Tag Archives: Russia

Russia Effectively Leaves Arctic Council

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“On 21 February, the Kremlin announced that Russia revised its Arctic policy by removing mentions of the Arctic Council, stressing the need to prioritize Russian Arctic interests, and striving for greater self-reliance for its Arctic industrial projects.”

The Arctic Council, founded in 1996, lists its members as Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. The position of Arctic Council president rotates between member states, and though the Council currently has a Russian president, other members of the Council have refused to meet in his presence in response to the war in Ukraine. Underscoring the schism, the Council also recently met without its current president presiding and accepted a Canadian counterclaim to Arctic territory that is also claimed by Russia.[i] As the excerpted article from independent Norwegian news source High North News indicates, Russia has effectively pulled out of the Arctic Council as a result of the Council’s actions and will now pursue its interests in the Arctic through bilateral relations and self-reliance. Russia’s decision increases the chance of further political conflict in the Arctic that could lead to a physical confrontation between Russia and Arctic Council member states.

Source:

Malte Humpert, “Russia Amends Arctic Policy Prioritizing ‘National Interest’ and Removing Cooperation Within Arctic Council,” High North News (independent newspaper published by the High North Center at Nord University, Bodo, Norway). 23 February 2023. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-amends-arctic-policy-prioritizing-national-interest-and-removing-cooperation-within-arctic

On 21 February, the Kremlin announced that Russia revised its Arctic policy by removing mentions of the Arctic Council, stressing the need to prioritize Russian Arctic interests, and striving for greater self-reliance for its Arctic industrial projects. The hopes for cooperation with Russia in the Arctic continue to cool. Days after a U.S. diplomat stated that cooperation with Russia in the Arctic was now virtually impossible, the Kremlin published amendments to its Arctic policy. President Putin signed the decree on 21 February. The updated document places greater emphasis on Russian national interests in the region and removes specific mentions for cooperation within the Arctic Council.

While the original policy, published in March 2020, called for the “strengthening of good neighborly relations with the Arctic states” in the fields of economic, scientific, cultural and cross-border cooperation the amended version removes the above section and instead calls for the “development of relations with foreign states on a bilateral basis, “taking into account the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic.”

The amended text also removes mentions of “the framework of multilateral regional cooperation formats, including the Arctic Council, the coastal Arctic “five” and the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region.” 

In the original policy the section on international cooperation, placed significant emphasis on work within “multilateral regional cooperation formats” for the purpose of building up economic, scientific and technological, as well as cultural cooperation. It did not make any mention of prioritizing Russian national interests. In contrast, the wording of the revised document now places the country’s national interests in the Arctic ahead of work towards economic, scientific and technological, and cultural cooperation. Just last week, U.S. military leaders emphasized that the Arctic was now Russia’s number one priorityThe updated version also places a greater emphasis on Russian self-reliance in the region. It calls for ensuring “import independence of the shipbuilding complex,” clearly a response to western sanctions which have affected Russia’s ability to order and purchase ice-capable gas and oil tankers at foreign shipyards.The amended version of the policy calls for the” development and modernization of shipbuilding and ship repair facilities for the construction and maintenance of ships navigating in the waters of the Northern Sea Route. “In terms of energy supply for population centers and industrial facilities along the NSR the policy now calls for the use of domestically built “low-power nuclear power plants.” The first such facility, the floating nuclear power plant Akademik Lomonosov was towed through the Baltics and up the Norwegian coastline in 2018 to the Arctic town of Pevek to supply electrical power and residential heat.

Notes:

[i] For more additional information about the Canadian claim on the Lomonosov Ridge see: Les Grau, “Canada Makes Additional Claims to Arctic Territory Claimed by Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023.

Russia Cutting Back on Nuclear Icebreaker Production

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“An updated version of Russia’s Arctic Strategy states that Russia will only build one “Lider,” not three as originally planned. The amended document signed by President Putin on the 27th of February reads that only the lead ship of the new class will be built before 2035.”

As reported in the excerpted article from the Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia will only build one of the three nuclear icebreakers it had previously planned but will compensate by increasing conventional icebreaker production. Although the cutback in production could be a response to the latest rounds of EU sanctions against Russia, the decision may have already been in process. In the past, Russia has cut back on expensive projects only to introduce improved projects later. The change in direction may indicate Russia believes it already has enough atomic-powered icebreakers in an era of thinning polar icecaps.

Source:

Atle Staalesen, “Moscow lowers ambitions in nuclear icebreaker program, will not build fleet of new super-powerful vessels after all,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 1 March 2023.  https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2023/03/moscow-lowers-ambitions-nuclear-icebreaker-program-will-not-build-fleet-new-super-powerful

Only two days after the EU imposed sanctions against Russia’s state nuclear icebreaker operator, the country announces that it will not build a fleet of Lider-class vessels. An updated version of Russia’s Arctic Strategy states that Russia will only build one “Lider,” not three as originally planned. The amended document signed by President Putin on the 27th of February reads that only the lead ship of the new class will be built before 2035.

The lead ship carries the name “Rossiya” and is currently under construction at the Zvezda yard in the Russian Far East. It is due to be ready for sailing in 2027. The Lider (project 20510) will be equipped with two RITM-400 type nuclear reactors and have a total capacity of 120 MW, twice the power of the currently most powerful icebreakers. It will be able to crush through ice thicker than four meters.

The vessel is very complicated to build, and it comes at an extraordinarily high price. The Russian government in January 2020 allocated 127 billion rubles (€1,85 billion) for the construction of the lead ship. The reduction of the number of Liders is compensated by the construction of more LK-60 icebreakers[GRLCUT(1] . While the original strategy document from 2020 includes the construction of “no less than five” icebreakers of the 22220 class, the updated documents reads “no less than seven” vessels of the kind.

Russia already has three ships of the class in operation: the Arktika, Sibir and Ural. By year 2035, also the Yakutia, Chukotka, Kamchatka and Primorie will be completed. The Arctic Strategy also outlines the construction of 30 rescue and support ships, as well as three hydrographic survey ships and two piloting ships by 2030.

The updated document comes only two days after the European Commission adopted its 10th package of sanctions against Russia, a part of which is aimed at nuclear icebreaker operator Atomflot. According to the Commission, the sanctions against Atomflot will reduce Russia’s ability to take use of the Northern Sea Route to exploit its vast Arctic oil and gas reserves.

“With oil and gas exports shifting from Europe to Asia as a result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and subsequent Westerns sanctions, Russia’s icebreaker fleet is key to the country’s Arctic hydrocarbon strategy. In order to escort oil and gas tankers on the much longer and more challenging voyage from the Yamal and Gydan peninsulas to Asia, rather than the much shorter and less ice infested route to Europe, Russia relies on Atomflot’s fleet of nuclear icebreakers,” an explanation from the Commission reads.Vladimir Putin has since 2018 had the development of the Northern Sea Route as one of his key priorities and federal agencies have been commissioned to reach 80 million tons of goods per year on the route by 2024. The lion’s share of the projected goods traffic is oil, liquified natural gas and coal.

Russia Widens and Tightens Conscription Policies

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Andrey Kartapolov (General-Ret), chairman of the Duma Defense Committee.

Andrey Kartapolov (General-Ret), chairman of the Duma Defense Committee.

“The information space is filled with aggressive advertising of the services of commercial structures to evade military duty…”

The Kremlin continues to struggle to attract adequate military manpower to participate in its so-called special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine. The partial mobilization of 300,000 soldiers announced in September 2022 helped to stabilize Russian lines but so far has been insufficient to launch a counteroffensive or consolidate control of the four recently annexed provinces.[i] Similarly, Russian private military companies (PMCs) like the Wagner Group and other local militias have also proven inadequate to consolidate gains. The Kremlin and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) increasingly may be forced to rely upon conscript soldiers to fill Russia’s manpower needs.

Russia is considering a proposal to change the age for draft-eligible Russians. In December 2022, the MoD announced that the age for draft-eligible Russian men would be changed from 18-27 to 21-30 years of age, which would supposedly provide for more mature and experienced conscripts. However, according to the first excerpt from the pro-business site Vedomosti, “the transition to a new draft age in 2023 is unlikely.” There is simply insufficient time for local draft boards to prepare and carry out this change. However, the article quotes another expert who claims that the “law on raising the draft age could come into force in the fall of 2023.” At first, the draft will be of a mixed type, that is, men aged 18 to 30 will be subject to it.” Expanding the age limits from 18-30 for military manpower could help the MoD to fill the military’s ranks. The Kremlin is also cracking down on ways to evade military service. To avoid the draft, many young Russian men employ the services of various legal agencies to find legal or medical reasons to remain out of the military.[ii] Not surprisingly, as the second excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant describes, legislation has been proposed that would “ban advertising of legal and consulting companies that provide services to conscripts.” The article quotes a Russian legislator who asserts that “the information space is filled with aggressive advertising of the services of commercial structures to evade military duty.” According to the Kremlin’s narrative, military duty is a sacred honor, and as the SMO continues, more young Russian men will be forced to carry out this obligation if the conscript age eligibility is expanded and legal recourse for potential conscripts is curtailed.

Sources:

Anna Vergazova, “В Госдуме оценили сроки перехода к новому призывному возрасту (The State Duma estimated the timing of the transition to a new draft age),” Vedomosti (Russian pro-business news outlet), 3 March 2023. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2023/03/03/965182-perehoda-novomu-prizivnomu-vozrastu

The transition to a new draft age in 2023 is unlikely, Yury Shvytkin, deputy head of the State Duma Defense Committee, told Vedomosti…. Viktor Bondarev, Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Federation Council, said on March 3 that the draft law on raising the draft age could come into force in the fall of 2023. He added that the introduction of the document is planned in the spring, and suggested that in this case it would come into force by the beginning of the autumn draft…

…A proposal to gradually increase the draft age was made by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on December 21, 2022 at an expanded meeting of the collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense. According to his proposal, the draft age can be increased from 18 to 21 years, and the maximum – from 27 to 30 years. In addition, Shoigu called for an increase in the number of military personnel to 1.5 million people.

Earlier, Andrey Kartapolov, chairman of the Duma Defense Committee , told Parliamentary Gazeta that from April 1, conscription could take place according to the new rules. At first, the draft will be of a mixed type, that is, men aged 18 to 30 will be subject to it.

Bulat Bashirov, “Призывников оградят от юристов (Conscripts to be shielded from lawyers),” Kommersant (Russian pro-business news outlet), 7 February 2023. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5811945

…Deputies of the Parliament of Bashkiria took the initiative to ban advertising of legal and consulting companies that provide services to conscripts. The legislators propose to amend the federal legislation accordingly, since “aggressive advertising of services for evading military duty” provokes citizens to commit acts punishable in criminal and administrative order….“The information space is filled with aggressive advertising of the services of commercial structures to evade military duty,” the explanatory note to the document says…. “Advertising ways to avoid conscription is widespread: cars with similar banners are literally parked near recruiting stations,” Vladimir Nagorny, head of the Bashkirian Kurultai Committee on State Construction, told Kommersant. “Their services are to find, they believe, a legal way to avoid conscription. The first way can be characterized as abuse of the right. On the advice of such lawyers, the recruit will appeal the decision of the draft commission in court, and even if he loses, by that time the draft campaign will already be over. The second method is friendly independent medical commissions, which find a disease in the conscript that exempts him from service. Lawyers do not hesitate to talk about this method.”

Notes:

[i]Russia annexed the four Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia in 2022, although the Kremlin does not fully control them.

[ii] For additional information regarding how young Russian men avoid being conscripted see: Ray Finch, “Dodging the Draft” OE Watch, December 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/377105

Image Information:

Image: Andrey Kartapolov (General-Ret), chairman of the Duma Defense Committee
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Andrey_Kartapolov,_2018.jpg
Attribution: Mil.ru. CCA 4.0 Intl

Russia-Supported Military Rulers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties

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“Giant posters of Malian Presidents Assimi Goïta and Guinean President Mamady Doumbouya, who came to power through coups like the Burkinabè transitional president, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, were brandished by the demonstrators next to Russian flags.”

A new nexus of West African allies is emerging that bears watching. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, which are all led by military dictators generally sympathetic to Russia and antagonistic towards France, continue to deepen their ties, especially regarding military and counterterrorism affairs. As detailed in the first article from the pan-African news aggregator Africanews.com, in March 2023, the prime minister of Burkina Faso suggested on a visit to Mali that the two countries create what he called “a federation.” A similar idea had also been broadly discussed in February 2023, when leaders from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea—all of whom had faced sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for unconstitutional assumptions of power—also discussed the creation of a new regional organization to help them circumvent ECOWAS.[i] Of note is the inclusion of Guinea in the mix. Since Guinea faces no similar jihadist insurgency as Mali and Burkina Faso, it does not appear to have the same degree of pro-Russian sentiments as Mali[ii] and Burkina Faso,[iii] which host or are presumed to host mercenaries from the Russian private military company Wagner Group, respectively. Yet, the fact that Guinea is ruled by a military leader may be sufficient to pull Guinea into the pro-Russia orbit of the other two. As detailed in the second article from Africanews.com, this nexus of geopolitical affinities and antipathy was displayed at a January 2023 rally in Burkina Faso decrying French presence and promoting Burkinabè sovereignty. As the article articulates, “Giant posters of Malian Presidents Assimi Goïta and Guinean President Mamady Doumbouya, who seized power like the Burkinabè transitional president, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, were brandished by the demonstrators next to Russian flags.” As this alliance deepens, other francophone West African countries with pro-Russian, anti-French sentiments from civil society, namely, the Central African Republic and Chad, may well be targeted for future recruitment.

Sources:

“Le Burkina Faso aspire à créer ‘une fédération’ avec le Mali (Burkina Faso seeks to create a federation with Mali),” africanews.com (pan-African news aggregator), 2 March 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/02/02/le-burkina-faso-aspire-a-creer-une-federation-avec-le-mali/

Burkinabe Prime Minister Apollinaire Joachimson Kyelem de Tambela, visiting neighboring Mali this week, has suggested the creation of a “federation” between his country and Mali.

 The two states, faced with jihadist violence, and led by putschist soldiers who demanded the departure of French soldiers from their territories, have come closer in recent months.

In a speech during a dinner, the head of the Malian government, Choguel Kokalla Maïga, estimated that this working visit will strengthen the ties of cooperation on the security and economic levels between the Republic of Mali and Burkina Faso:

“Des milliers de Burkinabés manifestent pour la ‘souveraineté nationale’ (Thousands of Burkinabe protest for ‘national sovereignty’),” africanews.com (pan-African news aggregator), 30 January 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/01/29/des-milliers-de-burkinabes-manifestent-pour-la-souverainete-nationale/

Gathered in Place de la Nation, in the center of the capital, at the call of the coordination of associations and organizations of civil society, the demonstrators held up placards on which one could read: “Imperialism, down”, ” French policy in Africa, down”, “No to Macron’s diktat”, or “Forward for the sovereignty of Burkina”.

Giant posters of Malian Presidents Assimi Goïta and Guinean President Mamady Doumbouya, who came to power through coups like the Burkinabè transitional president, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, were brandished by the demonstrators next to Russian flags.“Sovereignty, freedom of choice of its partners, obstinate defense of the interests of the Malian people. I am certain that these principles are shared by all the countries which want to take charge of themselves and our brothers and friends of Faso, I am convinced of it, must have similar requirements.”

Notes:

[i] See: Jason Warner, “West African States Ruled by Military Leaders Seek To Circumvent Future Sanctions,” OE Watch, 03-2023. Awaiting online publication.

[ii] See: Jason Warner, “Mali Defends Reliance on Russian Counterterrorism Assistance,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437332

[iii] See: Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism with Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

Western Efforts To Isolate Russia and Iran Falter in Latin America

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Naval vessels of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy.

Naval vessels of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy.

“In recent days, Russian media in Spanish, such as Sputnik and Russia Today, highlighted the rejection of the various Latin American governments to the requests of…Berlin. ‘The arms race in Ukraine does not have the support of South America,’ the outlets declared.”

Latin American countries have often spoken in terms of “neutrality” as they have tried to remain “non-aligned” regarding the Russia-Ukraine war.[i] While some countries in the region have condemned Russia’s invasion, none has joined the Western-led sanctions campaign. Nor has any of the six Latin American countries with old Soviet weaponry stepped forward to donate it to Ukraine. Underscoring these trends is the first article from the Spanish-language outlet BBC Mundo, covering German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s recent trip to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. At each stop, Scholz implored his counterparts to consider donating their Soviet weapons systems to Ukraine.[ii] All three leaders firmly declined. For his part, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva even blamed both Russia and Ukraine for the current conflict. Colombian President Gustavo Petro said he would rather see Colombia’s equipment become “junk” than send it to Ukraine where it could prolong the war. Latin American countries have been similarly reluctant to turn away from Iran. According to the second accompanying article from Argentina’s leading daily newspaper, La Nación, two Iranian warships sanctioned by the United States recently docked in Rio de Janeiro. Taken together, these developments suggest neither Russia’s war in Ukraine nor Iran’s domestic crackdowns on protestors and its provision of kamikaze drones to Russia for use in Ukraine have managed to isolate these countries in Latin America.

Sources:

“Por qué los países latinoamericanos se han negado a enviar armas a Ucrania (Why Latin American countries have refused to send weapons to Ukraine),” BBC Mundo (the Spanish-language outlet of the popular British state-owned network), 3 February 2023. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-64506590

During a meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who is visiting several Latin American countries this week, Fernández clarified that Argentina “is not thinking of sending weapons” to the conflict zone. A few days earlier, his peers in Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil had made similar claims…In recent days, Russian media in Spanish such as Sputnik and Russia Today, highlighted the rejection of the various Latin American governments to the requests of Berlin.

“Brasil permite que dos buques de guerra iraníes atraquen en Río pese a las presiones de EE.UU (Brazil allows two Iranian warships to dock in Rio despite US pressure),” La Nación (Argentina’s leading daily newspaper), 28 February 2023. https://www.lanacion.com.ar/el-mundo/brasil-permite-que-dos-buques-de-guerra-iranies-atraquen-en-rio-pese-a-las-presiones-de-eeuu-nid28022023/

Once Lula’s trip [to the White House] ended, the docking of the ships was authorized. Vice Admiral Carlos Eduardo Horta Arentz, deputy chief of the Brazilian Navy General Staff, gave his approval for the ships to dock in Rio between February 26 and March 4, according to an announcement published on February 23…The Brazilian Navy authorizes a foreign ship to dock in Brazil, but only with prior authorization from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which takes into account the request of the embassy in question and the logistics…Diplomacy with Iran was one of the highlights of Lula’s attempts to bolster Brazil’s international position during his previous presidential terms. In 2010, he traveled to Tehran to meet then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as he tried to broker a US-Iran nuclear deal.

Notes:

[i] For more background on Latin America’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine, see: Ryan C. Berg et al., “A Hesitant Hemisphere: How Latin America Has Been Shaped by the War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 February 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/hesitant-hemisphere-how-latin-america-has-been-shaped-war-ukraine

[ii] For more information on the estimated six countries in the region that could donate Soviet-era weapons systems to Ukraine, see: Jeff Seldin, “U.S. Pushing Central, South American Countries to Give Ukraine Quick Military Boost,” Voice of America, 20 January 2023. https://www.voanews.com/a/us-pushing-central-south-american-countries-to-give-ukraine-quick-military-boost-/6927591.html

Image Information:

Image:  Naval vessels of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy
Source:  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ceremony_to_welcome_the_33rd_and_send-off_the_34th_naval_groups_of_the_Islamic_Republic_of_Iran_Navy_%2813%29.jpg 
Attribution: Wikimedia, CC-BY-4.0

Georgians Consider Outcomes of War in Ukraine

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Protesters in Tbilisi, 7 March 2023.

Protesters in Tbilisi, 7 March 2023.

“In any case, Georgia needs to start preparing and working on increasing its civil defense capabilities.”

The Georgian government condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine initially but has not taken part in any sanctions against Russia out of concern of being drawn into the conflict. Additionally, Georgia’s economy remains closely tied to Russia’s, and the government continues to contend with the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which have been occupied by Russia-supported forces since the end of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War.[i] While Georgia will likely maintain its neutrality on Ukraine, the accompanying excerpted article from the independent, non-profit think tank Georgian Institute of Politics offers a Georgian perspective of five possible outcomes of the Russia-Ukraine war. The article is a follow up to the think tank’s initial assessment of possible outcomes, which was published just a few weeks after the war began in 2022. While the report acknowledges that Georgia will not have a direct impact on the outcome of the war, each of the scenarios shows how Georgia will be affected in some way.

In the first scenario, Ukraine wins the war, which the article’s authors believes is probable, resulting in Georgia joining NATO and having deeper integration with Europe. Conversely, the article believes that this would come with the risk that Russia will then destabilize Georgia regardless of who is in power in Moscow. The second scenario examines what could happen if Ukraine turns into a frozen conflict or returns to the status quo before the war began. The article states that a frozen conflict would allow Russia time to restore its military but also would push additional Russian migrants into Georgia. Georgia could also become the focal point of Putin’s ire as he looks to claim a quick victory to compensate domestically for losses in Ukraine. This would in turn cause Georgian officials to move away from integrating with Europe and pursue a policy more in line with Russian interests. 

In the third scenario, Russia achieves its strategic goals in Ukraine, and in the fourth scenario, Russia and NATO engage in full-scale war. These are unlikely according to the article. The fifth and final scenario, which the authors believe is very likely, is that a war of attrition will continue for two or more years and that this will put Georgia in a difficult position. The article notes how Georgian Dream, the ruling party in Georgia’s parliament, has been improving ties with Russia, though many in Georgia still see Russia as a threat. In early March, the Georgian government withdrew a bill requiring NGOs to register as foreign agents in Georgia after facing protest that the bill had been influenced by Russia. Lastly, the article notes that Georgia will face “major strategic dilemmas” regardless of how the war ends and recommends that Georgian officials increase civil defense capabilities and cooperation with Turkey.[ii] While the article does not claim to be an official Georgian perspective, it makes clear that Georgia will be impacted by the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

Source:

“One Year of War in Ukraine and Risk Assessment for Georgia: Five (updated) Scenarios,” Georgian Institute of Politics (an independent non-profit think tank in Georgia), 13 February 2023.

In March of 2022, just a couple of weeks after Russia launched the full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, GIP proposed four possible scenarios of future developments and their possible implications for Georgia…However, almost one year since the invasion, the conflict seems to be reaching its decisive point…

As the war continues reshaping global geopolitics, the following piece will revisit GIP’s previous assessments and offer insights into what has changed over the last 11 months since its publication. Although the war is far from over and significant battles are still ahead, five scenarios discussed in detail below offer some insights into the dilemmas and potential risks that Georgia may face considering different possible developments in Ukraine.

Scenario 1: Ukraine wins the war (Probable)

As western support for Ukraine continues to increase, leading to a successful counteroffensive operation, and eventual victory, the geopolitical paradigm in the wider Black Sea region would change drastically…If the situation is going to develop in this direction and Ukraine is going to achieve full de-occupation of its territories (including the Crimean Peninsula), it’s not excluded that the window of opportunity may appear for NATO’s further enlargement to the East…In the best-case scenario, this would also imply Georgia joining the alliance. In addition to NATO enlargement, Russia’s defeat and retreat from the region will also make Georgia’s European integration irreversible…

…This scenario implies risks for Georgia from another perspective…Defeat in Ukraine may result in regime change in Russia, leading to internal instabilities and power struggles. This could lead to a spillover of chaos in the already volatile North Caucasus, creating a range of challenges on the border of Georgia. In other words, while a strong Russia is a serious threat to Georgia, an unstable Northern neighbor is no less dangerous for its security.

Risks will increase for Georgia even if the Russian regime survives defeat in Ukraine. Since it can still act as a spoiler, the Kremlin might be keen to restore its tarnished prestige by continuing adventurous foreign policy towards Georgia…

Scenario 2: Freezing the conflict and/or returning to status quo ante (Possible)

As the war drags on causing an immense number of causalities on both sides, there is a possibility that both Russia and Ukraine could reach the point of exhaustion…

This would be either freezing the conflict or returning to the status quo in the Eastern part of Ukraine…the existence conflicts with frozen solutions will also allow Russia to restore its forces and prepare for a new assault. This scenario also implies a risk for Georgia, as preparing for a new offensive would intensify the ongoing “silent” mobilization. This, in its turn, may lead to an increase in Russian migrants to Georgia…

Moreover, with conflict intensity decreased in Eastern Ukraine, Russian Federation could apply pressure on Georgia through South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As in the first scenario, amid the upcoming presidential elections in 2024, Putin might need a quick victory on the foreign front to compensate for the damage caused by the failures in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, officials in Tbilisi might be forced to give up its policy of Euro-Atlantic integration and align its external policies with the Kremlin’s…

Scenario 3: The Kremlin achieves its strategic goals (Unlikely)

In this scenario, Russia achieves a successful breakthrough in the upcoming major battles. With Western support decreasing, Ukrainian resources exhausting, and a raising death toll among civilians, Ukraine might be forced to concede. Ukraine’s concession would imply the change of the government in Kyiv, recognition of occupied territories as part of Russia and the end of Euro-Atlantic presence in the region for decades to come.

As it was outlined in our scenario 2: Georgian nightmare published in March 2022, there is no doubt that in case of such developments, the Kremlin may pose an ultimatum to Tbilisi or may even establish a puppet regime in Tbilisi. Georgia could be dragged into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or even into the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)…

Scenario 4: NATO-Russia Full-Scale War (Highly unlikely)

Out of all the possible scenarios outline here, this seems to be the least likely, yet still a possibility. Especially if, after a successful counteroffensive in the East, Ukraine will start military operations to free the Crimean Peninsula. Attacks on Crimea or deeper territories in Russia might further escalate the conflict and lead to the Kremlin using a tactical nuclear weapon…

In case of a war between Russia and NATO member states, the Black Sea region gains strategic importance. It includes Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, members of the alliance and most likely get involved in the conflict…In this context, Georgia’s strategic location gains vital importance for Russia and NATO allies…

Scenario 5: Attrition warfare continues for 2 or more years (Very likely)

There is also a possibility that neither Russia nor Ukraine is going to back down that might lead to the protracted attrition warfare. In this context, illicit trade and alternative imports of the western technology is going to gain even more importance for the Kremlin. This will put Georgia in a difficult position due to its transactional foreign and security policy towards Russia. And deliberately or not, by improving economic ties with Russia, Georgian Dream did end up moving Georgia closer to its erstwhile enemy…

Despite the GD’s rhetoric, existing occupied territories remain an obstacle to improving relations with the Kremlin. Opinion polls repeatedly show that the majority of Georgians perceive Russia as a threat and support the country’s pro-European foreign policy…

Conclusion…All the scenarios outlined above suggest that regardless which direction the situation is going to develop, Tbilisi will be facing major strategic dilemmas. In any case, Georgia needs to start preparing and working on increasing its civil defense capabilities. Similar to what was suggested in our last year’s scenarios, Georgia needs to intensify its cooperation with Turkey a NATO member and a large regional military power that has a potential to counterbalance Russian regional dominance…

Notes:

[i] For more information on Georgia’s security issues in Russian-occupied South Ossetia and Abhazia, see: Matthew Stein ““Borderization” Continues in Georgia,” OE Watch, 03-2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues See also Dodge Billingsley “Russia Flexes Its Muscles in Abkhazia While Citizens Recall Anniversary of War with Georgia,” OE Watch, 09-2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/268081

[ii] For more background on Georgia’s security cooperation with Turkey and Azerbaijan, see: Matthew Stein “Trilateral Security in the Caucasus,” OE Watch, 07-2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: Protesters in Tbilisi, 7 March 2023
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Georgia_Protest_2023_VOA.png
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The Evolutionary Russian View of Peacekeeping as Part of Modern Warfare (Matthew Stein) (March 2023)

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Russia views peacekeeping operations as a part of warfare, specifically that they can be
utilized to achieve strategic objectives beyond conflict resolution
• Russia’s past peacekeeping operations have shown how these involved ending the conflict
as quickly as possible and enforcing terms of any cease-fire agreement, including taking
action that favored one of the belligerents as long as Russia remains in the dominant position
• Russia’s Nagorno-Karabakh peacekeeping operation ended a conflict and helped the
Russian government maintain influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States with
a Russian military detachment in place for the foreseeable future, which can help explain
how conflicts involving Russia are likely to end.

Russian Battalion Tactical Group Mission Training in the Arctic

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28 A COLD, SOGGY, BOGGY SLOG: GROUND FORCES IN HIGHER LATITUDE
COMBAT
By Dr. Lester W. Grau

34 RUSSIAN BATTALION TACTICAL GROUP MISSION TRAINING IN THE
ARCTIC
By Dr. Lester W. Grau & Dr. Charles K. Bartles

40 POLAR NIGHTS, WHITE NIGHTS, AND NORMAL DAYS AND NIGHTS:
ARCTIC GROUND TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND ENGAGEMENT
By Dr. Lester W. Grau

Russia Using Media Organizations To Garner Support From “Islamic” Countries

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President of the Republic of Tatarstan R.N. Minnikhanov.

President of the Republic of Tatarstan R.N. Minnikhanov.

“Cooperation with countries of the Islamic world in the media sphere is one of the key aspects of the Russian international policy.”

In December 2022, the Moscow headquarters of the Russian news channel RT hosted a conference titled “Russia and the Islamic World: Practical Steps in Media Cooperation.” The conference was co-sponsored by three entities: the Group of Strategic Vision Russia–Islamic World (GSV); Russia’s Sputnik International News Agency, which is highly influential in Arabic-speaking countries; and the Union of Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) News Agencies (UNA).[i] The conference featured representatives from Emirati and Turkish media and aimed to not only strengthen media coordination between Russia and OIC countries, but also to harmonize broader narratives in order to counter “misinformation.” The accompanying excerpt, published in the Saudi English-language daily Arab News, highlights how “Moscow is shifting its focus to the Muslim world.” The Kremlin is looking to deepen policies promoting Russo-Muslim cooperation mechanisms—including the annual GSV-hosted Kazan Summit, one of the primary economic summits for Russia and OIC countries—which may provide Moscow with opportunities to skirt economic sanctions. The Kremlin also hopes that such efforts may promote the continued the neutrality of Muslim countries vis-à-vis Ukraine.[ii] As GSV chairman and Tatarstan Republic leader Rustam Minnikhanov expressed in his address to the December conference, excerpted alongside this commentary from the official GSV website, “cooperation with countries of the Islamic world in the media sphere is one of the key aspects of the Russian international policy.” Especially noteworthy is the role played by the GSV and similar organizations in strengthening Russo-Turkish cooperation, given the historical links between Turkey and Russian Muslim-majority areas such as Tatarstan, which some in Turkey consider part of the broader “Turkic World.” Thus, Russo-Muslim cooperation mechanisms such as the GSV are not only fulfilling an important and immediate geopolitical role, but they also push forward the type of historical, quasi-civilizational approach to geostrategic thinking that has steadily emerged in both Putin’s Russia and Erdogan’s Turkey.[iii]

Sources:

Diana Galeeva. “Moscow shifts its focus to the Muslim world,” Arab News (English-language Saudi daily), 17 December 2022. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2217786

In addition to the activities of the Russian Muftiates, which Russia has used as part of its religious soft power since the 2000s, are the Group of the Strategic Vision “Russia-Islamic world,” the para-diplomacies of the Russian Muslim regions (Chechnya, Dagestan, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan), and the activities of Muslim NGOs, such as the Association of Muslim Businessmen of the Russian Federation. Arguably, these policies have helped Russia to achieve economic, political and security advantages, including investments in its regions (Chechnya and Tatarstan) by the Gulf Cooperation Council states. The neutral position of GCC states over the Ukraine crisis also suggests the positive outcomes of these policies.

“International Conference ‘Developing Media Cooperation with the Islamic World – Russia’s Most Important Doctrine’,” Group of Strategic Vision Russia – Islamic World, 15 December 2022. https://russia-islworld.ru/en/novosti//international-conference-developing-media-cooperation-with-the-islamic-world-russias-most-important-doctrine-2022-12-15-29854/ Moreover, regular events held by the Group of Strategic Vision ‘Russia – Islamic World’ testify to the dynamics of fruitful international relations. Cooperation with countries of the Islamic world in the media sphere is one of the key aspects of the Russian international policy. Rustam Minnikhanov expressed his opinion that in the current difficult geopolitical situation the role of mass media was increasing and that the journalistic work of honest and verified mass media was crucial in combating false information and promoting traditional spiritual values.

Notes:

[i] The GSV is a Russian entity formed in 2006 to coordinate Moscow’s relations with the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a multilateral forum of Muslim-majority countries in which Russia is an observer state.  In 2014, President Putin bolstered the GSV’s capabilities as a conduit for Russian influence in Muslim-majority countries by increasing its visibility and appointing Tatarstan Republic leader Rustam Minnikhanov as its head.

[ii] In January 2023, a presidential decree made the Kazan Summit an annual event. The summit’s website is available at: https://kazansummit.ru/en/

[iii] One of the most visible proponents of this type of thinking in Russia is Alexander Dugin, a Russian political philosopher whose geopolitical musings are thought to influence the strategic thinking of the Russian armed forces’ leadership. See: Lucas Winter, “The Appeal of ‘Duginism’ in the Middle East,” OE Watch. 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/427403

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Image: President of the Republic of Tatarstan R.N. Minnikhanov
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Rustam_Minnikhanov_official_portrait.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0


Russia Losing to China in Central Asia

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Map of Central Asia.

Map of Central Asia.

“China can successfully form the image of a guarantor of the security of the countries of the region, replacing Russia in this capacity.”

The ripple effects of the Kremlin’s decision to invade Ukraine in early 2022 continue to reverberate around the world, particularly among China and Russia’s other neighbors. As the excerpted article from the semi-independent Russia-based Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye[i] indicates, given the demands of fighting in Ukraine, “it is increasingly difficult for Russia to ensure the security of Central Asia.” Furthermore, after its poor military performance in Ukraine, regional leaders see that the Russian armed forces are not nearly as formidable as they were once believed to be. And yet, Russia’s unprovoked attack has led certain Central Asian countries to worry about being met with the same fate as Ukraine.

Given Russia’s growing absence from Central Asia, the author, military journalist Alexander Khramchikhin, asserts that “with all these circumstances, China can dominate the region almost automatically.”[ii] He continues to say that a Chinese military presence in Central Asia is steadily developing, since over the last several years, the People’s Liberation Army of China and the People’s Armed Police have already conducted numerous joint exercises with the armies, border police, and internal troops of various Central Asian countries. The author then concludes that “China can successfully form the image of a guarantor of the security of the countries of the region…replacing Russia in this capacity.” The author reviews Chinese involvement in all five Central Asian countries, reminding readers of the recently constructed Chinese base in Tajikistan, claiming that “the place of Moscow as a guarantor of the security of Dushanbe is confidently taken by Beijing.” To ensure that China’s economic interests are well protected, he maintains that it is only a matter of time before further Chinese bases materialize in other Central Asian countries. Khramchikhin concludes that “Beijing will act on the principle of ‘crossing the river, groping for stones,’” suggesting that this transformation of China’s growing military presence in Central Asia will be gradual.

Source:

Alexander Khramchikhin, “Пекин прибирает к рукам страны Центральной Азии (Beijing takes over the countries of Central Asia),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye (semi-independent Russian news source focused on military topics), 26 January 2023. https://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2023-01-26/5_1222_asia.html

…Central Asia is now in the deep shadow of the Ukrainian events. But this does not mean at all that the struggle for it has ceased. In addition to geographic proximity, Russia has powerful historical, linguistic, cultural, economic, political, and military ties with the countries of Central Asia. To a large extent, the labor markets of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are oriented towards Russia. This explains the very significant influence of Moscow in the region….

…However, these ties are also gradually beginning to blur and weaken. In particular, Ukrainian events contribute to this. Because of them, it is increasingly difficult for Russia to ensure the security of Central Asia: too large forces are deployed by Moscow in Ukraine. In addition, the countries of the region see that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are by no means as strong as previously thought. On the other hand, some of these countries are beginning to fear sharing the fate of Ukraine…. In connection with all these circumstances, China can dominate the region almost automatically. In fact, competitors themselves give him this dominance….

The growth of China’s economic influence in the countries of Central Asia automatically leads to an increase in political influence…. If the growth of China’s economic influence in Central Asia is automatically followed by the growth of its political influence, then, obviously, the growth of political influence will be followed by the growth of military influence, which is already happening. In addition, most of China’s economic projects in the countries of Central Asia are part of the global One Belt, One Road project. Accordingly, Beijing wants to ensure the safety of these projects.

…In the 21st century, the People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) have already conducted dozens of joint exercises with the armies, border and internal troops of the Central Asian countries.… Accordingly, China can successfully form the image of a guarantor of the security of the countries of the region from the well-known “three evils” (terrorism, separatism, extremism), replacing Russia in this capacity.

…The highest form of military cooperation between China and the countries of Central Asia is the deployment of Chinese military bases in the region…. Quite expectedly, it began with Tajikistan – the weakest country in Central Asia militarily and economically, the most remote from Russia, while having the longest border with Afghanistan… Dushanbe is experiencing a serious security deficit and is not sure that Moscow is able to solve this problem (especially now, in the context of the Ukrainian campaign). Therefore, the place of Moscow as a guarantor of the security of Dushanbe is confidently taken by Beijing…. 

The deployment of Chinese military bases in other countries of the region is apparently a matter of time. The pace and order of deployment of Chinese military facilities in the countries of Central Asia will be determined both by the general geopolitical situation and the degree of economic dependence of each specific country on China. …Most likely Tajikistan will be followed by Kyrgyzstan, then Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The last one, apparently, will give consent to the deployment of PLA facilities in the country Kazakhstan…. Chinese military bases in Central Asia will ensure the smooth functioning of the Belt and Road Initiative and the stability of local regimes. At first, Chinese facilities in the countries of the region are unlikely to be too large, but gradually the presence of the PLA and the PAP in these states will expand. As in all other areas, Beijing will act on the principle of ‘crossing the river, groping for stones.’ Almost always, the implementation of this principle leads China to success.

Notes:

[i]Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye (Independent Military Review).

[ii] Alexander Khramchikhin was one of the few Russian military analysts who warned against an invasion of Ukraine, arguing that such an attack could have catastrophic consequences for Russia. See: Alexander Khramchikhin, “Полураспад Украины (Half-life of Ukraine),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye, 11 March 2021. https://nvo.ng.ru/gpolit/2021-03-11/8_1132_ukraine.html

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Image: Map of Central Asia
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Central_Asia_-_political_map_2008.svg
Attribution: CCA-SA 3.0