Category Archives: Russia

Articles whose main focus is topics pertaining to Russia.

Russia Uses Diplomacy To Increase Military Influence In Libya

Posted on by

Russian military assets in Al Khadim airfield, Libya, 2020

“Libya offers at least two advantages to Russia: its ports are only about an hour’s flight from the European coast, and its air bases in the south are very close to Sudan and the African Sahel countries…”

A series of recent diplomatic visits involving Russian officials and Libyan military leader Khalifa Haftar could eventually lead to deepening bilateral military relations, according to regional press coverage.[i] In August, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov led the first-ever Russian military delegation to visit Haftar.[ii] Yevkurov went back less than a month later, in mid-September, quickly followed by a visit to Moscow by Haftar, where he met with Russian President Putin and Defense Minister Shoigu. According to the first excerpt from al-Araby al-Jadeed, a Qatari-aligned daily newspaper, Haftar is seeking a more formal defense relationship with Russia, which would include official political recognition for Haftar and his allies, as well as sustained military support for forces under Haftar’s control. In exchange, per the second accompanying excerpt, from the Turkish news agency Anadolu Agency, Russia would establish a long-term aerial and naval military presence in eastern Libya, similar to its current presence in Syria.As the excerpt notes, Libya’s proximity to Europe, the Sahel, and Sudan gives it unique geopolitical value to Russia, creating a corridor of influence linking its bases in Syria to territories ruled by friendly governments in the African Sahel. Although the discussions remain nothing more than talks at the moment, the intensity of Russia’s military-diplomatic efforts signals Moscow’s growing interest in increasing its military influence in eastern Libya.

Sources:

“حفتر يجري لقاءات مكثفة مع مسؤولين في روسيا: بحث عن شراكة عسكرية معلنة؟

(Haftar holds intensive meetings with Russian officials: Seeking over military partnership?),” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 28 September 2023. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/حفتر-يجري-لقاءات-مكثفة-مع-مسؤولين-روس-بحث-عن-شراكة-عسكرية-معلنة

In other details about Haftar’s discussions in Moscow, sources’ information agreed that Haftar asked Moscow to upgrade the level of bilateral relations by signing a defense and security agreement stipulating that he would obtain more military equipment, such as Russian air defense systems, drones, and the establishment of advanced workshops to maintain his militia’s military equipment, most of which are Russian-made.

According to the same sources, Moscow summoned Haftar after he repeated his request during Yevkirov’s two visits to Benghazi, last August and the week before last. The sources confirmed that the discussions are still in early stages, as Moscow is still unwilling to officially announce its presence in Libya by signing any official and announced agreement.

“حفتر بين مطرقة العقوبات الأمريكية وسندان الدعم الروسي

(Haftar between the hammer of US sanctions and the anvil of Russian support),” Anadolu Agency (Turkish news agency), 2 October 2023. https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/التقارير/حفتر-بين-مطرقة-العقوبات-الأمريكية-وسندان-الدعم-الروسي-إضاءة/3005791

… Haftar has not abandoned Russian support and is asking for a price in return, not the least of which is recognition of his legitimacy and the provision of heavy and advanced weapons such as combat aircraft, drones, and air defense systems… [Russia] is still prepared to provide more weapons and training to his soldiers, and maintain military equipment in exchange for establishing its military presence on the southern front of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This makes it difficult for Haftar to choose between US sanctions and Russian military and diplomatic support…

Libya offers at least two advantages to Russia: its ports are only about an hour’s flight from the European coast, and its air bases in the south are very close to Sudan and the African Sahel countries. Although Wagner elements were deployed in several Libyan air bases in the east and south, such as Al-Jufra (central), Al-Kharrouba (east), Brak Al-Shati and Tamanhint (south), they have not yet been able to have an independent naval base in Sirte nor an air base in Al-Jufra (east of Tripoli)—as is the case with the Hmeimim air base and Tartus naval base in Syria—due to American pressure on Haftar. Therefore, observers expect that Moscow will seek to seize more than one military base in Libya, and connect them to its air supply line from Russia to Syria, passing through Libya and from there to its allies in Sudan and the African Sahel countries, all the way to the Central African Republic.

Notes:

[i] For additional reporting and context, see: “Russia Seeks to Expand Naval Presence in the Mediterranean,” Wall Street Journal, 15 September 2023. https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/russia-seeks-to-expand-naval-presence-in-the-mediterranean-b8da4d; “Libya: The security relationship between Khalifa Haftar and Moscow is intensifying,” Le Monde, 11 October 2023. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/10/11/libya-the-security-relationship-between-khalifa-haftar-and-moscow-is-intensifying_6162923_124.html; and “After Libya’s floods, Russia throws its weight behind Haftar,” The New Arab, 9 October 2023. https://www.newarab.com/analysis/after-libyas-floods-russia-throws-its-weight-behind-haftar

[ii] The Russian Defense Ministry’s Telegram channel reported on it being the first-ever such visit https://t.me/mod_russia/29689. Yevkurov first visit was on 22 August, the day before the head of the Wagner Group was killed in an airplane crash and in the context of reassuring African countries with Wagner presence that the PMC was now under government control. Yevkurov returned to Libya on 17 September, in the aftermath of the Derna floods. Haftar traveled to Moscow on 28 September. 

Image Information:

Image:  Russian military assets in Al Khadim airfield, Libya, 2020
Source: US AFRICOM Public Affairs, https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/33034/russia-and-the-wagner-group-continue-to-be-in  
Attribution: Public Domain

Poland And The Baltic States Express Concern About Regional Stability

Posted on by

Members of the Wagner group training Belarusian troops in summer 2023.

“It can be expected that the Wagner troops will be used for border provocations against Polish uniformed services… It also cannot be ruled out that some of the mercenaries will try to infiltrate Poland and other countries mainly on the Eastern Flank.”

Since the Wagner Group, a private Russian military company known for its brutality and criminal activities, began training in Belarus in July, concerns amongst the neighboring states have steadily risen regarding regional border security. Belarussian President Lukashenko offered the Wagner Group employment in Belarus — with the goal of increasing the effectiveness of the Belarusian military — following its attempted run on the Russian capital in June of 2023.[i]

As the excerpted publication from the Polish Institute of International Affairs (Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych) indicates, despite interacting under the auspices of improving Belarusian military readiness and effectiveness, Belarus’s neighbors fear that Belarus is readying additional means of offense against its neighbors. Poland’s concern is that as Belarus’ offensive forces become better trained, they may create instability in the delicate border peace that the two countries have reached. Furthermore, the article suggests that the Wagner Group’s location in Belarus suggests the possibility of a larger-scale engagement within Poland and other border countries like Lithuania. In essence, Belarussian “Wagner-trained fighters” could enter the open border zones with a Belarussian passport with the intent to identify viable targets in Poland, specifically within the critical infrastructure.[ii]  Additionally, the statement requests the Wagner Group be declared a terrorist organization. Such a designation would significantly broaden the legal bounds of recourse and response available to both Poland and NATO, both as a preventative measure to increase border security but also as a guarantee of support from NATO should Belarus pursue further provocative actions. As expressed in the second excerpted piece, a joint statement from Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia released on Poland’s Ministry of Internal Affairs X (formerly Twitter) feed, Belarus, by collaborating with Wagner and, more broadly, with Russia, is taking deliberate steps to destabilize the region. The joint statement declares that the four nations would take decisive and swift action should further provocation occur, noting that any border infractions would result in the immediate shutdown of all Belarussian border crossings. In addition, the governments called for the immediate removal of all Wagner Group members and holdings from Belarussian borders. Their statement asserts that the Wagner Group poses a threat not only to each country’s respective national security but to the security of the free world as well.

Sources:

Anna Maria Dyner, “Grupa Wagnera na Białorusi – potencjalne zagrożenia dla Polski (Wagner Group Arrives in Belarus – Potential Threats to Poland),” Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych (official website of Polish Institute of International Affairs), 27 July 2023. https://pism.pl/publications/wagner-group-arrives-in-belarus-potential-threats-to-poland

The mercenaries in Belarus give the Belarusian and Russian authorities additional tools for hybrid action against NATO countries, in particular Poland and Lithuania. It can be expected that the Wagner troops will be used for border provocations against Polish uniformed services, including the possible use of arms or attempts to destroy barriers. They may also be used to coordinate and command operations at the border. It also cannot be ruled out that some of the mercenaries will try to infiltrate Poland and other countries mainly on the Eastern Flank (both illegally and, for example, with the use of Belarusian passports) with the task of identifying critical infrastructure facilities. Some of them may also be prepared to carry out acts of sabotage on Polish soil. … These activities will increase tensions and have a psychological impact on Polish society in the context of, among other things, the Belarusian-Russian military exercise Union Shield, scheduled for the end of September, or the October parliamentary elections in Poland.

It may also be necessary to recognize the Wagner Group as a terrorist organization. This would allow the use of the Anti-Terrorist Activities Act, which, among other things, broadens the spectrum of activities that can be undertaken by the relevant security services and authorities against persons suspected of seeking to carry out terrorist activities. In addition, Poland may hold consultations within NATO and propose a common approach by Alliance members to the Wagner Group, chiefly by pointing out that they are being used by Belarus and Russia as a tool of hybrid action that requires a coordinated response from the Alliance, for example, in the form of an increased Allied presence at the border.

At the same time, Poland and NATO should announce that they will use all available instruments to fight the Wagner Group mercenaries if they pose a threat, with Belarus and Russia fully responsible for their actions on the border.

Mariusz Kamiński, Angé Bilotaité, Māris Kučinskis, Lauri Läänemets, “Oświadczenie Ministrów Spraw Wewnętrznych Polski,  Litwy, Łotwy i Estonii po spotkaniu konsultacyjnym w Warszawie (Statement by the Ministers of the Interiors of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia after the consultation meeting in Warsaw),” Twitter@MSWiA_GOV_PL, 28 August 2023. https://twitter.com/MSWiA_GOV_PL/status/1696123142249283636

We emphasize that the actions taken by Russia and Belarus cooperating as an attempt to deliberately destabilize the situation in the region. We declare we are determined to oppose this together. Our answer will be joint, decisive and appropriate to the current situation- up to the possibility of further isolating both regimes by closing border crossings. We are determined to defend the borders of the democratic world, leaving access to our territories for the…Belarussian oppositionists.In this regard we call on the Belarussian regime to remove the “Wagner” group from the territories of Belarus…

Notes:

[i] For a Belarussian perspective on the Wagner Group’s presence, as well as their views regarding Polish and neighboring states reactions, see: “Тенденции военно-политической обстановки и обновленную Концепцию нацбезопасности обсудили в Витебске (Trends in the military-political situation and the updated National Security Concept were discussed in Vitebsk)” Белта (A news service of Belarus), 13 September 2023. https://www.belta.by/amp/regions/view/tendentsii-voenno-politicheskoj-obstanovki-i-obnovlennuju-kontseptsiju-natsbezopasnosti-obsudili-v-587792-2023/

[ii] For more information on the operational tactics of Wagner Group from their previous engagements in Ukraine, see: Charles Bartles, “The Composition And Tactics Of Wagner Assault Detachments,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/the-composition-and-tactics-of-wagner-assault-detachments/

Image Information:

Image: Members of the Wagner group training Belarusian troops in summer 2023.
Source: https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&url=https%3A%2F%2Fcommons.wikimedia.org%2Fwiki%2F, File%3APMC_wagner_in_belarus_2.png&psig=AOvVaw3nFw9Wep8soItuzbytxYTa&ust=1695536938589000&source=images&cd=vfe&opi=89978449&ved=2ahUKEwi799i4jcCBAxUeW_EDHdRvBoQQjRx6BAgAEAw
Attribution: CC By 3.0 Deed

The Evolution Of Russia’s Peacekeeping Mission In Nagorno-Karabakh

Posted on by

Map of the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh war showing Azerbaijan day-to-day advances.

“The conditions under which the Russian peacekeeping contingent was introduced into the region in 2020 have been seriously adjusted.”

On 19 September 2023, Azerbaijani forces launched an operation against the breakaway republic of Artsakh, and within days, succeeded in ending ethnic Armenian control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The excerpted article from the independent news website Kavkazskiy Uzel reports on how Azerbaijani control of Nagorno-Karabakh has impacted the Russian peacekeeping mission.[i] The article notes that Russian peacekeepers dismantled a few observation posts and established new ones, some of which were set up with Azerbaijan to jointly protect the weapons and equipment surrendered by the armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh. The dismantled observation posts were situated in eastern Nagorno-Karabakh near Azerbaijan. The article also notes, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that its peacekeepers will adapt to the new situation, even as a large percentage of the population in Nagorno-Karabakh has left the region. The mandate of the Russian peacekeeping mission runs through November 2025 and will be automatically extended for another five years unless the governments of Armenia or Azerbaijan request to terminate it. The article notes that the Armenian government signed a declaration recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan two weeks after Azerbaijan took control of the region, essentially ending support for the breakaway republic. While one of the main tasks of the Russian peacekeeping mission has changed, it appears likely that Russia will continue to operate in the region.

Sources:

“МИД России пояснил смену постов миротворцев адаптацией к новым условиям (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia explained the change to the posts of peacekeepers as adapting to the new conditions),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website reporting on the Caucasus), 10 October 2023. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/393302

Peacekeepers are adapting to new conditions against the backdrop of a mass exodus of the population from the region, reported Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova.

As t“e “Caucasian K”ot” wrote, on October 5, peacekeepers reported on the dismantling of observation posts in the Askeran, Martakert and Shusha regions, and on October 8, the Russian peacekeeping contingent dismantled posts in the Martuni and Martakert regions…

A day earlier, the Russian peacekeeping contingent reported that the Russian peacekeeping contingent had set up 25 guard posts in the North (seven posts) and South (18 posts) areas of responsibility, including 14 jointly with the Azerbaijani side. Peacekeepers are taking part in the protection of warehouses with ammunition, weapons, military and special equipment surrendered by the armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh, as stated in the bulletin dated October 9.

The activities of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh will adapt to new conditions against the backdrop of a mass exodus of the population from the region, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said today…

As a result of the virtual capitulation of Stepanakert, Azerbaijan gained control over the region. On September 28, the President of Nagorno-Karabakh signed a decree ending the existence of the republic. After the military operation carried out by Azerbaijan on September 19-20, almost all residents left Nagorno-Karabakh, in which, according to various sources, about 120 thousand people lived…If the Russian peacekeeping contingent leaves Nagorno-Karabakh, it must return to Russia, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said today in an interview with the Public TV Channel when asked about the possibility of deploying peacekeepers in Armenia…On October 5, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed a declaration recognizing the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, including the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh…

Notes:

[i] Russian peacekeepers were deployed as part of the ceasefire agreement that ended the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. For background on the Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh and how Russia uses peacekeeping missions to achieve strategic objectives beyond conflict resolution, see: Matthew Stein “The Evolutionary Russian View Of Peacekeeping As Part Of Modern Warfare,” FMSO’s Foreign Perspectives Brief, 24 March 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/2023-03-24-the-evolutionary-russian-view-of-peacekeeping-as-part-of-modern-warfare-matthew-stein-update/

Image Information:

Image: Map of the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh war showing Azerbaijan day-to-day advances.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2023_Nagorno-Karabakh_War.svg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Russia Signs Agreement To Open Naval Base In Abkhazia

Posted on by

Map of Russian Black Sea naval bases Sevastopol and Novorossiysk and the proposed base at Ochamchira on disputed Georgian territory.

“The interaction between Moscow and Sukhum in terms of military-technical cooperation is aimed at increasing the level of defense capability of both Russia and Abkhazia, says Bzhania.”

Abkhazia has signed a bilateral agreement to host a Russian naval base near the southern Abkhazian city of Ochamchira. Western observers have interpreted the announcement as proof Ukraine is having success driving Russia’s Black Sea Fleet out of Crimea, while the Russian and Abkhazian press are focused on the regional implications of the proposed Russian naval base.

According to the first excerpted article from the Russian daily Izvestia,[i] the agreement is intended to increase defense cooperation between Russia and Abkhazia, recognized as an independent state by Russia.[ii] However, the second excerpted article from the regionally focused Echo Kavkav points out, Russian coastal patrol boats already use the port at Ochamchira. This port is small in comparison to Novorossiysk, the naval port to which Russia has moved much of its Black Sea fleet after Ukraine demonstrated it is capable of attacking naval assets at Sevastopol on Crimea. According to political figure and Hero of Abkhazia[iii], Aslan Kobakhia, the announcement is part of the information war between pro-Russian Abkhazians and those Abkhazians who prefer a more independent political path for Abkhazia. He noted there has been talk of an expanded base in Ochamchira for years, further observing that “no matter how deep you go, it’s a small port, only a few ships can be there at a time, and large ships cannot base there.” However, Kobakhia did conclude an expanded port at Ochamchira could be used as a vital refueling hub for Russia’s Navy. According to Giva Kvarchia, as quoted in the third excerpted article from the Abkhaz diaspora media website Abkhaz World, the base in Abkhazia would be mutually beneficial as it would be an economic boon to Abkhazia and provide a military advantage to Russia. A base at Ochamchira would also serve as a deterrent against any future military action by Georgia to take back Abkhazia. Kvarchia acknowledged that the base would be provocative and both “a protection and a potential threat.” A Russian naval base in Abkhazia presents an interesting security dilemma for the region. Ukraine has proven capable of attacking Russian naval vessels in Novorossiysk, Russia, and Sevastopol, on the Ukrainian Crimean Peninsula, which has been annexed by Russia. Given that Abkhazia is not Russian territory, any decision to engage the Russian Navy there would necessarily be seen as an attack on the territory.[iv] While, the announcement of the Russian naval base in Abkhazia is merely that, the positioning of additional Russian assets there could impact the operational environment of the whole eastern Black Sea region.

Sources:

“Бжания сообщил о размещении в Абхазии пункта постоянного базирования ВМФ РФ (Bzhania announced the deployment of a permanent base for the Russian Navy in Abkhazia), Izvestia (pro-Kremlin daily newspaper), 05 October 2023. https://iz.ru/1584377/2023-10-05/bzhaniia-soobshchil-o-razmeshchenii-v-abkhazii-punkta-postoiannogo-bazirovaniia-vmf-rf

A new permanent base for the Russian Navy will appear on the Black Sea coast in Abkhazia; a corresponding agreement between Russia and Abkhazia has already been signed, Abkhaz President Aslan Bzhania said in an interview with Izvestia.

“Two states, but we have a common Fatherland”

“On the day of our holiday [in honor of the 30th anniversary of Victory Day in the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992–1993 and Independence Day, which was celebrated on September 30], a small missile ship came to us, we boarded it – a very modern ship with serious combat capabilities . We have signed an agreement, and in the near future there will be a permanent base for the Russian Navy in the Ochamchira region,” Bzhania said.

In addition, the President of the Republic noted that Russia continues to provide support, providing the opportunity for Abkhaz specialists to undergo advanced training in educational institutions of the Russian Federation.

The interaction between Moscow and Sukhum in terms of military-technical cooperation is aimed at increasing the level of defense capability of both Russia and Abkhazia, says Bzhania.

From August 21 to September 1, 2023, joint Russian-Abkhaz military special-purpose, flight and tactical exercises were held in four regions of Abkhazia, aimed at increasing the level of field training of troops and forces, coordinating their actions when performing combat missions.

Russia recognized the sovereignty of Abkhazia on August 26, 2008. This year, ceremonial events were held in the republic in honor of the 15th anniversary of this event. Currently, the Russian and Abkhaz military jointly ensure the security of the republic. Also, the borders of Abkhazia are guarded by the border service of the Russian FSB.

Vitaly Shariya, “Аслан Кобахия: «Шум вокруг Очамчырского морпорта – буря в стакане воды» (Aslan Kobakhia: ‘The noise around the Ochamchira seaport is a storm in a teacup’),” Ekho Kavkaza (regionally specific news source), 12 October 2023. https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/32634876.html

“I’ve been there several times. No matter how deep you go…’It’s a small port. Only a few ships can be there at a time. There are no such opportunities that some people are talking abo–t – they left Sevastopol, they left Novorossiysk… The Russian fleet cannot leave either Sevastopol or Novorossiysk, there are no such opportunities. Five percent of those ships will not fit on the territory of Abkhazia. You need to know a little to speak. There is no place to base large ships there. Ships can enter there, refuel, and go back to sea. The Russian Federation doesn’t comment at all, but here we start, you know, creating a storm in a teacup… Why, I can’t understand.”

“Givi Kvarchia: ‘Military Bases: A Double-Edged Sword of Protection and Threat,’ Abkhaz World (pro-Abkhaz web news service run by Abkhaz diaspora in Europe), 6 October 2023. https://abkhazworld.com/aw/interview/2536-givi-kvarchia-military-bases-a-double-edged-sword-of-protection-and-threat?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

[Q]. Aslan Bzhania also made a statement indicating that Sukhum is prepared to deepen its military-technical cooperation with the Russian Federation, and that a new permanent base for the Russian Navy will be established on the Black Sea coast in Abkhazia. Could you comment on this matter?

[Givi Kvarchia].  As for the enhanced military-technical cooperation between our nations, it is already outlined in the broader alliance and strategic partnership agreement, as well as in interdepartmental agreements between our defence ministries. This ’sn’t a new development; it has been in planning for a long time. Perhaps it h’sn’t proceeded at the pace’we’d desire, especially in terms of military-technical cooperation. Regarding the Ochamchira port and the basing of certain Black Sea Fleet ships or a portion of it there, this ’sn’t new in Abkhazian politics either. Discussions and negotiations about the joint use of the Ochamchira port by the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia have been ongoing for years, and as far as I know, an agreement has been reached to use this port on mutually beneficial terms.

[Q]. Givi, could you elaborate on the essence of the“e “mutually beneficial te”ms”?

[Givi Kvarchia]. The crux of it is that a portion of this port will be used by the Abkhazian side for economic purposes. Meanwhile, another portion will tilizedsed by the Russian Federation for military objectives.

[Q]. Givi, considering the war in Ukraine and recent information that a drone made its way to Sochi, a’en’t you concerned that a Naval base in Ochamchira might pose a security threat to the citizens or the country as a whole? What are your thoughts?[Givi Kvarchia]. Any military base or basing point can serve as both protection and a potential threat. However, our discussions about the Ochamchira port began before the military operation in Ukraine unfolded. To put it simply,’it’s a double-edged sword, but from our perspective, it represents more of a security measure than a threat, in my view.

Notes:

[i] Although Russian media outlet Izvestia broke the story of the proposed Russian naval base at Ochamchira, there was very little additional Russian coverage of the topic. In a separate article from Izvestia, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov deferred on the topic, noting that it was a military issue and inferring that questions about the basing agreement should be directed to the Russian Ministry of Defense, see: “Песков переадресовал вопрос о размещении ВМФ в Абхазии в Минобороны (Peskov forwarded the question about the deployment of the Navy in Abkhazia to the Ministry of Defense), Izvestia, 5 October 2023. https://iz.ru/1584547/2023-10-05/peskov-pereadresoval-vopros-o-razmeshchenii-vmf-v-abkhazii-v-minoborony

[ii] Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, are break-away republics within the Republic of Georgia. Georgia considers both territories occupied by Russia, which is not factually accurate, especially in the case of Abkhazia which has fought to be recognized as an independent state and maintains its own security apparatus. Only a handful of countries have recognized Abkhazia’s independence: Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru and Syria.

[iii] Hero of Abkhazia, much like Hero of the Russian Federation, is a title given to Abkhazians who have performed a heroic deed in the service of the state, usually veterans of the war between Abkhazia and Georgia (1992-1993).

[iv] For more on current Russia-Abkhazia relations see: Dodge Billingsley “Abkhazia Pushes Back Against Russia’s Suggestion Of Incorporation,” OE Watch, 08-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/abkhazia-pushes-back-against-russias-suggestion-of-incorporation/

Image Information:

Image: Map of Russian Black Sea naval bases Sevastopol and Novorossiysk and the proposed base at Ochamchira on disputed Georgian territory.
Source: Combat Films and ResearchAttribution: Combat Films and Research by permission using map data from OpenStreetMap

Russia Continues Investment In Arctic Route Expansion

Posted on by

“The Russian government decided that a terminal for shipment of zinc and lead will be built in the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya and the Seaport of Arkhangelsk will have its capacity tripled.”

Despite fighting in Ukraine and Western sanctions, Russia continues to push the expansion of its Northern Sea route’s capacity. According to the excerpted article from the Norway-based The Barents Observer, the Russian state’s push followed a significant investment in Arctic infrastructure development by sanctioned Russian oligarch Andrei Patrushev.[i] According to the article, Patrushev will take an ownership stake in the Archangelsk Seaport. Much of the shipping currently goes east to the Russian Far East and China, but many non-European countries are expanding trade with Russia. In the past, President Putin set increased shipping goals for the North Sea Route which have been met. Still, this current goal to increase from 34 million metric tons to 83 million metric tons is quite ambitious. Who the intended customers are, where the demand exists, and what type of goods are still unknown. Much of this cargo will continue to be LNG, coal, oil, timber, grain, and processed metals. Indeed, Russia is investing in its north for the long term, and the Patrushev family seems convinced that it is a good place to invest. Their financing, in tandem with state investment, may provide insight into the relationship between the oligarchs that keep Russia’s economy functioning and the Russian political state.

Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Following Andrei Patrushev’s infrastructure investment comes a major government development plan for seaports in Arkhangelsk and Novaya Zemlya,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 2 October 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2023/10/following-andrei-patrushevs-infrastructure-investment-comes-major

The Russian government decided that a terminal for shipment of zinc and lead will be built in the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya and the Seaport of Arkhangelsk will have its capacity tripled. “The Government continues to systematically develop the Northern Sea Route,” Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin underlined this week as he presented a new infrastructure plan for the north Russian region of Arkhangelsk.

According to the document, the local seaport will have its capacity tripled by 2035.  While it handled 6,5 million tons of goods in 2022, it will be able to handle 25 million tons in 2040.  This should involve major dredging operations in the Northern Dvina river and improved railway connections to the seaport. The construction of the new terminal will be started no later than 2026 and it is to be completed in 2031.  The key commodities  for the new port in Arkhangelsk will be zinc and lead concentrates.  The plan also includes the construction of a terminal in Novaya Zemlya, which is to be ready for operations in 2026.  The construction of the new infrastructure will be covered by non-budgetary funds.

The terminal in the far northern and heavily-militarised archipelago has been under planning for several years. It is due to be built in the Bezimyannaya Bay, not far from the local nuclear weapon test sites.  It will handle ores and concentrate from the Pavlovskoye mine. State nuclear power company Rosatom and its subsidiary First Ore Mining Company are behind the project.

The Russian government’s approval of the infrastructure plan comes only few months after Andrei Patrushev acquired an ownership stake in the Seaport of Arkhangelsk. Andrei Patrushev is the son of Russian national security strongman Nikolai Patrushev.

In early 2023, Patrushev bought a 10 percent stake in the seaport. With the acquisition, Patrushev teamed up with port owners TD Bulat-SBS, Investment Industrial Partner and Vaiz Invest.  The latter reportedly controls 60 percent of the port.

Andrei Patrushev is the youngest son of Nikolai Patrushev, the Russian Security Council Secretary. The Patrushev family is closely associated with the FSB. Andrei Patrushev is a major owner of the Gazprom Shelf Project, a company that has management responsibility for several of Russia’s best Arctic drilling rigs and vessels.  He also controls a major share of Arctic exploration company Marine Arctic Geo Exploration Expedition (MAGE).

Arkhangelsk is one of Russia’s biggest Arctic seaports.  It is extensively used for shipments of goods and construction materials to far northern industrial projects like the Syradasayskoye coal field and Rosneft’s Vostok Oil.As the new federal plan was approved in Moscow, a Chinese cargo ship loaded forestry products from the terminal.  According to regional Governor Aleksandr Tsybulsky, Chinese furniture manufacturers are ready to start shipping up to one million cubic meters of wood products on the Northern Sea Route. The first shipload includes 300 containers sent on the Chinese ship Xin Xin Hai 1

Notes:

[i] See: “The West has imposed a barrage of sanctions on top Russian figures. See how they’re connected to Putin,” The Washington Post, 15 March 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/15/putin-inner-circle-russia/ and the official U.S. government notice; U.S. Treasury Announces Unprecedented & Expansive Sanctions Against Russia, Imposing Swift and Severe Economic Costs, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, 24 February 2022. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0608

Russia Enlists Partners To Attack U.S. Dollar To Fund War in Ukraine

Posted on by

Bank Saint Petersburg sanctioned by the U.S. and UK on 24 February, one of many Russian banks sanctioned in the days following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

“The document contains a list of friendly and neutral states whose credit institutions and brokers will be able to trade on the Russian market for currencies and asset liabilities.”

Russia seeks to make strategic advances in the economic war in which it finds itself as it struggles to gain an operational advantage on the battlefield in Ukraine. Russian moves to end the global dominance of the U.S. dollar have taken on new urgency as the war in Ukraine has exposed how reliant Russia and other nations are on the dollar for their national economies and settlement of global financial transactions.[i] According to the excerpted article from Russian financial news source RI-Centr.ru, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin recently signed a resolution with “more than 30 friendly or neutral states,” including “all Central Asian states” to explore conducting financial settlements in national currencies rather than the dollar. The article acknowledged that the moves away from the dollar contained risks for banks and other financial institutions.

The article from the Russian news outlet политический калейдоскоп (Political Kaleidoscope) noted Indonesia, the world’s seventh-largest economy and fourth-most populous country, has also begun the process of transitioning from the dollar for global trade and financial transactions. According to the article, Jakarta has set up a “National Task Force that will support financial transactions in local currencies.” The article concludes by noting that “Indonesia has become the latest ‘heavyweight’ in the company of fighters against the dominance of the U.S. dollar in the global financial system” and that China, India, and Russia have agreed to switch to national currencies for mutual payments. Finally, the article noted that the BRICS nations[ii] are pursuing a dollar alternative and that Russian President Putin recently emphasized that “de-dollarization is an irreversible process that is gaining inertia.” While the U.S. dollar is still the preferred safe-haven currency worldwide, Russia’s (and China’s) efforts to reduce its dollar dependence would give Russia increased flexibility to conduct trade, especially for commodities such as oil—a tool for financing the war in Ukraine and potential wars elsewhere—without the threat of adverse financial conditions imposed on its economy by a dominant U.S. dollar.[iii]

Sources:

“УТВЕРЖДЁН СПИСОК СТРАН — ПАРТНЁРОВ ПО ВАЛЮТНОЙ ТОРГОВЛЕ (LIST OF CURRENCY TRADING PARTNERS HAS BEEN APPROVED),” RI-Centr.ru (Russian financial news outlet), 21 September 2023. https://ia-centr.ru/publications/utverzhdyen-spisok-stran-partnyerov-po-valyutnoy-torgovle/?utm_source=finobzor.ru

The corresponding order was signed by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin.

The document contains a list of friendly and neutral states whose credit institutions and brokers will be able to trade on the Russian market for currencies and asset liabilities.

There are more than 30 countries on the list, including all Central Asian states. Approval of the list is part of the process of transition to settlements in national currencies.

The approval of the resolution was announced in July 2023. At that time, the list of partner states included 44 countries. In the current message on the government website, 32 countries are mentioned. Israel and Georgia, which were previously named as included in the list, are not among them. This is not the final version of the document.

Russia and the countries of the post-Soviet space are progressively engaged in financial integration. Thus, on April 28, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) published a draft agreement that should simplify the admission of brokers from the union states to the exchanges of the participating countries. In addition, at the end of August, EEC members signed an agreement on bank guarantees in the field of public procurement.

Experts note that the proposed mechanisms do not yet fully solve the problem of risks for banks and other financial players.

Sergey Manukov, “К дедолларизации подключилась одна из крупнейших экономик планеты (One of the largest economies on the planet has joined dedollarization),” Political Kaleidoscope (политический калейдоскоп), 21 September 2023. https://k-politika.ru/k-dedollarizacii-podklyuchilas-odna-iz-krupnejshix-ekonomik-planety/?utm_source=finobzor.ru

There are new additions to the camp of fighters against the dominance of the dollar in the global financial system and trade. Moreover, it is very significant and noticeable. Indonesia has joined the dedollarization process. This, by the way, is the seventh economy in the world, which, without a doubt, in one or two decades will rise another couple of positions in the ranking. In addition, Indonesia ranks fourth in the world in terms of population – approx. 280 million people.

Jakarta has created a National Task Force that will support financial transactions in local currencies (LCT). In Indonesia, remember, this is the Indonesian rupiah. In a statement, the head of the Indonesian central bank, Bank Indonesia, Perry Warjiyo, said that the transition to national currencies in settlements and trade with friendly countries will help not only strengthen the Indonesian financial market, but also stabilize the local rupiah.

“Increasing local currency transactions should help export-import activities, investments and cross-border payment transactions, including QRIS (Indonesia’s domestic settlement standard),” explains a top Indonesian banker.

Indonesia has become the latest “heavyweight” in the company of fighters against the dominance of the US dollar in the global financial system, consisting of China, India and Russia. Beijing, New Delhi and Moscow agreed to switch to national currencies for mutual payments. In addition, BRICS has not abandoned plans to introduce, if not a single currency of the organization, then at least a single payment mechanism. Indonesia has not yet joined BRICS, but its President Joko Widodo attended the group’s recent summit in South Africa as a guest. Speaking at the summit via video link, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized that dedollarization is an irreversible process that is gaining inertia.

Joko Widodo, by the way, not long ago called on local authorities to abandon foreign payment systems and switch to credit cards from local banks. True, he spoke not so much about dedollarization as about the possibility of banning such popular cards as Visa and Mastercard, following the example of what they did with Russia.

In the United States, the plans of China, Russia, India and other developing countries to deprive the dollar of the unofficial title of world currency are, at least outwardly, calmly and they claim that nothing can threaten the “green” in the foreseeable future, at least for several decades.Recently, by the way, Zimbabwe announced its desire to join the bank created by the BRICS countries. As a result, rumors spread that this southern African country also wants to join the de-dollarization. However, according to Zimbabwe’s former finance minister, abandoning the dollar could easily lead to economic disaster.

Notes:

[i] For a Russian perspective on the dollar shortly after its invasion of Ukraine see: Ilya Polonsky, “Россия способна поставить точку в эпохе гегемонии доллара (Russia is able to put an end to the era of dollar hegemony),” Economic Enrichment (экономическое обоэрение) (Russian financial news outlet), 18 March 2022. https://finobzor.ru/116153-rossija-sposobna-postavit-tochku-v-jepohe-gegemonii-dollara.html

[ii] The BRICS nations are Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Coined in 2001, the term was originally BRIC and remained that way until the addition of South in 2010. Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are set to join the bloc and receive full membership on 1 January 2024.

[iii] Historically, when the cost of oil rises the dollar has depreciated. However, since 2022, roughly correlating with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the price of oil and the value of the dollar have moved in tandem. Therefore, high energy costs and a rising dollar have put additional pressure on economies like Russia’s and China’s. For an analysis of what is fueling the new connection between commodity prices and the strength of the U.S. dollar see: Boris Hofmann, Deniz Igan, and Daniel Rees, “The Changing Nexus Between Commodity Prices and the Dollar: Causes and Implications,” BIS Bulletin No. 74, (Switzerland based Bank for International Settlements), 13 April 2023. https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull74.pdf

Image Information:

Image: Bank Saint Petersburg sanctioned by the U.S. and UK on 24 February, one of many Russian banks sanctioned in the days following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Source: Combat Films and Research, Inc.
Attribution: Combat Films and Research, Inc. By permission

Russian North Sea Fleet Deputy Commander Killed in Nagorno-Karabakh

Posted on by

Map of the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh war showing Azerbaijan day-to-day advances as of 22 September 2023.

“This was a man who belonged to the fleet, and even though he was a political officer, what did he do down there [Nagorno Karabakh]?”

Attrition continues within Russia’s officer corps as Russian commanders die on the battlefield, even beyond Ukraine and Syria.[i] According to the Norway-based news outlet The Barents Observer, deputy commander and political officer of Russia’s Northern Fleet submarine forces, Ivan Kovgan, was killed in Nagorno-Karabakh on 20 September.[ii] The article noted that Kovgan was deployed to the disputed region as the deputy commander of the Russian peacekeeping contingent. Kovgan’s SUV reportedly was struck by Azeri artillery, killing him and four other Russian servicemembers. It is unclear whether the strike on the Russian peacekeepers’ vehicle was intentional or a mistake as a result of the fog of war. In any case, the event prompted an immediate apology from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev to Russian President Putin and the promise of an investigation. The article also noted that residents of the Kola Peninsula, where Kovgan resided, were shocked that he would have even been selected to serve in Nagorno-Karabakh. While units from the Russian Northern Fleet have been deployed to Ukraine, some with catastrophic consequences,[iii] the death of Kovgan while on a less-risky peacekeeping mission is an unexpected blow. Russia has lost many high-ranking officers in Ukraine, and losing another senior officer in far-off Nagorno-Karabakh is costly.

Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Deputy Commander of Russia’s Northern Fleed submarine forces is killed in Nagorno-Karabakh,” The Barents Observer (Norway based naval news focused news source), 22 September 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/09/deputy-commander-russias-northern-fleet-submarine-forces-killed-nagorno-karabakh

Kovgan was only days away from completing his assignment in the disputed territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan when his car came under attack. He and four more Russian servicemen were killed.

A photo reportedly taken on the site of the attack shows a Russian military SUV type UAZ Patriot that has crashed into a rocky hillside. At least four bodies can be seen in and around the vehicle.

The lethal attack came from Azerbaijani forces and took place on the 20th of September as part of a major onslaught on Armenia-backed forces in the region. It is reported to have taken place near the settlement of Canyataq in the northeastern corner of the self-proclaimed republic.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev in a telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin the following day apologised for the killings and assured that an investigation will be initiated and the guilty troops punished.

But for many locals in Gadzhievo it appear a mystery that a top officer from the Northern Fleet’s submarine forces was on duty in the far-away Nagorno-Karabakh.

“Who sent this first rank captain to that place???” a man writes in a comment on local social media in Gadzhievo. “This was a man that belongs to the fleet, and even though he was a political officer, what did he do down there??? After all, he was our naval political officer with both body and mind!” he underlines.Ivan Kovgan had reportedly been two months in Nagorno-Karabakh when he was killed. He was serving as Deputy Commander of the so-called peacekeeping forces that have been deployed in the area since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020. Back home in the Kola Peninsula he was Deputy Commander of the Northern Fleet’s submarine forces with responsibility for military-political operations.

Notes:

[i] Russia has lost several senior officers in Syria since 2016, including most recently Colonel Oleg Pechevisty, who was killed in May 2023. See: Isabel Van Brugen, “Russian Colonel Killed After Direct Strike on His Command Post – Reports,” Newsweek, 29 May 2023. https://www.newsweek.com/russian-colonel-oleg-pechevisty-killed-syria-strike-ukraine-war-1803136 and “Администрация Подпорожского района (Administration of Podporozhye district),” ВКонтакте (InKontact) Russian online social media and social networking service based in Saint Petersburg). 27 May 2023. https://vk.com/wall-167456645_21197

[ii] For additional information from the Russian perspective on the renewed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and presence of Russian peacekeepers, see: Kirill Strelnikov, “Прощание с Карабахом: уроки трагедии с двумя стульями (Farewell to Karabakh: lessons from the tragedy with two chairs),” RIANovosti (state-owned domestic Russian media outlet), 21 September 2023. https://ria.ru/20230921/karabakh-1897672995.html; “Messages appeared on the Internet about an attack by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces on a warehouse of Russian Peacekeepers, Top War (English language Russian military news focused media website, part of Military Review (Военное Обозрение)), 23 September 2023. https://en.topwar.ru/226714-v-seti-internet-pojavilis-soobschenija-ob-udare-vs-azerbajdzhana-po-skladu-rossijskih-mirotvorcev.html

[iii] The 200th is one of two Arctic infantry units subordinate to the Northern Military District’s 14th Army Corps, the 14th Army Corps is Ground Forces unit subordinate to the navy command, and as part of the Northern Military District it is subordinate to the Northern Fleet. For an investigative news piece on the fate of the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade in Ukraine see: “‘Wiped Out’: War in Ukraine has decimated a once feared Russian brigade,” The Washington Post, 16 December 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/16/russia-200th-brigade-decimated-ukraine/

Image Information:

Image: Map of the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh war showing Azerbaijan day-to-day advances as of 22 September 2023.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2023_Nagorno-Karabakh_War.svg
Attribution: CCA SA 4.0 Int

Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons to Engineer Units

Posted on by

A Soviet/Russian made POM-2 [R1] fragmentation anti-personnel mine on display.

“The use of UAVs for the remote laying of anti-personnel mines will ensure the element of surprise when used in both the defense and offense…”

The war in Ukraine continues to drive changes in military units and doctrine. Innovative use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been a common theme for both Russia and Ukraine since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Both countries have modified UAVs to lay mines. The accompanying excerpted article from the Russian monthly Военная мысль (Military Thought) discusses Russian plans to formalize this capability by creating a “special mining platoon” within certain engineer units. Although this is one of the first mentions of how adaptations from the so-called “special military operation”[i] are being implemented into Russia’s version of a Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E), it is unlikely to be the last. Other novel uses of UAVs, including as “suicide drones,” will likely be integrated into Russian MTO&E structures soon.

Sources:

D.F. Evmenenko and S.I. Melnik, “Дистанционное минирование местности при помощи

Малых беспилотных летательных аппаратов (The use of small unmanned aerial vehicles to conduct remote mining),” Военная мысль [Military Thought] (monthly Russian military periodical), September 2023. https://vm.ric.mil.ru/

Combat actions in the special military operation do not have the characteristics of high intensity [warfare] and rapid battlefield changes due to widescale usage of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The most widespread among them are multi-rotor helicopter-type devices (multicopters). Simple, cheap and reliable, they are easy to control and very maneuverable at low speeds and low altitudes. These systems can easily change targets in the field. In addition, such systems are easy to transport, scalable in size and load capacity…

The Second World War, military conflicts of recent decades, especially in the Persian Gulf region (Operation Desert Storm), and the US Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan show that their effectiveness increases several times when used suddenly and unexpectedly…

Although remote mining by aviation and artillery troops can be carried throughout the entire operational depth of an enemy formation, the remote mining capabilities of engineer troops are substantially more limited… The UMZ [R1]  and GMZ-K [R2]  universal minelayers only have a range of up to 200 m…

The need arose to develop a system that would allow the creation of minefields under any combat conditions in compliance with the requirements for safe the use of remote mining means for our troops.  As part of solving this problem, specialists from the Tyumen Higher Military Engineering Command School (TVVIKU) developed a device for discharging antipersonnel POM-2R mines…

The use of UAVs for the remote laying of anti-personnel mines will ensure the element of surprise when used in both the defense and offense…It is proposed to use UAV crews with mine containers in a special mining platoon (SMP) with 6 UAVs…The platoon consists of two squads, each with 6 personnel, 3 UAVs, and an all-terrain vehicle such as a UAZ ‘Wolverine’.

Characteristics of a Mine-Laying Multicopter-Type UAV (exact model unspecified in source)

Notes:

[i] Moscow insists on using the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Soviet/Russian made POM-2 [R1] fragmentation anti-personnel mine on display.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/POM-2_mine#/media/File:POM-2S.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0

Abkhazia Pushes Back Against Russia’s Suggestion of Incorporation

Posted on by

Map of Republic of Georgia featuring the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

“We tread a distinct path. We haven’t received any formal requests to join the Russian Federation, and I’m yet to identify any political faction within Abkhazia that envisions such a relationship dynamic with Russia.”

In an interview published on 22 August in the pro-Russian media outlet Arguments and Facts, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, suggested that for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the “idea of joining Russia is still popular[i] and it may well be implemented if there are good reasons.” Medvedev’s commentwas not well received by Abkhazian officials, regardless of whether it was an off-the-cuff remark or a more calculated statement. As per the excerpted article on pro-Abkhaz media source Abkhaz World, the Secretary of the Security Council of Abkhazia, Sergey Shamba, responded to Medvedev’s statement by declaring that he was unaware of any political parties or groups that preferred incorporation into Russia, insisting that Abkhazia “tread” its own path. Shamba also noted that Abkhazia “is keen on fostering close and allied relations with Russia,” but that the tiny republic remains committed to independence. A statement from the Foreign Ministry of Abkhazia published in a second excerpted article from Abkhaz World declared that “The millennia-old statehood of Abkhazia is not a subject for debate.”[ii] The same article also included comments by other Abkhaz officials, including Aslan Kabakhia, who declared that it was “very unpleasant to hear of talks of a potential change in Abkhazia’s status from the very individual who [previously] endorsed our independence,” and another official, Akhra Bzhaniya, who noted that “our sovereignty is not a toy.” Abkhazia remains defiant regarding independence, suggesting that a miscalculation by Russian or other regional leaders could reignite conflict in the breakaway republic. For example, some Ukrainian officials continue to call on Georgia to open a second front in the Caucasus by militarily invading Abkhazia, assuming Russia will be forced to divert military forces in defense of Abkhazia.

Sources:

“Abkhazia: Seeking Alliance but Standing Apart from Russian Federation,” Abkhaz World (pro-Abkhaz media outlet based in London and Istanbul), 24 August 2023. https://abkhazworld.com/aw/current-affairs/2484-abkhazia-seeking-alliance-but-standing-apart-from-russian-federation

The Secretary of the Security Council of Abkhazia, Sergey Shamba, emphasised that while Abkhazia is in favour of forming an alliance with Russia, the nation is open to various forms of bilateral relations.

Abkhazia is keen on fostering close and allied relations with Russia. However, Sergey Shamba highlighted that there currently aren’t any political entities within the republic expressing a desire to become part of the Russian Federation.

Shamba’s remarks were in response to the statements made by Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Head of the Russian Federation’s Security Council. In a previous article on the http://aif.ru website, Medvedev pointed out that both Abkhazia and South Ossetia still harbour sentiments of aligning with Russia, suggesting that this aspiration “might very well materialize given compelling reasons.”

Medvedev further elaborated, “South Ossetia has, on multiple occasions, held referendums on the prospect of joining Russia. This aligns naturally with the trajectory of uniting North and South Ossetia — a single people. I believe this resonates with Dmitry Medvedev’s statements. I’m optimistic that in due course, the right conditions will emerge, culminating in the unification of the North and South.”

Shamba, speaking of Abkhazia, added, “We tread a distinct path. We haven’t received any formal requests to join the Russian Federation, and I’m yet to identify any political faction within Abkhazia that envisions such a relationship dynamic with Russia.” He reiterated that while Abkhazia is eager to bolster allied relations with Russia, they remain flexible in exploring different relational frameworks.

“Невыученные уроки. Дмитрий Медведев проанализировал события 2008 года (Unlearned lessons. Dmitry Medvedev analyzed the events of 2008),” Arguments and Facts (pro-Moscow media outlet) 23 August 2023. https://aif.ru/politics/world/nevyuchennye_uroki_dmitriy_medvedev_proanaliziroval_sobytiya_2008_goda

At one time, Saakashvili became the first US proxy leader in the Caucasus with a single mission – to incite the hatred of the inhabitants of Georgia towards Russia, shake its position in the Transcaucasus, overshadow the centuries-old friendship of the two peoples. This strange creature brought the war closer with all its might. She pretended to be an “Old Testament shepherd David” – and at the same time did everything so that the Georgians would forget their common history, break ties with Russia, hate their closest neighbors – Russians, Ossetians, Abkhazians – and wish them death. The latest performances of Russophobes in Georgia show that this public is still counting on revenge. Although he constantly runs into rebuff from his fellow citizens, who do not intend to elevate hatred of Russia to the rank of a national idea and are quite warm towards our citizens. This is also obvious: the majority of Georgians are much more comfortable living with our state in peace. Russia is nearby, America is overseas. For Georgia, a country of the richest culture, connected with Russia by thousands of threads, Russophobia is nonsense, ugliness, a serious illness. Luckily, it’s completely curable.

We do not need a repetition of history-2008. We remain ready to tackle problems at the negotiating table in the spirit of the UN Charter. But if our concern has real outlines, we will not hesitate. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the idea of joining Russia is still popular. And it may well be implemented if there are good reasons for that.

“Abkhazia’s Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Medvedev’s Remarks,” Abkhaz World, 24 August 2023. https://abkhazworld.com/aw/current-affairs/2486-abkhazia-s-foreign-ministry-issues-statement-on-medvedev-s-remarks

“In today’s environment, the international security system is under significant strain. We note a substantial escalation in tensions between the Russian Federation and the collective West. Many statements made in the media are viewed as outcomes of the intensifying geopolitical contest.

The millennia-old statehood of Abkhazia is not a subject for debate. Our legislation provides clear insight into this. The Republic of Abkhazia stands as a steadfast ally of the Russian Federation.

Our relations are governed by an extensive legal framework, comprising over 200 agreements. In the Republic of Abkhazia, repeated statements by senior Russian officials regarding the impossibility of revising the fundamental principles of bilateral relations are highly valued.The irrevocable path towards development as a sovereign, independent legal state has been chosen by the people and is protected by the paramount law – the Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia.”

Notes:

[ii] The statement by Medvedev set off a firestorm of media responses, but to put it in perspective, his comment was said at the end of a very lengthy diatribe in which he insulted, criticized, and lambasted the U.S. and the West in general, declaring western influence and intrigue as the roots of all problems Russia faces in Georgia and Ukraine. Despite the context Ukraine Pravda and Reuters for example led with the headline that Russia might “annex” Abkhazia and South Ossetia although that is not the word that Medvedev used.  see: “Russia May Annex Georgian Breakaway Regions-Medvedev,” Reuters, 22 August 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-may-annex-georgian-breakaway-regions-medvedev-2023-08-22/

Image Information:

Image: Map of Republic of Georgia featuring the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Source: Ssolbergj, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Abkhazia_and_South_Ossetia – /media/File:Georgia,_Ossetia,_Russia_and_Abkhazia_(en).svg
Attribution: CC BY SA-3.0

Russia Announces New Combined Arms Army in Arctic To Offset NATO Expansion

Posted on by

Map of Russian Federation with the Kola Peninsula highlighted, a strategically important space for Russian defense in the Arctic.

“While Sweden and Finland were conditionally neutral countries, there was no need to keep any large forces in the region.  However, now that Finland has joined NATO, and Sweden is on this path, it is necessary to strengthen the northwestern direction.”

Russia will form a new Combined Arms Army (CAA) in the Arctic North as a response to Finland and Sweden joining NATO, according to a recently published article from the pro-government daily Izvestia. The Russian military expert featured in the article claims the Northern Fleet’s 14th Army Corps will likely be the nucleus of this new CAA, while the Arctic 200th and/or 80th brigades will likely be upsized to divisions. The new divisions will likely see the incorporation of a new Iskander missile brigade and air defense brigade to somewhat standardize the structure with other CAAs. Russian ground forces in the Baltic region facing Sweden and Finland, recently renamed the Leningrad Military District, will probably also expand to meet the new threat. The Northern Fleet Strategic Command covers the bulk of the Northern Sea route, but the Eastern Strategic Command controls the Chukotka Peninsula. There is currently a motorized rifle regiment stationed there, and plans exist to expand this to a division. Due to the distance involved, it is unlikely that the new CAA will expand to incorporate this other Russian Arctic ground force. The focus of the new CAA will be the defense of the Kola Peninsula.

Source:

Roman Kretcul and Aleksei Ramm, “Полярный округ: в составе Северного флота создадут общевойсковую армию (Arctic circle:  A new combined arms army will form as part of the Northern Fleet),” Izvestia (large pro-government Russian daily), 1 July 2023. https://iz.ru/1538203/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/poliarnyi-okrug-v-sostave-severnogo-flota-sozdadut-obshchevoiskovuiu-armiiu.

A new combined-arms army will be formed as part of the Northern Fleet.

This decision was made by the Russian Defense Ministry.  It will cover the Russian border in the north, including the border with Finland and Norway. The defense of the Kola Peninsula is a vital task for Russia since strategic missile submarines are based there.  The creation of a new army is especially important due to the entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO. The new formation will be based on the current army corps. The army will include motorized rifle brigades, regiments and divisions. Their personnel will be trained in Arctic combat.

“While Sweden and Finland were conditionally neutral countries, there was no need to keep any large forces in the region,” military historian Dmitry Boltenkov explained to Izvestia. “However, now that Finland has joined NATO, and Sweden is on this path, it is necessary to strengthen the northwestern direction.” The expert noted that the 200th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, the 80th Arctic Brigade, and the 61st Separate Marine Brigade are now stationed there. He did not rule out that the 200th and 80th brigades would be reorganized into divisions, and the 14th Army Corps, of which they are now a member, into an army. The most important thing is that with the creation of this army, powerful separate formations will also appear – a missile brigade, an air defense brigade and others. This will significantly increase the group’s capabilities in the region. According to Dmitry Boltenkov, the protection of the Kola Peninsula is vital, if only because strategic missile submarines are based there.

In recent years, Allies have shown an increased interest in the Arctic region. Norway hosts large-scale exercises of the Cold Response Alliance every two years. In the spring of 2022, over 30 thousand military personnel, more than 200 aircraft and 50 ships took part in them. The Russian Armed Forces regularly conduct exercises in polar latitudes. In particular, the annual maneuvers “Umka”, during which both personnel training and polar research are performed. On July 1, the press service of the Northern Fleet reported that the Arctic grouping, which includes warships of the Kola flotilla, will conduct a traditional Arctic campaign with a set of tactical exercises on the continental coast, islands and in the waters of the seas of the Arctic Ocean.

Image Information:

Image: Map of Russian Federation with the Kola Peninsula highlighted, a strategically important space for Russian defense in the Arctic.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Murmansk_in_Russia.svg
Attribution: CCA-Share Alike 3.0