Tag Archives: Nagorno-Karabakh

Armenia Hints It May Withdraw From Russia-Backed Regional Security Bloc

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Monastery Valley in Armenia

“Armenia will refrain from joining the CSTO Collective Security Council resolution of November 23, 2023 on the CSTO budget for 2024 and from participating in financing the organization’s activity envisaged by this resolution. However, it will not object to adopting this resolution in a curtailed format.”

Armenia recently announced it will no longer pay its dues to the Collective Security Treaty Organizations (CSTO), a Moscow-led security organization comprised of countries from Central Asia and the South Caucasus. According to the first excerpted piece from the Russian state news agency, TASS, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told his countrymen that they can no longer rely on the CSTO and he had no answer to how Yerevan benefits from being a member. The move comes as relations between Yerevan and Moscow have cooled, particularly after a series of clashes over the disputed Nagorno Karabakh region, , last September with neighboring Azerbaijan resulted in the mass expulsion of the enclave’s Armenian population.

Pashinyan, who did not attend the CSTO’s last summit in Minsk in 2023, had hinted that Armenia plans to suspend its participation in the security bloc. Critics of the CSTO claim it is a tool for Moscow to wield military power over former Soviet-bloc countries. The last time CSTO forces were called in to preserve the peace came in January 2022, when roughly 2,500 CSTO peacekeepers – the bulk of them Russian – responded to anti-government rioting in Kazakhstan. But Pashinyan has criticized the alliance for not supporting Armenia during its various clashes with Azerbaijan,accusing Russian peacekeepers of abandoning their positions when Azerbaijani troops crossed into Nagorno-Karabakh.[i] According to the second excerpted article from Armenian TV and radio service Azatutyun, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Armenia is free to withdraw from the organization.[ii]  If Armenia does leave the CSTO, the move could signal a major realignment of the regional balance of power in the Caucasus, as Russia, preoccupied by the war in Ukraine, looks to keep a military presence in the region. Armenia recently held joint drills with the United States, has sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and has expressed interest in one day joining the European Union. If the CSTO were to lose Armenia or other members, it could weaken Russia’s military leverage in the South Caucasus. Alternatively, it could make other regional security blocs like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which also comprises China, more relevant and powerful.

Sources:

Source:  “Armenia to refrain from financing CSTO activity in 2024,” (“Армения воздержится от финансирования деятельности ОДКБ в 2024 году,” TASS (Russian state news agency), 8 May 2024. https://tass.com/world/1785765

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said earlier that his country cannot rely on the CSTO and he cannot answer Armenian society’s question why the country should be its member. In recent time, Yerevan has skipped numerous meeting in a range of integration formats. Thus, Pashinyan did not attend the CSTO summit in Minsk in 2023 and announced that Armenia had suspended its participation in this organization.

CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov told TASS on April 22 that it was a matter of “an independent and sovereign country” to decide whether to take part in the upcoming CSTO summit or not. However, he said that he hoped that many might change for the better before the summit.

Source:  “Armenia Free To Leave Russian-Led Bloc, Says Moscow,” (Армения свободна выйти из возглавляемого Россией блока, заявила Москва), Azatutyun (Armenian TV and Radio service affiliated with U.S. funded RFE/RL) 3 May 2024. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32932373.html#

“We still do not question the sovereign right of our Armenian partners to independently determine their foreign policy course, including in the context of the further work of the organization,” the ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova told a news briefing in Moscow.

“Let me remind you that Article 19 of the [CSTO} Charter establishes the possibility of leaving the alliance,” Zakharova said. “In that case, a member state … must send an official notification no later than six months before the withdrawal date.”

The Armenian government, she said, has taken no steps in that direction so far despite its “constantly circulated accusations against the organization.” This means that Armenia remains for now a full-fledged member of the Russian-led military alliance and must “must fulfill appropriate obligations,” added Zakharova. She did not specify those obligations.Over the past year or so, Yerevan has boycotted high-level meetings, military exercises and other activities of the CSTO in what Pashinian described in February as an effective suspension of Armenia’s CSTO membership. The premier repeatedly said afterwards that he could pull his country out of the alliance of six ex-Soviet states altogether.

Notes:

[i] “Armenian PM Attacks Russian-Led Alliance At Summit In Yerevan,” RFE/RL, 24 November 2022. https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-csto-pashinian-criticism/32145663.html

[ii] During a recent visit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Pashinyan struck an agreement for Russian border guards to withdraw from along the Armenia-Azerbaijani border. See: Gabriel Gavin, “Russia to withdraw troops from Armenia’s border,” Politico.eu, 9 May 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-to-withdraw-troops-from-armenias-border/

Image Information:

Image: Monastery Valley in Armenia
Source: Unsplash, https://unsplash.com/photos/aerial-photo-of-a-village-during-daytime-VQ07UveM3-U
Attribution: Free to use under the Unsplash License

Russia Withdraws Its Forces from Nagorno-Karabakh

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Map of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

“Let us note that a few days ago, the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov confirmed the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent from Karabakh.”

In April 2024, the government of Azerbaijan announced that the Russian peacekeeping mission had started withdrawing personnel, marking one of only a few instances a Russian peacekeeping mission in the Commonwealth of Independent States has ended.[i] The excerpted article from Azerbaijan’s news agency Trend reports that the Russian peacekeeping force from Nagorno-Karabakh has relocated to temporary deployment points in Armenia.[ii] Armenia’s Secretary of the Security Council noted that these units cannot remain in Armenia. Lastly, the article notes that Azerbaijan requested the removal of the Russian peacekeeping force and the Russian government complied but does not mention where Russian personnel will eventually be redeployed.

Additionally, a joint Russia-Turkey observation center in Azerbaijan that once monitored the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has also closed. The excerpted article from Turkey’s state-run Anadolu Agency notes that the joint observation center had been based in Azerbaijan since early 2021 as part of an agreement between Russia and Turkey to observe the ceasefire agreement. The article notes that the work of the center is no longer needed since Azerbaijan took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023.[iii] As a result, Russian and Turkish personnel, 60 from each country, are leaving. Overall, the total number of Russian personnel redeploying from the peacekeeping mission and the joint monitoring center is not significant but is worth noting as Russia has historically reached agreements to leave some units in place even after a peacekeeping mission has changed or ended. Russia will likely continue to be involved in developments between Armenia and Azerbaijan going forward, but Azerbaijan’s complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh frees up Russian forces to use elsewhere, potentially in Ukraine.[iv]

Sources:

Source: Rena Abdurakhmona, “Российские миротворцы направились из Карабаха в Армению (Russian peacekeepers have deployed from Karabakh to Armenia),” Trend (news agency in Azerbaijan), 23 April 2024. https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3889409.html

Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh went to temporary deployment points in Gorus and Garakils (Sisian)…(the) Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia Armen Grigoryan told the Armenian media…

“Since Russian peacekeeping troops are leaving Karabakh, they, of course, cannot remain in the Republic of Armenia either. A group and convoy of peacekeepers from Karabakh headed to temporary deployment points in Goris and Garakils (Sisian),” he said.

Let us note that a few days ago, the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov confirmed the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent from Karabakh.

Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan – Head of the Department for Foreign Policy of the Presidential Administration Hikmet Hajiyev, answering a question from AZERTAG regarding information about the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the territory of Azerbaijan, said that the top leadership of both countries made a decision on the early withdrawal of peacekeepers…

Source: Ruslan Rehimov, “Turkish-Russian joint center completes mission in Azerbaijan,” Anadolu Agency (state-run news agency of Turkey), 26 April 2024.https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/turkish-russian-joint-center-completes-mission-in-azerbaijan/3203012

The Turkish-Russian joint observation center established in Azerbaijan’s Aghdam region has completed its mission after three years of service.

The center was established to monitor cease-fire and prevent violations after the Second Karabakh War, when Azerbaijan liberated most of the Karabakh region from decades of occupation by Armenia.

Karim Valiyev, Azerbaijan’s chief of general staff, praised the center’s contributions to peace at a ceremony on Friday attended by Azerbaijani, Russian, and Turkish officials.

Valiyev said Azerbaijan has fully established its sovereignty in Karabakh, and therefore the mission of the monitoring center had been completed…The center, established near the Marzili village of Aghdam, opened on Jan. 30, 2021, with 60 Turkish and 60 Russian soldiers…Azerbaijan established full sovereignty in Karabakh after an “anti-terrorism operation” in September 2023, after which separatist forces in the region surrendered.

Notes:

[i] The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is made up of former Soviet Republics and remains an area where the Russian government has special relationships and works to maintain influence. Russian peacekeeping missions in the CIS in the past have typically been open-ended with Russian forces remaining in place in some capacity, which has allowed Russia to maintain influence. The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) peacekeeping mission to Kazakhstan in January 2022 marks the other example of Russian forces ending a peacekeeping mission in the CIS and withdrawing its forces. For background on Russian peacekeeping missions in the CIS, see: Matthew Stein, “The Evolutionary Russian View of Peacekeeping as Part of Modern Warfare,” FMSO’s Foreign Perspectives Brief, 24 March 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/2023-03-24-the-evolutionary-russian-view-of-peacekeeping-as-part-of-modern-warfare-matthew-stein-update/

[ii] The Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh deployed in November 2020 as part of the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan that ended the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. The peacekeeping force included around 2,000 Russian personnel, who established two dozen observation posts in Nagorno-Karabakh to monitor the ceasefire under a five-year mandate that would automatically renew for an additional five years unless Armenia or Azerbaijan gave notice to the other two parties to the agreement to terminate the mission.

[iii] In September 2023, Azerbaijani forces carried out an operation in Nagorno-Karabakh which resulted in Azerbaijan regaining full control of the region from ethnic Armenians and ended the existence of the self-proclaimed breakaway region of Artsakh. The Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh closed a few observation posts following the September 2023 operation,but remained largely in place with the consent and cooperation of Azerbaijani authorities.

[iv] Russian peacekeepers dealt with several ceasefire violations from both sides in the years since then and notably allowed activists from Azerbaijan to blockade the Lachin Corridor, the single road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, starting in December 2022 until September 2023. For background on the blockade of the Lachin Corridor, see: Matthew Stein, “Ongoing Clashes In Nagorno-Karabakh Threaten Fragile Truce,” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/ongoing-clashes-in-nagorno-karabakh-threaten-fragile-truce/

Image Information:

Image: Map of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Source:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2020_Nagorno-Karabakh_war.svg
Attribution: CCA 3.0

Armenia Distances Itself From Instruments Of Russian Security

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An image of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan from 2023. Armenia is currently taking steps to distance itself from both the CSTO and Russia.

“The CSTO, instead of fulfilling its obligations to Armenia in the field of security, on the contrary, creates security problems. And this position, I say frankly, is a threat to the national security of Armenia.”

Armenia has been critical of both Russia and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) over their responses to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and the subsequent clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Some Armenian officials have even called for the country to leave the CSTO and limit cooperation with Russia, though Armenia has continued to engage with both since the end of the 2020 war because of a lack of other options.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Kavkazskiy Uzel, reports that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on 22 February 2024 that Armenia had ended its participation in the CSTO, though he did not go as far as to say that Armenia is leaving the organization. The article notes that the decision is based on the CSTO’s responses to the 2020 war and the numerous clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan since then. The article also relays that Armenia has been critical of the Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh for not favorably dealing with Azerbaijan’s blockade of the breakaway region and not preventing Azerbaijan’s operation in September 2023, which ended with Azerbaijan regaining full control of the region. The article ends with a statement from Pashinyan, who claims that the CSTO is a threat to the national security of Armenia. Based on this statement, it is possible that Armenia will leave the CSTO, but the country will still be home to a Russian military base and Russian border guards in its territory for the foreseeable future.[ii] In a seemingly related development, the second excerpted article, from the Armenian news website News.am, reports that Armenia has notified Moscow that Russian border guards will need to be removed from the Zvartnots International Airport. Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyancommented that Armenian border guards are capable of taking over duties at the airport. The article clarifies that Armenia is not asking the Russian border guards to leave their positions on the border with Turkey or Iran, but only to leave the airport. While this development has yet to play out, it is one step Armenia has taken to rely less on Russia.

Sources:

“Главное о критике Арменией ОДКБ и Кремля (The heart of Armenia’s criticism of the CSTO and the Kremlin),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website reporting on the Caucasus), 29 February 2024. https://www.caucasianknot.com/articles/386973

After Russia’s refusal to intervene in the armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020, Armenia’s confidence in the benefits of participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization weakened to the point of threats to leave the CSTO. The “Caucasian Knot” has prepared a report on how the degree of Armenia’s unfriendly rhetoric towards Russia increased and what steps Armenia took in its attempts to look for an alternative to the CSTO…

During the escalation of the Karabakh conflict in 2020, Armenia turned to the CSTO for help. Moscow responded by saying that it could not help, since the borders of Armenia were not violated and the war took place on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh…the Kremlin limited itself to political support for Yerevan, and after that it sent peacekeepers to the Karabakh… conflict zone.

At a meeting with Putin on December 27, 2022, the Armenian prime minister again recalled the responsibility of Russian peacekeepers. “The Lachin corridor has been blocked for almost 20 days. This is the area of responsibility of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. And I want to remind you that according to the trilateral statement of the presidents of the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia, the Lachin corridor should be under the control of Russian peacekeepers,” said Pashinyan…

On September 21, 2023, the day after the end of hostilities in Karabakh, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan sharply criticized Russian peacekeepers. “The Russian peacekeeping contingent was supposed to guarantee the safety of the civilian population…We bear our share of responsibility. But I don’t think that we should turn a blind eye to the failures that the Russian peacekeeping force had contingent,” he said…“Due to the inaction of the Russian peacekeeping contingent, over 100 thousand Armenians left their homes and native places in Nagorno-Karabakh in a week,” Pashinyan said…

On February 22, 2024, Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, in an interview with France 24 TV channel, stated that the CSTO reaction did not correspond to reality in relation to the Republic of Armenia, in particular in 2021 and 2022. “And, obviously, this could not go unnoticed by Armenia. Today, in practice, we have actually frozen our participation in this agreement in this organization,” said the Prime Minister of Armenia…

On February 28, 2024, answering questions from deputies in the Armenian parliament, Nikol Pashinyan stated that “The CSTO, instead of fulfilling its obligations to Armenia in the field of security, on the contrary, creates security problems. And this position, I say frankly, is a threat to the national security of Armenia…”

“Armenia FM comments on Russian border guards’ presence on Turkey border,” News.am (Armenian news website), 7 March 2024. https://news.am/eng/news/811212.html

Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan explained how Yerevan informed Moscow about the matter of the Russian border guards at Zvartnots International Airport of the Armenian capital city of Yerevan.

At Thursday’s press conference, the FM confirmed the statement by the secretary of the Council of Armenia regarding the aforementioned matter, and stated that the Russian side was informed about the initiative to remove the Russian border guards from Zvartnots airport…

“Now we believe that Armenia is institutionally capable of independently implementing border guard service at the [Yerevan] airport, about which we have informed the Russian side. I believe that this will be enough for the Russian side and the matter will be over,” Mirzoyan noted, adding that it is about the entire package of jurisdiction at the airport…To the question about the presence of Russian border guards in other places in Armenia, for example on the Turkish border, the minister responded that the matter is only about Zvartnots airport. “Therefore, we are talking only about the airport,” added the Armenian FM.

Notes:

[i] Russia and the CSTO have had separate responses to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and subsequent clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia deployed a peacekeeping mission to Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the ceasefire agreement, but the peacekeepers are not affiliated with the CSTO. The CSTO declined to intervene in the 2020 war or the clashes on the grounds that the organization stated Armenia itself was not attacked in any of the instances and thus, does not necessitate a collective defense response from the organization.

[ii] Russia’s 102nd Military Base is located near the city of Gymuri, Armenia with an estimated 3,000 soldiers garrisoned there, while Russian border guards provide security on Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran as well as operating at the Zvartnots International Airport outside of the capital Yerevan.

Image Information:

Image: An image of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan from 2023. Armenia is currently taking steps to distance itself from both the CSTO and Russia.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nikol_Pashinyan_-_2023_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA 2.0

The Evolution Of Russia’s Peacekeeping Mission In Nagorno-Karabakh

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Map of the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh war showing Azerbaijan day-to-day advances.

“The conditions under which the Russian peacekeeping contingent was introduced into the region in 2020 have been seriously adjusted.”

On 19 September 2023, Azerbaijani forces launched an operation against the breakaway republic of Artsakh, and within days, succeeded in ending ethnic Armenian control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The excerpted article from the independent news website Kavkazskiy Uzel reports on how Azerbaijani control of Nagorno-Karabakh has impacted the Russian peacekeeping mission.[i] The article notes that Russian peacekeepers dismantled a few observation posts and established new ones, some of which were set up with Azerbaijan to jointly protect the weapons and equipment surrendered by the armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh. The dismantled observation posts were situated in eastern Nagorno-Karabakh near Azerbaijan. The article also notes, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that its peacekeepers will adapt to the new situation, even as a large percentage of the population in Nagorno-Karabakh has left the region. The mandate of the Russian peacekeeping mission runs through November 2025 and will be automatically extended for another five years unless the governments of Armenia or Azerbaijan request to terminate it. The article notes that the Armenian government signed a declaration recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan two weeks after Azerbaijan took control of the region, essentially ending support for the breakaway republic. While one of the main tasks of the Russian peacekeeping mission has changed, it appears likely that Russia will continue to operate in the region.

Sources:

“МИД России пояснил смену постов миротворцев адаптацией к новым условиям (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia explained the change to the posts of peacekeepers as adapting to the new conditions),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website reporting on the Caucasus), 10 October 2023. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/393302

Peacekeepers are adapting to new conditions against the backdrop of a mass exodus of the population from the region, reported Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova.

As t“e “Caucasian K”ot” wrote, on October 5, peacekeepers reported on the dismantling of observation posts in the Askeran, Martakert and Shusha regions, and on October 8, the Russian peacekeeping contingent dismantled posts in the Martuni and Martakert regions…

A day earlier, the Russian peacekeeping contingent reported that the Russian peacekeeping contingent had set up 25 guard posts in the North (seven posts) and South (18 posts) areas of responsibility, including 14 jointly with the Azerbaijani side. Peacekeepers are taking part in the protection of warehouses with ammunition, weapons, military and special equipment surrendered by the armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh, as stated in the bulletin dated October 9.

The activities of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh will adapt to new conditions against the backdrop of a mass exodus of the population from the region, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said today…

As a result of the virtual capitulation of Stepanakert, Azerbaijan gained control over the region. On September 28, the President of Nagorno-Karabakh signed a decree ending the existence of the republic. After the military operation carried out by Azerbaijan on September 19-20, almost all residents left Nagorno-Karabakh, in which, according to various sources, about 120 thousand people lived…If the Russian peacekeeping contingent leaves Nagorno-Karabakh, it must return to Russia, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said today in an interview with the Public TV Channel when asked about the possibility of deploying peacekeepers in Armenia…On October 5, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed a declaration recognizing the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, including the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh…

Notes:

[i] Russian peacekeepers were deployed as part of the ceasefire agreement that ended the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. For background on the Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh and how Russia uses peacekeeping missions to achieve strategic objectives beyond conflict resolution, see: Matthew Stein “The Evolutionary Russian View Of Peacekeeping As Part Of Modern Warfare,” FMSO’s Foreign Perspectives Brief, 24 March 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/2023-03-24-the-evolutionary-russian-view-of-peacekeeping-as-part-of-modern-warfare-matthew-stein-update/

Image Information:

Image: Map of the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh war showing Azerbaijan day-to-day advances.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2023_Nagorno-Karabakh_War.svg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Russian North Sea Fleet Deputy Commander Killed in Nagorno-Karabakh

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Map of the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh war showing Azerbaijan day-to-day advances as of 22 September 2023.

“This was a man who belonged to the fleet, and even though he was a political officer, what did he do down there [Nagorno Karabakh]?”

Attrition continues within Russia’s officer corps as Russian commanders die on the battlefield, even beyond Ukraine and Syria.[i] According to the Norway-based news outlet The Barents Observer, deputy commander and political officer of Russia’s Northern Fleet submarine forces, Ivan Kovgan, was killed in Nagorno-Karabakh on 20 September.[ii] The article noted that Kovgan was deployed to the disputed region as the deputy commander of the Russian peacekeeping contingent. Kovgan’s SUV reportedly was struck by Azeri artillery, killing him and four other Russian servicemembers. It is unclear whether the strike on the Russian peacekeepers’ vehicle was intentional or a mistake as a result of the fog of war. In any case, the event prompted an immediate apology from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev to Russian President Putin and the promise of an investigation. The article also noted that residents of the Kola Peninsula, where Kovgan resided, were shocked that he would have even been selected to serve in Nagorno-Karabakh. While units from the Russian Northern Fleet have been deployed to Ukraine, some with catastrophic consequences,[iii] the death of Kovgan while on a less-risky peacekeeping mission is an unexpected blow. Russia has lost many high-ranking officers in Ukraine, and losing another senior officer in far-off Nagorno-Karabakh is costly.

Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Deputy Commander of Russia’s Northern Fleed submarine forces is killed in Nagorno-Karabakh,” The Barents Observer (Norway based naval news focused news source), 22 September 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/09/deputy-commander-russias-northern-fleet-submarine-forces-killed-nagorno-karabakh

Kovgan was only days away from completing his assignment in the disputed territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan when his car came under attack. He and four more Russian servicemen were killed.

A photo reportedly taken on the site of the attack shows a Russian military SUV type UAZ Patriot that has crashed into a rocky hillside. At least four bodies can be seen in and around the vehicle.

The lethal attack came from Azerbaijani forces and took place on the 20th of September as part of a major onslaught on Armenia-backed forces in the region. It is reported to have taken place near the settlement of Canyataq in the northeastern corner of the self-proclaimed republic.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev in a telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin the following day apologised for the killings and assured that an investigation will be initiated and the guilty troops punished.

But for many locals in Gadzhievo it appear a mystery that a top officer from the Northern Fleet’s submarine forces was on duty in the far-away Nagorno-Karabakh.

“Who sent this first rank captain to that place???” a man writes in a comment on local social media in Gadzhievo. “This was a man that belongs to the fleet, and even though he was a political officer, what did he do down there??? After all, he was our naval political officer with both body and mind!” he underlines.Ivan Kovgan had reportedly been two months in Nagorno-Karabakh when he was killed. He was serving as Deputy Commander of the so-called peacekeeping forces that have been deployed in the area since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020. Back home in the Kola Peninsula he was Deputy Commander of the Northern Fleet’s submarine forces with responsibility for military-political operations.

Notes:

[i] Russia has lost several senior officers in Syria since 2016, including most recently Colonel Oleg Pechevisty, who was killed in May 2023. See: Isabel Van Brugen, “Russian Colonel Killed After Direct Strike on His Command Post – Reports,” Newsweek, 29 May 2023. https://www.newsweek.com/russian-colonel-oleg-pechevisty-killed-syria-strike-ukraine-war-1803136 and “Администрация Подпорожского района (Administration of Podporozhye district),” ВКонтакте (InKontact) Russian online social media and social networking service based in Saint Petersburg). 27 May 2023. https://vk.com/wall-167456645_21197

[ii] For additional information from the Russian perspective on the renewed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and presence of Russian peacekeepers, see: Kirill Strelnikov, “Прощание с Карабахом: уроки трагедии с двумя стульями (Farewell to Karabakh: lessons from the tragedy with two chairs),” RIANovosti (state-owned domestic Russian media outlet), 21 September 2023. https://ria.ru/20230921/karabakh-1897672995.html; “Messages appeared on the Internet about an attack by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces on a warehouse of Russian Peacekeepers, Top War (English language Russian military news focused media website, part of Military Review (Военное Обозрение)), 23 September 2023. https://en.topwar.ru/226714-v-seti-internet-pojavilis-soobschenija-ob-udare-vs-azerbajdzhana-po-skladu-rossijskih-mirotvorcev.html

[iii] The 200th is one of two Arctic infantry units subordinate to the Northern Military District’s 14th Army Corps, the 14th Army Corps is Ground Forces unit subordinate to the navy command, and as part of the Northern Military District it is subordinate to the Northern Fleet. For an investigative news piece on the fate of the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade in Ukraine see: “‘Wiped Out’: War in Ukraine has decimated a once feared Russian brigade,” The Washington Post, 16 December 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/16/russia-200th-brigade-decimated-ukraine/

Image Information:

Image: Map of the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh war showing Azerbaijan day-to-day advances as of 22 September 2023.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2023_Nagorno-Karabakh_War.svg
Attribution: CCA SA 4.0 Int

Armenia Questions Continuing Its Membership in Russia-Led Regional Security Body

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Before the meeting of the leaders of the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. From left to right: CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas, Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, and President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon

“After Russia’s refusal to intervene in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020, Armenia’s confidence in the benefits of participating in the Collective Security Treaty Organization has weakened to the point of threats to leave the CSTO.” 

Armenia has long considered ending its membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) due to a perceived lack of support from the organization following numerous clashes with its neighbor Azerbaijan, which is not a CSTO member. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s statement on 22 May that Armenia is considering leaving the organization marked the latest in a series of disputes between Armenia and CSTO leadership that could be a turning point for its role in the organization. The accompanying excerpted article from the independent, Caucasus-focused website Kavkazskiy Uzel provides a look at the issues Armenia has with the CSTO. The article notes “the degree of Armenia’s unfriendly rhetoric towards Russia has been rising” since the CSTO refused to intervene in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. In the fall of 2021, Pashinyan made a comment that “Armenia was not going to consider the possibility of leaving” the CSTO, but this position has changed since then. The article notes how the organization and Russia responded to recent incidents between Armenia and Azerbaijan. From Armenia’s perspective, clashes over Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2022 should have triggered the CSTO’s collective defense clause, but the organization declined to intervene. This damaged Armenia’s already tenuous relations with the CSTO in addition to straining Armenian-Russian relations, as Armenian officials believed Russia has failed to pressure Azerbaijan to stop attacks against their country.[i] The article also notes that Pashinyan refused to sign a CSTO declaration in December 2022, declined to host a previously planned CSTO joint military exercise in Armenia in 2023,[ii] and refused to host CSTO observers. Armenia’s relations with the CSTO have become bad enough that the CSTO Secretary General became concerned that Armenia will withdraw from the organization.

Sources:

“Главное о критике Арменией ОДКБ и Кремля (The crux of Armenia’s criticism of the CSTO and the Kremlin),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website), 23 May 2023. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/386973/

After Russia’s refusal to intervene in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020, Armenia’s confidence in the benefits of participating in the Collective Security Treaty Organization has weakened to the point of threats to leave the CSTO. The “Caucasian Knot” has prepared a report on how the degree of Armenia’s unfriendly rhetoric towards Russia has been rising… 

During the aggravation of the Karabakh conflict in 2020, Armenia turned to the CSTO for help. In response, Moscow stated that it could not help, since the borders of Armenia were not violated, the war took place on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. During the 2020 war, the Kremlin limited itself to political support for Yerevan, and then sent peacekeepers to the Karabakh conflict zone…In the fall of 2021, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, commenting on Armenia’s criticism of the CSTO in connection with Russia’s position on the conflict in Karabakh, stated that Armenia was not going to consider the possibility of leaving this organization. However, two years later, Armenia’s rhetoric on this issue changed.  

In the spring of 2022, Nikol Pashinyan accused the CSTO of not properly responding to the actions of the Azerbaijani military in the Sotk-Khoznavar sector. “The way the CSTO reacted to what happened was a failure for the organization itself. Contrary to existing procedures, the CSTO has not decided to conduct monitoring at the site at the moment, justifying the long-standing fears of the Armenian public that an organization important for the security of Armenia will not do anything at the right time,” said the Armenian Prime Minister… 

According to Pashinyan, during the discussion of security issues in the CSTO, he received clear assurances that the Armenian border was a “red line” for the organization, but “it turned out that red lines exist only in words.” “This is important not only for Armenia, but also for the CSTO, because if you say that there is no border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, then there is no CSTO, because the CSTO has a zone of responsibility, which is defined by borders. If there is no border, then there is no area of responsibility; if there is no area of responsibility, then there is no organization,” Pashinyan said. 

On November 23, 2022, Nikol Pashinyan refused to sign the declaration of the Collective Security Council (CSC) of the CSTO and the draft decision on assistance to Yerevan. The reason was the lack of a clear political position of the organization on the issue of Azerbaijan’s actions… 

In January 2023, Nikol Pashinyan stated that Yerevan considers it inappropriate to hold CSTO exercises in Armenia. “The Armenian Defense Ministry has already informed the CSTO Joint Headquarters in writing that we consider it inappropriate to conduct exercises in Armenia in the current situation…” he said.  

Commenting on the possibility of Armenia’s withdrawal from the CSTO, Nikol Pashinyan replied that the Armenian side would be guided by the state interests in this decision…“When the CSTO Secretary General arrived in Armenia in 2022, he told me that the CSTO was concerned that Armenia would withdraw from the Organization. I said that this concern is out of place, but there is another concern that the CSTO may withdraw from Armenia. My assessment now is this: the CSTO, willingly or not, is leaving Armenia. And this worries us,” Pashinyan repeated… 

On May 22, 2022, Nikol Pashinyan confirmed at a press conference that the issue of Armenia’s withdrawal from the bloc remains on the agenda… 

He also explained why Armenia refused CSTO observers, being a member of this military bloc. “The CSTO mission does not operate on the territory of Armenia for the simple reason that, in fact, the organization does not indicate its vision of the territory and borders of Armenia. 90 percent of the problems stem from this,” the prime minister said.

Notes:

[i] For more background on the strained relations between Armenia and Russia, see: Matthew Stein “Armenia Acquires Indian Multiple Rocket Launcher System Amid Delays in Russian Deliveries,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

[ii] For more background on Armenia’s refusal to sign the CSTO declaration, see: Matthew Stein “Armenia Takes Another Step Away From Russia,” OE Watch, 2-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: Before the meeting of the leaders of the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. From left to right: CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas, Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, and President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CSTO_Summit_2022_01.jpg   
Attribution: CCA 4.0 

Ongoing Clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh Threaten Fragile Truce

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Azerbaijani protesters during the 2022 blockade of the Lachin corridor.

Azerbaijani protesters during the 2022 blockade of the Lachin corridor.

“Thus, the corridor was blocked by two checkpoints — an “ecological” and a “peacekeeping” one. The peacekeepers are not letting ecologists enter Stepanakert, but they’re also not interfering with their blocking of the highway.”

On 5 March 2023, a clash took place in the Lachin Corridor, which connects Armenia with the Armenian-occupied region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The fight between Azerbaijani soldiers and Armenian policemen left five dead. The Lachin Corridor remains the only road connecting ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia following the ceasefire agreement that ended the 2020 war. The blockade is being carried out by so-called “ecologists” from Azerbaijan, who have stated they are concerned that mining operations in Nagorno-Karabakh are having a negative environmental impact on the region. However, there have been reports that the “ecologists” are likely working for the government of Azerbaijan. The incident brought increased attention to Azerbaijan’s ongoing blockade of the Corridor, which effectively cut off a significant lifeline for ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. The blockade also raises questions about the role Russian peacekeepers have in the Lachin Corridor, as well as Armenians who are using routes outside the main road in the corridor to travel to Nagorno-Karabakh. While the incidents have not spiraled out of control into a larger conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, they have added to what has been an unstable situation since the 2020 war ended.[i] The accompanying excerpted articles provide a look at the issues causing incidents in recent months between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces.

The first article from the independent English-language newspaper Novaya Gazeta Europe is a reporter’s account of traveling to Nagorno-Karabakh and includes interviews with regional analysts on the situation since the blockade by Azerbaijani ecologists began in December 2022. The author details numerous issues for those trying to travel to Nagorno-Karabakh via the Lachin Corridor, including the cost to be escorted there and having to pass through multiple checkpoints. The author points out how “Azerbaijan is building very expensive roads from its side, carving tunnels in the mountains,” as part of an effort to not only cut off the Lachin Corridor, but also control additional routes to Nagorno-Karabakh. Another analyst interviewed for the article claimed that Armenians are using the corridor to transport military cargo and that vehicles continue to travel to Nagorno-Karabakh despite the ecologists’ blockade. The article also notes how the blockade has remained in place even after outside efforts to end it, including Putin’s attempt to maintain leverage in Nagorno-Karabakh and the wider region through the appointment of ethnic Armenian Ruben Vardanyan to the office of State Minister in Armenia. Vardanyan was later dismissed, reportedly at the request of Azerbaijani President Aliyev during negotiations to end the blockade. The second article from Armenia’s state news agency Armenpress offers insight into an 11 April incident near the Lachin Corridor. While the article presents only the Armenian perspective, which blamed Azerbaijan for instigating the incident, the article notes that the Armenian military had been carrying out engineering work. It is unclear if this work is for a road or a defensive position, but it is taking place near the corridor. With the ongoing blockade by Azerbaijani ecologists and both Armenia and Azerbaijan constructing and using roads in and around the Lachin Corridor to their own advantage, additional skirmishes are likely, increasing the chance of escalation to a wider conflict.

Source:

Irina Tumakova, “‘The thing I miss the most? Freedom’,” Novaya Gazeta Europe (independent English-language newspaper), 24 March 2023. https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/03/24/the-thing-i-miss-the-most-freedom-en

While I was coming down the Lachin mountain serpentine, my phone started vibrating. It was someone from the Russian military base, which, as is commonly believed, maintains peace and security in the small part of Karabakh that is still controlled by the unrecognised republic. “Andrey Valeryevich,” the man from the Russian peacekeepers base introduced himself shortly. “I was told you want to cross over to Stepanakert. Why?”

I explained that I had to see how people in Nagorno-Karabakh are living under the blockade organised by Azerbaijani eco-activists.

“The blockade?” Andrey Valeryevich chuckled. “They’re doing great, better than before! It’s us, peacekeepers, who’re under the blockade. The prices are crazy! Take a dozen eggs — three hundred rubles [€3.6] in Russian money. Isn’t that crazy? Three hundred! These ‘blockade victims’, these Armenians, are the ones selling us eggs at such prices!”

…“There’s a passage to get into Karabakh, but it costs money, 150 thousand [Armenian] drams [about €360] per person,” Armenian politologist Andrias Gukasyan tells me a few days later. “You have to first go to the Russian peacekeepers base in Goris. Why are you so surprised? You’ve come from Russia, you know what it’s like…”

…From the Armenian side, the border is guarded by an Armenian military police post. This is where Karabakh’s blockade begins. There’s another post like that in Stepanakert, in between the two there are Russian peacekeepers and Azerbaijani “ecologists” who organised the blockade.

…Karabakh and Armenia are connected via the Lachin corridor in the mountains. The corridor’s width is stated at 22 km. In reality, it’s a narrow highway where even two cars aren’t always able to let each other pass…Driving here is hard and dangerous, so Azerbaijan is building very expensive roads from its side, carving tunnels in the mountains…

According to the trilateral agreement signed on 9 November 2020, Azerbaijan pledged not to interfere with Armenians’ coming and going to and from Karabakh. The corridor has to remain under the control of Russian peacekeepers, they’re the ones ensuring the aforementioned freedom of movement.

On 12 December 2022, the road was blocked by people from Azerbaijan. They referred to themselves as eco-activists who had to verify the compliance with the environmental protection norms on two Karabakh mines — the Drmbon mine and the Kashen mine…Thus, the corridor was blocked by two checkpoints — an “ecological” and a “peacekeeping” one. The peacekeepers are not letting ecologists enter Stepanakert, but they’re also not interfering with their blocking of the highway…

“After the death of police officers (on 5 March, a car of the unrecognised republic’s police department was shot at, three police officers were killed — editor’s note), we went to the Russian peacekeeper contingent, we wanted to express our protest against everything going on. There’s a lot of blame on our locals too when it comes to the police officers’ death…”

“According to the trilateral agreement, this road is a humanitarian corridor to connect Armenia with Armenian residents of Karabakh,” this is how Azerbaijani political analyst Ilhar Velidaze explains the recent protests in the Lachin corridor. “However, we are able to follow the cargo movement through satellites and we have observed several times that the road is used for military cargo too, as well as soldiers coming in from Armenia. We couldn’t just act indifferently…Unfortunately, the Armenian side is trying to misrepresent the situation as a humanitarian catastrophe,” he notes. “But there’s no catastrophe to speak of. Take a look at the so-called ‘blockade’…During the last three months of the Azerbaijani activists’ protest, the Lachin road was used by over 4,000 vehicles that were transporting various cargo, furthermore, these are heavy-duty vehicles. Can this be called a blockade?”

“Putin sent Ruben Vardanyan to Karabakh as his representative,” Arif Yunusov, Head of the Conflictology Department of Azerbaijan’s Institute of World and Democracy, notes. “He was conducting secret talks about these mines, but they fell through. But for Putin, the main thing wasn’t the mines. Russia, dissatisfied with Pashinyan, assumed that Vardanyan would gain power in Karabakh, the next step being his candidacy as Armenian Prime Minister…You may recall how Presidents [Robert] Kocharyan and [Serzh] Sargsyan came into power, they’re from Karabakh too. Karabakh is a jumping off point.”

Ruben Vardanyan, Russian billionaire of Armenian origin, came back to Armenia in September of last year, went to Karabakh, and was appointed State Minister… In February, it came out that Vardanyan was dismissed from his position, as per the condition put forward by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. That was soon after the UN International Court of Justice demanded the Lachin corridor be unblocked. But the “ecologists” pickets remained.

…When the condition of Vardanyan’s dismissal was fulfilled, Azerbaijan brought forward another one — this one has as much to do with the environment and ecologists (nothing)…“Now, they’re demanding there be a checkpoint built on that road because the Armenians are allegedly transporting weapons into Karabakh,” Arif Yunusov says…

“Азербайджанцы потребовали от армянских военнослужащих прекратить инженерные работы: подробности о провокации в селе Тех (Azerbaijani demanded that Armenian soldiers halt engineering work: details on the provocation in the village of Tegh),” Armenpress (state news agency of Armenia), 12 April 2023. https://armenpress.am/rus/news/1108490.html

…Presenting the details of the Azerbaijani provocation near the village of Tegh on April 11, Khachatryan said that under the pretext of negotiations, an Azerbaijani car drove up to the Armenian positions from the territory controlled by them and demanded that the Armenian military personnel stop engineering work……On April 11, at about 16:00, on the territory of the Republic of Armenia, near the village of Tegh, Syunik region, a group of servicemen of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, under the pretext of clarifying the border points of deployment, approached the servicemen of the RA Armed Forces, further provoked them, opened fire in the direction of the servicemen and positions of the Armenian Armed Forces…As a result of the Azerbaijani provocation from the Armenian side, there are 4 dead and 6 wounded. As of 0800 April 12, the situation on the front line remains relatively stable.

Notes:

[i] For more background on incidents between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 2020 war ended, see: Matthew Stein “The Impact of Territorial Changes in Nagorno Karabakh,” OE Watch, July-2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: Azerbaijani protesters during the 2022 blockade of the Lachin corridor.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Azerbaijani_protesters_during_the_2022_blockade_of_the_Lachin_corridor_03.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

The Evolutionary Russian View of Peacekeeping as Part of Modern Warfare (Matthew Stein) (March 2023)

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Russia views peacekeeping operations as a part of warfare, specifically that they can be
utilized to achieve strategic objectives beyond conflict resolution
• Russia’s past peacekeeping operations have shown how these involved ending the conflict
as quickly as possible and enforcing terms of any cease-fire agreement, including taking
action that favored one of the belligerents as long as Russia remains in the dominant position
• Russia’s Nagorno-Karabakh peacekeeping operation ended a conflict and helped the
Russian government maintain influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States with
a Russian military detachment in place for the foreseeable future, which can help explain
how conflicts involving Russia are likely to end.

“The Evolutionary Russian View of Peacekeeping as Part of Modern Warfare” by Matthew Stein (July 2022)

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War stood out as a significant chapter in the history of the conflict in the region. Not only did Azerbaijan take control over a large amount of territory, the Russian government deployed peacekeepers as part of the cease-fire agreement between the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan. This marked the first time a peacekeeping force became involved in the conflict over the region and stood as another example of how Russia utilized a peacekeeping operation as a response to a conflict in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CIS is made up of states of the former Soviet Union and is an area where the Russian government has special relationships and a sphere of influence. While the United States has arguably pulled back from peacekeeping operations in recent years and, as a result, the U.S. military has deemphasized them, Russia views peacekeeping operations as a key part of modern warfare. Like other military operations, Russians consider that peacekeeping operations can be utilized to achieve strategic objectives beyond conflict resolution. This article examines how Russia views peacekeeping operations as a part of warfare, including in its military doctrine and based on past conflicts in the CIS. It also examines how this applies to the most recent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the peacekeeping operation as a response to civil unrest in Kazakhstan. Insights from this may also inform potential outcomes of the current war in Ukraine.