Turkey as a Drone Superpower: A Case Study of a Mid-Size Power Driving the Operational Environment (Karen Kaya) (March 2023)

(Click image to download brief.)


KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Turkey has emerged as a drone superpower on the world stage. In just the past few years,
Turkey has become one of a select group of countries in the world that can produce, use
and export armed drones extensively, trailing only the United States, Israel, and China.
• Turkey’s innovative use of its cost-effective Bayraktar TB-2 drone involves using drone
squadrons effectively as a mobile air artillery, thereby achieving overmatch by emphasizing
quantity over quality. This strategy has impacted geopolitical outcomes in several regional
conflicts, and has provided a strategy for middle sized powers to emulate. Several such
powers—including Ukraine, Poland, Azerbaijan—are buying these cost-effective systems
from Turkey with a view to do so. Other midsize countries with limited defense budgets
are likely to replicate this approach, changing the nature of local conflicts and even the
calculations of larger observing nations.
• Drones and anti-aircraft technologies that merge ISR with strike capabilities will increasingly
impact the trajectories of conflicts. The entry barriers to these technologies are falling,
making it easier for geopolitical issues to turn to war.


Armenia Takes Another Step Away From Russia

Nikol Pashinyan.

Nikol Pashinyan.


“It is dispiriting that Armenia’s membership in the CSTO did not deter Azerbaijan from aggressive actions.”


Armenia’s frustration with Russia and its role as the de facto leader of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) appeared to reach a head at the organization’s November 2022 summit, when Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan abruptly ended a meeting with leaders of the other member states and refused to sign two documents drafted during the summit. For his part, Pashinyan had previously criticized Russia’s response to multiple attacks by Azerbaijan against Armenia in 2022 and Russia’s inability to deliver weapons that Armenia purchased.[i] The accompanying excerpted articles provide additional context on Pashinyan’s actions during the recent CSTO summit as well as how the Armenian government continues to pursue other security cooperation partnerships—namely with India—due to what it perceives to be continued failures by Russia and the CSTO.

The first article, from the Armenian state news agency Armenpress, reports on Pashinyan’s speech during the CSTO summit. Pashinyan mentions the three major clashes that took place between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War ended and how “Armenia’s membership in the CSTO did not deter Azerbaijan from aggressive actions.”[ii] He states that these clashes caused “great damage to the image of the CSTO both within our country and abroad.” Pashinyan goes on to outline the Armenian government’s position on how its borders have been violated by Azerbaijan and that these actions should have been considered an attack that would have necessitated a strong response from the CSTO. According to the CSTO’s charter, this could have included military assistance, but the organization denied Armenia’s request. Pashinyan ends his speech by explaining how his government proposed negotiating the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s forces from Armenian territory through the CSTO Security Council, but that he would not sign the draft put together by the council because he believes it is an insufficient to prevent Azerbaijan from continuing to act with impunity.

Underscoring Armenia’s disillusionment with Russia, the second accompanying article from the Armenian independent online newspaper Hetq reports on an agreement Armenia signed with India’s Kalyani Strategic Systems two weeks before the CSTO summit to acquire 155 mm artillery systems. The article notes that Armenia’s Defense Minister visited India’s defense exposition in October and that this most recent agreement comes after Armenia signed a contract in September to purchase India’s Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher as well as anti-tank rockets and different types of ammunition.

Overall, there is no indication that Armenia will be leaving the Russia-led CSTO despite calls to do so from Pashinyan’s political opposition. Armenia’s bilateral economic and military ties to Russia make this difficult. Instead, Armenia’s refusal to sign the CSTO’s official response to the situation with Azerbaijan is an example of the types of protest steps we expect the Armenian government to continue to register.


Sources:

“Для нас принципиальную важность имеет подтверждение зоны ответственности ОДКБ в Армении: речь премьера на СКБ ОДКБ (The confirmation of the zone of responsibility of the CSTO in Armenia has the most significance for us: the address of the prime minister at the Special Security Council of the CSTO),” Armenpress (state news agency in Armenia), 23 November 2022.

https://armenpress.am/rus/news/1098011.html

“…The presidency of the Republic of Armenia in the CSTO ends today. This period was very eventful…Over the past two years, the CSTO member state Armenia has been subjected to aggression by Azerbaijan at least three times.

It is dispiriting that Armenia’s membership in the CSTO did not deter Azerbaijan from aggressive actions…These facts cause great damage to the image of the CSTO both within our country and abroad, and I regard this as the main failure of Armenia’s chairmanship in the CSTO…

Our position is as follows: according to the Alma-Ata Declaration of December 21, 1991, the founding countries of the CIS, as independent states, recognized each other’s territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders. This means that the aforementioned countries became independent with the administrative borders that existed between the republics during the Soviet Union. That is, the former administrative borders became state borders, and the territories of the above-mentioned countries were determined by these borders. It is within these borders that the Republic of Armenia became a member of the UN and the CSTO.

Since May 11, 2021, Azerbaijan has used armed forces three times and occupied approximately 140 square kilometers of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia. This happened on May 11 and November 14, 2021 and September 13, 2022.

So, according to the UN resolution of December 14, 1974, number 3314, the above actions of Azerbaijan are regarded as aggression.

What do we expect from the CSTO in this regard? Statements of this fact, in the form of a clearly formulated political assessment. To refrain from such an assessment, saying that there is no border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, means to assert that there is no zone of responsibility of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and if there is no zone of responsibility, then there is no organization itself. It can at least be interpreted that way.

These nuances are also important because they play a decisive role in further collective actions. In this context, I want to respond to comments according to which Armenia is trying to draw the CSTO countries into a war with Azerbaijan. This is pure manipulation, because Armenia cannot be interested in a war, if only because it has suffered enough from wars, including in September of this year.

Armenia also proposes, by decision of the CSTO CSC, to accelerate the necessary political and diplomatic work with the Azerbaijani side, aimed at the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia to their original positions as of May 11, 2021.

Such a position is important not only for restoring the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia, but also for deterring Azerbaijan from further aggressive actions against our country…Under these conditions, the lack of a clear political assessment of the situation and the failure to make the above decision may mean not only the CSTO’s refusal of allied obligations, but may also be interpreted by Azerbaijan as a green light from the CSTO for further aggression against Armenia…

Therefore, based on this, dear colleagues, at the moment I believe that the draft “Declaration of the CSTO CSC and on joint measures to provide assistance to the Republic of Armenia” submitted for signing is not sufficiently finalized, and in this form, with all due respect, I am not ready to sign these documents…

Vahe Sarukhanyan, “$155M for Artillery: Armenia Signs Another Arms Deal with India,” Hetq (independent online newspaper in Armenia), 11 November 2022.

https://hetq.am/en/article/150099

The Indian press, referring to a November 9 statement released by the local Bharat Forge company, reports that the latter’s military-industrial subsidiary, Kalyani Strategic Systems, has received a US $155 million order to export 155 mm artillery gun systems to Armenia over the next three years.

Although Bharat Forge didn’t disclose the identity of the customer, the Indian Business Standard news site writes that according to its sources in the Indian Defense Ministry the contract was signed with the Armenian government…

…In October, Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan led a delegation to a defense industry exhibition (DefExpo-2022) in Gandhinagar, India displaying locally manufactured armaments and defense systems.

This latest arms deal follows a September 2022 $245 million contract Armenia signed with India to purchase Indian-made Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, anti-tank rockets and various types of ammunition…


Notes:

[i] For more context on Armenia’s acquisition of Indian systems, see: Matthew Stein, “Armenia Acquires Indian Multiple Rocket Launcher System Amid Delays in Russian Deliveries,” OE Watch, Issue #11, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429405

[ii] For background on the recent incidents between Armenia and Azerbaijan, see: Matthew Stein, “Armenia Questions Russian Peacekeeping After Nagorno-Karabakh Incident,” OE Watch, Issue #9, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/425540


Image Information:

Image: Nikol Pashinyan
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nikol_Pashinyan_April_2021_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

“The Evolutionary Russian View of Peacekeeping as Part of Modern Warfare” by Matthew Stein (July 2022)

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War stood out as a significant chapter in the history of the conflict in the region. Not only did Azerbaijan take control over a large amount of territory, the Russian government deployed peacekeepers as part of the cease-fire agreement between the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan. This marked the first time a peacekeeping force became involved in the conflict over the region and stood as another example of how Russia utilized a peacekeeping operation as a response to a conflict in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CIS is made up of states of the former Soviet Union and is an area where the Russian government has special relationships and a sphere of influence. While the United States has arguably pulled back from peacekeeping operations in recent years and, as a result, the U.S. military has deemphasized them, Russia views peacekeeping operations as a key part of modern warfare. Like other military operations, Russians consider that peacekeeping operations can be utilized to achieve strategic objectives beyond conflict resolution. This article examines how Russia views peacekeeping operations as a part of warfare, including in its military doctrine and based on past conflicts in the CIS. It also examines how this applies to the most recent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the peacekeeping operation as a response to civil unrest in Kazakhstan. Insights from this may also inform potential outcomes of the current war in Ukraine.


Azerbaijan Balances Security Cooperation Between Turkey and Russia

Unmanned combat aerial vehicle Akıncı of Bayraktar at Teknofest 2019.

Unmanned combat aerial vehicle Akıncı of Bayraktar at Teknofest 2019.


“Within its framework, it is planned to sign a number of agreements, and also announced the intention to establish the production of Bayraktar-Akinchy heavy drones in Azerbaijan.”


The accompanying excerpted article from the independent Russian-language website Kavkazskiy Uzel provides a regional analysis of how Azerbaijan balances its security cooperation with Turkey and Russia.  It also discusses Azerbaijan’s recent purchase of the Turkish-made Akinci drone.  The article reports on Teknofest being hosted in Azerbaijan, noting that this was the first time the festival took place outside of Turkey.  It points out that Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a number of agreements there.  It also notes the delivery of the Bayraktar Akinci drone to Azerbaijan and that Turkey “will transfer production technologies” to Azerbaijan.  The Akinci has better capabilities than the Bayraktar TB2, which Azerbaijan currently has in its inventory. 

The comments from analysts in the region provide more context for what Azerbaijan is looking for from Russia versus Turkey.  Regional security analyst Shair Ramaldanov notes that security cooperation between Azerbaijan and Russia is mostly for the “repair of military equipment of Soviet and Russian production” and that “spare parts for this are supplied from Russia.”  Political scientist Ilgar Velizade points out one key difference in Azerbaijan’s security cooperation with Turkey and Russia, specifically “in relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan aims at the joint production of new weapons; [whereas] in relations with Russia, Baku buys arms in the Russian Federation.”  Political scientist Arastun Orujlu noted another difference between Turkey and Russia: that “Turkey does not yet produce tanks and military aircraft, so Baku will purchase this equipment from the Russian Federation.  But in the field of high-tech, missile, helicopter weapons, Turkey is ahead of the Russian Federation.” 

Overall, the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan have had various systems serviced by Russia in the past, even if relations between the two had been strained.  While the article does not mention this, the war in Ukraine is having an impact on logistics for the Russian defense industry.  Azerbaijan’s acquisition of the Bayraktar Akinci shows what it continues to look for in its security partnership with Turkey, which gave the country a specific capability that Russia could not.


Source:

“Аналитики сравнили военно-техническое сотрудничество Баку с Анкарой и Москвой (Analysts compared military-technical cooperation of Baku with Ankara and Moscow),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent Russian-language website with news from the Caucasus), 28 May 2022. https://kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/377597/

Azerbaijan is hosting the Teknofest aviation, cosmonautics and technology festival, which is held outside of Turkey for the first time. Within its framework, it is planned to sign a number of agreements, and also announced the intention to establish the production of Bayraktar-Akinchi heavy drones in Azerbaijan. Military cooperation between Baku and Ankara is unlikely to interfere with cooperation with Moscow, since it is about the supply of various types of weapons, analysts interviewed by the “Kavkazskiy Uzel” noted…

The organizers of the festival are the Turkish Technology Team Foundation (T3), the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Ministry of Industry and Technology of Turkey…Within the framework of the festival, Turkey and Azerbaijan are planning to sign a number of agreements, Turkish Minister of Industry and Technology Mustafa Varank told the Anadolu Agency.

The most significant achievement of the festival in Baku is the flight of the new Turkish heavy strike-reconnaissance U“V “Bayraktar-Akin”hi” from Turkey through the airspace of Georgia to Baku without an intermediate landing. The UAV covered 3200 km. This aircraft is much larger, better armed, flies longer and higher, and is capable of carrying more weapons than its predecessor, Bayraktar-TB2, which Azerbaijan used in the 2020 Autumn War…Ankara will transfer production technologies to the Azerbaijani side.

…On February 22, 2022, the Declaration on Allied Cooperation between Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation was signed in Moscow. The document says that the parties are developing bilateral military-political cooperation that meets national interests and is not directed against third countries…They cooperate on issues of equipping with modern weapons and military equipment, as well as in other areas in this area of ​​mutual interest…Military expert Shair Ramaldanov told t“e “Caucasian K”ot” correspondent that the military-technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation did not stop. It consists, according to him, primarily in the repair of military equipment of Soviet and Russian production and the restoration of weapons damaged during the hostilities. Spare parts for this are supplied from Russia…

…Political scientist Ilgar Velizade told t“e “Caucasian K”ot” correspondent that the Azerbaijani-Turkish and Azerbaijani-Russian military-technical cooperation differs in at least one fundamental poin“. “If in relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan aims at the joint production of new weapons, then in relations with Russia, Baku buys arms in the Russian Federati”n,” he said.

…Political scientist Arastun Orujlu compared the expected arms supplies to Azerbaijan from Turkey and Russi“. “Turkey does not yet produce tanks and military aircraft, so Baku will purchase this equipment from the Russian Federation. But in the field of high-tech, missile, helicopter weapons, Turkey is ahead of the Russian Federation, he told t“e “Caucasian K”ot” correspondent…


Image Information:

Image: Unmanned combat aerial vehicle Akıncı of Bayraktar at Teknofest 2019.
Source:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BayraktarAk%C4%B1nc%C4%B1_Teknofest2019_(3).jpg
Attribution: CC BY YA 4.0

Azerbaijan and Russia Seek Improved Relations

Vladimir Putin and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made statements for the press following Russian-Azerbaijani talks.

Vladimir Putin and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made statements for the press following Russian-Azerbaijani talks.


“The parties, taking into account the high level of military-technical cooperation, interact on issues of equipping with modern weapons and military equipment, as well as in other areas in this area of ​​mutual interest.”


Azerbaijan has had a strained relationship with Russia for a number of years, but as the accompanying excerpted article from Azerbaijani semi-independent news agency Trend reports, President Aliyev and President Putin signed an agreement on 22 February 2022 to improve relations.  Several points of the agreement are worth noting, particularly since Aliyev and Putin signed it two days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The article includes the text of the agreement, which has over 40 areas of cooperation.  The first and second points state that both sides will respect each other’s internal and foreign affairs, and refrain from interfering in them.  Point number nine states that both governments will continue to make efforts to implement the agreements they signed with Armenia as part of the ceasefire agreement that ended the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.  Since then, Azerbaijan has provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine as the two sides have had a good bilateral relationship.  Still, Azerbaijan has so far held a neutral position on the war.

Points 12 through 16 pertain to increasing security cooperation in various capacities, particularly numbers 14 and 15, which deal with working together to develop new weapons and equipment.  While it is unknown how much this security cooperation will develop, Russia will likely continue to provide Armenia with new weapons and equipment.  This could be a continuation of previous policy where Russia provided both Armenia and Azerbaijan with equipment as part of an effort to maintain influence with each during their conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Lastly, point number 25 states that both sides “will refrain from carrying out any economic activity that causes direct or indirect damage to the interests of the other Party.”  The government of Azerbaijan has reportedly suspended flights of its national airline to Russia due to insurance issues, but it has so far not carried out any economic sanctions against Russia as part of its neutral position on the conflict.  Considering the history of Azerbaijan’s strained relations with Russia, it is difficult to determine how much this relationship will develop, but the agreement marks a step closer to better relations at a time when the Russian government faces sanctions and poor relations with a number of countries around the world.


Source:

“Обнародован текст Декларации о союзническом взаимодействии между Россией и Азербайджаном (The published text of the Declaration on Allied Cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan),” Trend (semi-independent news agency in Azerbaijan), 22 February 2022.

https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3559098.html

As Trend reports on Tuesday with reference to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, the Declaration says: “President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, having comprehensively considered the state and prospects for the development of Russian-Azerbaijani relations…Noting the importance of building a multipolar world based on international law and the central role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, declare the following:

1. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan build their relations on the basis of allied interaction, mutual respect for independence, state sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the state borders of the two countries, as well as adherence to the principles of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-use of force or threat of force.

2. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan pursue an independent foreign policy aimed at protecting their national interests.

9. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan will continue to contribute in every possible way to efforts to implement the provisions of the statements of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the Russian Federation dated November 9/10, 2020, January 11, 2021 and November 26, 2021, which served as the basis for strengthening stability and security, unblocking all economic and transport ties in the region and for normalizing relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia.

12. The Parties shall develop bilateral military-political cooperation that meets national interests and is not directed against third countries.

13. The parties will deepen interaction between the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan, including holding joint operational and combat training activities, as well as developing other areas of bilateral military cooperation.

14. The parties, taking into account the high level of military-technical cooperation, interact on issues of having modern weapons and military equipment, as well as in other areas in this area of ​​mutual interest.

15. The Parties will intensify efforts to create service centers for maintenance, repair, modernization of weapons and military equipment, as well as to organize joint production of various types of military products.

16. In order to ensure security, maintain peace and stability, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan may consider the possibility of providing each other with military assistance on the basis of the UN Charter, separate international treaties and taking into account the existing international legal obligations of each of the Parties.

25. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan will refrain from carrying out any economic activity that causes direct or indirect damage to the interests of the other Party.


Image Information:

Image: Vladimir Putin and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made statements for the press following Russian-Azerbaijani talks
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Putin-Aliyev_joint_statements_(2022-02-22)_02.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

Iran Agrees to Gas Swap with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan

Workers construct a pipeline in Iran near Azerbaijan.

Workers construct a pipeline in Iran near Azerbaijan.


Deficits and pressure drops caused early gas outages.”


Iran has long had strained relationships with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.  On 28 November 2021, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi signed a tripartite gas swap agreement with his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev and Turkmenistan President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov.  The excerpted article from the Mehr News Agency, an outlet affiliated with the Islamic Ideology Dissemination Organization in turn supervised by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, details the background to the deal, the problems Iran has faced with its neighbors to the north, and the benefits Iran expects from the deal. 

Even though Turkmenistan is a Sunni country, Iran historically had regarded it as a useful trading partner to make up for gas shortfalls.  However, around 2007, Turkmenistan repeatedly moved to adjust the price of gas supplied to Iran, its long-term contract notwithstanding.  While this created some tension, Iranian officials nonetheless continued their bilateral trade until Turkmenistan cut it off due to Iran’s accrued debts.

Iranian relations with Azerbaijan are more complex.  Two-thirds of the world’s Azeris live in Iran while barely one-third live in Azerbaijan.  Azerbaijan is also largely Shi’ite, but this ethnic and sectarian overlap has only heightened suspicion.  Azerbaijan is a largely secular state and Iran is an Islamic Republic and a Shi’ite-led theocracy.  Tehran also resented Baku’s extensive relationship with Israel and suspected that Israeli agents used Azerbaijan as a launch point for operations against Iran’s nuclear program.  Tension flared in October 2021 when Iran held war games along its frontier with Azerbaijan, a move that Baku saw as an implicit threat.

Concerns aside, the recent agreement, which took effect on 22 December 2021, outlines a gas swap in which Iran would receive gas from Turkmenistan and supply an equivalent amount to the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhchivan, a territory bordering Iran but separated from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenia.  The Iranians expect 1.5 to 2 billion cubic meters of gas to be transported annually.  Aliyev signaled that the deal could enable a sharp turn in the trajectory of relations.  “From now on, Iranian-Azerbaijani relations will develop in all areas,” he said.  He also celebrated the fact that Azerbaijan was peeling Iran away from Armenia.

The Raisi government hopes that the gas swap will help alleviate energy problems in northern Iran in time for winter.  The excerpted article suggests that low pressure and inadequate gas contributed to energy shortages.  Unmentioned in the article is that, in 2008, gas shortages combined with impassable roads due to heavy snows led to unrest in several northern provinces that took the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to quell.


Source:

“Qarardad-e Swap-e Gazi Seh Janehbeh (Tripartite Gas Swap Contract),” Mehr News Agency (affiliated with the Islamic Ideology Dissemination Organization supervised by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei), 30 November 2021. https://www.mehrnews.com/news/5363718/

…Last night, news was published that contract for gas swap with a capacity of 1.5 to 2 billion cubic meters from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan through Iran had been concluded. This important agreement was announced at a time when gas imports from Turkmenistan had long been suspended because of financial disputes and with Azerbaijan because of political disputes. In this regard, last night, Minister of Oil, Javad Owji, said, “Since December 2016 , Iran’s gas relations with Turkmenistan had been cut off, but with the conclusion of this agreement, a step forward was taken in the energy relations between the two countries….”

The most important aspect of this agreement is the restoration of relations with Turkmenistan. Iran and Turkmenistan gas relationship that began in 1996 with the conclusion of a 25-year contract. Gas imports from Turkmenistan were strongly in Iran’s favor due to the low price of that country’s gas compared to other countries. Of course, beginning around 14 years ago, Turkmenistan suddenly began to demand price increases against the opposition of Iranian officials. However, relations between Iran and Turkmenistan continued to be good until 2013, but in 2016, Turkmenistan cut off gas exports to Iran due to accumulated debts….

The most important advantage of the swap can be considered the proof of security and the country’s ability to transfer energy between two different countries. This advantage becomes even more important in relation to the relations between Iran and Azerbaijan, which have been embroiled in political disputes in recent months. It should be emphasized that Iranian gas delivered to Azerbaijan is located in the small and strategic region of Nakhchivan….

The final advantage of this contract is to solve through the right of transfer the problem of gas deficits and pressure drops in the northern provinces of Iran. In recent years, such deficits and pressure drops caused early gas outages in industries and problems in domestic consumption. In this regard, the head of the National Iranian Gas Company stated, “In addition to economic importance, this contract will help the stability of the gas network in the north and northeast of Iran.”


Image Inforrmation:

Image: Workers construct a pipeline in Iran near Azerbaijan.
Source: Fars News Agency
https://cdn.yjc.news/files/fa/news/1400/9/10/15218933_862.jpg
Attribution: