Tag Archives: AFRICOM

Uganda and Rwanda Target Militants in Congo

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Ugandan soldiers on parade.

Ugandan soldiers on parade.

“In order to fight them more effectively, our two countries [Uganda and DRC] have recently agreed to pool their efforts in order to carry out joint operations against this common enemy.”

The first accompanying excerpt from the Rwanda-centric media outlet taarifa.rw discusses the continued counterterrorism collaboration of Rwanda’s neighbors, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  The cooperation is meant to combat militants loyal to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the insurgent Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), based in the DRC.  According to the article, the two countries’ forces have opened a second axis for launching an offensive against the ADF.  The article notes that originally Uganda entered the DRC with the DRC government’s permission because the ADF conducted two bombings in Kampala, but Uganda has increased coordination with the DRC to more effectively combat the ADF.

The second accompanying excerpt from the Ugandan publication pulse.ug also emphasizes a retaliatory objective for Uganda’s latest troop deployment to the DRC.  Besides the ADF’s bombings in Kampala, the group also began attacking markets located near Uganda’s northern border with the DRC.  After the ADF stole food and medicine and retreated, numerous displaced people crossed into Uganda, which created an additional humanitarian crisis for Uganda.  Further, the article notes the Ugandan army suspected that ADF members were operating in Uganda by disguising themselves as refugees.  This incentivized Uganda to enter the DRC to push the ADF back from the border.

As the final excerpt from the pro-government Rwandan daily newtimes.co.rw notes, there is a growing perception that the conflict in the DRC is now a regional affair.  According to the article, Rwandan President Paul Kagame is calling for collective regional military action to combat the ADF and the Rwandan government is opening lines of communication with Uganda to resolve their border issues as another means to address the ADF’s regional threat.  In addition, the article mentions Rwanda’s increasing collaboration with Burundi to target other militia groups besides the ADF, and with Mozambique to combat ISIS-loyal militants in that country.  This suggests that Rwanda is increasingly acquiring regional military influence.

Source:

“Uganda Sends More Troops To DRC,” taarifa.rw (Rwanda-centric media outlet), 3 February 2022. https://taarifa.rw/uganda-sends-more-troops-to-drc/

Uganda’s government says it has sent an extra number of troops into neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo to bolster its fight against the Allied Democratic Forces rebels. Last year in November, thousands of [Ugandan] troops crossed into DRC on invitation by President Félix Tshisekedi to “fight against armed groups, in particular the Ugandan rebels of the ADF”. Uganda gladly accepted the invitation and responded by conducting aerial and artillery bombardment of ADF bases deep in the jungles of DRC.

The attacks in October and November [2021] prompted the Ugandan military to deploy in eastern DRC in late November to take on the Islamist fighters.

Source: “Thousands of refugees flee into Uganda after an ADF attack,” pulse.ug (Ugandan publication covering Ugandan affairs for a global readership), 7 February 2022. https://www.pulse.ug/news/thousands-of-refugees-flee-into-uganda-after-an-adf-attack/522ex8c

Uganda’s Minister of State for Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees, Esther Anyakun, said that the ADF reportedly broke into pharmacies and shops as residents fled at their approach. The rebels allegedly made off with food and medicine. The refugees that crossed into Uganda were registered by Uganda Red Cross with the help of the Office of the Prime Minister and The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR. Only days before this fresh influx of refugees, residents in Bundibugyo and Ntoroko districts were advised not to accommodate refugees fleeing battle in the Democratic Republic of Congo. These refugees, Ugandan authorities said, would have to be reported to the Refugees’ Reception Center and be registered.

Source: “Security problems in DR Congo affect the whole region,” newtimes.co.rw (pro-government Rwandan daily), 8 February 2022. https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/security-problems-dr-congo-affect-whole-region-kagame

President Paul Kagame has called for collective efforts by regional leaders towards the end of security challenges in the Democratic Republic of Congo, mainly associated to armed militia groups based in the country. He said that Rwanda was ready to play her part in resolving the security challenges stemming from the neighbouring country. The head of state also weighed in on Rwanda’s ties with neighboring countries, which he said were on a promising trajectory.

Image Information:

Image: Ugandan soldiers on parade.
Photographer: Master Sergeant Carlotta Holley
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ugandan_soldiers_on_parade.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Mozambique Struggles with Post-Conflict Recovery in War Torn Cabo Delgado

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Praça dos Heróis na cidade de Pemba, Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, VOA.

Praça dos Heróis na cidade de Pemba, Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, VOA.

“With the onset of the rainy and cyclone seasons, the cumulative impact of years of conflict and the worsening humanitarian emergency, it is more important than ever that Medicines Sans Frontiers teams have unrestricted and safe access to the area…”

On 4 February, the international affairs focused Brazilian publication portalrbn.com published the excerpted article on northern Mozambique’s transition from active military conflict to post-conflict reconstruction.  According to the article, many civilians in Cabo Delgado remain displaced and lack medical care, while attacks by militants loyal to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria persist.  For example, the militants carried out 20 attacks in the last two weeks of January, torching 2,800 homes and forcing 14,000 people to flee their villages.  The article indicates the military has retaken almost all the territory that the militants captured in 2021 but have not been able to prevent continued attacks on civilians.

Based on interviews with Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) personnel in the area, the article suggests that in addition to providing security, the military needs to find ways to provide medical care and protection against cyclones to aid displaced people.  If the military fails to do so, MSF warns the humanitarian crisis will spiral out of control, which will then affect the broader post-conflict recovery. 

In fact, further military support to Mozambique is expected in coming months. A 3 February article from South Africa-based news24.com noted that South African president Cyril Ramaphosa promised to continue South Africa’s deployment of 1,500 troops to Mozambique and allow for new investment to assist Mozambique’s post-conflict recovery.  According to the article, this will be essential to restoring normalcy to Cabo Delgado and allow for the reconstruction of northern Mozambique and the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis.  The article notes that Tanzania and Rwanda are also deploying forces to secure northern Mozambqiue and revitalize its economy, signaling a regional effort in ending the insurgency.

Source:

“Ataques e violência em Cabo Delgado deslocam milhares de pessoas no início da temporada de ciclones (Attacks and violence in Cabo Delgado displace thousands of people at the start of cyclone season),” portalrbn.com (Portuguese language international affairs focused Brazilian publication), 4 February 2022. https://portalrbn.com.br/mocambique-ataques-e-violencia-em-cabo-delgado-deslocam-milhares-de-pessoas-no-inicio-da-temporada-de-ciclones/

A significant part of Cabo Delgado’s population is now extremely vulnerable to displacement and the lack of access to medical care. Local authorities have reported more than 20 attacks on four villages in the last two weeks with 2,800 homes damaged or destroyed by fire. This is the biggest wave of displacement in recent months. “Violent attacks and continued insecurity in several districts of central Cabo Delgado have led thousands of people to leave their homes with only what they could carry, just as the cyclone and rain season is starting,” says Raphael Veicht, chief of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) emergency unit.

With the onset of the rainy and cyclone seasons, the cumulative impact of years of conflict and the worsening humanitarian emergency, it is more important than ever that MSF teams have unrestricted and safe access to the area so they can provide people with the necessary care. It is absolutely crucial that medicines and medical supplies can be imported quickly without bureaucratic delays.

Source: “’We are fighting to bring peace’: Ramaphosa visits insurgency-hit Mozambique,” news24.com (South Africa based on-line news), 3 February 2022. https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/we-are-fighting-to-bring-peace-ramaphosa-visits-insurgency-hit-mozambique-20220203

President Cyril Ramaphosa visited northern Mozambique, supporting the government’s latest effort to reassure neighbours and investors that an Islamist uprising is under control. Over the last week, Mozambique has tried to reassure neighbours and investors that their efforts are worthwhile. Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan visited last Friday and TotalEnergies boss Patrick Pouyanne met Nyusi in Maputo on Monday. Rwandan forces last week also allowed journalists a rare visit, to see how life is slowly returning to some of the hardest-hit areas.

Image Information:

Image: Praça dos Heróis na cidade de Pemba, Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, VOA.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pra%C3%A7a_dos_Her%C3%B3is_na_cidade_de_Pemba,_Cabo_Delgado,_Mozambique,_VOA.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Yemen’s Houthis Employ Iranian “358” Loitering Anti-Aircraft Missile

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One of the five, near-fully assembled uniquely Iranian-designed and manufactured Three-Five-Eight surface-to-air missiles that were a part of the shipment seized by the USS FORREST SHERMAN in November (2019).

One of the five, near-fully assembled uniquely Iranian-designed and manufactured Three-Five-Eight surface-to-air missiles that were a part of the shipment seized by the USS FORREST SHERMAN in November (2019).

“… It seems that Iran has transferred this type of missile to its allies in Yemen to test it against the American planes owned by the Saudi and Emirati air forces participating in the war…”

The Iranian “358” missile appears to be an increasingly important weapon for Yemen’s Houthi-led military forces.  The 358 missile is classified as surface-to-air, but in early January, it was seemingly used as a surface-to-surface missile to target the provincial leader of the pro-secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Shabwah Province.  On 14 January, a 358 was used to shoot down a Chinese-manufactured Wing Loong II unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) belonging to the Saudi-led coalition, according to several open-source analysts on Twitter.  It is unclear how many of these missiles are in Houthi possession.  Since 2019, several of them have been seized from Yemen-bound vessels in the Arabian Sea.  A 358 was also found in Iraq last October. 

According to an October 2021 article from the prominent Yemeni news website al-Masdar Online, the 358is a key Iranian weapon developed to counter U.S. aircraft, particularly UAVs.  The missile ships in three parts and once assembled can be launched from mobile positions, such as small trucks.  It does poorly against fast-moving targets but can be effective against helicopters and some UAVs.  The article from al-Masdar Online implies that it may be the Houthi-led military forces’ most effective air defense missile, potentially having been used to bring down a variety of aircraft, including an Apache helicopter, Wing Loong UAVs, Scan Eagle and RQ-20 UAVs manufactured by the United States, and the Karayel UAV manufactured by Turkey.  This sentiment is echoed by analysis from the Egyptian think tank Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies, which considers the 358’s presence in Yemen and Iraq as indicative of “a new shift in Tehran’s strategy in using its proxies in the region,” one which puts new emphasis on defending against aerial attacks.

Source:

@3Mr_o_o (pro-Houthi, Iraq-based “Observer of political and military affairs”), Twitter, 3 January 2022. https://twitter.com/3Mr_o_o/status/1478359982097813511

#Yemen

The mercenary Ali al-Jabwani, head of the Transitional Council in Shabwa governorate, survived an attack in the Usaylan area yesterday. The images released from the attack show a missile similar to the famous 358 missile.

Source: @AlgerianAircra1 (Algeria-focused “Aircraft Tracker” account interested in “Aircraft News and Novelties related to Defense and Aviation”), Twitter, 14 January 2022.  https://twitter.com/AlgerianAircra1/status/1481988325774925825

It appears that the Houthis in Yemen have shot down another Wing Loong II UCAF aircraft from the Saudi coalition. Judging by the video, it seems that an Iranian missile known as the 358 was used – a large, relatively slow missile with large wings.

Source:

“من “صلاح الدين” العراقية الى “مارب” اليمنية.. صواريخ دفاع جوي إيرانية بأيدي مليشيات طهران

(From Iraq’s Salahuddin to Yemen’s Marib… Iranian Air Defense Missiles in the Hands of Tehran’s Militias),” al-Masdar Online (prominent Yemeni news website), 24 October 2021. https://almasdaronline.com/articles/239284

But the situation has changed significantly since mid-2019, when the Houthi militia announced in June that its air defenses had managed to shoot down a U.S.-made MQ9 drone in Hodeidah Governorate, using a “domestically developed” missile. In August of the same year, the militia’s military spokesman said: “We have the ability to neutralize a large number of enemy aircraft.”… It seems that Iran has transferred this type of missile to its allies in Yemen to test it against the American planes owned by the Saudi and Emirati air forces participating in the war. Iran considers this missile as its armor against American aircraft…

Source:

“تهديد الأجواء.. ما وراء حائط الصواريخ الإيراني في الشرق الأوسط

(Threat to the skies… Behind the Iranian missile wall in the Middle East),” Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies (Egyptian think tank), 2 November 2021. https://marsad.ecss.com.eg/64307/

The unique design of this missile, and its subsequent reappearance in other regions in the Middle East, was an indication that it might be the main player in all the shootdowns that have taken place in Yemen recently, such as the downing of a “Scan Eagle” drone last June, in Serwah District, Marib Governorate … In sum, the appearance of the “358” missile in Iraq, and before that in Yemen (and it may have been used recently in Syria), indicates a new shift in Tehran’s strategy in using its proxies in the region. This strategy now includes air defense, after it was previously limited to missile power, and then drones.

Image Information:

Image: One of the five, near-fully assembled uniquely Iranian-designed and manufactured Three-Five-Eight surface-to-air missiles that were a part of the shipment seized by the USS FORREST SHERMAN in November (2019).
Source: CENCTCOM, Steve McLeod, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/2087998/us-dhow-interdictions/
Attribution: Public Domain

Wagner’s Questionable Operations in Africa

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The arrival of Russian military equipment, including these BRDM-2 armored vehicles, along with members of the Wagner Group helped prevent a rebel army from taking the Central African Republic’s capital in 2021.

The arrival of Russian military equipment, including these BRDM-2 armored vehicles, along with members of the Wagner Group helped prevent a rebel army from taking the Central African Republic’s capital in 2021.

“If no one else can provide it, African countries may continue to turn to the likes of Wagner…”

In 2021, Russia’s Wagner Group, a Kremlin-linked private military force, made a significant difference in the Central African Republic (CAR) when somewhere between 1,200 and 2,000 of its mercenaries, aided by 300 Rwandan soldiers, prevented rebels from capturing CAR’s capital, Bangui.  Wagner’s success was initially lauded by much of CAR’s populace, but as the accompanying excerpted article from South African Institute for Security Studies notes, those feelings of appreciation for restoring security have morphed into anger as Wagner has been accused of human rights abuses against civilians.  As the article states, Wagner has a mixed record in several African nations, including Libya, Sudan, and Mozambique.

In addition to the Wagner Group’s human rights record, people are asking questions about how the organization is paid.  As the article notes, no one has seen a contract between Wagner and CAR, leading to allegations that lucrative mining deals are the paramilitary force’s method of payment.  Further muddying the waters is the government of Mali, which denies the presence of the Wagner Group, claiming instead that it only has Russian instructors on its soil.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Wagner Group does not care that it is supporting undemocratic regimes.  This is particularly obvious in Mali, where Wagner did not arrive until after Colonel Assimi Goïta’s coup.  Still, as the article points out, despite the anguish of Western countries over Wagner’s involvement in Africa and the backlash of some African nations over the deplorable human rights abuses committed by the organization, there is grudging acceptance that in some beleaguered nations, Wagner has helped stabilize the situation by driving off terrorists.

Source:

Peter Fabricius, “Wagner’s Dubious Operatics in CAR and beyond, Institute for Security Studies (South African think tank), 21 Jan 2022. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/wagners-dubious-operatics-in-car-and-beyond

Russia has established a strong military presence in the Central African Republic (CAR) over the past four years, clandestinely using dubious actors like the military company Wagner, which is allegedly close to President Vladimir Putin. Wagner has become the deniable vanguard of a major Russian push into Africa, many analysts believe.

France has threatened to completely withdraw military support to Mali. Sweden has already announced its exit from the European force Takuba because of Wagner’s arrival. Such decisions are difficult because they may further weaken the fight against the common enemy – violent extremism.

But Wagner’s growing presence on the continent also poses some difficult questions to the international community, including the West. The problem is not only about democracy but also stability and security. If no one else can provide it, African countries may continue to turn to the likes of Wagner – though it’s too soon to judge its overall effectiveness either.

He says complicating any analysis or comparison is that Russia’s involvement in the CAR and elsewhere in Africa is probably more covert, so it’s hard to know just where it is and what it’s doing. (There are rumours that Russia has its eyes on Burkina Faso, for example.)

Image Information:

Image: The arrival of Russian military equipment, including these BRDM-2 armored vehicles, along with members of the Wagner Group helped prevent a rebel army from taking the Central African Republic’s capital in 2021.
Source: UN Security Council/Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RussiansinBangui.png
Attribution: Public Domain

Russia’s Increasingly Visible Military Presence in Mali

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Map showing Russia and Mali.

Map showing Russia and Mali.

“‘You speak of mercenaries, it’s your business. For us, they are Russian instructors,’ said the Malian official.”  

Although Mali has longstanding military ties with France, Russia is filling the void left in the region following France’s withdrawal of forces from Mali.  According to a recent French-language article in tvmonde.com, Russian personnel have replaced French troops at a base in Timbuktu.  The article further suggests there may be up to 400 Russians in Mali operating as military instructors.

The article contends there is also growing confirmation of Russia’s Wagner Group in Mali, implying that the Russians are, in fact, mercenaries rather than regular armed forces.  According to the article, a Malian official in Timbuktu noted mercenaries were what outsiders might call the Russian troops, but from the Malian perspective all that matters is that the Russians are instructing Malian soldiers.  Meanwhile, according to a 12 January report in Russian-language Interfax military news.com, Russia denies any government role in Wagner Group activities in Mali and considers the company as having the right to independently pursue business interests in Mali.

The tvmonde.com article also notes that France and UN forces in Mali remain suspicious of the Russian presence and have reportedly conducted flights over the Timbuktu base hosting the Russians.  The article states that this angered Russia and caused Mali to request that France discontinue flights over the base.

Source:

“Mali: les Russes présentés comme des instructeurs de plus en plus nombreux (Mali: Russians presented more and more as instructors),” information.tv5monde.com 7 January 2021. https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/mali-les-russes-presentes-comme-des-instructeurs-de-plus-en-plus-nombreux-439418#:~:text=Un%20des%20responsables%20maliens%20a,notre%20camp%20militaire%20de%20Sofara.&text=Mais%20un%20influent%20%C3%A9lu%20d,%C3%AAtre%20tu%C3%A9%20des%20mercenaires%20russes%22

Many Russian instructors have been deployed in Mali in recent weeks, especially on the Timbuktu base (north) recently left by French forces, said Malian military officials. One of these officials responded in the affirmative to the possibility that these instructors now number about 400 across the country.

The apparent strengthening of cooperation with Russia coincides with the reconfiguration of the French forces and the planned reduction of the Barkhane anti-jihadist force, which will drop from around 5,000 soldiers in the Sahel in the summer of 2021 to around 3,000 in the summer of 2022. Barkhane recently handed over three bases in the north to the Malians, the most recent in Timbuktu in mid-December. Russian instructors recently arrived in Timbuktu to accompany the delivery of Russian helicopters, a Malian official said. Another Malian official, also on condition of anonymity, confirmed the presence of “Russian military instructors in several parts of Mali. You speak of mercenaries, it’s your business. For us, they are Russian instructors,” said the chief official.

Source: “Москве неизвестно, сколько граждан РФ, сотрудников ЧВК “Вагнер”, находятся в Мали” (“Moscow does not know how many citizens of the Russian Federation and employees of Wagner PMC are in Mali),” Interfax militarynews.ru (Russian language news service), 12 January 2022. https://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=564129&lang=RU

As a high-ranking diplomat stressed, “the officials of the Russian Federation have nothing to do with the activities of our private companies. This is capitalism. Everyone earns as they can,” he added. The interlocutor provided a negative answer to the question of whether, in principle, a register of Russian citizens in Mali is maintained.

Image Information:

Image: Map showing Russia and Mali
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mali_Russia_Locator.svg
Attribution: [CC x 2.0]

Somalia: Puntland Troops Fight Each Other, Not Terrorists

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While this al-Shabaab leader was killed, future progress against the terrorist organization in Puntland is threatened by military in-fighting.

Somalia’s forces in Puntland State have turned their guns against one another, leading to fears that al-Shabaab could take advantage to establish their base in the area.

Puntland’s armed forces are expected to fight al-Shabaab and Islamic State terrorists.  However, according to the excerpted accompanying article from a Kenyan media group’s publication, The East African, the military members from this autonomous, federal state of Somalia recently turned their weapons on each other in the port town of Bossaso.  Specifically, fighting occurred between forces loyal to Puntland’s government and an elite antiterrorism brigade known as the Puntland Security Force (PSF).  Heavy and light arms were used in the fighting, reportedly intense at times, resulting in both combatant and civilian casualties.

Purportedly, Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni’s attempt in November to sack Mohamud Osman Diyaano, the director of the PSF, was the cause of the hostilities.  The same decree that dismissed Diyaano also appointed Brigadier General Mohamed Amin Abdullahi as his replacement.  As the article notes, Diyaano rejected the move and, along with top PSF officers, declared the dismissal and replacement to be illegal.

There are concerns that the clash between the two components of the armed forces will weaken its capabilities and resolve to combat al-Shabaab and the Islamic State.  Unlike neighboring Somaliland, which has declared its independence from Somalia and wishes to be recognized as a sovereign nation, Puntland has decided to remain part of Somalia.  Puntland’s contribution to combating al-Shabaab and the Islamic State is valued and important, and any distraction from its military objective benefits these terrorist organizations.  Unfortunately, the terrorists threaten the stability not just of Puntland but of the entire geostrategic nation of Somalia, whose neighboring waters see tremendous amounts of tanker traffic helping to supply the world with oil.

Source:

Abdulkadir Khalif, “Puntland soldiers turn weapons on each other,” The East African (a Kenyan media group), 25 December 2021.  https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/puntland-soldiers-turn-weapons-on-each-other-3662910

Somalia’s forces in Puntland State have turned their guns against one another, leading to fears that al-Shabaab could take advantage to establish their base in the area.

In the past couple of weeks, an armed clash in the port city, some 1,500km northeast of Mogadishu, has seen the law enforcers mostly engage in vicious fights, rather than guarding civilians.

Neither the pro-government side nor the PSF officers have issued clear information on the status of the fighting and the casualty levels.

Bossaso, the commercial capital and the main port of Puntland, had become a ghost town as residents fled for cover on Tuesday. Businesses remained largely closed.

Image Information:

Image: While this al-Shabaab leader was killed, future progress against the terrorist organization in Puntland is threatened by military in-fighting.
Source: Wargeyska Saxafi, Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Godane.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Russian Orthodox Church Strengthening Its Position in Africa

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St Sergius Russian Orthodox Church in Noordwyk, Midrand, South Africa.

St Sergius Russian Orthodox Church in Noordwyk, Midrand, South Africa.

“…The expansion of the mission of the Russian Orthodox Church to Africa is an important ecclesiastical and political step…”

Even before open war broke out in late February, the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine shook the international community of believers who share the Orthodox faith.  In 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople officially recognized and established the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.  The Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) interpreted this as weakening their influence in Ukraine, as well as furthering the divide between the Ecumenical Patriarchy in Constantinople and its counterpart in Russia.  Since then, the leadership of the ROC has been working to expand its influence in regions that have traditionally fallen under the mandate of those churches that support the Ecumenical Patriarch.  The accompanying excerpt from the pro-business Russian daily newspaper Kommersant describes how the ROC has recently made significant inroads among Orthodox believers in Africa at the expense of the Ecumenical Patriarchy.  The article does not make it clear whether or not the Kremlin is using the ROC as a soft-power tool in this case. 

The article begins by stating, “the Holy Synod accepted into the Russian Orthodox Church more than a hundred clerics of the Patriarchate of Alexandria from eight African countries.”  These clerics, according to the article, “came under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate due to their categorical disagreement with the decision of the Patriarch of Alexandria to recognize the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.”  The article quotes a religious expert who asserts that “the expansion of the mission of the Russian Orthodox Church to Africa is an important ecclesiastical and political step.”  This expert concludes by stating that “Orthodoxy is developing quite dynamically in various states of the continent and attracts millions of people, [which will] strengthen the role of Moscow in the global Christian mission, despite all political crises.”

Source:

Pavel Korobov, “Русская православная церковь укрепила позиции в Африке (The Russian Orthodox Church has strengthened its position in Africa),” Kommersant (pro business Russian daily newspaper), 29 December 2021. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5154738

…On Wednesday, the Holy Synod accepted into the Russian Orthodox Church more than a hundred clerics of the Patriarchate of Alexandria from eight African countries. The clergy came under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate due to their categorical disagreement with the decision of the Patriarch of Alexandria — he recognized the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, established by Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople. The expert is convinced that the decision of the Russian Orthodox Church will irritate the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Constantinople, but will lead to the strengthening of Moscow’s role in the global Christian mission….

…To date, at least a hundred parishes of the Patriarchate of Alexandria, headed by their pastors, have declared their desire to transfer to the bosom of the Russian Orthodox Church…. 

The head of the Center for the Study of Problems of Religion and Society at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Roman Lunkin, called the decision “echoes of the conflict” between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate of Constantinople… “The expansion of the mission of the Russian Orthodox Church to Africa is an important ecclesiastical and political step,” says Mr. Lunkin. “The development of preaching among Africans has great prospects, Orthodoxy is developing quite dynamically in various states of the continent and attracts millions of people.” …In this regard, Mr. Lunkin speaks of “strengthening the role of Moscow in the global Christian mission, despite all political crises: Irritation of Constantinople and the Patriarchate of Alexandria is inevitable.”

Image Information:

Image: St Sergius Russian Orthodox Church in Noordwyk, Midrand, South Africa.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:St_Sergius_Russian_Orthodox_Church,_Noordwyk,_Midrand.jpg
Attribution: CCA SA 4.0 Intl

Algeria Obtains Chinese Integrated EW Reconnaissance/Jamming System

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The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) arrives in Algiers, Algeria, March 5, 2019.

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) arrives in Algiers, Algeria, March 5, 2019.

“…The integrated electronic countermeasure system can carry out reconnaissance, interference and warning on the enemy’s electronic information systems…”

Algeria’s electronic warfare (EW) capabilities have been bolstered by recent acquisitions, including the Russian Kvant 1L222 Avtobaza ELINT system and the Chinese DWL002 passive detection radar.  The latest acquisition is an integrated EW system from China.  A handful of Twitter users focused on Algerian military affairs first noticed the delivery.  They identified it as a CHL-906, based on visual similarities to a model exhibited last November at EDEX 2021, Egypt’s recently established annual arms show.  The Algeria-focused military blog MenaDefense quickly picked up news of the delivery, and several Arabic-language media outlets subsequently reported it.  The CHL-906 is manufactured by the China Electronics Corporation (CEC) and sold for export by the China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation (CEIEC) and ELINC China (ELINC), a CEC subsidiary.  The ELINC website describes it as an integrated EW system that provides comprehensive “reconnaissance, interference and warning on the enemy’s electronic information systems.”  The chassis-mounted CHL-906 has a purported 600 km detection radius and a 300 km jamming radius.  The latest Algerian acquisition is almost certainly in part a reaction to its neighbor, Morocco, recently bolstering its UAV arsenal.

Source:

@kmldial70. “#Algeria probably received a package of very modern #Chinese EW systems recently,” Twitter (social media network), 1 January 2022. https://twitter.com/kmldial70/status/1477238084823658496

Source: @Aln54Dz “Electronic warfare department acquires the system CHL-906 ELINC

#AlgerianArmy,” Twitter (social media network), 1 January 2022. https://twitter.com/Aln54Dz/status/1477404225168683014)

Source: “Un nouveau système de guerre électronique pour l’Algérie (A new electronic warfare system for Algeria),” MenaDefense (Algeria-focused military blog), 1 January 2022. https://www.menadefense.net/algerie/un-nouveau-systeme-de-guerre-electronique-pour-lalgerie/

This is the Integrated Electronic Warfare system from the Chinese company ELINC and CEIC… which is used to:

  • Detect enemy radio and radar emissions over a distance of 600 km
  • Determine the position, identify and classify enemy emissions over these distances
  • Protect radars and anti-aircraft systems from anti-radiation missiles by “covering” radar frequencies
  • Block communications over a distance of 300 km
  • Prohibit the enemy (air, sea, land) from using GNSS satellite positioning systems (GPS, Baidu, Galileo, Glonass) over a distance of 300 km
  • Jam frequencies from 0.5 to 40 GHz
  • Detect stealth aircraft and ships
  • Detect remotely piloted drones and sever their data link to the ground
  • Detect AEW aircraft over a distance of 500 km
  • “Fry” certain radio-electric equipment thanks to the directed emission power of 500 Kw

Source:  “Integrated EW System,” ELINC Company Website (China Electronics Corporation Subsidiary), undated. https://www.elinc.com.cn/business/defense/IntegratedElectronicWarfare/

The integrated electronic countermeasure system can carry out reconnaissance, interference and warning on the enemy’s electronic information systems such as early warning detection, communication transmission, multi-dimensional reconnaissance, navigation and positioning, and guided fire control. Combat operations such as ground-to-air defense, air interdiction, border control, anti-terrorism and stability maintenance, seize and maintain the battlefield system information rights.

Image Information:

Image:  The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) arrives in Algiers, Algeria, March 5, 2019.
Source: Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Ford Williams, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet. https://www.dvidshub.net/image/5149959/190305-n-ji086-036
Attribution: Public Domain

Southeast Asia Sees Decrease in Terrorism

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DSA 2016 - Close Quarters Battle.

DSA 2016 – Close Quarters Battle.

“The government-imposed lockdowns have forced people to spend more time online, raising the likelihood of vulnerable individuals being exposed to radical ideologies in the cyber domain.” 

On 10 January, Malaysian business news outlet malaymail.com covered a report from a Singaporean think tank, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.  According to the article, the report indicated that terrorism was decreasing in Southeast Asia due to factors associated with COVID-19.

The article noted lockdowns forced militants, like all citizens in Southeast Asia, to reduce their activities, but it also noted that the lockdowns may have produced longer-term security risks.  During the lockdowns youths spent more unsupervised time online and could have been exposed to radical ideas as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) continued its online recruitment efforts.

In Peninsular Malaysia itself, the article noted that there were no terrorist arrests at all in 2021, which is consistent with the trend line of reduced terrorism in the region.  In Sabah of Malaysian Borneo there were 15 terrorist arrests in 2021, roughly one-fifth the number of arrests there in 2019.  As reported in Singapore’s Straits Times, the terrorist arrests in Sabah relate to Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf’s maritime activities, including piracy and kidnapping, that are carried out between the borders of the Philippines and Malaysia and also involve Indonesian militants.  The malaymail.com article attributed the reduction in terrorism in the Philippines to the army’s capturing of militant bases in southern Mindanao.

As for Indonesia, the malaymail.com article suggested Jamaah Ansharut Daulah’s stagnation since 2020 and Mujahidin Indonesia Timor’s decline was caused by increased cost of movement, a result COVID-19 travel restrictions.  The only country that saw similar numbers of violence in 2020 as 2021, according to the article, was Thailand, where an insurgency has festered for more than a decade in the country’s majority Muslim south.  In general, however, the article points to the combination of COVID-19 travel restrictions and successful counter-terrorism operations to arrest militants as key factors behind the downturn in militancy in Southeast Asia.

Source:

“Terrorist threats in South-east Asia decline in 2021, according to Singapore report,” malaymail.com (Malaysian business news outlet), 10 January 2021. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2022/01/10/terrorist-threats-in-south-east-asia-decline-in-2021-according-to-singapore/2034142

Terrorist threats in South-east Asian countries declined in 2021, a Singapore think-tank said in its annual threat assessment. There were fewer terror-related incidents in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines as governments battled Covid-19. In Thailand in 2021, meanwhile, violent incidents connected to an insurgency in the far south were similar to those in the previous year, the researchers found.

The report specifically linked the Covid-19 pandemic to the drop in terror activities in Malaysia last year. Authorities made no terror-related arrests in Peninsular Malaysia last year, but made about 15 in Sabah between May and September. The government-imposed lockdowns have forced people to spend more time online, raising the likelihood of vulnerable individuals being exposed to radical ideologies in the cyber domain. Around the region, groups such as IS have increased their recruitment and radicalisation efforts through social media during the pandemic.

Elsewhere, the armed forces of the Philippines drew praise for retaking terror bases in the southern region of Mindanao.

Source: “Malaysia’s Sabah is South-east Asian terrorists’ preferred transit point: Experts,” straitstimes.com (Singapore based news outlet), 5 September 2021. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysias-sabah-is-south-east-asian-terrorists-preferred-transit-point-experts

As security threats posed by extremists rise in South-east Asia, Malaysia’s Sabah state has emerged as a preferred route for Indonesian militants to enter the southern Philippines to carry out their terrorist activities, according to a regional intelligence source.

Sabah appeared to be a transit point for Indonesians who want to join terror groups or learn to make IEDs (improvised explosive devices) in the Philippines, according to the source.

Source: “Annual Threat Assessment,” rsis.edu.sg (Singapore based think tank), 1 January 2021. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/CTTA-January-2022.pdf

Whilst this reflects a continuous declining trend of attacks and plots compared to the years preceding the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2021 terrorist landscape was particularly marked by aggressive counterterrorism (CT) operations that hauled in more than three hundred terrorist suspects – the largest figure since 2018 – including key militant group leaders.

Image Information:

Image: DSA 2016 – Close Quarters Battle.
Source: Rizuan
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DSA_2016_-_Close_Quarters_Battle.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Sahel Drug Trade Mixes with Militancy

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2014 02 19 Handover of Uniform to Somali Custodial Corps 07.

2014 02 19 Handover of Uniform to Somali Custodial Corps 07.

“All in all, drug trafficking is intensifying and constitutes a funding opportunity for crime and a threat to the security of states.” 

On 11 January, the Burkina Faso-based Norbert Zongo Cell for Investigative Journalism in West Africa (CENOZO) wrote the attached, excerpted French-language article on criminal drug trafficking in the Sahel.  CENOZO was founded by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to report on corruption, organized crime, bad governance, and violations of human rights. According to the article, a number of factors are contributing to drug financing of terrorism in the region, including the lack of state authority, weak judicial systems, the collapse of the traditional pastoral economy, and corruption.

In particular, the article points to northern Mali as a transit point for cocaine in West Africa, which disrupts the stability of state institutions and benefits from the complicity of political or military figures.  The article also notes that drugs often pass through the three coastal West African countries of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo and suggests that drug lords in Burkina Faso remain unknown and have evaded security forces crackdowns.  Although the article acknowledges UNODC has launched several programs to counter drug trafficking, including surveillance at airports, the indifference and corruption of government officials has limited the ability of such programs to curtail the drug trade in the Sahel.

One of the drugs that the article highlights with concern is tramadol, often used by laborers. However, the northern Nigeria-focused news outlet Daily Trust noted in a 5 June article that the Nigerian National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) has intercepted tramadol shipments from the coastal city of Lagos. These were destined for Boko Haram in the country’s northeast.  The drug is used to keep fighters awake and vigilant during long battles or when hiding in the bush to evade security forces.

Besides high-level officials and militant group involvement in the drug trade, the article argues the abuse of drugs by impoverished youth can also result in their being recruited by armed groups.  Consistent with previous reporting from as early as January 2014 by the Geneva-based Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, the excerpted article by globalinitiative.net states that the origin of some of the drugs in the Sahel is Latin America, including Colombia and Brazil, as well Bombay, India.  Therefore, the problem of drug trafficking and its inter-relation with terrorism and militancy in the Sahel remains complex, with distinct local and global factors contributing to its perpetuation.

Source:

“Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger: Sur les routes criminelles de la drogue au Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger: On the criminal drug routes in the Sahel),” cenozo.org (UN sponsored media consortium based in Burkino Faso), 11 January 2022.  https://cenozo.org/burkina-mali-niger-sur-les-routes-criminelles-de-la-drogue-au-sahel/

Several types of drugs transit through Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, with Europe as their destination. Facilitated by porous borders and insufficient means of control, this traffic fuels crime in the Sahel. Between January and October 2021, Burkina Faso customs seized at least 78.11 tons of drugs.

Tramadol is trafficked for non-medical use and is widely consumed by people performing physical work: gold miners, agricultural producers, workers on major construction sites. Its trafficking constitutes a great threat in West, Central and North Africa, underlines the UNODC.

The drugs usually come from Bombay in Asia and Colombia and Brazil in Latin America. UNODC describes the Sahelian region as a trade and migration route where “the lack of state authority, weak judicial systems, the collapse of the traditional pastoral economy, corruption and the presence of fire have created an ideal conducive environment for illicit trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, corruption and money laundering.” The UNODC cites Mali in its 2013 report as one of the main transit countries for cocaine in West Africa, combining several related activities that dangerously disrupt the stability of institutions.


Source: “Illicit Trafficking and Instability in Mali: Past, Present and Future,” globalinitiative.net (Geneva based civil society organization), January 2014.  https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Illicit-Trafficking-and-Instability-in-Mali-Past-present-and-future.pdf

Cocaine first entered these networks in 2002, after South American wholesalers began using West African ports as an intermediate step in reaching consumers in Europe. The consequent rise of organized criminal syndicates in coastal states such as Nigeria and Ghana gained the attention of international bodies and policymakers. Although some amount of cocaine arrives by boat or plane directly to Mauritania and Morocco, the main ports of entry for South American wholesalers to the region are still believed to be Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.


Source: “NDLEA Seizes 34,950 Tramadol, Diazepam Capsules Enroute To Boko Haram,” dailytrust.com (news outlet covering social and political affairs of northern Nigeria), 5 June 2021. https://dailytrust.com/ndlea-seizes-34950-tramadol-diazepam-capsules-in-lagos

Spokesman of the agency, Femi Babafemi said in Abuja that a 25-year-old, Mohammed Isah, was recruited to move the drugs from Lagos to Borno was arrested. The suspect claims he accepted the offer because of the monetary benefit due to pressure on his finances as his wife and three children displaced by Boko Haram activities.

Image Information:

Image: 2014 02 19 Handover of Uniform to Somali Custodial Corps 07.
Source: AMISOM Public Information https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2014_02_19_Handover_of_Uniform_to_Somali_Custodial_Corps_07_(12632984573).jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0