Category Archives: OE Watch

Armenia Continuing Its Move Away From Russian Reliance

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French Caesar self-propelled howitzer fires into the Middle Euphrates River Valley, 2 December 2018.

“Yerevan and Paris signed a contract for the supply of Caesar self-propelled artillery units, French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said.”

Armenia continues taking steps away from Russia by working with other partners. The majority of Armenia’s weapons inventory is made up of Russian systems, leaving the Armenian government largely reliant on Russia. However, the accompanying excerpted articles report that Armenia reached a military-technical cooperation agreement with France in June 2024. The first excerpted article from the independent Russian-language news website Eurasia Daily reports that Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyansigned a military-technical cooperation agreement with the French company KNDS during his visit to France in June. The article notes that Papikyan also met with his French counterpart during his visit, but the details of their meeting were not disclosed. It is also mentioned that Armenia purchased French armored personnel carriers and radar systems in the past year, with negotiations still underway for Armenia to acquire the Mistral 3 short-range air defense system.

The second excerpted article from the independent news website Kavkazskiy Uzel reports that the meeting between the defense ministers of Armenia and France resulted in an agreement for Armenia to purchase an unknown number of French CAESAR 155mm self-propelled artillery systems. The article also includes a statement from Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan that Armenia has significantly reduced its military-technical cooperation with Russia since 2020.[i] Overall, Armenia’s recent acquisition of the French CAESAR 155mm artillery provides another system of non-Russian origin for the country’s inventory in the short-term, while the military-technical agreement with France could provide additional systems over the next several years. Both will help Armenia rely less on Russia going forward.[ii]

Sources:

“Армения и Франция достигли новых договорённостей в сфере ВТС (Armenia and France reached a new agreement on military-technical cooperation),” Eurasia Daily (an independent Russian-language news website), 18 June 2024.

https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2024/06/18/armeniya-i-franciya-dostigli-novyh-dogovoryonnostey-v-sfere-vts

As part of a working visit of Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan to France, an agreement on military-technical cooperation (MTC) was signed between the Ministry of Defense of the Armenia and the military-industrial company KNDS on 17 June…

Before that, Suren Papikyan met with his French counterpart Sebastien Lecornu…The parties noted the importance of military-technical cooperation, around which new agreements were reached, the Armenian Defense Ministry reported, without disclosing their content…

In October 2023, in Paris, the Ministers of Defense of Armenia and France signed agreements on the supply of weapons to Armenia. France has already supplied Armenia with 24 Bastion armored personnel carriers, with another 26 combat vehicles in the production stage. Yerevan has also placed an order for three GM200 radars, and negotiations are underway on the supply of Mistral 3 portable anti-aircraft missile systems…

“Армения договорилась с Францией о поставке самоходок Caesar (Armenia reached an agreement with France on the delivery of the self-propelled Caesar),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website reporting on the Caucasus), 18 June 2024.

https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/401043

Yerevan and Paris signed a contract for the supply of Caesar self-propelled artillery units, French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said. The document was signed during the visit of Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan to France…

The Caesar self-propelled artillery unit is equipped with a 155-mm cannon and is capable of hitting targets at a distance of 40 kilometers…

In March, Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan noted that since 2020, Russia’s share in military-technical cooperation has decreased from 96% to less than 10%…

Notes:

[i] In the years since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in November 2020, the government of Armenia stated that it will reduce the number of weapon systems it acquires from Russia, because it does not believe Russia has been a reliable partner.

[ii] Armenia has acquired a few weapon systems from India in the years since, but these were not part of a long-term agreement with India. The systems from India included counter battery radar, multiple rocket launchers, and towed 155mm artillery. For more information on Armenia’s acquisitions of new weapon systems from India, see: Matthew Stein, “Armenia Takes Another Step Away From Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023.
https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/armenia-takes-another-step-away-from-russia/

Image Information:

 Image: French Caesar self-propelled howitzer fires into the Middle Euphrates River Valley, 2 December 2018.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:French_Caesar_self-propelled_howitzer_in_Iraq.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Russia’s Africa Corps Personnel Redeploy From the Sahel to Kursk

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Russian Wagner fighters have been active along the border of Belarus since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2021, but now they are operating along the border with Ukraine, including some who reportedly returned to Russia from Africa.

“He emphasized that the Wagner fighters are returning to Russia, which means that they are being transferred from foreign missions.”

On 28 July, Tuareg rebels in the Coordination of Azawad Movements, a mostly secular Tuareg ethnonationalist militant and political coalition, together with the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), massacred dozens of Africa Corps fighters (formerly the Wagner Group) and Malian soldiers in northern Mali near the Algerian border.[i] This was the most severe loss of life in a battle for Africa Corps since the mercenary contingent increased its presence on the continent in 2020. It would be politically untenable for Russia to reveal weakness and pressure Africa Corps to fully cut and run from its mission in Mali. However, this disaster in northern Mali and the simultaneous difficulties Russia is facing in responding to the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk on Russian territory could lead to the redeployment of Africa Corps fighters from Mali and the Sahel region to Kursk. This, in turn, could result in a reduction of Russian counter-insurgency support to Mali and Sahelian states, which are already being engulfed by JNIM and its rival Islamic State in Greater Sahara.

This possibility is furthered in the pro-Russian government Russian-language website gazeta.ru, which reported that the Ukrainian offensive into Russia’s Kursk oblast is requiring Russia to call for assistance from Africa Corps. The article notes that Wagner Group, forces are returning from missions abroad to Ukraine and highlights how many Africa Corps fighters died in the ambush by Tuareg rebels and JNIM in Mali on 28 July. It further implies, based on a message from a prominent Russian Telegram user, that Africa Corps fighters who participated in conflicts in Africa would be among those transferred to Kursk. While details about this transfer are scant in the gazeta.ru article, such reports have also emerged from Russian-language websites critical of the Russian government. The second excerpted article in the Moscow Times also claims that Africa Corps fighters are being transferred from Africa to Kursk. The article emphasized that Africa Corps forces were previously sent to “distant” African countries, including Mali, where the junta leader extended the group’s contract. However, after the Russian Army’s encirclement in Kursk, those same forces are needed on the Russian home front. It remains unclear how this massacre and the fighting in Kursk will ultimately affect Africa Corps, but it is likely Africa Corps’ presence—and certainly its confidence—is less sustainable now than at any time in the recent past.

Sources:

“Бойцы «ЧВК Вагнер» прибыли в Курскую область. Что происходит в регионе на четвертые сутки боев? (Wagner ‘PMC fighters’ arrived in Kursk Oblast. What is happening in the region on the fourth day of fighting?),” www.gazeta.ru (Russian-language website that tends to be pro-Russian government but with a focus on social issues often more than politics) 9 August 2024. https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2024/08/09/19545865.shtml

Wagner PMC fighters and Akhmat special forces arrived in Kursk Oblast to join the battles against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The situation in the region is tense: a State of Smergency was declared, and border area residents of were evacuated. President Putin ordered that help be provided to the population.

Wagner PMC fighters arrived in Kursk Oblast and entered into battles against the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Sudzha, the SHOT Telegram channel reported. The total number of fighters sent to the combat zone was not specified. According to the channel, brigades of the Ministry of Defense’s volunteer corps are also joining in the fighting.

Military correspondent Yegor Guzenko, who publishes under the pseudonym Thirteenth, also reported that fighters from Wagner PMC were sent to the Kursk region. He emphasized that the fighters are returning to Russia, which means that they are being transferred from foreign missions. Recently, Wagner PMC fighters participated in African conflicts, and especially fought against the Tuaregs in Mali. As a result of these battles, the PMC endured losses, which numbered several dozen people.

В Курскую область начали перебрасывать бойцов «Вагнера» из Африки (Wagner fighters from Africa began being transferred to Kursk region), Moscow Times (independent Russian bi-lingual on-line newspaper previously located in Russia, but since relocated to Amsterdam to avoid government sensorship), 8 August 2024. https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2024/08/08/vkurskuyu-oblast-nachali-perebrasivat-boitsov-vagnera-izafriki-a138964

Russia is transferring Wagner PMC fighters from Africa to the Kursk region amid a successful offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the region, Z-blogger and the Telegram channel “Novorossiya Militia Reports” claim.

At the end of July in Mali, a contingent of government troops and Russian Wagner fighters near the border with Algeria were ambushed by Tuareg rebels. During the battle, Wagner and government troops were destroyed, and the losses of the Russian PMCs alone, according to various sources, may have reached 80 people.

Notes:

[i] Both al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM and the Tuareg rebel group Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) claimed the massacre of Wagner and Malian army fighters. However, both groups denied any cooperation with each other due to their conflicting Islamist and secular ethno-nationalist ideologies, respectively, if not also the CMA’s desire to receive international support for its cause, which would be jeopardized by any association with an al-Qaeda affiliate. See “Au Mali, le lourd revers des mercenaires russes de Wagner (In Mali, a large setback for Wagner’s Russian mercenaries),” Le Figaro, 29 July 2024. lefigaro.fr/international/au-mali-le-lourd-revers-des-mercenaires-russes-de-wagner-20240729


Image Information:

Image: Russian Wagner fighters have been active along the border of Belarus since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2021, but now they are operating along the border with Ukraine, including some who reportedly returned to Russia from Africa.
Source: Информационное агентство БелТА, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PMC_wagner_in_belarus_3.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Sahelian States Sever Ties with Ukraine

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Flag of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine.

“The government of the Republic of Niger, in total solidarity with the government and people of Mali, has decided in all sovereignty to sever diplomatic relations between the Republic of Niger and Ukraine with immediate effect.”

Allegations of an “African Front” being opened in Russia’s war on Ukraine have caused multiple nations in the Sahel to sever diplomatic relations with Ukraine as African and Russian leaders accuse Ukraine of supporting terrorist organizations. According to the first excerpted article from French daily Le Monde, Niger and Mali ceased diplomatic relations with Ukraine on 7 August 2024. The decision was made in response to separatist and jihadist fighters in Mali killing dozens of Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) and Malian military personnel fighting in northeastern Mali. In the wake of the battle, Andriy Yusov, the press representative of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, stated: “The fact that the rebels received the necessary data that allowed them to successfully carry out an operation against Russian war criminals has already been observed by the whole world. Of course, we will not disclose the details.”[i] While this is not a direct admission of Ukrainian involvement in the Sahel, Moscow has unsurprisingly sided with Niger and Mali, condemning Kyiv.

Recent actions by Mali and Niger have sparked discussion that a proxy war could be starting in Africa between Russian-backed militaries and separatist groups accused of being backed by Ukraine. According to the second excerpted article from the Africa-based think tank, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), there are likely far more significant geopolitical implications for Africa than regional conflicts between warring tribes and jihadist groups. Russia’s information campaigns in numerous nations have been widely reported on. However, recently, Ukraine’s special envoy for Africa and the Middle East, Maksym Subkh, announced new embassies throughout Africa to help combat the influence of Russia’s Africa Corps. Ukrainian intervention against Russia, indirectly through support or through kinetic operations, would not be unheard of. ISS also reported that Ukrainian special forces were deployed to operate in Sudan to support the Sudanese Armed Forces fighting against Africa Corps mercenaries and allied Rapid Support Forces.

Mali, Niger, and several other nations in the Sahel have faced complex security issues stemming from armed rebellion to radical jihadism and foreign influence for several years. The possible expansion of the Russia-Ukraine war to other portions of the globe, such as Africa, has received mixed reactions. The Economic Community of West African States, a political and economic union of fifteen African nations, including Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali, and Niger, condemned any foreign influence and the expansion of geopolitical events to Africa.[ii] Others may view any attempt to combat Russian expansion and aggression as a net positive. However, if Ukraine does become openly involved in attempting to subvert Russian expansion in Africa, it will undoubtedly cause a shift in the momentum of ongoing armed conflicts in the region. Though, with multiple armed groups active in Sahelian states with varying motivations and allegiances, it would be difficult to limit the extent of foreign aid and influence to exclude all jihadist groups.

Sources:

“Le Niger rompt « avec effet immédiat » ses relations diplomatiques avec l’Ukraine, deux jours après le Mali (Niger breaks off diplomatic relations with Ukraine “with immediate effect”, two days after Mali),” Le Monde, 7 August 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/08/07/le-niger-rompt-avec-effet-immediat-ses-relations-diplomatiques-avec-l-ukraine-deux-jours-apres-le-mali_6270883_3212.html

Niger announced on Tuesday, August 6, that it was breaking off diplomatic relations with Ukraine “with immediate effect,” two days after Mali accused Kyiv of “supporting” “terrorist groups” after a heavy defeat of the Malian army at the end of July during fighting with separatists and jihadists.

“The government of the Republic of Niger, in total solidarity with the government and people of Mali, has decided in all sovereignty (…) to sever diplomatic relations between the Republic of Niger and Ukraine with immediate effect,” declared the spokesman for the Niger government, Colonel-Major Amadou Abdramane, in a statement read on public television.

At the end of July, separatists and jihadists claimed to have killed dozens of members of the Russian paramilitary group Wagner and Malian soldiers during fighting in Tin Zaouatine (north-east Mali). This defeat is the heaviest suffered in a battle by the Wagner Group in Africa, analysts agree.

A Ukrainian military intelligence official, Andri Yusov, had implied that Kiev had provided information to the rebels so they could carry out their attack. “The government of the Republic of Niger learned with great shock and deep indignation about the subversive and unacceptable remarks of Mr. Andri Yusov, spokesman for the Ukrainian military intelligence agency ,” Abdramane said on Tuesday…

“The fact that the rebels received the necessary data that allowed them to successfully carry out an operation against Russian war criminals has already been observed by the whole world. Of course, we will not disclose the details. More information to come here too,” Yusov told Ukrainian television. The video of his statement was relayed by the Ukrainian ambassador to Senegal.

Following these statements, Mali announced the severance of its relations with Ukraine, which on Monday rejected the accusations and regretted the decision, which it considered “hasty” . The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry affirmed that Kyiv “unconditionally adheres to the norms of international law” and “reserves the right to take all necessary political and diplomatic measures in response to unfriendly actions.”

Peter Fabricius, “La guerre de la Russie contre l’Ukraine s’étend-elle à l’Afrique? (Is Russia’s War on Ukraine Spreading to Africa?),” Institute for Security Studies (pan-African think tank), 9 August 2024. https://issafrica.org/fr/iss-today/la-guerre-de-la-russie-contre-l-ukraine-s-etend-elle-a-l-afrique.

Russia appears to be stepping up its multi-pronged offensive to increase its influence in Africa, while Ukraine is fighting back, threatening to turn the continent into a major proxy battlefield.

Russia appears to be stepping up its multi-pronged offensive to increase its influence in Africa, while Ukraine is fighting back, threatening to turn the continent into a major proxy battlefield. Military skirmishes erupted last week in Africa, when Moscow’s Wagner force (now Africa Corps) suffered heavy losses in a battle against Tuareg separatists and jihadists in Tinzawatene, Mali. The setback marks a major blow to the Kremlin, which appeared to be expanding its presence or at least countering Western efforts to regain ground.

After last week’s intense battle in Tinzawatene, in which Tuareg separatists claim to have killed 84 Wagner fighters and 47 Malian soldiers, officer Andriy Yusov, a spokesman for Ukraine’s intelligence agency, said Malian rebels had received the “necessary” information to carry out the attack, hinting at possible Ukrainian involvement. In response, Mali’s military junta severed diplomatic relations with Ukraine, accusing it of supporting “international terrorism.” Ukraine denied the accusation, saying Mali acted hastily, without investigating the incident or providing evidence of its involvement. The military junta of Mali’s neighbor Niger has also severed diplomatic ties with Kiev. Russia has accused Ukraine of opening a new front in Africa, an accusation tinged with irony.

The consequences of the war between Russia and Ukraine could be serious for Africa. The Economic Community of West African States condemned “foreign interference in the region […] and any attempt to drag the region into the current geopolitical confrontations.” The African Union did not respond. This development may not be entirely new in Africa. For Ramani, if Ukraine did indeed contribute to Wagner’s defeat in Mali, it is part of his two-pronged strategy in Africa. On the one hand, diplomatic openness with the establishment of new embassies and, on the other, “discreet special operations like those observed against the RSF in Sudan.”

The “RSF” refers to the Rapid Support Forces, which are engaged in a violent conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). It is well known that Russia, including Wagner, supports the RSF. In February, the Kyiv Post reported that Ukrainian special forces were operating in Sudan, supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces against Wagner’s forces, allied with the RSF. For Ramani, Wagner’s defeat in Mali will lead to introspection. Wagner’s forces will likely be more controlled by the state, “like the process going on in Libya.”

Notes:

[i] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine responded to Niger’s decision in a press release, denying support for terrorist organizations. Located here: “Statement by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry regarding the decision of the authorities of the Republic of Niger to sever diplomatic relations with Ukraine,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 8 August 2024. https://mfa.gov.ua/fr/news/zayava-mzs-ukrayini-shchodo-rishennya-vladi-respubliki-niger-rozirvati-diplomatichni-vidnosini-z-ukrayinoyu

[ii] ECOWAS has a long-standing history in Africa, founded in 1975, and contributes to many social and economic projects including election monitoring, clean water initiatives, human development, regional security, and more. For more information on ECOWAS visit: “About ECOWAS,” ECOWAS, Updated 2024.  https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_Special_Operations_Forces_of_Ukraine.svg
Attribution: Public Domain

The Failure To Deter Houthi Vessel Attacks May Deepen Saudi-China Security Ties

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The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mason (DDG 87), sails in the Red Sea in support of Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) 31 January 2024.

“Some have gone so far as to assert that there is American collusion with the [Houthis], as Washington does not intentionally target the group’s main command centers in Yemen, nor its main leaders. The reason for the collusion is to harm Chinese trade in the Red Sea…”

Arabic-language media analysts and commentators widely agree that the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian – formed in December 2023 to address Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea — has not effectively deterred Yemen’s Houthis from targeting commercial maritime traffic.[i] However, they are divided on whether this failure is due to deliberate strategic choices or poor planning.[ii] Some commentators suggest that the real target of the operation is China, not the Houthis. They argue that the United States may be intentionally allowing Houthi attacks to weaken China economically and justify military presence in a region with increasing Chinese naval activity. The first excerpt, from the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, reflects this view, with several Yemeni political analysts indicating that the United States is colluding with the Houthis for a broader strategic aim.[iii] This perspective, however, is not universally accepted across the region. Pro-Houthi media outlets, for example, attribute the lack of deterrence to Yemeni strength and U.S. shortcomings. The second excerpt, from the Houthi news website al-Masirah, illustrates the Houthi narrative on Prosperity Guardian, whereby Yemeni forces have shattered U.S. military prestige and effectively deterred U.S. forces in the region. The third excerpt, from the Qatari daily al-Sharq, offers a more mainstream explanation, attributing the operation’s deterrent failure to poor planning and misjudgments about the Houthis. According to the author, effectively securing trade routes in the area will require patience and the involvement of more acceptable mediators, such as China.

Prosperity Guardian’s ineffective deterrence – regardless of the reasons – may be leading Saudi Arabia to seek help from China. Saudi Arabian leadership opted against joining Prosperity Guardian due to their interest in pursuing a negotiated settlement with the Houthis.[iv] In mid-June 2024, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman and top Saudi military officials visited Beijing for discussions that reportedly included a request for Chinese assistance to contain Yemeni attacks.[v] Whatever the ultimate reasons behind Prosperity Guardian’s ineffectiveness, one of its consequences – presumably unintended – could be deepening Saudi-Chinese security coordination in the Red Sea.

Sources:

بعد 8 أشهر من التصعيد… لماذا لم يردع التدخل الأميركي هجمات الحوثيين؟

“After 8 months of escalation… Why did the US intervention not deter Houthi attacks?” al-Sharq al-Awsat (Saudi daily), 18 July 2024. https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5041521-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-8-%D8%A3%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%9F

Despite the passage of eight months since the start of the Houthi attacks on ships under the pretext of supporting the Palestinians in Gaza, the American intervention under the name of the “Prosperity Guardian” has not succeeded in putting an end to the threat of the Iranian-backed group…

[Yemeni researcher and political analyst Abdul Sattar Al-Shamiri] claims in his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat that the continuation of the navigation crisis in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden does not affect America and Israel economically, but rather affects China the most in the long term…

This part related to China is consistent with what Tawfiq al-Jund, a Yemeni researcher at the Sana’a Center for Studies, told Asharq Al-Awsat… “The American military presence in the Red Sea needs justification before world powers, and the Houthi threat to maritime navigation is a strong justification for that, and it must remain for a period of time,” Al-Jund continues…

“Futile restoration attempts…they end in the collapse of Zionism,” al-Masirah (Houthi news outlet), 5 August 2024. https://www.almasirahnews.com/136216/

It was only a few days until the “Prosperity Alliance” found itself in a major predicament, as it was unable to provide protection for the ships of the Zionist entity and ships heading to the ports of the occupied territories. The scope of targeting for our country’s naval forces expanded to include commercial ships of the so-called “Prosperity Guardian” alliance, especially American and British ships, and the bottom of the sea became a stable for a number of them.. Under the pretext of redeployment to carry out other missions in other areas, the (Eisenhower) was withdrawn away from the danger zone, after our national army expanded the geographical scope of its naval military operations to include the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and later the Mediterranean Sea.

Instead of imposing a supposed deterrent against our people and revolutionary leadership, the picture was reversed, and the forces called the Prosperity Alliance were deterred. As a result, the reputation of the US administration collapsed, its prestige fell, and its deterrent image, which its presence in the Middle East aimed to restore, was shattered.

لماذا فشل تحالف الازدهار في هزيمة الحوثيين؟

“Why did the Prosperity Alliance fail to defeat the Houthis?” al-Sharq (Qatari daily), 30 July 2024. https://al-sharq.com/opinion/30/07/2024/%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%81%D8%B4%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%87%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86

Perhaps the main source of confusion or astonishment in Washington as well is that it does not imagine that defeating the Houthis would be this difficult. As a result, some have gone so far as to assert that there is American collusion with the group, as Washington does not intentionally target the group’s main command centers in Yemen, nor its main leaders. The reason for the collusion is to harm Chinese trade in the Red Sea.

The issue of American collusion with the Houthis or Iran, their main supporter, can basically be ruled out simply when considering the huge amount of spending on the operation, which has reached an estimated $30 billion dollars so far, without any result, in addition to the development of the group’s threat to Israel, the American red line.

There are many interconnected reasons for the failure of the campaign against the Houthis. The first and most important is the American-Western miscalculation of the group’s true strength. So in principle, the Prosperity Coalition should have adopted more robust and rigorous plans in its war against the Houthis, and the Pentagon acknowledged this by saying that defeating the Houthis requires a more robust and rigorous strategy… It can be said that defeating an ideological group like the Houthis, operating in a complex mountainous terrain, is next to impossible… Therefore, betting on neutralizing these groups and undermining their threats should be primarily a political bet. It should address the roots of the crisis, not its symptoms. The solution must start from within Yemen itself by intensifying efforts for a comprehensive reconciliation in which the Houthis are recognized as an authentic political and social component. This requires patience and the intervention of more acceptable mediators, led by China.

Notes:

[i] As of July 2024, Houthi attacks had not ceased. See: William Clough, “Military and Security, The Yemen Review Quarterly: April-June 2024,“ Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, 15 July 2024. https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/april-june-2024/22886

[ii] The stated goal of Operation Prosperity Guardian is “ensuring freedom of navigation for all countries and bolstering regional security and prosperity.” See: https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/

[iii] This perspective is most widespread among anti-Houthi factions in Yemen, particularly among members and supporters of the Saudi-based Internationally Recognized Government.

[iv] For more see: Lucas Winter, “Gaza War’s Impact On The Middle East Strategic Landscape,” FMSO Foreign Perspectives Brief, June 2024, page 9, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/gaza-wars-impact-on-the-middle-east-strategic-landscape-lucas-winterjune-2024/

[v] For more details see: Adam Lucente, “Saudi defense chief in China in bid for help with Houthis, boost military ties,” Al Monitor, 25 June 2024. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/06/saudi-defense-chief-china-bid-help-houthis-boost-military-ties; The Saudi delegation included Chief of the General Staff Lt. Gen. Fayyad bin Hamid Al-Ruwaili, Saudi Ambassador to China Abdulrahman bin Ahmed Al-Harbi; Commander of the Strategic Missile Force Lt. Gen. Jarallah bin Mohammed Al-Alweet, Director General of the Office of the Minister of Defense Hisham bin Abdulaziz bin Saif, head of the Armed Forces Operations Authority Maj. Gen. Misfer Al-Ghanem, and Military Attaché at the Saudi Embassy in Beijing Commodore Salem bin Saleh Al-Maliki. The Chinese delegation included Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Central Military Commission Lt. Gen. Jing Jianfeng, Director of the Office of International Military Cooperation at the Central Military Commission Maj. Gen. Li Bin, and several other senior officials. See: “Chinese and Saudi Defense Ministers Discuss Bilateral Relations,” Saudi Press Agency, 25 June 2024, https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2128876

Image Information:

Image: The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mason (DDG 87), sails in the Red Sea in support of Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) 31 January 2024.
Source: Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Christopher J Krucke, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command / U.S. 5th Fleet. https://www.dvidshub.net/image/8254865/operation-prosperity-guardian. 
Attribution: Public Domain

Iran Increasing Lithium Battery Production

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The Yuz, Iran’s domestically-manufactured electric vehicle, unveiled in November 2021.

“We must make progress to make up for this backwardness.”

The Iranian government appears to be doubling down on investment and production of lithium batteries. According to a report published by Young Journalist Club, on 8-9 July, Iran University of Science and Technology in Tehran hosted a conference to highlight local developments in the lithium battery field. Press reports suggest the conference was attended by academic and commercial representatives, but also military officers and politicians. In fact, both Iranian politicians and military personnel appear increasingly engaged in Iran’s lithium and battery industry. In March 2024, Reza Shojaei, the deputy head of the Iranian Defense Ministry’s Department of Energy Resources, claimed Iran had the technology to build electric vehicle batteries and said that the Defense Ministry would increase production by 35 percent to preclude the need to import lithium batteries. Defense officials attending the conference told Iranian journalists that they would not only commercialize electric vehicles, but also expand research laboratories and invest in lithium mining.[i]

The significance of the report is not so much a continuing emphasis on the development of electric vehicles, an item the Iranian press began reporting upon in November 2021,[ii] but rather to show the supremacy of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics if not the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on the development of new and cutting-edge technology.[iii] University professors and research centers subordinate themselves to the Iranian military. This reality has ramifications as many Iranians seeking degrees in the West focus their studies on science and technology and may come under pressure if they return to Iran to work directly or indirectly for sanctioned entities.

Domestic lithium production and an indigenous lithium industry can also have a profound impact on the operational environment. If the IRGC controls its mining, it would like profit disproportionately from its sale to foreign partners such as China. Advanced military technology also increasingly integrates lithium batteries into drones and both terrestrial and submarine robots. Given Iran’s proliferation of new weaponry to its proxies, an increased battery production capability could enable the Houthis and Hezbollah to upgrade their own weaponry and capabilities in the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.

Sources:

“توسعه حوزه لیتیوم نیازمند توجه و همکاری‌های چندگانه”(Developing the Lithium Field Will Require Dedication),” Young Journalist Club (an official center established by the political affairs bureau of the official Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting to train journalists), 9 July 2024. https://www.yjc.ir/fa/amp/news/8774326

Yesterday [8 July 2024], the Iran University of Science and Technology hosted the first international conference and the second national conference on lithium batteries, representing a big step in the development of the battery industry. Shojaei Fard, Director of the Automotive Research Institute of Tehran University of Science and Technology and Secretary of the conference, highlighted the dependence of the automobile industry on the field and how initially, we were working on batteries but lithium batteries were also a new thing. “We launched the lithium battery research and innovation center, and from there the project to examine the future of lithium batteries and technology and challenges began. Despite the fact that this conference is so specialized, we had over 180 papers submitted, though we rejected a few. We also have a training workshop today that a Chinese instructor will teach, a four more workshops tomorrow. During the program, we will review top articles. We will also announce the result of a review into which is the industry-leading lithium battery… We will have four parallel meetings over two days so we can review 80 articles.”

Naderi Sharif, the chief of the Energy Resources Development Organization, stated that there are two approaches to the development of battery technology. Some favor and some oppose.

Opponents of the development of lithium battery cell technology cite reasons such as the need for heavy investment, rapid changes in cell technology and diversity in cell products. Proponents of lithium battery development also believe that lithium batteries are a strategic technology and product and that the development of the energy sector depends on this product. Cheap fossil fuel has led to the backwardness of energy supply and production and related technologies. 

Naderi Sharif emphasized,”We shouldn’t just watch the world’s progress in this field, we must make progress to make up for this backwardness.”

Notes:

[i] Iran’s lithium industry has developed significantly over the past two years. In March 2023, Iranian officials announced discovery of 8.5 million tons of lithium deposits inside Iran near the Western city of Hamedan. If true, this would be the second largest lithium find after a 9.2 million ton reserve in the salt flats of Chile. Rumors also swirl in Iran that the Iranian government is both purposely allowing Lake Urmia in the West Azerbaijan province to evaporate in order to extract lithium and that it works with China to do so. The Iranian government has denied both rumors in the Persian press.

[ii] For a Persian language discussion of Iran’s domestic Yuz electric vehicle, see: “یوز در خیابان‌‌های تهران (Yuz on the streets of Tehran)” Fars News Agency, 2 November 2021. https://www.farsnews.ir/news/14000811000836

[iii] The same pattern exists with Iran’s satellite program. For a previous discussion of the involvement of universities in Iran’s satellite program, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Preparing for Zafar III Satellite Launch,” OE Watch, July 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/284140/download

Image Information:

Image: The Yuz, Iran’s domestically-manufactured electric vehicle, unveiled in November 2021.
Source: https://media.farsnews.ir/Uploaded/Files/Images/1400/08/11/14000811000831_Test_PhotoN.jpg
Attribution: Fars News Agency

Belarus and Iran Broaden Military Cooperation

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“Commander of the Iranian army, Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi, shakes hands with the commander of the Belarusian Air Force, Major General Andrei Yulianovich Lukyanovich, in Tehran,” Tasnim News Agency (IRGC-affiliated news source), 7 August 2024.

“The political, military, and defense officials of the two countries are determined to develop and deepen cooperation.”

A meeting between Iranian and Belarusian military officials underscores the strengthening of ties between the two internationally isolated countries. In the excerpted article by state broadcaster IRIB, the commander of the Iranian Army, MAJ GEN Mousavi, said “The political, military, and defense officials of the two countries are determined to develop and deepen cooperation.” During the 7 August meeting in Tehran, his counterpart, GEN Lukanovich, echoed this sentiment, noting “We also seek to expand and deepen military relations and exchange and benefit from the valuable experiences of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” The visit highlights Tehran and Minsk’s intent to bolster their strategic partnership.

Just months prior, in March, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko visited Iran for the first time in seventeen years.[i] Since the Ukraine War began in February 2022, Iran has expanded its ties with Russia through an impending defense pact that already includes selling its Shahed drones and, most recently, ballistic missiles to Moscow.[ii] It’s only natural that Belarus, a top Russian ally and shares a border with Ukraine, would also want to deepen its ties with Tehran. As MAJ GEN Mousavi pointed out during his discussion with his counterpart, Iran and Belarus have “common threats and interests” as the two countries are under Western sanctions.

In the meeting cited in the IRIB article, the Iranian Army commander also said, “Belarus holds a strategic and special position and is a strong barrier against NATO expansion. We, along with regional countries, are also opposed to NATO’s expansion.”

During his March visit, the Belarusian dictator met with then-President Ebrahim Raisi and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and signed seven memorandums of understanding, including one in trade and transportation, with a target of $100 million in trade.[iii] MAJ GEN Lukyanovich’s August visit appears to be an extension of that bilateral cooperation, which includes economic as well as military ties. With Iran isolated by the United States and the West, the strengthening of relations with other internationally isolated countries like Belarus is a mutually beneficial opportunity for Tehran in the realms of trade and military cooperation to survive economic pressure via sanctions.

Sources:

“آمادگی نیروی پدافند هوایی ارتش برای توسعه همکاری‌ها با بلاروس (The readiness of the army air defense to develop cooperation with Belarus),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 7 August 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00I3RX.

According to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Major General Andrei Yulianovich Lukyanovich, commander of the air force and air defense of the Republic of Belarus, met and held discussions with Major General [Abdolrahim] Mousavi at the General Staff Headquarters of the Armed Forces.

In this meeting, the army commander described Iran and Belarus as two countries with common threats and interests, under the unjust sanctions of America and the West, and possessing independence and non-dependence.

General Mousavi, while appreciating Belarus’ chivalrous and independent stance on the issue of the assassination of [Hamas political chief] martyr Ismail Haniyeh, stated: “Belarus holds a strategic and special position and is a strong barrier against NATO expansion. We, along with regional countries, are also opposed to NATO’s expansion.”

Referring to the unilateral sanctions imposed by global arrogance against Iran since the victory of the Islamic Revolution [referring to the West], the army commander added: “We have tried to make the most of this threat and not make our country’s defense dependent on external powers…”

The army commander emphasized: “The political, military, and defense officials of the two countries are determined to develop and deepen cooperation, and a clear example of this is the visit of the president of Belarus, Mr. [Aleksandr] Lukashenko, to Iran and his meeting with the late dear martyr President [Ebrahim] Raisi, which laid the foundation for relations and joint commissions…”

General Lukanovich said: “We also seek to expand and deepen military relations and exchange and benefit from the valuable experiences of the Islamic Republic of Iran…”Referring to Iran’s defensive capabilities to defend against enemy threats, General Lukanovich invited the army commander to visit Belarus and observe the country’s capabilities.

Notes:

[i] “Iran, Belarus Vow To “Strengthen Cooperation” During Lukashenko’s Visit,” IranWire, 13 March 2024. https://iranwire.com/en/politics/114738-iran-belarus-vow-to-strengthen-cooperation-during-lukashenkos-visit/

[ii] Natasha Bertrand and Kylie Atwood, “Iran transfers ballistic missiles to Russia, sources say,” CNN, 7 September 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/06/politics/iran-transfers-ballistic-missiles-russia/index.html

[iii] Maziar Motamedi, “Iran and Belarus sign cooperation roadmap in Lukashenko visit,” Al Jazeera, 13 March 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/13/iran-and-belarus-sign-cooperation-roadmap-in-lukashenko-visit

Image Information:

Image: “Commander of the Iranian army, Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi, shakes hands with the commander of the Belarusian Air Force, Major General Andrei Yulianovich Lukyanovich, in Tehran,” Tasnim News Agency (IRGC-affiliated news source), 7 August 2024.
Source: https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2024/08/07/3135937/generals-urge-promotion-of-iran-belarus-ties
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Iranian Military Equipment Integrating Artificial Intelligence

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“Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri speaking,” Student News Network (Iranian media outlet), 31 July 2024.

“Artificial intelligence technology has been utilized in the new equipment, and we are currently witnessing its results.”

As the international community enters the world of artificial intelligence (AI) warfare, Iran is integrating and developing this technology into its military equipment.[i] As reported by Iranian state broadcaster IRIB, Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGC-N) said during a ceremony in the southwestern port city of Bandar Abbas on 9 August, “Artificial intelligence technology has been utilized in the new equipment, and we are currently witnessing its results.” Tangsiri claims 2,654 new missile systems, drones, and other equipment have been integrated with AI to enhance precision, acquisition, and capabilities in its military hardware—demonstrating Tehran’s top focus is AI.

In January, General Hossein Salami, commander of the IRGC, made similar claims about the country’s drone fleet.[ii] Progress appears to be limited, as little public information is available on the subject, except for comments from high-ranking officials in the military apparatus. It’s also worth noting that Tehran has a history of making outlandish claims to boast its abilities. Nevertheless, Iran is thinking about how to further integrate and develop this technology by investing in training on how to integrate AI into its array of military equipment.[iii]

According to the IRIB article, RADM Tangsiri noted: “In the equipment and facilities that we put into operation today, we paid special attention to innovation and technical creativity.” He explained that AI has been a top priority and applied to systems used by the defense ministry and the specialized missile sites of the IRGC-N.

Not only does AI improve Tehran’s capabilities and support its top priority of regime preservation, the integration into its military hardware is a selling point on the arms market as Iran becomes a global exporter to Russia, Ethiopia, Venezuela, Sudan, and other countries.[iv]

Sources:

“استفاده از هوش مصنوعی در تجهیزات جدید سپاه (Use of artificial intelligence in the new IRGC equipment),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 9 August 2024.

https://www.iribnews.ir/00I3a3

According to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri stated during the ceremony for adding new equipment to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Navy (IRGC-NV): “210 systems out of 2,654 products in the field today were showcased, demonstrating every wave of new equipment joining the arsenal is large and meaningful.”

The commander of the IRGC-N added: “In terms of the equipment intelligence and countering electronic warfare, systems were introduced in this ceremony that were practically handed over to the forces by the IRGC’s top commander.”

Commander Tangsiri said: “In the equipment and facilities that we put into operation today, we paid special attention to innovation and technical creativity.”

The commander of the IRGC-N emphasized that: “In these added equipment and systems, we saw an increase in accuracy, aim, and targeting, which increased the confidence of using these weapons in the electronic warfare environment, adding to the capabilities of the equipment.”

Rear Admiral Tangsiri also stressed that the application of artificial intelligence in developing these systems has been a priority, both in the Defense Ministry and the specialized missile centers of the IRGC-N, and the results of these efforts are now evident.Commander Tangsiri stressed the importance of using artificial intelligence in the construction of equipment, whether in the Defense Ministry or the specialized missile center of the IRGC, saying: “Artificial intelligence technology has been utilized in the new equipment, and we are currently witnessing its results.”

Notes:

[i] Mahmoud Javadi, “Heavy Thunder, No Rain: Defense AI in Iran,” The Very Long Game. Contributions to Security and Defense Studies, 19 July 2024. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-58649-1_19

[ii] See: Michael Rubin, “Iran Announces Integration Of Artificial Intelligence Into Drone Fleet,” OE Watch, 10-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/iran-announces-integration-of-artificial-intelligence-into-drone-fleet/

[iii] Mahmoud Javadi, “Heavy Thunder, No Rain: Defense AI in Iran,” The Very Long Game. Contributions to Security and Defense Studies, 19 July 2024. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-58649-1_19

[iv] Danny Citrinowicz. “Iran is on its way to replacing Russia as a leading arms exporter. The US needs a strategy to counter this trend,” IranSource, Atlantic Council, 2 February 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-drone-uavs-russia/

Image Information:

Image: “Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri speaking,” Student News Network (Iranian media outlet), 31 July 2024.
Source: https://snn.ir/fa/news/1160582/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D9%88-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%DB%B3%DB%B0%DB%B9%DB%B3%DB%B9-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%AC%D9%88-%D9%88-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA-%D8%B4%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%AA-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF-%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D9%85
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

China and Russia Expand Agreement for Arctic Strategic Resource Development

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Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker, the Sabir, in Arctic waters. The Sabir is operated by Rosatom, which was appointed administrative control of the Northern Sea Route infrastructure in 2018.

“The Chinese company will be a main partner in the development of the major lithium field located in the far northern Russian region.”

Russia has signed an agreement with China to partner in the development of a major lithium field in Russia’s far north according to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer. It is likely that Russia would like to mine its lithium fields on its own, but the contract demonstrates Russia’s need for a partner. China has already partnered with Russia for Arctic development of oil, LNG, and other resources. The agreement gives China some latitude to exploit territory it would not otherwise have access. At the same time, Russia would be hard-pressed to develop the lithium field without outside capital investment that only China can provide at this time. The partnership agreement also comes at a time when China has shown it is eager to expand its presence in the Arctic and gain access to unexploited Arctic resources.[i]

Sources:

Atle Staalesen and Denis Zagore, “Chinese Developers come to mine lithium in Murmansk”, The Berents Observer,(independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 1 August 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2024/08/chinese-developers-come-lithium-mine-murmansk

The company MCC International Incorporation Ltd will join the development of the Kolmozerskoye lithium resources in the Kola Peninsula. The Chinese company will be a main partner in the development of the major lithium field located in the far northern Russian region. The company will take part in exploration of resources, development of technology, as well as production, the Russian license holder stated. The accompanying Nornickel Telegram photo is captioned “Hun Ventao, Vice President of Chinese company MCC International Incorporation Ltd signs deal with Igor Demidov, head of the Polar Lithium.”

The Russian edition of the Barents Observer reports that the Kolmozerskoye field is owned by Polar Lithium, a company controlled by Nornickel and Rosatom’s ore mining division. Nornickel’s Telegram channel stated that “The MCC International knows how to project mine processing plants, it possesses its own ore enrichment and lithium production technology.”

The Chinese company will reportedly also take part in the development of battery production.  “The experienced Chinese partner will help us more quickly create a high-tech battery industry in Russia,” according to Nornickel.

According to the developers, the new mine and processing plant are planned to be ready for production in year 2030. It is to be able to annually process up to 2 million tons of ore and produce 45,000 tons of lithium hydroxide and carbonate.

Nornickel is running the major nickel and copper mines and metallurgical plants in and around Monchegorsk, Kola Peninsula. The joint venture with Rosatom’s ore mining division was established in 2021.

Notes:

[i] See: Les Grau, “Chinese Icebreaker Sails to The Arctic,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-icebreaker-sails-to-the-arctic/

Image Information:

Image: Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker, the Sabir, in Arctic waters. The Sabir is operated by Rosatom, which was appointed administrative control of the Northern Sea Route infrastructure in 2018.
Source: https://c4.wallpaperflare.com/wallpaper/645/918/543/the-ocean-sea-icebreaker-the-ship-wallpaper-preview.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Russian Security Forces Face Rise of Domestic Terrorism Threats

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Russian Ministry of Emergency firefighters standing outside Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, site of a March 2024 terrorism attack.

In June, the FSB’s director, Aleksandr Bortnikov, revealed that the agency had prevented a total of 134 acts of terrorism and sabotage in central Russia alone since the outbreak of the conflict between Moscow and Kiev in February 2022. The country’s security agencies have also dismantled 32 international terrorist cells operating in the country over this period, he stated.

Russia’s Investigative Committee and the Federal Security Service (FSB) announced in early August it had foiled a plot by two Russian religious preachers to recruit fighters of the Islamic State (formerly ISIS) to carry out terrorist attacks inside the country. The plan was to enlist 19 Russian nationals living in the Tyumen region to join a jihadi movement in Syria. According to the excerpted article in the pro-Kremlin Russian news site RT, one of the suspects made public statements condoning terrorism and they urged Russians to send donations to ISIS, which violates Russian laws on material support of terrorism.

This comes amid a new report by the Interior Ministry of the highest number of terrorist crimes in Russia recorded in over two decades, as reported in the second excerpted article, also published by RT. Between January and June of 2024, some 1,651 crimes were reported, a nearly 40 percent spike over the same period the previous year.  In June the director of the FSB, Aleksandr Bortnikov, announced that his agency had foiled 134 acts of terrorism or sabotage this year in central Russia alone, as well as 32 international terrorist cells operating in the country. Even a youth wrestling coach born in Tajikistan was arrested in July for suspicion of abetting terrorist groups.[i] The following month, Ukrainian forces launched an incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, what constituted, according to Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “acts of terrorism.”[ii] Prior to that, last March, one of the deadliest terror attacks in Russia’s history occurred, after four gunmen shot up a concert venue outside Moscow, killing 145, before setting the building on fire. The gunmen were linked to a terrorist outfit known as Islamic State-Khorasan.

The rise in jihadi attacks is due to several factors, including an overextension of Russia’s roughly 360,000-strong Rosgvardiya, or Russian National Guard, a number of whom were carrying out rear-guard missions in Ukraine even before the latest incursion into Kursk.[iii]  The ability to respond to Ukrainian operations and simultaneously address Islamist extremist groups will stretch the Rosgvardiya and Russia’s domestic intelligence services even further.

Sources:

“ISIS recruiters arrested in Russia – security officials,” RT (formerly Russia Today, a Kremlin-back news outlet), 5 August 2024. https://www.rt.com/russia/602155-isis-recruiters-arrested-siberia/

The arrest warrants were executed in Tyumen Region in Western Siberia, Russia’s Investigative Committee and the Federal Security Service (FSB) jointly reported. The two individuals are accused of committing crimes between February 2015 and November 2022.

According to investigators, the pair convinced 19 people living in the region to join jihadists in Syria. One of the suspects allegedly made public statements condoning terrorism. Both urged people to send donations to IS, which amounted to material support of terrorism under Russian law, the statements claimed. Footage released by the FSB indicated that the suspects did not resist arrest. Neither agency has named them.

IS originated from radical Islamist forces in Iraq and came to international prominence after gaining strength in 2014, when it capitalized on the lack of security in the country as well as the turmoil in neighboring Syria. The jihadists’ lightning offensive that year allowed them to capture Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, as well as large swathes of territory in Syria.

The group has since been largely defeated militarily and fractured under local and international pressure, though some splinters remain active, particularly in Afghanistan. Terrorist cells affiliated with IS remain a threat in southern parts of Russia.

“Russia reports record level of terrorism,” RT, (formerly Russia Today, a Kremlin-back news outlet), 3 August 2024. https://www.rt.com/russia/602085-russia-terrorism-crimes-surge/

According to a document posted to the ministry’s official website earlier this week, 1,651 crimes classified as terrorism were recorded in the country in January-June 2024, a nearly 40% increase over the same period in 2023. The ministry noted that for the same period from 2006 to 2023, the figure did not reach 1,400. The previous record high was registered in the first half of 2022, when 1,332 terrorism-linked crimes were recorded.

Crimes associated with extremist activities have also reached a record high. From January to June, 819 such crimes were registered, a nearly 12% increase year-on-year. This figure had not surpassed 800 since 2018.

Crimes designated as terror-linked in Russia include making preparations for carrying out a terrorist attack, public calls for terrorism and justification of terrorism, as well as hostage-taking. Extremist crimes include those committed on the basis of political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred, or enmity towards any social group.

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) routinely makes public information on foiled terror plots, often describing the suspects as people linked with either Islamist terrorist groups or Ukrainian nationalists or collaborators.

In June, the FSB’s director, Aleksandr Bortnikov, revealed that the agency had prevented a total of 134 acts of terrorism and sabotage in central Russia alone since the outbreak of the conflict between Moscow and Kiev in February 2022. The country’s security agencies have also dismantled 32 international terrorist cells operating in the country over this period, he stated.Russia saw one of the deadliest terror attacks in its history this past March, when four gunmen went on a shooting rampage at the Crocus City Hall concert venue outside Moscow. The attackers shot everyone in sight before setting the building on fire. The tragedy left 145 people dead and over 500 injured. A terrorist organization known as Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K) claimed responsibility for the attack, but the FSB has alleged that Kiev was behind the massacre, possibly using Islamists as proxies.

Notes:

[i] “Russian youth wrestling coach changed with terrorism offenses,” RT, 4 July 2024. https://www.rt.com/russia/600432-russian-wrestling-coach-terrorism/

[ii] “Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s comment on events around Ukraine,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 14 August 2024. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1965546/

[iii] Mark Galeotti, “In Moscow’s Shadows,” Episode 153: Geopolitics, Nepotism, Terrorism, and Sabotage, 30 June 2024. https://inmoscowsshadows.buzzsprout.com/1026985/15334481-in-moscow-s-shadows-153-geopolitics-nepotism-terror-and-assassination-all-the-nice-things

Image Information:

Image: Russian Ministry of Emergency firefighters standing outside Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, site of a March 2024 terrorism attack.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2024_Crocus_City_Hall_terrorist_attack_5.jpg
Attribution: Пресс-служба Губернатора Московской области (Press Office for Governor of Moscow Oblast)

Russia Creating New Officer Academies to Support Armed Forces Expansion

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Saratov Higher Artillery Command School.

“Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order to establish the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School.”

In December 2022, Russia announced that it would increase the number of uniformed personnel in the Ministry of Defense from approximately 1 million to 1.5 million personnel at a Collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense, attended by President Putin, former Minister of Defense General Shoigu, and Chief of the General Staff General Gerasimov.[i]  At this event, and by way of subsequent pronouncements, Russia has made it clear that it will not revert back to its previous end strength when its special military operation ends.[ii] Although Russia has had to resort to partial mobilization to fill its ranks for the ongoing war in Ukraine, permanently raising the end-strength to 1.5 million will almost certainly entail recruiting more contract personnel and increasing the standard one-year conscription period to two years. It will also involve adding additional officers. In the Soviet/Russian system, inducting and training enlisted personnel can be done relatively quickly, but officer accessions are a different matter. Officers are typically only trained at specialized 4-to-5-year academies making the officer creation pipeline a long one.  This is problematic for Russia, as it shuttered many officer academies during major reforms in the early 2010s, so it does not have institutional training capacity to train the necessary number of officers for a 1.5 million personnel force.  The accompanying excerpted article from Russian newspaper Izvestiya, discusses how Russia is reopening military officer academies to support an expansion of the force that will likely not be fully implemented until well after the special military operation ends.

Sources:

“Мишустин поручил создать Саратовское высшее артиллерийское командное училище (Mishustin orders creation of Saratov Higher Artillery Command School),” Izvestiya (daily Russian newspaper), 8 July 2024.  https://iz.ru/1724553/2024-07-08/mishustin-poruchil-sozdat-saratovskoe-vysshee-artilleriiskoe-komandnoe-uchilishche

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order to establish the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School. The document was signed on July 6 and published on the official legal information portal on July 8.

“To create a federal state military educational institution of higher education, the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School, of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation,” the document states.

The staffing level of military and civilian personnel at the school should be 6,000 personnel…Several more military academies may be created in Ulyanovsk. As Governor Alexey Russkikh reported on social networks in February, the issue has already been discussed with representatives of the Ministry of Defense. Thus, an inter-university military training center may be created in the city. Its base may be the former educational building of the Suvorov School in Krasnoznamenny Lane. In addition, a higher school of military transport aviation is planned to be located in Ulyanovsk on the basis of a former technical school.

Notes:

[i] “Изменение призывного возраста и увеличение армии. Путин и Шойгу выступили в Минобороны (Changing the conscription age and increasing the size of the Army: Putin and Shoigu spoke at the Ministry of Defense),” TASS, 21 December 2022.  https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/16655079

[ii] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: Saratov Higher Artillery Command School
Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Саратовское_высшее_военное_командно-инженерное_училище_ракетных_войск#/media/Файл:Артиллерийская_ул_2_Саратов.jpg 
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0