CSTO Members Respond to Potential Involvement in Ukraine

Maulen Ashimbayev.

Maulen Ashimbayev.


“The key change is the concept of a “coordinating state”: it must take over leadership of a peacekeeping operation if one is carried out.”


In early January 2022, member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) demonstrated their willingness to carry out a joint peacekeeping operation when the organization deployed units from the Collective Operational Reaction Force to Kazakhstan.  On 3 March 2022, President Vladimir Putin submitted a protocol to Russia’s State Duma to amend the CSTO’s agreement of peacekeeping activities, causing speculation that the CSTO would deploy peacekeepers to Ukraine.  The accompanying excerpted articles provide more context to the possibility of a CSTO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, suggesting that CSTO is not likely get involved.

The accompanying excerpted article from semi-independent Russian daily Kommersant reports on Putin’s submission of the protocol to amend the CSTO’s peacekeeping activities.  The article mentions that the change involves having a “coordinating state” to take “leadership of a peacekeeping operation if one is carried out.”  CSTO officials stated that the “change is not connected to the events in neighboring Ukraine,” but is meant to integrate a CSTO peacekeeping force into the UN and deploy it outside the organization’s area of responsibility.  In the past, the Russian government has tried and failed to obtain an official mandate from the UN to have its peacekeeping forces in the post-Soviet space.  The article from Kazakhstan government-run news agency Kazinform reports on a statement from Maulen Ashimbayev, the Chair of the Senate of Kazakhstan, in response to the possibility of Kazakh peacekeepers deploying to Ukraine.  Ashimbayev states, “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with other documents, Kazakhstan can send our peacekeepers outside the CSTO countries only in accordance with a UN mandate.”  This statement came out the day of Russia’s invasion and prior to any speculation that came with Putin’s proposed change to the amendment. 

The article from the Armenian state news agency Armen Press reports on a statement from Vahagn Aleksanyan, a member of Armenia’s National Assembly, in response to Armenia’s obligations to the CSTO.  He notes, “the CSTO mechanisms are triggered in the event of an attack on one of the CSTO member states.”  In addition, he does not believe the conflict will spread to Russia, which would initiate a response of the CSTO’s article on collective defense.  He does not bring up a peacekeeping operation, but his comments still represent how another CSTO member is responding to potentially getting involved in the war in Ukraine.  If the statements from Kazakh and Armenian officials are any indication, the CSTO is not likely get involved in Ukraine.


Source:

Vladimir Solovyev, “Украина ни при чем (Ukraine has nothing to do with it),” Kommersant (semi-independent Russian daily newspaper), 4 March 2022.

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5240328

…Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a protocol on amending the “Agreement on the CSTO peacekeeping activities” to the State Duma for ratification. The key change is the concept of a “coordinating state”: it must take over leadership of a peacekeeping operation if one is carried out…The CSTO said the adoption of the change is not connected to the events in neighboring Ukraine…

…Changes to the “Agreement on peacekeeping activities” were adopted on September 16, 2021 at the CSTO Collective Security Council session in Dushanbe. They are necessary in order for the organization to be able to integrate its peacekeeping potential into the UN peacekeeping mechanism, so that it would be possible to use CSTO peacekeeping outside the organization’s area of ​​responsibility…

Source: Serik Sabekov, “Маулен Ашимбаев ответил на вопрос о направлении миротворцев из Казахстана в зону конфликта между РФ и Украиной (Maulen Ashimbayev answered the question about the deployment of peacekeepers from Kazakhstan to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine),” Kazinform (government-run news agency in Kazakhstan), 24 February 2022.

https://www.inform.kz/ru/maulen-ashimbaev-otvetil-na-vopros-o-napravlenii-mirotvorcev-iz-kazahstana-v-zonu-konflikta-mezhdu-rf-i-ukrainoy_a3903655

The Chair of the Senate of the Republic of Kazakhstan Maulen Ashimbayev commented on the question of the possible deployment of Kazakh peacekeepers to take part in the conflict in Ukraine, Kazinform reports.

“In this situation, we must proceed from the following – Kazakhstan is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization – the CSTO. In this regard, the question arises, is it possible to send Kazakh peacekeepers to the conflict?… . In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with other documents, Kazakhstan can send our peacekeepers outside the CSTO countries only in accordance with a UN mandate,” Maulen Ashimbayev said…

The speaker noted that, in accordance with the CSTO charter, peacekeeping forces and troops of the organization’s countries can only be used on the territory of the participating countries…

Source: “Депутаты коснулись вопроса возможности применения механизма ОДКБ в Украине (Deputies raised the issue of the possibility of using the mechanism of the CSTO in Ukraine),” Armen Press (Armenian state news agency), 7 March 2022.

https://armenpress.am/rus/news/1077269.html

The CSTO mechanisms work only in case of an attack on one of the CSTO member states. Vahagn Aleksanyan, a member of the “Civil Contract” faction of the National Assembly, said this, what would Armenia’s position be if Russia, the CSTO partner, offered to implement the CSTO mechanisms…

“It should be noted that the CSTO mechanisms are triggered in the event of an attack on one of the CSTO member states, the transfer of hostilities to the territory of Russia, at least for the moment, I do not consider likely,” Aleksanyan said…


Image Information:

Image: Maulen Ashimbayev.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maulen_Ashimbayev.jpg
Attribution: CC 1.0

Russian Invasion of Ukraine Detrimental to Turkey

Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.


“… conflict… poses a significant risk to the Turkish defense industry.”


The accompanying articles highlight that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine poses significant risks to Turkey’s already troubled economy, energy security, and defense industry regardless of Turkey’s position in this conflict as it balances its NATO obligations with its relations with Russia.  According to the first article from globally read security news site al-Monitor, the war will have crippling consequences for the Turkish economy since Russia is Turkey’s key economic partner in many sectors, including tourism, construction, and energy.  The second article from anti-Turkish government daily Sözcü states that sanctions targeting the Russian banking system will negatively impact Russian projects in Turkey, including the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant that Turkey contracted to a Russian company for development.  The war in Ukraine will also make trade routes in the region insecure and negatively impact Turkey’s economic interests and trade with other countries in the region.  Furthermore, according to the Sözcü article, the war will likely disrupt the flow of natural gas to Turkey, leading to an energy crisis since Russia is the largest natural gas supplier to Turkish markets.  The two countries have nearly completed the construction of two natural gas pipelines carrying Russian natural gas to Turkey and some European countries.

The third article from independent Turkish news agency Anka Haber Ajansı highlights that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will also have significant implications for the Turkish defense industry.  Defense cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey is significantly larger than Turkey’s widely reported TB-2 drone export to Ukraine.  Ukraine’s two major firms in aviation engine and manufacturing, Ukrainian Motor Sich and Ivchenko Progress, a Ukrainian state-owned company, provide engines for the Turkish defense company Baykar’s Bayraktar Akıncı drone and the Turkish Aerospace Industries’ T929 ATAK 2 attack helicopter.  Turkey is also building a MilGem-class corvette for the Ukrainian navy, which the article notes, is one of the biggest exports for the Turkey’s defense industry.  The article points out that the conflict will hinder Turkey’s ability to sustain the supply of subsystems and products to its defense industry from Ukraine.


Source:

Amberin Zaman,“Russian invasion of Ukraine would spell more economic turbulence for Turkey,”al-Monitor (a globally read security news site with regionally based reporting),07 February 2022. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/russian-invasion-ukraine-would-spell-more-economic-turbulence-turkey

War would bring Turkey under intense pressure from its Western allies to join putative sanctions against Russia, a critical trading partner and supplier of natural gas. Turkey will do its best to remain neutral, as signaled anew by Erdogan in comments to reporters en route home from Kyiv.

Ukraine has bought at least 20 drones from Turkey since 2018 and has used one only once in combat against Russian-backed separatists in Donbas in October 2021, eliciting growls from Moscow.

However, Turkey’s worries go beyond having to balance its NATO commitments with Russia, a key economic partner and since 2016 security partner in Syria. An actual war could have crippling consequences for Turkey’s battered economy.

In Ukraine, Turkey’s flourishing defense cooperation would likely suffer in a Russian attack as well.

Recent deals between Turkey and Ukraine include the supply of gas turbines for Turkish-designed naval vessels by Ukraine’s Zorya Mashproekt. Ukraine has ordered four of the MilGem class corvettes for itself.

Tourism, which Erdogan is banking on to help with an economic recovery ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections that are scheduled to be held by 2023, is also at risk.

… At best, Turkey can provide the two sides with “an optional diplomatic channel of communication” through which their respective messages are relayed.

Source: Dünya Taşlardan,“Rusya-Ukrayna krizi Türkiye’yi nasıl etkiler? (How does the Russia-Ukraine crisis affect Turkey?),”Sözcü (an anti-Turkish government daily),22 January 2022. https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2022/dunya/rusya-ukrayna-krizi-turkiyeyi-nasil-etkiler-6904478/

A possible war may involve significant losses for Turkey. First of all, if there is a war situation in the Black Sea, it will be difficult for tourists to come from both Russia and Ukraine this summer. Another problem is that Turkey meets most of its wheat needs from Russia and Ukraine. Since the war situation will also affect these imports, there may be rapid price hikes in food products…

In case of war, natural gas pipelines such as TurkStream and BlueStream in the Black Sea, which seem to be an important source of income for Russia, may also be attacked. Such a case may lead to a natural gas crisis in Turkey. By inviting both the Ukrainian and Russian presidents to Turkey, Turkey is actually signaling that it will remain neutral in this crisis with its mediation offer…

Turkey does not recognize and does not implement the sanctions imposed by the USA and EU countries on Russia. In this sense, we can say that there is an understanding and cooperation between the two countries. Although Turkey may not implement the Russian sanctions, especially the sanctions that would be applied in the banking system will negatively affect the Russian projects in Turkey. The construction of Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant may be delayed.

Since there will be no dollar circulation, Russia may have to pause its projects. Again, as the Black Sea will become a war zone, the use of commercial roads will be difficult, which will be reflected in the prices.

Source: Arda Mevlütoğlu,“Turkey – Ukraine Defense Cooperation In Russia’s Crosshairs?,”Anka Haber Ajansı (an independent Turkish news agency based in Ankara),06 February 2022. https://ankahaber.net/AnkaReview/Columnists/turkeyukraine_defense_cooperation_in_russias_crosshairs_73570

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky signed several agreements on Feb. 3, during Erdogan’s visit to Kyiv. The deals included a free trade agreement and a pact on cooperation in advanced technologies, aviation, and space…

Turkey’s sale of armed drones to Ukraine has come under harsh criticism by Russia. The TB2, however, is not the only subject of the rapidly enhancing defense industry cooperation between Kyiv and Ankara. Ukraine has become a preferred supplier for Turkey, especially for engines. A potential conflict, therefore, poses a significant risk to the Turkish defense industry…

Ukraine has two major firms in aviation engine design and manufacturing, Motor Sich and Ivchenko Progress…

The Bayraktar TB2’s manufacturer, Baykar Savunma. has developed a strategic reconnaissance/surveillance and strike drone that is designated Bayraktar Akinci. The Akinci can be powered by various types of turboprop engines, among them the Ivchenko Progress AI-450T… Baykar Savunma signed another deal with Motor Sich for the MS500 engine for the Akinci drone.

The drones are not the only area of engine procurement from Ukraine. Turkish Aerospace Industries (TA) signed a contract with Motor Sich for the TV3-117 turboshaft engines last June for use with the prototypes of the T929 ATAK 2 next-generation attack helicopter project. The Ukrainian company is also offering the same engine for the T925 10-ton class general-purpose helicopter project of TA.

Marine gas turbine specialist Zorya Mashproekt has become a candidate for supplying gas turbines for Turkish-designed naval vessels, mainly for the MilGem class corvettes… The MilGem sale to the Ukrainian Navy is one of the biggest defense exports of the Turkish defense industry…

An armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine poses a major risk for sustaining the supply of subsystems and products to Turkey. The level of risk depends on the scale of the conflict.

In a limited-scale conflict scenario, where the clashes occur in and around the Donbas region, there is a lower risk of Ukrainian defense industry facilities being targeted by Russian armed forces…

The second scenario is a full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russian armed forces. This scenario is the worst for Turkey and the region. In such a case, defense industry facilities as well as strategic industrial and infrastructure elements would be primary targets for the Russian military. The destruction of manufacturing facilities as well as the loss of skilled personnel would deal a devastating blow to the Ukrainian defense industry as well as to Turkish defense projects.

There may definitely be other scenarios involving intervention by external actors, diplomatic resolution, or various types of armed conflict. However, one thing is certain: a conflict of any type or scale would be a worst-case scenario for Turkey.


Image Information:

Image: Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
]Source: Russian Presidential Executive Office, kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62936, via Wikimedia, https://commons.m.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_and_Recep_Tayyip_Erdogan_(2020-03-05)_03.jpg, Files from Kremlin.ru
|Attribution: CC-BY-4.0 | Russia photographs taken on 2020-03-05

Russian Orthodox Church Strengthening Its Position in Africa

St Sergius Russian Orthodox Church in Noordwyk, Midrand, South Africa.

St Sergius Russian Orthodox Church in Noordwyk, Midrand, South Africa.


“…The expansion of the mission of the Russian Orthodox Church to Africa is an important ecclesiastical and political step…”


Even before open war broke out in late February, the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine shook the international community of believers who share the Orthodox faith.  In 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople officially recognized and established the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.  The Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) interpreted this as weakening their influence in Ukraine, as well as furthering the divide between the Ecumenical Patriarchy in Constantinople and its counterpart in Russia.  Since then, the leadership of the ROC has been working to expand its influence in regions that have traditionally fallen under the mandate of those churches that support the Ecumenical Patriarch.  The accompanying excerpt from the pro-business Russian daily newspaper Kommersant describes how the ROC has recently made significant inroads among Orthodox believers in Africa at the expense of the Ecumenical Patriarchy.  The article does not make it clear whether or not the Kremlin is using the ROC as a soft-power tool in this case. 

The article begins by stating, “the Holy Synod accepted into the Russian Orthodox Church more than a hundred clerics of the Patriarchate of Alexandria from eight African countries.”  These clerics, according to the article, “came under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate due to their categorical disagreement with the decision of the Patriarch of Alexandria to recognize the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.”  The article quotes a religious expert who asserts that “the expansion of the mission of the Russian Orthodox Church to Africa is an important ecclesiastical and political step.”  This expert concludes by stating that “Orthodoxy is developing quite dynamically in various states of the continent and attracts millions of people, [which will] strengthen the role of Moscow in the global Christian mission, despite all political crises.”


Source:

Pavel Korobov, “Русская православная церковь укрепила позиции в Африке (The Russian Orthodox Church has strengthened its position in Africa),” Kommersant (pro business Russian daily newspaper), 29 December 2021. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5154738

…On Wednesday, the Holy Synod accepted into the Russian Orthodox Church more than a hundred clerics of the Patriarchate of Alexandria from eight African countries. The clergy came under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate due to their categorical disagreement with the decision of the Patriarch of Alexandria — he recognized the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, established by Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople. The expert is convinced that the decision of the Russian Orthodox Church will irritate the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Constantinople, but will lead to the strengthening of Moscow’s role in the global Christian mission….

…To date, at least a hundred parishes of the Patriarchate of Alexandria, headed by their pastors, have declared their desire to transfer to the bosom of the Russian Orthodox Church…. 

The head of the Center for the Study of Problems of Religion and Society at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Roman Lunkin, called the decision “echoes of the conflict” between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate of Constantinople… “The expansion of the mission of the Russian Orthodox Church to Africa is an important ecclesiastical and political step,” says Mr. Lunkin. “The development of preaching among Africans has great prospects, Orthodoxy is developing quite dynamically in various states of the continent and attracts millions of people.” …In this regard, Mr. Lunkin speaks of “strengthening the role of Moscow in the global Christian mission, despite all political crises: Irritation of Constantinople and the Patriarchate of Alexandria is inevitable.”


Image Information:

Image: St Sergius Russian Orthodox Church in Noordwyk, Midrand, South Africa.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:St_Sergius_Russian_Orthodox_Church,_Noordwyk,_Midrand.jpg
Attribution: CCA SA 4.0 Intl

Cultural Perspectives, Geopolitics & Energy Security of Eurasia: Is the Next Global Conflict Imminent? (Mahir J. Ibrahimov, Gustav A. Otto, and Lee G. Gentile, Jr.)

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Marking the anniversary of the Ukraine Revolution of 2014, the Army University Press is pleased to announce the publishing of “Cultural Perspectives, Geopolitics & Energy Security of Eurasia: Is the Next Global Conflict Imminent?” This anthology was written under the auspice of CREL Management Office (CRELMO), and provides insight and observations on the importance of the Eurasia region, including Russia and other countries of the former USSR. The articles that make up this work provide a detailed description of regional realities, including a contextual discussion of the current Ukraine situation, viewed through the prism of Russia’s traditional military-strategic culture. As with all countries in the Eurasian region, Russia’s traditional strategic interests play a critical role in the geopolitical and socio-cultural situation in that region. The observations and insights in this volume are important for Army professionals who lead Soldiers in a variety of missions across the globe. The anthology goes beyond the obvious military strategic nexus and seeks to identify new spaces for consideration by planners and policymakers alike. (From introduction by MG John S. Kem, Provost, Army University.)   Click Here for Publication Site


Russia Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics (Timothy L. Thomas)

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This book is divided into three parts. Part one addresses President Vladimir Putin’s personality, Russian methods of developing strategy, and the Russian thought process for evaluating military affairs (forecasting, correlation of forces, forms, and methods of thought). Part two addresses the nature of future war, focusing on future war’s new weapons and organizations (to include aerospace, robotics, electronic warfare equipment, and unmanned aerial vehicles, among other pieces of equipment) and the DARPA-like organizations that have been created to increase Russia’s focus on science and technology developments. Part three address geopolitics, in particular the Russian militarization of the Arctic and the rationale behind their operations in Ukraine. All three parts help analysts in their attempts to uncover the vector (s) in which Russian military capabilities and actions are heading. The nation’s theorists have absorbed lessons learned from the contemporary conflicts of others and placed increased focus on the development of new technologies to protect their national interests and attain specific strategic goals.