China Justifies Naval Pressure Against Japan

JS Kurama sails in the East China Sea during a trilateral exercise, June 2021.

JS Kurama sails in the East China Sea during a trilateral exercise, June 2021.


“When Sino-Japanese relations become extremely tense, there will be another reconnaissance ship that will continue to perform missions in the waters surrounding Japan.”


On 10 May, the Chinese-language website sohu.com published the below excerpted article, which justifies Chinese naval activities in the East Sea as a response to perceived hostile actions by Japan. Moreover, the article indicates that Chinese pressure against Japan is achieving positive results. According to the article, a Chinese naval reconnaissance ship entered the Sea of Japan through the Tsushima Strait between South Korea and Japan, sailed around Japanese territory, and came within only six nautical miles the Japanese coast.[i] While the article refrains from claiming any strategic benefits, it argues the operation succeeded in frightening and thus sending a message to Japan.

The article also claims that Japanese media has interpreted the Chinese naval activities as treating Japan as an enemy. It suggests that as long as Sino-Japanese relations remain tense, Chinese naval reconnaissance ships will continue performing missions in the waters surrounding Japan. Likewise, the article notes that China dispatched several destroyers and other naval ships to conduct live fire drills in the East Sea after pro-Taiwan remarks were made by officials at the G7 foreign ministers meeting in Nagano, Japan. The end of the article alludes to the alliance between China and Russia, where it notes that Japan erred by trying to restore militarism and embracing confrontation with China and Russia.[ii] As a result of this, the article argues that Japan was exhausting its Self-Defense Forces in dealing with both Chinese and Russian military pressure. This implies that China is employing a strategy of weakening the Japanese military through over-extending its forces and wearing it down, a strategy China continues to use against Taiwan.


Source:

“解放军军舰横穿日本,距离海岸仅6海里,海自如临大敌 (The warships of the People’s Liberation Army went across Japan, only 6 nautical miles from the coast, and freely encountered the enemy),” sohu.com (popular pro-government Chinese-language website targeting a youth and gaming readership), 10 May 2023. https://www.sohu.com/a/674302624_121462986

Japan has become an anti-China bridgehead, and the reconnaissance ships of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) approached its territorial waters to frighten the Self-Defense Forces sufficiently. According to the news released by the Ministry of Defense of Japan, the reconnaissance ship sailed around Japan in three weeks…. At the closest time, it was only about 6 nautical miles from the Japanese mainland.

When Sino-Japanese relations are extremely tense, there will be another reconnaissance ship that will continue to perform missions in the waters surrounding Japan.

In response to remarks related to Taiwan made at the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting, China not only rejected such ludicrous remarks diplomatically. At the same time, a destroyer from the navy in the Eastern Theater Command of the PLA was dispatched to conduct live-fire shooting training in a specific area of the East China Sea.In recent years, Japan has had to face regular military pressure from China and Russia, which has exhausted its Self-Defense Forces.


Notes:

[i] The Tsushima Strait was the site of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905 in which Japan was victorious. More than one century later, since 2020, Japan has observed an increase in Russian naval ships that have passed through the Tsushima Strait and Soya Strait to its north nearly twice as often than a decade earlier. This has concerned the Japanese Ministry of Defense. See Japan Ministry of Defense, “Development of Russian Armed Forces in the Vicinity of Japan,” mod.go.jp, September 2021. https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/pdf/ru_d-act_e_210906.pdf

[ii] Although Japan has been upgrading its military capabilities over the past several years, this has been amid—and generally in response to—a military build-up by China. Further, Japan has consistently since the 1990s spent only between .09% and 1% of its GDP on the military. China, however, has viewed Japan as engaging in “military expansion planning” and has strongly criticized Japan for this.  For more, see: Sheila A. Smith, “How Japan Is Upgrading Its Military,” CFR, February 24, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-japan-upgrading-its-military


Image Information:

Image: JS Kurama sails in the East China Sea during a trilateral exercise, June 2021.
Source: Paul Kelly https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:JS_Kurama_sails_in_the_East_China_Sea_during_a_trilateral_exercise,_-21_Jun._2012_a.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Sudanese Conflict Harms Russian Military and Mining Interests

Darfur report - Page 3 Image 1

Darfur report – Page 3 Image 1.


“The war that two Sudanese generals are currently waging for the seizure of power is not necessarily good news for Vladimir Putin, whose interests are very important there.”


On 18 April, the French-language website francetvinfo.frfrancetvinfo.fr published the excerpted article, which covers a French think-tank’s perspectives on Russian interests in Sudan amid that country’s conflict between two warring factions loyal to two different generals. The article notes that, according to the deputy director of the Franco-Russian Observatory think-tank, the conflict harms Russia’s interests in Sudan because Sudan has long allied with Russia in return for supplies of Russian grain and arms.[i] However, the instability and uncertain result of the war in Sudan could put the alliance in jeopardy, while undermining Russian military and economic objectives in the country. According to the article, beyond Sudan’s diplomatic support to Russia, Russia also engages in mining in Sudan, such as for gold, which helps Russia mitigate the impact of international sanctions. In addition, Russia has aspirations to use Port Sudan as a naval base.[ii] According to the second excerpted Russian-language article from gazeta.ru, the port would be significant for Russian geopolitical power projection by extending Russian influence to the Red Sea and, more broadly, the Indian Ocean. As a result, Russia’s concerns about these negative outcomes of the war in Sudan explains why Russia has been vocal in calling for ceasefire between the warring parties in Sudan.


Sources:

“Pourquoi la guerre des généraux “n’est pas un scénario très favorable aux intérêts russes”, selon un expert (Why the War of the Generals ‘is Not a Very Favorable Situation for Russian Interests”, according to an expert),” francetvinfo.fr (French public service radio network), 18 April 2023. https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/afrique/soudan/soudan-pourquoi-la-guerre-des-generaux-n-est-pas-un-scenario-tres-favorable-aux-interets-russes-selon-un-expert_5777636.html

By consistently opposing UN resolutions condemning Russia and its war on Ukraine, Sudan has proven itself a staunch ally of Moscow. This is no surprise when one knows that Russia is its main supplier of arms and grain. And the war that two Sudanese generals are currently waging to seize power is not necessarily good news for Vladimir Putin, whose interests are very important there.

Sudan has become one of the main entry points for Russian influence on the African continent, explains Igor Delanoë, deputy director of the Franco-Russian Observatory in Moscow: “Russian companies in the field of extraction, mining, and more have actually been working there for years… It gives a window for Russia to the heart of the African continent”. 

A Russian naval base project in Port Sudan in the Red Sea is even on the table. But the current crisis is not helping Moscow’s affairs… Hence Russia is making repeated calls for ceasefires to end the Sudanese generals’ war as soon as possible.


Source:

“Зачем России база на Красном море? (Why a Russian Base on the Red Sea?),” 14 February 2023, gazeta.ru (pro-government Russian publication focusing on socio-political affairs) https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2023/02/14/16251997.shtml

The diplomats of modern Russia should proceed exclusively from long-term national interests. Russia repeatedly tried to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean in both the 19th and 20th centuries. In the recent past, aspirations to create naval bases in the Indian Ocean did not end in success either.There is hope that in the 21st century the country will finally establish itself both in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean, as well as in other critical points of the world oceans that are important from the geopolitical and geostrategic points of view.


Notes:

[i] After the first Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi, Russia in October 2019, Moscow began to show growing importance to the continent. However, Russia developed particularly close cooperation with Sudan, which raised hopes in Moscow that it had acquired a foothold on the continent to access other countries of the continent, such as being able to increase its influence politically and economically in the Central African Republic. Even when Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was removed from power by the Sudanese military in 2019, Moscow, which had supported al-Bashir, was still able to maintain close ties with Sudan. See: Sergey Kostelyanets, “Russia-Sudan Relations in the Early 21st Century: A Lost Opportunity or the Foundation for a New Beginning?” Asia and Africa Today 9 (2019): 56-62.

[ii] Sudanese General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (a.k.a. Hemedti) visited Russia for one week just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The reasons for the meeting remain unclear, but Russia reportedly smuggled hundreds of tons of illegal gold from Sudan as part of efforts to protect itself from expected international sanctions over the war in Ukraine. More broadly, attempting to mitigate the impact of international sanctions is an important feature of Russia’s policy in Africa, including in Sudan as well as in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic. Since the military’s overthrow of the civilian-led transitional government in 2021, Sudan had also been suffering an economic crisis, which was at least partly a result of the West halting financial aid to Sudan. This brought Russian and Sudan closer together ahead of the Russian war in Ukraine. Hamdi Abdel Rahman, “Uncovering the reasons behind Sudan’s Hemedti visit to Moscow amid the war in Ukraine,” futureuae.com, 10 March 2022. https://futureuae.com/ar-AE/Mainpage/Item/7191/a-silovik-as-the-best-choice-uncovering-the-reasons-behind-sudans-hemedti-visit-to-moscow-amid-the-war-in-uk


Image Information:

Image: Darfur report – Page 3 Image 1
Source: Sean Woo https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Darfur_report_-_Page_3_Image_1.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Multinational Joint Task Force Lauds Counterterrorism Success Against Boko Haram

Life goes on in Bosso, Niger, 19 April 2017.

Life goes on in Bosso, Niger, 19 April 2017.


“We are proud to release this documentary, which showcases the hard work and dedication of the MNJTF troops in the fight against terrorism.”


In April 2023, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the five-nation grouping of West African states focused on countering terrorism in the region, released its first-ever documentary film on its official website to highlight the progress the military coalition is making against Boko Haram around Lake Chad.[i] The documentary included interviews of MNJTF commanders from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon[ii] who emphasized several key themes regarding MNJTF strategy, including overcoming civilian mistrust as a result of past security forces abuses. The video noted that civil-military relations have improved since the mid-2010s when the Nigerian military committed numerous human rights violations throughout the Lake Chad region.[iii] This is important because, as an MNJTF commander interviewed in the documentary stated, Boko Haram operates like a Maoist insurgency and depends on moving among the people of Lake Chad like fish swimming in water. Good relations with the civilian population are essential to counter Boko Haram. Additional themes covered in the film included eliminating ungoverned spaces where Boko Haram operates with impunity, clearing territory to ensure traditional and national holidays can proceed without disruption to reflect a return to “normalcy,” and facilitating the travel of displaced persons back to their home villages. The documentary also noted the MNJTF’s primary focus was to conduct operations against Boko Haram in riparian areas along Lake Chad where Boko Haram often holds hostages for ransom and raises funds from the fish trade by taxing fishermen and selling fish that group members catch.[iv]


Source:

“The Multinational Joint Task ForceReleases Maiden Documentary,” mnjtffmm.org (official website of the MNJTF), 12 April 2023. https://mnjtffmm.org/press-release-the-multinational-joint-task-force-releases-maiden-documentary/

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has released a documentary showcasing its operational successes in the fight against insurgency in the Lake Chad Region. The documentary, titled “Victory Against Insurgency in the Lake Chad Region,” highlights the progress made by the MNJTF in the past few years in the fight against terrorism. The documentary features interviews with the Head of Mission, the Force Commander, Former Force Commander, and MNJTF sector commanders as well as footage of successful military operations and the impact of the MNJTF’s efforts on the local communities…. The documentary is part of the MNJTF’s ongoing efforts to raise awareness about its mission and to solicit support from the public.


Notes:

[i] For more information see: Jacob Zenn, “Nigerian Leadership Seeks Renewed Regional Cooperation Against Boko Haram,” OE Watch 02-2023.

[ii] Benin, the fifth MNJTF member-state, was not featured in the documentary. The country generally does not fight against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region.

[iii] In 2015, an Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) report found, based on interviews of civilians affected by the Boko Haram conflict, that the military and security forces were causing a high number of civilian casualties, and most notably in Baga, Nigeria, where civilians were reportedly shot by security forces and 642 people were displaced. Also problematic were reports of civilian vigilante groups handing over Boko Haram suspects to the military, who then disappeared. Some of the suspects, however, were simply detained by the vigilantes as part of a personal feud, rather than any meaningful relationship with Boko Haram. See OHCHR, “Violations and abuses committed by Boko Haram and the impact on human rights in the countries affected,” Report A/HRC/30/67 of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Agenda Item 2, 9 December 2015.

[iv] According to an informed report that included interviews of fishermen around Lake Chad, kidnapping for ransom makes financial sense for Boko Haram around the lake because there is a lot of money in circulation from agriculture and fishing from which ransom money can be paid. Moreover, the kidnapping-for-ransom tactic can serve as a punishment or a warning to deter civilians from paying “protection money” to Boko Haram’s Islamic State-aligned faction. Aside from this tactic, another faction collaborates with civilians who come from Niger to fish in the areas of Lake Chad under the militants’ control, and, in return for this “protection,” the Nigeriens bring goods that the militants need. See Maman Inoua Elhadji Mahamadou Amadou and Vincent Foucher, “Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin: The Bakura Faction and its Resistance to the Rationalisation of Jihad,” Megatrends Afrika Policy Brief, 8 December 2022.


Image Information:

Image: Life goes on in Bosso, Niger, 19 April 2017.
Source: Nicolas Pinault (VOA)https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Life_goes_on_in_Bosso,_Niger,_19_April_2017.png
Attribution: (CC x 2.0)

Vietnam Defense Exhibition Shows Diversified International Partnerships To Balance Against China

Vietnam claims Paracel and Spratly islands.

Vietnam claims Paracel and Spratly islands.


“An exhibition was officially opened for international partners and domestic citizens to observe the capacity, technological progress, and weapons and equipment manufactured by Vietnam.”


According to the first excerpted 6 April article from Vietnam’s national television broadcaster vov.com, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs deputy spokesperson denounced the National Natural Science Organization of China’s plans to conduct surveys in 33 areas of the South China Sea. Among the archipelagos in the South China Sea are the Spratly Islands (Truong Sa), which are claimed and controlled by Vietnam but are also claimed by China. Vietnam considers the Chinese survey’s encompassing of the Spratly Islands as an act of aggression. One way Vietnam has responded to China’s more aggressive military posture in the South China Sea, such as through surveying, is by branching out to multiple international actors to balance against China, if not also China’s ally, Russia. This was demonstrated at the 2022 International Defense Exhibition in Hanoi last December.[i] As the second excerpted article on the government-funded Voice of Vietnam website vtv.com noted, the exhibition was intended to highlight Vietnam’s military modernization and diversified international partners.[ii] While Russian artillery systems, which Vietnam has historically acquired for its army, were on display alongside Vietnamese ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, there were also weapons from companies of Western countries and their partners, such as the United States, Czechia, Israel, and India. China was not among the nearly 70 countries that attended. The weapons at the exhibition are among those that Vietnam could acquire and employ during any future confrontation without relying on Chinese allies.[iii]


Sources:

“Việt Nam phản đối việc Trung Quốc công bố khu vực khảo sát bao trùm Trường Sa (Vietnam opposes China’s announcement of conducting a survey area throughout the Spratly Islands),” vov.vn (official website of the Voice of Vietnam radio broadcaster), 6 April 2023. https://vov.vn/chinh-tri/viet-nam-phan-doi-viec-trung-quoc-cong-bo-khu-vuc-khao-sat-bao-trum-truong-sa-post1012290.vov

Regarding the information that the National Natural Science Organization of China announced 33 survey areas, including some lines covering the Truong Sa archipelago in Vietnam’s waters, Deputy Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pham Thu Hang at the press conference on April 6 stated, As it has repeatedly affirmed, Vietnam has a full legal basis and historical evidence to affirm its sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes based on international law.


“Người dân Hà Nội háo hức với Triển lãm quốc phòng quốc tế 2022 (Hanoians are enthusiastic about the 2022 International Defense Exhibition),” vtv.vn (Vietnamese government’s national television broadcaster), 8 December 2022. https://vtv.vn/xa-hoi/nguoi-dan-ha-noi-hao-huc-voi-trien-lam-quoc-phong-quoc-te-2022-20221208183916675.htm

On the morning of December 8, an exhibition was officially opened for international partners and domestic citizens to observe the capacity, technological progress, and weapons and equipment manufactured by Vietnam…. Many Vietnamese people witnessed the modern weapons of the army for the first time


Notes:

[i] Among the purposes of the exhibition was to “diversify defense equipment procurement sources” and to “introduce Vietnam’s defense capabilities and Vietnamese-made weapons” to the international community. Although Russia has historically been Vietnam’s main weapons supplier, the presence of Western countries at the exhibition indicates Vietnam’s interest in gradually diversifying by engaging in weapons transfers with them. See: “Vietnam hosts its first international defense expo.” rfa.org, 8 December 2022. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/vietnam-defense-expo-12082022030531.html

[ii] Unlike Truong Sa, the Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands) have been under Chinese control since the Chinese navy expelled the South Vietnamese navy from the islands in 1974. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam has inherited the South Vietnamese claims over the islands since 1975, as well as concerns about China attempting to occupy Truong Sa in the future.

[iii] After 1991, Vietnam sought to “multilateralize and diversify” its foreign ties by normalizing its relations with China and all Southeast Asian states and becoming a member of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). By 2001, Vietnam and Russia revived bilateral relations in the form of a strategic partnership and Vietnam and the United States signed a Bilateral Trade Agreement. Vietnam’s broader goal was to insulate the country from Sino-U.S. competition or other major power rivalries and protect its independence and self-reliance. See Carlyle A. Thayer (2017), “Vietnam’s Foreign Policy in an Era of Rising Sino-US Competition and Increasing Domestic Political Influence,” Asian Security, 13:3, 183-199.


Image Information:

Image: Vietnam claims Paracel and Spratly islands.
Source: Tonbi Ko https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vietnam_claims_Paracel_and_Spratly_islands.JPG
Attribution: CC x 3.0

Mozambique Regains Control of Islamic State-Afflicted Northern Province With Rwandan Help

Rwandan Patrol Mocimboa

Rwandan Patrol Mocimboa.


“Under the watchful eye of heavily armed Mozambican and Rwandan soldiers who guard the streets, the regular activity in the town center has revived again.”


In March 2023, Portuguese Radio and Television, which produces perspectives from Portugal and the broader Portuguese-speaking world, published the excerpted article noting that Mozambique northern province of Cabo Delgado, which two years ago was under siege by militants affiliated with the Islamic State (IS), is now back under the control of the Mozambican government. The key turning point was the intervention of Rwandan troops to support Mozambican military personnel.[i] Mozambique-Rwanda military forces continue to work together in Cabo Delgado to ensure that IS militants do not return. Although the article states that civilians have expressed their gratitude for the newfound security in Cabo Delgado, civilians also claim that the violence is still close by in towns such as Palma. Roads leading into rural areas remain at risk, and militants still erect flash checkpoints on roadways and abduct, steal from, and even kill civilians. According to the article, while the military’s counterinsurgency strategy has been a success, there has been no economic revival plan for Cabo Delgado, which could impede future progress. While some businesses have benefitted from the renewed security, there are still few jobs and significant unemployment among Cabo Delgado’s working-age population. As the article asserts, if the counterinsurgency strategy does not include or result in an economic revival in Cabo Delgado, jobless disaffected youth may still turn to the militants out of economic desperation.


Source:

“Vida regressa a Palma sob patrulha, dois anos após ataque no norte de Moçambique” (Life returns to Palma under patrols two years after the attack in northern Mozambique),” rtp.pt (popular Portuguese-language broadcaster covering Lusaphone affairs), 9 March 2023. https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/mundo/vida-regressa-a-palma-sob-patrulha-dois-anos-apos-ataque-no-norte-de-mocambique_n1472006

Under the watchful eye of heavily armed Mozambican and Rwandan soldiers who patrol the streets, the regular activity in the town center has revived again. Some contractors already announced their return to Afungi, the site of the energy facilities, in the middle of this year, but decisions from the French oil company TotalEnergies are pending.Meanwhile, the population complains about the lack of opportunities to benefit them from the largest private investment in Africa…. Unemployment and lack of opportunities – namely in emerging investments linked to gas – have been indicated by several observers as some of the reasons why young people are recruited into the ranks of the rebels in northern Mozambique.


Notes:

[i] The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) entered Cabo Delgado in northern Mozambique in 2021 to combat the IS-loyal militants in the country. The RDF succeeded in reducing the violence in much of Cabo Delgado and training Mozambican troops in counterinsurgency and, as a result, the RDF deployment period has been extended. For more on Rwanda’s military interventions in the region, see: Brendon J. Cannon & Federico Donelli, “Rwanda’s Military Deployments in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Neoclassical Realist Account,” The International Spectator, 58:1, 109-127, (2023).


Image Information:

Image: Rwandan Patrol Mocimboa.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RwandanpatrolMocimboa.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Philippine Interest in Trilateral Security Pact With United States and Japan Possibly Increasing

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force butai 01 – 04.

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force butai 01 – 04.


“Beijing is determined to change the status quo in the South China Sea by continuing to harass neighboring ‘small’ countries.”


In March 2023, the nationalist Japan Times published the excerpted article written by Kuni Miyake, the research director for foreign and national security affairs at the Canon Institute for Global Studies in Tokyo. Miyake argues the Philippines has growing concerns about Chinese policies in the South China Sea, including the building of military outposts on atolls claimed by the Philippines.[i] Therefore, the Philippines is more likely than in previous decades to be open to a trilateral partnership with Japan and the United States.

Miyake acknowledges that Philippines leader Rodrigo Duterte has signed economic agreements with Beijing related to issues ranging from oil and gas exploration to fishing rights. However, provocative actions by the Chinese navy, including targeting a Philippine Coast Guard ship with a laser device in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, and China’s harassing other smaller Southeast Asian countries, has contributed to momentum building in the Philippines government for closer security partnerships with Japan and the United States. In contrast to Beijing, Miyake argues that Japan must stress to the Philippine government the important geopolitical role of the Philippines in their bilateral relations. Miyake’s article comes after the Philippines began contemplating a visiting forces agreement (VFA) with Japan.[ii] For example, the second excerpted article in the Philippine publication Inquirer from November 2022 quoted the country’s Senate President, Juan Miguel Zubiri, who supports a VFA. Another senator stated a VFA would not only be beneficial to the Philippines because of the training Japan can provide, but also because the VFA would increase mutual preparedness between Japan and the Philippines for natural disasters and other humanitarian emergencies.


Sources:

Kuni Miyake, “The geopolitical trajectory of the Philippines is changing,” japantimes.co.jp (English-language daily with a nationalistic editorial perspective), 8 March 2023. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/03/08/commentary/world-commentary/philippine-trilateral-cooperation/

Returning to Manila this time, I was struck by a series of developments: a growing anxiety toward China among the populace, dramatic improvement in U.S.-Philippine relations and growing momentum to advance trilateral-security cooperation between Japan, the Philippines and the United States, which until a few years ago would have been only a dream.

In January of this year, Marcos was invited to China as a state guest and signed 14 agreements as the Chinese business community expressed intentions to invest $22.8 billion in the Philippines. Nevertheless, Beijing is determined to change the status quo in the South China Sea by continuing to harass neighboring “small” countries. In February this year, for example, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel blocked the path of a Philippine Coast Guard ship within the island nation’s exclusive economic zone while another Chinese vessel targeted a Philippine ship with a laser device…. What I found most fascinating in Manila was the idea that security cooperation between Japan, the U.S. and the Philippines is gaining momentum these days.


“Senators push for VFA with Japan,” inquirer.net (popular pro-democracy newspaper in the Philippines), 14 November 2022. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1692799/senators-push-for-vfa-with-japan

Senators are keen to endorse a visiting forces agreement (VFA) with erstwhile invader Japan, making it only the third nation with which the country has such an extraordinary agreement, next to the United States and Australia. “I’m sure we can muster enough support in the Senate for a visiting forces agreement with Japan. They’re good partners,” Senate President Juan Miguel Zubiri said during the Senate plenary’s marathon budget deliberations on Thursday night.

Forging a VFA with Japan would not only be helpful in joint training but also during natural disasters, said Senate President Pro Tempore Loren Legarda.This is not just military training but it will also include disaster response and disaster risk reduction.”

China’s force buildup in the region and opportunities for trilateral coordination and cooperation will be among the key topics on the agenda.


Notes:

[i] One of the first significant South China Sea confrontations between China and the Philippines occurred with China’s seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012. At the time, the Philippines believed an agreement existed whereby both countries would withdraw naval patrols from the shoal as typhoon season approached. However, when Philippine ships left the shoal, China placed a barrier across the entrance to the shoal and stationed coast guard boats there to chase away Philippine fishing boats. See: Mark Raymond and David A. Welch, “What’s Really Going On in the South China Sea?,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 42(2), 214-239, August 2022. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/18681034221086291

[ii] Since the rise of China in the 1990s, Philippine and Japanese political leaders and high-ranking defense officials have conducted goodwill visits and high-level dialogues, while Japan has consistently provided emergency relief assistance to the Philippines in the wake of earthquakes and typhoons. However, a VFA between the two countries would represent a significant elevation of the two countries’ bilateral ties. See: Renato Cruz De Castro, “Exploring a 21st-Century Japan-Philippine Security Relationship: Linking Two Spokes Together?,” Asian Survey Vol. 49 (4, 691-715), 2009. https://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-abstract/49/4/691/24277/Exploring-a-21st-Century-Japan-Philippine-Security?redirectedFrom=fulltext


Image Information:

Image: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force butai01 – 04
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Japan_Maritime_Self-Defense_Force_butai01_-_04.jpg
Attribution: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, CC x 4.0

Vietnam and Indonesia Resolve Maritime Disputes

Vietnam People's Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting.

Vietnam People’s Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting.


“It was very important to demarcate the overlapping waters between Vietnam and Indonesia…”


Over the past 10 years, Indonesia and Vietnam have clashed in the South China Sea, which Vietnam calls “The East Sea,” and which Indonesia calls “The North Natuna Sea.”  For example, in 2021, Indonesia seized 25 Vietnamese fishing boats and then detained and extradited more than 350 Vietnamese fishermen.[i] Prior to this incident, in 2019, a Vietnamese coast guard boat and an Indonesian naval boat crashed into each other in disputed waters.[ii] Before that, in 2014, the Indonesian navy accused Vietnamese fishing boats of entering Indonesian waters and sunk three Vietnamese boats.[iii] However, the excerpted article published by the pro-government Vietnamese publication tuoitre, noted that after 12 years of negotiations, Vietnam has proposed a boundary line in the waters with Indonesia, which Indonesia has accepted. According to the article, this boundary line will allow Vietnamese fishermen to avoid disputed waters and end the maritime clashes between the two countries. According to the excerpted article from Vietnamese military newspaper quân đội nhân dân the agreement followed the “Sea of ​​Peace-Sustainable Resolution” conference. At the conference, experts recommended Vietnam cooperate with ASEAN nations based on international law to resolve disputes.[iv] This was subsequently achieved with Indonesia and will allow ASEAN nations to be more unified when confronting maritime disputes with China, either diplomatically or military.


Sources:

“Việt Nam – Indonesia hoàn tất đàm phán phân định vùng đặc quyền kinh tế trên biển” (Vietnam – Indonesia complete negotiations on demarcation of exclusive economic zones at sea”),” tuoitre.vn (pro-Communist Party newspaper covering current affairs and originally aimed at youth audiences), 12 December 2022. https://tuoitre.vn/viet-nam-indonesia-hoan-tat-dam-phan-phan-dinh-vung-dac-quyen-kinh-te-tren-bien-20221222143434761.htm

Since 2010, the two countries have had dozens of rounds of negotiations regarding overlapping EEZ claims in the waters surrounding the Natuna Islands in the East Sea. The two sides have concluded negotiations on the demarcation of the exclusive economic zone on the basis of international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982

It was very important to demarcate the overlapping waters between Vietnam and Indonesia, because this was the justification for Vietnamese fishermen being accused by Indonesia of “fishing in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone.”

“Hội thảo quốc tế về Biển Đông ‘Biển hòa bình – Phục hồi bền vững’ (International Conference on East Sea ‘Sea of ​​Peace-Sustainable Resolution’),” qdnd.vn (Russian-language daily focusing on business and politics), 16 November 2022. https://www.qdnd.vn/xa-hoi/tin-tuc/hoi-thao-quoc-te-ve-bien-dong-bien-hoa-binh-phuc-hoi-ben-vung-711217The principles in the South China Sea will help shape other principles in other seas and oceans. Maintaining an order at sea, emphasizing compliance, trust and cooperation, more than ever before, is essential to ensuring a sustainable resolution. Vietnam’s policy on the East Sea is to fully respect and comply with international law, especially the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982).


Notes:

[i] “Indonesia returns 166 detained fishermen to Vietnam,” RFA, 16 November 2014. rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/returns-11162021162820.html

[ii] “Indonesian, Vietnamese vessels clash over illegal fishing,” AFP, 29 April 2019. youtube.com/watch?v=SZh5t2y2NxY

[iii] Mathias Hariyadi, “Jakarta sinks three Vietnamese fishing boats caught in its territorial waters,” Asia News, May 12, 2014. https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Jakarta-sinks-three-Vietnamese-fishing-boats-caught-in-its-territorial-waters-32882.html

[iv] Notably, prior to 2021, there was little optimism in the academic community that Indonesia and Vietnam would reconcile their maritime claims. However, Darwis and Putra noted that Indonesian President Jokowi sought to take a less confrontational stance when dealing with ASEAN navies in disputed waters. See Darwis and Bama Andika Putra, “Construing Indonesia’s maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam’s illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the North Natuna Sea,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 49:4, 172-192, 2022. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00927678.2022.2089524


Image Information:

Image: Vietnam People’s Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vietnam_People%27s_Navy_honor_guard_at_ASEAN_defense_ministers_meeting_2010-10-12_1.jpg
Attribution: Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison, U.S. Air Force, CC x 2.0

Complications Surround Kenyan Peacemaking in DRC

M-23 launch attack on MONUSCO in Kiwanja.

M-23 launch attack on MONUSCO in Kiwanja.


“One of the missing links has been the continued refusal by Kinshasa to negotiate with the rebel group M23.”


In February 2023, The East African, an online outlet covering regional affairs in Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda, published the excerpted article on the challenges Kenya faces in mediating the conflict between the Congolese government and rebels of the March 23 Movement, better known as M23. The M23 is predominantly Tutsi and is backed by Rwanda, whose president, Paul Kagame, is Tutsi and sympathizes with M23’s grievances against the Congolese government for neglecting their communities. In 2022, M23 suddenly renewed its offensive against the Congolese government after a nine-year hiatus, which began in 2012 when a fragile truce was achieved. The former Kenyan president, Uhuru Kenyatta, who left office in 2022, is heading efforts by the East African Community (EAC) to find a resolution, but the complexities of the conflict make peace elusive. Nevertheless, the article notes there is no plan to replace Kenyatta and that he is incentivized by the goal to make Kenya proud as a regional peacemaker.

According to the article, the inability to reach an agreement is caused, on one end, by the Congolese government’s insistence that M23 rebels are terrorists and refusal to negotiate with them on that basis. One the other end, M23 rebels are willing to meet with Kenyatta but demand direct negotiations with the Congolese government. Kenyatta’s most immediate recommendation is for the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) member-states to all contribute forces to separate the government and rebel lines. At present, however, only Kenyan forces are deployed in the epicenter of the violence in the town of Goma in eastern Congo, while deployments from Burundi, Uganda, and South Sudan have been pledged but not implemented. Further complicating peace efforts is the article’s claim that the Congolese government sees the EACRF mandate as militarily defeating M23, while the EACRF seeks to create conditions for a political process and dialogue. As noted in the excerpted article from Kenya-based publication The Star, 200 Kenyan troops traveled to eastern Congo to join the roughly 700 Kenyan troops already there. According to the article, their mission was not to defeat the M23 rebels, but to remain impartial and stabilize the region to enforce a conclusive peace agreement or at least a more enduring truce than one that had existed from 2012 until 2021.


Sources:

“Uhuru’s delicate balancing act in Congo peace talks assignment,” Theeastafrican.co.ke (regional-oriented weekly newspaper focusing on Kenyan, Ugandan, and Rwandan political, military, and economic affairs), 11 February 2023. theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uhuru-delicate-balancing-act-in-dr-congo-4119666

Former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta has been praised for helping end the Tigrayan conflict in Ethiopia. As a retired president and a glad-handed statesman, he became an obvious choice for the East African Community (EAC) in its pursuit of peace in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. But the complexity of the Congo conflict has left Kenyatta gasping for breath, with support and opposition coming in equal measure.

Last week, Kenyatta skipped the EAC Summit in Bujumbura called by President Evariste Ndayishimiye to help broker a ceasefire to the violence in eastern DRC.

Kenyatta’s domestic troubles, however, are only part of the problem in brokering peace in the DRC. On Thursday, he endorsed the Summit’s call for a ceasefire and withdrawal of rebels from the positions…. One of the missing links has been the continued refusal by Kinshasa to negotiate with the rebel group M23…. The M23, on their part, are demanding “direct negotiations” with the Congolese government. The rebels also asked to express their grievance to Kenyatta, whom they have met at least twice this year.

“200 more KDF troops arrive in DRC to enforce peace,” thestar.co.ke (independent Nairobi-based newspaper focusing on Kenyan politics), 16 November 2022. https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-11-16-200-more-kdf-troops-arrive-in-drc-to-enforce-peace/

The second batch of troops from Kenya to be deployed to fight M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo in a joint regional operation left the country.A team of about 903 has been deployed to the region to help contain the fighting that has displaced many. About 200 more troops left Nairobi for the troubled region of Goma. Gen Kibochi told the troops to remember their joint mission with other East African Community states to enforce peace. He urged the officers to obey the law of the land as they are deployed. The Commander of the team Major General Jeff Nyaga said they are there to help DRC stabilise.


Image Information:

Image: M-23 launch attack on MONUSCO in Kiwanja
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:M23_launch_attack_on_MONUSCO_in_Kiwanja_(7684320746).jpg
Attribution: MONUSCO Photos (CC x 2.0)

Nigerian Leadership Seeks Renewed Regional Cooperation Against Boko Haram

Trigger time at Flintlock 20.

Trigger time at Flintlock 20.


The operations conducted by MNJTF have seriously degraded the insurgents and there is, therefore, the need to bring all resources together to completely defeat the BHT/ISWAP.”


On 30 November, the business-oriented Lagos-based publication The Nation reported in the excerpted article on Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari’s speech to heads of state of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) countries, which include Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin.[i] Buhari argued for greater financial and political commitment to enable the MNJTF to defeat Boko Haram. Prior to Buhari’s speech, on 25 September, the southern Nigeria-based publication This Day, which often reports critically on northern Nigerian affairs, featured the second excerpted article that highlighted the importance the Nigerian army is placing on the MNJTF to combat Boko Haram. According to the article, Nigerian Brigadier General Abdulsallam Abubakar visited the MNJTF headquarters in Chad and, like Buhari, stated that the MNJTF was degrading Boko Haram but additional resources would be needed to finish the job. In particular, Abubakar pointed to the increasing operational tempo against Boko Haram, which comprises two factions around Lake Chad whose mobile bases were largely dismantled during a Chadian-led operation in 2019.[ii]

Although there are other security challenges facing Nigeria, such as banditry and cross-border trafficking, which were the MNJTF mandates when it formed in the 1990s, Buhari urged the MNJTF countries to continue to primarily focus on combatting Boko Haram. This has been the top priority for the MNJTF since Boko Haram launched its insurgency in 2010. The MNJTF was most effective in combating Boko Haram in 2015, but it has since suffered from a lack of coordination, if not also unity of purpose and sufficient resourcing. Ultimately, results will need to be seen on the battlefield in future MNJTF confrontations with Boko Haram along Lake Chad’s shorelines for Buhari’s and Abubakar’s statements to be validated. Their statements nevertheless demonstrate that Nigeria is not conducting a go-it-alone strategy against Boko Haram. Rather, the country considers the contributions of neighboring countries—and specifically the MNJTF—crucial to the military effort.[iii]


Sources:

“Boko Haram: Buhari urges MNJTF to exert final push to end terrorism,” thenationonline.ng (business-oriented Lagos-based daily newspaper), 30 November 2022. https://thenationonlineng.net/boko-haram-buhari-urges-mnjtf-to-exert-final-push-to-end-terrorism/

President Muhammadu Buhari yesterday urged the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin to exert the final push towards ending terrorism in the region. The President said this in his opening address at the 16th summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) at the Conference Hall of the Presidential Villa in Abuja. President Buhari, who ended his tenure as chairman of the commission at the end of the 16th summit, also charged his colleagues from the other five member-countries of to provide the requisite political and material support for the LCBC/MNJTF in order to motivate the formations to deliver on their mandates.

President Buhari noted that the fight against Boko Haram terrorists and other forms of threats in the region must remain the lead priority.

“MNJTF Seeks Joint Resource Pool to End Boko Haram, ISWAP Menace,” thisdailylive.com (independent Lagos-based daily newspaper), 25 September 2022. https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/09/25/mnjtf-seeks-joint-resource-pool-to-end-boko-haram-iswap-menace/

The Force Commander of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), Maj. Gen. Abdul Ibrahim, yesterday called on stakeholders to mobilise resources to bring to an end the menace posed by terror groups, Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP) in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. The Force Commander spoke as the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Gen. Lucky Irabor, said joint training of the armed forces was crucial in dealing with security challenges afflicting the nation…. Speaking in Chad, the Force Commander, MNJTF stated that to effectively bring hostilities in the region to an end and  “completely wipe out Boko Haram and ISWAP terrorists in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region,” all stakeholders must pool resources to contain insurgency. He said so far the operations conducted by MNJTF had significantly degraded the insurgents….“The operations conducted by MNJTF and Operation Hadin Kai have seriously degraded the insurgents and there is, therefore, the need to bring all resources together to completely defeat the BHT/ISWAP,” he said.

Director of Army Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Mr. Sunday Attah, affirmed that “the objective of the competition, which is to reinforce the existing cordial working relationship between members of the Armed Forces, has been achieved.”


Notes:

[i] The MNJTF, which is based in N’Djamena, Chad, was originally based in Baga, Nigeria until Boko Haram overran the military base there in 2015. Considering that Boko Haram has gained strength since 2015, the MNJTF is generally not regarded as having succeeded despite winning several battles with the group. In particular, it has been hampered by distrust between the member states. See Albert, Isaac Olawale. “Security Regimes in Africa – Prospects and Challenges.” Africa Development, Vol. 42, No. 3. 2017, pp. 119-135.

[ii] Chad launched Operation Bohoma Wrath against Boko Haram after the terrorist group, led by Abubakar Shekau, massacred roughly 90 Chadian soldiers in the town of Bohoma along the Lake Chad shoreline in a surprise raid in early 2020. For additional information see: United Nations S/2020/373 Security Council, “Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General,” May 8, 2020. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3861622?ln=fr

[iii] A book chapter on the MNJTF notes that the four MNJTF countries besides Nigeria are incentivized to participate in military operations against Boko Haram to build their own military capacities by receiving training and weapons from foreign armies. In this regard, these countries have tended to seek only limited engagements with Boko Haram on Nigerian territory, but still just enough to assure that the capacity-building of their armies continues. See Emmanuel, Nikolas. “External Incentives and the African Subregional Response to Boko Haram.” African Border Disorders, 1st ed., vol. 1, Routledge, 2018, pp. 136–50. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315166483-7


Image Information:

Image: Trigger time at Flintlock 20
Source: USAFRICOM from Stuttgart, Germany, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Trigger_time_at_Flintlock_20_(50111204252).jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Marawi Reflections Reveal Urban Warfare Challenges for Philippine Army

Boming on Marawi City.

Boming on Marawi City.


“Marawi showed all potential enemies the advantages of urban warfare [for insurgents].”


The Filipino publication mindanews.com recently published the excerpted article featuring portions from a book by Filipino author Gail Ilagan about the 2017 occupation of Marawi, Mindanao by up to 2,000 militants loyal to the Islamic State (IS) and the military’s recapture of the city. The article recounts details of the occupation, noting that the trigger of the occupation was the Philippine army’s attempt to capture the militants’ leader, Isnon Hapilon. Unbeknownst to the army, the militants had already established sleeper cells in Marawi that they activated once the operation to capture Hapilon began, including attacking a prison to release group members, bombing a church, and sending fighters to control university campuses.[i]

The article points to missteps by the army, including interpreting the militants to be local fighters when, in fact, they not only had inspiration from IS, but also had invited foreign IS supporters to Mindanao and employed IS tactics. In addition, Philippine security forces overlooked earlier bombings at night markets near universities and occupations of smaller towns in Mindanao, which had displaced residents and should have been seen as a harbinger of the future occupation of the much larger city of Marawi. Ultimately, the article claims the military’s unpreparedness resulted in more soldiers’ lives lost than necessary. Military equipment, such as tanks, were unsuitable for maneuvering Marawi’s narrow alleyways, while the insurgents’ hijacking of fire trucks and other public vehicles made it difficult for soldiers to identify their adversaries in the urban combat environment. However, the article concludes that hard lessons were learned from the siege of Marawi that make a similar insurgent takeover unlikely in the near term.[ii] The military has changed its organizational structure, acquired new equipment, and improved training methods to prepare for urban warfare.


Source:

“Local Frontlines of Globalized Islamic States Network: The Emerging War Arena for the Filipino Soldier,” mindanews.com (regional newspapers focusing on Mindanao), 16 October 2022. https://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2022/10/local-frontlines-of-globalized-islamic-states-network-the-emerging-war-arena-for-the-filipino-soldier/

Violent extremists are rare among Muslim Filipinos. However, it does not take a lot of them to cause a scale of destruction such as was seen in the aftermath of the 2017 Marawi Siege.

Among its choices, the region of Mindanao seemed to be most appealing [to ISIS] because of its porous maritime boundaries and the safe haven that local extremist groups could provide. One such local extremist group was the Basilan-based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) that had pledged allegiance to ISIS and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in June 2014. In 2016, al-Baghdadi accepted the Abu Sayyaf’s pledge and appointed ASG commander Isnilon Hapilon as the ISIS’ emir in Southeast Asia. Hapilon and his soldiers traveled soon after to Marawi where they were embraced by the Maute Group, as well as other local terrorist groups that shared the ISIS’ aspiration.

The Marawi Crisis was ignited in the early afternoon of 23 May 2017 when security forces tried to arrest Hapilon in Barangay Basak Malutlut in Marawi City. It was two days before the Muslim holiday of Eid’l Fitr. Intelligence sources would later reveal that the ISIS-inspired groups intended to mark Eid’l Fitr by taking over the only Islamic city in the Philippines and declaring it ISIS territory. At the time when the security team was sent to Marawi with the warrant of arrest, they were unaware that Hapilon’s forces were positioned in the adjoining buildings, ready to defend their leader. The arresting team immediately came under heavy fire as soon as they entered the narrow street where Hapilon’s quarters were located.

It would take five long months for the government to neutralize the extremists and rid Marawi of them.


Notes:

[i] In mid-2014, the longtime Abu Sayyaf commander Isnon Hapilon and around a dozen other militants released a video pledging allegiance to IS leader Umar al-Baghdadi. Hapilon noted in the video that these militants and other factions had made pledges separately but were now coming together, which signaled the unification of Abu Sayyaf factions and set the stage for the group’s eventual attack on Marawi under the leadership of the Maute Brothers and Hapilon, all of whom were killed during the battle. See: Jacob Zenn, “The Islamic State’s Provinces on the Peripheries: Juxtaposing the Pledges from Boko Haram in Nigeria and Abu Sayyaf and Maute Group in the Philippines.” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 13, no. 1, 2019, pp. 87–104.

[ii] The restoration of critical infrastructure in Marawi and the return of the city’s inhabitants to their original homes, which were destroyed during the battle in 2017, has been slow. This has also raised concerns that grievances of the local population regarding their treatment in post-conflict Marawi could result in their supporting antigovernment militant groups in the future or their remaining alienated from the government, which was one of the reasons why Abu Sayyaf was initially able to gain some traction from among the youths in Marawi. See: Jacob Zenn, “Marawi Rehabilitation Progress Slows in the Philippines,” OE Watch, July 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/277112 


Image Information:

Image: Boming on Marawi City.
Source: Mark Jhomel https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bombing_on_Marawi_City.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0