Category Archives: Global Operational Environment

Articles whose main focus is topics pertaining to Global Operational Environment.

Azerbaijan’s Joint Exercise With Turkey Sends Familiar Warning Message to Armenia

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Turkish Armed Forces at the Victory Parade 2020 in Baku

“The exercises are still another warning to Armenia to refrain from any border provocations and cool the attitude of those who harbor ideas and goals of revenge.”

Azerbaijan has carried out several joint military exercises with Turkey in recent years as part of their security cooperation partnership. Past exercises with Turkey have often sought to prepare Azerbaijani forces for a potential conflict with Armenian-backed separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh and gain experience from Turkey’s Armed Forces.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the independent Caucasus-based news website Kavkazskiy Uzel reports on a joint Azerbaijan-Turkey exercise that took place in October 2023, which has sent a familiar message to Armenia. According to an expert who previously worked in the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, the recent exercise serves as a warning to Armenia. Even though Azerbaijan regained control over Nagorno-Karabakh from ethnic Armenians in an operation a month prior to the exercise taking place, the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia have yet to reach an agreement demarcating their border, with disputes leading to several clashes along the border over the past few years. Azerbaijan’s exercise ultimately shows how it continues to develop its Armed Forces with Turkey’s help in preparation for a potential conflict with Armenia. Yet, the article mentions that the most recent exercise is different from previous ones because it involved more types of units outside of Azerbaijan’s Army, including missile and artillery, engineer, and special forces units. The exercise is also different because there are no longer Armenian troops on Azerbaijan’s territory. Given that Azerbaijan regained control of Nagorno-Karabakh it presumably no longer needs to conduct that type of scenario in an exercise.

Sources:

Faik Majid, “Аналитики в Баку оценили значение азербайджано-турецких учений (Analysts in Baku assessed the meaning of the Azerbaijsan-Turkish exercise),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent Caucasus-based news website), 25 October 2023. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/393732

“Up to three thousand military personnel are taking part in the joint Azerbaijani-Turkish military exercises “Mustafa Kemal Ataturk – 2023”, which began on October 23 in Baku, Nakhichevan, as well as in the territories of Karabakh that came under the control of Azerbaijan.

The current joint Azerbaijani-Turkish military exercises differ from previous ones in that they involve almost all types of troops, military expert, former employee of the information and analytical department of the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan Azad Isazade told the “Caucasian Knot”…

Judging by official reports, units of the ground forces of the Azerbaijani army, a separate combined arms army stationed in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, the Air Force, missile and artillery troops, engineering troops, special forces, even special forces of the Navy and representatives of the relevant types of troops of the Turkish Armed Forces are taking part in the exercises…

“Azerbaijan, after the anti-terrorist operation on September 19-20, restored its territorial integrity. There are no longer Armenian troops on its territory. However, the exercises are still another warning to Armenia to refrain from any border provocations and cool the attitude of those who harbor ideas and goals of revenge,” the military expert suggested. The algorithm of joint exercises between Azerbaijan and Turkey indicates Baku’s determination to transfer its army to the Turkish model of armed forces, says military expert, retired officer Adalat Verdiyev…One of the advantages of the Turkish army model is that small groups of special forces, commandos, even without the participation of artillery and other types of combat units, can independently successfully complete missions, going deep into rear of the enemy over long distances, or suddenly deliver crushing blows to the enemy’s forward positions,” said Verdiev…

Notes:

[i] For more information on past Azerbaijan-Turkey exercises, see: Matthew Stein “Azerbaijan’s Post-War Exercise with Turkey,” OE Watch, March 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/382686

Image Information:

Image: Turkish Armed Forces at the Victory Parade 2020 in Baku
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Turkish_Armed_Forces_at_the_Victory_Parade_2020_in_Baku_2.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Israel’s Operation in Gaza Compounding Logistical Delays for India’s Armed Forces

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Indian Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the India-Israel Business Summit, in New Delhi on January 15, 2018

“Consequently, in light of the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and now in Gaza, Russia and Israel, he warned, could well end up either failing to meet India’s numerous materiel requirements or delaying deliveries interminably.”

Two months after Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, India began to experience delays in deliveries of weapons and equipment from Russia. The Israeli operations in Gaza have only compounded the delays.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the independent English-language news website The Wire reports on the ongoing delays of military equipment from not only Russia, but now Israel, as it carries out its Gaza operation. The article examines how two of India’s main suppliers of weapon systems and equipment, Russia and Israel, are currently engaged in conflicts. It also notes how Israel has not provided India with major platforms or systems like Russia has but provided components for various systems as well as different munitions. These components have been implemented into systems of all branches of the Indian Armed Forces making it difficult to quantify the number of Israeli systems in Indian platforms. The author of the article ends by mentioning that Russia’s and Israel’s conflicts could motivate India to pursue alternatives to continue building its defense industry. While the article does not offer specifics on how India will deal with the delays, the situation may push India to seek other partners to find short and long-term solutions to grow the country’s defense industry.

Sources:

Rahul Bedi, “Ukraine and Gaza May Impact Russia and Israel’s Ability to Sustain Materiel Exports to India,” The Wire (an independent English-language news website in India), 14 October 2023. https://thewire.in/security/ukraine-gaza-materiel-exports-to-india

The involvement of India’s two principal materiel providers – Russia and Israel – in their respective wars and conflicts has the potential to impact the inflow of defence equipment supplies into the country, warned a cross-section of service veterans and military analysts.

…This equalled a whopping 55% or so of Russian and Israeli military imports for India…

Retired Brigadier Rahul Bhonsle of the Security Risks Asia consultancy in Delhi said that while the BJP-led government had launched the atamnirbhar initiative to indigenise Indian military needs, Delhi still topped the global list of defence equipment importers.

Consequently, in light of the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and now in Gaza, Russia and Israel, he warned, could well end up either failing to meet India’s numerous materiel requirements or delaying deliveries interminably.

Unlike Russia, Israel does not provide India any major platforms, but supplies critical and innovative force multipliers like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), assorted missile, guidance and avionics systems, precision-guided munitions, diverse sensors and surveillance and targeting radars, amongst other equipment.

Most of this was fitted onto combat aircraft, helicopters, warships, submarines and armoured vehicles.

But such equipment and component diversity made it difficult to quantify the exact or even near-precise percentages of Israeli military equipment in service with India’s armed forces.

…(though) Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza against Hamas was ‘unlikely’ to impact military hardware and spares supplies to India in the short term, they cautioned that an extended conflict could jeopardise deliveries.

…Once diplomatic ties with Israel were instituted under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1992, the two sides fast-tracked their strategic and defence relationship based on mutual security and commercial interests.

Israel, for its part, rightly perceived a commercial opportunity, while India looked upon Tel Aviv as a reliable and ‘no-questions-asked’ materiel provider, especially of varied ammunition and missile systems which India’s military badly lacked, and still does.

Nonetheless, it still took another six-odd years and the BJP’s ascent to power under Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee for Israel’s defence machinery to definitively establish itself in India…

However, it was the 11-week long Kargil war with Pakistan in 1999 that catapulted Israel’s defence industry to centre stage domestically.

As the seriousness of the deadly conflict unfolded, commercially savvy Israel dug deep into its military reserves to supply India high-end hardware, especially badly-needed 155mm rounds for its FH-77B Bofors howitzers, laser-guided munitions and other ordnance that contributed largely to the Pakistan Army vacating the mountainous region’s siege and ending hostilities.

Two decades later, the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) Mirage 2000H fighters in their attack on a Pakistani militant training camp at Balakot in Pakhtunkhwa in February 2019, fired specifically configured Israeli Crystal Maze Mk2 missiles (variants of the Rafael Advanced Defence Systems AGM-142 Raptor Have Nap/Popeye missile)…

…And though India had reduced its dependence on Russia for military equipment by some 33% between 2011 and 2020 in an effort to diversify its network of materiel suppliers, switching entirely to alternate sources was not an option military-planners in Delhi desired, as it entailed colossal expenditure, reworked infrastructure, inordinate delays and doctrinal changes.Perhaps the individual wars in Ukraine and Gaza and the constraints these could impose on Russia and Israel’s ability to export defence equipment may end up providing alternative routes to sustain and modernise India’s military through indigenous efforts.

Notes:

[i] For more information on India’s issues with deliveries of ordnance since the war in Ukraine began, see: Matthew Stein “India Takes a Step Away from the Russian Defense Industry,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 31 July 2023. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3475660/india-takes-a-step-away-from-the-russian-defense-industry/

Image Information:

Image: Indian Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the India-Israel Business Summit, in New Delhi on January 15, 2018
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Prime_Minister,Shri_Narendra_Modi_and_the_Prime_Minister_of_Israel,_Mr._Benjamin_Netanyahu_at_the_India-Israel_Business_Summit,_in_New_Delhi_on_January_15,_2018(2).jpg
Attribution: Government Open Data License – India (GODL)

India Upgrades Its Artillery Systems Based On Lessons From The War In Ukraine

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Dhanush howitzer during Republic Day Parade 2017

“The war also brought out the matter of increased survivability, the source said, referring to reports which suggested that Russia had lost 5,000 guns and rocket systems so far.”

India continues to draw many operational and tactical lessons from the war in Ukraine.[i] The excerpted article from The Hindu reports that India’s Branch of Artillery, an operational arm of the Army, conducted a study of the Ukraine conflict and will subsequently convert all existing towed and self-propelled artillery systems making 155mm the standard caliber. The article also notes that the Army will be looking to India’s defense industry to update these systems with a focus on buying indigenously produced munitions. Officials in India’s Ministry of Defense stated concerns about the availability of ordnance for various systems after the war in Ukraine began.[ii] Overall, this marks an example of Indian officials taking another lesson from the war in Ukraine resulting in a long-term change for the country’s armed forces.

Sources:

Dinakar Peri, “Indian Army draws lessons from Ukraine war, revises artillery requirements,” The Hindu (English-language newspaper in India), 17 September 2023. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/army-draws-lessons-from-ukraine-war-revises-its-artillery-requirements/article67315823.ece

Drawing lessons from the Ukraine war, the Indian Army has revised the profile of its Artillery regiment, with focus on a mix of mobility and augmented long-range firepower.

The Army expects to achieve its target of converting the entire artillery to medium 155 mm gun systems by 2042…

“The Regiment of Artillery has done a detailed study along with the Operations Branch. In the revised Artillery profile, Army is going for more self-propelled and mounted gun systems,” the source said…

The Army has embarked on a plan to make 155 mm the standard calibre of all artillery guns…

The war also brought out the matter of increased survivability, the source said, referring to reports which suggested that Russia had lost 5,000 guns and rocket systems so far.

There is a need for methods for force preservation as well as to adopt shoot-and-scoot techniques. “The Russia-Ukraine conflict also shows that we need to be prepared for such a prolonged war,” the source said.

…the Army inducted the M777 Ultra Light Howitzer (ULH) in November 2018. It has since inducted all 145 guns contracted. In addition, 100 K9-Vajra Self Propelled Guns have been inducted and the Defence Acquisition Council has approved procurement of 100 more.

…The Army has also placed orders for 114 Dhanush guns, indigenously upgraded based on the Bofors guns, and 300 Sharang guns, which are upgraded from 130mm guns to 155 mm…

In addition, Request for Proposals (RFPs) have been also issued for two more gun systems — 155mm/ 52 calibre Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS) and Mounted Gun System (MGS). The MGS has crew and ammunition onboard the vehicle and has shoot-and-scoot capabilities, officials said. The Army is looking for around 300 guns.…In addition to guns, there is a major focus on indigenisation of munitions, officials said, stating that four types of munitions were currently under trials.

Notes:

[i] The Indian Army carried out an exercise in the summer of 2022 that worked through tactical communication issues related to the war in Ukraine and earlier this year policy makers outlined several capabilities that India should develop in its armed forces after watching how Russia and Ukraine have made adjustments on the battlefield, see: Matthew Stein “Lessons For India From The War In Ukraine,” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/lessons-for-india-from-the-war-in-ukraine/

[ii] For more information on India’s issues with deliveries of ordnance since the war in Ukraine began, see: Matthew Stein “India Takes a Step Away from the Russian Defense Industry,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 31 July 2023. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3475660/india-takes-a-step-away-from-the-russian-defense-industry/

Image Information:

Image: Dhanush howitzer during Republic Day Parade 2017
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dhanush_howitzer_during_Republic_Day_Parade_2017.jpg
Attribution: Government Open Data License – India

Côte d’Ivoire’s Stance On Military Interventions Prioritize Democratic Principles

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Members of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center honor guard stand in formation during a welcoming ceremony for Ivory Coast Gen. Soumaila Bakayoko.

“If ECOWAS chooses a particular option to resolve the regional crisis, Côte d’Ivoire will follow this option in solidarity with other member states.”

On 29 September, the Turkish website of Anadolu News Agency published the excerpted French-language article on Côte d’Ivoire’s intention to comply with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) if the organization military intervenes in Niger. The article notes that ECOWAS has threatened to intervene militarily in Niger to reinstall deposed president Mohamed Bazoum to power. A spokesperson for Côte d’Ivoire’s government confirmed that the country will not make any decision regarding Niger unilaterally but will respect the outcomes of ECOWAS member states’ debates.

The decision to follow ECOWAS into battle in Niger differs from Côte d’Ivoire’s announcement in November 2022 that it would withdraw its forces from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), despite MINUSMA’s continued counterinsurgency efforts against al-Qaeda and Islamic State-loyal militants. According to the excerpted French-language article in tvmonde5.com, Côte d’Ivoire’s withdrawal from MINUSMA came after Mali’s coup leaders alleged that Ivorian troops who entered Mali to operate with a German contingent were “mercenaries.”[i] Côte d’Ivoire’s commitment to ECOWAS and reduction in military support to MINUSMA can be interpreted as a reflection of how opposition parties have been permitted to participate in Ivorian politics and how other reforms have improved electoral competition since 2020.[ii] Côte d’Ivoire is willing to support military efforts to restore democratically elected civilian rulers, such as Bazoum, to power. However, the country is refraining from offering its troops for regional military efforts to support governments, such as in Mali, that refuse to return power to democratically elected leaders and that express allegiance towards Russia, including its proxy, Wagner Group.

Sources:

“L’option d’une intervention militaire de la Cédéao au Niger reste possible (The option of ECOWAS military intervention in Niger remains possible),” Anadolu News Agency (Turkish state-run news agency aligned with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)), 29 September 2023. https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/loption-dune-intervention-militaire-de-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao-au-niger-reste-possible/3003520

The option of military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Niger remains on the table and Côte d’Ivoire will comply with the decisions adopted collectively by the community “if ECOWAS decides on this option,” said Ivorian government spokesperson Amadou Coulibaly. The government spokesperson affirmed that Côte d’Ivoire is a member that respects its commitments in ECOWAS.

In Niger, members of the presidential guard took power on July 26, pushing aside President Mohamed Bazoum and announcing the suspension of the Constitution and the formation of a National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland. ECOWAS threatened to intervene militarily to enable Bazoum to regain power and considered this an option ready to be implemented alongside strict punitive measures.

“La Côte d’Ivoire va retirer progressivement ses soldats du Mali (Ivory Coast will withdraw its soldiers from Mali gradually),” tvmonde5.com (French public television broadcaster’s website focusing on worldwide affairs affecting France), 16 November 2022. https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/la-cote-divoire-va-retirer-progressivement-ses-soldats-du-mali-1424754

Côte d’Ivoire indicates that the soldiers and other elements active within MINUSMA will not be relieved in August 2023.Relations between Côte d’Ivoire have become significantly strained in recent months, particularly after the arrest last July of 49 Ivorian soldiers in Bamako.

Notes:

[i] The bilateral dispute between Côte d’Ivoire and Mali reached a culmination in January 2023 when Côte d’Ivoire honored 49 soldiers after they were released from detention in Mali, where there were held for half a year, and returned home. Only weeks before their release from detention, a Bamako court had sentenced most of the Ivorian soldiers to 20 years in prison and others to death for being “mercenaries”. Although Ivorian soldiers had been invited to Mali by the German contingent of MINUSMA, the Malian coup leaders alleged the “Sahel Aviation Service (SAS),” which is a private company, transported the Ivorian soldiers. In contrast, the Wagner Group, which is affiliated to the Russian government, was welcomed into Mali by the Malian coup leaders. It is possible that the Ivorian and German governments’ criticism of the coup in Mali and lack of transition back to democracy underscored the Malian coup leaders’ initial actions to detains the Ivorian soldiers. See; “Mali detains Ivorian soldiers, accuses them of being mercenaries,” Rfi.fr, 12 July 2022. https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20220712-mali-detains-ivorian-soldiers-accuses-them-of-being-mercenaries

[ii] The U.S. State Department notes that since the Ivorian president’s election to a third term in 2020, the country’s democratic processes have been “generally considered free.” Similarly, the election monitoring group, New Dawn, assessed that the latest Ivorian local and regional elections in September 2023 “had gone smoothly.” Consistent with these democratic trends, Ivorian foreign policy has become increasingly aligned with ECOWAS and its member-states’ oppositions to military coups in West Africa. See; “2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cote d’Ivoire,” U.S. Department of State, 2023. https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cote-divoire. See also; “Sweeping win for ruling party in Ivory Coast local and regional elections,” france24.com, 5 September 2023. https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230904-sweeping-win-for-ruling-party-in-ivory-coast-local-and-regional-elections

Image Information:

Image: Members of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center honor guard stand in formation during a welcoming ceremony for Ivory Coast Gen. Soumaila Bakayoko.
Source: MSG Montigo White https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/43/Members_of_the_Kofi_Annan_International_Peacekeeping_Training_Center_honor_guard_stand_in_formation_during_a_welcoming_ceremony_for_Ivory_Coast_Gen._Soumaila_Bakayoko%2C_the_Economic_Community_of_West_African_130626-A-ZZ999-016.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Niger Sees Wave of International Departures Post-Coup

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Forces Armées Nigeriennes (Niger Armed Forces) personnel complete a training course in February 2020. Following the coup d’état in July 2023, the Nigerien military junta has seen a wave of international departures from the country.

“The regime in Niger…ordered the UN coordinator…to leave it within three days, denouncing in particular the ” obstructions” of the United Nations to its international recognition.”

The military junta that took over Niger in July 2023 is consolidating its power, kicking out numerous international entities, and severing relationships with others. As the first article from the pan-African news aggregator AfricaNews.fr relays, after several contentious months, French troops are leaving Niger via Chad. Soon after the military takeover by General Tiani, Niger began to annul security cooperation agreements with France, which to that point, had relied on Niger as its most reliable ally after being ousted from other African states. When Paris was slow to initiate the request to move its 1,500 soldiers out of the country, the Nigerien government accused France, and other West African states, of colluding to launch an armed intervention to reinstall the ousted president, Mohamed Bazoum.[i] Anti-French sentiment, especially as regards Paris’ role in military and security affairs, has been a marker of the political ethos in West Africa for several years.[ii]

France is not the only entity to be ousted. As per the second article, also from AfricaNews.fr, in mid-October the military junta in Niger demanded the departure of the UN’s country coordinator and its highest-ranking member in the country, Canadian Louise Aubin. The junta decried the “obstructions” that the United Nations had placed on it being an internationally recognized government. Niger’s anti-UN stance is in line with its new ally Mali, which recently demanded the end of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) mission in Mali. The article noted that the absence of a UN coordinator will worsen humanitarian conditions in Mali where an estimated 4.3 million people are in need of humanitarian aid. In addition to the physical departure of French troops and the UN coordinator, other entities in Niger are leaving of their own volition. In October, the United States formally declared the transition of power to be a coup and suspended more than $300 million in aid. Algeria, which has been leading the mediation efforts between the junta and the deposed president, also asserted in mid-October that it would suspend its efforts. In an official statement, Algeria noted that the decision came as “official and public declarations from Nigerien authorities have raised legitimate questions as to their real willingness to follow up on their acceptance of Algerian mediation.” The Prime Minister of the new government in Niger has called the attempts by Algeria “manipulation.”[iii]

Sources:

“Niger: départ des forces françaises en direction du Tchad (Niger: departure of French forces towards Chad),” AfricaNews.fr (pan-African new aggregator), 11 October 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/10/11/niger-depart-des-forces-francaises-en-direction-du-tchad/

French soldiers left their bases in Niger on Tuesday in a first land convoy under local escort, heading “in the direction of Chad” indicated the military regime in power in Niamey since the end of July.

“The troops based in Ouallam (west) left their base today. These are operations for the departure of the first land convoy towards Chad under escort of our Defense and Security Forces,” specifies the regime of Niamey, in a press release read Tuesday evening on national television.

In addition to this departure by land, “three special flights” were recorded at Niamey airport , two for the departure of “97 special forces elements” and one “dedicated to logistics.”

The regime which had assured that it wanted this withdrawal to take place “in complete safety” specified that the disengagement will continue in accordance with “the timetable agreed by both parties.”

The withdrawal of the French was quickly demanded by the Nigerien generals after their arrival in power and French President Emmanuel Macron announced their departure at the end of September.

“Niger: l’ONU “regrette” l’ordre d’expulsion de sa représentante (Niger: the UN “regrets” the order to expel its representative),” AfricaNews.fr (pan-African new aggregator), 12 October 2023. https://www.africanews.com/2023/10/12/niger-the-un-regrets-the-order-to-expel-its-representative/

United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres “deeply regrets” the order to expel the UN coordinator in Niger given by the military regime, which will “hinder” humanitarian operations, his spokesperson said on Wednesday.

This expulsion of Louise Aubin, requested within 72 hours by the regime resulting from a coup d’état in July, “will hinder the ability of the UN to fulfill its mandate and disrupt essential work” in Niger where “4.3 million people need humanitarian aid, mainly women and children,” insisted Stéphane Dujarric, adding that this order was contrary to international rules applicable to United Nations representatives.

The regime in Niger on Wednesday ordered the UN coordinator in this country, Canadian Louise Aubin, to leave it within three days, denouncing in particular the ” obstructions” of the United Nations to its international recognition. He had previously denounced the “perfidious actions” of Secretary General Antonio Guterres for, according to him, hindering the participation of the representative of Niger in this event and “undermining any effort to end the crisis.”

“Crise au Niger: l’Algérie suspend sa mediation (Crisis in Niger: Algeria suspends its mediation),” AfricaNews.fr (pan-African new aggregator), 10 October 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/10/10/crise-au-niger-lalgerie-suspend-sa-mediation/

Algeria announced on Monday that it was “suspending” its mediation intended to put an end to the crisis that has shaken Niger since the takeover by the military…

But the exchanges between the two chancelleries on “the program and content of this visit” were not “conclusive”, added the press release.

Algeria also deplores that “official and public declarations from Nigerien authorities have raised legitimate questions as to their real willingness to follow up on their acceptance of Algerian mediation.”The Prime Minister of Niger, Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine, declared that he had learned of the acceptance of this mediation on social networks, half-heartedly accusing Algeria of “manipulation.”

Notes:

[i] See: Jason Warner, “West African States Split On Potential Intervention In Niger,” OE Watch 08-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-split-on-potential-intervention-in-niger/

[ii] See: Jason Warner, “Anti-French Sentiment Undergirds Overthrow Of Nigerien Government,” OE Watch 08-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/anti-french-sentiment-undergirds-overthrow-of-nigerien-government/; Jason Warner, “French Researchers Respond To Wave Of Anti-French Sentiment In Africa,” OE Watch 07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/french-researchers-respond-to-wave-of-anti-french-sentiment-in-africa/; Jason Warner, “CAR Joins Mali In Accusing France Of Funding Terrorists,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/car-joins-mali-in-accusing-france-of-funding-terrorists/

[iii] “Algeria ‘postpones’ its mediation in Niger”, AfricaNews.com, 10 October 2023. https://www.africanews.com/2023/10/10/algeria-postpones-its-mediation-in-niger//

Image Information:

Image: Forces Armées Nigeriennes (Niger Armed Forces) personnel complete a training course in February 2020. Following the coup d’état in July 2023, the Nigerien military junta has seen a wave of international departures from the country.
Source: https://nara.getarchive.net/media/forces-armees-nigeriennes-niger-armed-forces-personnel-65f554
Attribution:  Public Domain Dedication.

Military Junta Led Sahelian States Create New Collective Security Organization

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The leader of junta currently ruling Mali, COL Assimi Goita, recently tweeted an announcement about the new mutual defense pact between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.

“The military regimes led by Assimi Goïta in Mali, Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso and Abdourahamane Tiani in Niger signed a charter on Saturday establishing a defensive alliance.”

With the string of coups d’état that have engulfed the African continent over the past three years, a steady drumbeat of alliances has been growing among military juntas.[i] As per the article from leading Africa-focused French language publication Jeune Afrique, the increasing amity between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has coalesced into a formalized mutual security cooperation organization. Called the “Alliance of Sahelian States,” the grouping is a defensive alliance that commits each country to respond to the aid of the others in the event of any “attack on the sovereignty or integrity of the territory” of one of its members. Additionally, the Alliance of Sahelian States also includes economic dimensions (likely to help each of the regimes, all of which have faced threats of economic sanctions for unconstitutional transfers of power) and counterterrorism dimensions (as the three collectively constitute the epicenter of jihadist violence undertaken by Al-Qaeda and Islamic State-linked groups).[ii] While Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have been getting closer since 2022 – often with support from Russia[iii] – the real impetus for the formalization of the Alliance of Sahelian States was Niger’s July 2023 coup. In the aftermath, West Africa’s primary regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), threatened to launch a military intervention to restore power to the democratically elected president. This proposal starkly divided West African states, with Nigeria, Benin, and Senegal falling on one side, and Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Algeria, on the other. Mali and Burkina Faso intuitively aligned behind Niger given the vulnerabilities that other military juntas would face if ECOWAS made good on its word. Whether or not the Alliance of Sahelian States is more than a paper tiger remains to be seen. However, the spate of military coups overtaking the region is having serious implications for patterns of alliances and rivalries.

Sources:

“Le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le Niger scellent ‘l’Alliance des États du Sahel’ (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger seal ‘The Alliance of Sahelian States’),” Jeune Afrique (centrist pan-African news outlet), 16 September 2023. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1483586/politique/le-mali-le-burkina-et-le-niger-scellent-lalliance-des-etats-du-sahel/   

The military regimes led by Assimi Goïta in Mali, Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso and Abdourahamane Tiani in Niger signed a charter on Saturday establishing a defensive alliance.This “Charter of Liptako-Gourma” creates “the Alliance of Sahel States” (AES), wrote on X (former Twitter), the head of the junta in Mali, Assimi Goïta. Its goal is “to establish an architecture of collective defense and mutual assistance,” he stressed. The charter provides (art. 6) that “any attack on the sovereignty and integrity of the territory of one or more contracting parties will be considered as an aggression against the other parties and will engage a duty of assistance and relief of all parties, individually or collectively, including the use of armed force to restore and ensure security within the area covered by the Alliance.Since the July 26 coup in Niger, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has maintained a consistent position: the military authorities must “restore constitutional order immediately” by releasing deposed President Mohamed. Bazoum and reinstalling him in his functions. The West African organization has repeatedly threatened armed intervention and imposed heavy economic sanctions on Niger.“This alliance will be a combination of military and economic efforts between the three countries,” Malian Defense Minister Abdoulaye Diop told journalists. “Our priority is the fight against terrorism in the three countries,” he added.

Notes:

[i] For more on the growing ties between these three countries, see: Jason Warner, “’Axis’ of Military Regimes Strengthens In West Africa, With Support From Russia,” OE Watch,09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/axis-of-military-regimes-strengthens-in-west-africa-with-support-from-russia/; Jason Warner, “West African States Split On Potential Intervention In Niger,” OE Watch, 08-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-split-on-potential-intervention-in-niger/; Jason Warner, “West African States Ruled By Military Leaders Seek To Circumvent Future Sanctions,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-ruled-by-military-leaders-seek-to-circumvent-future-sanctions/; Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Leaders In Mali, Burkina Faso, And Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/

[ii] For more on the differing approaches that West African states have taken in dealing with these groups, see: Jason Warner, “As Sahelian Jihadists Expand South, Côte d’Ivoire Stands As Model Of Success,” OE Watch,09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/as-sahelian-jihadists-expand-south-cote-divoire-stands-as-model-of-success/;  Jason Warner, “Sahelian Countries Divided On Negotiating With Al-Qaeda, Islamic State Militants,” OE Watch,07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/sahelian-countries-divided-on-negotiating-with-al-qaeda-islamic-state-militants/; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Claims Disguised Jihadists, Not Military, Responsible For Civilian Killings,” OE Watch, 06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/burkina-faso-claims-disguised-jihadists-not-military-responsible-for-civilian-killings/; Jason Warner, “Vast Majority Of Malians Express Confidence In Russia’s Ability To Address Jihadist Violence,” OE Watch,06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/vast-majority-of-malians-express-confidence-in-russias-ability-to-address-jihadist-violence/

[iii] For more on Russia’s role with these three countries, see: Jason Warner, “’Axis’ of Military Regimes Strengthens In West Africa, With Support From Russia,” OE Watch,09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/axis-of-military-regimes-strengthens-in-west-africa-with-support-from-russia/; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Claims Disguised Jihadists, Not Military, Responsible For Civilian Killings,” OE Watch, 06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/burkina-faso-claims-disguised-jihadists-not-military-responsible-for-civilian-killings/; Jason Warner, “Vast Majority Of Malians Express Confidence in Russia’s Ability To Address Jihadist Violence,” OE Watch, 06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/vast-majority-of-malians-express-confidence-in-russias-ability-to-address-jihadist-violence/; Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Leaders In Mali, Burkina Faso, And Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/

Image Information:

Image: The leader of junta currently ruling Mali, COL Assimi Goita, recently tweeted an announcement about the new mutual defense pact between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
Source: https://t.co/IjT43NHrKs
Attribution: BY-SA 4.0

Nigerien Civilians Calm Despite Threat of Conflict With Benin

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The Benin-Niger border crossing is set to be closed as per Niger’s fears that Benin might use the crossing to move ECOWAS troops and French equipment into Niger.

“[Benin] is accused of welcoming and transporting French equipment and ECOWAS soldiers to the border with Niger…At that location, residents say they are less worried.”

On 18 September, the Cameroon-based website, lopinionplus.com, published the below excerpted French-language article, which highlighted ongoing tensions in the region between Niger and Benin. According to the article, Niger’s military coup leaders, who overthrew the country’s democratically elected leadership in August, are closing the border with Benin. The new coup leaders in Niger allege that Benin is transporting Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) soldiers and French equipment to the border to support a potential invasion of Niger to restore the country’s civilian leadership.[i] The article notes that civilians in the Nigerien town of Gaya, which is situated near the border with Benin, remain unconcerned. Some civilians, for example, point to the longstanding territorial dispute over Lété (Summer) Island in the Niger River between Benin and Niger that began in 1963.[ii] The ramping up of forces on the Nigerien side of the border in response to the alleged ECOWAS actions now resembles that of 1963, but, civilians expect tensions to subside as they did 50 years ago. Nevertheless, geopolitical circumstances are different now. As the second excerpted French-language article from 20 September in Jeune Afrique reported, Niger has significant support in the Sahel from other post-coup countries, such as Mali and Burkina Faso. For example, the article mentioned how Burkina Faso passed a law authorizing the country’s military forces to aid Niger if any other “external army,” such as Benin’s, intervenes in Niger’s domestic affairs. Unlike the border dispute in 1963, the current tensions have a greater probability of reverberating throughout West Africa.

Sources:

“Niger: l’armée renforce son dispositif à la frontière du Bénin (Niger: the army reinforces its presence on the border with Benin),” lopinionplus.com (French-language Cameroon-based publication covering Francophone African affairs), 18 September 2023. https://lopinionplus.com/niger-larmee-renforce-son-dispositif-a-la-frontiere-du-benin/

Nigerien soldiers reinforced their security measures in Gaya, a border town between Malanville in Benin and Kamba in Niger that is located more than 300 kilometers from Niamey. [Benin] is accused of welcoming and transporting French equipment and ECOWAS soldiers to the border with Niger.

At that location, residents state that they are less worried…. In the years 1963-64 there were tensions between Benin and [Niger] because of Lété Island and there was a law enforcement deployment in Gaya. So this is the second time that we have this type of deployment…,” explained a resident.

“Le Burkina Faso vote une loi autorisant l’envoi de soldats au Niger (Burkina Faso votes for a law authorizing the sending of soldiers to Niger),” Jeune Afrique (French language online publication focusing on pan-African affairs), 20 September 2023. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1484544/politique/le-burkina-faso-vote-une-loi-autorisant-lenvoi-de-soldats-au-niger/

On September 19, the Transitional Legislative Assembly passed a law authorizing the sending for “three renewable months” a military contingent to neighboring Niger, which has been threatened by an armed intervention of West African countries since the coup of July 26. The law, which was proposed by the transitional government, was unanimously approved by 71 members.These three countries [Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali], which are led by military regimes, signed a charter on September 16 in Bamako to establish an alliance of “collective defense and mutual assistance”, thus creating the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

Notes:

[i] On 5 August, Benin announced that it would support ECOWAS to resolve the political unrest in neighboring Niger. Several West African states expressed willingness to military intervene in Niger if ECOWAS sanctioned an intervention. This could, therefore, imply that Benin will become a launchpad for an ECOWAS invasion of Niger if an invasion is sanctioned. See Philip Churm, “Benin pledges support for ECOWAS over Niger,”  AfricaNews.com, 5 August 2023, 2023. https://www.africanews.com/2023/08/05/benin-pledges-support-for-ecowas-over-niger//

[ii] In the early 1960s, Dahomey (as Benin was known until 1975) and Niger failed to resolve through negotiations their border dispute over Lété (Summer) Island, but both countries’ militaries eventually disengaged from the border region. Ultimately, the International Court of Justice ruled in Niger’s favor in 2011. The island is 16 km long and 4 km wide and is passable by foot for pastoralists from one bank of the river to the other bank during the dry season. For more, see: Markus Kornprobst, “The management of border disputes in African regional subsystems: comparing West Africa and the Horn of Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies 40:3 (2002), 369-393.

Image Information:

Image: The Benin-Niger border crossing is set to be closed as per Niger’s fears that Benin might use the crossing to move ECOWAS troops and French equipment into Niger.
Source: YoTuT from United Stateshttps://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_border_crossing_into_Benin_from_Niger_(5488529569).jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Russian Influence Fades in Southern Syria

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A Druze man photographed in Suweida Syria, 2008.

“In the last two years, the decline of the Russian role within Syrian territories has become clear…”

Russia’s fading presence and loss of influence in southern Syria was on display during recent antiregime protests by the ethnoreligious Druze minority group in the Syrian province of Suweida.[i] As of mid-September, the protests had been going on for over a month. Russia, which had previously mediated between the regime and the Druze, was nowhere to be seen.[ii] Suweida’s protest movement—which has ebbed and flowed throughout the civil war—was motivated by longstanding deterioration in living conditions.

A prominent Druze leader, speaking to protesters who had been injured by regime forces in mid-September, placed blame for the unrest on local Iranian agents and allies. As reported in the first excerpt, from the Lebanese news website al-Modon, he accused them of stealing Syrian wealth and brainwashing its citizens with a “subversive” ideology. Russia’s absence from the volatile situation in Suweida is as noteworthy as are the strident accusations made against Iran and its local allies. In 2018, Russia had established itself as an effective mediator between the Syrian regime and Sunni rebels from Daraa, the province immediately to the west of Suweida. Russia did so by bringing rebel factions into a Russia-controlled proxy force known as the “5th Corps.” Two years ago, as reported in the second accompanying excerpt, from Qatar’s al-Jazeera, Russia began handing control of its southern proxies to the Syrian regime, and Iran took advantage of this situation through its influence in Syrian Military Intelligence and the Syrian Army’s 4th Division.[iii] Druze discontent with Iran’s influence rose due to Iranian proxies and allies in the regime extracting scarce resources from Suweida’s economy—including lucrative cross-border smuggling routes into Jordan and the Gulf. In 2022, a group of Druze leaders sought Russian assistance in curbing Iran’s local influence, on the assumption that Russia maintained sway in this part of Syria. In response, Russia sent a group of lowly military police with no decision-making powers, in what was a clear hint of waning Russian influence.[iv] The situation has only become starker with the Suweida protest movement. Indeed, as of mid-September, the Kremlin had made no official statement on the protests in Suweida, and Russian government-linked media blamed them on the United States, as noted in the third accompanying excerpt, also from al-Modon. The Kremlin is no longer able to provide even the illusion of influence in this part of Syria. Iran, for its part, appears to have solidified its influence in the south, but in doing so has made itself increasingly unpopular.

Sources:

“السويداء:الهجري يدعو للجهاد ضد إيران وميليشياتها..بعد استهداف المتظاهرين بالرصاص

(Suweida: al-Hajiri calls for jihad against Iran and its militias… after protesters shot at),” al-Modon (Lebanese news website), 13 September 2023. https://www.almodon.com/arabworld/2023/9/13/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AB-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B9-%D8%A5%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA

He considered that the “security movement” that opened fire on demonstrators in Suwayda was the product of the “corrupt” security services that have been tampering with Syria for years, stressing that the demonstrators should not be drawn into the plan of these agencies to attack the people of Suwayda…

He considered that the authority in Iran is “racist and corrupt” and entered Syria in order to “steal the country and its wealth and change people’s minds in a direction they are not convinced of,” stressing that Iran, its militias, and the Lebanese Hezbollah are “occupiers and we do not accept their presence in Syria…and we announce this publicly.”

كعكة الأسد.. هل يقوي مقتل بريغوجين نفوذ إيران في سوريا؟

(Assad’s cake… will the killing of Prigozhin strengthen Iranian influence in Syria),” al-Jazeera (Qatari news outlet), 6 September 2023. https://www.aljazeera.net/midan/reality/politics/2023/9/6/صراع-حول-كعكة-الأسد-هل-يقوي-مقتل

In the last two years, the decline of the Russian role within Syrian territories has become clear. This was not limited to the disappearance of Russian hopes for reaching a political solution to the war that has been going on for more than ten years, but it also amounted to cutting off Russian support for many of Moscow’s agents in Syria…

The Iranians took advantage of this opportunity in order to remove Russia relatively from the scene and capture former proxies whom the Kremlin could no longer support militarily and financially. This happened with the Syrian regime’s Eighth Brigade, one of the most loyal units to Russia within the armed forces in southern Syria, which was reduced. Russia halved the salaries of its members, and in 2022 it completely stopped communicating with the brigade, which prompted the brigade to work for the Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate, one of Iran’s most powerful agents. At the same time, the National Defense Forces militias east of Deir ez-Zor, led by Hassan al-Ghadhban, separated from Moscow. In favor of the Iranian-backed Fourth Division, after Moscow failed to pay the salaries of the members for a full six months.

“موسكو تقرأ إنتفاضة السويداء..من لبنان

(Moscow reads the Suweida uprising… from Lebanon),” al-Modon (Lebanese news website), 5 September 2023. https://www.almodon.com/opinion/2023/9/5/%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%83%D9%88-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A3-%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86

Although more than two weeks have passed since the Suweida uprising, the Kremlin remains silent about it. 

…

What is relatively new this time in accusing the West of being behind the Suweida uprising is the claim of an American plan to destabilize the region by controlling the network of financial flows linked to the crisis in the Lebanese banking system…

On the first of this month, the Topwar website, which is linked to the Russian Ministry of Defense, published a text regarding the Suwayda uprising entitled “The Syrian Protests and the US Strategy in Lebanon”…

Notes:

[i] The Druze are an esoteric, monotheistic ethnoreligious group that constitute 3 percent of Syria’s population, concentrated in Suweida Province. There are also Druze communities on the Syria-Israel border and in Lebanon. Unlike neighboring Sunni-majority Daraa Province—the heartland of Syria’s rebellion—the Druze-majority province of Suweida carved out an effective position of neutrality in Syria’s civil war. By staking out a neutral position, the Druze effectively became “strategic bedfellows” of the Assad regime. See: Fabrice Balanche. “The Druze and Assad: Strategic Bedfellows,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 20 October 2016. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/druze-and-assad-strategic-bedfellows

[ii] See for instance: “Syrian government releases detainees with Russian mediation in Syria’s Suwayda,” North Press Agency, 11 July 2020. https://npasyria.com/en/44220/

[iii] For more see: Lucas Winter. ”Growing Iranian Influence Near the Border with Israel in Southwest Syria,” OE Watch, March 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/368233

[iv] Key Druze leaders refused to meet with the powerless Russian delegation, which consisted of military police. See: Sources: Eight Demands to Russian Delegation in Suweida,” al-souria.net (Syrian opposition news website) via The Syrian Observer (Syrian media aggregator), 9 August 2022. https://syrianobserver.com/news/77992/sources-eight-demands-to-russian-delegation-in-suweida.html and

السويداء: حركة رجال الكرامة ترفض استقبال وفد روسي

“Suweida: Men of Dignity refuses to meet Russian delegation,” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 10 August 2022. https://tinyurl.com/4tsmy3t2

Image Information:

Image: A Druze man photographed in Suweida Syria, 2008.
Source: CharlesFred, Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/charlesfred/
Attribution: CC 2.0

“Axis” of Military Regimes Strengthens in West Africa With Support From Russia

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“Niger junta leader General Abdourahamane Tchiani announced that his country will allow the military governments of Mali and Burkina Faso to send their soldiers into Niger to defend against an attack.”

A new pro-Russia geopolitical bloc is gaining steam in West Africa. Composed of francophone military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the new bloc is showing itself to be a cohesive and problematic new alliance in regional military, security, and political affairs with assistance from Russia and the Wagner Group. The first excerpted article, from the French state-sponsored RFI reposted on the pan-African news aggregator AllAfrica.com,includes the first known reference to a so-called “Mali-Russia-Niger Axis.”. To that “Axis,” one should also add Burkina Faso, a close ally of Mali, the Nigerien junta, and Russia. Mali and Russia formed the basis of this “Axis” after its two coups in 2020 and 2021, and Burkina Faso’s own 2022 coup led it to quickly fall in with the other two states.[i] Niger’s own military-led overthrow led its new government to  the newest member of the “Axis.” The four countries increasingly support one another. According to the RFI article, Russia recently vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that would have kept UN observers in Mali. This veto was both a boon for Mali, which had demanded the end of the UN’s peacekeeping mission, and for Russia, which the UN had, in veiled language, accused of widespread human rights abuses in Mali. The second article from AllAfrica.com states that the Nigerien junta recently signed a pact with Mali and Burkina Faso to allow their troops to enter Niger to defend it against an external attack. This pact was made in reference to discussions of a potential Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military intervention into Niger to oust that country’s leader, General Abdourahamane Tchiani.[ii] Regarding Russian involvement, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger all have varying degrees of engagement with the Wagner Group.[iii] Moreover, in all three countries, Russian misinformation and disinformation campaigns, particularly decrying French presence, have been rampant. In return, Mali has been a supporter of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Increasingly, West Africa is being split into two camps. On one side is the described pro-Russia axis, while on the other side are the France-friendly countries like Senegal,[iv] Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo, and Nigeria, the latter of which chairs ECOWAS.

Sources:

Melissa Chemam, “West Africa: Niger’s Junta Finds Support in Mali and Russia, But France Stands Firm,” AllAfrica.com (pan-African news aggregator), 11 September 2023. https://allafrica.com/stories/202309120079.html

The leaders of Russia and Mali have agreed the political crisis in Niger should be resolved using diplomacy and not force. Meanwhile, France has rejected accusations by Niger’s coup leaders that it’s planning a military intervention.

The Kremlin said President Vladimir Putin and interim Malian leader Assimi Goita had talked by telephone at Bamako’s request.

The comment came a day after Niger’s military rulers accused former colonial power France of assembling troops, war materials and equipment in several neighboring West African countries with a view to “military intervention” in the Sahel state.

A Mali-Russia-Niger axis

During his telephone exchange with Putin, Goita thanked Russia for vetoing an attempt by the UN Security Council to keep a team of UN experts in Mali.

The experts had accused “foreign forces”, a veiled reference to the Russian mercenary group Wagner, of involvement in widespread abuses in Mali.

Mali shares a long border with Niger, and, immediately after the coup, its junta voiced support for Niger’s new military rulers.

It has on several occasions stated its opposition to a military intervention there.

Mali has shifted sharply to Russia since back-to-back coups in 2020 and 2021, becoming one of the few nations to back Moscow at the United Nations over its invasion of Ukraine.

The Kremlin added that Putin and Goita also discussed cooperation between Russia and Mail on economic and commercial issues, and on “anti-terror” operations.

Ecowas leaders have threatened to intervene militarily in Niger, the fourth West African nation since 2020 to suffer a coup after Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea.

“Niger: Junta Leader Signs Order to Allow Help from Burkina Faso, Mali Military,” AllAfrica.com (pan-African news aggregator), 25 August 2023. https://allafrica.com/stories/202308250228.html

Niger junta leader General Abdourahamane Tchiani announced that his country will allow the military governments of Mali and Burkina Faso to send their soldiers into Niger to defend against an attack.

Tchiani had been in a meeting with the foreign ministers of Burkina Faso, Olivia Rouamba, and Mali, Abdoulaye Diop, visited Gen Tchiani in Niamey before signing the order.West African regional bloc Ecowas was threatening to use force if President Mohamed Bassoum is not reinstated, but the regional West African bloc is focusing on diplomacy for now.

Notes:

[i] For more reading on the relationships between these four countries, see: Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Claims Disguised Jihadists, Not Military, Responsible for Civilian Killings,” OE Watch 06-2023.https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/burkina-faso-claims-disguised-jihadists-not-military-responsible-for-civilian-killings/; Jason Warner, “Vast Majority of Malians Express Confidence in Russia’s Ability To Address Jihadist Violence,” OE Watch, 06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/vast-majority-of-malians-express-confidence-in-russias-ability-to-address-jihadist-violence/; Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Rulers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/; Jason Warner, “Mali Defends Reliance on Russian Counterterrorism Assistance,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437332; Jason Warner, “West African States Ruled by Military Leaders Seek To Circumvent Future Sanctions” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-ruled-by-military-leaders-seek-to-circumvent-future-sanctions/

[ii] For more on the perspectives of the potential ECOWAS intervention, see: Jason Warner, “West African States Split on Potential ECOWAS Intervention in Niger,” OE Watch 08-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-split-on-potential-intervention-in-niger/

[iii] Mali has a substantial Wagner presence in the country. In Burkina Faso, the government has denied the official presence of Wagner, though many observers, including Ghana’s president, have claimed that the private military company does indeed operate there. In the case of Niger, reports have emerged that the Tichani has requested Wagner’s presence, though it is yet unconfirmed if this call has been answered. For more on Burkina Faso’s relationship with Wagner and Russia, see: Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/burkina-faso-fights-terrorism-with-recruits-and-russia/

[iv] Even within Senegal, members of the political commentariat have decried Senegal’s potential participation in a theoretical ECOWAS intervention into Niger. For instance, an op-ed signed by more than one hundred Senegalese in the news outlet Sud Quotidien called participation in such an intervention “a neocolonial military adventure.”  See: “Afrique de l’Ouest: L’aventure militarie neocoloniale du President Macky Sall (West Africa: The neocolonial military adventure of President Macky Sall),” Sud Quotidien (Senegal-based news outlet), 6 September 2023. https://fr.allafrica.com/stories/202309070398.html

Kazakhstan Draws on Lessons From War in Ukraine

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Russian and Kazakh military to discuss security in Central Asia

“Units of special operations forces and the National Guard liberated the Kapchagai hydroelectric power station, which was captured by a mock enemy.”

Kazakhstan has always been concerned that its northern regions could be annexed by Russia.[i] As a result, Kazakhstan’s armed forces carried out an air defense exercise in February 2023 and a command-staff exercise in early September 2023 that appeared to draw on lessons from the war in Ukraine, even if it was not explicitly stated.[ii] According to the accompanying excerpted article from the Kazakhstan-based Russian-language online newspaper Informburo, the command-staff exercise, Batyl Toytarys – 2023 (Brave Resistance – 2023) involved brigade tactical groups, air support, and special forces in scenarios that included defending against a river crossing and recapturing a hydroelectric power station from an enemy force. The article notes that the exercise took place in four different regions in the country, two of which are near the Kazakhstan-Russia border. It also notes that Kazakhstan’s Navy took part in the exercise by securing facilities in the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstani officials did not release any further information on the conditional enemy for the exercise, but it appears to be working through a scenario of dealing with a conventional enemy who would target multiple regions of the country on a large scale.

Sources:

Aygerim Ummat, “Токаеву показали, как проходят военные учения ‘Батыл тойтарыс – 2023’ (Tokayev was shown how the armed forces carried out the exercise ‘Batyl toytarys – 2023’),” Informburo (Russian-language online newspaper in Kazakhstan), 5 September 2023. https://informburo.kz/novosti/tokaevu-pokazali-kak-proxodyat-voennye-uceniya-batyl-toitarys-2023

…the Head of State Kassym-Jomart Tokayev visited the strategic command and staff military exercises “Batyl Toytarys – 2023″…

Brigade tactical groups, with the support of aviation, as well as in cooperation with units of ground forces and special operations forces, worked out tactical actions to capture the designated enemy line on the opposite bank while overcoming a water barrier.

Units of special operations forces and the National Guard liberated the Kapchagai hydroelectric power station, which was captured by a mock enemy. The units of the Ministry of Emergency Situations worked to alleviate the consequences of the man-made disaster and worked out measures to provide humanitarian assistance to the population.

According to a single concept and plan, which was developed by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan, a strategic regrouping of troops was carried out in the areas where the exercises will be held…the Navy, with the support of aviation and special operations forces, ensured the security of economic facilities in the Caspian Sea. The corresponding joint combat training tasks were carried out at the training grounds of Almaty, Karaganda, North Kazakhstan, and Abay regions.

Notes:

[i] For more information on Kazakhstan’s exercise and the cancelled parade, see: Matthew Stein “Kazakhstan Draws Lessons From the Russia-Ukraine War,” OE Watch 03-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437097

[ii] Kazakhstani public perceptions of Russia are trending negative. A recent public survey revealed that 30 percent of the Kazakhstani population had lost its positive perception of Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, while half of those questioned did not change their perception of Russia. Conversely, 5 percent of those surveyed had a better perception of Russia. For more detail see: “Треть казахстанцев стала хуже относиться к России после начала ее вторжения в Украину (A third of Kazakhstanis have a worse attitude toward Russia after the start of its invasion of Ukraine),” Vlast, 18 May 2023. https://vlast.kz/novosti/55152-tret-kazahstancev-stala-huze-otnositsa-k-rossii-posle-nacala-ee-vtorzenia-v-ukrainu.html

Image Information:

Image: Russian and Kazakh military to discuss security in Central Asia
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Russian_and_Kazakh_military_to_discuss_security_in_Central_Asia.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0