Tag Archives: Ukraine

Russia Further Bolstering Iran Relations Following Ukraine Invasion

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Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.

Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.

“The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation also stressed that ‘Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order.’”

A major tenet of the Kremlin’s current ideology revolves around transforming what it perceives as a U.S.-led global security sphere into a multipolar world order where Russia occupies one of the key poles. The Kremlin promotes this ideology globally, especially to countries that have had a troubled relationship with the United States, and Russia has increased these efforts since its invasion of Ukraine began. The accompanying excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant describes the recent visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to Tehran on 9 November, where he claimed, “Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order.” During Patrushev’s visit, the two sides “discussed all aspects of bilateral cooperation, from the economy to security,” in light of improving bilateral relations over the past decade.[i] The author suggests that the two countries traded notes regarding “the survival of the economy under sanctions, cybersecurity, terrorism, as well as the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of Russia and Iran.” The latter point was emphasized by Patrushev, who “noted the key role that Western intelligence services have played in organizing mass riots in Iran and the subsequent dissemination of disinformation about the situation in the country.”

Since the Kremlin officially denies receiving military assistance from Iran, the article carefully cites foreign reports on “the supply of Iranian drones to Russia for use in hostilities in Ukraine.” For the Kremlin and the wider Russian audience, admitting the need for Iranian military technology would be regarded as humiliating. Not that long ago, it was Iran who requested Russian military assistance, and now the tables have turned.[ii] The article concludes by asserting that increased Western pressure on Iran will likely result in “closer cooperation between Russia and Iran.”

Source:

Marianna Belenkaya, “Совбезы РФ и Ирана поговорили на одном языке (Security Councils of Russia and Iran spoke the same language),” Kommersant (pro-business news outlet), 9 November 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/amp/5653639

Russia and Iran held interdepartmental consultations on security issues in Tehran on Wednesday (9 Nov). The Russian delegation was led by Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Patrushev. In the Iranian capital, he was received by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. According to official reports, the meeting discussed various issues of Russian-Iranian cooperation in the field of security, as well as a number of international problems….

The two countries have accumulated a lot of common themes, or rather, common problems. Among them are the survival of the economy under sanctions, cybersecurity, terrorism, as well as the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of Russia and Iran.

Iranian politicians do not need to explain anything to their Russian colleagues. They understand everything themselves, moreover, they speak the same language. Thus, at a meeting with an Iranian colleague, Nikolai Patrushev noted “the key role of Western intelligence services in organizing mass riots in Iran and the subsequent dissemination of disinformation about the situation in the country based on the Persian-language Western media controlled by them.” …The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation also stressed that “Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order” and this “is confirmed by the unprecedented pressure on our countries from Washington and its satellites.”

…From the very beginning of hostilities in Ukraine, Tehran stated that they understood Russian security concerns and believed that the conflict between Moscow and Kyiv was provoked by NATO… The atmosphere in Iranian-Ukrainian relations escalated after the media reported on the supply of Iranian drones to Russia for use in hostilities in Ukraine….

… Against this background, experts believe that the stronger the pressure of the West on Iran, including in the form of strengthening the sanctions regime, and the more elusive the chance to restore the “nuclear deal” becomes, the closer cooperation between Russia and Iran will become.

Notes:

[i] For additional background on Russian-Iran relations, see Ray Finch, “Russian Views of Iran,” Review of Persidskij bastion (Persian Bastion) in NATO Defense Review, edited by R. N. Pukhov and Yu. Yu. Lyamin, Moscow, CAST, 2019, 320pp. https://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=668

[ii] For additional background on Russian arms sales to Iran, see Ray Finch, “Russian Arms Sales to Iran,” OE Watch, July 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/365980

Image Information:

Image: Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Patrushev_NP.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Intl

Members of Collective Security Treaty Organization Show Less Support for Russia-Led Body

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Flag of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Flag of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

“The question of the participation of the troops of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in the war between Russia and Ukraine is not on the agenda.”

Despite various disputes and conflicts, member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) have until recently appeared to put aside their differences to continue working jointly within the Eurasian intergovernmental military alliance. However, as the accompanying excerpted articles illustrate, these internal frictions may be taking a toll. The first article excerpted article from semi-independent Russian daily newspaper Kommersant reports on Armenia’s refusal to participate in a CSTO exercise that took place in Kazakhstan. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had requested that the CSTO provide military assistance following the mid-September 2022 clashes with Azerbaijan, but member states “insisted on the need to resolve the conflict situation through diplomacy.” This marked the second time that the CSTO refused military assistance to Armenia in its clashes with Azerbaijan. The second article, from independent news website Fergana, reports on Kyrgyzstan’s refusal to take part in a CSTO exercise in Tajikistan because of ongoing clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. The article also notes that the Ministry of Defense of Kyrgyzstan cancelled a separate CSTO exercise in Kyrgyzstan a week prior. The CSTO exercises in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan were part of an annual series that focuses on preparing CSTO joint operational forces for a variety of scenarios. The third article, from Kazakhstan’s independent news website Vlast, reports on a comment from an official from Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry that CSTO forces will not get involved in the war in Ukraine, noting Kazakhstan’s respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. While Kazakh officials have previously mentioned their position on this, the statement comes at a time when other member states are showing less overall support for the organization.

Sources:

Andrey Sapozhnikov, “Армения не будет участвовать в учениях ОДКБ (Armenia will not participate in the CSTO exercises),” Kommersant (semi-independent Russian daily newspaper), 26 September 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5581954

The exercises of the countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which will be held from September 26 to October 8 in Kazakhstan, will be held without the participation of Armenia. The reason for the country’s refusal to participate in military activities was the border conflict with Azerbaijan…

On September 13, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalated…Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan requested military assistance from the organization. The CSTO member countries, however, insisted on the need to resolve the conflict situation through diplomacy.

“Кыргызстан отказался от участия в учениях ОДКБ в Таджикистане из-за «неостывшей крови» (Kyrgyzstan refused to participate in the CSTO exercise in Tajikistan because of “bad blood”),” Fergana Agency (an independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 11 October 2022. https://fergana.agency/news/128011/

The military contingent of Kyrgyzstan will not take part in the exercises of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) “Frontier – 2022” in Tajikistan due to the military conflict between the two countries. This was stated by Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan Edil Baisalov…

…on October 9, the Ministry of Defense of Kyrgyzstan announced the cancellation of the CSTO exercises “Indestructible Brotherhood – 2022”, which were to be held from October 10 to 14 at the Edelweiss training center in Balykchy. The reasons for the cancellation were not reported.

Tamara Vaal, “Войска ОДКБ не будут принимать участие в войне между Россией и Украиной – МИД (The Forces of the CSTO will not take part in the war between Russia and Ukraine – Ministry of Foreign Affairs),” Vlast (independent news website in Kazakhstan),” 3 October 2022.

https://vlast.kz/novosti/51937-vojska-odkb-ne-budut-prinimat-ucastie-v-vojne-mezdu-rossiej-i-ukrainoj-mid.html

…The question of the participation of the troops of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in the war between Russia and Ukraine is not on the agenda, Aibek Smadiyarov, the agency’s official representative, said at a briefing at the Foreign Ministry on Monday… 

He also stressed that Kazakhstan proceeds from the principles of the territorial integrity of states, their sovereign equality and peaceful coexistence in accordance with international law and the UN Charter.

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Collective Security Treaty Organization
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_Collective_Security_Treaty_Organization.svg
Attribution: Public domain

Turkish Lessons Learned From the War in Ukraine

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President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy meets with Minister of National Defense Minister of Turkey Hulusi Akar, Kyiv, Ukraine.

President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy meets with Minister of National Defense Minister of Turkey Hulusi Akar, Kyiv, Ukraine.

An armed force with a high degree of maneuver capability and a high communication capability can conduct very effective maneuvers regardless of how much bigger its enemy force may be.

Various Turkish news programs consider Turkey’s observations from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The accompanying excerpts from one such televised debate summarize Turkey’s military, technical, and geopolitical takeaways from the war. The excerpts are from a program which aired on Nokta TV24, a Turkish independent news and analysis channel, featuring a discussion between former Turkish Ambassador Fatih Ceylan, the Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO from 2013 to 2018, and one of Turkey’s top defense and security experts, Arda Mevlütoğlu. The show was posted on YouTube.

To begin, Mevlütoğlu notes the most important lesson from a military and technological standpoint has been that an armed force (Ukraine) can conduct very effective maneuvers against a much larger enemy force (Russia). He points to the importance of Ukraine’s capable strike systems, maneuver forces, and particularly communication systems. Citing reports of Russia having to resort to commercial GPS systems because of its Glonass GPS system being jammed, he concludes that attention to electronic and cyberwarfare are also extremely important. Mevlütoğlu also points to the importance of the psychological dimensions of the war, noting that Ukraine’s successful and effective psychological campaign has enabled it to maintain the support of the European public, which has been critical for ensuring those countries’ continued support. As such, he claims that diplomatic, cultural, and psychological factors are just as important as military defense technologies, which can even be a tool of foreign policy. He points to the success of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones in Ukraine, and how the successes of these drones have increased Turkey’s profile there [1]. Geopolitically, Mevlütoğlu assesses that Russia will end up deeply weakened in terms of potential and capability. He argues that such a Russia will have an asymmetric relationship with China, where China will have the upper hand in their trade relationship, especially in energy. In this sense, he sees China coming out as one of the beneficiaries of this war. On the other hand, he claims that the United States has consolidated its political-military influence in Eastern Europe, which he says will likely limit China’s influence in Europe and access to the Atlantic.

Sources:

“İnsansız Kara – Hava ve Deniz Aracı Üretiminde Neredeyiz? | S-400’lerin İkinci Partisi Gelir Mi? Fatih Ceylan Arda Mevlütoğlu ile (Where are we in the Production of Unmanned Land – Air and Sea Vehicles? | Would a Second Batch of S-400’s Come?  Fatih Ceylan speaks with Arda Mevlütoğlu),” Nokta TV24 via YouTube (a Turkish independent news and analysis channel), 1 September 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZT3eIYmT84Q&list=WL&index=63

Q: As you know, there’s been a huge inflection point in the global security environment in February 2022 with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine… We’ve left behind six months of this war.  In these six months, what lessons should we learn as far as military operations and deterrence based on how the war is going?  What strategies, visions, concepts, and doctrines do we need to develop for the future? 

A: Six months of the Russia-Ukraine war has given us the opportunity to make some very important political, military, and strategic and observations.  From the Turkish point of view, both from a military and technological standpoint, some of the most important ones are [as follows]:  An armed force with a high degree of maneuver capability and a high communication capability can conduct very effective maneuvers regardless of how much bigger its enemy force may be.  A well-educated, well-equipped force with units with good communication systems and highly [capable] strike systems can be very effective.  Communication technology is the most important here…  There is open-source information that says that the Starlink communication system provided by Elon Musk has been instrumental for Ukraine in the battlefield… We have reports that there have been important GPS jamming attempts in the region, especially against Russia’s Glonass system.   And in fact, there are reports that Russia has had to resort to commercial GPS systems as a result.  So we can conclude that there is huge competition in electronic and cyber war.  We can’t see this directly, we can only observe the outcomes of this.  The war has shown us that electronic and cyberwars, as well as strike and maneuver forces are extremely important. 

There is also the psychological dimension.  Morale and psychological support is very important.  Ukraine has been conducting a very successful, very effective psychological war.   It has not only consolidated its public support in the West, but increased it.  It has obtained moral superiority and retained this.  So, however right you may be in your war, if you can’t defend your thesis in the international arena or find international support, it is that difficult to continue your fight…  Of course in this case there can be no explanation for attacking a sovereign country. 

So [the war has shown us that] it’s not just military fighting [that matters]; the fight in the diplomatic, cultural, psychological dimensions are also very important.  In fact, military defense is not just a military or industrial thing, its also an element of foreign policy.  We don’t need to repeat the success that Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s have had for Ukraine, they are even conducting crowdfunding activities to buy more. 

Q: There’s a new reality now… When we look at the military strategies of the U.S., China and Russia and the related doctrines they are developing, we see a serious global strategic competition that is here to stay for many years.  How will the balance of powers play out? 

A:  This is an open-ended process.  In this competition between the U.S., China and Russia, my view is that, regardless of how this war ends, Russia will end up deeply weaked.  It will continue to be a superpower and a big power, but it will be seriously damaged and tarnished in terms of potential and capability.  Such a Russia will have an asymmetric relationship with China such that China will have an advantage, particularly in terms of energy imports and advanced technologies and systems.  …  So I think China may come out benefiting from this [war].  I don’t know if it will result in a conflict with Taiwan- I think it’s very difficult and I hope not.   Taiwan’s TSMC company is very important for global microchip production, so a war in that region could lead to a serious global crisis… But it will be tense.  In fact we see that the U.S. has focused its interest in that area.  China’s relations with the U.S. and the West may be both competitive and cooperative at the same time…  Finally, the U.S. has consolidated its military-political influence in Eastern Europe.  So China’s influence in Europe and access to the Atlantic may become more limited.

Notes:

[1] See also Karen Kaya, “Turkish-Made Bayraktar TB2 Drones Play Important Role in Ukraine,” OE Watch, Issue 6, 2022.

Image Information:

Image: President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy meets with Minister of National Defense Minister of Turkey Hulusi Akar, Kyiv, Ukraine.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Volodymyr_Zelensky_and_Hulusi_Akar.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Russia Claims Victory in Vostok 2022 Exercise

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President Putin and Chief of General Staff Gerasimov, Vostok 2022, 6 September 2022.

President Putin and Chief of General Staff Gerasimov, Vostok 2022, 6 September 2022.

One of Russia’s large-scale, annual military exercises, Vostok-2022, took place from 1-7 September.  As with such exercises, it was widely covered in the Russian media, and as the brief excerpt from the Ministry of Defense’s TV Zvezda news network indicates, Russian forces again proved victorious. The article also stresses that Russia has not been isolated by its aggression against Ukraine, pointing out that 10 countries participated: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, India, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, and Tajikistan. The article says that President Putin arrived at the Sergeevsky training ground to watch the final part of the exercises from a specially equipped command post.  He watched his soldiers taking lines, liberating settlements, and forcing enemy retreats.

Sources:

Maxim Petrenko, Sergey Lebedev, “Враг уничтожен: как прошли учения Восток-2022»на полигоне Сергеевский (The enemy is destroyed: how did the exercises Vostok-2022 at the Sergeevsky training ground),” TV Zvezda (Ministry of Defense news network), 6 September 2022. https://tvzvezda.ru/news/2022961429-48GVw.html

Vladimir Putin watched the maneuvers from a specially equipped command post. From there, he fully assessed the operational situation. Real-time data came even from the distant borders of the huge test site. All thanks to cameras installed in the fields with 32x magnification.

At the same time, the Chief of the General Staff had a connection with all the commanders-in-chief. The most up-to-date information was received from the training ground to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the technical characteristics of the weapons used were shown on the screen.

According to the legend of the exercises, the mock enemy “Vostochnye” attacked the “Northern” and their allies, wedging 200 kilometers into the depth of defense. The enemy was stopped, suffered losses, but retained reserves. From this point, the action begins to unfold – a grouping of troops, supported by artillery and tactical landing forces, hitting the enemy, taking lines and liberating settlements. Massed strikes by rocket troops and artillery, breaking the enemy’s reserves as well, are forcing the enemy to retreat.

A special feature of Vostok this year is the creation ofa coalition grouping of the armed forces of ten countries – Russia, Azerbaijan, Algeria, Armenia, Belarus, India, Kyrgyzstan, China, Mongolia, Tajikistan. Operational groups of the defense departments of Kazakhstan, Laos, Nicaragua and Syria were also involved….…The participants of the maneuvers noted that all the goals of the exercises were fulfilled. The issues of ensuring military security in the Eastern Region have been worked out. 

Image Information:

Image: President Putin and Chief of General Staff Gerasimov, Vostok 2022, 6 September 2022.
Source:  http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69288
Attribution: CCA CA 4.0 Intl

Russia Builds New Armor Repair Facilities To Replenish Losses in Ukraine

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Russian T-72 Tank.

Russian T-72 Tank.

The Russian Defense Ministry will create two armored plants. 

While Russian information regarding the extent of damaged armor from their invasion of Ukraine is masked by the state, the accompanying excerpt from the Russian pro-business source Kommersant nevertheless suggests that such damages are considerable enough for Russia to need to establish new facilities. According to the article, Russia recently mandated the creation of two plants for the “repair of armored weapons and equipment, automotive equipment in the interests of defense.”  The article also points out that based on special legislation passed in July 2022, these repair facilities will be able to “work outside the established hours of work, at night, on weekends and non-working holidays.” Currently, the main Russian armor repair facilities are in the Sverdlosk Region, on the eastern side of the Ural Mountains.  The new plants will be built near Moscow and Rostov, much closer to Ukraine and Western Europe.

Source:

Anastasia Larina, “Мишустин поручил создать два бронетанковых завода для ремонта военной техники (Mishustin instructed to create two armored plants for the repair of military equipment),” Kommersant (pro-business site), 5 September 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5547483

The Russian Defense Ministry will create two new armored plants.  The corresponding order was signed by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin.  The document is posted on the portal of legal information.  The main goal of the enterprises is “the repair of armored weapons and equipment, automotive equipment in the interests of defense.”

“To create a federal state institution “71 armored repair plant” of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and a federal state institution “72 armored repair plant” of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation,” the order says.  They will be built in the city of Ramenskoye in the Moscow region and in the city of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky in the Rostov region.

In July, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on special measures in the economy during a military operation.  It allows the government to establish “the procedure and conditions for engaging in work outside the established hours of work, at night, on weekends and non-working holidays.”  In August, several Rostec enterprises switched to work in several shifts without summer holidays to fulfill the state defense order.

Image Information:

Image: Russian T-72 Tank
Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A2-72#/media/%D0%A4%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BB:ParkPatriot2015part2-19.jpg
http://vitalykuzmin.net/?q=node/635
Attribution: Vitaly Kuzmin, CC BY-SA 4.0

African Stances on the Russia-Ukraine War Demonstrate Reliance on, Antipathy Toward West

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 “The West wants its African partners to share its condemnation of Russia. African states meanwhile cling to their monopoly on victimhood and historical resentment of Western domination in world affairs.”

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, official reactions from African nations have varied.  For instance, the March 2022 UN vote to condemn Russian aggression showed that 27 African states voted for the resolution, one state (Eritrea) voted against, 17 abstained, and nine more were absent for the vote.  As commentary from the respected Pan-African Institute for Security Studies lays out, the range of African reactions to the war is guided by logics not always appreciated from the outside.

First, and most important, the authors underscore that the continent’s 54 states are in no way a monolithic bloc and would not share a singular, unified viewpoint of the war given their varying goals, positions in international society, and international alliances.  Second, the authors note that African states are not affected by the war in the same ways.  While extreme food shortages were felt in certain states throughout the continent as a result of Russian blockades of grain and fertilizer, for many African countries, these issues “[don’t] compare with the Western aid that enables African countries to function.”  Third, the authors note that the war has been a litmus test bringing to light variations in African states’ interpretations of the international system.  Certain African states seek to maintain the Western “rules-based” order, and thus find more sympathy with Ukraine.  Conversely, other African states, with lingering antipathy to a global order in which they view themselves to be marginalized, are thus more sympathetic with revisionist, non-rule-abiding states like Russia. The authors sum up their assessments, saying: “Western surprise at most African countries’ limited emotion towards Russia’s invasion, and Africa’s neutral stance, point to a self-centeredness on both sides.  The West wants its African partners to share its condemnation of Russia.  African states meanwhile cling to their monopoly on victimhood and historical resentment of Western domination in world affairs.” 

Source:

Paul-Simon Handy and Félicité Djilo, “Unpacking Africa’s Divided Stance on the Ukraine War,” Institute for Security Studies (pan-African think tank), 12 August 2022. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/unpacking-africas-divided-stance-on-the-ukraine-war  

“African votes in the United Nations (UN) on the war revealed sharp divisions between countries… The high number of abstentions was widely interpreted as a sign of Russian influence or evidence of the growing anti-Westernism of African governments and citizens.  This view wrongly assumes that Africa is a political monolith.  It also suggests an underlying expectation by the West that states on the continent should align with them because of the West’s pre-eminence in development and humanitarian aid, and their shared historical past. 

Western surprise at most African countries’ limited emotion towards Russia’s invasion, and Africa’s neutral stance, point to a self-centredness on both sides.  The West wants its African partners to share its condemnation of Russia. African states meanwhile cling to their monopoly on victimhood and historical resentment of Western domination in world affairs. 

How do African states benefit from proclaiming non-alignment?  Although the conflict reveals the extent of the continent’s dependence on grain and fertiliser from Ukraine and Russia, it doesn’t compare with the Western aid that enables African countries to function.  The increasing price of hydrocarbons is affecting Africa’s most fragile states.  While European countries imposed sanctions against Russia despite the costs to their energy supplies, many African countries feel less able to adopt a principled and values-based foreign policy. 

The divide, however, runs deeper – extending to perceptions about the international order itself.  Western states defend a rules-based system in which they are pre-eminent.  African states have a more cynical view of a global order whose rules seem to be determined by the West.  This difference in outlook may explain Africa’s leniency towards Russia, even though the latter has violated a cardinal AU principle on territorial integrity. 

African states’ position is not without contradictions – which isn’t surprising given the many norms and values on a continent of 54 states.  They aspire to an international order based on rules, not force, while at the same time sympathizing with Russia and China, which challenge this order for different reasons.”  

India Draws Lessons on Cyber and Electronic Effects From the War in Ukraine 

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GSLV-Mk III-D1 being moved from Vehicle Assembly Building to second launch pad.

GSLV-Mk III-D1 being moved from Vehicle Assembly Building to second launch pad.

While national R&D is focused in this field, the Indian Army is closely watching the advancements made by our adversaries, to ensure that these vital capabilities are inducted into our armed forces well ahead of times. 

The Indian Army has been focused on a possible conflict with China since the border incidents on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in 2017 and 2020.  While Indian officials have been improving the army’s combat and logistic capabilities on the LAC, the accompanying excerpted article reports on an Indian Army exercise involving satellite communications that drew lessons from the war in Ukraine and that officials are hoping will guide further development of army capabilities.  The article from the independent English-language newspaper The Hindu reports on the scenario of the exercise, which involved using all satellite communications in the Indian Army in different technical and operational situations.  The article notes that the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) also took part in the exercise and that it included the eastern regions and northern border areas of India, which includes the LAC.  The articles go on to mention how the Indian Army has been studying electronic warfare in the war in Ukraine at multiple levels and that India believes this further established the importance of satellite communications.  The article notes that the army is currently using ISRO satellites but is set to have its own by December 2025 as India’s Acquisition Council approved the new satellite back in March during the early weeks of the war in Ukraine.  It is also points out that the Indian Army is closely watching the advancements made by its adversaries and that this is an effort to stay ahead of them.  Overall, the exercise and satellite acquisition show how India continues to respond to China and that it is closely watching what is happening in Ukraine.  

Source:

Dinakar Peri, “Indian Army conducts Exercise Skylight to test resilience of its satellite communications,” The Hindu (independent English-language newspaper), 6 August 2022. 

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-army-conducts-exercise-skylight-to-testresilience-of-itssatellite-communications/article65733174.ece

To test the operational readiness of satellite systems and personnel manning them, the Indian Army last week carried out Exercise Skylight validating and showcasing the resilience of its communication capabilities in case terrestrial connectivity is disrupted in future conflicts, officials in the security establishment said. 

“During the two-week long exercise, all satellite communication assets in the Army were activated and various technical and operational scenarios in space domain were simulated.  Various agencies responsible for space and ground segments, as also the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) participated in the exercise,” a source in the security establishment said.  This includes over 200 static platforms and over 80 vehicle based and man portable systems that were incorporated… 

“…the exercise covered the eastern part of the country, northern borders and the island territories. “This will be done regularly,” the source said. 

The Army has carried out detailed studies of cyber and electromagnetic effects in the war in Ukraine. Electronic warfare has played a major role in Ukraine, sources said, “We had multiple iterations on how this conflict has panned out, at various levels.”  

The studies established efficacy of reliable satellite communication like the one afforded by ‘Starlink’, officials said…(the) Indian Army is utilizing the services of a number of ISRO satellites as it does not have a dedicated satellite.  In March, The Defence Acquisition Council cleared a proposal for a GSAT-7B communications satellite.  The army is on course to get its own satellite by December 2025. 

…To train its personnel on all aspects of satellite communication, the Army recently published Request for Information for its own student satellite, for training engineering students in Military College of Telecommunication Engineering on satellite technology. 

…While national R&D is focused in this field, the Indian Army is closely watching the advancements made by our adversaries, to ensure that these vital capabilities are inducted into our armed forces well ahead of times, officials added. 

Image Information:

Image: GSLV-Mk III-D1 being moved from Vehicle Assembly Building to second launch pad 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:GSLV-Mk_III-D1_being_moved_from_Vehicle_Assembly_Building_to_second_launch_pad.jpg 
Attribution: Government Open Data License – India (GODL)

Ukraine War Likely To Reduce Russian Security Commitments in Central Asia

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Emomali Rahmon and Vladimir Putin.

Emomali Rahmon and Vladimir Putin.

“Emomali Rahmon and Vladimir Putin discussed issues of expanding cooperation in the field of security, including through military and military-technical cooperation, as well as in the field of defense construction, especially in terms of modernizing the armed forces of Tajikistan and strengthening the protection of the Tajik-Afghan border.”

The Russian government has repeatedly stated it is committed to security in Central Asia and often points to ongoing security assistance to governments in the region and the 201st Military Base in Tajikistan and the 999th Airbase in Kyrgyzstan as proof of its commitment.  The accompanying excerpted articles offer an update on Russian commitments in Central Asia amid its invasion of Ukraine.  The article from the independent news website Fergana Agency reports on President Putin’s visit to Tajikistan to meet with President Emomali Rahmon at the end of June.  The article mentions that the presidents discussed expanding security cooperation, modernizing Tajikistan’s armed forces, and strengthening the Tajik – Afghan border.  The article does not mention how much money Russia will spend or what equipment it will provide.  The article from the independent news website Kloop reports on Putin’s order to begin negotiating with the government of Kyrgyzstan over a joint air defense system.  The article notes that Tajikistan reached a similar agreement for a joint air defense system with Russia last year.  Tajikistan’s Ministry of Defense cited the need to counter the threat posed by terrorist groups potentially using unmanned aerial systems as one reason for the agreement.  Russian spending and security assistance in Central Asia reportedly decreased following the takeover of Crimea and the Donbas in 2014 due to sanctions but rebounded after a couple of years.  While it is unknown how much money and materiel Russia has so far expended in its invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin will probably have little choice but to reduce its commitment to security in Central Asia at least temporarily.

Source:

“Путин и Рахмон обсудили модернизацию армии Таджикистана и охрану таджикско-афганской границы (Putin and Rahmon discussed the modernization of Tajikistan’s army and the security of the Tajik-Afghan border),” Fergana Agency (independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 29 June 2022.
https://fergana.agency/news/126750/

The President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, and the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon, discussed the modernization of the armed forces of Tajikistan and the strengthening of the protection of its border with Afghanistan…

Putin arrived in Dushanbe on the evening of June 28 for a two-day visit.  Rahmon personally met him at the airport…

“During the talks, special attention was paid to the development of the situation in Afghanistan and the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border.  In this context, Emomali Rahmon and Vladimir Putin discussed issues of expanding cooperation in the field of security, including through military and military-technical cooperation, as well as in the field of defense construction, especially in terms of modernizing the armed forces of Tajikistan and strengthening the protection of the Tajik-Afghan border.”  – Rahmon’s press service said in a statement…

Munduzbek Kalykov, “Кыргызстан и Россия могут создать объединенную региональную систему ПВО — Путин поручил провести переговоры (Kyrgyzstan and Russia could create a regional air defense system – Putin authorized discussions to be held),” Kloop (independent Russian-language news website in Kyrgyzstan), 8 July 2022.
https://kloop.kg/blog/2022/07/08/kyrgyzstan-i-rossiya-mogut-sozdat-obedinennuyu-regionalnuyu-sistemu-pvo-putin-poruchil-provesti-peregovory/

Russian President Vladimir Putin authorized negotiations with Kyrgyzstan on the creation of a unified regional air defense system. Putin signed this order on July 8.

“Instruct the Russian Ministry of Defense to hold negotiations with the Russian Foreign Ministry with the Kyrgyz side and, upon reaching an agreement, sign the said agreement on behalf of the Russian Federation, allowing changes that are not of a fundamental nature to be made to its draft, approved by the government of the Russian Federation,” the document says…

The same agreement on the creation of a joint regional air defense system with Russia last year was approved by the Parliament of Tajikistan.

Minister of Defense Sherali Mirzo, speaking in parliament, noted that the implementation of this agreement is in the interests of ensuring the security of the airspace of Tajikistan “given the growing regional threats and the emergence of new types of hostilities, such as the widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles, including by terrorist and extremist groups.” …It was also reported that Russia is negotiating the creation of a joint air defense system with Kazakhstan and Armenia…

Image Information:

Image: Emomali Rahmon and Vladimir Putin
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_and_Emomali_Rahmon_(2017-10-10)_03.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Kremlin Easing Russian Citizenship for All Ukrainians

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President Vladimir Putin …signed a decree giving the right to all residents of Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship in a simplified manner….

Six months before Russia reinvaded Ukraine, President Putin published a long historical article where he asserted that “Russians and Ukrainians are one people, a single whole.” (See: “Studying Putin’s History of Ukraine,” OE Watch, Sept 2021.)  Attempts to prove this assertion using force have thus far met with considerable Ukrainian resistance.  However, the Kremlin is also employing its administrative and economic prowess to make it easier for Ukrainians to become Russian citizens.  As the first excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant points out, the Kremlin has recently enacted legislation “giving the right to allresidents of Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship in a simplified manner.”  The article goes on to stress that this new streamlined procedure does “not require them to renounce Ukrainian or other citizenship.”  The article concludes by quoting a high-level Kremlin official, who claims that “from 2016 to 2020, about 978,000 citizens of Ukraine received Russian citizenship.”

The second excerpt from the popular, pro-Kremlin site Versiya describes how Russian authorities have set up “bus passport tours” to transport those Ukrainians who want to obtain Russian citizenship.  The buses pick up Ukrainians in regions not taken by Russia and transport them to those occupied by Russian forces.  According to the author, Russian “passportization of the Black Sea region is gaining momentum [where, for instance], “the number of residents of Odessa who have received Russian passports goes into the thousands.”  Many pensioners participate in these tours, since once they gain Russian citizenship, they “will be able to apply for Russian pensions (before recalculation – 10,000 rubles [$185] a month.”  The article asserts that there are many other categories eligible to receive monthly payments: “war veterans and children, the disabled…fathers and single mothers…pregnant women,” and that the Russian benefits far exceed those provided by the Ukrainian government.  The article concludes by pointing out that because of the conflict in and around “the Mykolaiv and Zaporozhye regions…, up to 85 percent of local residents lost their jobs… [and] there is only one hope – for Russia.”

Source:

Elena Rozhkova, Ksenia Veretennikova, “Гражданам Украины вышло упрощение (Citizens of Ukraine received a simplification),” Kommersant (pro-business site), 11 July 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5458512

President Vladimir Putin on Monday signed a decree giving the right to all residents of Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship in a simplified manner…. The expert believes that the updated decree will be relevant given the dynamically changing situation with the transition of Ukrainian territories under the control of Russian troops, as well as for Ukrainian emigrants living in Russia.

According to the new amendments, the possibility of obtaining Russian citizenship in a simplified manner now applies to all residents of Ukraine, and not only to the population of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) and regions of Ukraine controlled by the Russian armed forces. The document also notes that the presence of citizens in military service cannot serve as a basis for rejecting their applications for admission to Russian citizenship….

…The deputy [Mr. Zatulin] also clarified that residents of the DPR, LPR and Ukraine who receive Russian citizenship are not required to renounce their first citizenship and can have two passports…. 

…In June 2022, TASS, citing the press center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, reported that since April 2019, on the basis of this decree, more than 800 thousand people have acquired Russian citizenship. A year ago, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation Dmitry Kozak… stated that not only residents of Donbass, but also residents of the “rest of Ukraine” apply for Russian citizenship. According to him, from 2016 to 2020, about 978 thousand citizens of Ukraine received Russian citizenship…

Source: Alexander Artishchenko, “Туры за паспортами (Tours for passports),” Versia (popular, pro-Kremlin site), 3 August 2022. https://versia.ru/zhiteli-nikolaeva-i-odessy-ezdyat-oformlyat-rossijskoe-grazhdanstvo-v-xersonskuyu-oblast

Passportization of the Black Sea region is gaining momentum – Russian citizenship is issued in Kherson, Skadovsk, Genichesk, Nova Kakhovka, Oleshki, Belozerka and Gola Prystan. Despite the fact that it is rather difficult to leave the settlements controlled by Ukraine, besides, they mostly let pensioners through and, less often, women, the number of residents of Odessa who have received Russian passports goes into the thousands….

…Bus passport tours are organized from Zaporozhye and Nikolaev to Kherson – the final destinations of the trip are usually not advertised, but these buses are still allowed through at checkpoints without any problems. As explained by the deputy head of the military-civilian administration of the Kherson region Ekaterina Gubareva, any citizen of Ukraine, regardless of place of residence, even from Lviv, can apply for a Russian passport. … Together with Russian citizenship, pensioners will be able to apply for Russian pensions (before recalculation – 10,000 rubles a month, but in the fall they promise to recalculate and increase pensions, and accrue “from above” what they don’t receive in the summer). Moreover, war veterans and children, the disabled and some categories of beneficiaries are entitled to an allowance of 5,000 rubles per month. The allowance can be issued in the same place as passports. Gubareva separately noted, that monthly social payments are due to fathers and single mothers – at the rate of 10,000 rubles for each child. And payments to a full family for the maintenance of a minor child will amount to 4,000 rubles. Also, pregnant women can apply for social assistance (10,000 rubles – a one-time payment for pregnancy, and another 20,000 – at the birth of a child).

Russia’s social support is especially important, since Kyiv has actually curtailed the payment of pensions and social benefits in the Mykolaiv and Zaporozhye regions. As of early August, up to 85 percent of local residents lost their jobs – able-bodied families do not have the full opportunity to support their elderly and children. In the Odessa region, 70 percent of the inhabitants have lost their jobs (although pensions are still paid there). So there was only one hope – for Russia.

How China Will “Win” the War in Ukraine

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President Vladimir Putin held talks in Beijing with President of China Xi Jinping, Feb 2022.

President Vladimir Putin held talks in Beijing with President of China Xi Jinping, Feb 2022.

“China is interested in the military weakening of both Russia and the West…”

In the accompanying article from the semi-independent Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye, respected military expert Alexander Khramchikhin provides a thought-provoking assessment of how China looks at its relationship with Russia within its wider foreign policy.  The author asserts that “in economic terms, China is using Russia’s problems to the maximum extent, trying to get it to lower prices for supplied energy resources.”  The Chinese leadership understands that it cannot fully side with Russia in its war on Ukraine because “it is more important for Beijing to maintain economic relations with the West than to provide assistance to Russia.”  The author downplays the military side of the China-Russia relationship, claiming that the “measures were more of a demonstrative propagandistic nature.”  He points out that while “Beijing’s political position is no longer neutral, but pro-Russian,” it is mostly “at the level of the rhetoric of officials and China’s votes in the UN.”  Despite Beijing’s vocal support, the author points out that “China supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine, sends humanitarian aid to this country and calls for a political resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict by respecting the interests of both sides.” The author claims that “China is interested in the military weakening of both Russia and the West.”  He points out that it is to China’s advantage if the conflict is prolonged, which will lead to “maximum exhaustion of both sides.”  Such an outcome will make it easier for Chinese leaders to cut favorable political and economic deals with an “exhausted Russia.”  Similarly, an “exhausted West will lose many levers of pressure on China, which, in particular, will allow Beijing to solve the issue of joining Taiwan much easier.”

Source:

Alexander Khramchikhin, “Кому быть младшим партнером (Who will be the junior partner),” Nezasimoye Voennoye Obezreniye (semi-independent Russian media source), 23 June 2022. https://nvo.ng.ru/gpolit/2022-06-23/10_1194_partner.html

What will the Chinese choice of Russia lead to?  …The thesis that China is a true friend of Russia, ready to lend a helping hand to it in any difficult situation, is taken for granted by many citizens of our country.  Although this thesis never had almost any practical confirmation, it does not have them even now.

…In economic terms, China is using Russia’s problems to the maximum extent, trying to get it to lower prices for supplied energy resources.  At the same time, many Chinese companies de facto complied with the anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the West, since it was more important for them to preserve not the Russian, but the Western markets….   This means that it is more important for Beijing to maintain economic relations with the West than to provide assistance to Russia.

In the military sphere, several major bilateral and multilateral exercises were held with the participation of the Russian Armed Forces and the PLA, as well as several joint patrols of the Russian and Chinese Air Forces near Japan.  These measures were more of a demonstrative propagandistic nature….

…The current conflict in Ukraine has actually become a continuation of the events of 2014, taking into account the general change in the situation in the world.  Today, Beijing’s political position is no longer neutral, but pro-Russian – however, again, only at the level of the rhetoric of officials and China’s votes in the UN.  At the same time, however, China stands for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, sends humanitarian aid to this country and calls for a political resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict by respecting the interests of both sides….

In the economic sphere, China is acting in exactly the same way as in 2014 and in subsequent years: it seeks to make the most of Russia’s problems, seeking to reduce prices for Russian energy resources.  At the same time, Chinese companies de facto comply with almost all new anti-Russian sanctions, since Western markets are still more important for them.  Moreover, some Chinese companies are refusing to buy Russian oil and coal even at reduced prices….

Of course, Chinese military experts will carefully study the military operations of both sides – and again draw conclusions for themselves.  China is interested in the military weakening of both Russia and the West…

Accordingly, China is not interested in either a quick victory for Russia or its defeat.  From all points of view, it is beneficial for China to prolong the conflict to the maximum and to have a compromise outcome, caused by the maximum exhaustion of both sides.  An exhausted Russia will be much more accommodating towards China on all economic and political issues.  The exhausted West will lose many levers of pressure on China, which, in particular, will allow Beijing to solve the issue of joining Taiwan much easier and easier….

…The transformation of Russia into a junior partner (if not a direct vassal) of China is possible if the war in Ukraine drags on for a long time and turns out to be, if not a failure, then generally unsuccessful for Moscow.  Such a scenario also seems unlikely so far….  The evolution of Russian-Chinese relations into a direct and open military-political alliance is possible if Russia wins a victory in Ukraine (full or partial).  At the same time, the West will continue to increase pressure on both Moscow and Beijing…. 

In any case, the current situation once again confirms that Beijing always acts solely in its own interests.  Which is absolutely right – this is how a normal country should behave.  It’s just that Chinese interests do not always coincide with ours.

China will never be our friend.  And he will extend a helping hand to us only if he receives something very significant and valuable from our hand in return.

Image Information:

Image: President Vladimir Putin held talks in Beijing with President of China Xi Jinping, Feb 2022
Source: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67712
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Intl