Monthly Archives: April 2024

Iranians Using Black Market VPNs To Bypass Restrictions

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Abolhassan Firouzabadi, secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace, poses in 2018.

“Surveys show that about 64 percent of [Iranian] users use VPNs.”

While Iran has long sought to constrain internet access and limit the information ordinary Iranians can access, Iranians’ use of virtual private networks (VPNs) to bypass restrictions and regime censorship is flagrantly increasing. According to the excerpted article from Iran’s main financial newspaper Donya-e Eqtesad, almost two-thirds of Iranians now use a VPN. Among those affiliated with universities and scientific institutions, that number increases to more than 90 percent, suggesting that rhetoric about indigenous scientific prowess and a national intranet aside, Iranian researchers find no substitute for the information they gather from abroad.[i] It also suggests that Iranians do not accept the government’s previous efforts to greenlight specific VPNs.[ii] Iranians grumble that the regime’s efforts to filter and censor the internet is rendering free VPNs worthless and is driving up the cost of paid services that must constantly augment their products to stay ahead of regime censorship attempts.[iii] Notably, the article also reveals that the amount Iranians spend on VPNs exceeds the combined revenue of the top two Iranian cell phone companies. Open discussion about nominally illegal technologies in Iran reflects the widespread rejection of regime precepts by the broader Iranian population.[iv] Such a widespread embrace of VPNs by both the general population and the educated elites suggests that Iranians are primed for change. While the government’s monopoly of force can perpetuate internet restrictions regardless of popular will, the desperation by Iranians to escape the Islamic Republic’s ideological bubble indicates that it would be naïve to accept regime claims of popular legitimacy.

Sources:

“بازار سیاه وی‌پی‌ان”(Black Market VPN),” Donya-e Eqtesad (Iranian financial newspaper, 13 February 2024. https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/بخش-بازار-دیجیتال-19/4045965-بازار-سیاه-وی-پی-ان

…. The number of users who buy VPNs is constantly increasing. Meanwhile, studies show that the price of filter breakers is getting more expensive by the day, and the volatility of the black market is also the result of inflation. People are forced to pay exorbitant prices for their natural right, i.e. free access to the Internet, to the extent that according to some statistics, in the past year, the annual gross for filter breakers reached 300 trillion rials [$7.14 billion]… greater than the revenue of the country’s two largest mobile providers.

In July-August this year, the Majlis Industry Commission published a report on the state of the Internet, in which it presented interesting statistics about the extent of people’s use of VPNs. According to this report, credible surveys show that about 64 percent of users use VPNs, and anonymous bandwidth share on the international network was less than five percent last year but now stands at 25 percent. During the presentation of the report of the Majlis’ Industries and Mines Commission, Gholamreza Nouri Ghezeljeh, the head of the independent faction in the Majlis [parliament] pointed to the statistics of 64 percent of people using filter breakers and said that some scientific centers reported up to 96 percent of the use of such workarounds to filters in scientific centers…. The frequent blocking of free VPNs has forced users to buy paid VPNs. Marzieh Adham, a communications scientist and cyberspace activist, told Donya-ye Eqtesad, “The reason for the price of VPNs is that the VPNs that are designed are constantly blocked and need to be recreated and made available to users.”

Notes:

[i] For an earlier discussion of Iranian efforts to create a national intranet, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Progress on National Intranet,” OE Watch, July 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/312355

[ii] For an earlier discussion of Iranian efforts to create state-sanctioned VPNs, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Established Official VPN Operators,” OE Watch, December 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/345959

[iii] For broader discussion of Iranian efforts to censor the internet, see: Michael Rubin, “Evolution of Iranian Surveillance Strategies Toward the Internet and Social Media,” The Institute for Policy, Advocacy, and Governance, December 2019. https://www.aei.org/articles/evolution-of-iranian-surveillance-strategies-toward-the-internet-and-social-media/

[iv] The current VPN battle parallels the efforts by ordinary Iranians to access satellite television in the 1990s. Iranians openly put satellite receivers on the roofs of their houses and apartment buildings. When efforts to bribe officials to look the other way failed, Iranians illegally imported ever-smaller satellite receivers they acquired in Dubai or Istanbul that they could better hide. After decades, the government effectively acknowledged defeat and stopped meaningful efforts to prevent Iranians from watching television programming from the outside world.

Image Information:

Image: Abolhassan Firouzabadi, secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace, poses in 2018.
Source: https://www.atnanews.ir/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/bazdid-fazaye-majazi-ertebatat-8.jpg
Attribution: Allameh Tabataba’i News Agency

Iran Conducts Joint Exercises To Bolster Air Force

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Iran’s Yasin training jet unveiled on 11 March 2023.

“The Air Force has had a very good year in the field of defense diplomacy.”

Iran’s Air Force traditionally lags behind its other military branches, but Iranian authorities are seeking to close the gap.[i] With the end of many sanctions and growing confidence, the Iranian Air Force is engaging in “defense diplomacy” with friendly regimes to improve pilot training and overall capability. While the excerpted article from a pro-regime website Alef.ir does not mention specific partners, there are few possibilities. Iran collaborates with the so-called “Axis of Resistance” consisting of pro-Iranian regimes or proxy groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Iranian soldiers have participated in exercises in Russia and former Soviet states in Central Asia, many of which might also open doors to Iranian pilot training.[ii] Any willingness by other countries to welcome Iranian pilots for training courses or exchanges could enhance Iranian familiarity with aircraft and platforms it might encounter in conflict and enable Iranian Air Force personnel to surreptitiously learn about potential new technologies. For example,  the Iraqi Air Force flies U.S.-produced F-16s that are a generation more advanced than jet fighters in Iran’s arsenal. Exchanges with Russia or China could foreshadow investment in their military markets. Air Force Commander Hamid Vahedi’s comments about “maintenance and repair of parts and airplanes” suggest that the Iranian Air Force might use new partnerships to acquire spare parts or upgrade avionics. While Iranian leaders often embraced the rhetoric of self-sufficiency to suggest isolation and sanctions did not hurt them, the scramble for new relationships suggests the Iranian Air Force seeks to emerge from its isolation and play a greater role in Iran’s regional military calculations.

Sources:

“بآمادگی نیروی هوایی ارتش برای انجام رزمایش با کشورهای همسو”(The Air Force is Prepared to Conduct Exercises with Allied Countries),” Alef.ir (website affiliated with conservative populist politician Ahmad Tavakkoli), 15 February 2024. https://www.alef.ir/news/4021126042.html

Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi, commander of Iranian Army’s Air Force, in a meeting of foreign military attaches in Tehran [coinciding with the 45th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution], said, “The Air Force has always been effective and decisive in every field that it has entered. The commander of the Army Air Force spoke of [recent achievements, including] “production and utilization of Yasin [RG1] training light fighter bomber and purchase and acquisition of the Fajr-3 training aircraft of the Pak-130 training aircraft; production and operation of a variety of drones including Kaman-12 [RG2] and Saman-22; performing long-range operations outside Iran’s flight information region (FIR); manufacturing of various simulators, laser-guided bombs, anti-radar rockets, as well as the establishment of new science centers including those focused on artificial intelligence…. He added, “The Air Force has had a very good year in the field of defense diplomacy, with a number of positive steps and productive instances of delegation exchanges, meetings and visits, training courses, and the dispatch of observers to exercises in other countries….” He added, “The Islamic Republic of Iran [Army] Air Force is prepared to cooperate and interact as much as possible with aligned countries in various fields, including carrying out joint exercises, educational cooperation, especially the exchange of students and professors between aviation universities in various fields, cooperation in the affairs of maintenance and repair of parts and airplanes.”

Notes:

[i] For a moment the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps sought to develop a strike fighter, but it was unable to compete technologically with the U.S.-produced F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and upgraded F-16s, Russia’s Sukhoi-35s, or their Chinese corollaries. Instead, Iran sought to jerry-rig and cannibalize its existing fleet to keep the dwindling number of its 1970s-era aircraft viable. For discussion of the state of the Iranian Air Force see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian F-14 Crash Highlights Iran’s Need for New Fighter Contract,” OE Watch, 08-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iranian-f-14-crash-highlights-irans-need-for-new-fighter-contract/

[ii] For earlier Iranian participation in Russian war games, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Revolutionary Guards Take Part in Russian Military Games,” OE Watch, September 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195247/download; For Iranian participation in Chinese war games, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: IRGC Training in China,” OE Watch, September 2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/205061/download

Image Information:

Image: Iran’s Yasin training jet unveiled on 11 March 2023.
Source: https://cdn.isna.ir/d/2023/03/11/3/62547091.jpg?ts=1678512083735
Attribution: Iranian Students’ News Agency

China Reinvigorates Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia

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Kyrgyz Highway A363 towards Chinese border-Xinjiang.

“China firmly supports Uzbekistan in safeguarding its national sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and firmly supports Uzbekistan in choosing its own development path.”

China seeks to strengthen its security cooperation with Central Asian countries to safeguard its core interests in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). According to the first excerpted article from the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, People’s Daily, Chinese President Xi Jinping met his Uzbek counterpart, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, in Beijing and pledged an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” with Uzbekistan. This places Uzbekistan at the highest ranking of China’s foreign relations alongside Pakistan, Belarus, and Venezuela. These elevated diplomatic ties not only pave the way for the advancement of strategic BRI projects but also signal to the BRI stakeholders the urgency of security cooperation in the current turbulent international environment.

To this end, Mirziyoyev places significant emphasis on the One-China principle and strictly opposes external interference in China’s internal affairs, especially with regard to Beijing’s crackdown on Uyghurs in Xinjiang Province in the name of deradicalization. Xinjiang is home to the Muslim Uyghur minority and borders the former Soviet states of Central Asia, serving as the geopolitical linchpin in the success of the rejuvenation of the Silk Road. Mirziyoyev firmly supports China stabilizing Xinjiang by taking repressive­­ measures to eradicate extremism, terrorism, and separatism. This state visit indicates a growing China-Central Asia alliance in security cooperation and soft power development. The day before Mirziyoyev’s visit, China’s State Council Information Office released a whitepaper, cited in the second excerpted article. This white paper articulates the legal basis for countering “The Three Evils,”[i] operation and supervision mechanisms, and China’s vision of security cooperation on a regional and global scale.[ii] With the growing “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” in the region, Beijing is undertaking a more direct engagement in Central Asia’s security and defense capabilities. Overall, China’s multifaceted BRI strategies are likely to intensify the growing Great Power competition in the region.

Sources:

Yijun Yang, “习近平同乌兹别克斯坦总统米尔济约耶夫会谈 (Xi Jinping holds talks with President Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan),” People’s Daily (official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee), 25 January 2024. http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-01/25/nw.D110000renmrb_20240125_1-01.htm

On January 24, President Xi Jinping hosted President Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan at the Great Hall of the People. The two heads of state announced that China and Uzbekistan have decided to develop an all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership, symbolizing an era of a more meaningful and dynamic China-Uzbekistan relationship.

Facing the current complex international situation, the two sides pledged to build a solid foundation for mutual trust and continue with high-quality joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China firmly supports Uzbekistan in safeguarding its national sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and firmly supports Uzbekistan in choosing its own development path.

Mirziyoyev said that he looks forward to the opportunity to further consolidate and deepen mutual trust and expand all-round cooperation under the BRI, including agriculture, green energy, and tourism. Uzbekistan firmly abides by the One-China principle, resolutely opposes external forces interfering in China’s internal affairs, and is willing to firmly support China on issues involving Taiwan, Xinjiang, human rights, and other matters related to China’s core interests. Furthermore, Uzbekistan is ready to work with China to combat the “Three Evilsand safeguard their respective and regional security.

“中国的反恐怖主义法律制度体系与实践 (China’s Legal Framework and Measures for Counterterrorism),” The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 23 January 2024. http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2024-01/23/content_116958678.htm

Terrorism poses a persistent and asymmetric threat to international peace and security. China has found a path of law-based counterterrorism that conforms to its realities by establishing a sound legal framework, promoting strict, impartial, procedure-based law enforcement, and ensuring impartial administration of justice and effective protection of human rights…

Relying on more than 40 years of experience, China has gradually developed a counterterrorism legal framework based on the Constitution. The Counterterrorism Law, in concert with the criminal laws and National Security Law, covers administrative regulations, judicial interpretations, local regulations, and departmental and local government rules…Upholding the vision of a global community of shared future, China is willing to work closely with other countries to push forward counterterrorism cause as part of global governance. On the basis of equality and respect, China will engage in extensive exchanges, cooperation, and mutual learning to facilitate the global effort to counter terrorism.

Notes:

[i] The “Three Evils” (三股恶势力) is a political slogan referencing extremism, terrorism, and separatism.

[ii] Released by China’s State Council Information Office, the white paper consists of chapters such as “An Improving Legal Framework for Counterterrorism,” “Clear Provisions for the Determination and Punishment of Terrorist Activities,” “Standardized Exercise of Power in Fighting Terrorism,” “Protection of Human Rights in Counterterrorism Practices,” and “Effective Protection of People’s Safety and National Security.”

Image Information:

Image: Kyrgyz Highway A363 towards Chinese border-Xinjiang.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kyrgyzstan_(6052094329).jpg
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Uzbekistan and China Sign Strategic Partnership Agreement

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Official portrait of Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev

“According to Xi, the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway should be started as soon as possible and help transform Uzbekistan from a landlocked country into a country connected by land routes.”

Uzbekistan conducts bilateral cooperation across political, economic, or security spheres with several different partners, including Russia, China, and the United States, but rarely engages too closely with any one partner. Despite precedent, the accompanying excerpted article from the independent Russian-language news website Fergana Agency reports that China and Uzbekistan signed an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” in late January 2024 during President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s visit to China. The article includes a quote from President Xi Jinping, who stated that China supports Uzbekistan’s “national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and in choosing its own development path.” In turn, Mirziyoyev stated that Uzbekistan supports the “one China principle.” Uzbekistan has previously stated it supports the one China principle, but Mirziyoyev went on to note that Uzbekistan now firmly supports Beijing on its core[i] interests, including Taiwan. He also noted that Uzbekistan will cooperate with China in the fight against the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Uzbekistan already cooperates with China on “three evils” through the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but this could be a sign of deeper cooperation in this area and might include an increase in bilateral security cooperation. China has already signed similar comprehensive agreements with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in recent years.[ii] Overall, the most recent agreement with Uzbekistan strengthens China’s position in the region.

Sources:

“Узбекистан и Китай повысили отношения до всепогодного всестороннего партнерства (Uzbekistan and China have increased relations to an all-weather comprehensive partnership),” Fergana Agency (independent Russian-language news website focusing on Central Asia), 25 January 2024. https://fergana.agency/news/132723

Uzbekistan and China have increased relations to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership for a new era.” The corresponding joint statement was signed by the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev and the President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping following negotiations in Beijing on January 24…

Xi Jinping noted that 32 years ago, Uzbekistan became the first Central Asian country to establish diplomatic relations with China…“In particular, over the past seven-plus years, we have been working together to establish healthy and prosperous bilateral cooperation in various fields,” the Chinese President said.

China firmly supports Uzbekistan in defending its national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and in choosing its own development path, Xi emphasized…

According to Xi, the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway should be started as soon as possible and help transform Uzbekistan from a landlocked country into a country connected by land routes…

Shavkat Mirziyoyev noted the symbolic significance of choosing China as the first country he visited this year…

Mirziyoyev stated that Uzbekistan:

  • firmly adheres to the “one China principle”
  • resolutely opposes the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of the PRC 
  • [is] ready to firmly support Beijing on issues related to its core interests, including Taiwan, Xinjiang, human rights 
  • [will] cooperate with the PRC in the fight against the “three forces of evil” (terrorism, separatism and extremism) and ensuring security in both countries and the region as a whole.

The parties welcomed the launch of a pilot project to introduce the Lu Ban Workshop, the Chinese vocational education system, in Uzbekistan. During the negotiations, it was noted that by the end of 2023, mutual trade between the two countries had reached $14 billion. The leaders expressed the opinion that in the near future trade turnover could be increased to $20 billion.

Mirziyoyev called on Chinese partners to actively participate in the processes of privatization of state-owned enterprises and banks in Uzbekistan. As a result of the negotiations, over 15 cooperation documents were signed regarding the joint construction of the Belt and Road, economic and technological cooperation, interconnectedness, environmental protection, new energy sources, science and culture…

[i] For additional information on China’s position regarding Taiwan being a “core interest,” see: Dodge Billingsley, “Chinese Officials Justify Reaction to Western Presence in Taiwan Strait,” OE Watch, 07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-officials-justify-reaction-to-western-presence-in-taiwan-strait-2/

[ii] The separate agreements between China and individual Central Asian states exemplify China’s preference for bilateral relations over regional frameworks. For background on China and Tajikistan’s security cooperation agreement, see: Matthew Stein and Peter Wood “Chinese-Tajikistani Security Cooperation Gaining Momentum,” FMSO Foreign Perspective Brief, January 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/chinese-tajikistani-security-cooperation-gaining-momentum-stein-wood/

Image Information:

Image: Official portrait of Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Shavkat_Mirziyoyev_official_portrait_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Sri Lanka Suspends Chinese Research Vessel Visits

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Map of South Asia, India featured.

“In the immediate (time frame), it means that China’s third ‘research/spy vessel’ Xiang Yang Hong 3 is not welcome in the first week of the New Year.”

India has been wary of Chinese research vessels docking in Sri Lankan ports and has pushed Sri Lanka to prevent these port calls. China claims the vessels are only for scientific purposes, but the Chinese ships that have docked in Sri Lanka are known to have dual scientific and intelligence-gathering purposes.[i] The accompanying excerpted articles report on Sri Lanka’s recent decision for a one-year moratorium on foreign research vessels docking in the country’s ports beginning 1 January 2024, and demonstrate how Sri Lanka continues to be a focal point in tensions between India and China.

The first excerpted article from India’s independent think tank Observer Research Foundation states that Sri Lanka’s moratorium is an attempt to appease India by not allowing Chinese ships to carry out intelligence gathering activities so close to India under the guise of scientific research. While Sri Lanka has become more economically tied with China over the past several years, it still relies on India as an economic and political partner. Sri Lanka’s ties with India, while strained at times, go back further than its ties with China. An immediate impact of the moratorium resulted in the Chinese ship Xiang Yang Hong 3 being prohibited from docking in Sri Lanka in early January. The author mentions that China sought permission from both Sri Lanka and the Maldives to dock the Xiang Yang Hong 3 late last year. The second excerpted article from India’s English-language daily Deccan Herald reports that in light of the Sri Lankan moratorium, the Maldives is allowing the Xiang Yang Hong 3 docking rights. The purpose of the Chinese visit is for the rotation of personnel and replenishment for the ship, and not for research, according to the article. Nevertheless, the decision by the Maldives enables China a port visit close to India. The article also mentions that there will likely be some political fallout between India and the Maldives over this authorization, though it is unclear how this will play out. Overall, Sri Lanka’s one year moratorium on foreign ships reflects India’s influence in Sri Lanka. However, the docking of the Xiang Yang Hong 3 in the Maldives likewise demonstrates that India’s ability to influence only extends so far, allowing China to project power and maintain a presence near India.

Sources:

N. Sathiya Moorthy, “Decoding Sri Lanka’s moratorium on foreign research vessels,” Observer Research Foundation (independent think-tank in India), 8 January 2024. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/decoding-sri-lanka-s-moratorium-on-foreign-research-vessels

On the face of it, the recent Sri Lankan government’s decision to ‘declare a pause’ on foreign research vessels for one year beginning 1 January 2024 is an attempt to buy peace with the large-hearted Indian neighbour, and also the United States…

In the immediate, it means that China’s third ‘research/spy vessel’ Xiang Yang Hong 3 is not welcome in the first week of the New Year…

“The arrival of these ships creates serious diplomatic tensions, and it (2024) is an election year,” Foreign Minister Ali Sabry said, by way of explanation. “Such ship visits can be highly disruptive for the region and Sri Lanka, because of the pressure the government may come under…” he added…

For instance, Shi Yan 6 was not the first Chinese research/survey ship, otherwise considered a ‘spy ship’, to visit Sri Lanka…A year earlier in 2022, Yuan Wang 5 had berthed at the Chinese-controlled Hambantota Port in the south, unlike Shi Yan 6, which docked at the capital Colombo…

In the case of the new vessel, Xiang Yang Hong 3, China had sought permission from both Sri Lanka and neighbouring Maldives, to dock it in these waters from 5 January to the end of May, a long five-month haul. As the intention was to map the ocean in these parts, the long stay should be a cause for concern for the larger Indian neighbour.

It should be equally so for the US, whose Diego Garcia military base is situated 700 km away…

Anirban Bhaumik, “India wary as Maldives allows China ‘research vessel’ to dock at port,” Deccan Herald (English-language daily newspaper in India), 23 January 2024.

https://www.deccanherald.com/world/india-wary-as-maldives-allows-china-research-vessel-to-dock-at-port-2861168

…President Mohamed Muizzu’s government on Tuesday stated that it had decided to allow Chinese PLAN’s ‘research vessel’ Xiang Yang Hong 3 to dock at Malé, the main port of the Maldives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the government of the Maldives stated that the decision to allow the ship to make the port call followed a diplomatic request from Beijing. It, however, claimed that Xiang Yang Hong 3 would dock at Malé only for the rotation of personnel and replenishment and would not conduct any research as long as it would remain in the territorial waters of the Maldives.New Delhi, however, is not convinced and, according to the sources, would soon convey its concerns to Malé through diplomatic channels. A source in New Delhi told DH that India would use its assets to keep watch on the Xiang Yang Hong 3 during its port call in the Maldives…

Notes:

[i] For background on India pressuring Sri Lanka to prevent Chinese vessels docking in Sri Lankan ports, see: Matthew Stein “India Works To Maintain Sri Lankan Foothold Amid Growing China Presence,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/india-works-to-maintain-sri-lankan-foothold-amid-growing-china-presence/

Image Information:

Image: Map of South Asia, India featured.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:South_Asia._LOC_2001622357.jpg
Attribution: Public domain

China Claims Philippine Navy Seeks External Intervention in South China Sea

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Philippine Coast Guard

“China has firmly gained actual control of Second Thomas Shoal and its adjacent waters, but China and the Philippines are in a stalemate.”

On 5 January, an anonymous Chinese analyst published the accompanying excerpted Chinese-language article analyzing the ongoing clashes in the South China Sea between China and the Philippines. The article contends that Philippine warships were illegally resting on the Second Thomas Shoal.[i]. The author claims the Philippines was attempting to send repair materials to those ships, escalating tensions with China. Further, the tensions provided excuses for external forces (specifically the United States and Japan) to intervene on the Philippine side. The author also suggests that the Philippine strategy was to benefit from foreign assistance to establish full control of the Second Thomas Shoal. The author’s outlook mimics the Chinese government’s official position. To that end, the author asserts that China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea, to include the Second Thomas Shoal.[ii] While the author acknowledges that China and the Philippines are in a stalemate over control of the shoal, the author claims the Philippines will also try to provoke China into an action that would undermine its legitimate claims to the shoal. The author claims the Philippine strategy began with the new Marcos administration, which took office in June 2022.[iii] China contends the Philippine government should have removed the broken ships from the shoal instead of trying to repair them. In conclusion, the author insists that dialogue is the best way to manage differences in the South China Sea. However, as the author sees it, there appears to be little prospect for a resolution through dialogue due to the Marcos administration’s provocations.

Sources:

“非法“坐滩”军舰即将解体，菲律宾又想了个馊主意 (The illegal “beach-sitting” warships will soon be ruined, and the Philippines has another bad idea),” sohu.com (Beijing-based internet company providing information on diverse aspects of contemporary Chinese affairs), 5 January 2024. https://www.sohu.com/a/748698907_137871#google_vignette

In the past year, the Philippines has frequently provoked troubles in the South China Sea, and China has decisively counterattacked. In the end, the Philippines failed to obtain any benefits. However, the Philippines will obviously not surrender because its warships illegally on the Second Thomas Shoal beachside are about to be ruined. This is among the main reasons why the Philippines desperately breaks into the Second Thomas Shoal to transport repair materials. In addition, the Philippines intends to escalate tensions in the South China Sea and create excuses for external forces such as the United States and Japan to interfere in the situation in the South China Sea.

Notes:

[i] The Second Thomas Shoal is an atoll in the Spratly Island chain and has been a flashpoint between China and the Philippines, among their other broader disputes in the South China Sea. The Philippines has deployed marines to a broken down navy ship, which was grounded on the shoal in 1999 while attempting to protect Philippine maritime claims. In 2013, China began to increase its presence near the shoal to weaken the Philippines’ control of it. China also claims that former Philippines president, Joseph Estrada (1998-2001), had promised to remove the Philippine Navy ship, but the current Marcos government denies this. “China-Philippines Tensions in the South China Sea,” Congressional Research Service, In Focus, 13 December 2023. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12550/2

[ii] For additional information on the China-Philippines dispute over the Second Thomas Shoal, see: Dodge Billingsley, “China and Philippines Spar Over Grounded Ship in Spratly Islands,” OE Watch, 08-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/china-and-philippines-spar-over-grounded-ship-in-spratly-islands/

[iii] In 2020 and 2021, the Duterte administration began to express concerns about Chinese island reclamation in the South China Sea. Since coming to power in 2022, geopolitical factors have moved the Marcos administration even closer to the United States and farther from China. One reason for this is China’s increasing efforts to terraform islands in the South China Sea, which enables China to assert a greater territorial presence in the sea. Another reason is that the Chinese “fishing militia” has amassed at Whitsun Reef, which demonstrates China’s intent to seize it from Philippine control. Alvina Cambria, “From Aquino to Marcos: political survival and Philippine foreign policy towards China,” China, Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 6 November 2023. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24761028.2023.2281165

Image Information:

Image: A Chinese Coast Guard ship allegedly obstructs the Philippine Coast Guard vessel Malabrigo as it provided support during a Philippine Navy operation near Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed South China Sea, 30 June 2023.
Source: Philippine Coast Guard, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:June_30,_2023_PCG_CCG_encounter_1.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

China Increases Presence in East China Sea To Change Status Quo

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The East China Sea. The pink line represents the both the regular Chinese ADIZ and the ECS ADIZ.

“We can only move forward, not backward. We will never let even 1 millimeter of our territory taken.” -Xi Jinping

China is reportedly deploying multiple warships near the borders of its East China Sea (ECS) air defense identification zone (ADIZ) for at least the next year.[i] The action by the PLA Navy raises concern for nearby Japan. According to the first article excerpt published in one of Japan’s leading newspapers, Yomiuri Shimbun, Japanese sources have observed a Jiangkai II-class [RG1] guided missile frigate and a highly capable air defense missile destroyer in the ECS.[ii] Japan is concerned by China’s operational posture within its unilaterally established ECS ADIZ. As the article explains, instead of allowing freedom of navigation in international airspace recognized in international law, China is operating as if its ECS zone falls under their jurisdiction, often warning foreign aircraft within the ADIZ that it will take “defensive emergency measures” if they do not leave immediately.

Concern surrounding the ECS ADIZ is not new. This zone differs from others as it intentionally overlaps portions of ADIZs maintained by Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.[iii] The overlapping zones could create potential flashpoints, especially in areas in which disputed territories are involved. For example, both ADIZs maintained by China and Japan overlap the highly disputed, Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, located adjacent to Taiwan. According to the second article excerpt, published through Tokyo-based nonprofit news agency Kyodo News, China’s Coast Guard drafted a plan to maintain its presence around the Senkakus, (also known as Diaoyu in China) throughout 2024. This decision came after Chinese President Xi Jinping pointed out the need for China to “constantly strengthen” its efforts to safeguard the sovereignty of the islands. The last excerpted article, also published in Yomiuri Shimbun, points out that China is strengthening its anti-access/area denial strategy while also exerting military pressure on Taiwan.[iv] The article describes China having four ships deployed around the clock, working closely with fighters, and increasing military activities. It adds that China will likely aim to block U.S. and Japan Self Defense Forces aircraft from entering the airspace in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. Meanwhile, an expert cited in the article points out that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could include a concurrent “Senkaku contingency” because China claims the Senkakus are part of Taiwan.

Sources:

“China Deploys Multiple Warships Around Self-Claimed ADIZ,” Yomiuri Shimbun (one of Japan’s five major newspapers), 28 January 2024. https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/defense-security/20240128-165250/
China is deploying multiple warships around the clock in waters near the borders of the air defense identification zone that it has unilaterally established, The Yomiuri Shimbun has learned.

China is operating the zone on the premise that it is Chinese airspace. Aircraft that fly within its ADIZ are told to immediately leave.
Contrary to international custom, China unilaterally demands that aircraft flying in the zone follow Chinese authorities’ instructions. It also claims it will take “defensive emergency measures” if an aircraft fails to do so.

China started deploying at least three navy warships around the clock in waters around its claimed ADIZ, according to Japanese government sources. The three include an air defense missile destroyer, which is the Chinese version of an Aegis-equipped destroyer, and a frigate warship. Equipped with high-performance radar, air defense missile destroyers are highly capable of shooting down aircraft. The Chinese military aircraft repeatedly scramble in response to SDF aircraft, according to the sources. The Chinese military is believed to be strengthening its monitoring of SDF and U.S. military aircraft and warships in the East China Sea.

China’s monitoring capabilities were initially believed to be low, and it was thought that its establishment of the ADIZ would have no substantial impact. However, some observers are warning that China will have its warships, which are deployed around the clock, and fighters work together and increase its military activities. “It’s intended to block the SDF and U.S. military aircraft [from entering the airspace] in the event of contingencies in the Taiwan Strait,” said an SDF source.

“China Plans To Keep Ships Near Senkakus 365 Days in 2024,” Kyodo News (Tokyo-based non-profit news agency), 30 December 2024. https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/12/eb55266c4a9f-china-plans-to-keep-ships-near-senkakus-365-days-in-2024.html?phrase=Senkaku&words=Senkakus,Senkaku

 China plans to keep its ships near the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea for 365 days in 2024 as leader Xi Jinping has called for bolstering Beijing’s sovereignty claim over the islets, sources familiar with the matter said Saturday.

During a rare visit by Xi on Nov. 29 to the command office for the East China Sea area of the China Coast Guard in Shanghai, the president pointed out the need for Beijing to “constantly strengthen” its efforts to safeguard the sovereignty of the islands, which China calls
Diaoyu, the sources said.

Xi, who also heads the Central Military Commission, the highest national defense organization, commented on a bilateral row over the Senkaku Islands, saying, “We can only move forward, not backward. We will never let even 1 millimeter of our territory taken,” the sources added.

“4 Chinese Warships Deployed Around Taiwan, Sources Say; Believe Ships Will Collaborate with Other Warships in East China Sea,” Yomiuri Shimbun (one of Japan’s five major newspapers), 30 January 2024. https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/defense-security/20240130-165702/

China is believed to be using the ships to exert military pressure on Taiwan. If China and Taiwan enter an armed conflict with each other, an envisaged situation known as a Taiwan contingency, China likely will aim to block U.S. and other forces by using the ships in conjunction with other warships nearby. These warships are continually being deployed near the border of China’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), which China has unilaterally declared over an area of the East China Sea.

China is strengthening its anti-access/ area denial (A2/AD) strategy, which restricts the military activities of other countries in its vicinity. The strategy aims to prevent U.S. forces from entering the first island chain that connects the Nansei Islands and the Philippines. The Chinese warships deployed near the ADIZ and around Taiwan are said to be almost in line with the island chain.“There’s a good chance that China will use force to make a move on the Senkakus in the future if Japan lets its guard down,” former Self-Defense Fleet Commander in Chief Yoji Koda said. “Japan needs to be fully prepared.”

Notes:

[i] A buffer zone set up by a country outside its sovereign airspace is intended to help prevent incursions. China’s zones can be broken down into the “China ADIZ” and the “ECS ADIZ,” the latter of which is contested. For more information on China’s ECS Air Defense Identification Zone, see: “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zones: A Primer,” Center for International Maritime Security, 10 November 2022. https://cimsec.org/east-china-sea-air-defense-identification-zones-a-primer/

[ii] While the article does not identify the exact destroyer type, it refers to it as “The Chinese version of an Aegis-equipped destroyer,” which is likely the Type 052D. The Type 052D, is equipped with an advanced active electronically scanned array radar system and a 64-cell missile vertical launch system capable of firing surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles. Liu Xuanzun, “China Launches Two New Type 052D Destroyers: Media,” Global Times, 12 March 2023. globaltimes.cn/page/202303/1287149.shtml  

[iii] Japan established its ADIZ in 1969, while the United States established Taiwan’s after WWII and South Korea’s during the Korean War. Ibid.

[iv] For additional information on China’s position regarding Taiwan, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Chinese Officials Justify Reaction to Western In Taiwan Strait,” OE Watch, 07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-officials-justify-reaction-to-western-presence-in-taiwan-strait-2/

Image Information:

Image: The East China Sea. The pink line represents the both the regular Chinese ADIZ and the ECS ADIZ.
Source: Maximilian Dörrbecker (Chumwa), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Defense_Identification_Zone_(East_China_Sea)#/media/File:JADIZ_and_CADIZ_and_KADIZ_in_East_China_Sea.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0


Hungary Deepens Bilateral Ties With Chad

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Trigger time at Flintlock 20, USAFRICOM from Stuttgart, Germany.

“Prime Minister Viktor Orban has decided to deploy a military contingent to Chad for two years before March 2024 to assist the country economically, prevent illegal immigration, and help combat terrorism.”

In recent years, France, the historical European power in West Africa, has been withdrawing from the region, while Russia has been reasserting its military and political influence.[i] Additionally, Hungary, a country with a foreign policy more aligned with Russia than other European Union (EU) countries, has begun expanding its footprint in West Africa. As the excerpted French-language article in the Chadian news website alwihdainfo.com notes, Hungary has signed military, educational, health, agricultural, and energy memoranda of understanding with Chad. Both countries have expressed the desire to strengthen their bilateral ties.

A French-language article on the website of Radio France Internationale, provides additional details, reporting that Hungary intends to send between 200 and 400 soldiers to Chad to focus on stopping migration, countering terrorism, and providing humanitarian assistance. The article also notes that with instability surrounding Chad, the country has become a refugee hub. This is why Hungary is setting up a permanent base in the country and why Hungary’s foreign minister stated his country was determined not to let Chad collapse.

The article acknowledged the domestic policy motivations for Hungary, which, like Russia, has become antagonistic to the EU, despite Hungary being a member-state.[ii] Further, according to the article, Hungarian media has promoted the story that the EU plans to establish “migrant ghettos” in Hungary. This represents an effort to sway Hungarian public opinion for foreign policy measures to stop migration, such as the new measures in Chad. It also appears Hungary is aligning its foreign policy in Africa with Russia’s. Russia is over-extended in Africa because of its Ukraine operations and can only deploy a few thousand former Wagner fighters to Africa, seemingly in the context of the Africa Corps. However, in countries where former Wagner troops are not operational, Hungary can step in and support juntas or other authoritarian regimes, such as Chad, which is seeing diminishing Western support. The emerging “coup belt” countries in West Africa will be empowered and less likely to restore civilian rule like the juntas had originally promised now that Russia and seemingly Hungary are backing them.

Sources:

“Coopération: Le Tchad et la Hongrie renforcent leur coopération dans plusieurs domaines (Cooperation: Chad and Hungary strengthen their cooperation in several domains),” alwihdainfo.com (Privately owned French-language Chadian website noted for being critical of the government), 8 December 2023. alwihdainfo.com/Cooperation-Le-Tchad-et-la-Hongrie-renforcent-leur-cooperation-dans-plusieurs-domaines_a128541.html

During a joint press conference, the two diplomats highlighted the advantages and objectives of the agreements, emphasizing their importance in strengthening the new and strengthened cooperation while respecting the interests of each country…. They expressed their confidence in strengthening ties between Chad and Hungary, and stressed that the bilateral cooperation will benefit both peoples and contribute to regional stability. According to Ndjamena, the agreements signed on December 7, 2023 create a pathway for productive collaboration between Chad and Hungary and offere new opportunities for economic growth, social development, and scientific progress.

“La Hongrie compte envoyer des militaires au Tchad pour lutter contre «les migrations» (Hungary plans to send soldiers to Chad to fight against “migration),” rfi.fr (French state-owned radio news website reporting on international affairs), 19 November 2023. rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20231118-la-hongrie-compte-envoyer-des-militaires-au-tchad-pour-lutter-contre-les-migrations

As Budapest is strongly opposed to the European refugee acceptance policy, it continues to claim that it is necessary to “support the management of problems where they begin and not transfer them to Europe”, Prime Minister Viktor Orban has decided to deploy a military contingent to Chad for two years before March 2024 to assist the country economically, prevent illegal immigration, and help combat terrorism. Instead of welcoming refugees to Hungary, Viktor Orban’s government prefers to support the African people there. Hungary will send between 200 and 400 soldiers to Chad. The government continues to generate fear of migration in the run-up to the 2024 European elections. The Hungarian Post began sending a government questionnaire to all Hungarians, which was published on the Internet. It has questions such as “Brussels wants to install migrant ghettos in Hungary. Do you agree ?” which is a totally false statement.

Notes:

[i] The French withdrawal from West Africa was a major trend in 2023. The year concluded with the French Embassy in Niger announcing that it was ending its diplomatic presence in the country. France also withdrew its 4,500-troop Operation Barkhane force from Mali in August 2022 and withdrew its troops from Burkina Faso in February 2023. These events have all occurred after coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in May 2021, January 2022, and July 2023, respectively, which France and the West denounced. Russia, in contrast, has backed the post-coup military regimes. For more on Burkina Faso’s role as a bellwether of Russian and France in West Africa, see Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso: A Bellwether on Russian and French Presence,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/burkina-faso-a-bellwether-on-russian-and-french-presence/

[ii] Since Viktor Orbán became Prime Minister in 2010, Hungary has passed several illiberal legislative bills, with strict anti-migrant legislation as a core policy. Hungary also has embraced the authoritarian leaders in Russia and China and helped to deepen their political and economic influence throughout Central Europe. Although little existing research has discussed Hungary coordinating or aligning its foreign policy with that of Russia, Hungary’s cultivating security ties specifically with Chad—whose authoritarian leader since 2021, Mahamat Déby, succeeded his father, who ruled for three decades—notably comes at a time when Russia is supporting other military-authoritarian regimes in West Africa as well, which border Chad, including in Sudan, Libya, Central African Republic, Mali, and Niger. For an assessment of Russian influence on Hungary, see Dr. Péter Krekó, “ING2 Committee Hearing on Russian interference in the EU: the distinct cases of Hungary and Spain,” European Parliament, 27 October 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/256493/OJ%20item%204_peter_kreko_ing2_hearing_20221027_speaking_points.pdf.

Image Information:

Image: Trigger time at Flintlock 20, USAFRICOM from Stuttgart, Germany.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Trigger_time_at_Flintlock_20_(50111204252).jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Resolve Border Dispute

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President Sadyr Zhaparov of the Kyrgyz Republic and President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan forged a bi-lateral agreement regarding shared disputed borders, outside the CSTO framework.

“Chairman of the State Committee for National Security Kamchybek Tashiev said that more than 90% of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border has been agreed upon. He made this statement on December 12 after a meeting with his Tajik counterpart Saimumin Yatimov.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Kloop reports that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan recently reached a bilateral agreement to demarcate most of their shared border separate from efforts by Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to resolve the border dispute. The CSTO is a political-military organization made up of former Soviet republics, including Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan that works to provide security in the Eurasia region. The Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan dispute stems from borders that were not demarcated when the two countries became independent. The lack of clear boundaries has been a source of contention and became particularly acute after a series of clashes took place in 2022.[i] The largest and deadliest clash took place in September 2022 and threatened to undermine cooperation within the CSTO as it marked the first time relations between two member states resulted in open armed conflict.[ii] According to the Kloop article, the heads of the National Security Committees of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in December and agreed to demarcate a large section of their border. The agreement includes demarcating some of the more controversial sections of the border near the location of previous clashes. The article also notes that the agreement is not finalized, but it will likely fulfill the promise by Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov to resolve the border issue by the spring of 2024. It remains to be seen whether this agreement will prevent any future border clashes from taking place or if they do, whether Russia or the CSTO will get involved. While the fact that neither Russia nor the CSTO were involved in the mediations is noteworthy given the regional role of Russia and the fact that the CSTO, the development is not necessarily a sign of waning Russian interest. Russia has offered to mediate following border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan over the years, but nothing came of it. Also, the CSTO claims it is ready and capable of providing security in the region but could not prevent two of its member states from clashing. Instead, the agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan reflects the fact that governments in the region have taken more initiative[iii]  in regard to their own security affairs, rather than looking to outside partners.

Sources:

“Ташиев и Ятимов сообщили о согласовании более 90% кыргызско-таджикской границы (Tashiyev and Yatimov reported on the agreement of more than 90 percent of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border),” Kloop (independent Russian-language news website in Kyrgyzstan), 13 December 2023.

Chairman of the State Committee for National Security Kamchybek Tashiev said that more than 90% of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border has been agreed upon. He made this statement on December 12 after a meeting with his Tajik counterpart Saimumin Yatimov.

Tashiev and Yatimov are the chairmen of the government delegations of the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan on the delimitation and demarcation of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border…

According to him, the sections starting from Kayragach, Kulundu, Maksat, Arki-1, Arki-2, Zhany-zher and up to Zhiydelik have been fully agreed upon. Sections from Kara-Bak, Lakko to the “junction of the point of three states” have also been agreed upon.

“That is, at the moment we have almost completed all controversial issues [on the border]. There are only a few meetings left to finally finalize the issue with the state border,” concluded the head of the State Committee for National Security…

Earlier, President Sadyr Japarov promised that the issue of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border would be resolved before the spring of 2024.

The total length of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border is 972 kilometers. As of 2022, a total of 664 kilometers of border have been agreed upon…

Due to undefined borders, conflicts periodically arise in the territories adjacent to Tajikistan in the Batken and Osh regions…

The last large-scale conflict occurred on September 14-17, 2022. Fights and clashes took place along the entire perimeter of the state border. As a result of the conflict, 63 Kyrgyzstanis were killed and another 206 people were injured. The Tajik authorities noted that 41 people were killed and more than 20 people were injured in that conflict…

Notes:

[i] For background on Russian efforts following the September 2022 clashes, see (in Russian): Mirayim Almas, “«Богатый опыт»: Россия готова помочь Кыргызстану и Таджикистану в решении пограничных споров (‘Rich experience’: Russia is ready to help Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in resolving the border disputes),” Kloop, 15 September 2022. https://kloop.kg/blog/2022/09/15/bogatyj-opyt-rossiya-gotova-pomoch-kyrgyzstanu-i-tadzhikistanu-v-reshenii-pogranichnyh-sporov/

[ii] Kyrgyzstan cancelled a CSTO exercise set to take place in October 2022 following the border clash with Tajikistan. See: Matthew Stein “Members Of Collective Security Treaty Organization Show Less Support For Russia-Led Body,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/members-of-collective-security-treaty-organization-show-less-support-for-russia-led-body/

[iii] For more on Central Asian states cooperating on security issues, see: Matthew Stein “Central Asian States Take the Initiative in Security Cooperation,” OE Watch, 01-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/central-asian-states-take-the-initiative-in-security-cooperation/

Image Information:

Image: President Sadyr Zhaparov of the Kyrgyz Republic and President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan forged a bi-lateral agreement regarding shared disputed borders, outside the CSTO framework.
Sources: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Official_Photo_of_the_President_of_the_Kyrgyz_Republic_H.E._Mr._Sadyr_Zhaparov.jpg and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_Tajikistan – /media/File:2021_Moscow_Victory_Day_Parade_037_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: Modified (combined photos) as per rights granted: CC BY SA 4.0

India Looking to Alternative Arms Suppliers Because of Delays From Russia

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The next generation M4 rifle from Swiss Arms, the Sig Sauer SG 516 is a newborn assault rifle manufactured by the SIGARMS GmbH, Switzerland. The rifle is based on an American-made Colt Defense M4 Carbine but combined with gas piston/op-rod system, based on the SIG 550 series system.

“This deficit surfaced visibly in the inability of the Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited (IRRPL) joint venture (JV), instituted in late 2021, to deliver the first batch of around 5,000 AK-203 7.62x39mm rifles to the Indian Army, by March 2024.”

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the impact on the Russian defense industry’s deliveries of weapons and equipment to numerous countries, including India, is well documented.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website The Wire reports on a Russian-Indian joint venture failing to meet an early 2024 delivery deadline of a batch of assault rifles for India’s Armed Forces. While this marked a small item that Russia has failed to deliver to India compared to the larger systems that have been delayed, the article notes that India has already found an alternative. The article reports that the Indian Army recently acquired 73,000 SIG Sauer rifles from the United States, similar to a purchase of SIG Sauer rifles a few years ago to meet a short notice operational requirement.[ii] The article notes delays of a few other Russian systems, including two S-400 [R1] surface-to-air missile systems and two guided missile frigates. India is not likely to quickly find alternatives to the S-400s or frigates, considering the cost and delivery timeline for these types of systems. However, India’s purchase of SIG Sauer rifles shows that it is willing to look for alternative partners whenever possible.

Sources:

Rahul Bedi, “Russian Rifle Delays Raise Concerns Over Deliveries from Moscow,” The Wire (an independent English-language news website), 15 December 2023. https://thewire.in/security/indias-assault-rifle-induction-woes-continue-with-delays-in-indigenous-ak-203-production

Delays in the indigenous licensed manufacture of Russian Kalashnikov AK-203 [R1] assault rifles at a dedicated facility in Korwa near Amethi in Uttar Pradesh, has further raised concerns in domestic military circles over Moscow’s ability to deliver assorted contracted-for platforms and other materiel to India on time, or if at all.

Despite the sanguinity expressed periodically by Russian officials and diplomats to their Indian counterparts – over the fact that their military-industrial complex remained robust and was ‘on stream’ to vindicate its equipment delivery schedules, US-led sanctions on Moscow for invading Ukraine have, in reality severely jeopardised its capacities in this regard.

This deficit surfaced visibly in the inability of the Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited (IRRPL) joint venture (JV), instituted in late 2021, to deliver the first batch of around 5,000 AK-203 7.62x39mm rifles to the Indian Army, by March 2024. Instead, at the Indian Army’s prompting, the Ministry of Defence recently approved the add-on import of around 73,000 ‘Patrol’ Sig Sauer assault rifles from the US…

No official statement on this postponement in supplying the AK-203s to the Indian Army units has been forthcoming, from either IRRPL, the Indian Army or the Ministry of Defence. But industry sources said that the economic and technological sanctions on Russia, were together responsible for deferrals in even an industrially low-end project entailing the licensed manufacture of assault rifles. The IRRPL was formed, amidst much fanfare, to manufacture some 750,000 AK-203 rifles…

Russia’s defence industrial complex seems to concur, as it recently conceded its inability in continuing to deliver military kit to its many clients, including India, as it needed to prioritise ‘manufacturing and supplying products to the Russian Army’…

Meanwhile, apart from the deferred AK-203 project, India has three other major Russian platforms on order, all of which were plagued by delays, and possibly an ambiguous future.

These included the delivery of two of five Almaz-Antey S-400 Triumf self-propelled surface-to-air missile systems, acquired for the Indian Air Force (IAF) in a deal signed in October 2018 for $5.5 billion, constructing two Project 1135.6M Admiral Grigorovich guided missile frigates worth an estimated $950 million at Russia’s Yantar Shipyard at Kaliningrad…Between 2021 and March 2023 Russia had delivered three S-400 systems, and Rosonboronexport’s Mikheyev had recently told the country’s state-owned news agency TASS, that the remaining two air defence systems would arrive by end-2023, which has not happened…

Notes:

[i] For more information on Russian military equipment delays to India since the war in Ukraine began, see: Matthew Stein, “India Takes a Step Away from the Russian Defense Industry,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 31 July 2023. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3475660/india-takes-a-step-away-from-the-russian-defense-industry/

[ii] See: Matthew Stein, “Bypassing the “Make in India” Initiative,” OE Watch, May 2020. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-21393-00-00-00-35-96-47/2020_2D00_05_2D00_01-Bypassing-the-_1C20_Make-in-India_1D20_-Initiative-_2800_Stein_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true

Image Information:

Image: The next generation M4 rifle from Swiss Arms, the Sig Sauer SG 516 is a newborn assault rifle manufactured by the SIGARMS GmbH, Switzerland. The rifle is based on an American-made Colt Defense M4 Carbine but combined with gas piston/op-rod system, based on the SIG 550 series system.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SIG_SG_516_14.5%E2%80%B3.jpg
Attribution: CCA 3.0