Tag Archives: Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan Imposes New Language Requirements for Citizens

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Statue of man and camels from Türkistan, Kazakistan.

“Knowledge of the language is necessary,” Interior Ministry spokesman Shyngys Alekeshev told reporters, adding that the new amendments were similar to those in countries like Germany, Canada and Turkey.”

Summary: Kazakhstan imposes stricter language requirements for naturalized citizens to reduce the role of Russia in Kazakhstani society.

Kazakhstan has made it stricter for noncitizens to become naturalized citizens by requiring applicants to pass a series of history and language tests. According to the excerpted article from state-run news outlet Kazinform, “ignorance of the state language… as well as the basics of the history and Constitution… can become grounds for refusal to admit citizenship.” The move is part of a broader push by the government to promote and preserve the Kazakh language and possibly distance itself from Russian influence. The move comes amid remarks made by Russian commentators and academics who have called into question the legitimacy and sovereignty of Kazakhstan as a country. It may be interpreted as a move to reduce the role of the Russian language in schools, business, and other aspects of Kazakhstani life. In January, a Russian historian, Mikhail Smolin, claimed on Russia’s state-owned television that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan did not exist as nations.[i] The charge drew widespread condemnation in the region.

The new language rules, under the leadership of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, are just one manifestation of Kazakstan’s pivot away from Russia toward other regional powers like China. Part of the Soviet legacy, particularly along its northern border with Russia, large portions of Kazakhstan’s population do not speak Kazakh. There are proposals underway to regulate the country’s media to require that a majority (55 percent) of all content on radio and television be broadcast in Kazakh by 2025. The widely heard phrase “Qazaqsha soyle” (Speak Kazakh) is now commonly heard on the street and has even emerged as an internet meme.

Tokayev has defined his “multi-vector” foreign policy as one of pragmatism defined by “national interests and strategic tasks.”[ii] Russian soft power and influence is arguably on the wane in Kazakhstan, whose youthful population – half of its population is under the age of 30 – did not grow up under the Soviet Union and have absorbed the “de-colonization” discourse ascendant among other countries in the Global South.[iii]

Sources:

“Ignorance of the state language at the elementary level can prevent admission to citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan – Ministry of Internal Affairs,” (Незнание госязыка на элементарном уровне может помешать в приеме в гражданство РК- МВД),” Kazinform (Kazakhstani state news agency) 20 May, 2024. https://www.inform.kz/ru/neznanie-gosyazika-na-elementarnom-urovne-mozhet-pomeshat-v-prieme-v-grazhdanstvo-rk-mvd-0aabd6

“Ignorance of the state language at the elementary level, as well as the basics of the history and Constitution of our country can become grounds for refusal to admit citizenship. The elementary level will be determined by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. The purpose of the amendments is rapid adaptation and integration into society. Knowledge of the language is first of all necessary for the citizens themselves who want to obtain our citizenship in order to quickly join society and participate in the life of the state,” said Shyngys Alekeshev at a briefing in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

“To prevent dual citizenship, a new basis for registering the loss of citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan is being introduced. Citizenship of our country will be lost if the passports of another state are used after acquiring citizenship of Kazakhstan. Previously, it was planned to lose citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan only for the acquisition of citizenship of a foreign state,” added Shyngys Alekeshev.

Notes:

[i] “Russian historian Mikhail Smolin: ‘Uzbekistan did not exist at all before the revolution’,” Anhor.uz (online Uzbek newspaper), 23 January 2024. https://anhor.uz/news/there-were-no-uzbeks/

[ii] “President Tokayev: Kazakhstan Continues Constructive, Balanced Foreign Policy Considering National Interests,” The Astana Times (English-language weekly), 3 January 2024.

https://astanatimes.com/2024/01/president-tokayev-kazakhstan-continues-constructive-balanced-foreign-policy-considering-national-interests

[iii] In May 2022, months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, not a single leader of Central Asia commemorated Victory Day in Moscow—a symbolic blow to the Kremlin and a demonstration of the region’s growing autonomy. See: Temur Umarov, “Kazakhstan is Breaking out of Russia’s Grip,” Foreign Policy, 22 September 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/16/kazakhstan-russia-ukraine-war/

OE Insight Summary: 

KAZ is set to impose tougher Kazakh language requirements to obtain citizenship, which some interpret as a slight at Moscow and a move to assert greater autonomy.

Image Information:

Image: Statue of man and camels from Türkistan, Kazakistan
Source: Ekrem Osmanoglu, Unsplash, https://unsplash.c om/photos/statue-of-man-and-camels-during-daytime-2qbAZ7RGPNM
Attribution: Free to use under the Unsplash License

Armenia Hints It May Withdraw From Russia-Backed Regional Security Bloc

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Monastery Valley in Armenia

“Armenia will refrain from joining the CSTO Collective Security Council resolution of November 23, 2023 on the CSTO budget for 2024 and from participating in financing the organization’s activity envisaged by this resolution. However, it will not object to adopting this resolution in a curtailed format.”

Armenia recently announced it will no longer pay its dues to the Collective Security Treaty Organizations (CSTO), a Moscow-led security organization comprised of countries from Central Asia and the South Caucasus. According to the first excerpted piece from the Russian state news agency, TASS, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told his countrymen that they can no longer rely on the CSTO and he had no answer to how Yerevan benefits from being a member. The move comes as relations between Yerevan and Moscow have cooled, particularly after a series of clashes over the disputed Nagorno Karabakh region, , last September with neighboring Azerbaijan resulted in the mass expulsion of the enclave’s Armenian population.

Pashinyan, who did not attend the CSTO’s last summit in Minsk in 2023, had hinted that Armenia plans to suspend its participation in the security bloc. Critics of the CSTO claim it is a tool for Moscow to wield military power over former Soviet-bloc countries. The last time CSTO forces were called in to preserve the peace came in January 2022, when roughly 2,500 CSTO peacekeepers – the bulk of them Russian – responded to anti-government rioting in Kazakhstan. But Pashinyan has criticized the alliance for not supporting Armenia during its various clashes with Azerbaijan,accusing Russian peacekeepers of abandoning their positions when Azerbaijani troops crossed into Nagorno-Karabakh.[i] According to the second excerpted article from Armenian TV and radio service Azatutyun, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Armenia is free to withdraw from the organization.[ii]  If Armenia does leave the CSTO, the move could signal a major realignment of the regional balance of power in the Caucasus, as Russia, preoccupied by the war in Ukraine, looks to keep a military presence in the region. Armenia recently held joint drills with the United States, has sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and has expressed interest in one day joining the European Union. If the CSTO were to lose Armenia or other members, it could weaken Russia’s military leverage in the South Caucasus. Alternatively, it could make other regional security blocs like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which also comprises China, more relevant and powerful.

Sources:

Source:  “Armenia to refrain from financing CSTO activity in 2024,” (“Армения воздержится от финансирования деятельности ОДКБ в 2024 году,” TASS (Russian state news agency), 8 May 2024. https://tass.com/world/1785765

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said earlier that his country cannot rely on the CSTO and he cannot answer Armenian society’s question why the country should be its member. In recent time, Yerevan has skipped numerous meeting in a range of integration formats. Thus, Pashinyan did not attend the CSTO summit in Minsk in 2023 and announced that Armenia had suspended its participation in this organization.

CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov told TASS on April 22 that it was a matter of “an independent and sovereign country” to decide whether to take part in the upcoming CSTO summit or not. However, he said that he hoped that many might change for the better before the summit.

Source:  “Armenia Free To Leave Russian-Led Bloc, Says Moscow,” (Армения свободна выйти из возглавляемого Россией блока, заявила Москва), Azatutyun (Armenian TV and Radio service affiliated with U.S. funded RFE/RL) 3 May 2024. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32932373.html#

“We still do not question the sovereign right of our Armenian partners to independently determine their foreign policy course, including in the context of the further work of the organization,” the ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova told a news briefing in Moscow.

“Let me remind you that Article 19 of the [CSTO} Charter establishes the possibility of leaving the alliance,” Zakharova said. “In that case, a member state … must send an official notification no later than six months before the withdrawal date.”

The Armenian government, she said, has taken no steps in that direction so far despite its “constantly circulated accusations against the organization.” This means that Armenia remains for now a full-fledged member of the Russian-led military alliance and must “must fulfill appropriate obligations,” added Zakharova. She did not specify those obligations.Over the past year or so, Yerevan has boycotted high-level meetings, military exercises and other activities of the CSTO in what Pashinian described in February as an effective suspension of Armenia’s CSTO membership. The premier repeatedly said afterwards that he could pull his country out of the alliance of six ex-Soviet states altogether.

Notes:

[i] “Armenian PM Attacks Russian-Led Alliance At Summit In Yerevan,” RFE/RL, 24 November 2022. https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-csto-pashinian-criticism/32145663.html

[ii] During a recent visit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Pashinyan struck an agreement for Russian border guards to withdraw from along the Armenia-Azerbaijani border. See: Gabriel Gavin, “Russia to withdraw troops from Armenia’s border,” Politico.eu, 9 May 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-to-withdraw-troops-from-armenias-border/

Image Information:

Image: Monastery Valley in Armenia
Source: Unsplash, https://unsplash.com/photos/aerial-photo-of-a-village-during-daytime-VQ07UveM3-U
Attribution: Free to use under the Unsplash License

Kazakhstan Draws on Lessons From War in Ukraine

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Russian and Kazakh military to discuss security in Central Asia

“Units of special operations forces and the National Guard liberated the Kapchagai hydroelectric power station, which was captured by a mock enemy.”

Kazakhstan has always been concerned that its northern regions could be annexed by Russia.[i] As a result, Kazakhstan’s armed forces carried out an air defense exercise in February 2023 and a command-staff exercise in early September 2023 that appeared to draw on lessons from the war in Ukraine, even if it was not explicitly stated.[ii] According to the accompanying excerpted article from the Kazakhstan-based Russian-language online newspaper Informburo, the command-staff exercise, Batyl Toytarys – 2023 (Brave Resistance – 2023) involved brigade tactical groups, air support, and special forces in scenarios that included defending against a river crossing and recapturing a hydroelectric power station from an enemy force. The article notes that the exercise took place in four different regions in the country, two of which are near the Kazakhstan-Russia border. It also notes that Kazakhstan’s Navy took part in the exercise by securing facilities in the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstani officials did not release any further information on the conditional enemy for the exercise, but it appears to be working through a scenario of dealing with a conventional enemy who would target multiple regions of the country on a large scale.

Sources:

Aygerim Ummat, “Токаеву показали, как проходят военные учения ‘Батыл тойтарыс – 2023’ (Tokayev was shown how the armed forces carried out the exercise ‘Batyl toytarys – 2023’),” Informburo (Russian-language online newspaper in Kazakhstan), 5 September 2023. https://informburo.kz/novosti/tokaevu-pokazali-kak-proxodyat-voennye-uceniya-batyl-toitarys-2023

…the Head of State Kassym-Jomart Tokayev visited the strategic command and staff military exercises “Batyl Toytarys – 2023″…

Brigade tactical groups, with the support of aviation, as well as in cooperation with units of ground forces and special operations forces, worked out tactical actions to capture the designated enemy line on the opposite bank while overcoming a water barrier.

Units of special operations forces and the National Guard liberated the Kapchagai hydroelectric power station, which was captured by a mock enemy. The units of the Ministry of Emergency Situations worked to alleviate the consequences of the man-made disaster and worked out measures to provide humanitarian assistance to the population.

According to a single concept and plan, which was developed by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan, a strategic regrouping of troops was carried out in the areas where the exercises will be held…the Navy, with the support of aviation and special operations forces, ensured the security of economic facilities in the Caspian Sea. The corresponding joint combat training tasks were carried out at the training grounds of Almaty, Karaganda, North Kazakhstan, and Abay regions.

Notes:

[i] For more information on Kazakhstan’s exercise and the cancelled parade, see: Matthew Stein “Kazakhstan Draws Lessons From the Russia-Ukraine War,” OE Watch 03-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437097

[ii] Kazakhstani public perceptions of Russia are trending negative. A recent public survey revealed that 30 percent of the Kazakhstani population had lost its positive perception of Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, while half of those questioned did not change their perception of Russia. Conversely, 5 percent of those surveyed had a better perception of Russia. For more detail see: “Треть казахстанцев стала хуже относиться к России после начала ее вторжения в Украину (A third of Kazakhstanis have a worse attitude toward Russia after the start of its invasion of Ukraine),” Vlast, 18 May 2023. https://vlast.kz/novosti/55152-tret-kazahstancev-stala-huze-otnositsa-k-rossii-posle-nacala-ee-vtorzenia-v-ukrainu.html

Image Information:

Image: Russian and Kazakh military to discuss security in Central Asia
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Russian_and_Kazakh_military_to_discuss_security_in_Central_Asia.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Russia Strengthens Its Military Presence in Central Asia

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201st Military Base.

201st Military Base.

“Russia decided to increase the readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of “US attempts to restore its military presence in Central Asia.”

Russia’s military bases in Central Asia have always been important to its strategic goals in the region, particularly for dealing with potential instability in Afghanistan. While the Russian government initially accepted U.S. airbases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan beginning in 2001 to support operations in Afghanistan, it later pressed both governments to evict U.S. forces. The United States left the Kharshi-Khanbad airbase (known as K2) in Uzbekistan in 2005[i] and left the Transit Center at Manas in Kyrgyzstan in 2014. Russian officials have claimed that U.S. security cooperation with Central Asian states in the 2000s took place as part of an effort to establish permanent military bases in the region, though the United States has not used a regional military facility since it left Manas.

The accompanying excerpted article from Kyrgyzstan’s independent news website Kloop reports on a statement by Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on 28 April 2023 in New Delhi, India about increasing the combat readiness of Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Shoigu noted that Russia made this decision to increase combat readiness because the United States is trying “to restore its military presence in Central Asia…under the pretext of helping in the fight against terrorism.” However, the article also notes that Shoigu did not offer facts to substantiate this this claim. When Russian officials announced measures to strengthen its military bases in Central Asia in the past, they noted specific increases in capabilities, like the transfer of S-300 [RG1] air defense systems to Tajikistan in 2019.[ii] Shoigu also stated that requests from members of the SCO to host military facilities is a “direct threat to stability in the SCO space.” Shoigu did not mention which SCO member would potentially host the U.S. military, but SCO members in Central Asia include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. There have been no reports that any of the three have been negotiating to host U.S. forces, but Shoigu is warning fellow SCO members that Russia will consider hosting the United States as a threat. The article also usefully provides a reminder of the current Russian military bases in Central Asia. These include the Kant airbase outside Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and the 201st Russian military base, home of the 201st Motor Rifle Division, in Tajikistan, the latter of which is Russia’s largest military facility outside its borders. The article ends by noting that Ukraine claimed it destroyed a tactical group from the 201st military base last year, though this has not been verified. While Russia claims it is strengthening its bases in Central Asia as a measure to maintain its presence in the region, without any specific information on how this will take place, it is possible that Russia is doing this to replace losses of the of the 201st in Tajikistan suffered in Ukraine.

Source:

Munduzbek Kalykov, “Шойгу: Россия повышает боеготовность своих военных баз в Кыргызстане и Таджикистане (Shoigu: Russia will increase the combat readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan),” Kloop (an independent Russian-language news website in Kyrgyzstan), 29 April 2023. https://kloop.kg/blog/2023/04/29/shojgu-rossiya-povyshaet-boegotovnost-svoih-voennyh-baz-v-kyrgyzstane-i-tadzhikistane/

Russia decided to increase the readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of “US attempts to restore its military presence in Central Asia.” This was stated by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu as reported by RIA Novosti.

According to Shoigu, “the United States and its allies, under the pretext of helping in the fight against terrorism, are trying to restore their military presence in Central Asia.” However, he did not provide specific facts.

“We regard requests to the countries of the region to deploy military infrastructure as a direct threat to stability in the SCO space…” Shoigu said on April 28 at meeting of defense ministers of the SCO member states in New Delhi.

A Russian military base has existed in Kyrgyzstan since the early 2000s. Its main forces are located in the small town of Kant, not far from Bishkek – these are Su-25 [RG1] attack aircraft and Mi-8 [RG2] helicopters. The Russian joint military base also includes a test site at Issyk-Kul, where Russian sailors test underwater torpedoes.

The 201st Russian military base is located in Tajikistan, and the garrison is deployed in the cities of Dushanbe and Bokhtar. This is Russia’s largest military facility outside its borders. The base includes motorized rifle artillery, reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile and other units, as well as an air group……in mid-April 2022, the Ukrainian army announced the destruction of the tactical group of the 201st Russian military base, which has a permanent deployment in Tajikistan…

Notes:

[i] The withdrawal of U.S. forces from K2 cannot be solely attributed to Russian pressure. In May 2005, the Uzbek military forcefully put down public demonstrations in the Ferghana Valley, killing numerous civilians and drawing the ire of the Bush administration regarding human rights. This began a diplomatic row between the United States and Uzbekistan, which resulted in an Uzbekistani demand that the United States leave the base within six months, eventually withdrawing from K2 in November 2005.

[ii] For more background on Russia’s transfers of S-300s to Tajikistan, see: Matthew Stein “Russia Transfers S-300s to Tajikistan,” OE Watch, December 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: 201st Military Base.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:201_military_base_09.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Key Arab Countries Join Chinese-Led Regional Body as Dialogue Partners

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Shanghai Cooperation Organization Secretariat (2022).

Shanghai Cooperation Organization Secretariat (2022).

“… The group’s expansion, however, should not be interpreted as meant to pose a challenge to the West, but rather as a means to provide an alternative…”

A growing number of Arab countries are joining the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as “dialogue partners.” The SCO was established in the early 2000s as a mechanism for deepening political, economic, and security cooperation between countries of Central and South Asia. It has eight member nations (China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) and over a dozen “observer” and “dialogue partner” nations, which may send delegates to SCO meetings and negotiate with the bloc on particular issues but do not have voting rights or official sway within the organization.

In the past year, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have all been officially granted “dialogue partner” status, with Bahrain expected to follow suit. With this, roughly two-thirds of countries in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility have joined the SCO in some capacity.[i] While these developments bear watching, SCO partnership is—at least for now—not necessarily at odds with existing security commitments and arrangements.[ii] Instead, engagement with the SCO is seen as part of a strategic diversification approach being pursued by Arab countries in response to emerging multipolarity. Arabic-language media largely sees these moves through an economic lens and as part of what the first accompanying excerpt, published in the Qatari-aligned daily al-Araby al-Jadeed, considers China’s “efforts to consolidate a new multipolar world economic order.” Arab countries’ interest in the SCO, however, should not be dismissed as a purely economic phenomenon bereft of potential strategic implications. According to a former Egyptian diplomat cited in the second accompanying article, published last September in the prominent Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, Russia will seek to use the SCO “as an additional point in its confrontations with the West.” Russian attempts to use the SCO for strategic leverage against NATO would likely cause friction within the organization, clashing not only with China’s more regional and economic focus but also with the strategic interests of other SCO members. Nonetheless, growing Russo-Chinese geostrategic alignment may eventually enable the SCO’s orientation to gradually shift toward global geopolitics, particularly if its membership begins extending beyond Central and South Asia. Especially noteworthy in this regard is Iran’s interest in full SCO membership (it is currently an observer country). This interest, combined with the recent China-mediated Saudi-Iranian détente, makes the SCO a potential venue through which Iran may seek to compete with the United States. Last April, Iran was for the first time invited to participate in the SCO defense ministers’ meeting in New Delhi. As reported in the third accompanying excerpt, from the pro-Iranian Lebanese media outlet al-Mayadeen, Iran’s Defense Minister called for the establishing of a “Shanghai Maritime Security Belt” and more broadly using the SCO to promote a “balance of power.” Iranian ambitions notwithstanding, the SCO remains an “alternative” rather than a “challenge” to the West, as articulated by an Indian journalist cited in the fourth accompanying excerpt, from the Saudi English-language daily Arab News. Still, in a competitive world, today’s alternatives may become tomorrow’s challenges. Present Arab involvement in the SCO remains limited and largely economic in nature, but the potential for this involvement to morph in a way that that erodes U.S.-Arab security partnerships, while not imminent, is worthy of consideration.

Sources:

“منظمة شنغهاي.. ترسيخ الصين لاقتصاد التعددية القطبية يتمدّد عربياً

(Shanghai Organization.. China’s consolidation of the multipolar economy is expanding in the Arab world),” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 16 April 2023. https://tinyurl.com/muamystt

China is seeking to attract a larger number of economically active countries to membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as part of its efforts to consolidate a new multipolar world economic order.

“ماذا يعني انضمام 5 دول عربية إلى منظمة «شنغهاي»؟

(What does the accession of 5 Arab countries to the ‘Shanghai Organization’ mean?).” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 17 September 2022. https://tinyurl.com/bdf9f2v8


Ambassador Raouf Saad, the former Egyptian assistant foreign minister and former Egyptian ambassador to Moscow, acknowledged that Russia will work to exploit the matter as an additional point in its confrontations with the West. However, he stressed the constants of Egyptian foreign policy, which refuses to “enter into alliances directed at the expense of its interests.”

“وزير الدفاع الإيراني: يجب تفعيل حزام الأمن البحري لمنظمة “شنغهاي

(Iranian Defense Minister: The ‘Shanghai Organization’ maritime security belt must be activated,)” al-Mayadeen (pro-Iran Lebanese media outlet), 29 April 2023. https://tinyurl.com/35dfp45z

Today, Saturday, the Iranian Minister of Defense, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, proposed adopting the “Shanghai Maritime Security Belt” mechanism with the aim of maintaining the security of communication lines and collectively guaranteeing global trade with the participation of the armed forces of member states…

During his remarks at the meeting of defense ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states in New Delhi, India, Ashtiani said that the achievements of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization “should promote global multilateralism and balance of power.”

“Middle Eastern participation grows in China-led security bloc as new countries join,” Arab News (English-language Saudi daily), 5 May 2023. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2298341/world
“It is a question of moving the weight or the center of gravity from the Western world — the US and EU combined — to the Eastern world, the place where the population of the world actually now exists overwhelmingly, the place where the fastest-growing economies are also present,” Suhashini Haidar, diplomatic editor at the English-language daily the Hindu, told Arab News. The group’s expansion, however, should not be interpreted as meant to pose a challenge to the West, but rather as a means to provide an alternative, she said.

Notes:

[i] Of the 21 countries in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility, only eight (Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Yemen) do not have any status in the SCO. However, Iraq, Israel, and Syria have all applied for dialogue partner status, while Turkmenistan has attended SCO summits as a guest attendee. That leaves Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, and Yemen as the only countries with no relationship to the SCO.

[ii] SCO partnership alone means little in terms of defense commitments: Turkey, a NATO member, is an SCO dialogue partner.  Full membership in the SCO should also not be equated to membership in a defense alliance, such as NATO, given that both India and Pakistan are full members. Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have an adversarial relationship with one another, are both dialogue partners.

Image Information:

Image: Shanghai Cooperation Organization Secretariat (2022).
Source: N509FZ, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Shanghai_Cooperation_Organization_Secretariat_%2820220909162501%29.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

Kazakhstan’s Military Doctrine Raises Questions for Russia

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Flag of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Flag of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

“Building up the radar field and increasing the potential and capabilities of the troops in conducting air and missile defense of the state…(and, the) development of the Unified Regional Air Defense System of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation.”

When Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the government of Kazakhstan immediately stated that it would remain neutral in the conflict. While the Kazakhstani government has stuck to this neutrality since the war began, it has also taken certain measures to distance itself from Russia’s militarism, including canceling its Victory Day Parade in May 2022 and suspending defense exports (including to Russia) in August 2022.[i] Thus, when Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev approved a new military doctrine in October 2022, it drew attention to how Kazakhstan perceives various threats, with some speculation that Russia would be considered a threat without being named.

The accompanying excerpted article from Kazakhstan’s Russian-language independent newspaper Vremya reports on the changes in the doctrine since it was last published in 2017. The article reports that Kazakhstan has increased the combat potential of its units in “strategic directions,” and that it has created new units to combat disinformation. Although the article notes that a border conflict will be handled by the country’s border guards and the armed forces, it is unclear in the doctrine how a border conflict would different from other types of conflicts, such as an attack from another state. Another change in the doctrine is the development of special operations forces and an articulation on how they will cooperate with specialized units in other government agencies.

The new doctrine further notes that Kazakhstan will build capabilities in air defense, including in radar and missile defense. The doctrine references the “development of the Unified Regional Air Defense System of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation,” which is the only time that Russia is mentioned, suggesting Kazakhstan still sees Russia as a useful partner or at least does not wish to openly label it a threat. Other notable changes include equipping the border guards with modern systems as well as expanding production of basic types of ammunition for the armed forces. The Kazakh government established ammunition production as one of the early efforts to build the country’s defense industry, and this expansion of it could help Kazakhstan rely less on defense imports.

Sources:

“Токаев изменил военную доктрину Казахстана (Tokayev changed the military doctrine of Kazakhstan),” Vremya (a semi-independent Russian-language newspaper in Kazakhstan), 15 October 2022.

https://time.kz/news/politics/2022/10/15/tokaev-izmenil-voennuyu-doktrinu-kazahstana

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev changed the military doctrine of Kazakhstan…

Some of the changes are aimed at replacing the word “heading” with “section”, as indicated in the quote, but the bulk of the changes have affected the fundamental formulations of the doctrine. The document contains exceptions to the old doctrine and additions to it…The further text of the changes approved by Tokayev, in addition to those already indicated in the quote are provided in full:

“Chapter 3. The current state of the military security of the Republic of Kazakhstan”; Paragraphs 18 and 19 shall be stated as follows:

The combat potential of the land, air force and naval component of the military organization of the state has been increased by creating the necessary set of troops (forces), weapons, military equipment and supplies in strategic directions.

Subdivisions have been created in the Armed Forces to organize counteraction to information-psychological and software-technical (cyber) influences in the troops. Work is underway to increase their potential and capabilities…

“Section 3. Basic Provisions”;

“Chapter 5. Vision in the field of military security and defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan”;

Paragraph 39 shall be amended as follows:

39. The resolution of a border armed conflict in the border space of the Republic of Kazakhstan is carried out by the Border Service together with the Aviation Service, the Border Academy of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan, other national security bodies in cooperation with the authorities, formations and military units of the Armed Forces and the National Guard of the Republic of Kazakhstan, if necessary, forces can be used and funds of other central state and local executive bodies.”…

“Chapter 6. Approaches to ensuring the military security of the Republic of Kazakhstan”;

Heading “3.3.1. Maintenance of combat readiness of the Armed Forces, other troops and military formations of the Republic of Kazakhstan” shall be stated as follows:

In paragraph 54: supplement with subparagraph 2-1) of the following content: “2-1) the development of the Special Operations Forces for effective operations in peacetime and wartime in cooperation with special forces units of other state bodies.”

Subparagraph 4) shall be stated in the following wording: “4) building up the radar field and increasing the potential and capabilities of the troops in conducting air and missile defense of the state…

Paragraph 57 shall be stated as follows: “1) development of the Unified Regional Air Defense System of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation…

Paragraph 61: subparagraphs 3), 4) and 5) shall be stated as follows: “3) equipping the Border and Aviation Services of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan with modern weapons and military equipment, technical means of border protection; 4) bringing the infrastructure of the State Border in line with its categorization and modern requirements; 5) increasing the efficiency of interaction between the Border Service of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan with central state, local executive bodies and the population of border areas in matters of protecting the State Border, including in the underwater environment of the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea”…

In paragraph 68: subparagraph 6) shall be stated in the following wording: “6) ensuring sustainability and expanding the production of basic types of ammunition for the Armed Forces, other troops and military formations”…

Notes:

[i] For more on the Kazakhstani government’s decision not to hold a Victory Day parade commemorating the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in May, angering some in Russia, see: Matthew Stein, “Kazakhstan Cancels Soviet-Era Parade To Focus on Combat Readiness,” OE Watch, June 2022. For more on Kazakhstan’s suspensionvof defense exports for one year starting in August 2022, leaving Russia with one fewer supplier of weapons and equipment that closely matches its own armed forces, see: Matthew Stein, “Kazakhstan Suspends Defense Exports, Denying Russia Purchases,” OE Watch, October 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/427937

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kazakhstan_Armed_Forces_Flag.svg
Attribution: Public domain

Kazakhstan Suspends Defense Exports, Denying Russia Purchases

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President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, following Russia-Kazakhstan talks in Sochi, Russia.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, following Russia-Kazakhstan talks in Sochi, Russia.

The export of weapons, military equipment and military products will be suspended until the end of August 2023.

When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, international sanctions forced the Russian defense industry to consider purchasing military equipment from defense companies in Kazakhstan as a workaround to meet requirements for the Russian Armed Forces. In 2014, no significant Russian acquisitions from Kazakh companies ultimately took place. However, following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a new round of international sanctions against Moscow have reportedly caused Russia to look again at Kazakhstan’s defense industry. However, as the accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Fergana Agency reports, the Kazakh government’s announcement on 27 August that it is suspending all defense exports for one year. The ban includes “the export of weapons, military equipment and military products,” and it appears to have the greatest impact on Russia. The move is viewed as a direct effort by Kazakhstan to avoid violating sanctions levied against Russia, which it has stated multiple times that it seeks not to violate. The article notes that Russia had been planning to make a $46 million defense purchase from a Kazakh company, including acquiring shells for howitzers, ammunition for mortars, rockets, and even armored personnel carriers. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development denied this. The article notes that the pro-Russian Rybar Telegram channel tried to refute the Kazakh government by publishing documents for the purchase, but they could not be verified. Regardless of whether the Kazakh government agreed to the purchase, the one-year suspension of defense exports ultimately deprives Russia of a supplier of weapons and equipment that closely matches its own armed forces.

Sources:

“Казахстан на год приостановит экспорт вооружений (Kazakhstan is suspending defense exports for one year),” Fergana Agency (independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 29 August 2022.

https://fergana.agency/news/127503/

Kazakhstan will suspend the export of military products for a year. The Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development of the country came up with such an initiative, and it was supported by the Commission on Defense Industry, the website of the Prime Minister reports…the export of weapons, military equipment and military products will be suspended until the end of August 2023.

In the middle of this month, Russian Telegram channels reported on an allegedly planned deal for the sale of Soviet and Russian-made ammunition by the Kazakh company Technoexport…They said that the contract in the amount of $46 million was concluded on July 16, 2022. The reports also provided a list of weapons – shells for howitzers, ammunition for mortars, rockets, armored personnel carriers and so on. The Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development of Kazakhstan denied this information a few days later.

In response, the Rybar Telegram channel published documents (without specifying their origin) that cast doubt on the refutation of the Kazakh authorities.

On August 19, a meeting was held in Sochi between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kazakh leader Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. As the Kremlin reported, the agenda of the talks included the development of Russian-Kazakh relations, strategic partnership and cooperation.

Image Information:

Image: President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, following Russia-Kazakhstan talks in Sochi, Russia
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Putin-Tokayev_(2022-08-19).jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Kazakhstan Cancels Soviet-Era Parade To Focus on Combat Readiness

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Kazakhstan Republican Guard.

Kazakhstan Republican Guard.

“Units of the Air Assault Forces worked out tactical methods of combat operation in urban areas during the main stage of the complex, interdepartmental strategic command and staff exercise ‘Brave Resistance – 2022“

Like Russia, Kazakhstan commemorates the Soviet Union’s victory over Germany in World War II.  A few weeks before 9 May, the Kazakh government announced that it planned to cancel its Victory Day military parade for the third year in a row.  The government also cancelled the parade in 2020 and 2021 because of the global pandemic.  While some Russian media speculated that the Kazakh government’s decision was a sign that it wanted to move away from Russian influence because of the war in Ukraine, the accompanying excerpted articles provide insight into the real reasons behind the Kazakh government’s decision.

The article from the news website Tengri News reports that the government cancelled the parade “because of the budget as well as the need to resolve other issues,” which included “combat readiness” and “the execution of tasks to ensure security and defense of the state and military facilities.”  The article from Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense website Sarbaz reports on how Kazakhstan’s Armed Forces carried out the “Brave Resistance – 2022” exercise in the city of Almaty as part of its combat readiness effort.  The article notes that the exercise involved a battalion tactical group with multiple support units as well as other agencies in an urban operation.  The article from the semi-independent newspaper Vremya and the second article from Tengri News report that the exercise took place in multiple regions and involved similar circumstances.  While the government of Kazakhstan has stated that it would not recognize the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, it has stayed neutral in the war in Ukraine.  As Kazakhstan faces a difficult economic outlook this year, it likely looked to cut costs where possible while not sacrificing the readiness of its armed forces.

Sources:

Meirim Smaiyl, “Почему не будет военного парада, ответили в Минобороны (The Ministry of Defense answered why there will not be a military parade),” Tengri News (news website in Kazakhstan), 13 April 2022. https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/pochemu-ne-budet-voennogo-parada-otvetili-v-minoboronyi-466522/

…“There are no plans to hold a military parade in Kazakhstan in 2022 because of the budget as well as the need to resolve other issues. In particular, the priority to have the required level of combat readiness and mobility of the Armed Forces, and the execution of task to ensure security and defense of the state and military facilities,” said the ministry’s press service…

Last year, because of the epidemiological situation in the country, the military parade in honor of Defender of the Fatherland Day and Victory Day was also cancelled.

Source: “Активная фаза учения «Батыл Тойтарыс – 2022» прошла в Алматинской области (The active phase of the exercise “Brave Resistance – 2022” has started in the Almaty Oblast),” Sarbaz (news website of Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense),” 15 April 2022.

https://sarbaz.kz/army/aktivnaya-faza-ucheniya-batyl-toytarys-%E2%80%93-2022-proshla-v-almatinskoy-oblasti-221041839/

Units of the Air Assault Forces worked out tactical methods of combat operation in urban areas during the main stage of the complex, interdepartmental strategic command and staff exercise “Brave Resistance – 2022”…

According to the exercise plan, a battalion tactical group made up of an air assault battalion, reinforced by reconnaissance, artillery, engineering and sapper units, and UAV crews, in coordination with personnel from Special Operations Forces and the National Guard, carried out the task of freeing an area captured by a group of bandits…

Source: Langa Chereshkayte, “Сложные условия (Difficult conditions),” Vremya (semi-independent Russian-language newspaper in Kazakhstan), 18 April 2022. https://time.kz/articles/reporter/2022/04/18/slozhnye-usloviya

The exercise “Brave Resistance – 2022” with live firing took place at the Oymash training facility of the Aqtau garrison. According to the plan of the exercise, naval infantry was tasked with freeing a settlement from an armed group…

Additionally, during the tactical portion of the exercise, units of the border guards and the armed forces carried out combat training to strengthen the state border in order to prevent reserves from penetrating…

Source: “Военные учения прошли в Жамбылской области (A military exercise took place in the Zhambyl Oblast),” Tengri News (news website in Kazakhstan), 15 April 2022. https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/voennyie-ucheniya-proshli-v-jambyilskoy-oblasti-466547/

…It is noted that during the exercise of soldiers in the Matybulak training facility in the Zhambyl region, the situation was simulated to take in account the experience of modern armed conflicts, in which illegally armed groups deployed in mountainous border areas…

…motorized rifle and tank units eliminated the enemy, while National Guard personnel cleared out the area…

Image Information:

Image: Kazakhstan Republican Guard.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kazakhstan_Republican_Guard.JPEG
Attribution: Public Domain

The Collective Security Treaty Organization Demonstrates Its “Peacekeeping” Capabilities

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CSTO collective peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan 2022-JAN-11, Kyrgyzstan soldier in Almaty Power Station-2.

CSTO collective peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan 2022-JAN-11, Kyrgyzstan soldier in Almaty Power Station-2.

“The Russian Ministry of Defense noted that the CSTO peacekeepers in Kazakhstan will not be involved in the active operational measures of local law enforcement and security agencies…”

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), an intergovernmental military alliance of select post-Soviet states, made history on 6 January 2022, when the organization’s leadership agreed to a request from the government of Kazakhstan to deploy peacekeepers to support Kazakh security forces after a few days of civil unrest across the country.  This marked the first time the CSTO sent units from its Collective Operational Reaction Force and demonstrated how the organization can respond to an incident on short notice.

According to the excerpted article in semi-independent Russian daily newspaper Kommersant, the CSTO Security Council agreed to Kazakhstan’s request for peacekeepers based on Article 4 of the organization’s treaty.  The article notes that this section of the treaty provides for a collective response in the event of a threat to the “security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty” of a member state.  It also points out “the authorities of Kazakhstan said the attacks were coordinated from abroad, but did not say by who.”  The article mentions how previous requests to the CSTO for military support, in 2010 by Kyrgyzstan and in 2021 by Armenia, were not granted.  The CSTO did not respond to Kyrgyzstan with military support in 2010 because its articles at the time did not allow a response to an internal security issue.  After the 2010 unrest, CSTO member states changed the articles to allow the collective forces to be used to respond to an internal security threat of a member state.  The lack of a response to Armenia in 2021 is notable as it involved clashes with Azerbaijan, an external threat to Armenian security, but the CSTO had not previously provided the Armenian government support for its conflict with Azerbaijan and stated the 2021 clashes were a border incident, which essentially did not require an actionable response.

The article from Central Asia-focusedindependent news website Fergana Agency reports on the units deployed and breaks down contributions from member states.  The majority of these came from Russia, including companies of the 31st Airborne Brigade, 98th Airborne Division, and the 45th Guards Special Forces Brigade.  A company of the 103rd Vitebsk Guards Airborne Brigade from Belarus, soldiers of the 25th “Scorpion” Special Forces Brigade from Kyrgyzstan, as well as special forces units from Armenia and Tajikistan also deployed.  The units in this peacekeeping force closely match the units that conduct annual joint military exercises of the CSTO’s collective forces.  The article also notes that the peacekeeping force tasks included protecting key infrastructure and airfields and that “the CSTO peacekeepers in Kazakhstan will not be involved in the active operational measures of local law enforcement and security agencies.”  This included Russian forces at Almaty’s international airport.  While the CSTO peacekeeping forces reportedly began withdrawing on 13 January, the deployment demonstrated the capabilities of the CSTO to respond to an incident involving a member state.

Source:

Kiril Krivosheev, Yelena Chernenko, Yuri Barsukov, and Arshaluis Mgdesyan, “ОДКБ спешит на помощь (The CSTO is hurrying to help),” Kommersant (semi-independent Russian daily newspaper), 6 January 2022.

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5156017

…Around midnight (on 5 January), President Tokayev held a meeting of the Security Council, at which he announced a “counter-terrorist operation.” “The groups are, in fact, international, which have taken part in serious training abroad and their attack on Kazakhstan should be regarded as an act of aggression,” President Tokayev explained. “In this regard, today, I turned to the CSTO heads of state to assist Kazakhstan in overcoming this terrorist threat.”…

A confirming response to this request was sent overnight. The statement was, ironically, made by a politician who himself unsuccessfully sent a similar request not long ago, Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, who is the current head of the CSTO Collective Security Council…

the Council made a decision in accordance with Article 4 of the treaty…It involves collective assistance, including military, if “one of the participating states is subjected to aggression (an armed attack that threatens security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty).”…The authorities of Kazakhstan said the attacks were coordinated from abroad, by did not say by who…

It is unknown how long the peacekeeping mission will last…It should be noted that the CSTO collective forces are being used for the first time. In 2010, authorities in Kyrgyzstan asked for a deployment of the organization’s forces (against the backdrop of interethnic conflict in the south) as well as in 2021, when authorities of Armenia requested it (against the backdrop of an armed confrontation with Azerbaijan). However, these requests were not granted…

Source: Alexander Rybin, “Охранники инфраструктуры с боевым опытом (The guards of infrastructure with combat experience),” Fergana Agency (independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 7 January 2022.

https://fergana.agency/articles/124563/

On the night of 6-7 January, the first units of the Russian Airborne Forces arrived in Almaty and took control of the airport of the largest city in Kazakhstan…The total number of the peacekeeping force in Kazakhstan should stand around 2500. This includes a company from Belarus (around 150-200), 200 from Tajikistan, 150 from Kyrgyzstan and another 100 from Armenia. The remainder are from the Russian Army.

All of the Russian units in Kazakhstan have previously been involved with military operations in the post-Soviet period.

The 31st Airborne Brigade, which is permanently garrisoned in Ulyanovsk, took part in the Second Chechen campaign and the war in South Ossetia in 2008…Since 2013, the 31st has been part of the Rapid Reaction Forces.

The 98th Airborne Division is located in Ivanovo. This unit has experience in participating in peacekeeping missions – in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, in Georgia-Abhazia in 1998 and in Kosovo in 1999…The 45th Guards Special Forces Brigade of the Airborne Forces is one of the most elite units in the Russian Army…

A peacekeeping company from the 103rd Vitebsk Guards Airborne Brigade deployed from Belarus…Kyrgyzstan sent 150 soldiers from the 25th “Scorpion” Special Forces Brigade to Kazakhstan…It is still unknown which units Tajikistan and Armenia deployed, but, according to local media, they are special forces…

As stated by the ministries of the CSTO governments, which agreed to take part in the peacekeeping mission in Kazakhstan, the military personnel will carry out task to protect key infrastructure and airfields. The Russian Ministry of Defense noted that the CSTO peacekeepers in Kazakhstan will not be involved in the active operational measures of local law enforcement and security agencies…

Image Information:

Image: CSTO collective peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan 2022-JAN-11, Kyrgyzstan soldier in Almaty Power Station-2.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CSTO_collective_peacekeeping_forces_in_Kazakhstan_2022-JAN-11,_Kyrgyzstan_soldier_in_Almaty_Power_Station-2.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0