Tag Archives: Kremlin

Russia Compares Ukraine Conflict to WWII

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Soviet Victory Parade, Red Square, Moscow, June 1945.

Soviet Victory Parade, Red Square, Moscow, June 1945.

“Comparing the special operation in Ukraine with the Great Patriotic War is unreasonable.”

The Soviet victory in World War II (WWII), which it calls “The Great Patriotic War,”  is the central to the Kremlin’s current ideology, which recasts it to justify the so-called special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine.[i] According to Kremlin propaganda, just as the USSR fought against the evils of Nazi Germany, so too today, Russian soldiers are defending their country from a Ukrainian “Nazi” threat. By framing this conflict as a fight against Nazism, the Kremlin has been able to tap into narratives of pain, fear, and sacrifice experienced by the Russian people during WWII. However, the accompanying excerpt from the semi-independent Russian news source Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye argues that viewing the SMO in Ukraine through a WWII lens presents its own set of challenges.   

The author asserts that “comparing the special operation in Ukraine with the Great Patriotic War is unreasonable,” proceeding then to remind readers of basic facts surrounding WWII and how they differ from those surrounding the SMO in Ukraine. For instance, in June 1941 “the Red Army had a very significant (several times) quantitative superiority in military equipment over the Wehrmacht.” This was not the case in February 2022, when the Russian military “did not have any quantitative superiority over the Armed Forces and other military formations of Ukraine.” Comparing casualties during the two conflicts, the author points out that so far, Russian total losses in Ukraine are small, noting that “during the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army lost the same number of servicemen on average in one day!”

Responding to those who assert that there can be no negotiations with the current Ukrainian leadership, the author reminds readers that in the summer and autumn of 1941, the USSR tried to reach a negotiated settlement with Nazi Germany. To those who claim that the USSR was the sole victor in WWII, the author reviews the critical role which the Western lend-lease program played in the Allied victory. The author makes other cogent comparisons, suggesting that to measure progress in the SMO thought a warped WWII lens will only “multiply losses and delay victory.”[ii] It is noteworthy that this sober assessment of the SMO was published given Russian press restrictions and the pervasiveness of pro-Kremlin propaganda.

Source:

Alexander Khramchikhin, “Уязвленный патриотизм порождает истерику (Wounded patriotism breeds hysteria),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye (semi-independent Russian news source), 1 December 2022. https://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2022-12-01/4_1216_patriotism.html

Comparing the special operation in Ukraine with the Great Patriotic War is unreasonable. A large part of Russian society is experiencing difficult feelings about the course of the military campaign in Ukraine. Many do not understand why we have not yet won,and sometimes retreating – moreover, from the territories included in the Russian Federation.

Such a reaction to the Ukrainian events is quite understandable in itself, but not should not incite hysteria. Expressing dissatisfaction with what is happening, outside observers cite the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War as a positive example for today’s Russia….

As of June 22, 1941, on the Soviet-German border, the Red Army had a very significant (several times) quantitative superiority in military equipment over the Wehrmacht…. As of February 24, 2022, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the Russian-Ukrainian border did not have any quantitative superiority over the Armed Forces and other military formations of Ukraine. And the qualitative superiority of the Russian side was and remains not so fundamental as to compensate for the quantitative superiority of the enemy.

At the same time, however, hostilities are taking place exclusively on the territory of Ukraine (meaning the territory at the beginning of the current campaign). Ukrainian strikes on the territory of the Russian Federation (taken at the same time) are of microscopic proportions. Irretrievable losses of the RF Armed Forces over the entire period of hostilities are small. During the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army lost the same number of servicemen on average in one day!

Regular statements by some Russian officials about “creating a favorable background” for negotiations with “respected Western partners” produce a painful impression on the Russian population, to put it mildly.… But in the summer and autumn of 1941, at the direction of Stalin and Beria, Soviet representatives… tried to transfer to Berlin proposals for a virtually complete repetition of the Brest Peace. That is, about the surrender to the Germans of the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and maybe also Karelia. …If the Anglo-Saxons had not fought against Hitler (for whom almost all of continental Europe worked), and if Lend-Lease had been supplied not to the Soviet Union, but to Germany, we would have had a very bad time.

…But criticism is different. It is absolutely unacceptable to question the legitimacy of the actions of the army, to talk about its non-existent losses and, moreover, about non-existent crimes. But to ignore failures in various types of support and obvious mistakes in the preparation of the campaign as a whole means to multiply losses and delay victory.

Notes:

[i] For additional background on the Kremlin’s attempt to create a new state ideology, see: Ray Finch, “Russian Culture Ministry Proposes Possible Framework for New State Ideology,” OE Watch, Issue #5 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/417836

[ii] The author, Alexander Khramchikhin, was one of the few Russian military analysts who warned against an invasion of Ukraine, arguing that such an attack could have catastrophic consequences for Russia. See: Alexander Khramchikhin, “Полураспад Украины (Half-life of Ukraine),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye, 11 March 2021. https://nvo.ng.ru/gpolit/2021-03-11/8_1132_ukraine.html

Image Information:

Image: Soviet Victory Parade, Red Square, Moscow, June 1945|
Source: https://tinyurl.com/bdnrfsex
Attribution: Russian Ministry of Defense (Mil.ru) CCA 4.0 Intl

Russia Further Bolstering Iran Relations Following Ukraine Invasion

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Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.

Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.

“The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation also stressed that ‘Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order.’”

A major tenet of the Kremlin’s current ideology revolves around transforming what it perceives as a U.S.-led global security sphere into a multipolar world order where Russia occupies one of the key poles. The Kremlin promotes this ideology globally, especially to countries that have had a troubled relationship with the United States, and Russia has increased these efforts since its invasion of Ukraine began. The accompanying excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant describes the recent visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to Tehran on 9 November, where he claimed, “Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order.” During Patrushev’s visit, the two sides “discussed all aspects of bilateral cooperation, from the economy to security,” in light of improving bilateral relations over the past decade.[i] The author suggests that the two countries traded notes regarding “the survival of the economy under sanctions, cybersecurity, terrorism, as well as the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of Russia and Iran.” The latter point was emphasized by Patrushev, who “noted the key role that Western intelligence services have played in organizing mass riots in Iran and the subsequent dissemination of disinformation about the situation in the country.”

Since the Kremlin officially denies receiving military assistance from Iran, the article carefully cites foreign reports on “the supply of Iranian drones to Russia for use in hostilities in Ukraine.” For the Kremlin and the wider Russian audience, admitting the need for Iranian military technology would be regarded as humiliating. Not that long ago, it was Iran who requested Russian military assistance, and now the tables have turned.[ii] The article concludes by asserting that increased Western pressure on Iran will likely result in “closer cooperation between Russia and Iran.”

Source:

Marianna Belenkaya, “Совбезы РФ и Ирана поговорили на одном языке (Security Councils of Russia and Iran spoke the same language),” Kommersant (pro-business news outlet), 9 November 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/amp/5653639

Russia and Iran held interdepartmental consultations on security issues in Tehran on Wednesday (9 Nov). The Russian delegation was led by Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Patrushev. In the Iranian capital, he was received by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. According to official reports, the meeting discussed various issues of Russian-Iranian cooperation in the field of security, as well as a number of international problems….

The two countries have accumulated a lot of common themes, or rather, common problems. Among them are the survival of the economy under sanctions, cybersecurity, terrorism, as well as the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of Russia and Iran.

Iranian politicians do not need to explain anything to their Russian colleagues. They understand everything themselves, moreover, they speak the same language. Thus, at a meeting with an Iranian colleague, Nikolai Patrushev noted “the key role of Western intelligence services in organizing mass riots in Iran and the subsequent dissemination of disinformation about the situation in the country based on the Persian-language Western media controlled by them.” …The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation also stressed that “Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order” and this “is confirmed by the unprecedented pressure on our countries from Washington and its satellites.”

…From the very beginning of hostilities in Ukraine, Tehran stated that they understood Russian security concerns and believed that the conflict between Moscow and Kyiv was provoked by NATO… The atmosphere in Iranian-Ukrainian relations escalated after the media reported on the supply of Iranian drones to Russia for use in hostilities in Ukraine….

… Against this background, experts believe that the stronger the pressure of the West on Iran, including in the form of strengthening the sanctions regime, and the more elusive the chance to restore the “nuclear deal” becomes, the closer cooperation between Russia and Iran will become.

Notes:

[i] For additional background on Russian-Iran relations, see Ray Finch, “Russian Views of Iran,” Review of Persidskij bastion (Persian Bastion) in NATO Defense Review, edited by R. N. Pukhov and Yu. Yu. Lyamin, Moscow, CAST, 2019, 320pp. https://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=668

[ii] For additional background on Russian arms sales to Iran, see Ray Finch, “Russian Arms Sales to Iran,” OE Watch, July 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/365980

Image Information:

Image: Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Patrushev_NP.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Intl

Russian Military Experiencing Pay Problems

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“Social injustice in the payment of military labor can become a prerequisite for the disintegration of the army.”

The Kremlin continues to wrestle with manpower issues related to its so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine. What was envisioned as a quick operation with minimal forces has become a difficult slog requiring ever-more military personnel. The accompanying excerpt from an article in the semi-independent Nezavisimaya Gazeta highlights that after Russia’s September 2022 “partial mobilization,” which added 318,000 new soldiers, there are now questions regarding how to pay for this additional manpower, as well as growing pay disparities within the ranks of the Russian military. 

The article reminds readers that the Russian Defense Ministry reported “that the minimum amount that military personnel called up as part of partial mobilization will receive will be 195,000 rubles (USD $3,145) per month.” After calculating personnel costs for the entire military, the author asserts that now at least 30 percent of defense spending will go to manpower. Traditionally, personnel costs have hovered around 15 percent of the defense budget. The author complains that “defense of the Fatherland is a constitutional duty of a citizen of the Russian Federation,” and that therefore, “he should fulfill it without powerful material incentives.” Mere patriotic rhetoric, however, has proven inadequate in motivating Russian soldiers.

Of note, the article also discusses the pay differential among those Russians who were recently mobilized and contract soldiers already serving in the military.[i] The article cites a retired general officer who claims that some of the recently mobilized are getting paid more than the officers who are training them. He warns that “social injustice in the payment of military labor can become a prerequisite for the disintegration of the army.” Another excerpt talks about “the danger of the material stratification of military personnel,” wherein certain soldiers are getting paid more than others doing similar work merely because they were mobilized.  The article concludes by looking at some of the problems family members of mobilized soldiers have had in gaining access to their pay. In addition to causing morale problems in the Russian ranks, such high levels of manpower expenditures are likely to slow Russia’s investments in rearmament in the latter phases of the war and perhaps long after it ends.

Source:

Vladimir Mukhin, “Монетизация СВО способна привести к разложению армии (Monetization of the SVO can lead to the decomposition of the army),” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (semi-independent news source), 8 November 2022. https://www.ng.ru/armies/2022-11-08/1_8584_monetization.html

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reported that “the minimum amount that military personnel called up as part of partial mobilization will receive will be 195 thousand rubles.” A simple calculation shows that at least 62 billion rubles ($1bn) a month will be spent on paying for the military labor of 318,000 mobilized people participating in a special military operation (SMO). And if we take into account similar expenses for more than a million military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, then at least 1.5 trillion rubles will be spent on the payment of monetary allowances per year, that is, almost every third ruble planned in the expenditure side of the budget for national defense in 2023…. In any case, the conflict with Ukraine turned out to be costly for the Russian budget….

Attention is drawn to the fact that the lion’s share of the planned defense spending – at least 30% – will be directed to the material motivation of the military to serve. Russia has never foreseen such expenses in its recent history. Previously, the share of spending on military salaries in the defense budget was no more than 12-15%. But the defense of the Fatherland is a constitutional duty of a citizen of the Russian Federation, and ideally, he should fulfill it without powerful material incentives….  

…Military expert, retired lieutenant general Yuri Netkachev believes that the state has correctly taken care of the material problems of the mobilized citizens and it is good that the families of the country’s defenders will receive financial support. “But why does this process apply only to the mobilized? There is a large stratum of servicemen in the Armed Forces who also participate in the SMO. But they do not have such material incentives as those announced by the Ministry of Defense for the mobilized,” General Netkachev told NG. “Social injustice in the payment of military labor can become a prerequisite for the disintegration of the army. In all my military service, I have never seen ordinary soldiers get more than the officers who command them. Right now, mobilized servicemen are being trained by officers of training platoons and companies. They are regular military men who, as a rule, have extensive combat experience. But it turns out that these experienced warriors, who train “green soldiers” called up from the civilians, to whom the state has already pocketed 200,000 rubles, receive several times less.”

Andrey Poleshchuk, chairman of the All-Russian Trade Union of Military Personnel (OPSV), also speaks about the danger of the material stratification of military personnel. He believes that “the financial decisions of the president, taken at the suggestion of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, cannot but raise questions.” “We understand that it is necessary to materially interest the mobilized, to stimulate them to successfully solve combat missions, to reduce the intensity of passions in society,” he says. – But how to explain the situation to the officers who command these mobilized in the combat area, and they are not subject to the instructions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on additional monetary surcharges. It turns out that they, professionals, should receive less or, at best, commensurate with the monetary allowance of their subordinates.” 

…According to the representative of the Ministry of Defense Sergey Mikischenko, at the request of a soldier, his family will be able to receive monetary allowance: “The monetary allowance of a serviceman is credited to his current account, which the serviceman submitted. At the request of a serviceman, monetary allowance can be transferred to his relatives; for this, the serviceman must issue a power of attorney…. Andrey Poleshchuk draws attention to the organizational problem associated with this: “We are faced with the fact that not everyone managed to issue powers of attorney for relatives to receive funds. Now they don’t have that option. Perhaps it makes sense to consider the issue of transferring notarial powers to the commanders of military units. A similar practice existed in the USSR.” 

Notes:

[i] For additional background on pay for Russian contract soldiers, see: Ray Finch, “Increase in Pay and Benefits for Contract Soldiers,” OE Watch, September 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/323757

Russian Views on Finland and Sweden Joining NATO

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NATO Secretary General meets with Ministers of Defense for Finland and Sweden, March 2022.

NATO Secretary General meets with Ministers of Defense for Finland and Sweden, March 2022.

“…Of course, this means the deterioration of our strategic position….” 

Russian reactions to the recent decision by Finland and Sweden to join NATO have ranged from mild concern to grave trepidation.  According to the excerpted article from the pro-Kremlin news outlet RIA Novosti, President Putin does not foresee any serious problems with this decision, provided that no “military infrastructure of the alliance is deployed in Finland and Sweden.”  If this were to occur, Putin stated that “Russia will be forced to respond in a similar way.”  Putin also asserted that there was no merit to “the thesis that Russia’s goal to push NATO forces away from its borders, preventing Ukraine from joining the alliance, led to the opposite, only from Sweden and Finland.”  Putin explained his rationale by claiming that “unlike Ukraine, Sweden and Finland do not persecute people who feel they are part of Russian culture.”

Other knowledgeable Russians have expressed greater concern over the further enlargement of NATO.  In an interview in the popular daily Moskovskiy Komsomolets, “Ruslan Pukhov, the Director of the Moscow Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), spoke about the military significance of NATO expansion in the northwest.”  According to Pukhov, this expansion “means the deterioration of our strategic position.”  He asserts that Russia will now “have to spend more on defense than before February this year [which will mean] that less money will be spent on infrastructure projects, healthcare, and education.”  Pukhov reviews Russia’s long history with these two countries, stating “both the Swedes and the Finns have already experienced the power of Russian weapons,” which resulted in “bad memories for them.”  He concludes that becoming members of NATO might tempt them to try to settle old scores, and that therefore Russia “can’t be weak.”

Source:

“Путин: Россия ответит в случае размещения баз НАТО в Швеции и Финляндии (Putin: Russia will respond in case of deployment of NATO bases in Sweden and Finland),” RIA Novosti (pro-Kremlin news outlet) 30 June 2022. http://RIA/Ru/20220629/Putin-1799133978.html

In Russia’s relations with Sweden and Finland, there are no such problems as with Ukraine, if they want to join NATO, let them join, but if the military infrastructure of the alliance is deployed in Finland and Sweden, Russia will be forced to respond in a similar way, Russian President Vladimir Putin said…

…He also called false and ‘having nothing to do with reality’ the thesis that Russia ‘s goal to push NATO forces away from its borders, preventing Ukraine from joining the alliance, led to the opposite, only from Sweden and Finland.  “For us, the membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO is not at all the same as the membership of Ukraine, these are completely different things.  They understand this very well.  No.  This is a completely different thing,” the Russian leader emphasized.  He noted that, unlike Ukraine, Sweden and Finland do not persecute people who feel they are part of Russian culture.

Source: Olga Bozheva, “Вступление Финляндии и Швеции в НАТО принесло России серьезные риски (The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO brought Russia serious risks),” Moskovskiy Komsomolets (popular, pro-Kremlin news organization), 5 July 2022. https://www.mk.ru/politics/2022/07/05/vstuplenie-finlyandii-i-shvecii-v-nato-prineslo-rossii-sereznye-riski.html

The process of accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO was continued.  On July 4, negotiations between these countries and the Alliance were completed in Brussels.  On July 5, the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Finland signed the accession protocol at NATO Headquarters.  Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Moscow Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), spoke about the military significance of NATO expansion in the northwest.

Now there are rather contradictory statements about the entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO.  A number of political scientists say that this does not pose a serious danger to us.  Someone thinks that we need to strengthen the borders, up to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons there.  What do you think their entry into the alliance means for us?

Of course, this means the deterioration of our strategic position.  And not because these countries suddenly became anti-Russian overnight – even before that they loved us like a dog with a stick.  However, they were not at least formally integrated into NATO structures, and accordingly, they behaved cautiously and correctly towards us.

…In any case, such a move by Stockholm and Helsinki does not lead to anything good.  And the one who says that their entry into NATO means practically nothing to us, he, I think, is disingenuous.

…This will force us to invest more financially in the arms race.  We’ve already gotten into it.  And now it doesn’t matter at all whether we did it ourselves or were dragged into it.  The score is on the scoreboard.  We will have to spend more on defense than before February this year.  This means that less money will be spent on infrastructure projects, healthcare, and education. There are no illusions here.

…Both the Swedes and the Finns have already experienced the power of Russian weapons… bad memories for them.  They still remember very well how they got hit in the teeth from us.  And if you suddenly forgot, so we can remind you….  So we can’t be weak.

Image Information:

Image: NATO Secretary General meets with Ministers of Defense for Finland and Sweden, March 2022
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/nato/51942155994
Attribution: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Kremlin Easing Russian Citizenship for All Ukrainians

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President Vladimir Putin …signed a decree giving the right to all residents of Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship in a simplified manner….

Six months before Russia reinvaded Ukraine, President Putin published a long historical article where he asserted that “Russians and Ukrainians are one people, a single whole.” (See: “Studying Putin’s History of Ukraine,” OE Watch, Sept 2021.)  Attempts to prove this assertion using force have thus far met with considerable Ukrainian resistance.  However, the Kremlin is also employing its administrative and economic prowess to make it easier for Ukrainians to become Russian citizens.  As the first excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant points out, the Kremlin has recently enacted legislation “giving the right to allresidents of Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship in a simplified manner.”  The article goes on to stress that this new streamlined procedure does “not require them to renounce Ukrainian or other citizenship.”  The article concludes by quoting a high-level Kremlin official, who claims that “from 2016 to 2020, about 978,000 citizens of Ukraine received Russian citizenship.”

The second excerpt from the popular, pro-Kremlin site Versiya describes how Russian authorities have set up “bus passport tours” to transport those Ukrainians who want to obtain Russian citizenship.  The buses pick up Ukrainians in regions not taken by Russia and transport them to those occupied by Russian forces.  According to the author, Russian “passportization of the Black Sea region is gaining momentum [where, for instance], “the number of residents of Odessa who have received Russian passports goes into the thousands.”  Many pensioners participate in these tours, since once they gain Russian citizenship, they “will be able to apply for Russian pensions (before recalculation – 10,000 rubles [$185] a month.”  The article asserts that there are many other categories eligible to receive monthly payments: “war veterans and children, the disabled…fathers and single mothers…pregnant women,” and that the Russian benefits far exceed those provided by the Ukrainian government.  The article concludes by pointing out that because of the conflict in and around “the Mykolaiv and Zaporozhye regions…, up to 85 percent of local residents lost their jobs… [and] there is only one hope – for Russia.”

Source:

Elena Rozhkova, Ksenia Veretennikova, “Гражданам Украины вышло упрощение (Citizens of Ukraine received a simplification),” Kommersant (pro-business site), 11 July 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5458512

President Vladimir Putin on Monday signed a decree giving the right to all residents of Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship in a simplified manner…. The expert believes that the updated decree will be relevant given the dynamically changing situation with the transition of Ukrainian territories under the control of Russian troops, as well as for Ukrainian emigrants living in Russia.

According to the new amendments, the possibility of obtaining Russian citizenship in a simplified manner now applies to all residents of Ukraine, and not only to the population of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) and regions of Ukraine controlled by the Russian armed forces. The document also notes that the presence of citizens in military service cannot serve as a basis for rejecting their applications for admission to Russian citizenship….

…The deputy [Mr. Zatulin] also clarified that residents of the DPR, LPR and Ukraine who receive Russian citizenship are not required to renounce their first citizenship and can have two passports…. 

…In June 2022, TASS, citing the press center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, reported that since April 2019, on the basis of this decree, more than 800 thousand people have acquired Russian citizenship. A year ago, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation Dmitry Kozak… stated that not only residents of Donbass, but also residents of the “rest of Ukraine” apply for Russian citizenship. According to him, from 2016 to 2020, about 978 thousand citizens of Ukraine received Russian citizenship…

Source: Alexander Artishchenko, “Туры за паспортами (Tours for passports),” Versia (popular, pro-Kremlin site), 3 August 2022. https://versia.ru/zhiteli-nikolaeva-i-odessy-ezdyat-oformlyat-rossijskoe-grazhdanstvo-v-xersonskuyu-oblast

Passportization of the Black Sea region is gaining momentum – Russian citizenship is issued in Kherson, Skadovsk, Genichesk, Nova Kakhovka, Oleshki, Belozerka and Gola Prystan. Despite the fact that it is rather difficult to leave the settlements controlled by Ukraine, besides, they mostly let pensioners through and, less often, women, the number of residents of Odessa who have received Russian passports goes into the thousands….

…Bus passport tours are organized from Zaporozhye and Nikolaev to Kherson – the final destinations of the trip are usually not advertised, but these buses are still allowed through at checkpoints without any problems. As explained by the deputy head of the military-civilian administration of the Kherson region Ekaterina Gubareva, any citizen of Ukraine, regardless of place of residence, even from Lviv, can apply for a Russian passport. … Together with Russian citizenship, pensioners will be able to apply for Russian pensions (before recalculation – 10,000 rubles a month, but in the fall they promise to recalculate and increase pensions, and accrue “from above” what they don’t receive in the summer). Moreover, war veterans and children, the disabled and some categories of beneficiaries are entitled to an allowance of 5,000 rubles per month. The allowance can be issued in the same place as passports. Gubareva separately noted, that monthly social payments are due to fathers and single mothers – at the rate of 10,000 rubles for each child. And payments to a full family for the maintenance of a minor child will amount to 4,000 rubles. Also, pregnant women can apply for social assistance (10,000 rubles – a one-time payment for pregnancy, and another 20,000 – at the birth of a child).

Russia’s social support is especially important, since Kyiv has actually curtailed the payment of pensions and social benefits in the Mykolaiv and Zaporozhye regions. As of early August, up to 85 percent of local residents lost their jobs – able-bodied families do not have the full opportunity to support their elderly and children. In the Odessa region, 70 percent of the inhabitants have lost their jobs (although pensions are still paid there). So there was only one hope – for Russia.

Russian Orthodox Church Strengthening Support for Ukraine Invasion

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Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces.

Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces.

“…It is worth recalling that shortly before the start of the special military operation of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, Hilarion said: “I am personally afraid of war. And I think that we must do everything to ensure that there is no war, no big war, no small war, no world war, no local war.”

Given its close alignment with the Kremlin, it is not surprising that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has adopted a “you are either with us or against us” philosophy and has openly endorsed the so-called “special military operation” (SMO) in Ukraine.  (For additional background, see “Religious Blessing for the “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine,” OE Watch, May 2022). The accompanying excerpt from the semi-independent Russian Nezavisimaya Gazeta describes some recent changes in the ROC’s hierarchy and organization, which reflects its growing militancy.  The article begins by recounting the recent transfer of high-level ROC cleric Metropolitan Hilarion, who had spoken out against the conflict in Ukraine.  Drawing an analogy to the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, Hilarion reminded his flock about “Rasputin [who] was an ardent opponent of Russia’s entry into the war.  He warned the tsar that if Russia entered the war, it would threaten the whole country with catastrophic consequences.” 

The article also provides an update regarding Orthodox believers in Ukraine who, up until last month, pledged allegiance to the Russian patriarch.  They now have announced their intention to split from the ROC, which has caused consternation in Moscow.  In the past, the clerics of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy (UOC-MP) enjoyed some level of independence from the church leadership in Moscow, but they will now fall under the “direct canonical and administrative subordination to the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia and the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church.”  The article also discusses the restoration “of protopresbyter of the military and naval clergy,” who will serve as the chief liaison between the ROC and the military.  In the past, “this chief military priest was equated with a general.” 

The growing proximity of the ROC and the military, according to the excerpt, “is not surprising.  After the start of the invasion of Ukraine, the patriarch visited the main military church in Kubinka several times and delivered sermons there on the importance of military service.”  These religious developments, whereby the ROC is losing influence in Ukraine, may provide additional incentives for the Kremlin to gain control over the entire country. 

Source:

Andrei Melnikov, “РПЦ переходит на военное положение (The Russian Orthodox Church moves into martial law),” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (semi-independent Russian media outlet), 7 June 2022.  https://www.ng.ru/faith/2022-06-07/1_8455_general.html

…The synod of the Russian Orthodox Church at a meeting on Tuesday put an end to the ambiguous position of the church against the backdrop of a military special operation in Ukraine. No longer bound by obligations to its Ukrainian believers, the Moscow Patriarchate is bringing its own configuration into line with the limits of influence of the Russian state. The synodals made revolutionary decisions: they removed Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeev), who was responsible for “pacifism” in the Russian Orthodox Church, from the post of chairman of the Department for External Church Relations (DECR), and at the same time strengthened the spiritual and patriotic component of church policy….

…It is worth recalling that shortly before the start of the special military operation of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, Hilarion said: “I am personally afraid of war. And I think that we must do everything to ensure that there is no war, no big war, no small war, no world war, no local war. There are a lot of forces that want to drag us into some kind of war, and they are not only outside our country, but also inside it. There are those who want to rattle weapons, who say: they say, we are invincible, invincible, we will repulse any enemy. In March, he suddenly began to justify Grigory Rasputin. “Rasputin was an ardent opponent of Russia’s entry into the war. And he warned the tsar that if Russia entered the war, it would threaten the whole country with catastrophic consequences….”

The rejection of soft church power was also reflected in other decisions of the Synod of June 7. The ROC responded in a peculiar way to the recent declaration of independence by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – mainly with the votes of those participants in the Council of the UOC on May 27, who are located on the territory of the country controlled by the Kyiv authorities. For a long time, starting from the Russian spring of 2014, the Moscow Patriarchate maintained demonstrative independence from the political situation and left the three eparchies of Crimea under the jurisdiction of the UOC.

In response to the appeals of His Grace Metropolitan Platon of Theodosius and Kerch, Metropolitan Lazar of Simferopol and Crimea, Bishop Alexy of Dzhankoy and Razdolnensky, proceeding from the need to maintain an effective canonical and administrative connection with the central church authorities for the successful flow of church life in the dioceses served by the aforementioned bishops, taking into account the practical the impossibility of regular communication of these dioceses with the Kievan Metropolia, to accept the Dzhankoy, Simferopol and Feodosiya eparchies into direct canonical and administrative subordination to the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia and the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, – says in synodal journals…. 

…Finally, the Synod, in a sense, turned history back: it restored the position of protopresbyter of the military and naval clergy, which had been abolished in 1918….  The chief military priest was equated with a general. ….

The attention of the Synod to the military theme is not surprising. After the start of the special operation in Ukraine, the patriarch visited the main military church in Kubinka several times and delivered sermons there on the importance of military service. It was these sermons that became the basis for calls for sanctions against the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, because he allegedly “blessed” the special operation in Ukraine. 

Image Information:

Image: Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Cathedral_of_the_Russian_Armed_Forces
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Intl

Russian Media Source Blames United States for Russian “Brain Drain”

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“Will the United States be able to weaken Russia by poaching its best specialists?”

An increasing number of Russians, often among the country’s best and brightest, have emigrated in recent years as the Kremlin’s domestic policies have become more repressive.  These self-exiled Russians believe they can better realize their potential in countries with a more transparent political system, better legal guarantees, and greater opportunities to exercise personal freedom.  This “brain drain” has become an even more acute problem for the Kremlin since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  According to the opposition media source Meduza, nearly 150,000 peoplehave emigrated from Russia since 24 February.  Rather than examining the domestic reasons for leaving Russia, some pro-Kremlin media blame the United States for this exodus.  Citing a recent Chinese article, the second excerpt from the semi-independentsite Nezavisimaya Gazeta claims that the United States has “created a brain drain trend using it as a tool to weaken Russia.”  According to the author, “Washington is trying to facilitate the transfer to the United States of the best Russian specialists with experience in semiconductors, space technology, cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, artificial intelligence, and other specialized scientific fields.”  Given this trend, the Kremlin may soon develop policies to restrict its most qualified citizens from leaving Russia.

Sources:

Kristina Safonova, “Сколько людей уехало из России из-за войны? (How many people left Russia because of the war?),” Meduza (opposition news source), 7 May 2022. https://meduza.io/feature/2022/05/07/skolko-lyudey-uehalo-iz-rossii-iz-za-voyny-oni-uzhe-nikogda-ne-vernutsya-mozhno-li-eto-schitat-ocherednoy-volnoy-emigratsii

Is it possible to estimate how many people left Russia after February 24?

Julia Florinskaya: I don’t have any estimates – neither accurate nor inaccurate. It’s more of an order of numbers. My order of numbers is about 150 thousand people.

Source: Tatyana Popova, “Организация «утечки мозгов» как новое глобальное оружие США (Organization of brain drain as a new global weapon of the United States),” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (semi-independent), 5 May 2022. https://www.ng.ru/world/2022-05-05/100_usa050522.html

Will the United States be able to weaken Russia by poaching its best specialists?

The United States of America intends to prevent the development of high technologies in Russia and in parallel to improve its economy, using special tactics, say the authors of the Chinese daily newspaper Global Times. …Washington is trying to facilitate the transfer to the United States of the best Russian specialists with experience in semiconductors, space technology, cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, artificial intelligence, space technology and other specialized scientific fields…. …According to the newspaper, the statement that the United States “wants to see Russia weakened” reveals the true intentions of the United States…. The US creates a brain drain trend using it as a tool to weaken Russia. The consequences of the mass exodus of specialists (scientists and engineers) from the country are obvious – this process undermines the foundation of national economic and military development. …However, it is clear that the US is determined to weaken Russia.

Russian WWII Veteran Benefits Lag Behind Those in Central Asia

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“It is noteworthy that one-time payments to Russian veterans are many times less than similar assistance to their fellow soldiers living in the Asian republics of the former USSR….”

As the brief excerpted article in the semi-independent Nezavisimaya Gazeta indicates, Kremlin rhetoric regarding the debt owed to World War II (WWII) veterans far outweighs the reality of the low pay they receive.  Russia’s annual Victory Day commemoration on 9 May has become the apotheosis and driving force behind current Kremlin ideology.  The Soviet Union’s triumph over Nazi Germany in the what the Russian’s know as the “Great Patriotic War” now serves as the bellicose prism through which the Kremlin view themselves and the world.  Just as the Soviet Union saved the world from fascism in the early 1940s, so today, according to Kremlin propaganda, brave Russian soldiers are fighting Nazism in Ukraine.  Given the central importance of this holiday and the current conflict, one might assume that the Kremlin would understand the importance of demonstrating its gratitude to those few surviving Russian veterans.  However, the article showed an unflattering comparison between the annual benefits provided to surviving WWII veterans in Russia and four Central Asian countries: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.  For instance, in 2022, “10 thousand rubles [$154] were transferred to the 20,320 [remaining WWII] veterans in the Russian Federation.”  Although the Central Asian economies are much smaller than Russia’s, they provided a significantly larger veteran benefit.  Uzbekistan provided $1,339; Kyrgyzstan paid $1,209; Kazakhstan paid $2,400; and Tajikistan provided $234 to its veterans.  Given the Kremlin’s increasingly heavy-handed regulation of Russia’s media environment, this issue bears further monitoring to see if it gains traction among the Russian public and may provide some opening to combat the Kremlin’s domestic misinformation campaign.

Source:

Mikhail Sergeev, “Участники ВОВ в России получат в 9 раз меньше, чем в Узбекистане и Киргизии (Participants of the Second World War in Russia will receive 9 times less than in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan),” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (semi-independent), 4 May 2022. https://www.ng.ru/economics/2022-05-04/100_e04052022_1.html

Comparison of veterans’ payments for Victory Day…On the anniversary of the Victory, participants in the Great Patriotic War living in the Donetsk People’s Republic, the Lugansk People’s Republic and the liberated territories of Ukraine will receive a one-time payment of 10,000 Russian rubles by decree of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The same amount will be received by veterans living in the territory of the Russian Federation. Annual payments for Victory Day in the amount of 10 thousand rubles were transferred to 20,320 veterans in the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Labor reported…

It is noteworthy that one-time payments to Russian veterans are many times less than similar assistance to their fellow soldiers living in the Asian republics of the former USSR…. In Uzbekistan, for example, war veterans, concentration camp prisoners and Leningrad blockade survivors will each receive 15 million soums (equivalent to 1,339 US dollars or more than 93,000 Russian rubles)…. In Kyrgyzstan, the veterans’ payment for Victory Day will amount to 100,000 soms ($1,209 or almost 85,000 Russian rubles)…. 

In Kazakhstan, the size of veterans’ payments for Victory Day varies depending on the region of residence and the special status of the recipient. Thus, veterans of the Great Patriotic War living in Nur-Sultan and Almaty will receive 1 million tenge (156 thousand Russian rubles) each, and in Aktobe – 2 million tenge (312 thousand Russian rubles).So the difference in the amount of veterans’ payments even increased this year. Last year, NG wrote that “soldiers living in Kazakhstan will receive 17 times more than their Russian fellow soldiers.” And today you can name another difference – 31 times more than in the Russian Federation….

Kremlin Using Education Policy To Foster Approval of Its “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine

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“The children of the soldiers who died in the special operation in Ukraine will be able to study free of charge at the Russian State Social University (RGSU).” 

Alongside its extensive media arsenal to maintain public support for the “special military operation” in Ukraine, the Kremlin has also mobilized its educational system.  As the first excerpt from the Moscow regional source M24 points out, children of Russian service personnel who have died fighting in this operation “will be able to study free of charge at the Russian State Social University (RGSU).”  The article posits that this education initiative might expand to include the “country’s leading universities, [which] will support our initiative and accept educational certificates from the RGSU as an exchange basis for free education.”  Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education (MoE) continues to develop mandatory courses for school-aged children to ensure that they understand the Kremlin’s narrative surrounding this operation.  In addition to grasping the Kremlin’s historical justification (see: “Teaching Russian School Children about Ukraine,” OE Watch, April 2022), the brief excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant describes how the MoE has now developed school lessons covering both Western sanctions and import substitution.  The article stresses that “the teacher should show Russia’s ability to overcome the negative consequences of Western countries’ sanctions pressure on the economic sphere of our society.” According to the article, “teachers should tell children about the benefits of import substitution,” and how this program will strengthen the Russian economy.  The article concludes by citing economic experts asked to gauge the effectiveness of such lessons.  One skeptical expert commented, “in the summer, or certainly in the fall, the children will come home and see for themselves that the family has no money, that there is no way to buy any goods.”

Source:

“Дети погибших в спецоперации на Украине военных получат бесплатное образование в РГСУ (Children of soldiers who died in a special operation in Ukraine will receive free education at the RGSU),” M24.ru (Moscow based regional news outlet), 26 March 2022. https://www.m24.ru/news/obrazovanie/26032022/444852

The children of the soldiers who died in the special operation in Ukraine will be able to study free of charge at the Russian State Social University (RGSU). This was reported on the official website of the university….

…The university expressed the hope that other Russian universities would also support the initiative, since the children of the military who died during the special operation may have different educational plans, including specialties that the RGSU does not teach.

“In such cases, we expect that other Russian state educational institutions chosen by them, including the country’s leading universities, will support our initiative and accept educational certificates from the RGSU as an exchange basis for free education,” the Russian State Social University concluded.

Source: Anna Vasilyeva, Maria Starikova, Olga Nikitina; Vlad Nikiforov, Alexander Dremlyugin,“Школам завезли антисанкционки (Anti-sanctions brought to schools),” Kommersant (Russian pro-business news media), 5 April 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5293728

As it became known to Kommersant, Russian schools received new recommendations on conducting special lessons against the backdrop of a “special military operation” in Ukraine. This time, teachers should organize classes for students in grades 5–9 and 10–11 on the topic “Anti-Russian sanctions and their impact on the domestic economy.” In the training manual, this “influence” is presented as rather positive – schoolchildren will be told about the growth in the share of Russian products in several areas, and then they will be asked to assess which countries will suffer large economic losses from sanctions…. 

…As stated in the training manual, the teacher should “show Russia’s ability to overcome the negative consequences of Western countries’ sanctions pressure on the economic sphere of our society, give an idea of ​​the main directions of the anti-sanctions policy in the Russian Federation.” Teachers should tell children about the benefits of import substitution….

“The lesson materials invite schoolchildren to familiarize themselves with the measures taken by the president and the government to counter sanctions from unfriendly countries,” the Ministry of Education told Kommersant….

…Kommersant asked economists to comment on the manual. Natalya Zubarevich, a specialist in the field of socio-economic development of the regions, refused to study it. “Why should I read these manuals? And so it is clear that we will lose the most advanced technological industries,” she told Kommersant. “In the summer, or certainly in the fall, the children will come home and see for themselves that the family has no money, that there is no way to buy any goods.”

More Wonder Weapons on Russia’s Drawing Board

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Peresvet Military Laser System.

Peresvet Military Laser System.

“The State Weapons Program (SWP) will focus on the creation of non-traditional types of weapons, including directed energy weapons, kinetic weapons, as well as artificial intelligence control systems and robotic systems.”

Despite military setbacks in Ukraine, Russia’s military industry (VPK) remains dedicated to developing military prowess, according to the excerpted article from the somewhat independent Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye.  Over the past decade, the Kremlin has focused on military modernization and improved combat capabilities, frequently demonstrating and asserting that the Russian armed forces are now a formidable power.  Perceived military superiority was likely a key factor underpinning the Kremlin’s decision to invade Ukraine in late February 2022.  After the past couple months, however, maintaining this façade of military dominance has become more challenging.  

The article describes a recent meeting between President Putin and Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, during which they discussed the upcoming State Weapons Program.  According to the article, Russia’s military industry remains on the cusp of “the creation of non-traditional types of weapons, including directed energy weapons, kinetic weapons, as well as artificial intelligence control systems and robotic systems.”  While the article omits the possible effects of Western economic sanctions on Russia’s military industry, it does provide examples of new weapons allowing Russia “to deliver massive strikes against enemy [Ukraine] infrastructure.”  The article also notes that “in December 2019, the world’s first really working combat laser system ‘Peresvet’ was put on combat duty,” but admits that there are questions surrounding its capabilities.  The article concludes by referring to developments in “robotics and artificial intelligence systems,” claiming that “large-scale work is underway in Russia to create ‘soulless’ combat units.”

Source:

“Разящая кинетика, направленное действие, искусственный интеллект (Breaking kinetics, directed action, artificial intelligence),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye (NVO-Independent Military Observer; somewhat independent), 7 April 2022. https://nvo.ng.ru/nvoweek/2022-04-07/2_1184_week.html

Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov promised the emergence of non-traditional weapons in Russia. The State Weapons Program (SWP) will focus on the creation of non-traditional types of weapons, including directed energy weapons, kinetic weapons, as well as artificial intelligence control systems and robotic systems. As reported on the Kremlin website, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov spoke about this at a meeting with President Vladimir Putin. “The work on preparing the initial data for the next SAP has been completed, by mid-2023 it will be formed and submitted for approval.

…During the special operation in Ukraine, we are already talking about the effectiveness of using high-precision weapons. These are ship-based cruise missiles ‘Caliber,’ aviation Kh-555, Kh-101 and Dagger, which allow the country to deliver massive strikes against enemy infrastructure….

…However, Yuri Borisov speaks of a completely different level of weapons…. Another non-traditional direction could be laser weapons. In December 2019, the world’s first really working combat laser system ‘Peresvet’ was put on combat duty. There is still no exact understanding of whether it ‘burns or dazzles’ the optical instruments of air objects. But it is already obvious: the country is actively working on the development of this type of weapon….

Robotics and artificial intelligence systems are also a priority. If you look at the exposition of the exhibition-forum ‘Army’ in Kubinka near Moscow, it becomes obvious that large-scale work is underway in Russia to create ‘soulless’ combat units.

Image Information:

Image: Peresvet Military Laser System
Source: mil.ru
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0