Georgians Consider Outcomes of War in Ukraine

Protesters in Tbilisi, 7 March 2023.

Protesters in Tbilisi, 7 March 2023.


In any case, Georgia needs to start preparing and working on increasing its civil defense capabilities.”


The Georgian government condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine initially but has not taken part in any sanctions against Russia out of concern of being drawn into the conflict. Additionally, Georgia’s economy remains closely tied to Russia’s, and the government continues to contend with the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which have been occupied by Russia-supported forces since the end of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War.[i] While Georgia will likely maintain its neutrality on Ukraine, the accompanying excerpted article from the independent, non-profit think tank Georgian Institute of Politics offers a Georgian perspective of five possible outcomes of the Russia-Ukraine war. The article is a follow up to the think tank’s initial assessment of possible outcomes, which was published just a few weeks after the war began in 2022. While the report acknowledges that Georgia will not have a direct impact on the outcome of the war, each of the scenarios shows how Georgia will be affected in some way.

In the first scenario, Ukraine wins the war, which the article’s authors believes is probable, resulting in Georgia joining NATO and having deeper integration with Europe. Conversely, the article believes that this would come with the risk that Russia will then destabilize Georgia regardless of who is in power in Moscow. The second scenario examines what could happen if Ukraine turns into a frozen conflict or returns to the status quo before the war began. The article states that a frozen conflict would allow Russia time to restore its military but also would push additional Russian migrants into Georgia. Georgia could also become the focal point of Putin’s ire as he looks to claim a quick victory to compensate domestically for losses in Ukraine. This would in turn cause Georgian officials to move away from integrating with Europe and pursue a policy more in line with Russian interests. 

In the third scenario, Russia achieves its strategic goals in Ukraine, and in the fourth scenario, Russia and NATO engage in full-scale war. These are unlikely according to the article. The fifth and final scenario, which the authors believe is very likely, is that a war of attrition will continue for two or more years and that this will put Georgia in a difficult position. The article notes how Georgian Dream, the ruling party in Georgia’s parliament, has been improving ties with Russia, though many in Georgia still see Russia as a threat. In early March, the Georgian government withdrew a bill requiring NGOs to register as foreign agents in Georgia after facing protest that the bill had been influenced by Russia. Lastly, the article notes that Georgia will face “major strategic dilemmas” regardless of how the war ends and recommends that Georgian officials increase civil defense capabilities and cooperation with Turkey.[ii] While the article does not claim to be an official Georgian perspective, it makes clear that Georgia will be impacted by the outcome of the war in Ukraine.


Source:

“One Year of War in Ukraine and Risk Assessment for Georgia: Five (updated) Scenarios,” Georgian Institute of Politics (an independent non-profit think tank in Georgia), 13 February 2023.

In March of 2022, just a couple of weeks after Russia launched the full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, GIP proposed four possible scenarios of future developments and their possible implications for Georgia…However, almost one year since the invasion, the conflict seems to be reaching its decisive point…

As the war continues reshaping global geopolitics, the following piece will revisit GIP’s previous assessments and offer insights into what has changed over the last 11 months since its publication. Although the war is far from over and significant battles are still ahead, five scenarios discussed in detail below offer some insights into the dilemmas and potential risks that Georgia may face considering different possible developments in Ukraine.

Scenario 1: Ukraine wins the war (Probable)

As western support for Ukraine continues to increase, leading to a successful counteroffensive operation, and eventual victory, the geopolitical paradigm in the wider Black Sea region would change drastically…If the situation is going to develop in this direction and Ukraine is going to achieve full de-occupation of its territories (including the Crimean Peninsula), it’s not excluded that the window of opportunity may appear for NATO’s further enlargement to the East…In the best-case scenario, this would also imply Georgia joining the alliance. In addition to NATO enlargement, Russia’s defeat and retreat from the region will also make Georgia’s European integration irreversible…

…This scenario implies risks for Georgia from another perspective…Defeat in Ukraine may result in regime change in Russia, leading to internal instabilities and power struggles. This could lead to a spillover of chaos in the already volatile North Caucasus, creating a range of challenges on the border of Georgia. In other words, while a strong Russia is a serious threat to Georgia, an unstable Northern neighbor is no less dangerous for its security.

Risks will increase for Georgia even if the Russian regime survives defeat in Ukraine. Since it can still act as a spoiler, the Kremlin might be keen to restore its tarnished prestige by continuing adventurous foreign policy towards Georgia…

Scenario 2: Freezing the conflict and/or returning to status quo ante (Possible)

As the war drags on causing an immense number of causalities on both sides, there is a possibility that both Russia and Ukraine could reach the point of exhaustion…

This would be either freezing the conflict or returning to the status quo in the Eastern part of Ukraine…the existence conflicts with frozen solutions will also allow Russia to restore its forces and prepare for a new assault. This scenario also implies a risk for Georgia, as preparing for a new offensive would intensify the ongoing “silent” mobilization. This, in its turn, may lead to an increase in Russian migrants to Georgia…

Moreover, with conflict intensity decreased in Eastern Ukraine, Russian Federation could apply pressure on Georgia through South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As in the first scenario, amid the upcoming presidential elections in 2024, Putin might need a quick victory on the foreign front to compensate for the damage caused by the failures in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, officials in Tbilisi might be forced to give up its policy of Euro-Atlantic integration and align its external policies with the Kremlin’s…

Scenario 3: The Kremlin achieves its strategic goals (Unlikely)

In this scenario, Russia achieves a successful breakthrough in the upcoming major battles. With Western support decreasing, Ukrainian resources exhausting, and a raising death toll among civilians, Ukraine might be forced to concede. Ukraine’s concession would imply the change of the government in Kyiv, recognition of occupied territories as part of Russia and the end of Euro-Atlantic presence in the region for decades to come.

As it was outlined in our scenario 2: Georgian nightmare published in March 2022, there is no doubt that in case of such developments, the Kremlin may pose an ultimatum to Tbilisi or may even establish a puppet regime in Tbilisi. Georgia could be dragged into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or even into the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)…

Scenario 4: NATO-Russia Full-Scale War (Highly unlikely)

Out of all the possible scenarios outline here, this seems to be the least likely, yet still a possibility. Especially if, after a successful counteroffensive in the East, Ukraine will start military operations to free the Crimean Peninsula. Attacks on Crimea or deeper territories in Russia might further escalate the conflict and lead to the Kremlin using a tactical nuclear weapon…

In case of a war between Russia and NATO member states, the Black Sea region gains strategic importance. It includes Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, members of the alliance and most likely get involved in the conflict…In this context, Georgia’s strategic location gains vital importance for Russia and NATO allies…

Scenario 5: Attrition warfare continues for 2 or more years (Very likely)

There is also a possibility that neither Russia nor Ukraine is going to back down that might lead to the protracted attrition warfare. In this context, illicit trade and alternative imports of the western technology is going to gain even more importance for the Kremlin. This will put Georgia in a difficult position due to its transactional foreign and security policy towards Russia. And deliberately or not, by improving economic ties with Russia, Georgian Dream did end up moving Georgia closer to its erstwhile enemy…

Despite the GD’s rhetoric, existing occupied territories remain an obstacle to improving relations with the Kremlin. Opinion polls repeatedly show that the majority of Georgians perceive Russia as a threat and support the country’s pro-European foreign policy…

Conclusion…All the scenarios outlined above suggest that regardless which direction the situation is going to develop, Tbilisi will be facing major strategic dilemmas. In any case, Georgia needs to start preparing and working on increasing its civil defense capabilities. Similar to what was suggested in our last year’s scenarios, Georgia needs to intensify its cooperation with Turkey a NATO member and a large regional military power that has a potential to counterbalance Russian regional dominance…


Notes:

[i] For more information on Georgia’s security issues in Russian-occupied South Ossetia and Abhazia, see: Matthew Stein ““Borderization” Continues in Georgia,” OE Watch, 03-2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues See also Dodge Billingsley “Russia Flexes Its Muscles in Abkhazia While Citizens Recall Anniversary of War with Georgia,” OE Watch, 09-2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/268081

[ii] For more background on Georgia’s security cooperation with Turkey and Azerbaijan, see: Matthew Stein “Trilateral Security in the Caucasus,” OE Watch, 07-2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues


Image Information:

Image: Protesters in Tbilisi, 7 March 2023
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Georgia_Protest_2023_VOA.png
Attribution: Public Domain

OE Watch, Vol. 12 (Iss. 05)

This OE Watch contains 25 foreign article reviews spanning over 30 different regions and countries covering Operational Environment topics from the foreign perspective for the US Army leader, development, training and education community, as well as others in governmental, analytic, and academic communities.

This issue can be downloaded at FMSO’s website: https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/415497/download

Its Table of Contents is here:

CHINA
3 Chinese Observations on the Role and Impact of Social Media in Cognitive Warfare
4 China’s PLA Increasing Use of Simulators and Simulations
6 China’s PLA Explores “Battlefield Metaverse” Training Base To Simulate Future Warfare

RUSSIA
7 Russia’s BARS Reserve System Inducting Cossacks
9 A Russian Strategic Assessment of Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine
11 Russian Orthodox Church Blesses “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine
12 More Wonder Weapons on Russia’s Drawing Board
13 Kremlin Using Education Policy To Foster Approval of Its “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine
15 Russian Culture Ministry Proposes Possible Framework for New State Ideology
17 Sanctions Threaten Russia’s Arctic Energy Projects

IRAN
19 Iran Digs into Central Syria, Filling Vacuum Left by Russia
21 Iran Tries To Justify Abstention in UN Vote Condemning Russian Invasion of Ukraine
23 Iranian Navy Joins Indian Naval Exercises
24 Iran’s New Damavand Destroyer Set To Join Navy

TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
25 Colombian Navy Discovers Clandestine Narcosub Shipyard
26 Mexican Criminal Organizations Consolidate Their Positions in South America
27 Al Shabaab Takes Advantage of Somalia’s Disjointed Election Process To Ramp Up Attacks
28 Separatist Conflict Imminent in Northern Mali

GLOBAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
30 Sanctions Likely To Weaken Russian Arms Flow to Africa
31 Algeria Caught Between Neutrality and Strategic Relations with Russia
33 Turkey Central To Reducing Europe’s Dependence on Russian Natural Gas Russian Natural Gas
36 India Begins Development of a Light Tank
37 Philippines Pursues Helicopter Deals with Russia, Turkey, and Poland
39 Indonesia Upgrades Naval Submarine Fleet
40 Kyrgyzstan Conducts Exercise with Its New Bayraktars

For more information on this product, please contact:
Mr. Paul (Kent) Baumann (paul.k.baumann2.civ@army.mil); Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS

OE Watch, Vol. 12 (Iss. 06)

This OE Watch contains 22 foreign article reviews spanning over 30 different regions and countries covering Operational Environment topics from the foreign perspective for the US Army leader, development, training and education community, as well as others in governmental, analytic, and academic communities.

This issue can be downloaded at FMSO’s website: https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/417921/download

Its Table of Contents is here:

CHINA
3   China Expands Naval Expeditionary Capability With New Ship and Helicopter Variants
5   Two Retired Chinese Officials Offer Conflicting Perspectives on Russia’s Prospects in Ukraine
8   Chinese Military Scholars Call out Russia for Invading Ukraine

RUSSIA
10   Russia Shifting Wounded Servicemen to Recruitment Duties
12   Russia Tests R-441 Liven Satellite Communication System in Ukraine
14   Russian WWII Veteran Benefits Lag Behind Those in Central Asia
15   Russian Media Source Blames United States for Russian “Brain Drain”

IRAN
16   Khamenei Speaks on Necessity of Palestinian Resistance
17   Iran Initiates and Defends New Bread Subsidies Amid Deteriorating Economy
19   Iran Seeks To Counter Misinformation Circulating on Social Media

TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
20   A Complex Link Between Coups and Jihadism in West Africa
22   Boko Haram Train Attack Raises Frustration with Nigeria’s Counterterrorism Strategy
23   National Armed Strike in Colombia Demonstrates Strength of Gulf Clan
24   Mexican Cartels Buy Land on Colombia-Venezuela Border
25   Algeria Sees Threat from Morocco as Western Sahara Conflict Threatens To Reignite
27   Degrading Environmental Conditions in Iraq Providing Cover for Terrorism
29   The Philippines Gaining Upper Hand Against Abu Sayyaf

GLOBAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
31   Turkey Tightens Grip on Black Sea amid War in Ukraine
33   Turkish-Made Bayraktar TB2 Drones Play Important Role in Ukraine
35   Kazakhstan Cancels Soviet-Era Parade To Focus on Combat Readiness
37   India Cancels Plans To Purchase Russian Equipment
39   Argentina Gets Closer to China-Led Economic and Multilateral Institutions

For more information on this product, please contact:
Mr. Paul (Kent) Baumann (paul.k.baumann2.civ@army.mil); Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS

OE Watch, Vol. 12 (Iss. 07)

This OE Watch contains 23 foreign article reviews spanning over 30 different regions and countries covering Operational Environment topics from the foreign perspective for the US Army leader, development, training and education community, as well as others in governmental, analytic, and academic communities.

This issue can be downloaded at FMSO’s website: https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/419460/download

Its Table of Contents is here:

CHINA
3 China To Reform Military Postgraduate Education
5 PLA Combining Battlefield and Classroom Education To Develop Quality Officers
7 PLA Using Cognitive Domain Operations To Achieve Political Aims
9 Taiwan’s “All-Out Defense” in Context of Aggressive PLA Exercise

RUSSIA
11 Russia Tests Palantin Electronic Warfare System in Ukraine
12 Russia’s “Terminator” System in Ukraine To Inform Tactics
14 Russian Orthodox Church Strengthening Support for Ukraine Invasion
16 Russia Building Literal and Figurative Bridges to China
18 Russia Revising Marine Doctrine To Use Civilian Ships for Military Purposes

IRAN
19 Iran Unveils New Drone-Fired Cruise Missile
20 Iran Opens New Drone Plant in Tajikistan
21 Iran Warns UAE Against Allowing Israel in the Persian Gulf

TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
22 Murder of Paraguayan Prosecutor in Colombia Suggests Transnational Criminal Cooperation
23 Somalia: Behind Al-Shabaab’s Success in Recruiting Children
24 Al-Qaeda’s Sahel Affiliate Targets Togo
25 Indonesia Extends Counter-Drug Trafficking Cooperation to South America

GLOBAL OE
27 Turkish Military Operation in Syria Risks Clash with Iran
30 Central Asian Forces Boosting UAV Capabilities
32 Azerbaijan Balances Security Cooperation Between Turkey and Russia
34 Algeria Inches Closer to Russia Amid Frosty Relations with Morocco and Spain
36 UAV Technologies Proliferating in Yemen and Saudi Arabia
38 Regional Coalitions Supersede the AU’s African Standby Force
40 Venezuela’s Mystery Plane Shows Iran’s Strategic Penetration of Latin America

For more information on this product, please contact:
Mr. Paul (Kent) Baumann (paul.k.baumann2.civ@army.mil); Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS

OE Watch, Vol. 12 (Iss. 08)

This OE Watch contains 23 foreign article reviews spanning over 30 different regions and countries covering Operational Environment topics from the foreign perspective for the US Army leader, development, training, and education community, as well as others in governmental, analytic, and academic communities.

This issue can be downloaded at FMSO’s website: https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/421643/download

Its Table of Contents is here:

CHINA
3 China’s Newest Aircraft Carrier Extends Capabilities With “Leapfrogged” Technology
5 China Advancing Cooperation With Pakistan’s Navy in the Indian Ocean
7 Profile of a Joint Staff Officer in the PLA’s Northern Theater Command
9 PLA Army Efforts Integrate New Technology and Equipment Into Units
11 China Arming Algeria To Fight Its “New Generation Wars”
13 How China Will “Win” the War in Ukraine

RUSSIA
15 Russia To Provide Belarus a Potential Nuclear Delivery Capability
17 Russia’s Newest Nuclear Submarine Joins Northern Fleet
18 Kremlin Easing Russian Citizenship for All Ukrainians
20 Russian Views on Finland and Sweden Joining NATO
22 Ukraine War Likely To Reduce Russian Security Commitments in Central Asia

IRAN
24 Iranian F-14 Crash Highlights Iran’s Need for New Fighter Contract
25 Iranian Trade With China Is Up, but So Is Political Risk
26 Iran’s Revolutionary Guards To Expand Drug Treatment Center
27 Iran Believes Turkey’s Rapprochement With Israel and Saudi Arabia Is a Threat

TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
29 Yemen’s Houthi Movement Continues To Recruit and Indoctrinate Child Combatants
30 Iván Márquez Survives Attack but FARC Dissidents Remain on the Run
31 Mexican Criminal Organizations Poised To Dominate South America’s Illicit Economies
32 Benin Park Rangers Take on Counterterrorism Tasks

GLOBAL OE
33 Vietnam Trains Cambodian Navy Amid Chinese Competition
35 India Strengthens Security Cooperation With Vietnam
37 DRC Conflicts Reveal Difficulties in Deploying Regional Forces
38 Russia and China Look To Corner Bolivia’s Lithium Industry

For more information on this product, please contact:
Mr. Paul (Kent) Baumann (paul.k.baumann2.civ@army.mil); Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS

OE Watch, Vol. 12 (Iss. 09)

This OE Watch contains 20 foreign article reviews spanning over 30 different regions and countries covering Operational Environment topics from the foreign perspective for the US Army leader, development, training, and education community, as well as others in governmental, analytic, and academic communities.

This issue can be downloaded at FMSO’s website: https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/425244/download

Its Table of Contents is here:

CHINA
3 China Sharpens Tone Against U.S. Policy, Deepening Ties in Syria
5 China Using Japanese Higher Education To Build Military Capability
7 China Probably Expanding Its Nuclear Testing Capability
9 China Issues New White Paper With Special Emphasis on Taiwan
11 China Carries Out Ballistic Missile Defense Test Amid Related Developments

RUSSIA
12 Algerian Military Deepening Ties to Russia
13 Commercial UAVs Creating “Revolution in Artillery”
14 High-Profile Female Colonel From Russian Proxy Force Killed in Ukraine
16 Armenia Questions Russian Peacekeeping After Nagorno-Karabakh Incident
18 Russia Rebuilding Military Airfields in the Arctic

IRAN
19 Iran Reportedly Using New Carrier, Submarines To Expand Reach of Drones
20 Iran Unveils Stealth Speedboats
21 Iran’s Flawed Statistics and Growing Drug Addiction

TERRORISIM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
23 Mexican Cartels Display Their Post-Pandemic Power With Orchestrated Violence
24 Colombia’s Leftist President Seeks To Resume Negotiations With National Liberation Army
26 Global Reactions Vary After Death of Al-Qaeda Leader Al-Zawahiri

GLOBAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
28 India Draws Lessons on Cyber and Electronic Effects From the War in Ukraine
30 Venezuela Plays Host to China, Russia, and Iran in International Military Games
31 African Stances on the Russia-Ukraine War Demonstrate Reliance on, Antipathy Toward West
33 Algerian Media Dismissive of Morocco-Israel Security Cooperation

For more information on this product, please contact:
Mr. Paul (Kent) Baumann (paul.k.baumann2.civ@army.mil); Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS

OE Watch, Vol. 12 (Iss. 10)

This OE Watch contains 21 foreign article reviews spanning over 30 different regions and countries covering Operational Environment topics from the foreign perspective for the US Army leader, development, training and education community, as well as others in governmental, analytic, and academic communities.

This issue can be downloaded at FMSO’s website: https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/

Its Table of Contents is here:

CHINA
3 New Chinese Aerial Refueling Aircraft Enters Service
4 China Debuts New Space Capabilities
7 China Develops World’s First Small Modular Reactor
9 PLA Cognitive Domain Operations: Considering Preemption and Hard Kill
11 PLA Education Reforms: Problems Remain After More Than 20 Years
13 Chinese Tracking Ship Raises Controversy in Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port
15 India Works To Maintain Sri Lankan Foothold Amid Growing China Presence

RUSSIA
17 Russia Builds New Armor Repair Facilities To Replenish Losses in Ukraine
18 Russia Claims Victory in Vostok 2022 Exercise
19 Russia Conducts Arctic Naval Maneuver and Propaganda Tour Along Northern Sea Route
21 Russian Navy Weaponizes Shipping Containers
22 Kazakhstan Suspends Defense Exports, Denying Russia Purchases

IRAN
23 Iran Wants Sukhoi-35 Fighters From Russia
24 Iran Intercepts Crystal Meth Shipment From Afghanistan

TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
25 Colombia’s Gustavo Petro Promises New Approach to Security and Drugs
27 Coastal West African States Brace for Wave of Terrorism From the Sahel
30 Mali Claims France Funded Terrorists; France Denies

GLOBAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
32 Colombia’s New Government Quickly Reestablishes Relations With Maduro’s Venezuela
34 Turkish Lessons Learned From the War in Ukraine
37 The Appeal of “Duginism” in the Middle East
39 “Chronic Instability” Atop Algerian Military’s Foreign Intelligence and Security

For more information on this product, please contact:
Mr. Paul (Kent) Baumann (paul.k.baumann2.civ@army.mil); Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS

OE Watch, Vol. 12 (Iss. 11)

This OE Watch contains 23 foreign article reviews spanning over 30 different regions and countries covering Operational Environment topics from the foreign perspective for the US Army leader, development, training, and education community, as well as others in governmental, analytic, and academic communities.

This issue can be downloaded at FMSO’s website: https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/

Its Table of Contents is here:

CHINA
3 Provincial Exercises Highlight China’s Whole-of-Government Preparations for Conflict
5 Xi Jinping Sets Milestones for Next Five Years of Chinese Military Modernization
8 Taiwan Testing Satellite Program To Overcome Communications Vulnerabilities
9 Taiwan Set To Cooperate with Turkey on Cost-Effective Drone Technology

RUSSIA
12 Russian Military Watcher Identifies Problems With the Russian VDV and Parachute Assaults
14 Russian Airborne Troops Get First Material-Technical Support Brigade
16 Lack of PTSD Treatment for Russian Soldiers
18 Russia Demands Mandatory History Lessons for College Students
20 Russia Conducts Submarine Sea Trials and Amphibious Landing Exercise in Arctic

IRAN
22 Iran Vaunts Persian Language as Marker of National Identity Despite Country’s Ethnic Diversity
24 Iran’s Proposal To Build Railroads and Housing in Syria Could Enrich IRGC
25 Iran Lauds Air Defense, Claims Sepehr Radar Will Soon Be Operational

TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
26 Large Hack of Latin America’s Defense Departments Puts Security Services on Edge
27 Burkina Faso: A Bellwether on Russian and French Presence
29 African Leaders and UN See Terrorism in the Sahel as Dire
30 Somali Government Bans Media Reporting on Al-Shabaab GLOBAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
32 Ecuador Seeks New Relationship With China After Debt Deal
33 Erdoğan Relying on Russia To Bolster Support Ahead of Turkish Elections
35 Armenia Acquires Indian Multiple Rocket Launcher System Amid Delays in Russian Deliveries
37 Members of Collective Security Treaty Organization Show Less Support for Russia-Led Body
39 Saudi Arabia Continues Buying Missiles and UAVs From China as Part of Broader Foreign Policy Rebalancing
41 Morocco and Algeria Strengthen UAV Capabilities With Imports From China, Turkey, and Israel
44 India Responds to Chinese and Pakistani Naval Activities in Sri Lanka

For more information on this product, please contact:
Mr. Paul (Kent) Baumann (paul.k.baumann2.civ@army.mil); Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS

Iran Praises Revolutionary Guards’ Proxy Afghan Brigade

Mothers of Fatamayoun Militiamen Hold Photos of Sons Killed in Action, 2017.

Mothers of Fatamayoun Militiamen Hold Photos of Sons Killed in Action, 2017.


“If it were not for their sacrifices, today the Islamic State would have advanced to Bangladesh.”


Against the backdrop of the fight against the Islamic State that erupted in 2014, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force established a number of ethnic-based movements to fight in Syria.[i] The Quds Force deployed the Afghan Shia militia Liwa Fatemiyoun (Fatimid Banner) to Syria primarily to defend the Damascus shrine of Zaynab, the daughter of Imam Ali and the granddaughter of the Prophet Muhammad.[ii] In the excerpted article from IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency, General Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh, Deputy Commander of the Quds Force, speaks about the legacy of the Liwa Fatemiyoun upon the death of one of its commanders. He describes the Fatemiyoun, an Afghan proxy of the IRGC, as a core component of the Iranian strategy to foil the Islamic State. While this may be an exaggeration in terms of actual fighting, the IRGC used the crisis to form the Fatemiyoun and other ethnic militias to further the IRGC’s aim to export revolution.  That the Quds Force did not disband the Liwa Fatemiyoun after the defeat of the Islamic State inside Syria suggests that the IRGC seeks to preserve the group to utilize beyond its initial purpose. Fallahzadeh’s discussion that absent the Afghan brigade, the Islamic State might have reached Bangladesh, suggests that Iran might be ready for a renewed push into South Asia. Shortly after the Iranian Revolution, the IRGC sponsored not only Lebanese Hezbollah but sought to create a corollary movement among Pakistani Shia. While infiltration of the Lebanese diaspora helped the Quds Force project power not only in the Middle East, but also Africa and Latin America, it traditionally fell short in South Asia. Forty years later, the Quds Force might see the Liwa Fatemiyoun as a viable substitute for its failed Pakistan efforts to extend its influence as far to the east as it does to the west.[iii]


Source:

“Sardar Falahzadeh: Agar Aysargariha-ye Fatamayun Nabud, Emruz Da’esh ta Bangladesh Pishruye Kardeh Bud (General Falahzadeh: If It Were Not for the Sacrifices of the Fatamayun, the Islamic State Would Have Advanced to Bangladesh),” Fars News Agency (a news agency closely affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), 13 February 2023. https://www.farsnews.ir/news/14011124000424

General Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh, the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, met in Yazd with the family of the late Sayyid Qasem Hosseini, a warrior defending the shrine from the [Liwa] Fatemiyoun Division. In this meeting, General Fallahzadeh commemorated upon the memory of the martyrs defending the shrine and said, “the Islamic State was not a normal organization, but a vicious pedigree that was both determined and motivated by its false belief, and, in a single sentence, it can be said that the Islamic State was the army of false belief.

The deputy commander of the Quds Force added, “Usually mercenary armies try to avoid suffering casualties, but the Islamic State, with their firm but vicious conviction, martyred our warriors with suicide operations and perished in the process. In Syria, all blasphemy was against all Islam, and it was the alliance between Muslims in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Iran that stopped the Islamic State because [our] correct belief was greater and stronger.”

… He described the Islamic State as a product of the American Zionist plan and continued, “The defenders of the shrine and Fatemiyoun warriors, led by the Supreme Leader and the commander of the hearts of Haj Qassem Aziz [Qassem Soleimani], defeated this plan and secured a victory for the Islamic Front.”Referring to Fatemiyoun’s role in defending the Shrine of [Al-Sayyida] Zaynab [in Damascus], the deputy commander of the Quds Force said, “These beloved ones played an essential role in defending Islam, Shi’ism and humanity and, if it were not for their sacrifices, today the Islamic State would have advanced to Bangladesh.”


Notes:

[i] For more background on Iran’s Afghan and Pakistani militias, see: Michael Rubin, “Cleric Speaks on Iran’s Foreign Militias,” OE Watch, February 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/266059/download

[ii] Liwa Fatemiyoun was formed in 2014, although it is possible that former Afghan National Army soldiers are now serving in the ranks of Liwa Fatemiyoun, as thousands have fled Afghanistan and now reside in Iran.

[iii] For an earlier discussion of Iran’s concept of strategic boundaries extending to its west, see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian Influence Extends to the Mediterranean,” OE Watch, September 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/242569/download


Image Information:

Image: Mothers of Fatamayoun Militiamen Hold Photos of Sons Killed in Action, 2017
Source: https://images.khabaronline.ir//images/2016/5/16-5-14-135413950108_0633065.jpg
Attribution: Khabar Online

Russia Using Media Organizations To Garner Support From “Islamic” Countries

President of the Republic of Tatarstan R.N. Minnikhanov.

President of the Republic of Tatarstan R.N. Minnikhanov.


“Cooperation with countries of the Islamic world in the media sphere is one of the key aspects of the Russian international policy.”


In December 2022, the Moscow headquarters of the Russian news channel RT hosted a conference titled “Russia and the Islamic World: Practical Steps in Media Cooperation.” The conference was co-sponsored by three entities: the Group of Strategic Vision Russia–Islamic World (GSV); Russia’s Sputnik International News Agency, which is highly influential in Arabic-speaking countries; and the Union of Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) News Agencies (UNA).[i] The conference featured representatives from Emirati and Turkish media and aimed to not only strengthen media coordination between Russia and OIC countries, but also to harmonize broader narratives in order to counter “misinformation.” The accompanying excerpt, published in the Saudi English-language daily Arab News, highlights how “Moscow is shifting its focus to the Muslim world.” The Kremlin is looking to deepen policies promoting Russo-Muslim cooperation mechanisms—including the annual GSV-hosted Kazan Summit, one of the primary economic summits for Russia and OIC countries—which may provide Moscow with opportunities to skirt economic sanctions. The Kremlin also hopes that such efforts may promote the continued the neutrality of Muslim countries vis-à-vis Ukraine.[ii] As GSV chairman and Tatarstan Republic leader Rustam Minnikhanov expressed in his address to the December conference, excerpted alongside this commentary from the official GSV website, “cooperation with countries of the Islamic world in the media sphere is one of the key aspects of the Russian international policy.” Especially noteworthy is the role played by the GSV and similar organizations in strengthening Russo-Turkish cooperation, given the historical links between Turkey and Russian Muslim-majority areas such as Tatarstan, which some in Turkey consider part of the broader “Turkic World.” Thus, Russo-Muslim cooperation mechanisms such as the GSV are not only fulfilling an important and immediate geopolitical role, but they also push forward the type of historical, quasi-civilizational approach to geostrategic thinking that has steadily emerged in both Putin’s Russia and Erdogan’s Turkey.[iii]


Sources:

Diana Galeeva. “Moscow shifts its focus to the Muslim world,” Arab News (English-language Saudi daily), 17 December 2022. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2217786

In addition to the activities of the Russian Muftiates, which Russia has used as part of its religious soft power since the 2000s, are the Group of the Strategic Vision “Russia-Islamic world,” the para-diplomacies of the Russian Muslim regions (Chechnya, Dagestan, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan), and the activities of Muslim NGOs, such as the Association of Muslim Businessmen of the Russian Federation. Arguably, these policies have helped Russia to achieve economic, political and security advantages, including investments in its regions (Chechnya and Tatarstan) by the Gulf Cooperation Council states. The neutral position of GCC states over the Ukraine crisis also suggests the positive outcomes of these policies.

“International Conference ‘Developing Media Cooperation with the Islamic World – Russia’s Most Important Doctrine’,” Group of Strategic Vision Russia – Islamic World, 15 December 2022. https://russia-islworld.ru/en/novosti//international-conference-developing-media-cooperation-with-the-islamic-world-russias-most-important-doctrine-2022-12-15-29854/ Moreover, regular events held by the Group of Strategic Vision ‘Russia – Islamic World’ testify to the dynamics of fruitful international relations. Cooperation with countries of the Islamic world in the media sphere is one of the key aspects of the Russian international policy. Rustam Minnikhanov expressed his opinion that in the current difficult geopolitical situation the role of mass media was increasing and that the journalistic work of honest and verified mass media was crucial in combating false information and promoting traditional spiritual values.


Notes:

[i] The GSV is a Russian entity formed in 2006 to coordinate Moscow’s relations with the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a multilateral forum of Muslim-majority countries in which Russia is an observer state.  In 2014, President Putin bolstered the GSV’s capabilities as a conduit for Russian influence in Muslim-majority countries by increasing its visibility and appointing Tatarstan Republic leader Rustam Minnikhanov as its head.

[ii] In January 2023, a presidential decree made the Kazan Summit an annual event. The summit’s website is available at: https://kazansummit.ru/en/

[iii] One of the most visible proponents of this type of thinking in Russia is Alexander Dugin, a Russian political philosopher whose geopolitical musings are thought to influence the strategic thinking of the Russian armed forces’ leadership. See: Lucas Winter, “The Appeal of ‘Duginism’ in the Middle East,” OE Watch. 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/427403


Image Information:

Image: President of the Republic of Tatarstan R.N. Minnikhanov
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Rustam_Minnikhanov_official_portrait.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0