Category Archives: OE Watch

Iran Seeks To Cultivate Pakistani and Kurdish Support

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International Department of the Islamic Revolution Cultural & Research Institute unveils translations of Ali Khamenei’s book Palestine at the Tehran International Book Fair, May 10, 2024.

“Freedom fighters around the world will become familiar with the contents of this book.”

While Tehran propagating anti-Israeli vitriol is neither new nor remarkable, its choice about where to direct that propaganda does signal those people that the Iranian regime seeks to cultivate as allies. As reported by Dolat.ir, a government information center, the high-profile annual Tehran International Book Fair recently featured an updated collection of Khamenei’s writings and speeches about Israel and the Palestinians, dating to 1979.[i] Iranian press attention on translations of Khamenei’s writing on the Palestinians into both Urdu and Kurdish suggests renewed efforts by Khamenei to influence both Pakistani and Kurdish audiences. Over the past two decades, the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) has expanded its so-called “Axis of Resistance” to include not only Hezbollah and Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime, but also Iraqi militias and Houthi tribesmen in Yemen. In the early 1980s, the IRGC tried and failed to create a Hezbollah-like movement among Pakistani Shi’ites akin to its organization of Lebanese Shi’ites.

The effort to proselytize and disseminate Khamenei’s views to a Pakistani audience may suggest a renewed effort to cultivate the general Pakistani population. Such outreach would not limit itself to Pakistani Shi’ites but would seek to use Khamenei’s anti-Israel credentials to bolster Iran’s broader foreign policy leadership.[ii] The Iranian emphasis on cultivating Kurds suggests an effort to expand the Iranian regime’s influence among a population that has both been resistant to Khamenei’s worldview and has also cooperated closely with the U.S. military. While Iran maintains an open presence in Iraqi Kurdistan, the United States maintains a more overt presence. Both Iraqi Kurdistan and the Kurdish-dominated Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria impede the IRGC’s “land bridge” between Iran and the Eastern Mediterranean. Flipping the Kurds may not be imminent in the short-term, but Iran tends to play the long game.

Sources:

“کتاب «فلسطین؛ از منظر حضرت آیت‌الله سید علی خامنه‌ای» خشم نخست وزیر اسراییل را موجب شد” (The book Palestine: from the perspective of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, angered the Prime Minister of Israel.),” Dolat.ir (Government Information Center of the Islamic Republic of Iran), 11 May 2024. https://dolat.ir/detail/448480

The book Palestine is a compilation of descriptions, analyses, and proposed solutions by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution on the issue of Palestine. Given the significance and influential position of Imam Khamenei’s perspective on the Palestinian matter, and the unique current circumstances, this book has been translated and made available in various languages such as Arabic, English, Russian, Turkish, and other languages….

Hujjat al-Islam Saeed Solh-Mirzaei, a member of the Assembly of Experts said, “Due to the importance of Palestine for Urdu and Kurdish speakers, this book has been translated into these two languages, and it is hoped that all Muslims and freedom fighters around the world will become familiar with the contents of this book and fulfill their duties towards Palestine. God willing, they will soon pray together in gratitude in the noble Al-Qods.”

Notes:

[i] Filistin az manzar-i Ayatullah Khamini’i (Palestine from the Perspective of His Holiness Ayatollah Khamenei), Tehran: Islamic Revolution Publication, 2011.

[ii] For discussion of Iranian efforts to create Afghan and Pakistani militias, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Praises Revolutionary Guards’ Proxy Afghan Brigade,” OE Watch, 03-2023 https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/iran-praises-revolutionary-guards-proxy-afghan-brigade/; and Michael Rubin, “Cleric Speaks on Iran’s Foreign Militias,” OE Watch, February 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/266059/download

Image Information:

Image: International Department of the Islamic Revolution Cultural & Research Institute unveils translations of Ali Khamenei’s book Palestine at the Tehran International Book Fair, May 10, 2024.
Source: https://cdn-english.khamenei.ir/d/2024/05/11/3/40662.jpg
Attribution: Khamenei.ir

Iran’s Army Chief Claims It Is Accelerating Israel’s Destruction

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“Photo of commander-in-chief of the army (Artesh), Sayyed Abdolrahim Mousavi,” Iranian Online (semi-official news agency affiliated with IRNA), Uknown.

“History is divided into two eras, before and after Operation True Promise.”

Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian Army, Sayyed Abdolrahim Mousavi, recently declared on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting that “just like the resistance of the people of Gaza… Operation True Promise also created a strategic movement in the world.” Mousavi was referring to Iran’s retaliatory attack against Israel on 13 April in response to the Israeli air strike on the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus, Syria that killed senior members of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force earlier that month.[i] Mousavi highlighted how the history of the world had been divided before and after Iran’s operation against Israel.[ii] Referencing comments by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Mousavi emphasized that Israel’s destruction would come in the next twenty-five years and was only accelerated by the events of the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023 as well as Operation True Promise, because the latter chipped away at Israel’s security and invigorated political divisions within Israeli society. Of note, Iran’s 13 April attack brought Israel and Iran out of their forty-five-year shadow war, which had been marked by assassinations, cyberattacks, and sabotage. Israel’s subsequent attack on Iran on 19 April restored deterrence for the time being, but Israel’s limited response – destroying an S-300 [RG1] air defense system, demonstrating Israel’s ability to attack and take out Iranian air defense – has given Iran’s clerics the space to continue making bold statements at a time when regional tensions are at an all-time high, and when miscalculation is always a possibility.[iii]

Sources:

“دنیا به قبل و بعد از عملیات «وعده صادق» تقسیم شده است (The world is divided between before and after ‘True Promise’ operation),” Iranians Students’ News Agency (ISNA), 9 May 2024. https://www.isna.ir/news/1403022014474/%D8%AF%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D9%88-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%82-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA

The commander in chief of the army said: History is divided into two eras, before and after Operation True Promise. Just like how al-Aqsa Storm and the resistance of the people of Gaza took the world in a new direction, Operation True Promise also created a strategic movement in the world.

Today (May 9), Commander Sayyed Abdolrahim Mousavi, on the sidelines of awarding the medal of sacrifice presented by the commander-in-chief to the families of martyrs in the presence of journalists, spoke about the achievements of the army in the country: In the constitution it is emphasized that the army is popular. The army is national capital that belongs to the people of Iran, and wherever the country needs, the army will act.

He continued: If there’s a threat in the skies, the army will fulfill its duties. If needed in the sea, it will raise the proud flag of the Islamic Republic. If a conflict arises, they will fulfill their duty. Air defense forces are a broad umbrella in the sky that will constantly defend the country…The commander-in-chief of the army added: As the Supreme Leader predicted, the Zionist regime (Israel) will not see the next 25 years, with al-Aqsa Storm and Operation True Promise this issue will accelerate, and it is likely that the life of this illegitimate regime will end sooner so that the whole world can be saved from this cancerous tumor.

Notes:

[i] “Iran says Israel bombs its embassy in Syria, kills commanders,” Reuters, 1 April 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-bombs-iran-embassy-syria-iranian-commanders-among-dead-2024-04-01/; Matthew Mpoke Bigg, “What We Know About Iran’s Attack on Israel and What Happens Next,” New York Times, 14 April 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/14/world/middleeast/iran-israel-drones-attack.html

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Jon Gambrell, “Satellite photos suggest Iran air defense radar struck in Isfahan during apparent Israeli attack,” Associated Press, 22 April 2024. https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-s300-radar-hit-isfahan-attack-ce6719d3df8ebf5af08b035427ee215c

Image Information:

Image: “Photo of commander-in-chief of the army (Artesh), Sayyed Abdolrahim Mousavi,” Iranian Online (semi-official news agency affiliated with IRNA), Uknown.
Source:https://inn.ir/news/article/65026/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%84%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%88%DB%8C:-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%82-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C%D9%84-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4%DB%8C%D8%AF
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Iranian Commander Threatens Pursuit of Nuclear Weapon

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“IRGC Commander Ahmad Haghtalab delivering speech,” IRIB video screenshot, 18 April 2024.

“If the false Zionist regime wants to exploit the threat of attacking our country’s nuclear centers as a tool to put pressure on Iran, it is possible and conceivable to revise the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear doctrine and policies to deviate from previously declared considerations.”

On 18 Aril 2024, Ahmad Haghtalab, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander the head of security for Iran’s nuclear sites, declared on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, that “If the fake Zionist regime [of Israel] wants to use the threat of attacking nuclear sites to put pressure on Iran, it is possible and conceivable for [Iran] to revise its nuclear doctrine and policies, and deviate from its past declared considerations.” Haghtalab also threatened that if Israel attacked Iran, Tehran has identified Israeli nuclear sites and would respond in kind in the vein of Operation True Promise. This refers to Iran’s 13 April retaliation after Israel’s strike and killing of several high-ranking IRGC commanders at the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus, Syria earlier in the month. Other Iranian officials have also made public comments in recent months about the revision of the country’s nuclear doctrine. As per the second excerpted article, the IRGC-affiliated Javan newspaper noted that Haghtalab’s comments regarding Iran’s possible nuclear pivot were the first made by a high-ranking IRGC official and were made with “coordination with top decision-making bodies.”  Iran appears to be testing the world stage, and with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in shambles,[i] Tehran may be preparing to fully pursue its nuclear program. Indeed, Iran has been incrementally pulling away from the JCPOA and is now enriching uranium at 60 percent purity—short of the 90 percent purity required to be weapons-grade.[ii] In strategic terms, a nuclear weapon could also be considered a deterrent against forced regime change, and the ailing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, now 85, may be thinking about Iran’s survival post-mortem. Whatever the rationale, the renewed discussions of a nuclear revival merit attention.

Sources:

Source:

“مراکز هسته ای کشور در امنیت کامل هستند (Nuclear centers of the country are completely safe)” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 18 April 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00Hf4p

Chief Ahmad Haghtalab, pointing to the Zionist regime’s criminal act by attacking the consulate of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the country of Syria, has stamped out international laws and regulations…

The IRGC commander of the protection and security of the country’s nuclear centers, emphasizing that the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran are fully ready, noted: the nuclear sites of the Zionist enemy have the necessary identification and information and is at our disposal, and so to respond to their possible action. Our hands are on the trigger of firing powerful missiles to destroy specified targets.

He said that if the Zionist regime wants to take action against our nuclear centers and facilities, it will definitely and certainly be faced with our reaction…

If the false Zionist regime wants to exploit the threat of attacking our country’s nuclear centers as a tool to put pressure on Iran, it is possible and conceivable to revise the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear doctrine and policies to deviate from previously declared considerations.

Source:

“ اسرائیل تهدید اتمی مقام رسمی سپاه را جدی بگیرد (Israel must take the nuclear threat of the IRGC official seriously) Javan newspaper (daily newspaper closely tied to IRGC), 18 April 2024. https://www.javanonline.ir/0058dL

These statements, which are made for the first time by a senior IRGC official, are of serious importance in some ways…

Israel must take the message of this IRGC commander seriously because the red line of any country is its national security, and if Iran sees that its conventional weapons cannot provide security for its nuclear facilities, it may reconsider its defense and nuclear doctrines…Certainly this comment, which is widely published by the Islamic Republic’s official media, was not without coordination with the higher decision-making bodies of this system.

Notes:

[i] In 2015, five world powers plus Germany signed what became known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which curbed Iran’s controversial nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, 14 July 2015. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-comprehensive-plan-action_en

[ii] In 2018 the Trump administration withdrew from the 2015 JCPOA deal and reimposed sanctions, despite Tehran having not violating the agreement at the time. See: “President Donald J. Trump is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal,” White House, 8 May 2018. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal/; Francois Murphy, “Iran undoes slowdown in enrichment of uranium to near weapons-grade -IAEA,” Reuters, 26 December 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-undoes-slowdown-enrichment-uranium-near-weapons-grade-iaea-2023-12-26

Image Information:

Image: “IRGC Commander Ahmad Haghtalab delivering speech,” IRIB video screenshot, 18 April 2024.
Source: https://www.iribnews.ir/00Hf4p
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Iran To Cooperate With Russia On Gas Infrastructure and Trade

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Iran’s gas infrastructure remains both antiquated and inefficient.

“[Mohammad Hosseini] expressed Iran’s readiness to expand its cooperation with Russia to improve the safety of gas facilities against sabotage and terrorist attacks.”

Iran has the world’s third-largest proven oil reserves and, even under sanctions, remains one of the top ten world producers. Yet Iran’s gas industry lags far behind its oil extraction capabilities due to an antiquated refinery and pipeline network. Iran must import much of the gas that it utilizes both to fuel transportation needs and to inject into oil fields to facilitate extraction. Iran is increasingly looking to Russia, for assistance.

The excerpted report from Iran-focused Dubai-based brokerage PCM Farsi, addresses a meeting between Hossein Ali Mohammad Hosseini, the director of the Corporate Planning of the National Iranian Gas Company, and Russian energy officials. Hosseini’s comments that Russia and Iran might cooperate regarding gas infrastructure modernization reflects the government’s commercial agenda: if the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked National Iranian Gas Company can curb losses attributable to waste, then it will not need to spend as much to import refined gasoline.[i] The report also notes the vulnerability of Iran’s gas infrastructure . Iran has blamed Israel, without evidence, for a February 2024 explosion on a major pipeline. In the wake of the Woman, Life, Freedom protests, there have been numerous other gas infrastructure explosions across the country according to reports and social media discussions by ordinary Iranians. Many of these incidents go unreported, while the official Iranian media often dismisses the reported incidents as accidents, or the result of illegal tapping of gas lines to steal petrol. To acknowledge openly the need to work with Russia against gas infrastructure sabotage and terrorism suggests that the Iranian gas industry officials do not fully believe the more innocent explanations from their government. Given the importance of hydrocarbons to Iran’s economy, a faltering gas infrastructure and any vulnerability to sabotage, vandalism, or insurgency could disproportionately affect Iran’s economy and potentially its military readiness.

Sources:

“تهران و مسکو همکاری‌های خود را در زمینه فناوری گاز گسترش می‌دهند” (Tehran and Moscow expanding their cooperation in the field of gas technology),” PCM Farsi (Persian language portal of Dubai-based PCM Brokerage), 14 May 2024. https://pcmfa.news/2024/05/14/11977/

Mohammad Hosseini mentioned the desire for Iran to expand relations with Russia in the energy sector, and said his country welcomes the proposal of the Ministry of Energy of Russia to hold a specialized meeting on digitization, monitoring, and data analysis at the Russian Energy Week, as well as at the St. Petersburg Energy Congress. In his remarks, the director of the National Iranian Gas Company stressed the need to share common experiences in area such as reducing the amount of gas loss, and he expressed Iran’s readiness to expand its cooperation with Russia to improve the safety of gas facilities against sabotage and terrorist attacks.

Notes:

[i] For discussion of Iran’s efforts for gasoline self-sufficiency, see: Michael Rubin, “Achieving Gasoline Self-Sufficiency in Iran,” OE Watch, August 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/241432/download

Image: Iran’s gas infrastructure remains both antiquated and inefficient.
Source: Mojtaba Mohammadgholi, Shana Photo, https://media.shana.ir/d/2023/08/20/3/392725.jpg?ts=1692521593000
Attribution: Shana.ir

Revisiting Russian “Africa Corps’” Organizational Structure

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Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (left) is heading the newly formed Africa Corps, which under his leadership is set to become a key entity through which the Russian state will project power in West Africa.

“The Africa Corps represents the new incarnation of Russian military influence in Africa.”

Following the death of Russian Wagner Group founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious airplane crash near Moscow in 2023, reports have emerged that his successor is Russian Deputy Defense Minister, General Yunus-Bek Evkurov.[i] However, in Africa, the mercenary company’s operation is rebranding as “Africa Corps” whereas the company’s operations elsewhere in the world seem to be retaining the Wagner brand. This new branding may help the company avoid the stigma of its Wagner predecessors for war crimes and smuggling and reduce international pressure against the company in Africa.

The excerpted French-language article in the Chadian publication, alwihdainfo.com, is an African perspective of the differences between Russia’s Africa Corps[ii] and its predecessor Wagner Group. The article acknowledges that Africa Corps is the successor to Wagner Group with important differences. First, it notes that Africa Corps is intended to legitimize the Russian military influence on the African continent while competing with the diminishing presence of the U.S. and European powers. Second, Africa Corps may have a smaller footprint than Wagner in Africa. For example, the article mentions it operates only in Libya, inheriting Wagner’s main bases and most of Wagner’s fighters; Burkina Faso; Mali; Central African Republic and Niger. According to the article, Libya’s position on the Mediterranean Sea facilitates military supply lines and the movement of Africa Corps personnel into Africa. The previous iteration of Wagner had also operated extensively in Sudan and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in Eastern Africa, including Mozambique and Madagascar.[iii]

Another difference highlighted in the article relates to the way that Africa Corps will operate. Africa Corps is now focusing on providing military support to African countries through instructors, weapons, and developing counter-terrorism strategies with host nations in cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defense. In contrast, Wagner soldiers directly participated in missions against terrorist or insurgent groups and functioned separate from, albeit in support of, the Russian government. The article indicates that the new Africa Corps will be more sustainable than the previous Wagner Group because of Africa Corps’ formal integration with the Russian state, and the ministry of defense. Further the ministry’s commitment to Africa Corps indicates that Russia is serious about its geopolitical ambitions in West Africa and Africa Corps’ impact on the region will not be fleeting. At a time when Western influence and partnerships with West African states are waning, Africa Corps is becoming the entity through which Russia will reassert itself.

Sources:

Source: “De ‘Wagner’ à ‘Africa Corps’: la Russie toujours présente au Sahel (From ‘Wagner’ to ‘Africa Corps’: Russia always is present in the Sahel),” alwihdainfo.com (French-language Chadian publication with a reputation for independent reporting and being critical of the government), 3 May 2024. https://www.alwihdainfo.com/De-Wagner-a-Africa-Corps-la-Russie-toujours-presente-au-Sahel_a132053.html

Recently, many people have been curious about the difference between the Russian paramilitary group “Wagner” and the “Africa Corps”, which newly appeared on the African scene and which was also founded in Russia to be deployed in African countries. In this analysis, we will seek to explain the difference between the two organizations, how and where they operate, and what their ambitions are in Africa.

Africa Corps is a Russian military company that was created in early 2024 as a replacement for the Wagner Group. This organization reflects Russia’s desire to extend its military influence on the African continent and to provide legitimacy to its official and public presence in the face of the European and American presence. Africa Corps is deployed in 5 countries: Libya, Burkina Faso, Mali, Central African Republic and Niger. Libya represents the core of the corps due to the previous activity of Wagner elements in the city of Tripoli…. Another factor in the choice of Libya as the headquarters of this corps is its strategic geographical location due to its connection with the Mediterranean coast, which ensures military supply lines and movement of corps members to other countries The Africa Corps’ modus operandi is entirely dependent on providing military support to African countries such as instructors and weapons. The company also is concerns with the development of strategies in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, such as is the case in Mali and Niger… In short, the Africa Corps represents the new incarnation of Russian military influence in Africa.

Notes:

[ii] Since the death of Russian Wagner Group founder and CEO, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious airplane crash near Moscow in 2023, reports have emerged that his successor is Russian Deputy Defense Minister, General Yunus-Bek Evkurov. For a profile of Evkurov, which argues that he “has the full backing of Russia’s military establishment and will not have to beg for ammunition or restrict himself to the use of contractors and mercenaries,” see: Andrew McGregor, “Yunus-Bek Yevkurov: A Profile of Russia’s New Ingush African Corps Leader,” Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume: 15 Issue: 3, 18 April 2024. (URL?) The article notes that under Yevkurov “the Africa Corps will have greater access to resources, but will be expected to be self-sufficient in many ways. This means Wagner-style associations with business interests will likely continue, although disentangling these interests from the Wagner network will be challenging.” In addition, it asserts that “Improving battlefield performance will be a priority for Yevkurov. Thus far, Russian fighters have not proven any more effective in eliminating Sahelian terrorist formations than their French predecessors.”

[iii] See, for example, Brian Katz, Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, Nicholas Harrington, “Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies, CSIS, September 2020, https://russianpmcs.csis.org/

Image Information:

Image: Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (left) is heading the newly formed Africa Corps, which under his leadership is set to become a key entity through which the Russian state will project power in West Africa.
Source:kremlin.ru, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Deputy_Defence_Minister_Yunus-Bek_Yevkurov_and_Wagner_leader_Andrei_Troshev.jpg
Attribution: CC x 4.0

Russia Redeploys Military Police to Southern Syria

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Map showing Syria, Israel, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (1991).

“The [Russian] Military Police has set up an additional post near the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights.”

After over a year of absence, Russian forces have returned to Syrian territory near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, in theory, to curb spillovers of violence from Israel to Syria. Russia’s deployments to date have largely been symbolic, including occasional aerial patrols and the establishment of three military police observation posts in the Syrian provinces of Quneitra and Daraa, near the buffer zone separating Syria and Israel. As reported in the first accompanying article from the Syrian opposition news website Enab Baladi, Russia established its third observation post in the area in early April 2024, after establishing two similar posts in January.

Southern Syria is often considered the cradle of the Syrian civil war, and was a hardened rebel bastion for several years. Daraa province remained highly volatile until Russian-sponsored settlements with rebel groups in 2018 stabilized local security conditions. With a modicum of peace achieved, Russian presence and influence in this part of Syria dwindled beginning in 2018 while Iranian-backed Syrian government forces and militias strengthened their grip in former rebel territory. Following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian forces all but disappeared from southern Syria, allowing Iranian militias to expand their influence in the area, often through local proxies and under the cover of Syrian Army forces.[i] Iranian influence in Syrian territory close to Israel has become a source of heightened concern not just for Israel but also for Russia, which fears that Gaza spillover could threaten Syria’s delicate status quo.

In the months following the 7 October attack, Russia successfully blocked Iranian attempts to launch attacks from southern Syria in support of Hamas in Gaza per the second accompanying excerpt, published in January 2024 in the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed. The redeployment of Russian military police to this part of Syria may therefore be seen as bolstering Russia’s ability to continue preventing escalation on this front. Indeed, Russia’s observation posts have all been set up in the aftermath of Israeli assassinations of high-ranking Iranian officials in Syrian territory: the first two posts were set up in the weeks following the killing of General Razi Mousavi in late December 2023, and the third one the day after General Mohammad Reza Zahedi was killed in April 2024. Russia’s return to southern Syria is less about supporting Iran against Israel than it is about deterring Tehran’s use of Syrian soil to respond to Israeli attacks on Iranian personnel in Syria notwithstanding the deepening Russo-Iranian strategic cooperation. , However, experts are skeptical of Russia’s ability to succeed. According to Mustafa al-Naimi, a Turkey-based Syrian analyst cited in the third accompanying excerpt, also from Enab Baladi, Russia’s efforts are bound to fail. Even if it succeeds in preventing Iran from opening the Syria front against Israel, Russia will be unable to remove Iranian influence from the area, given that its proxies will simply “return to the region wearing the uniform of the Syrian regime.” As such, al-Naimi conjectures, Russia’s symbolic redeployment near the Syria-Israel border is unlikely to do anything other than postpone the inevitable: an expansion of the Gaza conflict into southern Syria.

Sources:

Source: “Russia establishes third military post on borders of occupied Golan Heights,” Enab Baladi English (Syrian opposition English-language news website), 2 April 2024. https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2024/04/russia-establishes-third-military-post-on-borders-of-occupied-golan-heights/

The Deputy Chief of the Russian Center for Reconciliation of the Opposing Parties in Syria (a division of the Russian Ministry of Defense), Major General Yury Popov, stated that the Military Police has set up an additional post near the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights… This Syrian military post is the third of its kind established since the beginning of the current year, after Russia reduced its deployment in southern Syria at the beginning of 2022 following its invasion of neighboring Ukraine.

Source:

ما أهداف روسيا من نشر نقاط مراقبة في القنيطرة؟ “What are Russia’s goals in setting up observation posts in Quneitra?” Al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 6 January 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9

[Researcher Rachid] Hourani added to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that, after the launch of the Israeli military operation against the Gaza Strip, Iran tried to activate several fronts based on the principle of “unifying the arenas.” There were several visits by Iranian military officials to Syria with the aim of opening that front, but they did not amount to much due to Russian rejection and its tendency to use the so-called “Iranian card” and control Tehran’s behavior in Syria.

Hourani considered that Russia can actually curb Iran in southern Syria “because it fully controls the military decision-making in regime areas, in addition to being a major party to the understandings related to Israel’s security threats from Syria, such as the settlement agreement with the Syrian opposition factions in mid-2018 and the Israeli-American-Russian security meeting that took place in mid-2019″…

Source:

ما وراء نشر روسيا نقاطًا عسكرية على حدود الجولان المحتل “What is behind Russia’s setting up military posts on the occupied Golan border?” Enab Baladi (Syrian opposition news website), 14 January 2024. https://www.enabbaladi.net/682917/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%8B%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88/

Mustafa Al-Naimi, a researcher on Iranian affairs, told Enab Baladi, “We are facing a scene of gradual escalation from both the Iranian and Israeli sides.” Al-Naimi believes that the Russian side is trying to reposition itself to ward off any attempt by the Israeli side to advance on the ground along this front by, at the very least, removing the Iranian militias from the southern region adjacent to the Golan.He added that this measure will not work for these militias, because they will return to the region wearing the uniform of the Syrian regime… because of this and the fact that the Israeli side does not trust that Russia has the ground forces needed to control the region at a depth of 45 kilometers, al-Naimi suggests that these measures are “postponing the battle, not preventing it.”

Notes:

[i] For more on the 2018 agreement, see: Armenak Tokmajyan. “A Flashpoint Looms in Southern Syria,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 26 March 2024. https://carnegie-mec.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/04/a-flashpoint-looms-in-southern-syria?lang=en&center=middle-east

For more on post-Ukraine Russian and Iranian presence in Syria, see: Lucas Winter, “Iran Repositions Its Proxies In Syria As Russia Turns Focus To Ukraine,” OE Watch, 02-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-repositions-its-proxies-in-syria-as-russia-turns-focus-to-ukraine/;  Lucas Winter, “Iran Digs Into Central Syria, Filling Vacuum Left By Russia,” OE Watch, May 2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-digs-into-central-syria-filling-vacuum-left-by-russia/; Lucas Winter, “Russian Influence Fades In Southern Syria,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russian-influence-fades-in-southern-syria/

Image Information:

Image: Map showing Syria, Israel, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (1991).
Source: https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-pclmaps-oclc-25871248-golan_heights-1991.jpg
Attribution: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, Public Domain

Russia Withdraws Its Forces from Nagorno-Karabakh

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Map of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

“Let us note that a few days ago, the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov confirmed the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent from Karabakh.”

In April 2024, the government of Azerbaijan announced that the Russian peacekeeping mission had started withdrawing personnel, marking one of only a few instances a Russian peacekeeping mission in the Commonwealth of Independent States has ended.[i] The excerpted article from Azerbaijan’s news agency Trend reports that the Russian peacekeeping force from Nagorno-Karabakh has relocated to temporary deployment points in Armenia.[ii] Armenia’s Secretary of the Security Council noted that these units cannot remain in Armenia. Lastly, the article notes that Azerbaijan requested the removal of the Russian peacekeeping force and the Russian government complied but does not mention where Russian personnel will eventually be redeployed.

Additionally, a joint Russia-Turkey observation center in Azerbaijan that once monitored the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has also closed. The excerpted article from Turkey’s state-run Anadolu Agency notes that the joint observation center had been based in Azerbaijan since early 2021 as part of an agreement between Russia and Turkey to observe the ceasefire agreement. The article notes that the work of the center is no longer needed since Azerbaijan took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023.[iii] As a result, Russian and Turkish personnel, 60 from each country, are leaving. Overall, the total number of Russian personnel redeploying from the peacekeeping mission and the joint monitoring center is not significant but is worth noting as Russia has historically reached agreements to leave some units in place even after a peacekeeping mission has changed or ended. Russia will likely continue to be involved in developments between Armenia and Azerbaijan going forward, but Azerbaijan’s complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh frees up Russian forces to use elsewhere, potentially in Ukraine.[iv]

Sources:

Source: Rena Abdurakhmona, “Российские миротворцы направились из Карабаха в Армению (Russian peacekeepers have deployed from Karabakh to Armenia),” Trend (news agency in Azerbaijan), 23 April 2024. https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3889409.html

Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh went to temporary deployment points in Gorus and Garakils (Sisian)…(the) Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia Armen Grigoryan told the Armenian media…

“Since Russian peacekeeping troops are leaving Karabakh, they, of course, cannot remain in the Republic of Armenia either. A group and convoy of peacekeepers from Karabakh headed to temporary deployment points in Goris and Garakils (Sisian),” he said.

Let us note that a few days ago, the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov confirmed the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent from Karabakh.

Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan – Head of the Department for Foreign Policy of the Presidential Administration Hikmet Hajiyev, answering a question from AZERTAG regarding information about the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the territory of Azerbaijan, said that the top leadership of both countries made a decision on the early withdrawal of peacekeepers…

Source: Ruslan Rehimov, “Turkish-Russian joint center completes mission in Azerbaijan,” Anadolu Agency (state-run news agency of Turkey), 26 April 2024.https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/turkish-russian-joint-center-completes-mission-in-azerbaijan/3203012

The Turkish-Russian joint observation center established in Azerbaijan’s Aghdam region has completed its mission after three years of service.

The center was established to monitor cease-fire and prevent violations after the Second Karabakh War, when Azerbaijan liberated most of the Karabakh region from decades of occupation by Armenia.

Karim Valiyev, Azerbaijan’s chief of general staff, praised the center’s contributions to peace at a ceremony on Friday attended by Azerbaijani, Russian, and Turkish officials.

Valiyev said Azerbaijan has fully established its sovereignty in Karabakh, and therefore the mission of the monitoring center had been completed…The center, established near the Marzili village of Aghdam, opened on Jan. 30, 2021, with 60 Turkish and 60 Russian soldiers…Azerbaijan established full sovereignty in Karabakh after an “anti-terrorism operation” in September 2023, after which separatist forces in the region surrendered.

Notes:

[i] The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is made up of former Soviet Republics and remains an area where the Russian government has special relationships and works to maintain influence. Russian peacekeeping missions in the CIS in the past have typically been open-ended with Russian forces remaining in place in some capacity, which has allowed Russia to maintain influence. The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) peacekeeping mission to Kazakhstan in January 2022 marks the other example of Russian forces ending a peacekeeping mission in the CIS and withdrawing its forces. For background on Russian peacekeeping missions in the CIS, see: Matthew Stein, “The Evolutionary Russian View of Peacekeeping as Part of Modern Warfare,” FMSO’s Foreign Perspectives Brief, 24 March 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/2023-03-24-the-evolutionary-russian-view-of-peacekeeping-as-part-of-modern-warfare-matthew-stein-update/

[ii] The Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh deployed in November 2020 as part of the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan that ended the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. The peacekeeping force included around 2,000 Russian personnel, who established two dozen observation posts in Nagorno-Karabakh to monitor the ceasefire under a five-year mandate that would automatically renew for an additional five years unless Armenia or Azerbaijan gave notice to the other two parties to the agreement to terminate the mission.

[iii] In September 2023, Azerbaijani forces carried out an operation in Nagorno-Karabakh which resulted in Azerbaijan regaining full control of the region from ethnic Armenians and ended the existence of the self-proclaimed breakaway region of Artsakh. The Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh closed a few observation posts following the September 2023 operation,but remained largely in place with the consent and cooperation of Azerbaijani authorities.

[iv] Russian peacekeepers dealt with several ceasefire violations from both sides in the years since then and notably allowed activists from Azerbaijan to blockade the Lachin Corridor, the single road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, starting in December 2022 until September 2023. For background on the blockade of the Lachin Corridor, see: Matthew Stein, “Ongoing Clashes In Nagorno-Karabakh Threaten Fragile Truce,” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/ongoing-clashes-in-nagorno-karabakh-threaten-fragile-truce/

Image Information:

Image: Map of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Source:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2020_Nagorno-Karabakh_war.svg
Attribution: CCA 3.0

Russian Iskandar Brigade Moves Closer to Finland

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A member of the Finnish Army watches a K-9 Thunder [RG1] 155mm Self-propelled Howitzer drive by after a live fire exercise with U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, on a range near Rovaniemi, Finland, May 17, 2024.

“Iskanders performed very well during the Special Military Operation [read: war], so the Finns should know that if something happens, such joy can come to them,” military expert Dmitry Boltenkov said to Izvestia.”

With the reestablishment of the Leningrad Military District, previously neutral Finland has become a focus of Russian and NATO interests. The excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer highlights Russia’s decision to form a missile brigade featuring Iskander missiles in the Republic of Karelia, near Finland. Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu noted that due to Finland’s decision to join NATO, and “NATO’s desire to build up military potential near the Russian borders, as well as to expand the North Atlantic Alliance at the expense of Finland and Sweden,” Russia was required to undertake “retaliatory measures…to create an appropriate grouping of troops in Northwest Russia.” Russia’s decision to form a missile brigade so close to Finland also coincided with the annual U.S.-led Immediate Response 2024 exercise which took place in northern Europe in April and included Finland. Immediate Response featured U.S. equipment sent to Europe to support the exercise.[i] What probably interests Russia most is how much of what equipment the U.S. leaves behind and where they leave it.

Sources:

Source: Thomas Nielsen, “Finland relaxed over Moscow’s plans to deploy Iskander-M missiles near border”, The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 24 April 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2024/04/finland-relaxed-over-moscows-plans-deploy-iskander-missiles-near-border

In its Kremlin-loyal newspaper Izvestia the Russian Defense Ministry reports on the new formation of a separate missile brigade in the Republic of Karelia. “Iskanders performed very well during the Special Military Operation [read: war], so the Finns should know that if something happens, such joy can come to them,” military expert Dmitry Boltenkov said to Izvestia.

Iskander-M [RG1] is mobile and each vehicle can carry two missiles. The missile flies ballistic at a hypersonic speed of Mach 6 and has a range of 400-500 kilometers.  Several different conventional warheads can be attached to the missiles, including a cluster munitions warhead, enhanced-blast warhead, high-explosive fragmentation warhead, an earth penetrator for bunker busting and an electromagnetic pulse device for anti-radar missions. The missile can also carry nuclear warheads.

Moscow has repeatedly said Finland’s decision to join NATO is provocative and will destabilize the security landscape in northern Europe. “Given NATO’s desire to build up military potential near the Russian borders, as well as to expand the North Atlantic Alliance at the expense of Finland and Sweden, retaliatory measures are required to create an appropriate grouping of troops in Northwest Russia,” Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu previously stated.

The fact is that it was Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine that destabilized geopolitics in all of Europe. Finnish NATO-membership was not on the political agenda in Helsinki before February 24, 2022.

Finland shares a 1,340 km border with Russia from the Baltic Sea in the south to the Kola Peninsula in the north. The border has been closed by Helsinki since last fall when Russia’s FSB directed huge crowds of migrants to enter Finland in what Finnish authorities have called a hybrid operation.

…Finland joined NATO in April 2023, a move that caused Russia to restructure its military forces by depriving the Northern Fleet of the status as a military district. Reestablishing the Leningrad Military District is considered a sign that Russia’s military planners now see the entire western border as one theater of operation in case of war.

Notes:

[i] Equipment belonging to the US Army 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division has been sent to support Immediate Response 2024 (IR24). The exercise includes allied training in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Czechia and Poland taking place between 21 April – 31 May, according to the Norwegian Armed Forces. See: Atle Staalesen, “US Army sends heavy equipment to Norwegian Arctic port of Narvik for transfer to Finland”, The Barents Observer, 24 April 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2024/04/us-army-sends-heavy-equipment-norwegian-arctic-port-narvik-transfer-finland

Image Information:

Image: A member of the Finnish Army watches a K-9 Thunder [RG1] 155mm Self-propelled Howitzer drive by after a live fire exercise with U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, on a range near Rovaniemi, Finland, May 17, 2024. 
Source: DVIDS, https://www.dvidshub.net/image/8418866/northern-forest-exercise
Attribution: Public Domain

Russian Import-Substitution Impacts Armored Vehicle Production

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Typhoon K-4386 “Typhoon-VDV” at Armiya-2021. Issues in bringing the Typhoon-VDV to serial production, due to the number of imported components and sophistication in design, illustrates the gap between Russia’s military modernization aspirations and industrial base capabilities.

“Currently, measures are being taken to engage specialized enterprises and organizations in the development and manufacturing of domestic components necessary for the production of protected military vehicles. Solving these issues is now considered by military leadership as one of the priority directions for enhancing combat readiness and reducing combat losses of the troops.”

Recent articles in Russian military publications regarding Typhoon [RG1] [i] armored vehicle production  highlight the advantages – and tradeoffs – of import-substitution measures across Russia’s defense industry. Moscow’s inability to import critical components has forced Russian manufacturers to simplify designs and shift component production to domestic manufacturers. According to the Russian military journal Material’no-tehnicheskoe obespechenie Vooruzhennyh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii, initial development of the Typhoon series of 4×4 and 6×6 armored vehicles in the 2010s was in response to the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) order to create vehicles capable of protecting crews on par with foreign offerings through 2020. The Typhoon-Kand Typhoon-Y capable of carrying a variety of armaments depending on mission requirements were Russia’s answer to the American-made Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle. Despite their official adoption by the Russian MoD, the number of components of foreign origin prevented mass production of initial models.

The journal further details how the military invasion of Ukraine in 2022 underscored the urgent need for armored transport. While domestic production has been a Russian military focus prior to the Ukrainian conflict, the war has accelerated import-substitution measures. Using existing multi-purpose vehicle chassis and domestic components, Russian military manufacturers began rapidly producing armored vehicles to meet pressing battlefield needs. However, current Typhoons suffer from reduced payload capacity, mobility, and less protection than initial test models using foreign produced parts. Some variants, such as the Typhoon-VDV, remain in limited production due to continued reliance on foreign parts.

The second excerpted article from the Russian military journal Armeiskii sbornik noted the extent of these changes in manufacturing and capability to the current Ground Forces model BMM [RG2] ,[ii] the ZCA-T “Linza,” a Typhoon-K variant. The “simplified chassis” version of the Linza features transmission, transfer block, bridge, power steering, and armor made by domestic manufacturers—primarily KamAZ but lacks a multi-functional command and control terminal. The case of the Typhoon demonstrates the impacts of import-substitution measures on the Russian defense industry and the rapid tradeoffs being made to maintain the current manufacturing tempo.

Sources:

Source: Evgeniy I. Kotyga, Vasily A. Novikov, Ksenia N. Moskalyuk, “Броня На Колесах (Armor on Wheels),” Logistics of the Military Forces of the Russian Federation (Monthly Russian military periodical), No. 4, April 2024. https://on-demand.eastview.com/browse/publication/144326

Pg. 75-76: “Following the tests, the protected vehicles OKR “Typhoon-K” and “Typhoon-U” were accepted for supply to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation by orders of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. However, due to the high complexity of the design and the large number of imported components, they were not mass-produced.

With the beginning of a special military operation, the issue of equipping the forces with protected vehicles became acute. To meet the urgent operational needs of the troops, the production of protected vehicles was organized based on the chassis and components of existing domestic multi-purpose vehicles (similar to unrealized projects with codes “Vodnik,” “Medved,” “Karatel,” etc.).

Pg. 78: “To address technical issues related to “import substitution” in protected vehicles of the “Typhoon-K” 4×4 wheeled formula and “Typhoon-VDV” families, a series of measures have been taken and is currently being implemented in the following main directions:

  • Utilization of domestic armored steels, titanium alloys, and composite ceramic panels instead of foreign-produced armor materials like Armox and Plasan.
  • Full localization of Cummins engines and ZF transmissions by domestic enterprises.
  • Import substitution of automotive components in suspension systems, steering control, electrical equipment, and other vehicle systems and assemblies with domestic counterparts.”

Pg. 80: “The effectiveness of the introduced changes in the design of protected vehicles has been positively evaluated based on the results of the conducted tests. Samples of modernized protected vehicles were accepted for supply to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at the beginning of 2023. Thus, summing up the creation of new and modernization of existing protected vehicles, it should be noted the effectiveness of measures for ‘import substitution,’ simplification of sample designs, and the use of domestic materials, components, and assemblies, which meets the high demand of the troops for this type of equipment.

Source: R. Pokutny, R. Kurmaev, V. Stolbunov, “Красный Крест На Броне (A Red Cross on Armor),” Army Digest (Monthly Military journal), No. 4 (128-129), April 2024. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/publication/470

Pg. 129: However, during the operation of the BMM (Armored Medical Vehicle), a number of shortcomings related to the excessive complexity of the design were identified. Taking into account the changes made (Table 1), on the basis of the ZSA-T “Linza” was created with a simplified design. The goals of creating this modification are to eliminate unnecessary complexity, reduce cost and time indicators at the production and operation stage, and replace imported components with domestic ones. The main changes to the ZSA-T “Linza” of a simplified design include the use of a single-volume body layout formula with a simultaneous increase in the protection class of the medical department, the provision of a spare wheel, and the installation of a “Tucha” smoke screen system, while BIUS (multifunction command and control system) and ABS (most likely the acronym for “anti-brake system”) are excluded.”

Notes:

[i] The Typhoon armored vehicle is produced by ROSOBORONEXPORT, a subsidiary of Rostec State Corporation and manufacturer of military equipment across the Russian Ground, Air, Naval, and Air Defense Forces. Products range from the T-90 tank to the Orlan family of UAVs.

[ii] “BMM” is the overarching term in the Russian Ground Forces for armored medical vehicles.

Image Information:

Image: Typhoon K-4386 “Typhoon-VDV” at Armiya-2021. Issues in bringing the Typhoon-VDV to serial production, due to the number of imported components and sophistication in design, illustrates the gap between Russia’s military modernization aspirations and industrial base capabilities. 
Source: ROSOBORONEXPORT, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Air-droppably_special-purpose_protected_vehicle_%28ZASN-D%29_during_the_%22Armiya_2021%22_exhibition.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0 DEED

Russia Evaluates Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Combat Missions

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“One of the main military-technical features of the special military operation in Ukraine, along with the use of high-precision and hypersonic missiles, has been the massive use of small commercial UAVs.”

The accompanying excerpted article in a monthly journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Armeisky Sbornik, discusses the importance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on the modern battlefield. Russia believes that current UAV usage is not just a feature of the current conflict, but also indicative of the changing character of war. Therefore, Russia is now considering how UAV usage will be employed for all types of combat actions (offense, defense, raid, meeting battle) and when on the march.[i] Although not explicitly stated, the article suggests that UAVs will no longer be concentrated in a single unit as they were before 2022.[ii] Russia’s understanding of the situation suggests that individual units will likely each have their own UAVs and counter-UAV technologies. In the Russian view, success on the modern battlefield requires that all types of units, not just electronic warfare and air defense personnel, need some degree of UAV and counter-UAV technologies to accomplish their respective missions.

Sources:

Source: V. Dyatchin and I. Starodubtsev, “Влияние беспилотных летательных аппаратов на способы действий общевойсковых подразделений (The influence of unmanned aerial vehicles on the methods of action of combined arms units),” Armeisky Sbornik (monthly journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense), May 2024.  https://army.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/573847/

One of the main military-technical features of the special military operation in Ukraine, along with the use of high-precision and hypersonic missiles, has been the massive use of small commercial UAVs. [i] Without UAVs, it is impossible to imagine the actions of assault detachments and groups, the destruction of the enemy by tube artillery and multiple launch rocket systems, including the use of high-tech weapons, the conduct of actions by reconnaissance elements, the fight against special detachments of foreign states and illegal armed groups, and other armed sabotage and terrorist formations. This also applies to the work of the command staff of combined arms formations in assessing the current situation and organizing combat actions.

Combined arms units participating in military conflicts use various forms and methods of action in the defense; on the offense; conducting combat, route, and direct security; enforcing martial law; during administrative movements; maneuvering on the battlefield, when locating targets.

The method of action means the sequence of use of all available forces and means, chosen by the unit commander and approved by the higher-level commander. When combined arms units are saturated with UAVs, unit commanders make changes to all methods of action, thereby achieving high efficiency when performing combat missions.

In the defense, UAVs conduct the following tasks in support of combined arms units:

  • conduct reconnaissance of enemy targets in front of the forward edge of the defense and in the immediate depths of their combat formations, transmit enemy target coordinates to artillery, combat vehicles, and air defense systems in real time;
  • support air, missile, artillery and combat vehicle (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles) fires in order to increase their accuracy, increase damage and reduce the combat potential of attacking enemy units;
  • inflict effective defeat on the opposing group of troops with fires from the defending combined arms formations;
  • help unit commanders study the terrain in combat areas and assess the nature of the actions of advancing enemy units;
  • monitor the nature of the actions of the enemy’s second echelons and reserves, and changes in the combat area;
  • control the actions of enemy units, their sabotage, reconnaissance and terrorist groups in the gaps between defensive strongpoints and on the flanks of units;
  • provide assistance to combat, route, and direct security elements in carrying out their tasks;
  • intensify electronic warfare against enemy electronic zones in order to disrupt the work of troops and weapons control centers;
  • perform other tasks in the interests of achieving defensive tasks by combined arms units.

In the offense, UAVs conduct the following tasks in support of combined arms units:

Laying fires, correcting air and artillery fires, increasing the accuracy of the destruction of targets by determining their coordinates in real time, reducing ammunition consumption, and assisting in creating the required superiority [of forces and means] over the defending enemy. They also help carry out the tasks of assault, raid and encircling detachments to destroy strongpoints, fortified areas (objects) and command posts of the opposing group.  Thanks to UAVs, which perform tasks to identify strongpoints, artillery and mortar firing positions, and the nature of the defending enemy’s actions, the losses of friendly personnel and equipment in an offensive are significantly reduced.When combined arms units are on the march, UAVs are used to strengthen route security and inflict preemptive fires on enemy formations that attempt to impede the movement of the column, as well as when encountering an enemy group and conducting meeting combat. When units occupy rest areas, UAVs take an active part in protecting them and repelling surprise enemy attacks…

Notes:

[i] For additional recent analysis on Russian drone development and operations, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Russia Details Plan To Overcome Military Drone Deficiencies,” OE Watch, 02-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-details-plan-to-overcome-military-drone-deficiencies/; and Charles Bartles, “Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons To Engineer Units,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-plans-to-add-remote-mining-uav-platoons-to-engineer-units/

[ii] Typically, a UAV company for a maneuver brigade or division.