Category Archives: OE Watch

Houthis’ Red Sea Attacks Not Only Motivated by Gaza

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Yemen map showing major population centers as well as parts of neighboring countries and the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

“The preparation of the naval force comes in light of the enemy mercenaries’ relinquishing of national sovereignty, and their exposing the country’s sovereign oil, gas and fishery resources to unprecedented plunder…”

While recent naval attacks by Yemen’s Ansarallah group—better known as the Houthis—have been justified as being in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, Ansarallah’s build-up of capabilities to engage in an anti-access naval campaign was motivated by domestic concerns that predate Israel’s operations against Hamas in Gaza. Beginning on 19 October, Ansarallah began targeting primarily commercial vessels in the Red Sea using unmanned aerial vehicles, ballistic missiles, and anti-ship cruise missiles. The majority of these weapons were shot down by ships from the USS Gerald Ford Carrier Strike Group.[i] These attacks were concurrent with other attacks carried out by Iranian allies, all presented as in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza and as part of a coordinated anti-Israel response by members of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”—Hezbollah in Lebanon, “Islamic Resistance” militias in Iraq, and Ansarallah in Yemen. According to the accompanying excerpt from the official Yemeni daily 26 September, Ansarallah leaders have justified their buildup of anti-ship capabilities as motivated by their adversaries “exposing the country’s sovereign oil, gas and fishery resources to unprecedented plunder” and their attempts to “expand and control the most important strategic ports and islands, such as Socotra and Mayun [also known as Perim Island].” From Ansarallah’s perspective, its domestic adversaries—both the Saudi-backed Internationally Recognized Government and the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council—have used the early 2022 UN-brokered truce in Yemen to tighten control over resources and strategic locations on Yemen’s coastline with foreign assistance and complicity.[ii] In August 2023, a few months before hostilities broke out in Gaza, Ansarallah officials threatened to sink two oil tankers seeking to transport Yemeni oil for export from ports in the Gulf Aden under the control of Ansarallah’s domestic opponents. Ansarallah’s position vis-à-vis Red Sea shipping prior to 7 October, per the article, was “to encourage international navigation through the [Bab El Mandab] Strait provided that it does not harm the sovereignty, unity, security or independence of the Republic.” Thus, while Ansarallah’s attacks on shipping vessels transiting Bab El Mandab are—at least rhetorically—linked to Israel’s invasion of Gaza, they should also be understood as a deliberate effort by the group to assert control over the entirety of Yemen’s territorial waters and internationalize the struggle for control of Yemen’s resources and strategic locations.

Sources:

“قدرات اليمن في حماية البحار والمياه الوطنية  Yemeni capabilities for protecting national seas and waterways,” 26 September (official Yemeni daily), 25 September 2023. https://www.26sep.net/index.php/local/64705-2023-09-25-05-09-57

”We were in a raging war with two ships coming to the port of Aden to plunder Yemeni gas, and they retreated four times, most recently yesterday. We informed the companies that owned the ships ‘Sinmar Jane’ and ‘Bolivar’ that we would strike them if they entered to loot gas from the port of Aden, and they are ready to do so. A few days earlier, President Al-Mashat vowed to ‘target the military bases of the Saudi-Emirati coalition forces on the Yemeni islands.’ At that time, he concurred with the Chief of Staff of the Naval Forces and Coastal Defense, Brigadier General Mansour Ahmed Al-Saadi, ‘on the level of qualitative armament that the naval forces now possess, which enables them to confront the enemy with all merit and ability, and allows them to meet the challenges…”


The Minister of Defense, Major General Muhammad Nasser Al-Atifi, had previously confirmed that maritime security of Yemeni territorial waters would be a priority in the next stage…

The preparation of the naval force comes in light of the enemy mercenaries’ relinquishing of national sovereignty, and their exposing the country’s sovereign oil, gas and fishery resources to unprecedented plunder. Alongside this organized plunder are the occupation’s efforts to expand and control the most important strategic ports and islands, such as Socotra and Mayun. It was necessary for the Yemeni armed forces to carry out their duty to protect the territorial waters and the sovereign wealth of oil, gas and fisheries from the dangers coming from the coalition of aggressors and their mercenaries from inside and outside the country, and to prepare themselves as a deterrent weapon for all these ambitions. Regarding freedom of international navigation in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the position of the Republic of Yemen is specific and clear, which is to encourage international navigation through the Strait provided that it does not harm the sovereignty, unity, security or independence of the Republic.

Notes:

[i] For details on Ansarallah’s naval arsenal, see: “A Maritime Menace: The Houthi Navy,” Oryx Blog, 2 January 2023. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2023/01/a-maritime-menace-houthi-navy.html; “Houthis Showcase Large Arsenal Of Missiles, Drones At Sana’a Military Parade,” MEMRI, 21 September 2023. https://www.memri.org/tv/houthis-showcase-large-arsenal-missiles-drones-military-parade; “Under Fire in the Bab al-Mandab: Houthi Military Capabilities and U.S. Response Options,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 8 December 2023. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/under-fire-bab-al-mandab-houthi-military-capabilities-and-us-response-options;“Houthi anti-ship missile systems: getting better all the time,” IISS, 4 January 2024. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/01/houthi-anti-ship-missile-systems-getting-better-all-the-time/ For details on Ansarallah’s anti-ship ballistic missiles, see: “We Might Have Just Seen the World’s First Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Attack,” Popular Mechanics, 1 December 2023. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a45964460/first-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-attack-houthi-rebels/

[ii] For more on control over Socotra, see: Lucas Winter, “Regional Friction Over Yemen’s Socotra Island,” OE Watch, June 2018. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-17883-00-00-00-27-93-72/2018_2D00_06_2D00_01-Regional-Friction-Over-Yemen_1920_s-Socotra-Island-_2800_Winter_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true; For more on control over Yemen’s Arabian Sea ports, see: Lucas Winter, “Saudis Seek Pathway to the Arabian Sea,” OE Watch, October 2018. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-17883-00-00-00-26-69-08/2018_2D00_10_2D00_01-Saudis-Seek-Pathway-to-the-Arabian-Sea-_2800_Winter_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true

Image Information:

Image:  Yemen map showing major population centers as well as parts of neighboring countries and the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
Source: CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/yemen/map
Attribution: Public Domain

Rising Violence Prompts Ecuador To Declare “Internal Armed Conflict”

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Noboa, the youngest president in Ecuador’s history, faces a crisis of insecurity.

“President Daniel Noboa issued…an executive decree that reforms the current state of emergency and recognizes the existence of an ‘internal armed conflict.’”

Ecuador has been reeling from a dramatic increase in homicides over the past four years as gangs have evolved into transnational criminal organizations linked to Mexico’s drug cartels.[i]. The country’s homicide rate rose from 6.7 per 100,000 citizens in 2019 to an estimated 45 per 100,000 in 2023.[ii] In a recent 48-hour period, two notorious gang leaders escaped prison, gangs laid siege to the University of Guayaquil, and one group stormed a live news broadcast, televising the bedlam for nearly 20 minutes before cutting the transmission, reports center-left Argentine news outlet Clarín. In response to this spate of violence, the recently elected Noboa government declared a state of emergency. However, the continued threat posed by multiple criminal groups has led Noboa to dramatically increase the sense of urgency, declaring instead an “internal armed conflict.” This empowered the nation’s armed forces to enforce a 60-day curfew and restore domestic security, according to Ecuadorian digital news outlet Primicias. The decree enumerated nearly two dozen armed groups and classified them as domestic terrorist organizations, the outlet says. Noboa is only a few months into his term, following a presidential campaign that featured the assassination at the hands of criminal groups of Fernando Villavicencio, a popular anticorruption candidate.[iii] To complement his presidential decree, Noboa announced a package of increased measures, including the construction of additional maximum-security prisons and the expropriation of criminal assets. The effectiveness of these measures bears watching throughout 2024 to see if Ecuador follows down a similar path as El Salvador or continues to spiral down into criminality and violence.

Sources:

“Súplicas de ‘no me maten’ y una granada en el bolsillo: así tomó en vivo un grupo narco el canal de televisión en Ecuador (Pleas of ‘don’t kill me’ and a grenade in the pocket: this is how a drug group took over a television channel in Ecuador live),” Clarín (Argentina’s oldest outlet that is generally considered center left), 9 January 2024. https://www.clarin.com/mundo/grupo-armado-irrumpio-transmision-vivo-canal-television-ecuador_0_0okSuT5tJC.html

An armed group stormed the live broadcast of a television channel in Ecuador, threatening those who were in charge of the programming with guns and weapons of war. There were also violent episodes at the University of Guayaquil and on commercial premises…the security forces stated only two hours after the assault that they were able to recover the taken buildings.

“Noboa declara conflicto armado interno y dispone la salida de militares (Noboa declares internal armed conflict and orders the departure of soldiers),” Primicias (a digital news outlet based in the capital, Quito) 9 January 2024. https://www.primicias.ec/noticias/politica/noboa-conflicto-armado-interno-militares/President Daniel Noboa issued…an executive decree that reforms the current state of emergency and recognizes the existence of an ‘internal armed conflict.’ Therefore, it provides for the immediate mobilization and intervention of the Armed Forces and the Police in the national territory. The decree was issued minutes after armed attackers took over the TC Television facilities and broadcast live. This new decree establishes the identification of…organized crime groups as ‘terrorist organizations and belligerent non-state actors.’

Notes:

[i] Previous governments, unable to stem the growth in criminal potency, have issued pleas to the international community for a “Plan Ecuador,” akin to the wide-ranging security assistance plan and social makeover that helped save Colombia from similar threats in the 1990s and 2000s. For more information, see: Ryan Berg “President Lasso Calls for ‘Plan Ecuador’ Amid Growing Security Concerns,” OE Watch, 12-2021. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-21393-00-00-00-40-08-49/2021_2D00_12_2D00_01-President-Lasso-Calls-for-_1C20_Plan-Ecuador_1D20_-Amid-_2800_Berg_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true

[ii] For more information on rising homicide figures in Ecuador, see: “How Ecuador Became Latin America’s Deadliest Country,” The Economist, 10 January 2024. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2024/01/10/how-ecuador-became-latin-americas-deadliest-country

[iii] For more on Villavicencio, see: Ryan Berg, “Presidential Candidate Assassination Shows New Depths of Ecuador’s Insecurity,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/presidential-candidate-assassination-shows-new-depths-of-ecuadors-insecurity/

Image Information:

Image: Noboa, the youngest president in Ecuador’s history, faces a crisis of insecurity. Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/presidenciaecuador/53367780040/  
Attribution: Flickr, PDM 1.0 DEED

Iran Rationalizes Russia’s Pro-Arab Position on Disputed Islands

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Iranian graphic depicting the strategic location and Iranian control over Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tonb Islands.

“Russia seems to take for granted its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

Despite official warmth, Iran has reason to be suspicious of Russia, given Russia’s historic willingness to interfere in Iranian politics and/or infringe on Iranian sovereignty.[i] The excerpted opinion piece from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated news outlet Fararu.ir, highlights that one of the most sensitive sovereignty issues for Iran today revolves around three islands—Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tonb Islands—occupied by Iranian forces in 1971 to prevent the UK from transferring their control to the UAE. While international law sides with the UAE, Iran has been unwilling to return the islands due to their strategic importance overseeing the shipping lanes on the Persian Gulf side of the Strait of Hormuz. Indeed, Abu Musa has become home to a major IRGC base.[ii] The excerpted article seeks to rationalize Russia’s decision to side with the UAE over Iran on questions about the islands’ sovereignty. It argues the UAE is an important outlet for the Russian economy in an era of isolation and sanctions. Russian officials may also believe Tehran has become so dependent on Moscow that Iran has little choice but to accept Russia’s pro-UAE position on the matter. Regardless, short of civil war distracting Iran during any transition following Khamenei’s death, there is little possibility that the UAE could liberate its occupied territories or that Russia could compel Iran to abandon the three islands. Still, Iranians have long memories and are unlikely to forgive the Kremlin for what they see as a betrayal. Iran may tilt more toward China in the future or simply bide its time and lick it wounds. But, when Iranians feel the moment is right, they will use the Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tonbs episode to justify a future betrayal of Russia.

Sources:

“Cherayi Mawzehgiri Russiyeh dar Khasus Jazair She Ganeh” (What Explains Russia’s Position with Regard to the Three Islands?),” Fararu.com (nominally independent web portal close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), 31 December 2023. https://fararu.com/fa/news/695771

Russia is a country that does not make treaty of friendship with anyone but rather pursues only its own interests. To put it simply, from the Russian perspective, there are no strategic enemies or strategic friends. Russians… do not see everything as zero sum game. For example, Russia is now at odds with the West, but it has also maintained cooperation on some issues, openly or covertly.

With this brief preamble, we return to recent Russian behavior with regard to the three islands. First, we need to look at things globally. Everyone knows well that America’s power in the world, if not weak is waning. On the other hand, China, with its strong economic backing and lack of arrogance in the style of the West – now has a positive image in the world. By mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China somehow announced its presence in the region, though it had been in place for many years as an emerging power in the world that is transforming from bipolar to multipolar….Perhaps one of the main reasons for Russia’s recent stance is the oil dollars of Arab countries, which have caught the eye of [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and Russia under sanctions. Moscow is under severe pressure due to Western sanctions, so it seems that with full cooperation with Arabs on the issue of the three Persian Gulf islands, it intends on one hand to influence the circle of America’s Arab allies and on the other hand, take a realistic view of its national and financial interests…. Russia seems to take for granted its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since the West has no place in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kremlin officials have sided with Arab countries without worrying about Iranian reactions.

Notes:

[i] For an earlier discussion of Iran’s the history and development of Iran-Russia relations, see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian Influence Extends to the Mediterranean,” OE Watch, September 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/242569/download

[ii] For background on the island dispute, see: Michael Rubin, “Revolutionary Guard Chief Exacerbates UAE-Iran Island Dispute,” OE Watch, June 2012, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195617

Image Information:

Image: Iranian graphic depicting the strategic location and Iranian control over Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tonb Islands.
Source: https://www.tabnak.ir/files/fa/tags/4706/1674926_155.jpg
Attribution: Tabnak.ir

Iran Hints It Will Supply Air Defense Weaponry to Palestinians

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Iraj Masjedi, a Qods Force commander and former Iranian ambassador to Iraq, meets with Qassem Soleimani, the late leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Qods Force.

“A day will come when… [Palestinians] will obtain air defense weapons.”

The advisor to the commander of the Qods Force, Iraj Masjedi, used the 3 January anniversary of the 2020 death of former Qods Force chief Qassem Soleimani to deride both the United States and Israel. The anniversary has become an annual commemoration in Iran.[i] Multiple Iranian politicians and military officers give speeches lionizing Soleimani and condemning the United States. While the Iranian population is inured to such bombast, the speech by Masjedi was noteworthy for its specificity about providing anti-air defenses to the Palestinians. In practice, support for Palestinians means support for Palestine Islamic Jihad and Hamas, both of which act as proxies for Iran.[ii] “A day will come when they [the Palestinians] will not allow bombardments by the Zionists and they will obtain air defense weapons,” he promised. Masjedi’s resume enhances the importance of his words. He was a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) general, Soleimani’s top advisor, and a former Ambassador to Iraq who today serves as a supreme advisor to the IRGC-Qods Force. If Iran can smuggle anti-aircraft missiles into Gaza, Hamas could target Israeli aircraft engaging in the Gaza fight and endanger commercial traffic servicing Ben Gurion Airport, with approach and departure routes over the West Bank.

Sources:

“Sardar Masjedi: Filistiniha beh Salah Pedafandi Dast Miyaband” (General Masjedi: Palestinians to Get Defensive Weapons),” Fararu.com (nominally independent web portal close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), 8 January 2024. https://fararu.com/fa/news/698061

The supreme advisor to the commander of the Qods Force [Iraj Masjedi] said that the strength of the Islamic Resistance is increasing daily. He said, “The Palestinians are fighting with rockets today, but a day will come when they will not allow bombardments by the Zionists and they will obtain air defense weapons,” he added.

Referring to America’s evils in the region, Masjedi said, “What is the commander of CENTCOM doing in Israel?” American planes are regularly sending weapons and bombs to Israel. The United States claim to stand for human rights when in fact they are the parents of terrorism.

The Americans have the largest army in the world but I tell you, they do not base one division of it in the United States itself, and instead it is spread out in the world. What are U.S. bases doing in the region? By what right are they based all over the world? Armies are responsible for maintaining their own territorial security. Where in the world do the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Islamic Republic of Iran Army have military bases? In this situation, the Americans tell others that Iran is interfering in the world, but this is very shameful.

He also referred to the weakness of the Israeli army in confronting the Palestinian resistance, saying that the Israelis have a special force called the Golani Brigade, which is considered to be a special force to deal with the Palestinians, but this brigade was so badly hit by the resistance forces that it was ordered to withdraw and the other five brigades of the Israel Defense Forces were forced to withdraw.The Supreme Advisor to the commander of the Qods Force also emphasized that the regional resistance forces with the support of the Iranian resistance force will break the hands of the enemies.

Notes:

[i] Against the backdrop of the Israel-Hamas war, this year’s commemorations of Soleimani’s death stretched on for a week with senior political and military  officials including, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, making statements testifying to Soleimani’s embodiment of the revolutionary values Iran seeks to espouse.

[ii] Iran initially embraced late Palestinian chairman Yasser Arafat and his Palestine Liberation Organization, the Iranian regime began to shift its support to Hamas following Arafat’s decision to begin negotiating with Israel at the end of the Reagan administration and largely broke with the PLO and the Palestinian Authority it dominated following the Oslo Accords. For an earlier discussion of Iran’s concept of strategic boundaries extending to its west, see: Michael Rubin, “Khamenei Speaks On Necessity Of Palestinian ‘Resistance,’” OE Watch, 06-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/khamenei-speaks-on-necessity-of-palestinian-resistance/

Image Information:

Image: Iraj Masjedi, a Qods Force commander and former Iranian ambassador to Iraq, meets with Qassem Soleimani, the late leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Qods Force. Source: https://jamejamonline.ir/files/fa/news/1402/10/13/1064448_573.jpg
Attribution: Jamejamonline.ir

Spotlight on Vatanpour, Iran’s “Most Active” Airbase

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Shahid [Martyr] Vatanpour Air Base, Isfahan

“If the army helicopters were not present, the costs in blood and treasure…would have been far greater.”

When the Iranian Air Force makes news, it is often for bad reasons, such as when its aging jets crash.[i] The excerpted article from Iranian news outlet defapress.ir features the Shahid Vatanpour Army Air Base south of Isfahan, providing some previously under-reported detail on the fact that it is a logistics and training base.[ii] The article also provides insight into activity and flight hours flown at Vatanpour and other air bases. For instance, the 168-fold difference in hours flown between Vatanpour and the Tehran Army Air Base is striking (366,477 vs. 2,177 hours). As a training base, it makes sense that there would be many flight hours logged at Vatanpour. However, delegation may be part of the enormous number of hours flown out of the base with Vatanpour being more central, less congested, and better suited as a logistical hub. Additionally, the metrics may be somewhat skewed because Iran stations certain F-14s at Tehran’s Mehrabad International Airport rather than at the Army Air Base, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operates airliners for military transport and logistics under the guise of passenger and cargo planes.

The aircraft themselves also tell a story. The short number of flight hours for the Chinooks stationed at Vatanpour may reflect, both the small number of Chinooks that remain in service and their poor condition.[iii] The inventory of Bell Helicopters has likewise shrunk, though the smaller platform and easier access to spare parts enables greater flight time.[iv] The excerpted article itself may serve another purpose as well. While the IRGC can rely on its many business interests to increase its official budget by more than an order of magnitude,[v] the regular Army has no such recourse. Even with the end of many international sanctions, funding remains limited. By highlighting the importance of Vatanpour, the IRGC may be seeking to protect the base should the Army’s top brass be considering an Iranian equivalent of a base realignment commission.

Sources:

“Paygah-e Isfahan: Fa’altarin Paygah-e Havaniroz Artesh” (Isfahan Base: The Army’s Most Active Air Force Base),” defapress.ir (official news agency of Iran’s defense ministry), 14 January 2024. https://defapress.ir/fa/news/644683

The Army Ground Forces are among the most influential forces that comprise the armed forces of our country. Within the ground forces is the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Aviation, colloquially known as “Havaniruz,” that has performed many missions in its existence, especially since the victory of the Islamic Revolution when it participated prominently in battle, security, and relief operations. In many cases, if the army helicopters were not present, the costs in blood and treasure we may have paid would have been far greater. The pilots of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Aviation carry out both helicopter and fixed wing missions. The Chinook pilots have the least numbers of flights, and the [Bell] 209 [Cobra], [Bell] 205, [Bell] 206, and [Bell] 214 pilots the most flight hours. The fixed-wing pilots also fly with [Dassault] Falcons, [Fokker F-27] Friendships and [Rockwell 690] Turbo Commander jets from Iran Army airbases in Tehran, Mashhad, Abyek [Qazvin], Masjid Suleiman, Khuzestan, Kerman, Kermanshah and the general support group and Vatanpour training center in Isfahan…. In the fixed-wing sector, Falcon jet pilots have the lowest number of flights and Turbo Commander pilots have the highest number of flights.In addition, the pilots assigned to the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Air Force base in Tehran recorded the least flight time with 2,177 hours, while the pilots assigned to the Shahid Vatanpour base in Isfahan recorded the highest amount, with 366,477 hours.

Notes:

[i] For previous discussion of Iranian fighter jet crashes, see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian F-14 Crash Highlights Iran’s Need for New Fighter Contract” OE Watch, 08-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iranian-f-14-crash-highlights-irans-need-for-new-fighter-contract/

[ii] The Iranian air forces are often subordinate to other branches of the Iranian military. Within both the regular Army and in the IRGC, the ground forces and navy are more prominent. In 2008, the Air Defense Force split from the Army’s Air Force to become its own distinct military branch focused on anti-aircraft capabilities. The IRGC, meanwhile, folds the role of its air force into the strategic missile and space forces, both of which outshine Iran’s aging jetfighters and other military aircraft. While Tehran spotlights its satellite launches and precision missiles, the bulk of its manned air force dates from prerevolutionary days with most aircraft more than a half century old.

[iii] Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s Chinooks numbered more than 100. They were once a workhorse for the Iranian Army. Famously, less than a year before the Islamic Revolution, four Iranian Chinooks strayed into Soviet airspace during a training mission, leading to the downing of two, with eight fatalities. Today, the Iranian Army Air Force may have at most two in service, the rest destroyed during the Iran-Iraq War, through attrition, or cannibalized for spare parts.

[iv] For background into Iran’s efforts to keep its helicopter fleet flying, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Reconstruction and Overhaul of Helicopters” OE Watch, March 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/368233/download

[v] For background about the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ economic interests, see: Michael Rubin, “The IRGC Wins Multibillion Dollar Economic Projects” OE Watch, August 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/241432/download

Image Information:

Image: Shahid [Martyr] Vatanpour Air Base, Isfahan
Source: https://www.ibena.ir/files/fa/news/1401/9/27/24702_342.jpg
Attribution: defapress.ir

Russia’s “Africa Corps” Set To Replace Wagner in Niger

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Russian mercenaries provide security for convoy with president of the Central African Republic

“The future Russian Army “Africa corps” is presented by certain Telegram channels as intended to replace Wagner.”

Russia’s Wagner Group became heavily involved in Africa in the years before the death of its founder Yevgeny Prigozhin in an airplane crash in August 2023. The mercenary fighter company deployed its troops primarily to West African countries where France was the security guarantor but had become ostracized by military juntas and authoritarian regimes, such as in Mali, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, and Sudan.[i] Wagner, in turn, became a key means for Russia to exert influence on the leadership of those countries, which often resulted in Russia being granted special concessions, such as access to resources. However, the Wagner brand name has fallen out of favor with the Kremlin for African operations following Prigozhin’s rebellion against Russian leadership. Yet, the benefit for Russia of having mercenary military formations in Africa still exists. As a result, Russia may replace Wagner with a new, but similarly purposed, “Africa Corps.”

The excerpted French-language article on the website of Radio France Internationale highlighted the visit in December 2023 of Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Evkourov (often spelled Yevkurov) to Niger, where the two countries agreed to strengthen military cooperation.[ii] The was significant because it was the first time a Russian delegation visited Niger since the 2023 coup and demonstrated Russia’s endorsement of Niger’s new military junta, whereas Western countries criticized the coup. Additionally, only one month after the coup, the new junta in Niger requested from Russia Wagner’s protection of the junta from internal and external threats, including a potential military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (See Jason Warner, “West African States Split On Potential Intervention In Niger,” OE Watch, Issue # 08, 2023, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-split-on-potential-intervention-in-niger/).  Evkourov’s visit solidifies the new partnership between Russia and Niger, with Wagner—or the new “Africa Corps”— as the vehicle for Russian influence. The article noted that, based on an analysis of Telegram social media channels, “Africa Corps,” like Wagner, would welcome mercenaries. Indeed, the offer of a relatively high salary, health insurance with free medical care, and life insurance, all under the supervision of Evkourov, would motivate mercenaries to join. Such inducements attract, in particular, Russian Army veterans whose professional skill set and sense of adventure is otherwise not compatible with civilian life. Further, the article indicates Russian military intelligence and businessmen close to Vladimir Putin support “Africa Corps.” The similarities between Wagner and “Africa Corps” strongly suggest the latter is a continuation of the former under different branding.

Sources:

“Russie: Moscou prépare un «corps militaire africain» pour prendre la suite de Wagner (Russia: Moscow is preparing an “African military corps” to replace Wagner),” Radio France Internationale, (French state-owned radio news website reporting on international affairs), 5 December 2023. rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20231205-russie-moscou-prépare-un-corps-militaire-africain-pour-prendre-la-suite-de-wagner

A Russian delegation led by the Deputy Minister of Defense is in Niamey. This is the first official visit by a member of the Russian government to this country since the July 26 coup which broke diplomatic relations between Niger and its international partners. The delegation led by the Russian Deputy Minister of Defense, Colonel-General Younous-bek Bamatguireevich Evkourov, was received by the head of the Nigerien military regime, General Abdourahamane Tiani. At the end of the meeting, the parties continued “to sign documents to strengthen military cooperation between the Republic of Niger and the Russian FederationThe future Russian Army “African corps” is presented by certain Telegram channels as intended to replace Wagner. Former mercenaries would be welcome. The conditions include a high salary of nearly 3,000 euros, free medical care, and life and health insurance, all under the supervision of Deputy Defense Minister Yunous-bek Bamatguireevich Evkourov. Other sources suggest that the unit receives direct patronage from Russian military intelligence, under the leadership of a businessman close to the president… This last scenario would be very similar to that applied to Wagner

Notes:

[i] In the final week of December 2023, the last remaining 1,500 French troops withdrew from Niger. In addition, Niger previously vowed to stop selling minerals to France and removed diplomatic immunity from the French Ambassador to Niger, who departed the country in August. With the closure of the French Embassy in Niamey on 31 December 2023, the 127 years of a French diplomatic presence in Niger came to an end. This followed a similar French withdrawal from Burkina Faso earlier in 2023 and from Mali in 2022. For additional details, see Morgane Le Cam, “France completes troop withdrawal from Niger, closes embassy,” lemonde.fr, 22 December 2023. lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/12/22/france-completes-troop-withdrawal-from-niger-closes-embassy_6367061_124.html

[ii] Evkourov is an interesting choice to lead Africa Corps because he was close to Yevgeny Prigozhin but remained loyal to the Russian Defense Ministry during Prigozhin’s mutiny. Evkourov played a mediating role during the mutiny. When Prigozhin’s Wagner forces entered Rostov and seized the city center, Evkourov received Prigozhin hospitably and defused tensions. However, after Prigozhin’s death, Evkourov led a delegation to Syria, Libya, Central African Republic, and other countries where Wagner operated and told Wagner forces that the Defense Ministry would take over the leadership of Wagner.

Image Information:

Image: Russian mercenaries provide security for convoy with president of the Central African Republic
Source: Clément Di Roma/VOA, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RussiansecurityBangui.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Russia Changes Arctic Icebreaker Names To Honor History

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The Russian Nuclear Icebreaker Arktika, the first of its class of nuclear-powered icebreakers.

“The naming of ships in Russia has become increasingly politicized. Recently, state oil company Rosneft put its new tanker on the water. It is named the Aleksei Kosygin after the prominent Soviet Politburo representative. In Soviet history, a significant number of ships have carried Stalin’s name.”

Russia is changing the planned names of its next two icebreakers, usually named for Russian geographic regions, to reflect Russian history. Russia is renaming its next two Arktika [R1]  class nuclear icebreakers after previous leaders Stalin and Lenin.[i] The next icebreaker, which was to be named Kamchatka, will now be named Stalingrad, and the following Sakhalin will become the Leningrad. According to the excerpted article from The Barents Observer, “the naming of ships in Russia has become increasingly politicized” as Moscow seeks to sustain the memory of those Soviet victories, both significant in Russian history. Both dictators, Stalin and Lenin, overmatch even Ivan the Terrible in Russia’s long history. After Stalin’s death, Soviet Premier Khrushchev led the de-Stalinization campaign and amongst other initiatives, renamed Stalingrad to Volgograd and Leningrad back to St. Petersburg. Undoubtedly the current Russian invasion of Ukraine is part of Putin’s rationale. To many Russians, the names denote sacrifice, heroism, and victory—important historical rallying points in the current context of Russian losses and determination in Ukraine.

Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “In chilly return to past, Putin names new icebreaker “Stalingrad,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 20 November 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2023/11/shadow-strife-and-aggression-descends-arctic-putin-names-new-icebreaker-stalingrad.

The projected nuclear-powered icebreaker was originally to be named Kamchatka. But the Kremlin now appears to have intervened and renamed the powerful ship Stalingrad.  According to the government-controlled newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta, the name change comes after a proposal from Governor of Volgograd region Andrei Bochkarev. Putin has approved the idea and the icebreaker will carry the name Stalingrad, Bochkarev told the newspaper. “The initiative is important for the preservation of the memory of the bravery of protectors of Stalingrad during the Great Patriotic War”. The city of Volgograd was called Stalingrad until 1961. It was site of one of the most bloody and cruel battles during the whole Second World War. Up to 1.9 million people are believed to have been killed in the battles that raged between August 1942 and February 1943. It is considered a turning point in the war that ultimately led to the fall of Hitler’s Nazi regime.

The Stalingrad will be Russia’s sixth icebreaker of the Project 22220. Its construction is due to start in 2024. Russia currently has three vessels of this class in operation. The Arktika, Sibir, and Ural keep Arctic ports and shipping lanes open for shipments. The Yakutia and Chukotka are due to be ready for operations in 2024 and 2026 respectively. In addition to the renaming of the Kamchatka to Stalingrad, Putin has reportedly also approved the renaming of the Sakhalin to Leningrad.The naming of ships in Russia has become increasingly politicized. Recently, state oil company Rosneft put its new tanker on the water. It is named the Aleksei Kosygin after the prominent Soviet Politburo representative.  In Soviet history, a significant number of ships have carried Stalin’s name.

Notes:

[i] For previous reporting on Russia’s nuclear icebreaker production, see: Les Grau, “Russia Cutting Back On Nuclear Icebreaker Production,” OE Watch, 04-2023, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-cutting-back-on-nuclear-icebreaker-production-2/

Image Information:

Image: The Russian Nuclear Icebreaker Arktika, the first of its class of nuclear-powered icebreakers.
Source: Abarinov, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Russian_Nuclear_Icebreaker_Arktika.jpg?uselang=ru – Лицензирование
Attribution: Public Domain

Russia Continues To Enhance Its Arctic Infrastructure

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Map of the Yenisei River showing national borders

“The 5.8 km long pipeline is a key component of Vostok Oil, the biggest industrial project currently unfolding in the Russian Arctic. According to Russian state oil company Rosneft and its subsidiary RN-Vankor, as many as 25 ships have taken part in dredging operations in the Yenisei during summer 2023. As winter approached, the company started laying the pipeline on the riverbed. The new pipeline will cross the Yenisei River near Tochina.”

Amid sanctions, Russia continues to develop the infrastructure necessary to exploit and export its vast natural resources, especially in the Arctic. The Yenisei River is a major river flowing northward that originates in Mongolia and bisects Russia. It is a key economic transport route of vital energy and metals from the industrial city and extraction centers of Norilsk. According to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, products move by rail from Norilsk to the river port of Dudinka, where they are shipped to the Arctic Ocean and then to ports east and west on the Northern Sea Route. Russia is investing heavily in increasing the carrying capacity of the Northern Sea route,[i] already moving energy to its Pacific customers on ice-class LNG carriers and oil tankers. The Dudinka port is at capacity and the riverside village of Tochina is being rapidly expanded. Reportedly, 21 riverside terminals are under construction to handle petroleum exports. Russia’s focus on new routes to its Asian markets, China and North Korea, will help it circumvent the sanctions and survive a protracted war in Ukraine.

Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Oilmen start building of underwater pipeline across the Yenisei,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 19 December 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2023/12/oilmen-start-building-underwater-pipeline-across-yenisey

The 5.8 km long pipeline is a key component of Vostok Oil, the biggest industrial project currently unfolding in the Russian Arctic. According to Russian state oil company Rosneft and its subsidiary RN-Vankor, as many as 25 ships have in taken part in dredging operations in the Yenisei during summer 2023. As winter approached, the company started laying the pipeline on the riverbed. The new pipeline will cross the Yenisey River near Tochina.

The pipes have a 820 mm diameter and wall thickness of 22 mm. The 5,8 km long installation will connect the eastern and western shores of the major Arctic river. Its starting point is in the village of Tochina, about 60 km north of Dudinka.

Rosneft is under great time pressure to build this part of the Vostok Oil project. On a number of occasions, company CEO Igor Sechin has reiterated that the project will produce more than 30 million tons already in 2024. By 2030, the Vostok Oil will produce more than 100 million tons per year, most of it to be exported through the Northern Sea Route to Asian buyers.

A significant number of wells are drilled in the Taymyr Peninsula and several hundred km of pipeline are under construction. The oil will be exported from the Sever Terminal on the coast of the Yenisei Bay.

In the course of summer 2023, more than one million tons of goods have reportedly been shipped to the construction sites along the Yenisei, including 120,000 tons of oil pipes.

Rosneft have developed 21 mooring point for ship deliveries in the area and as many as 402 ships have reportedly been involved in project shipments this year.

Notes:

[i] For additional reporting on Russian activity in the Arctic see: Les Grau, “Russian Arctic Seaports Expand Activity Despite War In Ukraine,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russian-arctic-seaports-expand-activity-despite-war-in-ukraine/

Image Information:

Image: Map of the Yenisei River showing national borders
Source: Kmusser, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yeniseirivermap.png
Attribution: CCA-Share Alike 3.0 Unported

Former Wagner Troops Integrated Into Chechen Unit Fighting in Ukraine

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State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

“A platoon dubbed Kamerton (Tuning Fork) consisting of fighters from the now-defunct Wagner Private Military Company (PMC), who had been incorporated into the ranks of the Akhmat special forces group, has carried out a successful assault on a Ukrainian-occupied elevated point.”

On 12 December 2023, a platoon of former fighters from the disbanded Wagner Group carried out an operation in Ukraine-controlled Bakhmut. The operation, a successful assault on the town, marked one of the few times that the official Russian news agency, TASS, has mentioned the Wagner Group after its failed mutiny in 2023 and the death of its mercurial leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin.

While the article does not provide significant detail about the operation itself, it confirms that remnants of Wagner are still actively fighting in Ukraine. The platoon, called Kamerton (or “Tuning Fork”), is under the command of the Akhmat Special Forces, a 12,000-strong Chechen special forces unit that is part of the Russian National Guard.[i] Roughly 1,200 Akhmat fighters are estimated to be fighting in Ukraine, though their poor discipline has drawn criticisms (they have been dubbed the “TikTok Army” for their social media posts).[ii]

The second excerpted article from TASS, published on 1 December 2023, provides more detail about Kamerton’s operational capability. It describes the platoon as having both an assault and artillery capability, which supports previous reporting that Akhmat forces not only engaged in trench clearing operations but also provided artillery support to assist Russia’s 4th Brigade and other forces in the disputed Donets region. Adding a platoon with artillery capability to Akhmat would fill a void in the unit structure as the Chechens are traditionally equipped and trained as light infantry or paramilitary combatants. Still, even if Kamerton includes an artillery component, it would be relatively small given the unit is described as a platoon.   Assuming the TASS stories are accurate, they provide preliminary evidence on the whereabouts of a small handful of Wagner fighters, how they are being used in Ukraine, and their current capabilities. The Akhmat battalion is a logical unit for former Wagner fighters as they were close and shared the same battlespace during the battle for Bakhmut in early 2023. Incorporating Wagner remnants into Akhmat units may also plug a capability gap and be easier than trying to integrate the former Wagner fighters into a standard Russian Army infantry or artillery unit.[iii] However, it remains unclear how the remnants of Wagner, or another private military company, will fill the void Wagner left in other parts of the world.[iv]

Sources:

“Собранный из бойцов ‘Вагнера’ отряд ‘Камертон’ провел первый штурм к западу от Артемовска, (Platoon formed from ex-Wagner PMC fighters carries out first assault near Artyomovsk),” TASS (official news agency of Russian government), 12 December 2023. https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/19516415

A platoon dubbed Kamerton (Tuning Fork) consisting of fighters from the now-defunct Wagner Private Military Company (PMC), who had been incorporated into the ranks of the Akhmat special forces group, has carried out a successful assault on a Ukrainian-occupied elevated point near the western outskirts of Artyomovsk, the platoon commander, who goes by the call sign “Press,” told TASS.

“Prior to this, it was everyday routine [frontline activities] – reconnaissance and fire strikes. Yet, this was precisely an assault on a key elevated point in this sector directly by the Kamerton platoon with support from the 4th brigade. In six minutes, Kamerton’s assault groups entered the elevated point and engaged in combat in a trench. They wiped out the enemy and opened up space for the operations of their neighboring platoons,” the commander said.

According to him, the positions taken will help develop further progress in this sector of the line of contact. “The 4th brigade and other Russian forces in this area are being covered by Kamerton’s artillery,” he clarified…

“Командир собранного из бойцов “Вагнера” отряда рассказал о выполнении задач в ходе СВО (The commander of the detachment assembled from Wagner fighters spoke about the implementation of tasks during the Northern Military District),” TASS (Russian state media), 1 December 2023. https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/19427897

According to the head of “Kamerton”, which is part of “Akhmat”, its fighters are engaged in “the whole range of tasks.”

The Kamerton detachment, which consists of former fighters of the Wagner PMC and is part of the Akhmat special forces, performs a full range of tasks in the area of the special military operation. The detachment commander with the call sign Press reported this to TASS.

“Tuning Fork” includes both assault groups and armored and artillery formations.

“Taking into account experience and past operations, we are faced with the whole range of tasks, as well as other Akhmat special forces units. From training personnel, combat coordination to carrying out combat missions on the line of combat contact,” Press said.

He clarified that Akhmat is a self-sufficient division with its own approaches and methods. According to the Press, Akhmat’s management has allowed Kamerton to fully exploit its strengths.“Tuning fork” inherited and brought with it in full all the best qualities inherent in “musicians” (fighters of the Wagner PMC – TASS note), both in matters of corporate ethics and in direct approaches to solving combat missions. PMC fighters in the Akhmat special forces are a unique alloy,” added the unit commander.

Notes:

[i] Akhmat Special Forces operating in Ukraine, led by Chechen commander, Apti Alaudinov, operated closely with Wagner Group prior to Prigozhin’s mutiny and siege of Russian military HQ in Rostov. Although the relationship changed, it would not be far-fetched for Wagner personnel to be incorporated the Chechen ranks as the units and personnel worked together. Also of importance, the Akhmat Special Forces was initially a predominantly Chechen unit. Over time the unit has become home to many ethnicities from the Russian Federation and prides itself as multicultural, multi-religious, comprised of Jews, Muslims and Christians—according to mulitiple statements from its commander Apti Alaudinov posted to his Telegram channel.

[ii] Borzou Daragahi, “Putin’s lapdog wears Prada: Chechen leader Kadyrov poses on TikTok while his men kill civilians in Ukraine,” The Independent, 7 April 2022. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/kadyrov-chechen-putin-ukraine-chechnya-b2052357.html

 [iii] To see more on Wagner Group activities around the world, see FMSO’s archives here: https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/tag/wagner-group/

[iv] A recent report by the Center for New American Security suggests that the Wagner Group has created a new “model that other Russian opportunistic actors will seek to replicate,” especially given the lack of financial resources for Russia’s military and civilian elite. See: Kimberly Marten, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Carisa Nietsche, “Potential Russian Uses of Paramilitaries in Eurasia,” CNAS, 17 January 2024. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/potential-russian-uses-of-paramilitaries-in-eurasia

Image Information:

Image: Southwestern part of Bakhmut (Donetsk region of Ukraine) during the battle for the city in Spring 2023.
Source: State Border Guard Service of Ukraine https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bakhmut_during_the_battle_(2023-04-05),_frame_16531.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Int

Russia Standardizing Munitions Used on First-Person View UAVs

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Russian Soldier with FPV UAV

“Previously, we had to independently manufacture, adapt, and “collectively develop” munitions. All this is unsafe. Now having a standard munition will make everyone’s job easier and safer…It’s no secret that some crews were blown up by their own munitions”

The accompanying excerpted article from the Russian military enthusiast website, Armeyskiy Standart, describes the role and importance of small first-person view (FPV) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are being used extensively in Ukraine. Many of these commercially produced UAVs have been repurposed from reconnaissance duties and modified to carry various munitions that can be effectively dropped on enemy personnel and/or equipment.[i] The second accompanying excerpted article from the Russian newspaper, Izvestia, discusses Russian efforts to further the FPV concept by developing standardized munitions for FPV UAVs. As the article explains, improvised explosives for use with small FPV UAVs are unstable and have resulted in crews being “blown up” by their own munitions. The impacts of the adoption of standardized munitions for FPV UAVs will likely extend long after Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine concludes. The en masse use of FPV UAVs is likely seen by the Russian military, and many others,[ii] as necessary for tactical success on the modern battlefield, especially in the conduct of close-range reconnaissance and fires. The adoption of standardized munitions will facilitate interoperability in the burgeoning Russian UAV industry and significantly lower already relatively low manufacturing costs. Standardization is a necessary step if Russia intends to place FPV UAVs into its table of organization and equipment structure, given their effectiveness and cost for delivering close-range reconnaissance and fires.

Sources:

Rustem Klupov, “FPV— дроны завоевывают поле боя: В ходе СВО впервые широко применены новые средства поражения (FPV— UAVs are conquering the battlefield: The new weapons were widely used in the SMO for the first time),” Armeyskiy Standart (Russian military enthusiast website), 7 December 2023. https://armystandard.ru/news/20231261712-o0qQy.html

In reports of special military operations [SMO], there are more and more reports of the use of so-called FPV (First-Person View) UAVs on the line of combat contact in the tactical depth at close-range. FPVs are quadcopters, or multi-rotor UAVs, equipped with a camera that transmits video to the operator-pilot’s control device. The pilot controls the UAV using this video feed, giving him the feeling of actually being in the UAV’s cockpit…

We can say that FPV UAVs are the “know-how” of SVO. They have wide ranging capabilities to destroy a variety of enemy targets. Having a small mass, they can lift a load several times their own weight and carry it at a speed of 120–140 km/h over a distance of 15–16 km… At the same time, the cost of one UAV is on average from 30 thousand to 60 thousand rubles [$330-660].

The versatility of FPV UAVs also lies in the fact that they can carry out additional reconnaissance of an object, deliver high-precision strikes and can carry munitions for various purposes — high-explosive, shaped-charge, fragmentation, thermobaric, incendiary, and kinetic…

The ability to use FPV UAVs in the tactical depth at close-range, which is most saturated with troops, allows these UAVs to always find their target, and having the capability to employ specialized munitions to ensure the reliable destruction of a variety of objects.The comparative effectiveness of FPV UAVs with other traditional means of destruction distinguishes this type as cheaper and more pragmatic in terms of accuracy and range of use.

Roman Kretsul, Alexey Ramm, and Dmitry Astrakhan, “С легким — на подъем: для FPV-дронов начали выпускать штатные боеприпасы (Easy goings — standardized munitions have begun to be produced for FPV UAVs),” Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 1 December 2023. https://iz.ru/1613625/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm-dmitrii-astrakhan/s-legkim-na-podem-dlia-fpv-dronov-nachali-vypuskat-shtatnye-boepripasy

…Several enterprises of the Russian defense industry have established serial production of ammunition for FPV UAVs, regular deliveries to the troops began this fall, two sources in the military department told Izvestia and confirmed by an interlocutor in the military-industrial complex.

The new ammunition is equipped with universal mounts that allow it to be suspended under almost all types of FPV UAVs used in the special military operation zone. Now the troops are receiving fragmentation, high-explosive fragmentation and cumulative warheads. In the future, their line is planned to be expanded.

Externally, a munition for an FPV UAV looks like a tube. New munitions are delivered to the troops in special protective plastic cases. As the publication’s interlocutors noted, the main advantage of the new products is their compactness combined with high power. This is achieved through the use of special explosives. Therefore, serial produced munitions are much superior improvised munitions…

“Previously, we had to independently manufacture, adapt, and “collectively develop” munitions. All this is unsafe. Now having a standard munition will make everyone’s job easier and safer…It’s no secret that some crews were blown up by their own munitions…” said Dmitry Uskov, a volunteer and contributor to the “13 Tactical” Telegram channel, told Izvestia…[i] FPV UAVs are one of the most dynamically developing areas of unmanned aviation. The operator controls such a device while wearing virtual reality glasses, like a pilot. With the proper skill, this allows you to deliver a UAV with a warhead precisely to the target, for example, to the door of a dugout or a vulnerable projection of an armored vehicle. For most other weapon systems, such precision is unimaginable…

[i] 13 Tactical is a pro-Russia site on the Telegram platform, as found at: https://t.me/s/tactical_13/2665

Notes:

[i] For other Russian uses of drones on the battlefield, see: Charles Bartles, “Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons To Engineer Units,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-plans-to-add-remote-mining-uav-platoons-to-engineer-units/

[ii] For a recent examination of Taiwan’s position regarding drones on the battlefield, see: John Lubianetsky, “Taiwan Addressing Drone Technology Gap With China,” OE Watch, 10-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/taiwan-addressing-drone-technology-gap-with-china/

Image Information:

Image: Russian Soldier with FPV UAV
Source:
Attribution: Russian Ministry of Defense, CC BY-SA 4.0