Tag Archives: China

Iran’s Proposed Maritime Security Alliance Draws Mixed Reviews

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North Arabian Sea (Jan. 19, 2021)

“Iran’s actual and real success in forming [the new naval alliance] is an imposition of a new deterrence theory and a great challenge to the United States of America and its hegemony in the region, which it is slowly losing.”

In early June 2023, Iran’s navy commander suggested that Tehran was on the verge of establishing a regional naval security alliance that would include India, Pakistan, and several Arab Gulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia.[i] Reactions in Arabic-language media were mixed. Outlets affiliated with or supportive of China, Iran, and Russia portrayed the announcement as a highly consequential move that would further erode, if not fully negate, U.S. regional influence. However, the announcement was essentially ignored by mainstream Arabic-language Gulf media outlets from the countries purported to form the alliance’s backbone, most notably Saudi Arabia.

The first accompanying source, an excerpt from Russia’s Sputnik Arabic, characterizes the proposed alliance as a one-time “fantasy” that has become an imminent reality made possible by the U.S. failure to provide regional maritime security. The second accompanying source, from a report in China’s CGTN Arabic, argues that the China-brokered Saudi-Iran détente has created favorable conditions for regional security cooperation between Iran and the Arab Gulf states.[ii] The third accompanying source, an opinion piece in the pro-Iranian Lebanese media outlet al-Mayadeen, describes how this new alliance constitutes Iran’s “imposition of a new deterrence theory and a great challenge to the United States of America and its hegemony in the region,” as well as “a practical reality, a fatal blow to the strategic interests of Israel.” Although not a tacit rejection of the idea, other Gulf media outlets have been less enthusiastic and officials from the Arab states involved have not commented. Prominent Saudi media outlets, such as al-Sharq al-Awsat and al-Riyadh, have also kept quiet. By contrast, Saudi media outlets have vocally expressed new alignment with Iran on regional matters, most notably Syrian normalization since Saudi Arabia’s May 2023 détente with Iran. Iran’s inclusion in the Russo-Chinese “Maritime Security Belt” exercises in the Indian Ocean, most recently in March 2023, indicate the possibility of a Russo-Chinese role in encouraging a regional naval coalition that marginalizes the United States’ role. Chinese interest in and encouragement of this Iranian-led security mechanism, if genuine, suggests that Saudi leadership might take the idea more seriously than the lack of media coverage would otherwise suggest.

Sources:

“تحالف بحري بين إيران والخليج… لماذا أصبح من الضروري أن تحافظ دول المنطقة على أمنها بنفسها؟

(Naval alliance between Iran and the Gulf… Why did it become necessary for regional countries to guarantee their own security?),” Sputnik Arabic (Russian Arabic-language media outlet), 5 June 2023. https://sputnikarabic.ae/20230605/تحالف-بحري-بين-إيران-والخليج-لماذا-أصبح-من-الضروري-أن-تحافظ-دول-المنطقة-على-أمنها-بنفسها-1077771292.html

A few weeks ago, talk of an alliance including Iran and the Gulf countries together was a fantasy, but it has become a reality with the announcement of the imminent formation of a naval alliance that includes the countries of the region… Hassan Ibrahim Al-Nuaimi, an Emirati political analyst, considered that the countries of the region suffered from maritime threats, while foreign countries failed to secure the seas in the region. Thus, it became clear to the Arab Gulf states that these foreign countries only pursue their own agendas, and do not care about the interests of other countries.

“إيران تخطط لتشكيل تحالف بحري وسط تحسين العلاقات في الشرق الأوسط

(Iran plans naval alliance amidst improving relations in Middle East),” CGTN Arabic (Chinese Arabic-language media outlet), 6 June 2023. https://arabic.cgtn.com/news/2023-06-06/1666049661388214273/index.html

Iran’s proposal for a security alliance or coordination mechanism with Gulf countries is completely natural. Iran had the idea, and it is not a new one, but conditions were not adequate in the past…

” تحالف دولي.. إيران في مواجهة هيمنة أميركا على المنطقة

(International alliance… Iran confronting American regional hegemony),” al-Mayadeen (pro-Iran Lebanese media outlet), 12 June 2023. https://www.almayadeen.net/articles/تحالف-دولي-إيران-في-مواجهة-هيمنة-أميركا-على-المنطقة

Iran’s actual and real success in forming it is an imposition of a new deterrence theory and a great challenge to the United States of America and its hegemony in the region, which it is slowly losing… The international naval alliance is a joint security project for Iran and the Gulf states, the realization of which constitutes a practical reality, a fatal blow to the strategic interests of “Israel” in that region…

Notes:

[i] In addition to Pakistan and India, Iran’s proposed alliance is to include Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Iraq.

[ii] The CGTN video report cites Dr. Niu Xinchun, the Director of Middle East Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). http://www.cicir.ac.cn/NEW/en-us/Institution.html?subtype=Middle%20East&&type=region

Image Information:

Image:  North Arabian Sea (Jan. 19, 2021)
Source: Photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Jose Madrigal, https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6493578/nimitz-transits-arabian-sea  
Attribution: Public Domain

Pakistan’s Defense Industry Publishes New Weapon Systems Roadmap

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Official logo of GIDS

“GIDS’ future roadmap ranges from improved variants of existing, mainstay solutions – such as the Fatah-series of surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) and Burq-series air-to-ground missiles (AGM) – to newly revealed systems, like the “Group 5 UCAV” or “LOMADS” SAM system.”

Pakistan has cooperated with China on the development and production of several weapons systems for use in country’s armed forces, including the Al-Khalid [RG1] main battle tank and the JF-17 [RG2] multirole fighter.[i] Technology transfers of smaller defense items have also provided a boost to Pakistan’s defense industry. The accompanying excerpted article from Pakistan defense-focused Quwa.org reports on a recent announcement by Pakistan’s government-owned Global Industrial & Defence Solutions (GIDS) on a roadmap to produce new products for the country’s armed forces. While the roadmap did not include joint production of a new system with China, it still provides a look at production capabilities in Pakistan’s defense industry, which has made sales to other governments in recent years.

The GIDS roadmap includes improved variants of existing systems as well as new systems. GIDS “does not develop or manufacture any of the systems it is promoting and selling,” but rather it is the commercial component of other state-owned defense companies, according to the article. The roadmap includes two high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial systems currently in development, one of which can carry a payload of 450 kg, or roughly 1000 lbs.  These systems could be used in a reconnaissance role for Pakistan and could fulfill several requirements for other buyers. The roadmap also includes a new surface-to-air missile system and an upgraded variant of a multiple rocket-launch system that Pakistan currently uses. The roadmap is described as “relatively ambitious” and states that “it is unclear how far Pakistan has developed each of these systems.” While Pakistan’s defense industry has been technologically limited in certain capacities, the article acknowledges that the companies producing these systems are confident enough to reveal them to potential buyers in the roadmap.[ii] It is unknown when all of the systems in the roadmap will be available for potential sales, but Pakistan’s new systems could offer buyers cheap alternatives to systems already on the market. JF-17s have a lower cost than other multirole aircraft, for example.2  Pakistan sold JF-17s to Nigeria in 2020, marking a boost for the country’s defense industry.

Sources:

“Pakistan’s Defence Industry Lays Out Ambitious Future Roadmap,” Quwa.org (news website focusing on defense issues in Pakistan), 22 May 2023. https://quwa.org/2023/05/22/pakistans-defence-industry-lays-out-ambitious-future-roadmap-2/embed/#?secret=Rt0Vm2ACd8#?secret=M3LkjwsxlO

Global Industrial and Defence Solutions (GIDS), the commercial representative of multiple Pakistani state-owned defence suppliers, released its roadmap for future products… 

GIDS’ future roadmap ranges from improved variants of existing, mainstay solutions – such as the Fatah-series of surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) and Burq-series air-to-ground missiles (AGM) – to newly revealed systems, like the “Group 5 UCAV” or “LOMADS” SAM system. 

It should be noted that GIDS itself does not develop or manufacture any of the systems it is promoting and selling. Rather, GIDS serves as the commercial wing of a conglomerate of Pakistani state-owned enterprises that specialize in defence, such as NESCOM, for example. Basically, it is these state-owned enterprises that carry out the development and production work of GIDS’ products… 

According to GIDS, there are two HALE UCAVs are under development: the 3,000-kg “Group 5 UCAV” and the 1,650-kg Shahpar III (also designated as “Group 4”). 

The Group 5 UCAV seems to leverage twin turboprop or piston engines. The Group 5’s designers (possibly, if not likely, NESCOM) is aiming to achieve an endurance of over 35 hours and external payload in excess of 450 kg. Though it is called a UCAV, it seems that NESCOM is optimizing the Group 5 for the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) role, especially imaging-related missions… 

GIDS also revealed multiple potential systems that may speak to the future of Pakistan’s ground-based air defence (GBAD) environment through new SAMs and radars. 

First, there is a ‘LOMADS’ SAM with a range of up to 100 km and maximum engagement altitude of 20 km. According to GIDS, each of these LOMADS units would comprise of a multi-function radar and six multi-cell launchers carrying four missiles each. GIDS did not reveal the guidance and seeker details of the SAM, but it likely leverages active radar homing (ARH) like the majority of its current-day contemporaries. 

GIDS also revealed an ‘E-SHORADS’ system, which it has also designated as the ‘FAAZ-SL’. The FAAZ-SL will offer a maximum range of 20-25 km and a maximum engagement altitude of 6-8 km. GIDS stated that the SAM will be truck-mounted (seemingly similar in design to the NASAMS)… 

Finally, GIDS has also shown that Pakistan is committed to continue developing upon the systems it already has, such as the Fatah, Azb, Burq, Zumr, and Ribat. 

The Fatah-II is an evolved variant of the Fatah-I, an indigenously developed multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). Whereas the Fatah-I has a range of 140 km, the Fatah-II will improve upon it with a range of equal or more than 250 km, while also continuing to leverage the same GNSS-aided INS guidance suite… 

Overall, GIDS has revealed a relatively ambitious product roadmap…It is unclear how far Pakistan has developed each of these systems. However, given that GIDS has revealed them to the public (and, potentially, to potential overseas buyers) could suggest that the institutes behind each of these are relatively confident about completing these projects…

Notes:

[i] For more information on the China’s efforts in the development of Pakistan’s defense industry, see: Matthew Stein “China Involved in Developing Pakistan’s Main Battle Tank,” OE Watch, August 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

[ii] For more on Pakistan’s sale of the JF-17s, see: Matthew Stein “Pakistan Moving into Sales of JF-17 Fighters,” OE Watch, May 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: Official logo of GIDS 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Official_logo_of_GIDS.png   
Attribution: Public domain

Russia Possibly Courting Eritrea for Red Sea Naval Base

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Massawa harbour

“The [Russian and Eritrean] leaders plan to discuss the prospects for the development of Russian-Eritrean relations in various fields, as well as topics of regional and international concern.”

On 31 May, the Russian government-affiliated TASS news agency, published the excerpted article about Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki’s visit to Moscow to meet with Russian President Putin. According to the article, the leaders discussed Russia’s war in Ukraine and other issues, such as academic exchanges and trade. Russia is interested in Eritrea because of its location adjacent to the Red Sea and its demonstrations of loyalty to the Kremlin, according to a second article from the Ukrainian publication focus.ua. This article notes that Eritrea was the only African country to vote against a UN General Assembly decision for Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine in March 2022.[i] Russia had previously signed an agreement with Sudan to base four Russian ships and 300 soldiers in Port Sudan, seeking a foothold on the Red Sea, according to the focus.ua article. The article notes that Sudan has not ratified the agreement, and the country’s ongoing conflict and Western pressure may cause the country’s authorities to reverse the deal. Eritrea, which borders Sudan, would provide Russia with an alternate base location near the Red Sea should the Sudan agreement not materialize. The Red Sea has strategic importance for Russia. Not only does 10 percent of global maritime traffic pass through it, but Russia’s competitors and other major powers, such as the United States and China, have naval bases along the Red Sea in Djibouti, which borders Eritrea to the south.[ii] However, Russia’s naval presence near one of the world’s major trade arteries represents expansionist intentions from the Ukrainian perspective represented in the article.

“Путин начал переговоры с президентом Эритреи (Putin Begins Discussions with the President of Eritrea),” tass.ru (Russian government-affiliated publication), 31 May 2023. https://tass.ru/politika/17892945

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the head of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki, who is in Russia on an official visit. The leaders plan to discuss the prospects for the development of Russian-Eritrean relations in various fields, as well as topics of regional and international concern. The current talks were the first meeting between the leaders of the two countries. 

According to data for 2022, the trade turnover between Russia and Eritrea amounted to $13.5 million, while exports from Russia to Eritrea accounted for $12.7 million. Since 2015, Eritreans have been provided with scholarships to study at Russian universities.

“Завоевание Африки. Зачем Кремлю военная база в Красном море (Why a Russian Base on the Red Sea?),” focus.ua (Russian and Ukrainian language Ukrainian magazine focusing on global economics), 16 February 2023. https://focus.ua/world/550262-zavoevanie-afriki-zachem-kremlyu-voennaya-baza-v-krasnom-more

Russia does not abandon attempts to expand control over African states.

Wherever there are “Wagners”, companies associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin gain access to the natural resources of these countries and a certain political influence on them (usually they are authoritarian regimes). There is information about the presence of this group of mercenaries in Mali, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Madagascar, Libya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and possibly Eritrea. 

Most likely, the military authorities of Sudan intend to receive weapons from the Russian Federation for their army, and also consider Russia’s military presence as one of the factors guaranteeing the preservation of the political processes in the country after the presidential and parliamentary elections. For Russia, hosting a base carries a wide range of political benefits. First of all, it is a presence in a region that is strategically important for the entire planet. The Red Sea has played an important role in world trade since the beginning of navigation. Now 10% of all maritime trade passes through it.We are mentioning that at a hypothetical military base (most likely it will be in Port Sudan) no more than four ships and 300 soldiers can be located at the same time. Time will tell how Sudan behaves in such circumstances. However, the growing influence of Russia in Africa, especially in the area of important trade routes, should be a wake-up call for the democratic part of the world.

Notes:

[i] In March 2023, five countries, including Belarus, North Korea, Syria, Eritrea, and Russia itself, voted against the UN General Assembly resolution that “demand[ed] that Russia “immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.” Sudan, in contrast, was one of 35 countries that abstained from the vote. See UNGA, “General Assembly resolution demands end to Russian offensive in Ukraine,” 2 March 2022. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152

[ii] The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) opened a “logistical support facility” in Djibouti in 2017 with the potential to support China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and protect Chinese interests and nationals in Africa and the Middle East more broadly. Chinese ambitions in Djibouti were also reflected in China’s desire to compete with Russia, which itself had strengthened its base in Tartus, Syria during the Syrian civil war. Jean-Pierre Cabestan (2020), “China’s Military Base in Djibouti: A Microcosm of China’s Growing Competition with the United States and New Bipolarity,” Journal of Contemporary China, 29:125, 731-747.

Image Information:

Image: Massawa harbour
Source: Reinhard Dietrich, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Massawa_harbour.JPG
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Russia and China Expanding Coast Guard Cooperation in Arctic

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“Cooperation on Coast Guard tasks is both a concrete action and often seen as more harmless than military cooperation. The Coast Guard’s work is about protecting sovereign rights at sea, like fishing resources and access to oil and gas. Letting China in when it comes to fisheries inspections would be a big step in practical cooperation that has a security element to it.”

A new agreement with Russia’s Coast Guard will give China greater access to the Arctic, according to the following excerpted article in Norway-based The Barents Observer.This is something China has sought as a “near Arctic” nation. China has long claimed a special status in Arctic relations since its proclamation that the “Arctic belongs to the world and China has the largest portion of the earth’s population.” Cooperation between the Russian and Chinese Coast Guards can be an important step in China’s ability to gain more access to Arctic waters. The agreement on joint coastal operations could also give China a stronger voice in dictating Arctic policy. An analyst quoted in the article sees this as a significant policy shift for Russia, concluding that “Russia is generally skeptical about letting China get too close in the Arctic, but the Ukraine war might have changed those calculations.” The article suggests the presence of Chinese Coast Guard vessels patrolling Arctic waters, should it come to that, will make Norway’s cooperation with Russia’s Coast Guard even more difficult.

Sources:

Thomas Nilsen, “Russia’s Coast Guard cooperation with China is a big step, Arctic security expert says”, The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 28 April 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/04/russias-arctic-coast-guard-cooperation-china-big-step-expert

On 24 April, a groundbreaking memorandum on extensive cooperation in Artic waters was signed with FSB Coast Guard. The Chinese Coast Guard was then invited to observe the long-planned “Arctic Patrol 2023” maritime security exercise. On 27 April, Governor Andrei Chibis met Chinese diplomats and discussed a roadmap for increased business, shipbuilding and Northern Sea Route developments. Amid the Ukraine war and halt in cooperation with the other seven Arctic nations, Russia turns east for new partners. Opening the door for China is a significant geopolitical change.

“Cooperation on Coast Guard tasks is both a concrete action and often seen as more harmless than military cooperation,” explained Andreas Østhagen, an expert on Arctic security with the Firdtjof Nansen Institute. “The Coast Guard’s work is about protecting sovereign rights at sea, like fishing resources and access to oil and gas. Letting China in when it comes to fisheries inspections would be a big step in practical cooperation that has a security element to it,” Osthagen stated. Government officials in Beijing have for years said China is a “near-Arctic state,” but so far, its presence up North has been limited to participating in conferences, annual research voyages, some few investments in Russia’s natural resource developments, and a few Asia-Europe shipments along the Northern Sea Route.

“China’s Polar Silk Road project seems to be more wait-and-see,” write researchers Frédéric Lasserre and Hervé Baudu in a report  published in April about the consequences of the war in Ukraine in the Arctic. The report, however, underlines that China is readily credited with great Arctic ambitions, but for now, mainly focused on securing hydrocarbon supplies from Siberia.  China has its own projects under construction. Barges for two additional floating nuclear power plants for the north coast of Siberia and a nuclear-powered icebreaker are currently under construction at a yard in China.

The Russia-China memorandum signed in Murmansk opens the opportunity for joint efforts to combat terrorism, illegal migration, fighting smuggling of drugs and weapons, as well as stopping illegal fishing. The deal was signed by top leaders with FSB Border Guards and the Chinese Coast Guard.

“This testifies that Russia actively wants to invite China into the kind of tasks we have thought Russia would safeguard,” Andreas Østhagen states, finding this a significant shift in policy. “We have thought that Russia is generally skeptical about letting China get too close in the Arctic, but the Ukraine war might have changed those calculations,” He notes that the future of China-Russian Arctic cooperation is difficult to predict, but he makes one comparison: “This reminds me a bit of when my mother-in-law wants to stay with us for a couple of weeks “until she finds something else.”

For Russia, the exercise showcasing FSB Border Guards’ maritime capabilities for the Chinese visitors wasn’t aimed at fishery inspections in the Barents Sea. This was hard-core security, as previously instilled by strongman Ramzan Kadyrov’s special Rosgvardia forces in the Arctic, including at the nuclear icebreaker base in Murmansk.

The exercise scenario was FSB fighting terrorists that had attacked Rosatomflot’s nuclear transport ship “Rosita” in Kola Bay. “All the inputs worked out during the practical maritime exercise confirmed the readiness of interdepartmental structures to solve problems in the waters of the Northern Sea Route,” said acting director of Atomflot Leonid Irlitsa.

Rosatomflot oversees Russia’s Northern Sea Route Directorate. The state-owned company is currently boosting the number of nuclear icebreakers and support infrastructure, key to President Putin’s great Arctic ambitions.  For neighboring Norway, FSB Coast Guards’ new cooperation with China could pose a challenge.“Although I think we are far away from seeing Chinese Coast Guard or naval vessels performing tasks in the Barents Sea, for Norway that would entail a new security challenge and make cooperation with the Russian Coast Guard (FSB) even more difficult,” says Andreas Østhagen. Norwegian-Russian Coast Guard cooperation in the Barents Sea is one of very few areas of contact that has not been officially called off by Oslo after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year.

People’s Liberation Army Continues To Integrate Intelligent Technology Into Training

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“This exercise applies the intelligent training and examination system throughout the entire process, which is a measure taken by the brigade to improve the quality and effectiveness of training and preparation by utilizing technological achievements.”

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is trying to improve training to overcome a lack of combat experience by incorporating advanced technologies to enhance combat drills. The recent article from the PLA Daily, excerpted below, details the incorporation of intelligent technologies into simulated confrontation training as well as the use of equipment simulators by a brigade from the 80th Group Army, Northern Theater Command. The intelligent training and examination system quantifies and evaluates the quality of training by the unit and standardizes assessments for a uniform comparison of training between units. The system conducts monitoring throughout the exercise and provides automatic scoring and a video recording to reduce data errors typical of manual recording. It also generates a training trend chart to identify shortcomings and weaknesses.

The PLA is reforming training to provide realistic training and enhance combat capabilities within the force.[i] The incorporation of intelligent technologies to standardize assessments and provide accurate historical databases to compare training for comparison of unit training and to provide uniform training and assessments of unit capabilities. The employment of weapons and equipment simulators provides efficient and economical training for personnel. The unit’s man-portable surface-to-air missile simulation training room used a smart sensor helmet to track, lock, and strike to target. The “intelligent examiner” records the firing and updates the training database. The system provides an evaluation of the training.

Sources:

“第八十集团军某旅 – “智能考官”助力精准施训 (A Brigade in the 80th Group Army – The “Intelligent Examiner” Facilitates Precision Training),” PLA Daily (Official PRC Military Newspaper), 8 May 2023. http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2023-05-08&paperNumber=01&articleid=905162

“The intelligent training and examination system is equivalent to an ‘intelligent examiner’, which can quantitatively evaluate the level of training. It is not only intelligent and efficient but also enhances the normalization and standardization of assessments. According to the commander of the brigade, this system can achieve full monitoring, automatic scoring, and video retention, reducing data errors caused by manual recording, and is conducive to improving the quality and efficiency of officers and soldiers’ training and examination.”

It is understood that at the beginning of this year, the brigade used an intelligent training and examination system to collect training data for officers and soldiers, and conducted a comprehensive analysis to establish training files for each officer and soldier. After each training session, the system can automatically generate training trend maps ….. The commander can identify weaknesses and provide data support for precise training by analyzing targeting gaps, fluctuations, and other factors.

The reporter walked into the portable ground-to-air missile simulation training room and saw a soldier wearing an intelligent sensing helmet, carrying a missile simulation launcher on his shoulder, tracking, locking, and striking the target. The ‘intelligent examiner’ records the shooting process in real-time and updates the training database. The scoring team restores the on-site situation based on 3D imaging technology, and presents the shooter’s performance evaluation analysis in a three-dimensional manner.It is understood that in the next step, they will further optimize the training and assessment plan, adjust the program parameters of the intelligent training and examination system, and accelerate the transformation of scientific and technological achievements.

Notes:

[i] See Kevin McCauley “China’s PLA Explores ‘Battlefield Metaverse’ Training Base to Simulate Future Warfare,” OE Watch, 05-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/416134

Image Information:

Image: PLA Group Armies
Source: Peter Wood
Attribution: Peter Wood

People’s Liberation Army Transitioning From “Informationized” to Intelligent Warfare Concepts

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Intelligent Warfare: Human-Machine Interface

“Compared with traditional informationized operational system of systems, intelligent operational system of systems exhibit new characteristics such as autonomy, multi-dimensional, resilience, and other features to counter vulnerabilities greatly improving their robustness.”

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) considers an evolution from the  current focus on “informationized” warfare concepts, such as the theory of system of systems operational capability, to intelligent warfare concepts, according to an article in the PLA Daily. PLA researchers have developed a system of systems operational capability theory that advocates an integrated C4ISR foundation for their move towards a joint operations capability.[i] The individual systems are basic warfighting functions—command, joint fires, logistics—integrated into a larger complex system. System of systems operations using advanced information technologies integrate weapons, equipment, and units to create a synergistic effect described by the PLA as 1 + 1 > 2. This capability enables the creation of modular, recombinant task forces at the strategic, campaign or operational, and tactical levels which the PLA calls “operational system of systems.” This theoretical development has brought about the concept of warfare that the PLA describes as “system of systems confrontation,” where the main characteristic of warfare is the confrontation and destruction of competing operational systems of systems. The author also proposes the development of intelligent operational system of systems.

The evolution of the PLA’s informationized warfare to concepts to one based on emerging intelligent technologies is described in the attached article in the PLA Daily. The author makes a transition to an intelligent operational system of systems to describe a task-organized force and warfare based on intelligent confrontation. This updates the current PLA view of system of systems confrontation based on information-based systems to a warfare system based on intelligent technologies. The author views the intelligent operational system of systems as a task force similar to the information-based operational system of systems composed of the required force modules—for example, command, maneuver, joint fires, and reconnaissance—but more resilient, autonomous, robust, and multidimensional.

However, the author highlights vulnerabilities that could be exploited. The intelligent operational system of systems will be heavily reliant on data to support an intelligent decision-making model. The author believes such a model has weak adaptability based on algorithm construction and parametric establishment. The intelligent decision-making model is only as good as its construction by humans, and unforeseen situations could cause errors leading to disaster on the battlefield. System security could also cause risks. Control of the intelligent operational system of systems will be difficult as its modular forces are dispersed across the physical domain, connected by the information domain, and compete in the cognitive domain. Data distortion and information damage can occur during combat as data, signals, commands, and information are transmitted across domains undergoing multiple interactions with humans and machines. Multiple and complex interactions in the command system across multiple domains can result in corruption of information. The author notes that the intelligent operational system of systems will be more autonomous, but many critical actions will still require humans to be in the loop. The contention that, as important as technology is, humans are decisive for victory in wars is a common theme in PLA articles on artificial intelligence. This belief questions the degree of human control the PLA is willing to cede to autonomous systems.

Sources:

“脆弱性：智能化作战体系“阿喀琉斯之踵 (Vu“nerability: t”e “Achilles Heel” of the Intelligent Operational System of Systems),” PLA Daily (Official PRC Military Newspaper), 6 May 2023. http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2023-05-16&paperNumber=07&articleid=905942

“The inexplicable nature of algorithms can lead to risks. As a special adversarial activity, the decision-making process of military intelligent sys“ems should have ”interpretability”, which means that people can understand the logical process and results of intelligent algorithm decision-making. However, the current artificial intelligence system algo“ithms exh”bit a “black box” feature, making it difficult for humans to understand and master its decision-making process. Minor changes and adjustments to simple parameters such as initial conditions and weights may result in complex results. This means that intelligent systems have structural vulnerabilities, unpredictable decision-making risks, and are highly likely to produce erroneous or even dangerous decisions. At the same time, this also leads to hidden backdoors or vulnerabilities in the data, algorithms, models, etc. of military intelligence systems, making it impossible to predict system security risk.It is difficult to completely trust the human-machine system. In the intelligent operational system of systems, command agencies at all levels collaborate with humans and machines, and the human brain and machine brain jointly constitute the command subject. During the combat process, in addition to human brain commands, all levels also need to implement the instructions issued by the computer brain. Due to the limitations of artificial intelligence“technolog”, the “black box” decision-making process, and human subjective consciousness, it is difficult for humans to unconditionally trust and accept machine decision results. This sense of distrust can be reduced through long-term human-machine collaborative training, but it cannot be absolutely eliminated. At a critical moment in the development of the battlefield situation, if there is a disagreement between the decision-making results of humans and machines, it will inevitably affect the speed and quality of decision-making.”

Notes:

[i] See Kevin McCauley, “PLA System of Systems Operations: Enabling Joint Operations,” Jamestown Foundation, 30 January 2017. https://jamestown.org/product/pla-system-systems-operations-enabling-joint-operations-kevin-mccauley/

Image Information:

Image: Intelligent Warfare: Human-Machine Interface
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Internet_of_Battlefield_Things.tif
Attribution: CCDC Army Research Laboratory (Public Domain)

Honduran Presidential Visit Kicks Off New Relations With China

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President Xiomara Castro meets with a representative of Taiwan on her inauguration day in 2022

“Castro opened the visit… in Shanghai; starting the agenda in that important metropolis illustrates the interest in strengthening commercial ties.”

Honduran President Xiomara Castro campaigned on a diplomatic switch from her country’s recognition of Taiwan, recognized since 1949, to that of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Talk of abandoning Taiwan subsided after her election. However, she announced in March 2023 that the country would switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in an effort to gain financing for a hydroelectric dam project and to lower its external debt burden.[i] President Castro made a weeklong visit to mainland China to inaugurate these new relations, where Honduras opened its first embassy and officially acceded to the Belt and Road Initiative, according to Prensa Latina, a Cuban government outlet. Castro visited the New Development Bank—commonly known as the BRICS Bank—and requested membership for Honduras, according to Prensa Latina. Castro followed that visit with a stop at Huawei headquarters.

Castro also secured a bilateral meeting with President Xi Jinping, according to La Prensa, a Honduran newspaper. He praised her courage, promised to negotiate a free trade agreement with Honduras, and agreed to promote the entrance of Honduran agricultural goods into the Chinese market. The outlet reported that Honduras will present China with a list of infrastructure projects for financing, likely focusing on ports. Honduras’ diplomatic switch to the PRC leaves Taiwan with just 13 remaining countries who recognize its sovereignty, seven of which are in Latin America and the Caribbean.[ii] The Western Hemisphere will remain the epicenter of the PRC’s efforts to isolate Taiwan diplomatically, with Central America and the Caribbean likely to be its principal focus.[iii]

Sources:

“Honduras abre su embajada en China (Honduras opens its embassy in China),” Prensa Latina (Cuban government outlet that covers issues of importance to its allies), 11 June 2023. https://www.prensa-latina.cu/2023/06/11/honduras-abre-su-embajada-en-china

Honduras inaugurated its embassy, after China did so last week in its capital…Castro opened the visit…in Shanghai; and starting the agenda in that important metropolis illustrates the interest in strengthening commercial ties. In fact, she requested the country’s accession to the New Development Bank, popularly called the BRICS Bank, during a meeting with the president of the entity, the Brazilian Dilma Rousseff, and later spoke with executives of the Huawei technology company.

“Gobierno de Honduras pedirá el apoyo a China para puertos (Government of Honduras Will Ask China for Support for Ports),” La Prensa (Honduran newspaper based in the business capital of San Pedro Sula), 15 June 2023. https://www.laprensa.hn/honduras/politica-gobierno-honduras-pedira-apoyo-china-para-puertos-KI13931748

Several projects have been discussed since it was necessary to pass this phase of the president’s visit to go into specific issues…Naturally, infrastructure issues are a priority…Honduras and China recently signed 22 documents in Beijing and next week it is expected that Honduran products such as coffee and bananas will begin to reach China.

Notes:

[i] To read more about potential lessons for Taiwan and its presence in Latin America and the Caribbean, see: Ryan Berg and Leland Lazarus, “What Taiwan Can Learn from Honduras’s Switch to China,” Foreign Policy, 31 March 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/31/latin-america-taiwan-china-honduras-united-states-diplomacy-tsai/

[ii] OE Watch has covered China’s expanding influence in Latin America, with a particular emphasis on Central America, where Taiwan is losing formal diplomatic allies. For example, see: Catalina Wedman, “China’s Growing Influence on the Latin American Economy,” OE Watch, October 2018, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/266517

[iii] For more on Taiwan’s future in the Western Hemisphere and its difficulty maintaining allies, see: Ryan Berg and Wazim Mowla, “Taiwan’s Future in Latin America and the Caribbean,” The Diplomat, 1 September 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/taiwans-future-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/

Image Information:

Image: President Xiomara Castro meets with a representative of Taiwan on her inauguration day in 2022
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:01.27_%E3%80%8C%E5%89%AF%E7%B8%BD%E7%B5%B1%E7%8E%87%E5%9C%98%E5%87%BA%E5%B8%AD%E5%AE%8F%E9%83%BD%E6%8B%89%E6%96%AF%E5%85%B1%E5%92%8C%E5%9C%8B%E7%B8%BD%E7%B5%B1%E5%8D%A1%E8%95%AC%E6%A5%9A%E5%B0%B1%E8%81%B7%E5%85%B8%E7%A6%AE%E3%80%8D%E5%90%91%E5%8D%A1%E8%95%AC%E6%A5%9A%E7%B8%BD%E7%B5%B1%E7%95%B6%E9%81%B8%E4%BA%BA%E8%87%B4%E6%84%8F%E4%B8%A6%E5%91%88%E9%81%9E%E7%89%B9%E4%BD%BF%E5%9C%8B%E6%9B%B8_-_51845921976.jpg
Attribution: Wikimedia, CC-BY 2.0

China Justifies Naval Pressure Against Japan

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JS Kurama sails in the East China Sea during a trilateral exercise, June 2021.

JS Kurama sails in the East China Sea during a trilateral exercise, June 2021.

“When Sino-Japanese relations become extremely tense, there will be another reconnaissance ship that will continue to perform missions in the waters surrounding Japan.”

On 10 May, the Chinese-language website sohu.com published the below excerpted article, which justifies Chinese naval activities in the East Sea as a response to perceived hostile actions by Japan. Moreover, the article indicates that Chinese pressure against Japan is achieving positive results. According to the article, a Chinese naval reconnaissance ship entered the Sea of Japan through the Tsushima Strait between South Korea and Japan, sailed around Japanese territory, and came within only six nautical miles the Japanese coast.[i] While the article refrains from claiming any strategic benefits, it argues the operation succeeded in frightening and thus sending a message to Japan.

The article also claims that Japanese media has interpreted the Chinese naval activities as treating Japan as an enemy. It suggests that as long as Sino-Japanese relations remain tense, Chinese naval reconnaissance ships will continue performing missions in the waters surrounding Japan. Likewise, the article notes that China dispatched several destroyers and other naval ships to conduct live fire drills in the East Sea after pro-Taiwan remarks were made by officials at the G7 foreign ministers meeting in Nagano, Japan. The end of the article alludes to the alliance between China and Russia, where it notes that Japan erred by trying to restore militarism and embracing confrontation with China and Russia.[ii] As a result of this, the article argues that Japan was exhausting its Self-Defense Forces in dealing with both Chinese and Russian military pressure. This implies that China is employing a strategy of weakening the Japanese military through over-extending its forces and wearing it down, a strategy China continues to use against Taiwan.

Source:

“解放军军舰横穿日本，距离海岸仅6海里，海自如临大敌 (The warships of the People’s Liberation Army went across Japan, only 6 nautical miles from the coast, and freely encountered the enemy),” sohu.com (popular pro-government Chinese-language website targeting a youth and gaming readership), 10 May 2023. https://www.sohu.com/a/674302624_121462986

Japan has become an anti-China bridgehead, and the reconnaissance ships of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) approached its territorial waters to frighten the Self-Defense Forces sufficiently. According to the news released by the Ministry of Defense of Japan, the reconnaissance ship sailed around Japan in three weeks…. At the closest time, it was only about 6 nautical miles from the Japanese mainland.

When Sino-Japanese relations are extremely tense, there will be another reconnaissance ship that will continue to perform missions in the waters surrounding Japan.

In response to remarks related to Taiwan made at the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting, China not only rejected such ludicrous remarks diplomatically. At the same time, a destroyer from the navy in the Eastern Theater Command of the PLA was dispatched to conduct live-fire shooting training in a specific area of the East China Sea.In recent years, Japan has had to face regular military pressure from China and Russia, which has exhausted its Self-Defense Forces.

Notes:

[i] The Tsushima Strait was the site of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905 in which Japan was victorious. More than one century later, since 2020, Japan has observed an increase in Russian naval ships that have passed through the Tsushima Strait and Soya Strait to its north nearly twice as often than a decade earlier. This has concerned the Japanese Ministry of Defense. See Japan Ministry of Defense, “Development of Russian Armed Forces in the Vicinity of Japan,” mod.go.jp, September 2021. https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/pdf/ru_d-act_e_210906.pdf

[ii] Although Japan has been upgrading its military capabilities over the past several years, this has been amid—and generally in response to—a military build-up by China. Further, Japan has consistently since the 1990s spent only between .09% and 1% of its GDP on the military. China, however, has viewed Japan as engaging in “military expansion planning” and has strongly criticized Japan for this.  For more, see: Sheila A. Smith, “How Japan Is Upgrading Its Military,” CFR, February 24, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-japan-upgrading-its-military

Image Information:

Image: JS Kurama sails in the East China Sea during a trilateral exercise, June 2021.
Source: Paul Kelly https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:JS_Kurama_sails_in_the_East_China_Sea_during_a_trilateral_exercise,_-21_Jun._2012_a.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Chinese Perspective on Manned-Unmanned Coordinated Operations on the Modern Battlefield

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Hongdu GJ-11 Sharp Sword[RG1]  (Chinese unmanned combat aerial vehicle).

Hongdu GJ-11 Sharp Sword [RG1]  (Chinese unmanned combat aerial vehicle).

“The manned-unmanned combat team has rewritten the modern battlefield formation model, with manned platforms leading unmanned platforms to form an integrated combat team.”

Researchers with China’s Air Force Research Institute recently published an article in China’s PLA Daily outlining five trends in coordinating manned and unmanned battlefield operations. Except for the potential for clustered autonomous systems to increase battlefield uncertainty, the authors argue that recent efforts to divide labor between complementary manned and unmanned systems have provided more options for tactical configuration and combat synergy.  The authors, Guo Yilun and Ma Quan assert there are three types of manned-unmanned platforms: 1) direct transmission of unmanned information for rear control, 2) interoperability between manned and unmanned platforms under limited control, and 3) completely controlled manned-unmanned platforms. As autonomous platforms continue to develop, the Chinese military will be able to combine manned and unmanned platforms into combat groups that will facilitate information processing, mission planning and decision-making, command distribution, and formation of operations to provide flexibility in constantly developing battlefield postures. A second benefit the authors believe will result from closer man-machine coordination is increased battlefield situational awareness. A real-time tactical “cloud” system will rapidly detect, process, and distribute requirements based on developing target data. Information from space platforms, sensors, and weapon systems in the land, sea, air, and space domains will be cross-verified and integrated into a unified framework that coordinates manned and unmanned data. Third, distributed command-and-control systems will be able to disaggregate computing, collection, and decision-making functions and assign sub-problems to collaborative manned-unmanned groups. Fourth, the authors argue that systems of higher autonomous control bring greater uncertainty in warfare; as such, autonomous systems should be classified by the degree to which they are integrated with manned systems. The authors suggest four levels of autonomy: non-autonomy, single-machine autonomy, multi-machine autonomy, and clustered autonomy. Finally, the authors assert that further integrating unmanned systems will save more than 60 percent the cost of manned operations and double their effectiveness.

Source:

郭一伦 (Guo Yilun) and 马权 (Ma Quan), “撬动战争形态衍变的新支点 (Prying a New Lever in Evolving Warfare Patterns),” PLA Dailv (PLA-owned media), 27 April 2023. http://www.81.cn/bz_208549/10165050.html

In the face of future intelligent battlefield environments, the use of a large number of intelligent, unmanned weapons and equipment will reshape battlefield combat force systems. Manned/unmanned combat forces will be flexibly organized as needed, and can be combined into different types and sizes of combat groups, which can be linked for information fusion processing, mission planning and decision-making, command distribution, and formation operations according to combat tasks and battlefield posture.

Image: Hongdu GJ-11 Sharp Sword[RG1]  (Chinese unmanned combat aerial vehicle).
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hongdu_GJ-11#/media/File:Gongji-11_20221020.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Beijing Expands Counter-Espionage Law To Crack Down on Foreign Access to Chinese Information

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“Activities carried out, instigated or funded … to steal, pry into, purchase or illegally provide state secrets, intelligence, and other documents, data, materials, or items related to national security.”

In April 2023 Chinese lawmakers passed a wide-ranging update to Beijing’s counter-espionage legislation banning the transfer of “all documents, data, materials, and items related to national security and interests” and broadening the definition of spying.[i] The amendments, as published in the excerpted statement from the Chinese government’s China.gov website, note that they will take effect on 1 July 2023. The amendments appear to target foreign information-gathering efforts, especially by limiting access to key government and economic data and expanding the range of legal definitions of espionage.[ii] Since the introduction of the legislation in 2014, Beijing has detained dozens of Chinese and foreign nationals on suspicion of espionage.[iii] Several high-profile incidents have emerged, including those involving an Australian journalist and former TV anchor; a Japanese executive; and even a U.S. citizen who has been detained in China since 2016 on charges of espionage related to research he published using open-source information that the Chinese government later deemed to be “state secrets.” Collectively, these incidents have brought attention to Beijing’s unclear definition of what constitutes “espionage.” Earlier this year, Chinese government raids on foreign firms conducting due diligence work in China further underscored the often-questionable lengths to which Beijing will go to control access to information that could be used for a variety of efforts that run counter to the Chinese Communist Party’s interests. [iv]

Source:

“中国人民共和国反间谍法 (People’s Republic of China’s Counter-Espionage Law),” China.gov (Official Website of the People’s Republic of China’s Central People’s Government), 27 April 2023. http://www.gov.cn/yaowen/2023-04/27/content_5753385.htm.

Article 4: “Acts of espionage” as used in this Law refers to the following conduct:

(1) Activities that endanger the national security of the People’s Republic of China that are carried out, prompted, or funded by an espionage organization and its agents, or carried out by agencies, organs, individuals, or other collaborators domestically or outside the PRC borders;

(2) Participation in an espionage organization or acceptance of tasks from an espionage organization and its agents, or seeking to align with an espionage organization and its agents;

(3) Activities carried out, instigated or funded by foreign institutions, organizations, and individuals other than espionage organizations and their representatives, or in which domestic institutions, organizations or individuals collude, to steal, pry into, purchase or illegally provide state secrets, intelligence, and other documents, data, materials, or items related to national security, or in which state employees are incited, enticed, coerced, or bought over to turn traitor.

(4) Network attacks, intrusions, obstructions, control, or disruptions targeting state organs, units involved with secrets, or critical information infrastructure, that are carried out, prompted, or funded by a espionage organization and its agents, or carried out by agencies, organs, individuals, or other collaborators domestically or outside the PRC borders;

(5) indicating targets for enemies;

(6) conducting other espionage activities.

This law applies where espionage organizations and their agents engage in espionage activities targeting a third country within the territory of the People’s Republic of China or using citizens, organizations, or other conditions of the PRC, endangering the PRC’s national security.

Article 14: No individual or organization may unlawfully obtain or possess any documents, data, materials or items that are state secrets.

Notes:

[i] For an English-language translation of the Counter-Espionage Law, see: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/counter-espionage-law-2023/

[ii] For a detailed analysis of China’s Counter-Espionage Law and the new amendments, see: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/bad-as-it-ever-was-notes-on-the-espionage-law/

[iii] The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) has determined many foreign citizens, including U.S. citizens, have been denied due process rights and that they are arbitrarily detained in violation of international law. In March 2023, China’s Foreign Ministry released a report accusing the United States of arbitrary detention of individuals at home and abroad one month prior to releasing its amendments to its counter-espionage legislation. See: “The United States’ Arbitrary Detention at Home and Abroad: Truth and Facts,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 29 March 2023,  https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbxw/202303/t20230329_11050809.html

[iv] In addition to due diligence firms, Beijing has blocked access to the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI), China’s largest academic database, in an effort that analysts assess is aimed at limiting foreign researchers’ access to public discourse and government data. For more on Beijing’s restriction of access to CNKI, see: Lin Yang, “China to Limit Access to Largest Academic Database,” Voice of America, 30 March 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-to-limit-access-to-largest-academic-database-/7029581.html