CSTO Summit 02.
Source: Mil.ru
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Main_Cathedral_CSTO_Summit_02.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Russia Laying Groundwork Ahead of July 2023 Russia-Africa Summit 

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South African President Cyril Ramaphosa during a plenary session at the Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi, Russia in October 2019.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa during a plenary session at the Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi, Russia in October 2019.

“Increasingly isolated by the West because of its special operation in Ukraine, Russia is actively turning to Africa, which it seeks to seduce”

As Russia prepares to host the Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg in the summer of 2023, commentators from across the African continent are offering insights as to how they perceive Russia trying to making inroads. In the first excerpted article from central African news aggregator L’Agence d’Information d’Afrique Centrale, writer Noël Ndong articulates the widely held perception that Russia seeks to expand its reach beyond its foothold of partners in Mali, the Central Africa Republic, and possibly Burkina Faso—most notably in other francophone African states. Ndong highlights former French stalwart ally Chad, as well as Morocco and Cameroon, noting Moscow’s rhetoric about aiding African states in their quests for energy independence.

The second excerpted article from Malian newspaper Le Journal de l’économie Malienne confirms the leader of Mali’s junta government, Assimi Goïta, recently received his invitation to the July 2023 meeting. The amity between two international pariahs should be unsurprising given that Goïta’s government relies on Russian Wagner mercenaries to stave off its spiraling jihadist insurgency, reportedly paying Wagner $10 million a month. A noted commentator on African geopolitical affairs, Gustavo de Carvalho, argues in the South Africa’s The Daily Maverick that in advance of the 2023 Russia-Africa Summit, the African Union needs to lead African efforts to have a unified front. While noting that in 2021, Russia was the largest arms supplier in Africa—supplying 44 percent of major arms to the continent—he also urges caution about what Moscow’s aggressive new posture means: “Given the continent’s relatively weak global position…Africa urgently needs a Russia strategy.”

Sources:

Noël Ndong, “Coopération: la Russie à l’assaut de l’Afrique (Cooperation: Russia on the assault in Africa),” L’Agence d’Information d’Afrique Centrale (Central Africa news aggregator), 18 October 2022. https://www.adiac-congo.com/content/cooperation-la-russie-lassaut-de-lafrique-142170

After Central African Republic, Mali, and Burkina Faso, Moscow is now on the hunt to conquer Morocco, Chad, and Cameroon…

With Morocco, Russia has approved a cooperation agreement in the field of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…. The agreement stipulates that Moscow will assist Rabat in the creation and improvement of nuclear energy infrastructure, the design and construction of nuclear reactors, as well as water desalination plants and particle accelerators. The agreement also consists of the provision of services in Morocco in the field of the fuel cycle, spent and radioactive nuclear fuel and waste management.

Increasingly isolated by the West because of its special operation in Ukraine, Russia is actively turning to Africa, which it seeks to seduce. Ambassador Extraordinary Oleg Ozerov, Head of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum Secretariat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said: “We see that African countries currently want to ensure an industrial transition of their economies. It will nevertheless be impossible to solve the problem of industrialization without having solved the problems of energy, without having granted access to electricity to the population and to the companies which must create industry and production.”

The second summit of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum is scheduled for the summer of 2023. It aims to give new impetus to Russian-African political, trade, economic, investment, scientific, technical and humanitarian cooperation.

Aboubacar Traoré, “Mali: Le colonel Assimi Goïta invité au Sommet Russie-Afrique (Mali: Colonel Assimi Goïta invited to the Russia-Africa Summit),” Le Journal de l’économie Malienne (online Malian news source), 14 November 2022.  https://www.lejecom.com/Mali-Le-colonel-Assimi-Goita-invite-au-Sommet-Russie-afrique_a6505.html

According to the diplomatic source, the Russian ambassador had come to officially deliver to Minister [of Foreign Affairs, Abdoulaye] Diop the letter by which the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, invites his Malian counterpart, Colonel Assimi Goïta, to participate in the Russia-Africa Summit scheduled for July 2023 in St. Petersburg.

­­Also, the Russian diplomat took this opportunity to inform the Malian authorities of the upcoming visit to Africa, including to Mali, of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

Gustavo de Carvalho, “Africa needs to forge a unified approach to Russia before 2023 Russia-Africa Summit,” The Daily Maverick (centrist South African newspaper), 3 August 2022. https://saiia.org.za/research/africa-needs-to-forge-a-unified-approach-to-russia-before-2023-russia-africa-summit/

For five days in July 2022, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov traveled to four African nations to signal Russia’s push into the continent. The visit to Egypt, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Ethiopia symbolises the Russian offensive to gain and reinforce international support…

While the July 2022 engagements in Africa yielded few tangible outcomes, Lavrov reinforced the criticism of Western policies in Africa, with a complementing narrative of the independent stance Africa has taken….

Russia has been ramping up its military relationships with several African countries for at least a decade. Its approach is often influenced by close ties between Russia’s arms industry and its infamous private security contractor, the Wagner Group. According to Sipri, a Swedish think tank, Russia was the largest arms supplier to Africa in 2021, accounting for 44% of continental imports of major arms. In total, Russia has signed military agreements with more than 20 African countries…

Given the continent’s relatively week global position…Africa urgently needs a Russia strategy. To that end, the AU can — and should — engage with its members in a more structured manner and help them put together joint positions on critical issues related to Russia and other partners, like the US, China, Europe and others…

Image Information:

Image: South African President Cyril Ramaphosa during a plenary session at the Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi, Russia in October 2019.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/governmentza/48951692933
Attribution: CC BY-ND 2.0

Kazakhstan’s Military Doctrine Raises Questions for Russia

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Flag of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Flag of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

“Building up the radar field and increasing the potential and capabilities of the troops in conducting air and missile defense of the state…(and, the) development of the Unified Regional Air Defense System of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation.”

When Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the government of Kazakhstan immediately stated that it would remain neutral in the conflict. While the Kazakhstani government has stuck to this neutrality since the war began, it has also taken certain measures to distance itself from Russia’s militarism, including canceling its Victory Day Parade in May 2022 and suspending defense exports (including to Russia) in August 2022.[i] Thus, when Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev approved a new military doctrine in October 2022, it drew attention to how Kazakhstan perceives various threats, with some speculation that Russia would be considered a threat without being named.

The accompanying excerpted article from Kazakhstan’s Russian-language independent newspaper Vremya reports on the changes in the doctrine since it was last published in 2017. The article reports that Kazakhstan has increased the combat potential of its units in “strategic directions,” and that it has created new units to combat disinformation. Although the article notes that a border conflict will be handled by the country’s border guards and the armed forces, it is unclear in the doctrine how a border conflict would different from other types of conflicts, such as an attack from another state. Another change in the doctrine is the development of special operations forces and an articulation on how they will cooperate with specialized units in other government agencies.

The new doctrine further notes that Kazakhstan will build capabilities in air defense, including in radar and missile defense. The doctrine references the “development of the Unified Regional Air Defense System of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation,” which is the only time that Russia is mentioned, suggesting Kazakhstan still sees Russia as a useful partner or at least does not wish to openly label it a threat. Other notable changes include equipping the border guards with modern systems as well as expanding production of basic types of ammunition for the armed forces. The Kazakh government established ammunition production as one of the early efforts to build the country’s defense industry, and this expansion of it could help Kazakhstan rely less on defense imports.

Sources:

“Токаев изменил военную доктрину Казахстана (Tokayev changed the military doctrine of Kazakhstan),” Vremya (a semi-independent Russian-language newspaper in Kazakhstan), 15 October 2022.

https://time.kz/news/politics/2022/10/15/tokaev-izmenil-voennuyu-doktrinu-kazahstana

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev changed the military doctrine of Kazakhstan…

Some of the changes are aimed at replacing the word “heading” with “section”, as indicated in the quote, but the bulk of the changes have affected the fundamental formulations of the doctrine. The document contains exceptions to the old doctrine and additions to it…The further text of the changes approved by Tokayev, in addition to those already indicated in the quote are provided in full:

“Chapter 3. The current state of the military security of the Republic of Kazakhstan”; Paragraphs 18 and 19 shall be stated as follows:

The combat potential of the land, air force and naval component of the military organization of the state has been increased by creating the necessary set of troops (forces), weapons, military equipment and supplies in strategic directions.

Subdivisions have been created in the Armed Forces to organize counteraction to information-psychological and software-technical (cyber) influences in the troops. Work is underway to increase their potential and capabilities…

“Section 3. Basic Provisions”;

“Chapter 5. Vision in the field of military security and defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan”;

Paragraph 39 shall be amended as follows:

39. The resolution of a border armed conflict in the border space of the Republic of Kazakhstan is carried out by the Border Service together with the Aviation Service, the Border Academy of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan, other national security bodies in cooperation with the authorities, formations and military units of the Armed Forces and the National Guard of the Republic of Kazakhstan, if necessary, forces can be used and funds of other central state and local executive bodies.”…

“Chapter 6. Approaches to ensuring the military security of the Republic of Kazakhstan”;

Heading “3.3.1. Maintenance of combat readiness of the Armed Forces, other troops and military formations of the Republic of Kazakhstan” shall be stated as follows:

In paragraph 54: supplement with subparagraph 2-1) of the following content: “2-1) the development of the Special Operations Forces for effective operations in peacetime and wartime in cooperation with special forces units of other state bodies.”

Subparagraph 4) shall be stated in the following wording: “4) building up the radar field and increasing the potential and capabilities of the troops in conducting air and missile defense of the state…

Paragraph 57 shall be stated as follows: “1) development of the Unified Regional Air Defense System of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation…

Paragraph 61: subparagraphs 3), 4) and 5) shall be stated as follows: “3) equipping the Border and Aviation Services of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan with modern weapons and military equipment, technical means of border protection; 4) bringing the infrastructure of the State Border in line with its categorization and modern requirements; 5) increasing the efficiency of interaction between the Border Service of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan with central state, local executive bodies and the population of border areas in matters of protecting the State Border, including in the underwater environment of the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea”…

In paragraph 68: subparagraph 6) shall be stated in the following wording: “6) ensuring sustainability and expanding the production of basic types of ammunition for the Armed Forces, other troops and military formations”…

Notes:

[i] For more on the Kazakhstani government’s decision not to hold a Victory Day parade commemorating the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in May, angering some in Russia, see: Matthew Stein, “Kazakhstan Cancels Soviet-Era Parade To Focus on Combat Readiness,” OE Watch, June 2022. For more on Kazakhstan’s suspensionvof defense exports for one year starting in August 2022, leaving Russia with one fewer supplier of weapons and equipment that closely matches its own armed forces, see: Matthew Stein, “Kazakhstan Suspends Defense Exports, Denying Russia Purchases,” OE Watch, October 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/427937

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kazakhstan_Armed_Forces_Flag.svg
Attribution: Public domain

Rationales for Russia’s Return to the Black Sea Grain Deal

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The four participants to the negotiations in Istanbul of the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Russia, Ukraine,Turkey and the United Nations, July 2022.

The four participants to the negotiations in Istanbul of the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Russia, Ukraine,Turkey and the United Nations, July 2022.

“Russia’s goal is to wrest more concessions… Russia wants to increase the volume of grains and fertilizers it’s exporting through the corridor at Ukraine’s expense.”

Russian resumption of its participation in the Black Sea Grain Agreement, following Turkey’s facilitation and mediation, helped to alleviate some concerns of a global food crisis.[i]  However, it was not clear what benefits Russia received for returning to the deal. The accompanying passages by Turkish experts offer some such rationales.

In the first accompanying passage from the regionally focused independent news site al Monitor, journalist Amberin Zaman writes that Russia wants to export more grain and fertilizer through the Black Sea corridor at Ukraine’s expense. Zaman also writes that Russia wants to resume ammonia exports via Ukraine. She notes that following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Kiev shut down a pipeline carrying Russian ammonia—a key ingredient in the production of nitrate fertilizers—to the Black Sea port of Odessa..

In the second accompanying passage from the Turkish independent news platform Dördüncü Boyut via YouTube, Turkish foreign affairs commentatorFehim Tastekin claims that Russia likely received some written guarantees that the grain corridor would not be used for military purposes.[ii] He notes Russia’s claim that the explosives used to destroy the Kerch Bridge had been brought from Odessa on a ship using that grain corridor. As such, he claims that Russia’s main benefit would be to spotlight this attack approach. He also claimed that Russia returned to the deal to avoid the perception that it was the cause of a global food and hunger crisis. Both of these views would support Russian narratives as part of their information operations.

Sources:

Amberin Zaman, “Turkey seeks to coax Russia back into Ukraine grain deal,” al-Monitor (independent news platform with local reporting from the Middle East), 1 November 2022. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/11/turkey-seeks-coax-russia-back-ukraine-grain-deal#ixzz7k8s1EXZp

Analysts say Russia’s goal is to wrest more concessions. “They want better terms for themselves via Turkey,” said Yevgeniya Gaber, a former Ukrainian diplomat… Gaber believes that Russia wants to increase the volume of grains and fertilizers it’s exporting through the corridor at Ukraine’s expense.

Russia also wants a resumption of ammonia exports via Ukraine. A pipeline carrying Russian ammonia, a key ingredient in the production of nitrate fertilizers, to the Black Sea port of Odessa ceased to function following Russia’s February 24 invasion of Ukraine. The United Nations has been pressing the sides to reach an agreement.

Russia likely also wants Ukraine to halt its offensive to retake Kherson, a critical port city in the country’s south, a demand that Ukraine will almost certainly spurn as it seeks to consolidate its recent battlefield gains.

Fehim Tastekin, “Arap Birliği’nin Türkiye’yi kınama iddiası ne anlama geliyor? (What does the Arab Union’s condemnation of Turkey mean?),” Dördüncü Boyut via YouTube (independent Turkish news and analysis platform on YouTube), 2 November 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ruZyRUhjuE8&t=510s

Russia likely received some written guarantees that the grain corridor would not be used for military purposes.  An important detail that has been missed in the Turkish media is Russia’s claim that the explosives used to destroy the Kerch Bridge had been brought from Odessa on a ship using the grain corridor.  So the most important concession that Russia received is likely a halting of attacks on its ships in the Black Sea, to move the conflict inland.   Russia also wants to avoid the perception that it is the cause of a global food and hunger crisis. 

Notes:

[i] For a background on Turkey’s control over access to the Black Sea and the Montreux Treaty, see: Karen Kaya, “Turkey Views Treaty as Important to Limiting U.S. Naval Activity in Black Sea,” OE Watch, May 2021.

[ii] This video was later unavailable as Turkey suspended YouTube on 13 November 2022.

Image Information:

Image: The four participants to the negotiations in Istanbul of the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Russia, Ukraine,Turkey and the United Nations, July 2022.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:IMO_welcomes_maritime_humanitarian_corridor_in_Black_Sea_(52233881214).jpg
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Russia Further Bolstering Iran Relations Following Ukraine Invasion

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Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.

Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.

“The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation also stressed that ‘Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order.’”

A major tenet of the Kremlin’s current ideology revolves around transforming what it perceives as a U.S.-led global security sphere into a multipolar world order where Russia occupies one of the key poles. The Kremlin promotes this ideology globally, especially to countries that have had a troubled relationship with the United States, and Russia has increased these efforts since its invasion of Ukraine began. The accompanying excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant describes the recent visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to Tehran on 9 November, where he claimed, “Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order.” During Patrushev’s visit, the two sides “discussed all aspects of bilateral cooperation, from the economy to security,” in light of improving bilateral relations over the past decade.[i] The author suggests that the two countries traded notes regarding “the survival of the economy under sanctions, cybersecurity, terrorism, as well as the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of Russia and Iran.” The latter point was emphasized by Patrushev, who “noted the key role that Western intelligence services have played in organizing mass riots in Iran and the subsequent dissemination of disinformation about the situation in the country.”

Since the Kremlin officially denies receiving military assistance from Iran, the article carefully cites foreign reports on “the supply of Iranian drones to Russia for use in hostilities in Ukraine.” For the Kremlin and the wider Russian audience, admitting the need for Iranian military technology would be regarded as humiliating. Not that long ago, it was Iran who requested Russian military assistance, and now the tables have turned.[ii] The article concludes by asserting that increased Western pressure on Iran will likely result in “closer cooperation between Russia and Iran.”

Source:

Marianna Belenkaya, “Совбезы РФ и Ирана поговорили на одном языке (Security Councils of Russia and Iran spoke the same language),” Kommersant (pro-business news outlet), 9 November 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/amp/5653639

Russia and Iran held interdepartmental consultations on security issues in Tehran on Wednesday (9 Nov). The Russian delegation was led by Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Patrushev. In the Iranian capital, he was received by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. According to official reports, the meeting discussed various issues of Russian-Iranian cooperation in the field of security, as well as a number of international problems….

The two countries have accumulated a lot of common themes, or rather, common problems. Among them are the survival of the economy under sanctions, cybersecurity, terrorism, as well as the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of Russia and Iran.

Iranian politicians do not need to explain anything to their Russian colleagues. They understand everything themselves, moreover, they speak the same language. Thus, at a meeting with an Iranian colleague, Nikolai Patrushev noted “the key role of Western intelligence services in organizing mass riots in Iran and the subsequent dissemination of disinformation about the situation in the country based on the Persian-language Western media controlled by them.” …The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation also stressed that “Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order” and this “is confirmed by the unprecedented pressure on our countries from Washington and its satellites.”

…From the very beginning of hostilities in Ukraine, Tehran stated that they understood Russian security concerns and believed that the conflict between Moscow and Kyiv was provoked by NATO… The atmosphere in Iranian-Ukrainian relations escalated after the media reported on the supply of Iranian drones to Russia for use in hostilities in Ukraine….

… Against this background, experts believe that the stronger the pressure of the West on Iran, including in the form of strengthening the sanctions regime, and the more elusive the chance to restore the “nuclear deal” becomes, the closer cooperation between Russia and Iran will become.

Notes:

[i] For additional background on Russian-Iran relations, see Ray Finch, “Russian Views of Iran,” Review of Persidskij bastion (Persian Bastion) in NATO Defense Review, edited by R. N. Pukhov and Yu. Yu. Lyamin, Moscow, CAST, 2019, 320pp. https://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=668

[ii] For additional background on Russian arms sales to Iran, see Ray Finch, “Russian Arms Sales to Iran,” OE Watch, July 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/365980

Image Information:

Image: Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Patrushev_NP.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Intl

Russian Military Experiencing Pay Problems

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“Social injustice in the payment of military labor can become a prerequisite for the disintegration of the army.”

The Kremlin continues to wrestle with manpower issues related to its so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine. What was envisioned as a quick operation with minimal forces has become a difficult slog requiring ever-more military personnel. The accompanying excerpt from an article in the semi-independent Nezavisimaya Gazeta highlights that after Russia’s September 2022 “partial mobilization,” which added 318,000 new soldiers, there are now questions regarding how to pay for this additional manpower, as well as growing pay disparities within the ranks of the Russian military. 

The article reminds readers that the Russian Defense Ministry reported “that the minimum amount that military personnel called up as part of partial mobilization will receive will be 195,000 rubles (USD $3,145) per month.” After calculating personnel costs for the entire military, the author asserts that now at least 30 percent of defense spending will go to manpower. Traditionally, personnel costs have hovered around 15 percent of the defense budget. The author complains that “defense of the Fatherland is a constitutional duty of a citizen of the Russian Federation,” and that therefore, “he should fulfill it without powerful material incentives.” Mere patriotic rhetoric, however, has proven inadequate in motivating Russian soldiers.

Of note, the article also discusses the pay differential among those Russians who were recently mobilized and contract soldiers already serving in the military.[i] The article cites a retired general officer who claims that some of the recently mobilized are getting paid more than the officers who are training them. He warns that “social injustice in the payment of military labor can become a prerequisite for the disintegration of the army.” Another excerpt talks about “the danger of the material stratification of military personnel,” wherein certain soldiers are getting paid more than others doing similar work merely because they were mobilized.  The article concludes by looking at some of the problems family members of mobilized soldiers have had in gaining access to their pay. In addition to causing morale problems in the Russian ranks, such high levels of manpower expenditures are likely to slow Russia’s investments in rearmament in the latter phases of the war and perhaps long after it ends.

Source:

Vladimir Mukhin, “Монетизация СВО способна привести к разложению армии (Monetization of the SVO can lead to the decomposition of the army),” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (semi-independent news source), 8 November 2022. https://www.ng.ru/armies/2022-11-08/1_8584_monetization.html

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reported that “the minimum amount that military personnel called up as part of partial mobilization will receive will be 195 thousand rubles.” A simple calculation shows that at least 62 billion rubles ($1bn) a month will be spent on paying for the military labor of 318,000 mobilized people participating in a special military operation (SMO). And if we take into account similar expenses for more than a million military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, then at least 1.5 trillion rubles will be spent on the payment of monetary allowances per year, that is, almost every third ruble planned in the expenditure side of the budget for national defense in 2023…. In any case, the conflict with Ukraine turned out to be costly for the Russian budget….

Attention is drawn to the fact that the lion’s share of the planned defense spending – at least 30% – will be directed to the material motivation of the military to serve. Russia has never foreseen such expenses in its recent history. Previously, the share of spending on military salaries in the defense budget was no more than 12-15%. But the defense of the Fatherland is a constitutional duty of a citizen of the Russian Federation, and ideally, he should fulfill it without powerful material incentives….  

…Military expert, retired lieutenant general Yuri Netkachev believes that the state has correctly taken care of the material problems of the mobilized citizens and it is good that the families of the country’s defenders will receive financial support. “But why does this process apply only to the mobilized? There is a large stratum of servicemen in the Armed Forces who also participate in the SMO. But they do not have such material incentives as those announced by the Ministry of Defense for the mobilized,” General Netkachev told NG. “Social injustice in the payment of military labor can become a prerequisite for the disintegration of the army. In all my military service, I have never seen ordinary soldiers get more than the officers who command them. Right now, mobilized servicemen are being trained by officers of training platoons and companies. They are regular military men who, as a rule, have extensive combat experience. But it turns out that these experienced warriors, who train “green soldiers” called up from the civilians, to whom the state has already pocketed 200,000 rubles, receive several times less.”

Andrey Poleshchuk, chairman of the All-Russian Trade Union of Military Personnel (OPSV), also speaks about the danger of the material stratification of military personnel. He believes that “the financial decisions of the president, taken at the suggestion of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, cannot but raise questions.” “We understand that it is necessary to materially interest the mobilized, to stimulate them to successfully solve combat missions, to reduce the intensity of passions in society,” he says. – But how to explain the situation to the officers who command these mobilized in the combat area, and they are not subject to the instructions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on additional monetary surcharges. It turns out that they, professionals, should receive less or, at best, commensurate with the monetary allowance of their subordinates.” 

…According to the representative of the Ministry of Defense Sergey Mikischenko, at the request of a soldier, his family will be able to receive monetary allowance: “The monetary allowance of a serviceman is credited to his current account, which the serviceman submitted. At the request of a serviceman, monetary allowance can be transferred to his relatives; for this, the serviceman must issue a power of attorney…. Andrey Poleshchuk draws attention to the organizational problem associated with this: “We are faced with the fact that not everyone managed to issue powers of attorney for relatives to receive funds. Now they don’t have that option. Perhaps it makes sense to consider the issue of transferring notarial powers to the commanders of military units. A similar practice existed in the USSR.” 

Notes:

[i] For additional background on pay for Russian contract soldiers, see: Ray Finch, “Increase in Pay and Benefits for Contract Soldiers,” OE Watch, September 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/323757

Russia Conducts Nuclear-Delivery Tests in the Arctic

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“Ballistic missiles were launched both from a nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea and from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk region towards the Kura range on Kamchatka.  Cruise missiles were launched toward targets in the Komi Republic from strategic bombers.”

In late October, Russia carried out a nuclear weapons exercise in the Arctic. According to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, it is the second major nuclear-delivery test of Russia’s sea-land-air Triad in 2022. The previous exercise was conducted in February, prior to the current Russian incursion into Ukraine.  President Putin oversaw the exercise, which included submarine, land, and bomber missile firings. The intended message is that Russia is a competent nuclear power in the Arctic. As the threat of the use of nuclear weapons circulates in the context of the Ukraine war, Russia’s nuclear delivery tests in the Arctic serve as a stark reminder to the world of its capabilities.

Source:

Thomas Nielsen, “Russia tested all legs of nuclear triad over the Arctic,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 26 October 2022.  https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/10/russia-tested-all-legs-nuclear-triad-over-arctic

Ballistic missiles were launched both from a nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea and from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk region towards the Kura range on Kamchatka.  Cruise missiles were launched toward targets in the Komi Republic from strategic bombers.

For the second time this year, President Vladimir Putin ordered a massive nuclear weapons exercise.  Last time was a few days before the invasion of Ukraine in late February.

The October 26 strategic drill included all three legs of Russia’s nuclear triad; submarine, land-based missiles and long-range bomber planes.

“During the event, the level of preparedness of military command and control structures, and the skills of the leadership and operation staff in the troops were checked,” the Kremlin said in a statement.

The President’s office added that all tasks were fulfilled, all missiles reached their targets.

While Putin oversaw the exercise, his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Valery Gerasimov, gave the orders to the involved strategic nuclear forces.