Category Archives: Russia

Articles whose main focus is topics pertaining to Russia.

Anticipating Russian Collapse, Chechen Diaspora Groups Jockey for Position

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“These congresses became a kind of political duel between the two leaders of the Diaspora: some participants in the events spoke openly about the division of the Ichkerians into opposing camps.”

Russia’s so-called “special military operation (SMO)” in Ukraine has breathed life into the Chechen diaspora hungry for Russian defeat and the chance to liberate Chechnya. However, the excerpted article from the Caucasus news service Kavkaz Realii describes how two separate Chechen diaspora groups have become bitter enemies as they seek to capitalize on what many Chechens believe is their best chance to reclaim their ancestral homeland.[i] At the core of the contention are two summits that members of the Chechen diaspora held to discuss their future: one in Antwerp and another outside of Paris. The Antwerp summit, held in November 2022, was headed by former minister and commander Akhmed Zakaev, who has taken a leadership role within the Chechen diaspora since he left Chechnya in 2000 after being wounded in battle. He has many followers and has held the title of prime minister of the “Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in exile” for more than a decade. However, many Chechens do not consider Zakaev or his government in exile to be the legitimate heirs to a future independent Chechnya. For its part, the summit outside of Paris, which occurred a day before Zakaev’s summit in Antwerp, was organized by the Tolam movement. This was arranged under the direction of Jambulat Suleymanov and Anzor Maskhadov, the latter the son of former Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. Since the summit occurred, Tolam has morphed into United Force.[ii]

In addition to Zakaev’s government in exile and the United Force, there are at least two other organizations—the Presidium of the Chechen Republic and Chechen Democrats—vying for a leadership role in the independence effort. In a bid to strengthen their respective positions, both the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in exile and the United Force have military presences in Ukraine, fighting against Russia. The second excerpted article from Paris-based Intelligence Online describes the Chechen political movement’s connections to military units in Ukraine. For his part, Zakaev and his government in exile founded the Separate Special Purpose Battalion (OBON), which is attached to the Ukraine Foreign Legion. Underscoring the importance that he places on Ukraine, Zakaev has also placed his appointed defense minister, Magomed Dikiev, in Kyiv. Zakaev’s OBON will join two notable Chechen units already fighting within the Ukraine Foreign Legion: the Sheikh Mansur Battalion, believed to have several hundred men, and the smaller Djokhar Dudayev Battalion. However, as the article notes, the battalions are close to Suleymanov’s United Force faction and therefore do not recognize Zakaev’s authority. Notably, neither article mentions more radical Chechen movements operating out of Turkey, which are also vying to lead a would-be independent Chechen Republic. If an independent or autonomous Chechnya could emerge, the infighting between these groups described above, which fractured the Chechen independent movement during earlier wars with Russia, is likely to again hamper the movement.

Sources:

“Раздор в чеченской диаспоре? В Европе прошли съезды противоборствующих сторонников Ичкерии (Discord in the Chechen diaspora? Congresses of opposing supporters of Ichkeria were held in Europe),” Kavkaz Realii (U.S. government supported but independent news service focused on the Caucasus), 29 November 2022. https://www.kavkazr.com/a/razdory-v-chechenskoy-diaspore-v-evrope-proshli-sezdy-protivoborstvuyuschih-storonnikov-ichkerii-/32152173.html

According to the chairman of the congress Suleymanov, the purpose of the event was the formation of a new social movement. The presidium was attended by veterans of the Chechen political movement: social activist Makhmud Bibulatov, Chechen activist Yaragi Sulumov living in Germany, as well as new figures in the person of the head of the Chechen opposition movement 1ADAT Ibragim Yangulbaev, Saikhan Muzaev (mentioned in the media as a refugee in Georgia and a friend of the one killed in Berlin in 2019, former Ichkerian field commander Zelimkhan Khangoshvili) and others.

…Speaking on behalf of the Chechen diaspora, Maskhadov and the Yangulbaev brothers (the youngest of them, Baysangur, who was recently included in the list of extremists in the Russian Federation, was also here) called for intensifying political activity and confronting certain forces that, in their opinion, lead to disunity among supporters independent Ichkeria. No one has been able to pinpoint what these powers are.

An unnamed representative of the Dzhokhar Dudayev battalion, who is fighting on the side of Ukraine, expressed support for Suleymanov. On his personal Facebook page, Bogdan Chechensky, a representative of the Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion also expressed support for the leader of “Tolam”.

Suleimanov himself spoke sharply about the so-called government abroad, headed by Akhmed Zakayev, and accused the latter of “a trail of adventures and state crimes.” He did not go into details.

…Khusein Dzhambetov, a member of the [Zakaev’s] Separate Special Purpose Battalion participating in the war on the side of Ukraine, and his deputy Hadji-Murat Zumso said that their military units will become the base of the army of Ichkeria in the future.

“Divided Chechen diaspora redoubles efforts to woo Kyiv,” Intelligence Online (Paris-based subscription news outlet), 28 November 2022. https://www.intelligenceonline.com/government-intelligence/2022/11/28/divided-chechen-diaspora-redoubles-efforts-to-woo-kyiv,109868303-eve

Both groups are striving for the same goal: to free Chechnya from what they consider to be its illegal occupation by Ramzan Kadyrov’s pro-Russian regime, an aim shared by other opposition groups and some members of the Ukrainian government. On other matters, however, the two factions are deeply divided, which is why they are holding separate events.

In June, Zakayev, who has appointed himself prime minister in exile, brokered an agreement that was signed by a Ukrainian deputy defence minister, to create a special battalion of Chechen fighters, OBON, within the regular Ukrainian army under contract. OBON currently has around 20 members. The new unit joins other Chechen troops, which have been in Ukraine since 2014: the Sheikh Mansur Battalion, which has several hundred men in rotation, and the smaller Djokhar- Dudayev Battalion. Both battalions are close to the Suleymanov faction and do not recognise Zakayev’s authority.

Zakayev has been active in Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian invasion. As early as February, he made public appeals from London to President Volodymyr Zelensky, encouraging the head of state to create a clear framework for foreign volunteers to become legally involved in the fighting. He regularly visits Kyiv, where he has placed his defence “minister”, Magomed Dikiev, in a permanent diplomatic role.

Notes:

[i] The inability of the Chechens to unite is complicated and has to do with many factors including culture, the importance of family clan, and the national myth, which values every male as a warrior. In an interview for a documentary film, former Chechen warlord and field commander Salman Raduev said, “We are a nation of one million people, we are a nation of one million generals… every Chechen is a general.” Although intended as hyperbole, Raduev’s comment speaks volumes about the Chechens’ inability to fight or govern together. See; Immortal Fortress: Inside Chechnya’s Warrior Culture,” Combat Films and Research for PBS, 1999. https://vimeo.com/ondemand/immortalfortress

[ii] Both movements draw their followers from about 200,000 Chechens who emigrated to Europe during the first and second Russian-Chechen wars between 1994 and 2009.

Russia Compares Ukraine Conflict to WWII

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Soviet Victory Parade, Red Square, Moscow, June 1945.

Soviet Victory Parade, Red Square, Moscow, June 1945.

“Comparing the special operation in Ukraine with the Great Patriotic War is unreasonable.”

The Soviet victory in World War II (WWII), which it calls “The Great Patriotic War,”  is the central to the Kremlin’s current ideology, which recasts it to justify the so-called special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine.[i] According to Kremlin propaganda, just as the USSR fought against the evils of Nazi Germany, so too today, Russian soldiers are defending their country from a Ukrainian “Nazi” threat. By framing this conflict as a fight against Nazism, the Kremlin has been able to tap into narratives of pain, fear, and sacrifice experienced by the Russian people during WWII. However, the accompanying excerpt from the semi-independent Russian news source Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye argues that viewing the SMO in Ukraine through a WWII lens presents its own set of challenges.   

The author asserts that “comparing the special operation in Ukraine with the Great Patriotic War is unreasonable,” proceeding then to remind readers of basic facts surrounding WWII and how they differ from those surrounding the SMO in Ukraine. For instance, in June 1941 “the Red Army had a very significant (several times) quantitative superiority in military equipment over the Wehrmacht.” This was not the case in February 2022, when the Russian military “did not have any quantitative superiority over the Armed Forces and other military formations of Ukraine.” Comparing casualties during the two conflicts, the author points out that so far, Russian total losses in Ukraine are small, noting that “during the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army lost the same number of servicemen on average in one day!”

Responding to those who assert that there can be no negotiations with the current Ukrainian leadership, the author reminds readers that in the summer and autumn of 1941, the USSR tried to reach a negotiated settlement with Nazi Germany. To those who claim that the USSR was the sole victor in WWII, the author reviews the critical role which the Western lend-lease program played in the Allied victory. The author makes other cogent comparisons, suggesting that to measure progress in the SMO thought a warped WWII lens will only “multiply losses and delay victory.”[ii] It is noteworthy that this sober assessment of the SMO was published given Russian press restrictions and the pervasiveness of pro-Kremlin propaganda.

Source:

Alexander Khramchikhin, “Уязвленный патриотизм порождает истерику (Wounded patriotism breeds hysteria),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye (semi-independent Russian news source), 1 December 2022. https://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2022-12-01/4_1216_patriotism.html

Comparing the special operation in Ukraine with the Great Patriotic War is unreasonable. A large part of Russian society is experiencing difficult feelings about the course of the military campaign in Ukraine. Many do not understand why we have not yet won,and sometimes retreating – moreover, from the territories included in the Russian Federation.

Such a reaction to the Ukrainian events is quite understandable in itself, but not should not incite hysteria. Expressing dissatisfaction with what is happening, outside observers cite the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War as a positive example for today’s Russia….

As of June 22, 1941, on the Soviet-German border, the Red Army had a very significant (several times) quantitative superiority in military equipment over the Wehrmacht…. As of February 24, 2022, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the Russian-Ukrainian border did not have any quantitative superiority over the Armed Forces and other military formations of Ukraine. And the qualitative superiority of the Russian side was and remains not so fundamental as to compensate for the quantitative superiority of the enemy.

At the same time, however, hostilities are taking place exclusively on the territory of Ukraine (meaning the territory at the beginning of the current campaign). Ukrainian strikes on the territory of the Russian Federation (taken at the same time) are of microscopic proportions. Irretrievable losses of the RF Armed Forces over the entire period of hostilities are small. During the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army lost the same number of servicemen on average in one day!

Regular statements by some Russian officials about “creating a favorable background” for negotiations with “respected Western partners” produce a painful impression on the Russian population, to put it mildly.… But in the summer and autumn of 1941, at the direction of Stalin and Beria, Soviet representatives… tried to transfer to Berlin proposals for a virtually complete repetition of the Brest Peace. That is, about the surrender to the Germans of the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and maybe also Karelia. …If the Anglo-Saxons had not fought against Hitler (for whom almost all of continental Europe worked), and if Lend-Lease had been supplied not to the Soviet Union, but to Germany, we would have had a very bad time.

…But criticism is different. It is absolutely unacceptable to question the legitimacy of the actions of the army, to talk about its non-existent losses and, moreover, about non-existent crimes. But to ignore failures in various types of support and obvious mistakes in the preparation of the campaign as a whole means to multiply losses and delay victory.

Notes:

[i] For additional background on the Kremlin’s attempt to create a new state ideology, see: Ray Finch, “Russian Culture Ministry Proposes Possible Framework for New State Ideology,” OE Watch, Issue #5 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/417836

[ii] The author, Alexander Khramchikhin, was one of the few Russian military analysts who warned against an invasion of Ukraine, arguing that such an attack could have catastrophic consequences for Russia. See: Alexander Khramchikhin, “Полураспад Украины (Half-life of Ukraine),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye, 11 March 2021. https://nvo.ng.ru/gpolit/2021-03-11/8_1132_ukraine.html

Image Information:

Image: Soviet Victory Parade, Red Square, Moscow, June 1945|
Source: https://tinyurl.com/bdnrfsex
Attribution: Russian Ministry of Defense (Mil.ru) CCA 4.0 Intl

Russia Taking Steps To Improve Mobilization Capabilities

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“Currently, in the military enlistment offices, the personal files of those liable for military service are stored exclusively in paper form, and each military enlistment office creates databases of citizens to be mobilized independently without any centralization.”

In September 2022, Russia began mobilizing 300,000 soldiers for its so-called special military operation in Ukraine—its first mobilization since World War II—exposing weaknesses in its infrastructure to track, prepare, and equip personnel for military service had deteriorated. As the two accompanying excerpts indicate, the Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) have recently enacted changes that they believe will improve the mobilization process.

The first excerpt from Russian pro-business news outlet Kommersant describes how President Vladimir Putin instructed the Ministry of Digital Development to create “a centralized database by 1 April 2024, which will contain information about all Russians liable for military service.” Currently, the article says military enlistment offices store the “personal files of those liable for military service…exclusively in paper form, and each military enlistment office forms databases of citizens to be mobilized independently without any centralization.” During the partial mobilization, this antiquated system resulted in considerable confusion, where draft notices were sent to “wheelchair users, IT specialists who received a deferment, those unfit for health reasons, and fathers of many children.” The plan now is to develop a centralized, digital database, which includes pertinent personal information “about all Russians liable for military service.”[i] The article concludes by asserting that creating this digitized “mobilization resource of 25 million people in Russia” will be a “colossal” undertaking.

There have also been problems providing newly mobilized soldiers with the required personal military kit (uniforms, boots, protective gear, etc.). The second excerpt from the pro-Kremlin news organization RIA Novosti describes the recent decision to appoint the “Kalashnikov Concern…the coordinator of the supply of combat equipment (bulletproof vests, helmets and other items of equipment) to the Russian army.” According to the article, this decision was based on the “unprecedented challenges [faced by the MoD] associated with a special military operation and providing all necessary supplies for the mobilized.”

Sources:

Nikita Korolev, “Айтикоматы: Воинскому учету указана цифровизация (ITcomats: Military registration ordered to digitalize),” Kommersant (Russian pro-business site), 25 November 2022.  https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5692024

Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the Ministry of Digital Development to create a centralized database by April 1, 2024, which will contain information about all Russians liable for military service. The Ministry of Digital Transformation will have to create an IT system that will include sets of all kinds of data about the life of citizens liable for military service: from their level of education and place of residence to current mobile phone numbers, email addresses and information about the available transport. 

The coordinator of the new information system, follows from the document, will be the Ministry of Defense…. After the start of partial mobilization in Russia on September 21, 2022, the media and human rights organizations reported numerous mistakes that the military commissariats made when sending out subpoenas and instructions. For example, summons were received by wheelchair users, IT specialists who received a deferment, unfit for health reasons, fathers of many children, etc….

…Currently, in the military enlistment offices, the personal files of those liable for military service are stored exclusively in paper form, and each military enlistment office creates databases of citizens to be mobilized independently without any centralization, says the interlocutor of Kommersant, who is engaged in the digitalization of one of the law enforcement agencies.

…Taking into account the fact that, according to the official statements of the Ministry of Defense, the mobilization resource of Russia is 25 million people and their data will need to be digitized in a month, “the work ahead is simply colossal,” a top manager of a Russian IT company engaged in developments in the field of artificial intelligence told Kommersant.

“Калашников назначили руководить поставками экипировки, сообщил источник (Kalashnikov was appointed to lead the supply of equipment, the source said),” RIA Novosti (pro-Kremlin news outlet), 13 November 2022. https://ria.ru/20221113/ekipirovka-1831120404.html

The Kalashnikov Concern has been appointed the main enterprise – the coordinator of the supply of combat equipment (bulletproof vests, helmets and other items of equipment) to the Russian army, this measure is needed, among other things, to provide the necessary equipment for the mass replenishment of the Russian Armed Forces – more than 300 thousand mobilized, an informed source told RIA Novosti….

…The interlocutor of the agency explained that this decision was made to unconditionally provide the Ministry of Defense with combat equipment in a situation where the military-industrial complex and the entire system of state defense orders are facing “unprecedented challenges associated with a special military operation and providing all the necessary mobilized.”

Notes:

[i] The plan to digitize data within the Military Commissariats has been discussed for quite some time. For more information see Ray Finch, “Russia Digitizing the Military Commissariat,” OE Watch, October 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/397925

Russia Justifies Bringing Back T-62 Tank

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T-62M Tank.

T-62M Tank.

T-62M Tank.

T-62M Tank.

“…there is little doubt that the SMO could become a prelude to a more serious armed conflict with countries that have more advanced militaries. And that is why more modern and advanced vehicles should be reserved for this hypothetical war, since the modernized T-62 is more than enough for the current stage of the SMO.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the official logistics publication of the Russian Ministry of Defense, MTO Journal, discusses Russian reasoning for bringing the T-62 tank back into service for use in Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. The T-62 [R1] was retired from active service in the Russian Armed Forces after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War because it was seen as outdated and obsolete compared to newer tanks. In considering the T-62’s reintroduction, the author argues that the move is not due to recent massive tank losses, or the impact of international sanctions on the ability of UralVagonZavod, Russia’s tank manufacturer, to produce modern tanks such as the T-72B3[R2] , T-80BVM[R3] , and T-90M[R4] . Instead, he says that it is because in 2021, even before the start of its conflict in Ukraine, Russia had already established a new refurbishment program for the T-62[R5] . Furthermore, the author posits that more modern tanks should be conserved in the event of “a more serious armed conflict with countries that have more advanced militaries.” T-62 Russian Medium Tank

Source:

Boris Dzherelievsky, “Т-62: ветеран снова в строю (T-62: The Veteran Returns to the Ranks),”

MTO Journal (official logistics publication of the Russian Ministry of Defense), January 2023.  https://mto.ric.mil.ru/upload/site193/3jW5JVFpXH.pdf

The launch of UralVagonZavod’s large-scale modernization program of the Soviet-era T-62 main battle tank has been the cause of interpretations by both potential and real opponents. Almost all of these interpretations stem from the fact that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, due to “huge losses of armored vehicles” in the SMO (special military operation), can only produce old vehicles, since the production of modern models has stopped due to sanctions. In fact, the production of the T-72B3M, T-80BVM, T-90M MBTs (main battle tanks) did not stop. And, by the way, the losses of our tanks in the SMO in comparison with other campaigns is not so great. In addition, the modernization program for the T-62 MBT was launched long before the SMO and is more likely associated with military operations in the Middle East, as well as with certain export plans…

It should be noted that the statements about the “complete obsolescence” of this tank are nothing more than a myth. The T-62 is the same age as the American M-60, which is still in service with Israel, Turkey, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Spain and many other countries, while surpassing it in most parameters. It is quite possible to compare it with the German Leopard MBT (adopted for service 4 years later than the T-62), the supply of which from Germany, Spain and Greece is being sought by the Kyiv regime. It is worth noting that our vehicle also surpasses this tank in a number of parameters, for example, in terms of gun power. The T-62 can hit the frontal armor of the “Leopard” from a distance of 3 km, while the German tank still needs to close to a distance of 1.5-2 km in order to break through the armor of the “62”…

The modernization program, launched by Uralvagonzavod in 2021, includes equipping the tank with a multispectral gyro-stabilized electro-optical system, an electromechanical mast and a new thermal imaging sight with a 1PN-96MT-02 laser rangefinder. The new thermal imager allows the tank gunner to detect targets at a distance of up to 3,000 meters. The dynamic protection “Kontakt-1” and lattice screens are installed on the sides of the vehicle.  According to experts, the first modernized T-62M[R1] s sent to the SMO zone were supposed to only be used in the second echelon, as well as to protect stationary objects or in “self-propelled gun mode” to support the advancing infantry, so they are not intended to be “dueling” with more modern MBTs with 125 mm guns. However, at the moment, most (Ukrainian) T-64[R2] s and T-72[R3] s have been knocked out, and the enemy is happy to use T-55[R4] s received from the countries of Eastern Europe, or even various infantry fighting vehicles including the old American M113[R5]  armored personnel carrier. It is clear that in such a situation, the modernized “62” can become a real king of the battlefield.  To this we can add that it is much easier to train reservists called up for partial mobilization on these vehicles, especially since many of the reservists served on them while they were in military service. Finally, there is little doubt that the SMO could become a prelude to a more serious armed conflict with countries that have more advanced militaries. And that is why more modern and advanced vehicles should be reserved for this hypothetical war, since the modernized T-62 is more than enough for the current stage of the SMO.

Image Information:

Image 1: T-62M Tank
Source: https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/T-62M-in-Kubinka-Tank-Museum/i-pr9rCnS/0/a00d74a4/X2/T-62M-Kubinka-04-X2.jpg  
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Image 2: T-62M Tank
Source: https://photos.smugmug.com/photos/i-6jZc4FQ/0/X3/i-6jZc4FQ-X3.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Russian-Led Military Alliance in Central Asia Weakening Amid Quagmire in Ukraine

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Main Cathedral CSTO Summit 02.

Main Cathedral CSTO Summit 02.

“In particular, it directly hits the unity within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), as a result of which the Indestructible Brotherhood exercises in Kyrgyzstan were canceled…”

The excerpted article from the Moscow-based, Russian-language newspaper Kommersant discusses deepening fissures within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) military alliance in Central Asia. First, the ongoing border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan resulted in Kyrgyzstan withdrawing from the CSTO’s upcoming exercises in Tajikistan, which have a collective defense scenario.[i] Moreover, according to the article, Kyrgyzstan postponed the exercises that are scheduled to take place in Kyrgyzstan next year, arguing that not taking part is within its rights as a CSTO member-state. However, the article notes that Russia appreciated that Kyrgyzstan requested that Russia mediate its conflict with Tajikistan because it preserved Russia’s central role in the CSTO and Central Asian affairs generally. The article emphasizes how this role is especially important for Russia because the war in Ukraine has placed it in a difficult situation geopolitically and the CSTO remains Russia’s Central Asian security linchpin considering growing competition in the region over the past two decades from the United States, Turkey, and China.[ii]

Finally, the article asserts that countries like Tajikistan can now take advantage of Russia’s vulnerable position resulting from the war in Ukraine. For example, in a recent speech at the Russia-Central Asia Summit, Tajikistani President Emomali Rahmon placed subtle demands on Russia to support Tajikistan. Tajikistan could, like Kyrgyzstan, decrease engagement with the CSTO and seek closer ties with China or other countries.

Source:

“Киргизия и Таджикистан громко ссорятся (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Fight Loudly),” kommersant.ru (Moscow-based Russian-language daily focusing on business and politics), 17 October 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5619937

The conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which developed for many years, but previously concerned only the residents of the border regions of the two countries, became an important factor for the entire post-Soviet space. In particular, it directly effects the unity in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which resulted in the Indestructible Brotherhood exercises in Kyrgyzstan being canceled, and the Frontier-2022 maneuvers that began today in Tajikistan taking place without the Kyrgyz military. In this context, the statement of the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon that Moscow allegedly does not respect its partners in the region sounded as strong as possible.

The Kyrgyz side formally stated that it would not participate in the [exercises], which is completely within its rights. As for the exercises that were supposed to take place in Kyrgyzstan, it was requested in Bishkek for them to be postponed to the next year…. Moscow liked that Bishkek was ready to see it as a mediator in resolving the conflict, while Dushanbe strongly demanded on a bilateral format.

According to a Kyrgyz source of Kommersant, the President of Tajikistan made a somewhat harsh speech at the “Russia-Central Asia Summit….” He recalled that the Russian language is being studied in the republic “from kindergarten” and a Russian military base is located there.

Notes:

[i] Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have had several intermittent clashes related to each country’s territorial exclaves within the other’s borders, creating competition regarding issues such as boundary demarcation and water and electricity use. Although these clashes often begin with local villagers using improvised weapons, in recent years the national armies have become involved, raising the risk that one of these localized clashes will eventually spiral into a national-level conflict. For more, see Matthew Stein, “Resolution to Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Problems?,” OE Watch, Issue 3, March 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/353586

[ii] Turkey’s assistance to Azerbaijan during its 2020 military victory against Armenia over disputed territories in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as its military performance in Syria and Libya in the years prior, has resulted in Central Asian states, such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, seeking Turkish support for their military modernization programs, especially related to unmanned aerial vehicles.


Image Information:

Image: Main Cathedral CSTO Summit 02.
Source: Mil.ru
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Main_Cathedral_CSTO_Summit_02.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Rationales for Russia’s Return to the Black Sea Grain Deal

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The four participants to the negotiations in Istanbul of the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Russia, Ukraine,Turkey and the United Nations, July 2022.

The four participants to the negotiations in Istanbul of the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Russia, Ukraine,Turkey and the United Nations, July 2022.

“Russia’s goal is to wrest more concessions… Russia wants to increase the volume of grains and fertilizers it’s exporting through the corridor at Ukraine’s expense.”

Russian resumption of its participation in the Black Sea Grain Agreement, following Turkey’s facilitation and mediation, helped to alleviate some concerns of a global food crisis.[i]  However, it was not clear what benefits Russia received for returning to the deal. The accompanying passages by Turkish experts offer some such rationales.

In the first accompanying passage from the regionally focused independent news site al Monitor, journalist Amberin Zaman writes that Russia wants to export more grain and fertilizer through the Black Sea corridor at Ukraine’s expense. Zaman also writes that Russia wants to resume ammonia exports via Ukraine. She notes that following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Kiev shut down a pipeline carrying Russian ammonia—a key ingredient in the production of nitrate fertilizers—to the Black Sea port of Odessa..

In the second accompanying passage from the Turkish independent news platform Dördüncü Boyut via YouTube, Turkish foreign affairs commentatorFehim Tastekin claims that Russia likely received some written guarantees that the grain corridor would not be used for military purposes.[ii] He notes Russia’s claim that the explosives used to destroy the Kerch Bridge had been brought from Odessa on a ship using that grain corridor. As such, he claims that Russia’s main benefit would be to spotlight this attack approach. He also claimed that Russia returned to the deal to avoid the perception that it was the cause of a global food and hunger crisis. Both of these views would support Russian narratives as part of their information operations.

Sources:

Amberin Zaman, “Turkey seeks to coax Russia back into Ukraine grain deal,” al-Monitor (independent news platform with local reporting from the Middle East), 1 November 2022. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/11/turkey-seeks-coax-russia-back-ukraine-grain-deal#ixzz7k8s1EXZp

Analysts say Russia’s goal is to wrest more concessions. “They want better terms for themselves via Turkey,” said Yevgeniya Gaber, a former Ukrainian diplomat… Gaber believes that Russia wants to increase the volume of grains and fertilizers it’s exporting through the corridor at Ukraine’s expense.

Russia also wants a resumption of ammonia exports via Ukraine. A pipeline carrying Russian ammonia, a key ingredient in the production of nitrate fertilizers, to the Black Sea port of Odessa ceased to function following Russia’s February 24 invasion of Ukraine. The United Nations has been pressing the sides to reach an agreement.

Russia likely also wants Ukraine to halt its offensive to retake Kherson, a critical port city in the country’s south, a demand that Ukraine will almost certainly spurn as it seeks to consolidate its recent battlefield gains.

Fehim Tastekin, “Arap Birliği’nin Türkiye’yi kınama iddiası ne anlama geliyor? (What does the Arab Union’s condemnation of Turkey mean?),” Dördüncü Boyut via YouTube (independent Turkish news and analysis platform on YouTube), 2 November 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ruZyRUhjuE8&t=510s

Russia likely received some written guarantees that the grain corridor would not be used for military purposes.  An important detail that has been missed in the Turkish media is Russia’s claim that the explosives used to destroy the Kerch Bridge had been brought from Odessa on a ship using the grain corridor.  So the most important concession that Russia received is likely a halting of attacks on its ships in the Black Sea, to move the conflict inland.   Russia also wants to avoid the perception that it is the cause of a global food and hunger crisis. 

Notes:

[i] For a background on Turkey’s control over access to the Black Sea and the Montreux Treaty, see: Karen Kaya, “Turkey Views Treaty as Important to Limiting U.S. Naval Activity in Black Sea,” OE Watch, May 2021.

[ii] This video was later unavailable as Turkey suspended YouTube on 13 November 2022.

Image Information:

Image: The four participants to the negotiations in Istanbul of the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Russia, Ukraine,Turkey and the United Nations, July 2022.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:IMO_welcomes_maritime_humanitarian_corridor_in_Black_Sea_(52233881214).jpg
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Russia Further Bolstering Iran Relations Following Ukraine Invasion

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Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.

Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.

“The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation also stressed that ‘Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order.’”

A major tenet of the Kremlin’s current ideology revolves around transforming what it perceives as a U.S.-led global security sphere into a multipolar world order where Russia occupies one of the key poles. The Kremlin promotes this ideology globally, especially to countries that have had a troubled relationship with the United States, and Russia has increased these efforts since its invasion of Ukraine began. The accompanying excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant describes the recent visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to Tehran on 9 November, where he claimed, “Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order.” During Patrushev’s visit, the two sides “discussed all aspects of bilateral cooperation, from the economy to security,” in light of improving bilateral relations over the past decade.[i] The author suggests that the two countries traded notes regarding “the survival of the economy under sanctions, cybersecurity, terrorism, as well as the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of Russia and Iran.” The latter point was emphasized by Patrushev, who “noted the key role that Western intelligence services have played in organizing mass riots in Iran and the subsequent dissemination of disinformation about the situation in the country.”

Since the Kremlin officially denies receiving military assistance from Iran, the article carefully cites foreign reports on “the supply of Iranian drones to Russia for use in hostilities in Ukraine.” For the Kremlin and the wider Russian audience, admitting the need for Iranian military technology would be regarded as humiliating. Not that long ago, it was Iran who requested Russian military assistance, and now the tables have turned.[ii] The article concludes by asserting that increased Western pressure on Iran will likely result in “closer cooperation between Russia and Iran.”

Source:

Marianna Belenkaya, “Совбезы РФ и Ирана поговорили на одном языке (Security Councils of Russia and Iran spoke the same language),” Kommersant (pro-business news outlet), 9 November 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/amp/5653639

Russia and Iran held interdepartmental consultations on security issues in Tehran on Wednesday (9 Nov). The Russian delegation was led by Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Patrushev. In the Iranian capital, he was received by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. According to official reports, the meeting discussed various issues of Russian-Iranian cooperation in the field of security, as well as a number of international problems….

The two countries have accumulated a lot of common themes, or rather, common problems. Among them are the survival of the economy under sanctions, cybersecurity, terrorism, as well as the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of Russia and Iran.

Iranian politicians do not need to explain anything to their Russian colleagues. They understand everything themselves, moreover, they speak the same language. Thus, at a meeting with an Iranian colleague, Nikolai Patrushev noted “the key role of Western intelligence services in organizing mass riots in Iran and the subsequent dissemination of disinformation about the situation in the country based on the Persian-language Western media controlled by them.” …The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation also stressed that “Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order” and this “is confirmed by the unprecedented pressure on our countries from Washington and its satellites.”

…From the very beginning of hostilities in Ukraine, Tehran stated that they understood Russian security concerns and believed that the conflict between Moscow and Kyiv was provoked by NATO… The atmosphere in Iranian-Ukrainian relations escalated after the media reported on the supply of Iranian drones to Russia for use in hostilities in Ukraine….

… Against this background, experts believe that the stronger the pressure of the West on Iran, including in the form of strengthening the sanctions regime, and the more elusive the chance to restore the “nuclear deal” becomes, the closer cooperation between Russia and Iran will become.

Notes:

[i] For additional background on Russian-Iran relations, see Ray Finch, “Russian Views of Iran,” Review of Persidskij bastion (Persian Bastion) in NATO Defense Review, edited by R. N. Pukhov and Yu. Yu. Lyamin, Moscow, CAST, 2019, 320pp. https://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=668

[ii] For additional background on Russian arms sales to Iran, see Ray Finch, “Russian Arms Sales to Iran,” OE Watch, July 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/365980

Image Information:

Image: Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Patrushev_NP.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Intl

Russian Military Experiencing Pay Problems

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“Social injustice in the payment of military labor can become a prerequisite for the disintegration of the army.”

The Kremlin continues to wrestle with manpower issues related to its so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine. What was envisioned as a quick operation with minimal forces has become a difficult slog requiring ever-more military personnel. The accompanying excerpt from an article in the semi-independent Nezavisimaya Gazeta highlights that after Russia’s September 2022 “partial mobilization,” which added 318,000 new soldiers, there are now questions regarding how to pay for this additional manpower, as well as growing pay disparities within the ranks of the Russian military. 

The article reminds readers that the Russian Defense Ministry reported “that the minimum amount that military personnel called up as part of partial mobilization will receive will be 195,000 rubles (USD $3,145) per month.” After calculating personnel costs for the entire military, the author asserts that now at least 30 percent of defense spending will go to manpower. Traditionally, personnel costs have hovered around 15 percent of the defense budget. The author complains that “defense of the Fatherland is a constitutional duty of a citizen of the Russian Federation,” and that therefore, “he should fulfill it without powerful material incentives.” Mere patriotic rhetoric, however, has proven inadequate in motivating Russian soldiers.

Of note, the article also discusses the pay differential among those Russians who were recently mobilized and contract soldiers already serving in the military.[i] The article cites a retired general officer who claims that some of the recently mobilized are getting paid more than the officers who are training them. He warns that “social injustice in the payment of military labor can become a prerequisite for the disintegration of the army.” Another excerpt talks about “the danger of the material stratification of military personnel,” wherein certain soldiers are getting paid more than others doing similar work merely because they were mobilized.  The article concludes by looking at some of the problems family members of mobilized soldiers have had in gaining access to their pay. In addition to causing morale problems in the Russian ranks, such high levels of manpower expenditures are likely to slow Russia’s investments in rearmament in the latter phases of the war and perhaps long after it ends.

Source:

Vladimir Mukhin, “Монетизация СВО способна привести к разложению армии (Monetization of the SVO can lead to the decomposition of the army),” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (semi-independent news source), 8 November 2022. https://www.ng.ru/armies/2022-11-08/1_8584_monetization.html

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reported that “the minimum amount that military personnel called up as part of partial mobilization will receive will be 195 thousand rubles.” A simple calculation shows that at least 62 billion rubles ($1bn) a month will be spent on paying for the military labor of 318,000 mobilized people participating in a special military operation (SMO). And if we take into account similar expenses for more than a million military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, then at least 1.5 trillion rubles will be spent on the payment of monetary allowances per year, that is, almost every third ruble planned in the expenditure side of the budget for national defense in 2023…. In any case, the conflict with Ukraine turned out to be costly for the Russian budget….

Attention is drawn to the fact that the lion’s share of the planned defense spending – at least 30% – will be directed to the material motivation of the military to serve. Russia has never foreseen such expenses in its recent history. Previously, the share of spending on military salaries in the defense budget was no more than 12-15%. But the defense of the Fatherland is a constitutional duty of a citizen of the Russian Federation, and ideally, he should fulfill it without powerful material incentives….  

…Military expert, retired lieutenant general Yuri Netkachev believes that the state has correctly taken care of the material problems of the mobilized citizens and it is good that the families of the country’s defenders will receive financial support. “But why does this process apply only to the mobilized? There is a large stratum of servicemen in the Armed Forces who also participate in the SMO. But they do not have such material incentives as those announced by the Ministry of Defense for the mobilized,” General Netkachev told NG. “Social injustice in the payment of military labor can become a prerequisite for the disintegration of the army. In all my military service, I have never seen ordinary soldiers get more than the officers who command them. Right now, mobilized servicemen are being trained by officers of training platoons and companies. They are regular military men who, as a rule, have extensive combat experience. But it turns out that these experienced warriors, who train “green soldiers” called up from the civilians, to whom the state has already pocketed 200,000 rubles, receive several times less.”

Andrey Poleshchuk, chairman of the All-Russian Trade Union of Military Personnel (OPSV), also speaks about the danger of the material stratification of military personnel. He believes that “the financial decisions of the president, taken at the suggestion of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, cannot but raise questions.” “We understand that it is necessary to materially interest the mobilized, to stimulate them to successfully solve combat missions, to reduce the intensity of passions in society,” he says. – But how to explain the situation to the officers who command these mobilized in the combat area, and they are not subject to the instructions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on additional monetary surcharges. It turns out that they, professionals, should receive less or, at best, commensurate with the monetary allowance of their subordinates.” 

…According to the representative of the Ministry of Defense Sergey Mikischenko, at the request of a soldier, his family will be able to receive monetary allowance: “The monetary allowance of a serviceman is credited to his current account, which the serviceman submitted. At the request of a serviceman, monetary allowance can be transferred to his relatives; for this, the serviceman must issue a power of attorney…. Andrey Poleshchuk draws attention to the organizational problem associated with this: “We are faced with the fact that not everyone managed to issue powers of attorney for relatives to receive funds. Now they don’t have that option. Perhaps it makes sense to consider the issue of transferring notarial powers to the commanders of military units. A similar practice existed in the USSR.” 

Notes:

[i] For additional background on pay for Russian contract soldiers, see: Ray Finch, “Increase in Pay and Benefits for Contract Soldiers,” OE Watch, September 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/323757

Russia Conducts Nuclear-Delivery Tests in the Arctic

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“Ballistic missiles were launched both from a nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea and from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk region towards the Kura range on Kamchatka.  Cruise missiles were launched toward targets in the Komi Republic from strategic bombers.”

In late October, Russia carried out a nuclear weapons exercise in the Arctic. According to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, it is the second major nuclear-delivery test of Russia’s sea-land-air Triad in 2022. The previous exercise was conducted in February, prior to the current Russian incursion into Ukraine.  President Putin oversaw the exercise, which included submarine, land, and bomber missile firings. The intended message is that Russia is a competent nuclear power in the Arctic. As the threat of the use of nuclear weapons circulates in the context of the Ukraine war, Russia’s nuclear delivery tests in the Arctic serve as a stark reminder to the world of its capabilities.

Source:

Thomas Nielsen, “Russia tested all legs of nuclear triad over the Arctic,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 26 October 2022.  https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/10/russia-tested-all-legs-nuclear-triad-over-arctic

Ballistic missiles were launched both from a nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea and from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk region towards the Kura range on Kamchatka.  Cruise missiles were launched toward targets in the Komi Republic from strategic bombers.

For the second time this year, President Vladimir Putin ordered a massive nuclear weapons exercise.  Last time was a few days before the invasion of Ukraine in late February.

The October 26 strategic drill included all three legs of Russia’s nuclear triad; submarine, land-based missiles and long-range bomber planes.

“During the event, the level of preparedness of military command and control structures, and the skills of the leadership and operation staff in the troops were checked,” the Kremlin said in a statement.

The President’s office added that all tasks were fulfilled, all missiles reached their targets.

While Putin oversaw the exercise, his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Valery Gerasimov, gave the orders to the involved strategic nuclear forces.

Russia Demands Mandatory History Lessons for College Students

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Vladimir Putin laid flowers at the monument to Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky on Red Square, 4 November 2020.

Vladimir Putin laid flowers at the monument to Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky on Red Square, 4 November 2020.

“The focus of the course on the formation of Russian patriotism is ensured by priority attention to the heroic pages of Russia’s struggle for freedom and independence against foreign invaders, for ensuring national interests and security.”

Over the past two decades, and especially since February 2022, the Kremlin leadership has used its extensive media resources to promulgate its version of Russian history. Key components of this narrative revolve around the continuity of the Russian state and how the West has always presented an existential threat. As the first excerpt from Russian government news source Rossiyskaya Gazeta points out, college students will now receive a mandatory “144 hours for the study of the history of Russia… in all universities without exception.” Students will not be permitted to review the materials on their own, but as the excerpt emphasizes, “educational institutions will have to spend 80 percent of this time on the so-called contact work, that is, not online.”

The second excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant describes one of the concepts prepared by the Russian Historical Society (RHS), which might be selected to write the curriculum. Rather than allowing individual universities to develop their own courses of instruction, the draft concept developed by the RHS urges the “unity of historical education at the country’s universities and is aimed at the formation of a common civic identity of Russian society.” Not surprisingly, this draft concept mimics the Kremlin’s view of history, where to the focus is on “the heroic pages of Russia’s struggle for freedom and independence against foreign invaders, for ensuring national interests and security.” The Kremlin’s perspective on current events is given special emphasis. For instance, describing the situation in Ukraine, “whose leadership turned it into ‘anti-Russia’ and, with the help of NATO, was preparing for the ‘return of Crimea and Donbass,’ led to the inevitability of a special military operation by Russia in 2022.” The article cites a Russian historian who refers to the official description of the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as propaganda. It also raises the “question of how modern students will relate to the words of the teacher in the presence of many sources of information.”  Nevertheless, the article concludes by stating that “RHS representatives promised that the document would undergo a wide public discussion” prior to being finalized. However, this discussion may not be very candid given the current political climate in Russia today.

Sources:

Elena Novoselova, “Во всех неисторических вузах вводится 114 часов истории России (All non-historical universities introduce 114 hours of Russian history),” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Official government source), 7 October 2022. https://rg.ru/2022/10/07/vo-vseh-neistoricheskih-vuzah-vvoditsia-114-chasov-istorii-rossii.html

It was decided to allocate 144 hours for the study of the history of Russia in non-historical specialties in all universities without exception. Educational institutions will have to spend 80 percent of this time on the so-called contact work, that is, not online.

Anna Vasilyeva, “От Руси до спецоперации (From Russia to special operation),” Kommersant (pro-business site), 10 October 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5606420

The Russian Historical Society has prepared a draft concept for a university course in the history of Russia for all students, regardless of their specialization. It covers the period from Ancient Russia to modern Russia and ends with the expansion of NATO, the entry of Russian troops into the territory of Ukraine and the announcement of Western sanctions. As conceived by the authors, such a concept should form in students the ideas of citizenship, patriotism and all-Russian unity. Teachers are advised to “avoid negative bias and slander” when talking about the problems and contradictions of Russian history.

A team of experts from the Russian Historical Society (RIO), led by Yuri Petrov, director of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has developed a draft unified concept of teaching Russian history for non-historical faculties…. Now universities have the right to determine the content of the subject, its chronological and geographical scope, as well as methodological aspects. As a result, “conflict persists and even deepens in approaches to the selection of content, in interpretations and concepts in relation to both the history of Russia as a whole and many topical problems of the past,” the concept says.

According to the authors’ plans, it should ensure the unity of “historical education at the country’s universities” and is aimed “at the formation of a common civic identity of Russian society.” … “The focus of the course on the formation of Russian patriotism is ensured by priority attention to the heroic pages of Russia’s struggle for freedom and independence against foreign invaders, for ensuring national interests and security.”…

…The “anti-constitutional coup in Kyiv” in 2014 and the circumstances of the annexation of the Crimean peninsula are also mentioned. The relevant appeals of President Vladimir Putin are almost directly quoted here: “The situation in Ukraine, whose leadership turned it into “anti-Russia” and, with the help of NATO, was preparing for the “return of Crimea and Donbass,” led to the inevitability of a special military operation by Russia in 2022,” the concept says….

…Candidate of Historical Sciences, teacher at Tyumen State University Alexander Fokin directly calls ‘propaganda’ that part of the concept that describes the latest events: “It is clear that they need to show that we have developed, and here we are faced with villains that hinder development. But it is difficult to evaluate the present from the point of view of a historical view…. It seems to them that if a teacher at a university begins to bend a certain line, then students will believe it as the truth. But the big question is how modern students will relate to the words of the teacher in the presence of many sources of information.”…So far, the concept has been sent to the Ministry of Education and Science and presented on Friday at the forum of history teachers in Tobolsk. There, RHS representatives promised that the document would undergo a wide public discussion.

Image Information:

Image: Vladimir Putin laid flowers at the monument to Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky on Red Square, 4 November 2020.  
Source: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64332/photos
Attribution: CCA-4.0