Details Emerge on the Russian Medical System in Ukraine

A Russian medic applying first aid. While Russia has released very little information about its casualty rate, a newly-released report offers some initial insights.


“The high professionalism of military doctors allowed them to reduce disabilities of military personnel, but most importantly, to reduce their hospital mortality rates, the lowest in history military medicine.”


Since the beginning of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, there has been little, if any, information released from Russian sources about the workings of the Russian military medical system in general, and Russian casualty rates in particular.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the official medical journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Voyenno-Meditsinskiy Zhurnal, is the first publicly released information about the inner workings of the Russian military medical system during the special military operation. Although this detailed 17-page account does not mention specific casualty numbers, some idea of the magnitude of Russian casualties can be postulated by the information it provides about the increases in various types of Russian military medical facilities, including long-term rehabilitation, palliative, and prosthetic care. The article also lays out the four stages of Russian military medical treatment consisting of forward treatment, treatment at Military District facilities, treatment at centralized MoD military medical facilities, and rehabilitation centers. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable effort in placing medical treatment as close to the line of contact as possible to increase positive outcomes. This is being accomplished not only by placing medical units further forward, but also by placing various medical capabilities/personnel at lower echelons than have historically occurred. In sum, the article does not provide Russian casualty figures but does support the premise that Russia has suffered large numbers of casualties in the operation and is adapting in response. The article highlights what the U.S. military medical community may expect if the U.S. engages in Large Scale Combat Operations on the modern battlefield.


Sources:

D.V. Trishkin, “Итоги деятельности медицинской службы Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации в 2023 году и задачи на 2024 год (Results of the medical service activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 2023 and goals for 2024.),” Voyenno-Meditsinskiy Zhurnal (official medical journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense) January 2024. https://voenmed.ric.mil.ru/upload/site229/3JSanq38G6.pdf

The results of an analysis of the medical service activities of the Armed Forces in 2023 in its main areas are presented. Particular attention is paid to the organization of medical care and treatment of the wounded during a special military operation. The multi-level system of staged medical care has proven its effectiveness.  The following results were achieved: the time for providing first aid was reduced by 3 times (to 10 minutes), providing medical care to a serviceman from the moment of injury – by 2 times (to 1 hour); 98% of military personnel were discharged upon recovery after treatment for wounds and injuries; mortality at the stages of

medical care was 0.43%, disability – 2.1%. First aid training for personnel resulted in a potentially preventable mortality rate of 5.2%. The main task facing the medical service in 2024 will be the timely and high-quality provision of medical care to the wounded and sick when performing tasks in a special military operation…

The main efforts of military medicine were aimed at organizing medical support for the special military operation.  The enemy’s use of modern types of weapons and ammunition during military operations determined the prevalence of combined, combined lesions and shrapnel wounds. Taking into account these factors, it was formed a medical care system in which there are 4 main stages for the provision of medical care and treatment to special military operation participants:

— the stage of providing qualified medical care, which is represented by mobile medical units;

— the stage of providing specialized medical care, consisting of stationary military hospitals of military district subordination;

— the stage of providing high-tech medical care, at central military medical facilities;

— the stage of medical rehabilitation at rehabilitation centers and military sanatoriums…

One of the most important aspects in the system medical treatment and evacuation support is the stage of providing qualified medical teams and medical battalions directly in area of the special military operation …medical units are put as close as possible to the line of contact. At the same time, the medical detachments and battalions have been strengthened with surgeons and traumatologists from central hospitals that are capable of performing surgical procedures that were previously not typically conducted at this stage…

The next stage of treatment involves the wounded being treated at military district hospitals…The tactics of “damage control” [«контроля повреждений»] are widely used to providing specialized medical care with the goal of minimizing the volume of surgical interventions in the seriously wounded and performing definitive surgical treatment after stabilization of their condition.

In central hospitals, the basis for the provision of high-tech medical assistance is based on a multidisciplinary approach to the treatment of patients by specialists with different specialties within one military hospital. Multidisciplinary teams include resuscitators, vascular surgeons, traumatologists, general surgeons and extracorporeal detoxification specialists….

[T]he medical system evacuation, includes mass casualty aviation evacuation to district and central military hospitals, and medical evacuation by ambulance, sea, and rail transport…

[T]he quality of medical care provided remains sufficiently high level. The high professionalism of military doctors allowed them to reduce disabilities of military personnel, but most importantly, to reduce their hospital mortality rates, the lowest in history military medicine.

At the same time, in order to prevent a decline in the quality of medical care, the leadership of the medical service of the RF Armed Forces has taken a number of measures aimed at increasing the number of military and hospital medical specialists and units to prevent staffing and medical unit shortages in the special military operation, including:

— forming separate medical battalions, medical companies and medical posts for formations [объединение], large units [соединение], and units [часть];

— 4 additional medical billets in the staffs of the combined arms armies;

— Branch Clinic No. 4 was added to the 1602nd Military Clinical Hospital (Lugansk) with 300 beds;

— construction of military hospitals is underway in Ryazan, Belgorod, Bryansk, Makhachkala, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Mirny, Vladikavkaz, Kursk, Sevastopol, new 100-bed medical buildings are in Samara, Pskov, Krasnoznamensk, Kostroma, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ivanovo;

— major and ongoing repairs of military hospital facilities are underway in Rostov-on-the-Don, Chita, Polyarny, Volgograd, Novosibirsk, Stavropol, Khabarovsk, Selyatino;— a medical detachment (reserve) has been formed and successfully performs its tasks with citizen volunteers that have medical training (currently a decision is being made to form a second detachment from among the volunteers).


Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.


Image Information:

Image: A Russian medic applying first aid. While Russia has released very little information about its casualty rate, a newly-released report offers some initial insights.
Source:
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl

Armenia Distances Itself From Instruments Of Russian Security

An image of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan from 2023. Armenia is currently taking steps to distance itself from both the CSTO and Russia.


“The CSTO, instead of fulfilling its obligations to Armenia in the field of security, on the contrary, creates security problems. And this position, I say frankly, is a threat to the national security of Armenia.”


Armenia has been critical of both Russia and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) over their responses to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and the subsequent clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Some Armenian officials have even called for the country to leave the CSTO and limit cooperation with Russia, though Armenia has continued to engage with both since the end of the 2020 war because of a lack of other options.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Kavkazskiy Uzel, reports that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on 22 February 2024 that Armenia had ended its participation in the CSTO, though he did not go as far as to say that Armenia is leaving the organization. The article notes that the decision is based on the CSTO’s responses to the 2020 war and the numerous clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan since then. The article also relays that Armenia has been critical of the Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh for not favorably dealing with Azerbaijan’s blockade of the breakaway region and not preventing Azerbaijan’s operation in September 2023, which ended with Azerbaijan regaining full control of the region. The article ends with a statement from Pashinyan, who claims that the CSTO is a threat to the national security of Armenia. Based on this statement, it is possible that Armenia will leave the CSTO, but the country will still be home to a Russian military base and Russian border guards in its territory for the foreseeable future.[ii] In a seemingly related development, the second excerpted article, from the Armenian news website News.am, reports that Armenia has notified Moscow that Russian border guards will need to be removed from the Zvartnots International Airport. Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyancommented that Armenian border guards are capable of taking over duties at the airport. The article clarifies that Armenia is not asking the Russian border guards to leave their positions on the border with Turkey or Iran, but only to leave the airport. While this development has yet to play out, it is one step Armenia has taken to rely less on Russia.


Sources:

“Главное о критике Арменией ОДКБ и Кремля (The heart of Armenia’s criticism of the CSTO and the Kremlin),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website reporting on the Caucasus), 29 February 2024. https://www.caucasianknot.com/articles/386973

After Russia’s refusal to intervene in the armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020, Armenia’s confidence in the benefits of participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization weakened to the point of threats to leave the CSTO. The “Caucasian Knot” has prepared a report on how the degree of Armenia’s unfriendly rhetoric towards Russia increased and what steps Armenia took in its attempts to look for an alternative to the CSTO…

During the escalation of the Karabakh conflict in 2020, Armenia turned to the CSTO for help. Moscow responded by saying that it could not help, since the borders of Armenia were not violated and the war took place on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh…the Kremlin limited itself to political support for Yerevan, and after that it sent peacekeepers to the Karabakh… conflict zone.

At a meeting with Putin on December 27, 2022, the Armenian prime minister again recalled the responsibility of Russian peacekeepers. “The Lachin corridor has been blocked for almost 20 days. This is the area of responsibility of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. And I want to remind you that according to the trilateral statement of the presidents of the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia, the Lachin corridor should be under the control of Russian peacekeepers,” said Pashinyan…

On September 21, 2023, the day after the end of hostilities in Karabakh, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan sharply criticized Russian peacekeepers. “The Russian peacekeeping contingent was supposed to guarantee the safety of the civilian population…We bear our share of responsibility. But I don’t think that we should turn a blind eye to the failures that the Russian peacekeeping force had contingent,” he said…“Due to the inaction of the Russian peacekeeping contingent, over 100 thousand Armenians left their homes and native places in Nagorno-Karabakh in a week,” Pashinyan said…

On February 22, 2024, Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, in an interview with France 24 TV channel, stated that the CSTO reaction did not correspond to reality in relation to the Republic of Armenia, in particular in 2021 and 2022. “And, obviously, this could not go unnoticed by Armenia. Today, in practice, we have actually frozen our participation in this agreement in this organization,” said the Prime Minister of Armenia…

On February 28, 2024, answering questions from deputies in the Armenian parliament, Nikol Pashinyan stated that “The CSTO, instead of fulfilling its obligations to Armenia in the field of security, on the contrary, creates security problems. And this position, I say frankly, is a threat to the national security of Armenia…”


“Armenia FM comments on Russian border guards’ presence on Turkey border,” News.am (Armenian news website), 7 March 2024. https://news.am/eng/news/811212.html

Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan explained how Yerevan informed Moscow about the matter of the Russian border guards at Zvartnots International Airport of the Armenian capital city of Yerevan.

At Thursday’s press conference, the FM confirmed the statement by the secretary of the Council of Armenia regarding the aforementioned matter, and stated that the Russian side was informed about the initiative to remove the Russian border guards from Zvartnots airport…

“Now we believe that Armenia is institutionally capable of independently implementing border guard service at the [Yerevan] airport, about which we have informed the Russian side. I believe that this will be enough for the Russian side and the matter will be over,” Mirzoyan noted, adding that it is about the entire package of jurisdiction at the airport…To the question about the presence of Russian border guards in other places in Armenia, for example on the Turkish border, the minister responded that the matter is only about Zvartnots airport. “Therefore, we are talking only about the airport,” added the Armenian FM.


Notes:

[i] Russia and the CSTO have had separate responses to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and subsequent clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia deployed a peacekeeping mission to Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the ceasefire agreement, but the peacekeepers are not affiliated with the CSTO. The CSTO declined to intervene in the 2020 war or the clashes on the grounds that the organization stated Armenia itself was not attacked in any of the instances and thus, does not necessitate a collective defense response from the organization.

[ii] Russia’s 102nd Military Base is located near the city of Gymuri, Armenia with an estimated 3,000 soldiers garrisoned there, while Russian border guards provide security on Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran as well as operating at the Zvartnots International Airport outside of the capital Yerevan.


Image Information:

Image: An image of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan from 2023. Armenia is currently taking steps to distance itself from both the CSTO and Russia.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nikol_Pashinyan_-_2023_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA 2.0


India’s Plan To Counter China and Sustain Maritime Sphere of Influence

The Indian Navy has been deployed in in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and Gulf of Aden, but the former is increasingly seeing competition with China.


“Modi government’s strategy [is] to use [Indian] island territories to project power in the Indo-Pacific in support of maritime security of the region.”


As China seeks to gain more prominence in the Indian Ocean, India is pushing back with a number of its own efforts to sustain its sphere of influence. According to the excerpted article from the Indian nationalist publication Hindustan Times, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh recently announced the inauguration of naval bases, which will be on islands in the Indian territory of the Lakshadweep archipelago, near the states of the Maldives and Sri Lanka. The article describes the bases as a “game-changer” and notes how they are part of a broader strategy of the Modi administration to project power into the Indo-Pacific. Specifically, according to the article, India seeks to counter the Chinese Navy and make it “think twice” about hostile actions towards India.

India considers China’s “String of Pearls” strategy in the Indian Ocean as an attempt to encircle and contain India, including with Chinese naval bases in Cambodia, Sri Lanka, [i] and Pakistan and a port in Myanmar, which can be converted to a base in the future. China can use naval bases to monitor India’s Navy and naval training exercises and, in the event of war, strike Indian ships capable of firing nuclear weapons, which would limit India’s nuclear deterrent.[ii] China claims that India is exaggerating the threat from China and is interfering in the sovereignty of India’s neighbors in the Indian Ocean, such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives, by pressuring them to disallow even Chinese “scientific research vessels”[iii] to dock at their ports.[iv] However, India disregards China’s claims. Rather, to meet the threat India perceives from China, the least India can do is to increase own naval bases to match, if not necessarily even exceed, the Chinese port and base presence in the Indian Ocean. India considers the Indian Ocean its own sphere of influence and is, therefore, building up its naval infrastructure to meet its security needs.


Sources:

“India to build naval bases in Agatti and Minicoy Islands,” Hindustan Times (Delhi-based weekly covering issues in India and around the world from nationalist angles),14 January 2024. hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-to-build-naval-bases-in-agatti-and-minicoy-islands-101707884042309.html

After Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Lakshadweep, India has decided to firmly extend its naval footprint by establishing naval bases in Agatti and Minicoy Islands along with air bases in order to secure the vital sea lanes of communication.

This decision dovetails into Modi government’s strategy to use its islands territories to project power in the Indo-Pacific in support of maritime security of the region. The geographical location of Lakshadweep and Minicoy Islands and the Andamans and Nicobar Islands is such that India can safeguard the maritime trade routes while countering the challenge of rapidly expanding Chinese Navy and their supplicants in the Indian Ocean…. Such level of force projection has never been seen in the past and will make the adversary [China] and its supplicants think twice before playing mischief in the Indian Ocean region.


Notes:

[i] An overlooked reason why China has gained increasing influence in Sri Lanka is that India’s domestic Tamil population has exerted pressure on India’s government to pressure the Sri Lankan government on treating Tamil civilians better during the civil war and in Sri Lanka. Although India did not directly intervene, it “warned” Sri Lanka about its human rights conduct, while the U.S suspended aid to Sri Lanka for its human rights violations. China, in contrast, took advantage of the situation to offer crucial aid, armaments, and diplomatic support to the Sri Lankan government without any criticism of its human rights record. See A. Jathindra, “Revisiting Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy Balance under the Shadow of the Space Dragon,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, July-August 2023. https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/28/2003270082/-1/-1/1/JATHINDRA_COMMENTARY.PDF

[ii] See, for example, Firstpost.com, “’String of Pearls’: How China-made Kyaukphyu Port in Myanmar threatens India’s nuclear attack submarine base,” 8 January 2024, https://www.firstpost.com/world/string-of-pearls-how-china-made-kyaukphyu-port-in-myanmar-threatens-indias-nuclear-attack-submarine-base-13588512.html.

[iii] The Washington D.C-based think tank, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), from 2020 to 2024, 64 Chinese “oceanographic missions” using “research vessels” were observed from satellite imagery, and 80% of them “demonstrated suspect behavior or possessed organizational links suggesting their involvement in advancing Beijing’s geopolitical agenda.” Indis would, therefore, rightly be suspicious of their activities in the Indian Ocean. See “China’s Research Vessels Carry Out Covert Missions for PLA,” The Maritime Executive, 14 January 2024. https://maritime-executive.com/article/study-china-s-research-vessels-carry-out-covert-missions-for-pla

[iv] See, for example, “印度海军潜艇到访斯里兰卡,印媒炒作“击败中国 (Indian navy submarine visits Sri Lanka, and Indian media exaggerates defeating China),” guancha.cn (privately owned Chinese-language website with nationalist tendencies), 5 February 2024. https://www.guancha.cn/internation/2024_02_05_724626.shtml


Image: The Indian Navy has been deployed in in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and Gulf of Aden, but the former is increasingly seeing competition with China
Source: Government of India https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Indian_Navy_QRT_deployed_in_North,_Central_Arabian_Sea_and_Gulf_of_Aden.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0


Hamas and Houthis Target Youth as New “Islamic Resistance” Movement Emerges

Hamas supporters in Gaza, including families and children, attending the 25th anniversary of the movement’s founding, December 2012.


Houthi vehicles carrying slogans of supporting Gaza roam the villages with forms to register children and youth into these training courses.”


Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen, both of whom have seen their popularity grow since 7 October, are capitalizing on conflict in Gaza to recruit new generations of young men into their culture of “Islamic Resistance.”[i] According to the first accompanying excerpt from an op-ed published recently in the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed, Hamas’s prior youth training efforts have been critical to its ability to withstand the Israeli campaign. The author mentions the “Futawwa” (youth) training program, which allowed Hamas to spread its “resistance” ideology across Gaza throughout the 2010s.[ii] The second and third accompanying excerpts, from the prominent Saudi dailies al-Sharq al-Awsat and al-Watan, respectively, illustrate how both Hamas and the Houthis have used their growing popularity since 7 October to launch recruitment campaigns, especially targeting the youth. Youth indoctrination is critical for both groups, and both have put substantial efforts into it over the past decade.[iii] The Houthi Movement and Hamas in Gaza share much in common. They are both mobilized movements with Islamic ideological underpinnings that act as de facto governments in their respective regions despite not formally being recognized as such by the international community. The key difference between them is doctrinal—the former are adherents of the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam while the latter is a Sunni, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movement. For both groups, though, “the culture of resistance” is a critical component that arguably supersedes sectarian differences. Perhaps to a greater degree than previously, a focus on sectarian differences seems secondary and increasingly irrelevant in the current context. Instead, Hamas and the Houthis—alongside Shia-majority Lebanese Hezbollah and the “Islamic Resistance of Iraq”—may coalesce into a transnational, cross-sectarian “Islamic Resistance” movement that should be thought of as distinct from the 2010s, Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.”[iv] Both on the Sunni and the Shia side, the new generation of fighters coming of age in the shadow of conflict in Gaza will presumably be less interested in sectarian differences or other intra-Islam disputes than in the fight against Israel.


Sources:

“How and why has Gaza held out?” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily) https://www.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/كيف-صمدت-غزّة-ولماذا

What is the secret of this resilience? … After the attempted coup against the Hamas government and the separation of Gaza from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip fell under a tight siege, and the local “Gaza Authority” found itself under a unique state of “independence.” It was able to make whatever decisions it wanted regarding its society, especially in the fields of education and curriculum making… Specifically, the Hamas Authority introduced the “Futawwa” program into the curricula of its schools, aiming to train students specifically in weapons use and field skills.


“Hamas seeks to exploit the Gaza war in the Lebanese camps,” al-Sharq al-Awsat (prominent Saudi daily), 4 December 2023. https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/4708376-%C2%AB%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%C2%BB-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AB%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86

On Monday, the Lebanese branch of the Hamas movement announced the establishment of the “Vanguards of the Al-Aqsa Flood.” This is an organization with military dimensions, as the statement suggested…

In a statement, the movement called on “young and heroic men” to join the “vanguard of the resistance.” The movement’s sources explained that “this project is linked to Lebanon and does not aim exclusively to gather more fighters, but rather to include more individuals in Hamas who are active in more than one sector.” A statement issued by the movement linked the establishment of these vanguards to “affirming the role of the Palestinian people, wherever they are, in resisting the occupation by all available and legitimate means,” and to “complementing what Operation Al-Aqsa Flood achieved, and benefiting from scientific and artistic energies and capabilities.”


“Houthis recruit children through seminars on war in Gaza,” al-Watan (prominent Saudi daily), 18 November 2023. https://www.alwatan.com.sa/article/1137388

A Yemeni source in Sanaa said that the most rejoicing over what is happening in Gaza is among the Houthi militias, who rose up directly to restore their dilapidated ranks and support their disintegrating fronts… The source stated that Houthi vehicles carrying slogans of supporting Gaza roam the villages with forms to register children and youth into these training courses, a method that does not differ from previous methods of recruitment. However, the Houthis have developed new tricks to entice children and youth to enroll in these malicious courses. This includes sending young graduates to the streets to talk about their participation in previous courses, graduating them without any assignments, and giving them monthly salarie


Notes:

[i] Several opinion polls confirm these groups’ rising popularity, including:

“Wide public support for Hamas’ offensive on October the 7th, but the vast majority denies that Hamas has committed atrocities against Israeli civilians,” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 13 December 2023. https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/963

“How the Israel-Hamas War in Gaza Is Changing Arab Views,” Arab Barometer, 14 December 2023. https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/how-the-israel-hamas-war-in-gaza-is-changing-arab-views/

“New Poll Sheds Light on Saudi Views of Israel-Hamas War,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21 December 2023. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-poll-sheds-light-saudi-views-israel-hamas-war;  “Arab Public Opinion about the Israeli War on Gaza,” Doha Institute, 10 January 2024. https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/arab-opinion-war-on-gaza-press-release-en.pdf

[ii] Much has been written on the program over the past decade. See for instance: “Gaza teens graduate from Hamas military school,” Ynet News, 24 January 2013. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4336807,00.html

and “Training Fighters of Future Across Gaza,” New York Times, 14 January 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/world/middleeast/training-fighters-of-future-across-gaza.html

[iii] For more on Hamas youth recruitment, see: “The Road to October 7: Hamas’ Long Game, Clarified,” CTC Sentinel, October/November 2023. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-road-to-october-7-hamas-long-game-clarified/; For the Houthis, see: “Yemen: Houthis Recruit More Child Soldiers Since October 7,” Human Rights Watch, 13 February 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/13/yemen-houthis-recruit-more-child-soldiers-october-7

[iv] The idea of an “Islamic Resistance” axis is not new. However, it bears distinguishing the emergent post-7 October Islamic Resistance from the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.” The latter coalesced in the early 2010s, during the fight against ISIS and in support of the Syrian regime, and at a time when Hamas was estranged from Iran and its proxies. As such, the Axis of Resistance emerged as a primarily Shia organization focused on countering Sunni extremism in Syria and Iraq (or, for the Houthis, fighting against Saudi Arabia and its Yemeni allies). Israel remained part of the discourse, but it was not the axis’s primary focus.


Image Information:

Image: Hamas supporters in Gaza, including families and children, attending the 25th anniversary of the movement’s founding, December 2012.
Source: https://media.farsnews.ir/Uploaded/Files/Images/1391/09/18/13910918213433966_PhotoL.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Names New Leader

Sana’a, capitol of Yemen at Night.


“Despite its decline in the Arabian Peninsula, [AQAP] remains the most effective terrorist group in Yemen, with the intent to launch attacks in the region and beyond.”


Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) named a successor after the recent loss of its leader. According to the first excerpted article from the Saudi state-owned international news outlet Al Arabiya, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, aka “Abu al-Laith,” a Yemeni national, has been named the new leader of AQAP. The organization’s official, Ibrahim al-Qusi, confirmed in a broadcast recording that the group’s former leader had been killed, declaring that “Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki is the new leader of the organization in the Arabian Peninsula.”[i] The new AQAP leader, Al-Awlaki, reportedly had direct ties to former al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden and was repatriated to Yemen by Bin Laden. Al-Awlaki is reported to also have originated from the same tribe as former al-Qaeda spiritual leader Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed in 2011. There is a $6 million reward from the U.S. State Department for information about the new AQAP leader, who has “publicly called for attacks on the U.S. and its allies.” The U.S. has designated AQAP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization since 2010.[ii]

The second excerpted article from the Jeddah-based Saudi daily newspaper Okaz, provides some perspective on the current status of AQAP, as well as the potential effect of Al-Awlaki as the group’s new leader. The article notes that the al-Qaeda affiliate has struggled for a multitude of reasons, including the loss of several key leaders, financial challenges, and internal disputes that have led to structural issues. The article also states that Al-Awlaki could be a unifier for AQAP due to his extensive background in the terrorist network, experience in the al-Qaeda leadership council, and previous position as Emir in the Shabwa Province. While there has been a shift in the West to focus on great power competition with China and Russia, and persistent challenges from Iran, the ongoing threat from international terrorist organizations cannot be discounted, especially with new leaders who have openly called for attacks against the United States.[iii]


Sources:

سعد العولقي.. من هو زعيم “القاعدة” الجديد في اليمن؟  (Saad Al-Awlaki… Who is the New Leader of Al Qaeda in Yemen),” Al Arabiya (Saudi state-owned news outlet), 11 March 2024. https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/yemen/2024/03/11/بعد-الاعلان-عن-مقتل-زعيم-تنظيم-القاعدة-من-هو-خليفته؟

Al-Qaeda in Yemen confirmed the killing of its leader, Khaled Batarfi, without going into details, announcing that his new successor is Saad Al-Awlaki. The SITE Center, which monitors terrorist media, stated that the organization’s legal official, Ibrahim al-Qusi, confirmed in a recording broadcast yesterday, Sunday, the killing of Batarfi, the organization’s leader since February 2020, declaring that “Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki is the new leader of the organization in the Arabian Peninsula.” , which the United States classifies as a terrorist…

Saad bin Atef Al-Awlaki, nicknamed “Abu Al-Laith,”… is of Yemeni nationality, and media reports indicate that he is one of those who was repatriated from Afghanistan to Yemen by the former leader of Al-Qaeda, who was killed by America in 2011, Osama bin Laden. Thus, Al-Awlaki becomes the fifth leader to publicly lead Al-Qaeda in Yemen, after working for years as the extremist organization’s second-in-command in the country.

Saad Al-Awlaki was born in the town of Al-Shu’bah in Wadi Yasbam in the Upper Egypt District in Shabwa Governorate (south). He comes from the large Al-Awalqi tribe, the same tribe from which the spiritual father of Al-Qaeda, Anwar Al-Awlaki, who was killed by an American drone in 2011, descends.


Mohamed Hefney, “خبير مصري لـ عكاظ: الخلافات تفكك تنظيم القاعدة الإرهابي في اليمن (An Egyptian expert to Okaz: Disagreements are Disintegrating the Al-Qaeda Terrorist Organization in Yemen),” Okaz (Saudi based newspaper), 13 March 2024. https://www.okaz.com.sa/news/politics/2157390

Fears are escalating within Al-Qaeda, after the killing of its fourth leader in Yemen, Khalid Batarfi, nicknamed “Abu al-Miqdad al-Kindi,” and the appointment of his successor, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, nicknamed “Abu al-Layth,” who the US administration classified in 2021 as a global terrorist, and offered a reward of $6. Millions of dollars in exchange for providing information about him.

Dr. Nabil Naeem, believes that Al-Awlaki is known for his extreme hostility toward America, and like all of his predecessors, he called for the necessity of launching attacks on the United States of America, which prompted the American administration to allocate a large financial reward to anyone who provides information about him. He stressed that Al-Qaeda in general, whether in Yemen or elsewhere, has become weak and fragile and is witnessing a major liquidation of its leaders, whether in Yemen or other countries in the region. It is not the organization that existed 20 years ago. The new leader of Al-Qaeda in Yemen faces grave challenges and priorities, including how to preserve his life and the lives of his followers from the expected physical liquidation. The Yemeni organization also faces challenges at the financial and structural levels, as the financial level is very weak. Structural level: There is a state of splits and divisions within the organization left behind by the former leader of the organization, which indicates that his death was under the direction of those close to him. Therefore, we do not rule out that the new leadership will seek to bring the terrorist organization together.Al-Awlaki is considered one of the founding leaders of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and he served as a member of the leadership council of Al-Qaeda. He was born in the 1980s. He joined the organization in 2010, and assumed the position of Emir of Shabwa Province until 2014, then he was appointed a member of the organization’s Shura Council, which is responsible for Managing operations, and he was called the second man in Al-Qaeda in Yemen.


Notes:

[i] Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was initially created in 2009 after the Saudi and Yemeni branches merged forces. The group is currently assessed to be one of the most lethal al-Qaeda affiliates. The Council on Foreign Relations published a backgrounder on AQAP, see: “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),” Council on Foreign Relations, 19 June 2015. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap

[ii] For a complete list of designated terrorist organizations by the United States Government see: “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, Accessed 12 March 2024. https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/

[iii] The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community further notes that, “Al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates on the African continent and Yemen will sustain the global network as the group maintains its strategic intent to target the United States and U.S. citizens.” The entirety of the most recent unclassified annual threat assessment issued by the United States Intelligence Community can be located here: “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 5 February 2024. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf


Image Information:

Image: Sana’a, capitol of Yemen at Night.
Source: https://openverse.org/image/c4b13d0f-5ffa-44fc-9a82-518d08dbfbc0?q=yemen Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0


Mexico’s Cartel-Related Violence Spikes as Elections Approach

Mexico has responded to security threats by deploying its army on the streets.


No more than 12 hours passed between the shooting of the Morena precandidate Miguel Ángel Zavala Reyes, and the shooting of the PAN precandidate, Armando Pérez Luna.”


Mexico has long suffered high levels of violence related to its powerful drug cartels. Violence often spikes during election season, as cartels seek to elect politicians aligned with their agendas and eliminate those opposed. According to the Spanish daily El País, recent assassinations in Mexico have contributed to growing fears that the country’s upcoming elections could witness more violence than in many previous election cycles.[i] The paper reports on two mayoral candidates in the municipality of Maravatío recently assassinated within hours of one another. The article mentions that earlier in the campaign season, cartels abducted and killed a third mayoral candidate from Maravatío. This area of the country features three powerful cartels contesting territory: the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, the Michoacán Family, and the Knights Templar. According to the second excerpted article by Diario de México, which highlights the research of NGO group Data Cívica, 36 aspirants to public office or members of their families were assassinated in January and February alone.[ii] Mexico’s cartels continue to accrete power, and during election season, seek to play a primary role in the selection of candidates. While candidates for federal office receive security protection from the government, local candidates do not. In Mexico, it is often control of local candidates that proves most important for cartel operations.


Sources:

“El terror en Maravatío: asesinados dos precandidatos a la alcaldía en menos de 12 horas (Terror in Maravatío: two mayoral candidates murdered in less than 12 hours),” El País (Spanish daily with excellent regional coverage), 27 February 2024. https://elpais.com/mexico/elecciones-mexicanas/2024-02-27/el-terror-en-maravatio-asesinados-dos-precandidatos-a-la-alcaldia-en-menos-de-12-horas.html 

No more than 12 hours passed between the shooting of the Morena precandidate Miguel Ángel Zavala Reyes, and the shooting of the PAN precandidate, Armando Pérez Luna; two of the people who were seeking to become the next municipal president of Maravatío, a municipality of 80,000 inhabitants in the State of Michoacán…According to the group Data Cívica, ‘In Mexico, electoral violence has become a tool of organized crime to influence the public life of states and municipalities’…During the month of January, at least five candidates or aspirants for elected office were murdered in Mexico.


“Febrero fue letal para aspirantes a cargo de elección popular: ONG (February was lethal for candidates for popular election positions: NGO),” Diario de México (one of the country’s oldest dailies), 15 March 2024. https://www.diariodemexico.com/mi-nacion/febrero-fue-letal-para-aspirantes-cargo-de-eleccion-popular-ong   At least five candidates or aspirants for elected office were murdered in Mexico during February, bringing the total to 10 in the first two months of the year, the non-governmental organizations Data Cívica reported this Friday. The number of homicides related to political violence rises to 36 when public officials and relatives of politicians are also considered, which are detailed in the report ‘Voting between bullets’ in February.


Notes:

[i] For more information on the potential criminal realignment in Mexico’s elections, see: Parker Asmann, “Mexico’s 2024 Election Could Spark Violent Criminal Realignments,” InSight Crime, 15 January 2024, https://insightcrime.org/news/mexico-2024-election-violent-criminal-realignments/

[ii] To read more about the project to track election violence by Data Cívica, see: “Voting Between Bullets, Understanding Criminal-Electoral Violence in Mexico,” https://votar-entre-balas.datacivica.org/


Image Information:

Image: Mexico has responded to security threats by deploying its army on the streets.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/isan/3740048960 
Attribution: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 DEED.


Venezuela Seeks To Rectify Deteriorating Relations With Iran

Venezuela’s former Foreign Minister, Jorge Arreaza, visits Iran.


Venezuela is rushing to meet the terms of a three-year alliance that has involved hundreds of millions of dollars in oil trades and contracts.”


Once considered to be one of the Maduro regime’s staunchest allies, the Venezuela-Iran relationship has entered a rocky period.[i] Beyond military cooperation, Iran has long provided critical support to the Maduro regime in the areas of sanctions evasion and diluents for crude oil refining. According to the first excerpted article from the Venezuelan daily El Nacional, the bilateral relationship began to deteriorate when the West partially lifted oil sanctions on Venezuela following pledges for freer and fairer presidential elections this year. The article reports that the Maduro regime shifted production and export to Western markets, falling woefully behind in its scheduled oil deliveries to Iran. The article also details that part of an earlier three-year agreement aimed at sanctions evasion saw Iran offload much of Venezuela’s sanctioned crude.[ii] The second excerpted article, from the business-focused Venezuelan news outlet Banca y Negocios, cites people familiar with the deal that helped boost Venezuela’s crude exports and mitigate fuel shortages while under previous sanctions. Under the deal, Iran also committed to renovating several of Venezuela’s large oil refineries. The Maduro regime’s decision to abandon the terms of its agreement with Iran has irked Iranian officials, according to the reporting by Banca y Negocios. At the same time, it speculates that the Maduro regime is motivated to return to the Iran deal as it anticipates the return of Western sanctions, having failed to comply with its prior commitments toward freer and fairer presidential elections. Returning to this agreement with Iran will be critical for the Maduro regime to survive the possible reimposition of Western sanctions on its oil sector.


Sources:

“Venezuela se apresura a mejorar su relación con Irán mientras se avecinan sanciones de EEUU (Venezuela rushes to improve its relationship with Iran as US sanctions loom),” El Nacional (Venezuelan daily focused on the politics of the Maduro regime), 13 March 2024. https://www.elnacional.com/economia/venezuela-se-apresura-a-mejorar-su-relacion-con-iran-mientras-se-avecinan-sanciones-de-ee-uu/  

Iran and Venezuela are trying to rebuild an oil alliance that began to crumble last year after Venezuela fell behind in oil trades…A review of PDVSA data and shipping documents shows that Venezuela fell behind on payments to Iran, a shortfall that worsened when the United States began issuing licenses in late 2022. Those authorizations led the state firm to reallocate shipments…to save the partnership, Venezuela is rushing to meet the terms of a three-year alliance that has involved hundreds of millions of dollars in oil trades and contracts. Nicolás Maduro’s government is trying to settle outstanding debt by accelerating deliveries of heavy crude oil and fuel shipments to Iran.


“Venezuela busca mejorar su relación con Irán tras presentar retrasos en el intercambio petrolero (Venezuela seeks to improve its relationship with Iran after presenting delays in the oil exchange),” Banca y Negocios (a Venezuelan digital portal focused on financial and economic reporting), 12 March 2024. https://www.bancaynegocios.com/venezuela-busca-mejorar-su-relacion-con-iran-tras-presentar-retrasos-en-el-intercambio-petrolero/    Six people familiar with the matter stated that the agreement between both nations helped boost crude oil exports and alleviate the fuel problem that Venezuela suffered…the possible reimposition of sanctions by the United States would make the alliance between Venezuela and Iran essential to keeping the Venezuelan oil sector afloat…Venezuela is rushing to comply with the agreement and pay off the debt, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars in oil exchanges and contracts, by accelerating the delivery of heavy hydrocarbons and fuel to the nation located in the Middle East.


Notes:

[i] For more historical background on the importance of the bilateral relationship, see: Moises Rendón and Claudia Fernandez, “The Fabulous Five: How Foreign Actors Prop Up the Maduro Regime in Venezuela,” CSIS Policy Brief, 19 October 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/fabulous-five-how-foreign-actors-prop-maduro-regime-venezuela

[ii] For more information on the deal signed between Iran and Venezuela, see: Deisy Buitrago and Vivian Sequera, “Iran, Venezuela Eye Trade Increase, Sign Petrochemical Deal,” Reuters, 12 June 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/iranian-president-caracas-kicking-off-regional-tour-2023-06-12/


Image Information:

Image: Venezuela’s former Foreign Minister, Jorge Arreaza, visits Iran.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Venezuela%E2%80%99s_Top_Diplomat_Visits_Iran-9.jpg  
Attribution: CC-BY-4.0.


Iran Vaunts Benefits of State-Owned Construction Company

IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami and Commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters Brigadier General Abdolreza Abed touring preparations for the Grand Mosalla Mosque of Tehran, IRNA (State Media) in March 2024.


“The enemy wanted to prove that ‘we can’t,’ and we had to prove that ‘we can,’ therefore, we were able to overcome the sanctions policy with the power of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters.”


Iran claims it has been able to circumvent sanctions thanks to an infrastructure entity blacklisted by the United States: the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Company (KAA). In an address published by state-aligned outlet Moniban News, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Hossein Salami cheered: “The enemy wanted to prove that ‘we can’t,’ and we had to prove that ‘we can,’ therefore, we were able to overcome the sanctions policy with the power of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters.”

Established during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), KAA functions as the IRGC’s lead contractor for civilian construction projects as well as its nuclear and ballistic missile projects. This resulted in its blacklist designation by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in 2010, given that its subsidiaries are known to funnel money to the IRGC and are used to fund its activities at home and abroad.[i] In the first excerpted article Salami noted that the KAA has helped the country be more independent and is a “powerful response” to sanctions playing a role in at least thirty sectors, including road and urban development, energy, marine, and oil sectors, and hospital construction. The KAA is considered one of the three main pillars of the IRGC-run economy. (The others are the Basij Cooperative Foundation and IRGC Cooperative Foundation.) Beyond its ability to help Iran circumvent sanctions, KAA has played an important role related to educational and employment opportunities. As per the second excerpted article from the Iranian state-run Entekhab News, Salami also emphasized that KAA has provided opportunities for university students not just in the field of engineering but all higher degrees. Additionally, it has prevented brain drain, a historic problem for Iran that has only increased in recent years due to the dire state of the Iranian economy due to U.S. sanctions and systemic mismanagement and corruption. While Iranian officials tend to fluctuate on whether U.S. sanctions on the country have impacted the economy, the recent comments by the IRGC Commander about the KAA seem to confirm that the punitive measures are not putting the necessary strain on the clerical establishment to change its behavior in the region.


Sources:

“سردار سلامی: بدلیل قدرت قرارگاه سازندگی خاتم الانبیا (ص) از تحریم عبور کردیم (General Salami: Due to the strength of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, we overcame sanctions),” Moniban News (State-aligned news. outlet), 3 March 2024.

https://www.moniban.ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-3/203934-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%AF%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%85

Major General Salami added: One of the biggest things the construction headquarters did was refuting the enemy’s particular thinking in this regard. The enemy wanted to prove that ‘we can’t’, and we had to prove that ‘we can,’ therefore, we were able to overcome the sanctions policy with the power of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters and jihadist bodies like the headquarters.

In explaining the hostile sanctions of Iran’s enemies, the IRGC commander stated: The sanctions policy was not a subjective and unrealistic policy, but rather an operational policy of the enemy, and it was completely objective, real, and tangible. But Islamic Iran, with the jihadist forces of Khatam al-Anbiya, was able to surpass and defeat the enemies of the Iranian nation.

In explaining the ethos of the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, he said: The ethos of the Khatam headquarters is not just providing technical work, but rather this headquarters is the heart of the revolution and its ethos is to preserve the political independence of the country, to restore the national self-confidence, and actually making the country not rely on the presence of foreigners, and follows this policy text in its basic actions, and for this reason, it undertakes great works and accepts risks…

Today, the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters is playing a role in at least thirty various sectors: road and urban development, energy, marine, oil, hospital construction and unique buildings, and the subway.

The commander-in-chief of the IRGC states: The Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters has expanded in various specialized fields, which is a powerful response to the enemy’s sanctions.


“فرمانده کل سپاه: قرارگاه خاتم‌الانبیا جلوی فرار مغز‌ها را گرفت (IRGC Commander-in-chief: Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters prevented the minds from escaping),” Entekhab News (state-run media), 3 March 2023.

https://www.entekhab.ir/fa/news/768073/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%DA%A9%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%85%E2%80%8C%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D9%84%D9%88%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%B2%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA

General Salami emphasized that the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters has prevented elite minds from leaving the country. He said: The Khatam headquarters has provided a wide and modern field for technical and industrial elites of our country, and every engineer and doctor with any degree of education can fulfill their dreams during their time at university at the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters.


Notes:

[i] The Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters was designated in 2010 by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. See: “Treasury Targets Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, 10 February 2010. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg539


Image Information:

Image: IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami and Commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters Brigadier General Abdolreza Abed touring preparations for the Grand Mosalla Mosque of Tehran, IRNA (State Media) in March 2024.
Source: https://www.irna.ir/news/85406994/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%87-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%86%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%86
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Iranian Navy Conducts Ballistic Missile Launches From Warship

“The moment the Dezful ballistic missile is fired from the Shahid Mahdavi warship in the form of a launch container,” Telegram video screenshot, 13 February 2024


“Nowhere is safe for powers who seek to threaten our security.”


Iran has successfully test-fired two unidentified long-range ballistic missiles with a range of 1,700 kilometers (1,056 miles) from the Shahid Mahdavi, a converted cargo ship operating in the Gulf of Oman. According to the excerpted article published by the news outlet Mehr News Agency, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami commented on the first-time launches with a warning: “Nowhere is safe for powers who seek to threaten our security.” The Shahid Mahdavi functions as a multipurpose aircraft carrier capable of carrying an array of military hardware, including air defense systems, drones, radars, and missiles.[i] The ballistic missiles reportedly hit targets in the Kavir Desert in central Iran.

Iran has the most extensive and diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East and North Africa. It is also the only country to possess a 2,000-kilometer range missile without a nuclear weapon capability.[ii] Iranian officials maintain that Tehran’s decision to acquire ballistic missiles was prompted by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) in order to deter future missile attacks by enemy countries.[iii] Calling the launch a “success,” Salami was quoted in the first excerpted article as saying that “the range of influence of [Iran’s] sea power has increased to any desired point.”[iv] The second excerpted article from the Iranian media source Khabar Online reports that Salami highlighted that the IRGC is “determined to powerfully defend national security, national interests, and the achievements” of Iran. As tensions in the region remain elevated as part of the Gaza war, and as Iran-backed Houthi rebels continue to attack ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, this new development underscores what happens when Tehran is unchecked by the international community.


Sources:

“شلیک موشک بالستیک دوربرد از ناو جنگی سپاه (Launch of long-range ballistic missile from IRGC warship),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news agency owned by Iranian government’s Islamic Development Organization), 12 February 2024.

https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6022735/%D8%B4%D9%84%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B4%DA%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87

Referring to the strength of the IRGC Navy, Major General Salami stated: Our offensive power and naval defense, with the arrival of a multitude of drones, cruise missiles, and even ballistic missiles with the ability to target combat vessels at sea, are very complex and show an interweaving of a combination of up-to-date, advanced, and modern capabilities.

He continued: “In the IRGC Navy, we had new achievements. The first issue was the joint work between the Air Force and IRGC Navy with the launch of a long-range ballistic missile from a warship that was successfully achieved, and with this new success, the range of influence of our sea power has increased to any desired point.”

The IRGC commander-in-chief, also referring to the other capabilities of the IRGC Navy, emphasized: “The oceanliner (warships) can appear anywhere in the oceans, and naturally, when they can launch missiles, nowhere is safe for powers who seek to threaten our security.”


“شلیک موشک بالستیک دوربرد سپاه پاسداران از روی یک ناو جنگی به روایت سردار سلامی (Firing a Revolutionary Guards long-range ballistic missile on a warship according to General Salami),” Khabar Online (Iranian news website affiliated with reformist political factions), 12 February 2024.

https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1872279/%D8%B4%D9%84%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B4%DA%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87

According to Khabar Online News Agency, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander-in-Chief General Hossein Salami said in a televised interview with the Revolutionary Guards program on Channel One: “In the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, we are always ready to give our lives for the great Iranian nation and are determined to powerfully defend national security, national interests, and the achievements of the Islamic revolution and must stand against all threats and dangers with all our strength and prevent the formation of new equilibriums in the field of the country’s national security.”


Notes:

[i] The test launch on the Shahid Mahdavi, which was released on video, was a joint project between the IRGC Navy (IRGCN) and Air Force. The type of ballistic missiles used in the exercise was not verified, as several state media outlets have named various missiles with an array of ranges.

[ii] Michael Elleman, “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program,” Iran Primer, 13 January 2021. https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-ballistic-missile-program

[iii] Kamran Taremi, “Ballistic Missiles in Iran’s Military Thinking,” Wilson Center, 14 October 2023. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/ballistic-missiles-irans-military-thinking

[iv] United Nations Security Council Resolution, UNSCR 2231, which once constrained Iran’s ballistic missile-related tests and transfers, expired in October 2023. For additional information, see: “Arms embargo on Iran expires despite US opposition,” Al Jazeera, 18 October 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/18/arms-embargo-on-iran-expires-despite-us-opposition


Image Information:

Image: “The moment the Dezful ballistic missile is fired from the Shahid Mahdavi warship in the form of a launch container,” Telegram video screenshot, 13 February 2024
Source: https://t.me/SEPAHCYBERY/83945
Attribution: IRGC Cyber Telegram Channel


Iranian Self-Sufficiency in Aircraft Spare Parts May Benefit Sanctioned States

Inspecting Airbus jet engines, April 2022


Some countries that were sanctioned… are coming to Iran and entrusting their planes to Iranian experts.”


Iran’s air transportation industry is under stress due to international sanctions.[i] In response to the sanctions, the Mehr News Agency reports that Iran’s Ministry of Defense has developed the industrial and technical capacity to develop spare aircraft parts and conduct maintenance on critical systems like aircraft engines.[ii] While this follows a known pattern of Iranian claims to immunize themselves from international sanctions, the current iteration differs because Iranian officials openly say they will use their new capacity to help other countries subject to international sanctions.

The willingness to help Russia or other countries evade sanctions, for example, by shipping drones to Russia, signals both a sense of impunity among Iranian officials but could also reflect growing substance to Iran’s alliances with other states that find themselves international pariahs. For Iran to help Russia service its leased Boeing or Airbus aircraft fleshes out bilateral relations beyond simply a one-way drone trade. Iran’s stated willingness to bypass sanctions to maintain or potentially upgrade Russian aircraft can have broad ramifications on the operational environment, not only in the Middle East but elsewhere around the world. First, Iranian efforts to help subjected states bypass sanctions blunt a major tool of international diplomacy meant to deter rogue or aggressive behavior. Second, supplying sanctioned states much-needed aviation hardware would be a boon to Iranian defense industries both financially and by allowing them greater opportunities to reverse engineer platforms such as the Sukhoi-35S [R1].[iii] Finally, money earned by Revolutionary Guard-run factories could also help support or subsidize Revolutionary Guard or proxy activities across the region.


Sources:

“خودکفایی ایران در ساخت قطعات هواپیماهای مسافربری”(Iran’s self-sufficiency in the manufacture of passenger plane parts),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news agency owned by Iranian government’s Islamic Development Organization), 9 March 2024. https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6049371

In an interview with Mehr, Javad Mashayekh, with reference to Iran’s self-sufficiency in the field of manufacturing passenger aircraft parts that researchers and specialists in knowledge-based companies have achieved, stated, “In the field of commercial and passenger planes, Iran was once dependent on procurement of aircraft parts, even for maintenance but because of sanctions,
we were unable to procure parts from other international suppliers. The deputy of the scientific department of knowledge-based economy development added, “This is what happened after the imposition of sanctions: Some of Iran’s knowledge-based companies used their power to develop car parts, and repair and maintenance of aircraft engines locally.” Mashayekh also said that the most complex part of an aircraft is its engine and, he noted, maintenance requires a high degree of technical knowledge. We promise that in these fields, our country has achieved self-sufficiency so we do not need to send out planes to foreign countries for almost any kind of repair or to have maintenance done there.

He continued, “In fact, we are currently witnessing that some countries that were sanctioned for various reasons and are not able to supply parts and get maintenance services are coming to Iran and entrusting their planes to Iranian experts…. For example, Russia has suffered many sanctions in the aviation sector due to the Ukraine crisis, and for this reason, it has concluded good contracts for maintenance services with Iranian knowledge-based companies.”


Notes:

[i] In 2016 Iran sought to purchase nearly 200 passenger jets split between Boeing and Airbus. At the time, the Iranian government justified the deals as an air safety matter. However, ambitions for a new fleet faltered as seating capacity of the new jets outstripped Iranian passenger traffic projections. Critics claimed the proposed deals were meant to provide spare parts to keep Iran’s military aircraft aloft. While Boeing and Airbus planes do not contain parts suitable for jet fighters, passenger jets and military cargo planes can share many parts. Boeing ultimately cancelled its deal, while Airbus delivered only four planes.

[ii] For discussion of Iranian turbojet engine development, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: New Heavy Engines on the Drawing Board,” OE Watch, November 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195245/download

[iii] For discussion of the Iranian desire for Sukhoi-35s, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Wants Sukhoi-35 Fighters From Russia,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-wants-sukhoi-35-fighters-from-russia/


Image information:

Image: Inspecting Airbus jet engines, April 2022
Source: https://media.mehrnews.com/d/2024/03/08/3/4894679.jpg?ts=1709893408775
Attribution: Mehr News Agency