Monthly Archives: October 2024

Rumors of Russian Military Cargo Activity Underscore Tunisia’s Eastward Turn Away From the United States

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Tunisian President Kais Saied on Inauguration Day, 23 October 2019.

“Kais Saied is a ripe fruit waiting to fall into the hands of the Russians”

Summary: Recent rumors of Russian military cargo flights into Tunisia highlight President Kais Saied’s “eastward turn”— including toward China and Iran — and the potential erosion of Tunisia’s security partnership with the United States.

On 19 May, the Italian daily La Repubblica published a report claiming that Russia may be using a Tunisian airport to transport military equipment, raising questions about Moscow’s designs in the country. Russia exerts substantial military influence in both Libya and Algeria, Tunisia’s neighboring countries.[i] Tunisia, however, is a historical Western security partner in which Russia has traditionally had little to no military influence. The rumors of Russian activities in Tunisia may not amount to much, but they should nonetheless be taken seriously in light of evident Russian attempts to deepen its influence in Libya and the Sahel,[ii] along with Tunisian President Kais Saied’s seeming “eastward turn.”

The report suggests that entities linked to Russia’s Wagner Group had flown equipment and personnel into the international airport of Djerba, a southern Tunisian island popular with local travelers and European package tourists.[iii] There is no open-source evidence supporting claims of Russian military-related movements in Djerba, but speculation among Tunisians is nonetheless rife, as noted in the first accompanying excerpt, from the Qatari-aligned English-language daily al-Araby al-Jadeed. Theories on Russian activities in Djerba include that former Wagner personnel are vacationing in Djerba; that Russia is “transporting migrants to overwhelm Tunisia’s border crossing points”; or that the planes are transporting “personnel and crates of vodka for Russian soldiers on leave in Tunisia.” The Russian embassy was quick to ridicule claims of any military connection to these flights, as shown in the second accompanying excerpt, from the Russian Embassy in Libya’s Facebook page. The week after the publication on Russian flights to Djerba, President Saied flew to Tehran to attend Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi’s state funeral. The last time a Tunisian head of state visited Iran was 1965. The following week, Saied flew to Beijing to attend the China-Arab Cooperation Forum. While Saied’s recent engagement with Iran and China has been more overt than any gestures toward Russia, most analysts see these developments as part of a broader eastward turn in Saied’s foreign policy. Saied’s eastward turn, particularly toward China, as largely motivated by economics explains a Tunisian political activist cited in the third accompanying excerpt, from Qatar’s al-Jazeera. However, there are also ideological affinities between members of Saied’s inner circle and Iranian political leadership.[iv] This confluence of circumstances, according to a Tunisian researcher cited in the fourth accompanying excerpt, from the Kuwaiti daily al-Jarida, makes Saied’s Tunisia a “ripe fruit waiting to fall into the hands of the Russians.”

Sources:

“Tunisia: alleged Russian military activity in Djerba raises concerns,” The New Arab (Qatari-aligned daily), 24 May 2024, https://www.newarab.com/news/tunisia-alleged-russian-military-activity-raises-concerns

Theories on the suspicious events at Djerba airport have become a “culture de trottoir” in Tunisia for months. Some speculate it involves Wagner personnel, while others suggest it’s about vodka shipments. According to some Tunisian analysts, these aircraft are believed to be “cargo planes” and civilian “charters,” not the military aircraft mentioned by La Repubblica. Some sources claim that the aircraft transported Russians affiliated with the former security company Wagner (now “Africa Corps”), who came to rest on the island of Djerba. Others suggest they transported personnel and crates of vodka for Russian soldiers on leave in Tunisia. A far more speculative hypothesis suggests that some aircraft might be transporting migrants to overwhelm Tunisia’s border crossing points, thereby creating a crisis. Wagner’s presence in neighbouring Libya mainly fueled all these rumours… While rumours continue circulating, one thing may seem to be agreed on: Russian aircraft have been seen on Djerba Island. President Kais Saied, known for publicly addressing rumours targeting his country, has refrained from commenting on the situation at Djerba airport.

Russian Embassy in Libya, Facebook Page, 20 May 2024, https://www.facebook.com/RussEmbLib/posts/122143879226177351

Now the Italian “La Repubblica,” having clearly decided to keep up with the task of creating and replicating horror stories about “Wagner,” scares the inexperienced reader with the idea of ​​​​Russian combat aircraft at the airport of the tourist island of Djerba in Tunisia, neighboring Libya. One can only envy their imagination. But as a reaction, we have to say: this is a lie and a fake. A complete lack of respect for the reader, whether in Italy or abroad.

توجه تونس شرقا.. خطة للانسلاخ من الغرب أم مناورة؟

“Tunisia’s eastward orientation… a plan to ditch the West or a maneuver?” al-Jazeera (Qatari news channel), 4 June 2024, https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2024/6/4/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A7-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AE-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8

Political activist Ahmed Al-Kahlawi views the Tunisian-Chinese rapprochement as an important step taken by President Saied to revive historical relations with China, stressing that the Tunisian orientation towards the East was dictated by the economic difficulties that the country is experiencing as a result of dysfunctional cooperation to benefit the interests of Western powers. Al-Kahlawi told Al-Jazeera Net that President Saied chose to lead Tunisia to establish new partnerships with the East because he was certain that Tunisia would reap many economic and investment advantages, especially with China, the rising economic power, considering that Tunisia would achieve great growth that would free it from the hegemony of Western countries.

تونس بين التوجه شرقاً أو الحفاظ على حلفها مع الغرب

“Tunisia between an eastward turn and maintaining its alliance with the West,” al-Jarida (Kuwaiti daily), 30 May 2024, https://www.aljarida.com/article/64205For his part, Tunisian researcher at the Institute for Defense and Security Studies, Jalal Harchaoui, explained that in a context characterized by Russian penetration of the Sahel region and Libya, “Kais Saied is a ripe fruit waiting to fall into the hands of the Russians.”

Notes:

[i] See: Lucas Winter, “Russia Uses Diplomacy To Increase Military Influence In Libya,” OE Watch, 10-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-uses-diplomacy-to-increase-military-influence-in-libya/; Lucas Winter, “Algeria Seeks Non-Alignment By Preserving Russia Ties While Welcoming NATO Overtures,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/algeria-seeks-non-alignment-by-preserving-russia-ties-while-welcoming-nato-overtures/; Lucas Winter, “Algerian Military Deepening Ties To Russia,” OE Watch, 09-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/algerian-military-deepening-ties-to-russia/

[ii] See: Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Amelia Cheatham. “Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Burkina Faso,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, January 2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/burkina-faso-russia-m-dime-report/;  Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Amelia Cheatham. “Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in Burkina Faso,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, January 2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/burkina-faso-china-m-dime-report/; Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Christopher Betts. “Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Mali,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, June 2024, Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Christopher Betts. “Instruments of Chinee Military Influence in Mali,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, June 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/mali-china-m-dime-report-2/

[iii] The La Repubblica article is unavailable without a subscription. It can be found at: https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2024/05/19/news/aerei_militari_russi_tunisia_allarme_usa_migranti_saied_timori_governo_meloni-423030975

[iv] Per Le Monde, “certain circles surrounding Saied have long-standing links with the Islamic Republic,” in particular his brother Naoufel Saied. “Tunisia: Kais Saied’s inclination to turn to Iran,” Le Monde, 25 May 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/05/25/tunisia-kais-saied-s-inclination-to-turn-to-iran_6672647_124.html

OE Insight Summary:

Recent rumors of RUS military cargo flights into TUN highlight President Kais Saied’s seeming “eastward turn”— including toward CHN and IRN— and the potential erosion of TUN’s security relationship with USA.

Image Information:

Image: Tunisian President Kais Saied on Inauguration Day, 23 October 2019.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kaïs_Saïd_2.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Turkey Deploying Syrian Private Security Contractors to Niger

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Turkey and Niger have increased their military cooperation since 2020, including through using Libya as a gateway.

“The defense component of the relationship between Niger and Turkey has become more prominent with the signing of a military cooperation agreement in 2020 and the sale of armed drones.”

Summary: Turkey is deploying Syrian militants to Niger to protect economic interests. While their desire for money presents challenges of commitment and resembles Russia’s Wagner mercenaries in West Africa, the Syrian militants operate more like private security contractors and have a lesser counter-insurgency role.

Russia’s Wagner Group, and its successor Africa Corps, have received significant international attention and notoriety because of their operations propping up of post-coup military regimes in West Africa. While their objectives ostensibly include combating Islamist militants and protecting mining and other extractive industries whose exports benefit Russia, they have also partaken in the excessive killing of civilians during counter-insurgency operations.[i] The excerpted French-language article in L’Orient Le Jour highlights Turkey’s recent programs to deploy militants to West Africa, whose activities can be juxtaposed against those of Wagner and Africa Corps.

According to the article, the program involves hundreds of pro-Turkish Syrians—and not Turks themselves—from the Sultan Murad brigade.[ii] This differs from Russia’s Wagner and Africa Corps, whose members are primarily Russians, despite recent evidence of an African member in Wagner ranks in Ukraine.[iii] The Syrians have been contracted by a Turkish private military company, which has paid the Syrian fighters up to $1,500 per month. This is almost ten times more than they had received when fighting in Turkish-controlled areas of Syria. Like with Wagner and Africa Corps members, remuneration is, therefore, a primary incentive for the Syrians to travel to Niger.

The exact activities of these Turkish mercenaries remain unclear. On one hand, the article asserts that their main role is to protect Turkish interests and projects in Niger, including mining operations. In this sense, they would be functioning much like private security contractors, rather than mercenaries. On the other hand, one of the Syrian contractors interviewed for the article noted that the outfit was deployed to combat Boko Haram. If true, this would likely mean that they were based in southeastern Niger near Lake Chad, where iron ore and other minerals are mined, where Boko Haram factions have pillaged villages and even taken over military outposts in the last few years. If this were the outfit’s primary role, it would appear to function more closely to Wagner, though without the regime protection efforts.

Although the interviewee states that his cohorts arrived in Niger only around one year ago, the article claims Turkey had been preparing for their deployment by sending Syrian fighters to train in Libya for several years. This provided the fighters with combat experience in Africa and a gateway for further travel to Niger. In addition, in 2020, Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement with Niger, which involved the sale of armed drones from Turkey to Niger. However, this may have since evolved into the additional deployment of these pro-Turkish Syrians to Niger as well.

The article does not indicate the Syrians in Niger will play as significant of a counter-insurgency role as Wagner or Africa Corps in West Africa, which also means their presence in the country is less likely to generate international concerns on humanitarian grounds. However, the Syrians’ primary motivation of remuneration and the challenging security environment in Niger, including with Boko Haram and other al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated fighters in their midst, raises questions about their ability to successfully defend Turkish interests, let alone enhance security in the region. Another question lingers about whether friction will develop between Turkey and Russia in West Africa through their deployment of fighters to protect their respective interests in similar areas.

Sources:

“Le Niger, nouvel Eldorado des mercenaires proturcs de Syrie (Niger, the new Eldorado of pro-Turkish mercenaries from Syria),” www.lorientlejour.com (Lebanon-based French-language publication covering Francophone international affairs, including coverage of Islamist militancy) 3 May 2024. https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1413977/le-niger-nouvel-eldorado-des-mercenaires-proturcs-de-syrie-enquete.html

A thousand Syrian fighters from areas under Turkish control have left for Niger for a year to protect Turkish interests and projects. In the areas of northern Syria controlled by Turkey, where recruitment into pro-Ankara factions is the main driver, according to Omar, his monthly salary never exceeded $46. “Here in Niger, we are paid $1,500,” added the young man, who supports his mother and brothers and sisters.

At the group’s headquarters, they signed six-month contracts with a private Turkish military consulting company that protects Turkish interests, including mines, in Niger.

The military regime of Niger, as a result of a coup d’état perpetrated on July 26, 2023, has reoriented its foreign policy and denounced military cooperation agreements with France and the United States, while Russia is advancing its interests in this country. For its part, Turkey has increased its influence in Niger over the past decade through humanitarian aid, development and trade. The defense component of the relationship between Niger and Turkey has become more prominent with the signing of a military cooperation agreement in 2020 and the sale of armed drones.

Notes:

[i] For an analysis of Russia’s Africa Corps, please see: (last Zenn OE Watch)

[ii] The Sultan Murad brigade in Syria was comprised primarily of ethnic Turkmen from Syria and specialized in fighting Islamic State (IS) forces, as opposed to forces loyal to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. The brigade was part of the Jaysh al-Fateh (“Army of Victory”) coalition, which was backed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey and reached its peak in 2015 before suffering from internal factional disputes. See: Fabrice Balanche, “The Battle of Aleppo Is the Center of the Syrian Chessboard,” WINEP, 5 February 2016.

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/battle-aleppo-center-syrian-chessboard

[iii] See, for example, Jacob Zenn, “Russia’s Africa Corps Appears to Be Recruiting African Militants,” Terrorism Monitor, July 9, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/brief-russias-africa-corps-appears-to-be-recruiting-african-militants/

OE Insight Summary:

TUR is deploying militants from SYR to NER to protect econ interests. While their desire for money presents challenges of commitment and resembles RUS Wagner mercenaries in WA, the SYR militants operate more like private security contractors and have a lesser counter-insurgency role.


Image Information:

Image: Turkey and Niger have increased their military cooperation since 2020, including through using Libya as a gateway.
Source: Saotura, https://commons.wikim edia.org/wiki/File:Niger_Turkey_Locator.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Sudanese Armed Forces Employ Iranian Drones in Civil Conflict

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Iranian drones have assisted Sudan SAF to gain a military advantage over the rival RSF paramilitary faction.

“Cooperation between the two countries [Sudan and Iran] increased in various fields since their recent resumption of diplomatic relations.”

Summary: The Sudanese Armed Forces received Iranian drones to gain a military advantage in urban warfare over the rival Rapid Support Forces paramilitary faction. This development deepens Sudan-Iran relations and boosts Iran’s hope for greater access to the Red Sea.

On 25 May, the Sudan News Agency published the excerpted Arabic-language article on the meeting in Tehran between Sudan’s foreign minister, Hussein Awad Ali, and Iran’s foreign minister, Ali Bagheri. The article discussed the deepening relations between the two countries amid a backdrop of Iranian attempts to expand its influence in the Red Sea[i] and to sell drones to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The SAF is combatting the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary faction for control of Sudan in a civil war.[ii] According to the article, the two foreign ministers pledged they would cooperate at the highest levels since resuming diplomatic relations in October 2023.[iii]

Drones will be the most important aspects of the two countries’ cooperation. In particular, the Iranian Ababil-3 flies low to evade radar detection and is ideal for urban combat missions.[iv] The RSF is trained in and accustomed to non-conventional warfare, including urban combat, where it initially gained an advantage over the SAF. However, the SAF’s superior weaponry, such as Iranian drones, is now neutralizing the initial RSF advantage. Although the RSF’s advances exceeded those of the SAF in the first half-year after the conflict broke out in April 2023, the Battle of Omdurman in February 2024 became a turning point when the SAF captured the city and continued advancing afterwards.[v] If Iranian drones support the SAF to retake control of more Sudanese territory, especially around the capital Khartoun, the SAF will become closer, or at least more ingratiated, to Iran. This will facilitate Iranian efforts to gain access to the Sudanese Red Sea coast. This will, in turn, strengthen Iran’s geopolitical position in the region, with its Houthi proxies in Yemen on the eastern side of the RedSea and the SAF in Sudan on the western side.

Sources:

“وزير الخارجية المكلف يلتقي القائم بأعمال وزير الخارجية الإيراني(Interim Foreign Minister Meets with Acting Iranian Foreign Minister),” suna-sd.net (Arabic-language public Sudanese news agency, which commits to independent and balanced reporting), 8 May 2024. Image:https://suna-sd.net/posts/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%83%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A

Acting Foreign Minister Ambassador Hussein Awad Ali met today in Tehran with Acting Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri, where he gave him condolences from the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, the Sudanese government, and the Sudanese people on the death of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi and Minister Foreign Ministry Hussein Amir Abdullahian and their colleagues in a helicopter crash.   

Cooperation between the two countries increased in various domains since their recent resumption of diplomatic relations and their reopening the two embassies again. They agreed to expedite the opening of the two countries’ embassies under the leadership of their respective ambassadors and to contribute to advancing relations between the two countries at a rapid pace to the highest level.

Notes:

[i] See, for example: Mohammed Yassin, “Reports about Iran’s Bid for Naval Base in Sudan Sparks Controversy,” Asharq al-Awsat, 4 March 2024. https://english.aawsat.com/world/4891051-reports-about-iran%E2%80%99s-bid-naval-base-sudan-sparks-controversy

[ii] The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are led by General Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan and are engaged in military conflict with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary faction, which is led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”). In April 2023, al-Burhan called the RSF a “rebel” movement and formally dissolved it, which led to civil war. In early 2024, the RSF still had the upper hand in the fighting, but now the SAF appears to have the military advantage. See: Andrew McGregor, “Gold, Arms, and Islam: Understanding the Conflict in Sudan,” Terrorism Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 9, April 2023. https://jamestown.org/program/gold-arms-and-islam-understanding-the-conflict-in-sudan/

[iii] Sudan severed relations with Iran in 2016 in opposition to Iranian sectarianism and under the geopolitical

influence of Saudi Arabia. However, in an effort to balance against the West, Sudan sought closer relations with Iran. Sudan and Iran’s restoration of relations only two weeks after Hamas’ massacre in Israel on October 7, 2023, and despite a previous thaw in Sudanese-Israeli relations, has only put the SAF’s relations with the West further under strain. See: Mohamed Yassin, “What is Sudan’s Purpose of Diplomatic Approach with Iran?,” Asharq al-Awsat, 22 January 2024. https://english.aawsat.com/features/4805441-what-sudans-purposediplomatic-approach-iran

[iv] See: “Sudan’s small but deadly drone fleet could turn the tide of war,” Military Africa, 22 April 2023. https://www.military.africa/2023/04/sudans-small-but-deadly-drone-fleet-could-turn-the-tide-of-war/

[v] See: Ashraf Abdelaziz, “Sudan war: ‘Iranian drones played decisive role in Omdurman battle.’” Dabanga Sudan, 17 March 2024. https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-war-iranian-drones-played-decisive-role-in-omdurman-battle.

OE Insight Summary:

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in SDN received IRN drones to gain a military advantage over rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF).  This shipment deepens SDN-IRN relations and boosts IRN hopes for Red Sea access.


Image Information:

Image: Iranian drones have assisted Sudan SAF to gain a military advantage over the rival RSF paramilitary faction
Source: Tasnim News Agency, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Iranian_drone_exercise_in_2022_-_Day_2_(52).jpg
Attribution: CC x 4.0

Burkina Faso Reels From Continued Terrorist Attacks

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Burkinabe soldiers respond to an ambush during training at Exercise Flintlock near Po, Burkina Faso.

“Burkina Faso – like its neighbors Mali and Niger – have been hit for almost ten years by attacks by jihadist groups which have left more than 20,000 dead and two million displaced.”

Summary: Despite the Burkinabe government spending nearly 30% of the state budget on military equipment, the Al-Qaeda-affiliated group Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin has continued to conduct deadly and coordinated attacks against targets throughout the country.

Even with exceptional monetary investment in military equipment by Burkina Faso, the al-Qaeda affiliated jihadist group Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) continues to conduct deadly and coordinated attacks against government targets. According to the first excerpted article from French language news agency specializing in African economics, Agence Ecofin, a speech by the Minister of the Economy, Aboubakar Nacanabo, revealed Burkina Faso had spent more than $1 billion to acquire military equipment in the fight against terrorism.[i] While this amount might not be notable for many nations, these purchases totaled 30% of the entire state budget in 2023 and contributed to the government’s 6.7% budget deficit. To help with funding, Burkina Faso implemented a voluntary Patriotic Support Fund and, later, compulsory taxes on telecommunications systems and land to assist with funding defense purchases. Minister Nacanabo indicated that the government planned a similar financial allocation for defense equipment purchases in 2024, totaling 29.49% of the state budget.

Despite its considerable spending, Burkina Faso continues to struggle with organized and frequent terrorist attacks by armed jihadist groups such as JNIM. JNIM, originally based in Mali, has spread through many parts of Africa, including Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, Togo, and Cote d’Ivoire.[ii] According to the second excerpted article from French-language public service news channel TV5 Monde, JNIM conducted a deadly attack on 11 June 2024, at the military installation in Mansila, near the border with Niger. The attack targeted homes and businesses in the town as well as the local military detachment. The government is yet to release an official report on the number of killed or wounded. The 11 June attack is just one in a long history of terrorist attacks affecting the country, with the article noting that over 20,000 have been killed by jihadist groups and over 2,000,000 have been displaced in Burkina Faso alone.

Nearly one third of the Burkinabe state budget is being spent on defense equipment purchases, and the ongoing armed conflict throughout the country raises questions about the efficacy of these purchases. Much of the military equipment purchased by the new regime is likely originating from Russia, as Burkina Faso and other Sahelian countries have moved away from Western aid.[iii] Though the country’s deteriorating security situation is currently a regional issue, Burkina Faso’s counterterrorism strategy and effective combat operations against groups like JNIM have broader U.S. policy implications. Transnational terrorist organizations have had a resurgence in conducting international attacks, which brings to the forefront the importance of stopping the spread of JNIM and the Islamic State from expanding to other neighboring African nations.

Sources:

“Burkina Faso: 1 milliard $ investis dans du matériel militaire en 2023 (Burkina Faso: $1 billion invested in military equipment in 2023),” Agence Ecofin (French language Geneve-based news agency), 7 June 2024. https://www.agenceecofin.com/economie/0706-119330-lien-burkina-faso-1-milliard-investis-dans-des-materiels-militaires-en-2023

Burkina Faso has been facing a security and humanitarian crisis for many years due to terrorist attacks, putting strong pressure on public finances. In 2023, the country’s budget deficit reached 6.7% due to security-related spending. Burkina Faso spent around $1 billion (more than 600 billion CFA francs), or 30% of the state budget, for the acquisition of military equipment in 2023. This information was revealed by Aboubakar Nacanabo (photo), minister of the Economy, during the program “Tribune of Accountability” broadcast on Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina.

According to the minister, this investment aims to strengthen the operational capabilities of the national armed forces in the fight against terrorism. Burkina Faso has, in fact, been facing a security and humanitarian crisis due to terrorist attacks for many years, putting strong pressure on public finances. In 2023, the country’s budget deficit reached 6.7% due to security-related spending, according to the government. However, Minister Nacanabo reassured the public by affirming that after these acquisitions, the government will gradually increase spending in other sectors. A move that could underline the administration’s commitment to ensuring balanced national development, despite pressing security challenges.

Note that Captain Ibrahim Traoré, president of the transition, has placed the fight against terrorism and the reconquest of the territory at the heart of his priorities; what is considered “essential” before the organization of national elections. As a result, several reforms have been put in place to respond more effectively to the crisis, notably the creation of the Patriotic Support Fund (FSP) in January 2023. Initially funded by voluntary contributions, the government introduced compulsory contributions on certain products and services to support the Fund. For the 2024 budget year, the Burkinabe government plans to allocate 29.49% of its budget to security-related expenses.

“Burkina Faso: quel bilan dans l’attaque djihadiste meurtrière à Mansila (Burkina Faso: what results in the deadly jihadist attack in Mansila),” TV5 Monde (Multi-nationally funded French language news outlet), 15 June 2024.  https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/burkina-faso-quel-bilan-dans-lattaque-djihadiste-meurtriere-mansila-2726176

The town of Mansila located in the northeast of Burkina Faso near Niger, was the target of a deadly jihadist attack on June 11, according to local and security sources. The authorities have not communicated on the attack claimed by the GSIM, affiliated with Al Qaeda.

A deadly jihadist attack, the exact toll of which is unknown, targeted the town of Mansila on Tuesday, in the north-east of Burkina Faso, near Niger, we learned on Sunday from local and security sources. On June 11, “ill-intentioned individuals stormed the detachment (military, editor’s note), our homes, our businesses and all other representations of the country”, indicates the association of pupils and students of Mansila, in a published press release on Facebook.

“At present, while we have not finished mourning our dead, many of our fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters are missing,” continues this association, which calls on the authorities to “restore peace.”  A security source confirmed the attack to AFP. “It is difficult to give a precise assessment, but there were losses in Mansila. Many elements are missing,” said this source.

The military detachments deployed in the various localities of Burkina generally comprise around 150 elements. No official report has been released, and the authorities have not communicated about this attack, which was claimed by the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Friday, the head of the military regime in power in Burkina Faso appeared on national television news, donating blood in the capital Ouagadougou, after two days of uncertainty following the fall of a shell in the courtyard of public television located near the presidency.

On Sunday, the presidency of Faso posted a message wishing a happy Eid to the country’s Muslims, accompanied by a photo of Captain Traoré praying. Burkina Faso – like its neighbors Mali and Niger – has been hit for almost ten years by attacks by jihadist groups which have left more than 20,000 dead and two million displaced. The authorities regularly claim to obtain victories over the jihadists, but the attacks continue, and part of the territory remains beyond the control of the army

Notes:

[i] Aboubakar Nacanabo’s speech took place in June 2024 during the “Tribune de la redevabilité (Tribune of Accountability)” broadcast on Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina.

[ii] The Office of the Director of National Intelligence published a foreign terrorist profile on JNIM, located here: “Jama’at Nursrat Al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM),” Office of the Director of National Intelligence Counter Terrorism Guide, Updated October 2022. https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/jnim_fto.html

[iii] The M-DIME Research Project details Russia’s total Military DIME influence in Burkina Faso, including arms transfers. Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Amelia Cheatham, “Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Burkina Faso,” Foreign Military Studies Office, January 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/burkina-faso-russia-m-dime-report/

OE Insight Summary:

Despite the Burkinabe government spending nearly 30% of the state budget on military equipment, JNIM has continued to conduct deadly and coordinated attacks against targets throughout the country.

Image Information:

Image: Burkinabe soldiers respond to an ambush during training at Exercise Flintlock near Po, Burkina Faso.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Burkinabe_soldiers_respond_to_an_ambush_during_training_at_Exercise_Flintlock_2019_near_Po,_Burkina_Faso,_Feb._26,_2019.jpg Attribution: Public Domain

Pakistan Under Pressure To Protect China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Projects

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China Pakistan Economic Corridor.

“Pakistan’s economy is in the throes of a deep crisis, and a massive military operation would entail its own costs.”

Summary: After several terrorist attacks against China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects in 2024, China is pressuring Pakistan to launch counterterrorism operations to protect Chinese interests. However, such operations would incur significant costs to Pakistan at a time when its economy is struggling.

Pakistan has been under pressure for years from its partners to do more to counter violent extremist groups operating within its territory. On 26 March 2024, a suicide bomber struck a bus in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan, killing five Chinese nationals and the vehicle’s driver. It marked the third attack on Chinese interests in Pakistan that month, though no group claimed responsibility for the bombing.[i] The Chinese nationals were engineers working on the Dasu Dam, a hydroelectric dam under construction by a joint Pakistan-China venture set to begin operation in 2025. The accompanying excerpted articles report on the fallout of the attack and how China could push Pakistan to do more to deal with violent extremist groups in its territory.

The first excerpted article from Pakistan’s English-language newspaper Dawn reports that Pakistani officials recently completed an investigation into the 26 March attack. However, it may not be enough to satisfy China that Pakistan can deal with the threat from extremist groups. The author points out that an operation against those responsible for the 26 March attack that killed the Chinese engineers is not feasible, as Pakistan believes the group responsible for the attack is based in Afghanistan and any operation would be costly and likely lead to broader conflict in the region.[ii]

The second excerpted article from Dawn reports on an official visit by Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to China in early June. Sharif, accompanied by Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Asim Munir, met with President Xi Jinping, who stated China supports Pakistan but noted security issues. While the article does not mention China specifically requesting Pakistan carry out a counterterrorism operation in light of the recent attacks, it does mention that President Xi Jinping asked Sharif to step up efforts to ensure the security of Chinese projects in Pakistan. This is in addition to Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Sharif holding a meeting, and both pledging to protect the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor “from its detractors and adversaries.” For the time being, China is not openly pressuring Pakistan to launch an operation against extremist groups. However, the attacks earlier this year and the June meeting show that Pakistan remains under considerable pressure to deal with extremist groups for the sake of its relations with China and its economy.

Sources:

Muhammad Amir Rana, “Chinese advice,” Dawn (independent English-language newspaper in Pakistan), 2 June 2024. https://www.dawn.com/news/1837210

Pakistan’s law-enforcement agencies have completed the investigation of the Dasu terrorist attack carried out against Chinese nationals in March, in record time. This is, indeed, a remarkable achievement, but it does not seem to have impressed the Chinese authorities very much, as there have been reports that Beijing wants a large-scale anti-terrorism operation, like Zarb-i-Azb, against the militants.

On March 26, a convoy of Chinese nationals travelling from Islamabad to the Dasu Hydropower Project site in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Kohistan district was attacked by Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorists…A joint investigation team comprising police and intelligence agencies’ personnel was immediately formed to address Chinese concerns regarding the capability of Pakistani law enforcers to probe a high-profile terrorist attack.

The reports of China’s demand for a massive counterterrorism operation are reflective of Beijing’s concerns over the escalating threats to Chinese nationals working on CPEC-related and other projects in this country. Pakistan has a history of launching such counterterrorism operations at the request of China. The Lal Masjid operation in Islamabad in 2007 was launched after Chinese President Hu Jintao called Gen Musharraf…

International pressure, including from the Chinese, also worked in 2014 when the Pakistan military launched Operation Zarb-i-Azb in North Waziristan…China’s latest demand regarding a large-scale operation does not seem feasible, as the TTP and its affiliates are hiding in Afghanistan, and cross-border operations would trigger a major conflict in the region…

Pakistan’s economy is in the throes of a deep crisis, and a massive military operation would entail its own costs…

Syed Irfan Raza, “Beijing vows to uphold Pakistani sovereignty,” Dawn (independent English-language newspaper in Pakistan), 8 June 2024. https://www.dawn.com/news/1838561

Acknowledging the all-weather strategic partnership between Pakistan and China, President Xi Jinping on Friday renewed his resolve to safeguard Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity besides extending financial support through investment in different sectors.

“China will, as always, firmly support Pakistan and safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” President Xi told Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif…

Besides federal ministers and senior officials, Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir is also a part of the delegation. This was the first meeting of PM Shehbaz with President Xi since assuming office…At the meeting, President Xi told the premier that the two neighbours should focus on “promoting the joint construction of CPEC”, and asked PM Shehbaz to step up efforts to ensure the security of Chinese projects in Pakistan.

…Earlier, PM Shehbaz met Chinese Premier Li Qiang in Beijing, where they resolved to protect CPEC “from its detractors and adversaries”, the Foreign Office said.

Notes:

[i] Earlier in March, insurgents in the Balochistan, Province, Pakistan attacked a Pakistani naval facility that helps provide security for the Gwadar Port, an important component of Chinese economic activity in Pakistan, in addition to an attack on the Gwadar Port Authority Complex, see: Avinash Mohananey, “Attacks on Chinese infrastructure in Pakistan disrupt CPEC, raise security concerns,” Economic Times, 28 March 2024. https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/attacks-on-chinese-infrastructure-in-pakistan-disrupt-cpec-raise-security-concerns/articleshow/108829369.cms

[ii] One estimate from an analyst with Pakistan’s National Defense University put the cost of Operation Zarb-i-Azb alone at nearly $2 billion, with the government of Pakistan also spending an unknown amount on the creation of additional security forces in the wake of the operation to help protect projects in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), see: Bhaswar Kumar, “Pakistan Army can’t afford China’s expensive security demand. What is it?,” Business Standard, 3 June 2024.

https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence-security/news/china-s-latest-demand-is-a-bitter-pill-to-swallow-for-pakistan-here-s-why-124060200665_1.html

OE Insight Summary:

After several terrorist attacks against CPEC projects in 2024, PAK is under pressure by CHN to launch a counterterrorism operation to protect CHN interests, while any operation will incur significant costs at a time when PKN economy is struggling

Image Information:

Image: China Pakistan Economic Corridor
Source:   
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Criminal Organizations Mar Mexican Elections

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Claudia Sheinbaum, former Mexico City mayor, won a resounding victory in the elections and will be the next president of Mexico.

“Without a doubt, this is a weakening of democracy because citizens are afraid to go out to vote, or they do not see the point in going out to vote, if it seems that crime is dominating, who defines who can be a candidate, who does campaign.”

Summary: Recently completed elections in Mexico, the largest in the country’s history, were also the most violent in its history. Election-related violence portends greater control of criminal organizations over politics.

Mexico’s 2 June elections were highly anticipated, and the results closely watched. It was the largest election in Mexico’s history, with more than 20,000 seats contested at local, state, and federal levels.[i] While coverage of the election tended to focus on breaking the glass ceiling—both major candidates were women, a first in a country known for “machismo”—the elections were also marred by intense violence, assassinations, and kidnappings.[ii]

The business-focused Mexican daily El Economista, reported that as the campaign closed, more than 30 candidates for public office, and approximately 50 people close to candidates or working for candidates, had been assassinated during the campaign season—the most violent campaign season on record. There were also countless attacks, threats, and intimidation against family members and friends of candidates, and hundreds more were murdered at campaign events, the outlet states. Further, the newspaper relays that most of the victims were candidates for local office, where organized crime groups seek to control public officials. 272 separate attacks were recorded during the campaign season, many of them in central and southern Mexican states afflicted by violence and contestation between criminal groups. Spanish international news agency EFE, says that election violence dampens democratic enthusiasm and participation. The outlet cites a datapoint of note: each assassination can reduce participation rates by up to 3 percent in a locality. EFE also reports that at least 168 polling stations around the country did not operate due to violence and security concerns.

Election-related violence also indicates the changing model of territorial control most criminal organizations seek to implement. Criminal organizations have taken to assassinating political opponents and candidates they deem as too independent.[iii] And, rather than corrupting sitting politicians, criminal groups seek to install their candidates in the most important local offices. Mexico’s election-related violence demonstrates the country’s slide into greater insecurity has grave consequences for the operational environment.

Sources:

“Los mexicanos salen a votar en las elecciones más grandes de la historia y también las más violentas (Mexicans go out to vote in the largest elections in history and also the most violent),” El Economista (a Mexican daily mostly focused on business and finance), 2 June 2024. https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/Los-mexicanos-salen-a-votar-en-las-Elecciones-mas-grandes-de-la-historia-y-tambien-las-mas-violentas-20240602-0003.html

Since the political campaigns began, 30 candidates for public office and nearly 50 leaders or sympathizers related to the electoral process have been murdered…The elections, in which just over 20,000 public positions will be elected…are being held under the shadow of violence that has left a record of murdered candidates, fueling concerns about democracy in the country…The fatalities are mostly aspirants, pre-candidates, or candidates for municipal positions.

“Las elecciones más grandes de México también pasarán a la historia como las más violentas (Mexico’s biggest elections will also go down in history as the most violent),” EFE (a Spanish international news agency with regional coverage), 2 June 2024. https://efe.com/mundo/2024-06-02/las-elecciones-mas-grandes-de-mexico-tambien-pasaran-a-la-historia-como-las-mas-violentas/ The largest election in Mexico will also go down in history this Sunday as the most violent…Integralia, a political consultancy, reported 150.5% more attacks in this electoral process, which officially began in September, compared to the last midterm elections in 2021, which includes murders, armed attacks, threats, kidnappings and disappearances…When analyzing previous elections, Data Cívica found that for each attack on a candidate, participation in the locality in question drops 1.3%, and if the victim is a serving politician, such as the mayor, the drop is 3%…‘Without a doubt, this is a weakening of democracy because citizens are afraid to go out to vote, or they do not see the point in going out to vote, if it seems that crime is dominating, who defines who can be a candidate, who does campaign.’

Notes:

[i] For more information on the election at a granular level, see: “Mexico Elects: Ongoing Coverage of the 2024 Race,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas. https://www.as-coa.org/articles/mexico-elects-ongoing-coverage-2024-vote

[ii] For more information on the election results and the dominant performance of the ruling Morena Party, see: Ryan C. Berg and Rubi Bledsoe, “Claudia Sheinbaum: the Most Powerful Woman in the World?,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 7 June 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/claudia-sheinbaum-most-powerful-woman-world

[iii] To listen to more analysis on the cartels’ changing operational methods and its relationship to election violence, see: Ryan C. Berg, “The Long Shadow of Violence in Mexico’s Elections,” 35West Podcast, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 13 June 2024. https://www.csis.org/podcasts/35-west/long-shadow-violence-mexicos-elections

OE Insight:

Recently completed elections in MEX, the largest in the country’s history, were also the most violent in its history. Election-related violence portends greater control of criminal organizations over politics. 

Image Information:

Image: Claudia Sheinbaum, former Mexico City mayor, won a resounding victory in the elections and will be the next president of Mexico.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/eneas/53678721694/.     
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Iran Spaceport To Open in 2025

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The Iranian spaceport in Chabahar.

“The largest spaceport in West Asia is being built in Chabahar.”

Summary: Iran has announced that its third satellite launch facility and its second “spaceport” will become operational in Chabahar by February 2025.

The Iranian space industry is both a source of pride and a strategic asset. It is used to launch vehicles to carry satellites into space and has dual-use technology benifits that could also further Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile ambitions.[i] As per the excerpted article below, from BultanNews.com, a conservative Iranian website, Isa Zarepour, Iran’s Minister of Communications, recently announced that its new spaceport is more than half complete and will be ready to launch satellites by February 2025. This announcement reflects both an expansion of Iran’s space program, and potentially its missile program, and the growing strategic importance to the southern strategic port city of Chabahar.[ii]

Iranian authorities take great pride in satellite launches, even though they fail almost as frequently as they succeed.[iii] In 2008, Iran inaugurated its first spaceport, the Imam Khomeini Spaceport, in the northern city of Semnan, upgrading it significantly in 2017.[iv] Iran also launches satellites from the Shahroud Test Center in Dasht-e Kavir. The Ebrahim Raisi government-initiated work on the new spaceport alongside other efforts to develop the Indian Ocean port of Chabahar. The Chabahar spaceport augments Iran’s satellite launching capabilities but does not replace the spaceport in Semnan. Reports about Chabahar excerpted here and reported in conservative websites do not mention Semnan, but Iran’s original spaceport appears to remain operational. The number of satellites that Iran launches annually – six so far in 2024 – do not appear to justify the expense of a third facility, suggesting two other possibilities. First, Iran might seek to utilize its satellite launch industry to support other countries seeking to put satellites into space but suspicious or resistant to work through Western countries, Russia, or China. Second, Iran’s growing military investment in Chabahar facility might suggest the launch facility will contribute to the region’s growing military footprint.

Sources:

“زارع‌پور: پایگاه فضایی چابهار ۵۶ درصد پیشرفت داشته است”(Zarepour: Chabahar Space Base is 56 percent Complete),” BultanNews.com (an Iranian conservative website), 7 June 2024. https://www.bultannews.com/fa/news/847281

Yesterday [6 June 2024], during a video conference with Acting President Mohammad Mokhber and several ministers inaugurated three major projects in the fields of oil and gas industry, hydroelectricity, and communications in Sistan and Baluchestan province.

The communications project connected the 1,261st village with a population greater than 20 households, a 20 trillion rial [US$475 million] communication network. In the ceremony, Isa Zarepour, the minister of Communications and Information Technology, said, “The largest spaceport in West Asia is being built in Chabahar, and with the round-the-clock efforts of my colleagues, its first phase will be completed by the ‘decade of dawn’ [the anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini’s return to Iran on 1-11 February 1979].”Stating that 56 percent of the first phase of the project has been completed, Zarepour said, “The first launch from the Chabahar space port will take place this year.”

Notes:

[i] For discussion of the dual use nature of Iran’s satellite launch capability, see: Michael Rubin, “Zuljaneh: Iran’s New Solid-Fuel Rocket,” OE Watch, March 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/368233/download

[ii] For previous discussions of Chabahar, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Announces Maritime Development Plan,” OE Watch, 01 2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/irans-supreme-leader-announces-maritime-development-strategy/ and Michael Rubin, “Iran: Construction Begins on the Chabahar-Zahedan Railway,” OE Watch, December 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular- format/379863

[iii] For discussion of Iranian satellite launches, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran to Launch New Satellite by Year’s End,” OE Watch, August 2018, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/241432/download and Michael Rubin, “Iran: Preparing for Zafar III Satellite Launch,” OE Watch, July 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/284140/download

[iv] For discussion of the Semnan space port, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Launch Officially Opens Space Port,” OE Watch, September 2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/205061/download

OE Insight Summary:

IRN has announced that its third satellite launch facility and its second “spaceport” will become operational in Chabahar by February 2025.

Image Information:

Image: The Iranian spaceport in Chabahar
Source: https://newsmedia.tasnimnews.com/Tasnim/Uploaded/Image/1402/07/10/14020710092925717284705610.jpg
Attribution: Tasnimnews.com

Bahrain May Renew Ties With Iran Following Saudi Arabia’s Lead

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“President’s deputy chief of staff of political affairs Mohammad Jamshidi,” ISNA, 7 June 2024.

“Bahrain directly sent this message that it wants to resume relations with Iran.”

Summary: Iran claims that Bahrain wants to restore ties with Tehran, following Saudi Arabia’s lead.

According to a state media interview with Mohammad Jamshidi, the Iranian president’s deputy chief of staff of political affairs, Bahrain “wants to resume relations with Iran.” The interview, reported by the Iranian Students’ News Agency on 7 June noted in May, Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who said Manama welcomed the recommencement of ties between the Persian Gulf neighbors.[i] A similar message was reportedly delivered during Al Khalifa’s visit to China during the same month.[ii]

If true, the resumption of Iran-Bahrain ties would end nearly a decade of separation. In 2016, Bahrain followed Saudi Arabia in ending ties with Iran after a mob stormed the Saudi missions in Tehran and Mashhad in response to the execution of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr. An example of the warming ties occurred when President Ebrahim Raisi, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, and their cohort died in a helicopter crash on 19 May, and Bahrain’s King Hamad gave his condolences to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.[iii] The Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani also attended the state funeral.[iv]

For their parts, in March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia recommenced ties through a China-brokered deal which allowed the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait to follow suit (both had downgraded ties due to the storming incident). Bahrain appears to be the next in line, which is noteworthy not only because it is home to the United States Fifth Fleet, but also because it normalized relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords in 2020.[v]

Bahrain tends to follow Saudi Arabia’s thinking. With the ongoing Gaza war bringing strong criticism from the Arab streets of the region’s monarchies—Jordan, Bahrain, and the UAE—the revival of ties has the potential to keep the Persian Gulf calm (in the event of a regional escalation between Israel and Iran), and arguably balance out some of the angry sentiment towards Arab monarchies for their relations with Israel.

Sources:

“تمایل بحرین برای برقراری روابط سیاسی با ایران (Bahrain government’s desire to establish political relations with Iran),” Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA- semi-official news agency), 7 June 2024. http://www.isna.ir/xdRgjG

The president’s deputy chief of staff gave news of Bahrain’s desire to establish political relations with Iran. According to ISNA, Mohammad Jamshidi stated in part of a television interview: “Bahrain directly sent this message that it wants to resume relations with Iran, however, this request was made during a meeting with Russian officials.”

Notes:

[i] “King of Bahrain Says No Reason to Delay Normalizing Ties with Iran,” Asharq al-Awsat, 24 May 2024. https://english.aawsat.com/gulf/5023861-king-bahrain-says-no-reason-delay-normalizing-ties-iran

[ii] “Bahrain sent message through Russia to normalize ties with Iran: Official,” Al Jazeera, 7 June 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/7/bahrain-sent-message-through-russia-to-normalise-ties-with-iran-official

[iii] “President Sheikh Mohamed and other world leaders send condolences on death of Iran’s Raisi,” The National, 22 May 2024. https://thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2024/05/20/iran-president-raisi-condolences

[iv] “Assigned by HM King, Foreign Minister condoles with Iranian officials,” Bahrain Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 May 2024. https://www.mofa.gov.bh/en/assigned-by-hm-king-foreign-minister-condoles-with-iranian-officials

[v] “The Abraham Accords,” US Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/

OE Insight Summary:

IRN claims that BHR wants to recommence ties IRN, following the lead of SAU.

Image Information:

Image: “President’s deputy chief of staff of political affairs Mohammad Jamshidi,” ISNA, 7 June 2024.
Source: http://www.isna.ir/xdRgjG
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Iran Asserts the Strength of Its Air Defense Capabilities

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“Brigadier General [Alireza] Sabahifard visiting the radar and missile positions in Tabriz,” IRIB (state media broadcaster), 11 June 2024.

“[Iran’s air defenses] have the capability to react promptly and momentously against any potential threats.”

Summary: Following Israel’s attack, Iranian Army Air Defense Force Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahifard visited the northwest region to assess its air defense capabilities and has asserted that they remain very strong.

Following Israel’s recent attacks, Iranian authorities are seeking to reassert the capabilities of their air defense systems by making visits to various air defense zones in the country. On 19 April, Israel carried out a retaliatory strike in western Esfahan (Iran), which took out one of four Russian-made S-300 air defense radars.[i] The Israeli attack was in response to Tehran and its proxies launching more than 300 drones, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles, in response to the Israeli strike on the Iranian embassy compound in Syria in mid-April.[ii]

As per the first excerpted article from the state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), during a visit to Iran’s northwest, Iranian Army Air Defense Force Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahifard underscored the capabilities of Iran’s air defenses claiming it “has the capability to react promptly and momentously against any potential threats.” Sabahifard emphasized that “The Army’s air defense force has achieved significant and valuable accomplishments, especially in the areas of producing various types of drones and radars.” According to the second excerpted article by IRIB, Sabahifard said, “Radars, missiles, electronic warfare, and drone systems will be unveiled in the near future and integrated into the country’s air defense cycle.” These comments about the strength of the air defense systems are in line with other Iranian officials’ efforts to downplay the Israeli retaliation in Esfahan. They have claimed that the attacks were merely carried out by quadcopters or, as they described, “toy” drones. But as evident by Sabahifard’s comments, Tehran is trying to sell the notion that is air defense systems can withstand any threat. In the wake of the tit-for-tat with Israel, the Iranian military is reassessing its air defense capabilities and better preparing itself for the possibility of another attack.

Sources:

“پیشرفت‌های پدافند هوایی ایران شتابنده و جهشی است (Iran’s air defense system has developed exponentially),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 9 June 2024.

https://www.iribnews.ir/00HqxS

According to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Brigadier General [Alireza] Sabahifard stated on Sunday during a visit to the air defense northwest region of the country: “The army’s air defense force has achieved significant and valuable accomplishments, especially in the areas of producing various types of drones and radars. These achievements are very important and precious stones that are a source of pride for friends and a cause of concern for enemies”

The commander of the army’s air defense force emphasized that air defense is at the forefront of the country’s defense, stating: “This divine force with its various defense systems has the capability to react promptly and momentously against any potential threats…”

The commander of the army’s air defense force pointed out that though air defense is successful and anonymous has been established within the armed forces, he added: “Air defense is a manifestation of the power of Islamic Iran, which under the shadow of self-belief and self-confidence for Iran was able to reach important developments for Iran and Iranians to be proud of today…”

“رونمایی از انواع سامانه‌های راداری، موشکی، جنگالی و پهپادی در آینده نزدیک (Unveiling of various radar, missile, forestry and drone systems in the near future),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 11 June 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00HrNy

According to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Brigadier General [Alireza] Sabahifard during his continued visit of the region’s air defense in the northwest of the country, evaluated the combat capability and operational readiness of the radar and missile positions of the “Shahid Nikandish” Tabriz group.

The commander of the Army’s Air Defense Force, referring to the effective role of air defense in improving the combat power of the armed forces, added: “Radars, missiles, electronic warfare, and drone systems will be unveiled in the near future and integrated into the country’s air defense cycle.”

Notes:

[i] Jon Gambrell, “Satellite photos suggest Iran air defense radar struck in Isfahan during apparent Israeli attack,” Associated Press, 22 April 2024. https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-s300-radar-hit-isfahan-attack-ce6719d3df8ebf5af08b035427ee215c

[ii] “Iran says Israel bombs its embassy in Syria, kills commanders,” Reuters, 1 April 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-bombs-iran-embassy-syria-iranian-commanders-among-dead-2024-04-01/; Matthew Mpoke Bigg, “What We Know About Iran’s Attack on Israel and What Happens Next,” New York Times, 14 April 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/14/world/middleeast/iran-israel-drones-attack.html

OE Insight Summary:

Following ISR’s attack, IRN Army Air Defense Force Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahifard visited the northwest region to assess its air defense capabilities.

Image Information:

Image: “Brigadier General [Alireza] Sabahifard visiting the radar and missile positions in Tabriz,” IRIB (state media broadcaster), 11 June 2024.
Source: https://www.iribnews.ir/00HrNy
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Kazakhstan Imposes New Language Requirements for Citizens

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Statue of man and camels from Türkistan, Kazakistan.

“Knowledge of the language is necessary,” Interior Ministry spokesman Shyngys Alekeshev told reporters, adding that the new amendments were similar to those in countries like Germany, Canada and Turkey.”

Summary: Kazakhstan imposes stricter language requirements for naturalized citizens to reduce the role of Russia in Kazakhstani society.

Kazakhstan has made it stricter for noncitizens to become naturalized citizens by requiring applicants to pass a series of history and language tests. According to the excerpted article from state-run news outlet Kazinform, “ignorance of the state language… as well as the basics of the history and Constitution… can become grounds for refusal to admit citizenship.” The move is part of a broader push by the government to promote and preserve the Kazakh language and possibly distance itself from Russian influence. The move comes amid remarks made by Russian commentators and academics who have called into question the legitimacy and sovereignty of Kazakhstan as a country. It may be interpreted as a move to reduce the role of the Russian language in schools, business, and other aspects of Kazakhstani life. In January, a Russian historian, Mikhail Smolin, claimed on Russia’s state-owned television that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan did not exist as nations.[i] The charge drew widespread condemnation in the region.

The new language rules, under the leadership of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, are just one manifestation of Kazakstan’s pivot away from Russia toward other regional powers like China. Part of the Soviet legacy, particularly along its northern border with Russia, large portions of Kazakhstan’s population do not speak Kazakh. There are proposals underway to regulate the country’s media to require that a majority (55 percent) of all content on radio and television be broadcast in Kazakh by 2025. The widely heard phrase “Qazaqsha soyle” (Speak Kazakh) is now commonly heard on the street and has even emerged as an internet meme.

Tokayev has defined his “multi-vector” foreign policy as one of pragmatism defined by “national interests and strategic tasks.”[ii] Russian soft power and influence is arguably on the wane in Kazakhstan, whose youthful population – half of its population is under the age of 30 – did not grow up under the Soviet Union and have absorbed the “de-colonization” discourse ascendant among other countries in the Global South.[iii]

Sources:

“Ignorance of the state language at the elementary level can prevent admission to citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan – Ministry of Internal Affairs,” (Незнание госязыка на элементарном уровне может помешать в приеме в гражданство РК- МВД),” Kazinform (Kazakhstani state news agency) 20 May, 2024. https://www.inform.kz/ru/neznanie-gosyazika-na-elementarnom-urovne-mozhet-pomeshat-v-prieme-v-grazhdanstvo-rk-mvd-0aabd6

“Ignorance of the state language at the elementary level, as well as the basics of the history and Constitution of our country can become grounds for refusal to admit citizenship. The elementary level will be determined by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. The purpose of the amendments is rapid adaptation and integration into society. Knowledge of the language is first of all necessary for the citizens themselves who want to obtain our citizenship in order to quickly join society and participate in the life of the state,” said Shyngys Alekeshev at a briefing in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

“To prevent dual citizenship, a new basis for registering the loss of citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan is being introduced. Citizenship of our country will be lost if the passports of another state are used after acquiring citizenship of Kazakhstan. Previously, it was planned to lose citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan only for the acquisition of citizenship of a foreign state,” added Shyngys Alekeshev.

Notes:

[i] “Russian historian Mikhail Smolin: ‘Uzbekistan did not exist at all before the revolution’,” Anhor.uz (online Uzbek newspaper), 23 January 2024. https://anhor.uz/news/there-were-no-uzbeks/

[ii] “President Tokayev: Kazakhstan Continues Constructive, Balanced Foreign Policy Considering National Interests,” The Astana Times (English-language weekly), 3 January 2024.

https://astanatimes.com/2024/01/president-tokayev-kazakhstan-continues-constructive-balanced-foreign-policy-considering-national-interests

[iii] In May 2022, months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, not a single leader of Central Asia commemorated Victory Day in Moscow—a symbolic blow to the Kremlin and a demonstration of the region’s growing autonomy. See: Temur Umarov, “Kazakhstan is Breaking out of Russia’s Grip,” Foreign Policy, 22 September 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/16/kazakhstan-russia-ukraine-war/

OE Insight Summary: 

KAZ is set to impose tougher Kazakh language requirements to obtain citizenship, which some interpret as a slight at Moscow and a move to assert greater autonomy.

Image Information:

Image: Statue of man and camels from Türkistan, Kazakistan
Source: Ekrem Osmanoglu, Unsplash, https://unsplash.c om/photos/statue-of-man-and-camels-during-daytime-2qbAZ7RGPNM
Attribution: Free to use under the Unsplash License