Author Archives: Matthew Stein

Armenia Takes Another Step Away From Russia

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Nikol Pashinyan.

Nikol Pashinyan.

“It is dispiriting that Armenia’s membership in the CSTO did not deter Azerbaijan from aggressive actions.”

Armenia’s frustration with Russia and its role as the de facto leader of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) appeared to reach a head at the organization’s November 2022 summit, when Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan abruptly ended a meeting with leaders of the other member states and refused to sign two documents drafted during the summit. For his part, Pashinyan had previously criticized Russia’s response to multiple attacks by Azerbaijan against Armenia in 2022 and Russia’s inability to deliver weapons that Armenia purchased.[i] The accompanying excerpted articles provide additional context on Pashinyan’s actions during the recent CSTO summit as well as how the Armenian government continues to pursue other security cooperation partnerships—namely with India—due to what it perceives to be continued failures by Russia and the CSTO.

The first article, from the Armenian state news agency Armenpress, reports on Pashinyan’s speech during the CSTO summit. Pashinyan mentions the three major clashes that took place between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War ended and how “Armenia’s membership in the CSTO did not deter Azerbaijan from aggressive actions.”[ii] He states that these clashes caused “great damage to the image of the CSTO both within our country and abroad.” Pashinyan goes on to outline the Armenian government’s position on how its borders have been violated by Azerbaijan and that these actions should have been considered an attack that would have necessitated a strong response from the CSTO. According to the CSTO’s charter, this could have included military assistance, but the organization denied Armenia’s request. Pashinyan ends his speech by explaining how his government proposed negotiating the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s forces from Armenian territory through the CSTO Security Council, but that he would not sign the draft put together by the council because he believes it is an insufficient to prevent Azerbaijan from continuing to act with impunity.

Underscoring Armenia’s disillusionment with Russia, the second accompanying article from the Armenian independent online newspaper Hetq reports on an agreement Armenia signed with India’s Kalyani Strategic Systems two weeks before the CSTO summit to acquire 155 mm artillery systems. The article notes that Armenia’s Defense Minister visited India’s defense exposition in October and that this most recent agreement comes after Armenia signed a contract in September to purchase India’s Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher as well as anti-tank rockets and different types of ammunition.

Overall, there is no indication that Armenia will be leaving the Russia-led CSTO despite calls to do so from Pashinyan’s political opposition. Armenia’s bilateral economic and military ties to Russia make this difficult. Instead, Armenia’s refusal to sign the CSTO’s official response to the situation with Azerbaijan is an example of the types of protest steps we expect the Armenian government to continue to register.

Sources:

“Для нас принципиальную важность имеет подтверждение зоны ответственности ОДКБ в Армении: речь премьера на СКБ ОДКБ (The confirmation of the zone of responsibility of the CSTO in Armenia has the most significance for us: the address of the prime minister at the Special Security Council of the CSTO),” Armenpress (state news agency in Armenia), 23 November 2022.

https://armenpress.am/rus/news/1098011.html

“…The presidency of the Republic of Armenia in the CSTO ends today. This period was very eventful…Over the past two years, the CSTO member state Armenia has been subjected to aggression by Azerbaijan at least three times.

It is dispiriting that Armenia’s membership in the CSTO did not deter Azerbaijan from aggressive actions…These facts cause great damage to the image of the CSTO both within our country and abroad, and I regard this as the main failure of Armenia’s chairmanship in the CSTO…

Our position is as follows: according to the Alma-Ata Declaration of December 21, 1991, the founding countries of the CIS, as independent states, recognized each other’s territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders. This means that the aforementioned countries became independent with the administrative borders that existed between the republics during the Soviet Union. That is, the former administrative borders became state borders, and the territories of the above-mentioned countries were determined by these borders. It is within these borders that the Republic of Armenia became a member of the UN and the CSTO.

Since May 11, 2021, Azerbaijan has used armed forces three times and occupied approximately 140 square kilometers of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia. This happened on May 11 and November 14, 2021 and September 13, 2022.

So, according to the UN resolution of December 14, 1974, number 3314, the above actions of Azerbaijan are regarded as aggression.

What do we expect from the CSTO in this regard? Statements of this fact, in the form of a clearly formulated political assessment. To refrain from such an assessment, saying that there is no border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, means to assert that there is no zone of responsibility of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and if there is no zone of responsibility, then there is no organization itself. It can at least be interpreted that way.

These nuances are also important because they play a decisive role in further collective actions. In this context, I want to respond to comments according to which Armenia is trying to draw the CSTO countries into a war with Azerbaijan. This is pure manipulation, because Armenia cannot be interested in a war, if only because it has suffered enough from wars, including in September of this year.

…Armenia also proposes, by decision of the CSTO CSC, to accelerate the necessary political and diplomatic work with the Azerbaijani side, aimed at the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia to their original positions as of May 11, 2021.

Such a position is important not only for restoring the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia, but also for deterring Azerbaijan from further aggressive actions against our country…Under these conditions, the lack of a clear political assessment of the situation and the failure to make the above decision may mean not only the CSTO’s refusal of allied obligations, but may also be interpreted by Azerbaijan as a green light from the CSTO for further aggression against Armenia…

Therefore, based on this, dear colleagues, at the moment I believe that the draft “Declaration of the CSTO CSC and on joint measures to provide assistance to the Republic of Armenia” submitted for signing is not sufficiently finalized, and in this form, with all due respect, I am not ready to sign these documents…

Vahe Sarukhanyan, “$155M for Artillery: Armenia Signs Another Arms Deal with India,” Hetq (independent online newspaper in Armenia), 11 November 2022.

https://hetq.am/en/article/150099

The Indian press, referring to a November 9 statement released by the local Bharat Forge company, reports that the latter’s military-industrial subsidiary, Kalyani Strategic Systems, has received a US $155 million order to export 155 mm artillery gun systems to Armenia over the next three years.

Although Bharat Forge didn’t disclose the identity of the customer, the Indian Business Standard news site writes that according to its sources in the Indian Defense Ministry the contract was signed with the Armenian government…

…In October, Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan led a delegation to a defense industry exhibition (DefExpo-2022) in Gandhinagar, India displaying locally manufactured armaments and defense systems.

This latest arms deal follows a September 2022 $245 million contract Armenia signed with India to purchase Indian-made Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, anti-tank rockets and various types of ammunition…

Notes:

[i] For more context on Armenia’s acquisition of Indian systems, see: Matthew Stein, “Armenia Acquires Indian Multiple Rocket Launcher System Amid Delays in Russian Deliveries,” OE Watch, Issue #11, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429405

[ii] For background on the recent incidents between Armenia and Azerbaijan, see: Matthew Stein, “Armenia Questions Russian Peacekeeping After Nagorno-Karabakh Incident,” OE Watch, Issue #9, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/425540

Image Information:

Image: Nikol Pashinyan
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nikol_Pashinyan_April_2021_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Kazakhstan’s Military Doctrine Raises Questions for Russia

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Flag of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Flag of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

“Building up the radar field and increasing the potential and capabilities of the troops in conducting air and missile defense of the state…(and, the) development of the Unified Regional Air Defense System of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation.”

When Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the government of Kazakhstan immediately stated that it would remain neutral in the conflict. While the Kazakhstani government has stuck to this neutrality since the war began, it has also taken certain measures to distance itself from Russia’s militarism, including canceling its Victory Day Parade in May 2022 and suspending defense exports (including to Russia) in August 2022.[i] Thus, when Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev approved a new military doctrine in October 2022, it drew attention to how Kazakhstan perceives various threats, with some speculation that Russia would be considered a threat without being named.

The accompanying excerpted article from Kazakhstan’s Russian-language independent newspaper Vremya reports on the changes in the doctrine since it was last published in 2017. The article reports that Kazakhstan has increased the combat potential of its units in “strategic directions,” and that it has created new units to combat disinformation. Although the article notes that a border conflict will be handled by the country’s border guards and the armed forces, it is unclear in the doctrine how a border conflict would different from other types of conflicts, such as an attack from another state. Another change in the doctrine is the development of special operations forces and an articulation on how they will cooperate with specialized units in other government agencies.

The new doctrine further notes that Kazakhstan will build capabilities in air defense, including in radar and missile defense. The doctrine references the “development of the Unified Regional Air Defense System of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation,” which is the only time that Russia is mentioned, suggesting Kazakhstan still sees Russia as a useful partner or at least does not wish to openly label it a threat. Other notable changes include equipping the border guards with modern systems as well as expanding production of basic types of ammunition for the armed forces. The Kazakh government established ammunition production as one of the early efforts to build the country’s defense industry, and this expansion of it could help Kazakhstan rely less on defense imports.

Sources:

“Токаев изменил военную доктрину Казахстана (Tokayev changed the military doctrine of Kazakhstan),” Vremya (a semi-independent Russian-language newspaper in Kazakhstan), 15 October 2022.

https://time.kz/news/politics/2022/10/15/tokaev-izmenil-voennuyu-doktrinu-kazahstana

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev changed the military doctrine of Kazakhstan…

Some of the changes are aimed at replacing the word “heading” with “section”, as indicated in the quote, but the bulk of the changes have affected the fundamental formulations of the doctrine. The document contains exceptions to the old doctrine and additions to it…The further text of the changes approved by Tokayev, in addition to those already indicated in the quote are provided in full:

“Chapter 3. The current state of the military security of the Republic of Kazakhstan”; Paragraphs 18 and 19 shall be stated as follows:

The combat potential of the land, air force and naval component of the military organization of the state has been increased by creating the necessary set of troops (forces), weapons, military equipment and supplies in strategic directions.

Subdivisions have been created in the Armed Forces to organize counteraction to information-psychological and software-technical (cyber) influences in the troops. Work is underway to increase their potential and capabilities…

“Section 3. Basic Provisions”;

“Chapter 5. Vision in the field of military security and defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan”;

Paragraph 39 shall be amended as follows:

39. The resolution of a border armed conflict in the border space of the Republic of Kazakhstan is carried out by the Border Service together with the Aviation Service, the Border Academy of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan, other national security bodies in cooperation with the authorities, formations and military units of the Armed Forces and the National Guard of the Republic of Kazakhstan, if necessary, forces can be used and funds of other central state and local executive bodies.”…

“Chapter 6. Approaches to ensuring the military security of the Republic of Kazakhstan”;

Heading “3.3.1. Maintenance of combat readiness of the Armed Forces, other troops and military formations of the Republic of Kazakhstan” shall be stated as follows:

In paragraph 54: supplement with subparagraph 2-1) of the following content: “2-1) the development of the Special Operations Forces for effective operations in peacetime and wartime in cooperation with special forces units of other state bodies.”

Subparagraph 4) shall be stated in the following wording: “4) building up the radar field and increasing the potential and capabilities of the troops in conducting air and missile defense of the state…

Paragraph 57 shall be stated as follows: “1) development of the Unified Regional Air Defense System of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation…

Paragraph 61: subparagraphs 3), 4) and 5) shall be stated as follows: “3) equipping the Border and Aviation Services of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan with modern weapons and military equipment, technical means of border protection; 4) bringing the infrastructure of the State Border in line with its categorization and modern requirements; 5) increasing the efficiency of interaction between the Border Service of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan with central state, local executive bodies and the population of border areas in matters of protecting the State Border, including in the underwater environment of the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea”…

In paragraph 68: subparagraph 6) shall be stated in the following wording: “6) ensuring sustainability and expanding the production of basic types of ammunition for the Armed Forces, other troops and military formations”…

Notes:

[i] For more on the Kazakhstani government’s decision not to hold a Victory Day parade commemorating the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in May, angering some in Russia, see: Matthew Stein, “Kazakhstan Cancels Soviet-Era Parade To Focus on Combat Readiness,” OE Watch, June 2022. For more on Kazakhstan’s suspensionvof defense exports for one year starting in August 2022, leaving Russia with one fewer supplier of weapons and equipment that closely matches its own armed forces, see: Matthew Stein, “Kazakhstan Suspends Defense Exports, Denying Russia Purchases,” OE Watch, October 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/427937

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kazakhstan_Armed_Forces_Flag.svg
Attribution: Public domain

India Moves To Compete With China in Africa

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3rd India-Africa Forum Summit.

3rd India-Africa Forum Summit.

“Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s remarks during the India-Africa Defence Dialogue (IADD), held on the sidelines of DefExpo 2022 here in Gujarat, are being seen as a counter to China’s growing influence in Africa.”

India has taken various steps to counter China since a series of border clashes took place along the Line of Actual Control in 2017 and 2020.[i] While most of these initiatives involved developing operational and tactical capabilities in the Indian Army, the Indian government has also taken a few strategic-level measures to strengthen its position in the Indo-Pacific region against China.[ii] However, a new playing field for Indian and Chinese competition is showing itself: the accompanying excerpted articles report on recent Indian efforts to sell weapon systems to governments in Africa, offering insights into Indian efforts to counter China at the strategic level.

The excerpted article from India’s independent think-tank Center for Land Warfare Studies examines Chinese exports of weapons in Africa. The author notes how China has been increasing arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa in recent years and that this has been taking place alongside the use of ports in the region. The author also points out how China is in a position to continue sales of weapons in Africa as the war in Ukraine could reduce Russia’s share of the arms market in the region. While India’s defense industry has yet to export significant numbers of weapon systems in the way that China can, a second article provides insight into Indian plans to change this status quo.

This excerpted article from India’s independent English-language news website, The Print, reports on the India-Africa Defense Dialogue, held in October in India alongside the most recent iteration of the country’s defense exposition. The article states that a number of participants from Africa attended and that India’s Defense Minister Rajnath Singh wanted to explore new areas of security cooperation between India and African states, “including capacity-building, training, cybersecurity, maritime security, and counter-terrorism.” Singh also stated that India and Africa are “important stakeholders in ensuring a safe and secure maritime environment, especially in the Indian Ocean region.” He further commented that India will partner with any African country on the “basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect.” Lastly, the article references an extensive list of weapons that might be of interest to African militaries, which could give India another opportunity to counter China if New Delhi is able to supply these systems as part of a different partnership than Beijing offers. 

Sources:

Dr. Manjari Singh, “China’s Increasing Arms Supply to the Middle East and Beyond: Another Dimension to the New Silk Road?,” Center for Land Warfare Studies (independent think-tank in India), 28 October 2022, No. 367.

https://www.claws.in/publication/chinas-increasing-arms-supply-to-the-middle-east-and-beyond-another-dimension-to-the-new-silk-road/

China has been expanding its arms export beyond Asia and for the last half a decade, Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have become its favourite destinations. From the region’s side, China is emerging as the second-best choice for arms imports after the US. Furthermore, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has added a new dimension to the existing global arms industry with an anticipated boost to China’s overall arms diplomacy particularly in the Middle East…

China has been exporting armed drones to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Iraq and Jordan since 2020…This change in position is also reflective of the East Asian economy’s

increasing weapon’s platform outreach—from 40 countries to 53, over a span of one decade from 2010 to 2019…

It is noteworthy that between 2015 and 2022, China has leased ownership of as many as

10 ports. Apart from these ports, China has been building seven more ports which are strategically significant, and serves as economic and political outposts for its expansionist approach. The Karachi Deepwater Port in Pakistan, Sokhna port in Egypt, CICT Terminal in Sri Lanka, Chittagong and Payra Ports in Bangladesh, CSP Terminal, Khalifa Port in the UAE, Sudan Port, Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam Ports in Tanzania, and Lamu & Mombasa ports in Kenya, are some of the other ports developed by Chinese firms…

The Russia-Ukraine conflict is likely to dent Russian economy and the former’s aggression will presumably lead to its diplomatic isolation, both of which are likely to provide a favourable environment to Chinese arms market. Additionally, maritime connectivity and building of Chinese ports in the Western Indian Ocean will further facilitate China’s arms sale…

Snehesh Alex Philip, “To counter China’s influence, India seeks to boost defence cooperation with African countries,” The Print (independent English-language news website from India), 18 October 2022.

https://theprint.in/defence/to-counter-chinas-influence-india-seeks-to-boost-defence-cooperation-with-african-countries/1173223/

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s remarks during the India-Africa Defence Dialogue (IADD), held on the sidelines of DefExpo 2022 here in Gujarat, are being seen as a counter to China’s growing influence in Africa.

Fifty African countries participated in the India-Africa Defence Dialogue initiated during the last DefExpo held in Lucknow in 2020. Among the attendees were defence ministers of 20 African countries…

During his address Tuesday, the Defence Minister stressed the need to explore new areas of convergence for defence engagements between India and Africa, including capacity-building, training, cybersecurity, maritime security and counterterrorism. He added that India and African countries are important stakeholders in ensuring a safe and secure maritime environment, especially in the Indian Ocean region.

“We do not believe in making or becoming a client or satellite state, and so, when we partner with any country, it is on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect…” he said.

Sources in the defence establishment also said equipment of interest to Africa includes light combat helicopters, patrol vessels, small arms, shoulder-fired rockets, Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, and surveillance drones, among others…

Notes:

[i] For more background on the clashes, see: Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “India’s Pangong Pickle: New Delhi’s Options After Its Clash with China,” War on the Rocks, 2 July 2022. https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/indias-pangong-pickle-new-delhis-options-after-its-clash-with-china/

[ii] The government of India increased its security cooperation with Vietnam in 2022 as one strategic-level measure to counter China. For more see: Matthew Stein, “India Strengthens Security Cooperation with Vietnam,” OE Watch, Issue #8, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/422297

Image Information:

Image: 3rd India-Africa Forum Summit
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:3rd_India-Africa_Forum_Summit_4.jpg
Attribution: Government Open Data License – India (GODL)

Members of Collective Security Treaty Organization Show Less Support for Russia-Led Body

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Flag of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Flag of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

“The question of the participation of the troops of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in the war between Russia and Ukraine is not on the agenda.”

Despite various disputes and conflicts, member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) have until recently appeared to put aside their differences to continue working jointly within the Eurasian intergovernmental military alliance. However, as the accompanying excerpted articles illustrate, these internal frictions may be taking a toll. The first article excerpted article from semi-independent Russian daily newspaper Kommersant reports on Armenia’s refusal to participate in a CSTO exercise that took place in Kazakhstan. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had requested that the CSTO provide military assistance following the mid-September 2022 clashes with Azerbaijan, but member states “insisted on the need to resolve the conflict situation through diplomacy.” This marked the second time that the CSTO refused military assistance to Armenia in its clashes with Azerbaijan. The second article, from independent news website Fergana, reports on Kyrgyzstan’s refusal to take part in a CSTO exercise in Tajikistan because of ongoing clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. The article also notes that the Ministry of Defense of Kyrgyzstan cancelled a separate CSTO exercise in Kyrgyzstan a week prior. The CSTO exercises in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan were part of an annual series that focuses on preparing CSTO joint operational forces for a variety of scenarios. The third article, from Kazakhstan’s independent news website Vlast, reports on a comment from an official from Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry that CSTO forces will not get involved in the war in Ukraine, noting Kazakhstan’s respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. While Kazakh officials have previously mentioned their position on this, the statement comes at a time when other member states are showing less overall support for the organization.

Sources:

Andrey Sapozhnikov, “Армения не будет участвовать в учениях ОДКБ (Armenia will not participate in the CSTO exercises),” Kommersant (semi-independent Russian daily newspaper), 26 September 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5581954

The exercises of the countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which will be held from September 26 to October 8 in Kazakhstan, will be held without the participation of Armenia. The reason for the country’s refusal to participate in military activities was the border conflict with Azerbaijan…

On September 13, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalated…Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan requested military assistance from the organization. The CSTO member countries, however, insisted on the need to resolve the conflict situation through diplomacy.

“Кыргызстан отказался от участия в учениях ОДКБ в Таджикистане из-за «неостывшей крови» (Kyrgyzstan refused to participate in the CSTO exercise in Tajikistan because of “bad blood”),” Fergana Agency (an independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 11 October 2022. https://fergana.agency/news/128011/

The military contingent of Kyrgyzstan will not take part in the exercises of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) “Frontier – 2022” in Tajikistan due to the military conflict between the two countries. This was stated by Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan Edil Baisalov…

…on October 9, the Ministry of Defense of Kyrgyzstan announced the cancellation of the CSTO exercises “Indestructible Brotherhood – 2022”, which were to be held from October 10 to 14 at the Edelweiss training center in Balykchy. The reasons for the cancellation were not reported.

Tamara Vaal, “Войска ОДКБ не будут принимать участие в войне между Россией и Украиной – МИД (The Forces of the CSTO will not take part in the war between Russia and Ukraine – Ministry of Foreign Affairs),” Vlast (independent news website in Kazakhstan),” 3 October 2022.

https://vlast.kz/novosti/51937-vojska-odkb-ne-budut-prinimat-ucastie-v-vojne-mezdu-rossiej-i-ukrainoj-mid.html

…The question of the participation of the troops of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in the war between Russia and Ukraine is not on the agenda, Aibek Smadiyarov, the agency’s official representative, said at a briefing at the Foreign Ministry on Monday… 

He also stressed that Kazakhstan proceeds from the principles of the territorial integrity of states, their sovereign equality and peaceful coexistence in accordance with international law and the UN Charter.

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Collective Security Treaty Organization
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_Collective_Security_Treaty_Organization.svg
Attribution: Public domain

Armenia Acquires Indian Multiple Rocket Launcher System Amid Delays in Russian Deliveries

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Pinaka MBRL at rehearsal of Republic Day Parade 2011.

Pinaka MBRL at rehearsal of Republic Day Parade 2011.

“There are cases when our country paid hundreds of millions of dollars, but the obligation to supply Armenia with weapons was not fulfilled, including by allied countries.”

The Armenian government has become increasingly critical over what it sees as a lack of Russian support in the wake of several incidents with Azerbaijan, particularly Armenia’s clashes on 12-14 September 2022 that resulted in dozens of service members killed on both sides. While Armenian officials have previously mentioned looking for alternative partners beyond Russia to provide security cooperation and other support, the accompanying excerpted articles offer a look at one way the Armenian government is dealing with a lack of support from Moscow. The excerpted article from Armenian independent news website Hetq reports on comments from Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan following an incident with Azerbaijan on 28 September. Pashinyan noted ongoing reforms of the Armenian Armed Forces and he blamed Azerbaijan for trying to prevent these from taking place. He went on to mention that Armenia “paid hundreds of millions of dollars” for new weapon systems from “allied countries,” but that these have not yet been delivered. While Pashinyan does not mention Russia as one of the allied countries that failed to deliver weapons, it remains one of Armenia’s most significant providers of weapon systems and equipment.[i] In the absence of assumed Russian deliveries, the second excerpted article, from India’s independent English-language news website The Print, reports that Armenia signed a contract with India in September to acquire the Pinaka multiple rocket-launcher system (MLRS) and that its order “would be fast tracked.” The article notes that the agreement includes an unknown number of Pinaka systems, ammunition, and anti-tank rockets. It also mentions that Armenia previously purchased four Swathi radar systems from India in 2020. As Armenia continues to carry out military reforms and prepare for potential clashes with Azerbaijan, the purchase of the Pinaka MLRS from India is an indication of what weapon systems Armenia believes it needs in the near term and demonstrates its willingness to look beyond Russia for supplies.

Sources:

Lusine Akopyan, “Обязательства по поставкам оружия Армении не выполняют и союзнические страны – Н. Пашинян (Allied countries are not fulfilling their obligations of supplying weapons to Armenia – N. Pashinyan),” Hetq (independent news website in Armenia), 29 September 2022.
https://hetq.am/ru/article/148783

At a government meeting on September 29, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that yesterday the Azerbaijani armed forces carried out another provocation on the southeastern section of the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, striking at Armenian units performing engineering work.

Engineering work was carried out on the territory of the Republic of Armenia, and the Azerbaijani units that opened fire were also on the territory of the Republic of Armenia…

“I also want to draw attention to the following circumstance. We have begun a large-scale process of reforming our armed forces, and Azerbaijan is trying to prevent Armenia from carrying out reforms in the Armed Forces with such provocations…,” Pashinyan said, adding that there are cases when our country paid hundreds of millions of dollars, but the obligation to supply Armenia with weapons was not fulfilled, including by allied countries…

Snehesh Alex Philip, “As tensions rise with Azerbaijan, Armenia buys Pinaka rockets & ammunition from India,” The Print (an independent English-language news website from India), 29 September 2022.
https://theprint.in/defence/as-tensions-rise-with-azerbaijan-armenia-buys-pinaka-rockets-ammunition-from-india/1147833/

Armenia has signed a contract with India for procuring the indigenous Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, unspecified missiles and ammunition, amid its growing tensions with Azerbaijan…

Sources in the defence and security establishment confirmed that the government-to-government contract, valued at about Rs 2,000 crore, was signed earlier this month and that the supplies would be fast tracked as per the requirement.

While the exact quantity is not known, the order includes the indigenous Pinaka system, ammunition and anti-tank rockets…

The ex-Soviet republic had bought four indigenous Swathi weapons locating radar in 2020 from India which was delivered in the backdrop of its conflict with Azerbaijan…

Notes:

[i] See: Matthew Stein, “Armenia Acquires Russian Helicopters as Part of Armed Forces Modernization,” OE Watch, Issue #3, 2022. 

Image Information:

Image: Pinaka MBRL at rehearsal of Republic Day Parade 2011
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pinaka_MBRL_at_rehearsal_of_Republic_Day_Parade_2011.jpg
Attribution: Government Open Data License – India

India Works To Maintain Sri Lankan Foothold Amid Growing China Presence

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New Delhi’s strategic and geographical compulsions barely allow it to sit back and watch Sri Lanka descend into chaos—a privilege that Beijing enjoys.

India is concerned that the Chinese involvement at the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka will turn into a long-term Chinese military presence. The docking in August of China’s Yuan Wang-5, a research ship that can track satellites and ballistic missiles, raised additional questions in India about Chinese involvement at the Hambantota Port at a time when the Indian government has been dealing with the fallout of unrest in Sri Lanka.  The accompanying excerpted article from the Indian independent think-tank Observer Research Foundation provides an Indian perspective on the visit of the Chinese ship and what the Indian government might do with Sri Lanka going forward. The article reports that the visit took place after negotiations with the new government in Sri Lanka and that despite Indian efforts to prevent the visit, the Chinese government ultimately received permission to dock. The article compares Chinese and Indian assistance to Sri Lanka following weeks of civil unrest and the change in government there in July 2022, noting that India provided assistance with fewer conditions. In addition, Sri Lanka “reciprocated by cancelling Chinese projects in the Jaffna peninsula and consenting to India’s investments” in various endeavors, including a maritime rescue coordination center at the Hambantota Port. Lastly, the author states that “unlike China, India has no option but to assist Sri Lanka” and that the recent assistance from India “was not aimed to root out Chinese influence; it was out of compulsion and to reverse its lost influence.” As China is likely to continue using the Hambantota Port in various capacities, the Indian government appears to be maintaining a foothold for now.

Sources:

Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, “Should India continue its assistance to Sri Lanka as China makes its way to Hambantota?,” Observer Research Foundation (independent think tank in India), 23 August 2022.

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/should-india-continue-its-assistance-to-sri-lanka/

On 16 August, Yuan Wang-5—a Chinese naval vessel—finally docked in Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port. Operated by the People’s Liberation Army’s Strategic Support Force, this “research vessel” can monitor/gather satellite and technical intelligence and also track the trajectories of ballistic missiles. This episode has raised several questions about India’s assistance to crisis-hit Sri Lanka, Colombo’s lack of gratitude for India, and China’s relevance in the region…

…The Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry agreed to host the Chinese vessel on 12 July when its President had already fled. Initially, the Sri Lankan Defence Ministry rejected these claims in public. However, in late July, it was confirmed that the vessel would be docking in Hambantota from 11-17 August for “replenishment” purposes and that there was nothing unusual about it. However, considering the ship’s potential to track and survey Indian defence and nuclear instalments in its Southern states, New Delhi expressed its concerns.

…On 4 August, the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister met his Indian and Chinese counterparts in Cambodia and received verbal guarantees of further assistance from both. It is quite likely that China demanded guarantees to dock Yuan Wang-5 in these meetings, and India asked to deter the same. Soon after, the Sri Lankan government requested China to defer the vessel docking until further considerations…The Chinese embassy also sought an urgent meeting with the Sri Lankan authorities and allegedly held a closed-door meeting with the President. Following these meetings, China received its new dates of docking from 16-22 August…

…Beijing’s response to the Sri Lankan crisis has been passive. It has withheld Colombo’s requests for financial assistance, worth US$ 4 billion, and loan restructuring, hoping to leverage them to further its interests.

China has used Colombo’s compulsion to deliver a strong message to India and the world—regardless of its assistance, Beijing still holds significant leverage in Sri Lanka and could challenge India in its backyard. This is something that China could be more determined to show to the world as its tensions with Taiwan continue to escalate…

Contradictory to the Chinese approach, New Delhi’s response is based on Sri Lanka’s humanitarian needs and its self-interests. It has assisted Sri Lanka with US$ 3.8 billion, expecting the island nation’s government to respect its interests and sensitivities. India’s assistance has taken in the form of currency swaps, grants, credit lines, humanitarian supplies, and infrastructure development…

In return, Sri Lanka has reciprocated by cancelling Chinese projects in the Jaffna peninsula and consenting to India’s investments in the energy sector, Free-Floating Dock Facility, Dornier aircraft, and a Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC). One of the sub-units of this MRCC will also be installed in the China-operated Hambantota port.

…unlike China, India has no option but to assist Sri Lanka. New Delhi’s strategic and geographical compulsions barely allow it to sit back and watch Sri Lanka descend into chaos—a privilege that Beijing enjoys. 

…India’s assistance was not aimed to root out Chinese influence; it was out of compulsion and to reverse its lost influence. It is no secret that China’s investments and loans still largely outweigh New Delhi’s financial assistance. In fact, even India knows that the IMF bailout solution it supports would require Sri Lanka to talk to China and restructure its loans.In the end, India should continue with its diplomatic engagement and assistance. India’s response to the crisis is not only strategic and status-oriented, but also symbolic since its Indo-Pacific partners expect it to play a significant role in the region. Any misadventure of denying or differing assistance to Sri Lanka also risks attracting more Chinese influence and undoing the positive gains of the last two years…

Kazakhstan Suspends Defense Exports, Denying Russia Purchases

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President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, following Russia-Kazakhstan talks in Sochi, Russia.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, following Russia-Kazakhstan talks in Sochi, Russia.

The export of weapons, military equipment and military products will be suspended until the end of August 2023.

When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, international sanctions forced the Russian defense industry to consider purchasing military equipment from defense companies in Kazakhstan as a workaround to meet requirements for the Russian Armed Forces. In 2014, no significant Russian acquisitions from Kazakh companies ultimately took place. However, following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a new round of international sanctions against Moscow have reportedly caused Russia to look again at Kazakhstan’s defense industry. However, as the accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Fergana Agency reports, the Kazakh government’s announcement on 27 August that it is suspending all defense exports for one year. The ban includes “the export of weapons, military equipment and military products,” and it appears to have the greatest impact on Russia. The move is viewed as a direct effort by Kazakhstan to avoid violating sanctions levied against Russia, which it has stated multiple times that it seeks not to violate. The article notes that Russia had been planning to make a $46 million defense purchase from a Kazakh company, including acquiring shells for howitzers, ammunition for mortars, rockets, and even armored personnel carriers. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development denied this. The article notes that the pro-Russian Rybar Telegram channel tried to refute the Kazakh government by publishing documents for the purchase, but they could not be verified. Regardless of whether the Kazakh government agreed to the purchase, the one-year suspension of defense exports ultimately deprives Russia of a supplier of weapons and equipment that closely matches its own armed forces.

Sources:

“Казахстан на год приостановит экспорт вооружений (Kazakhstan is suspending defense exports for one year),” Fergana Agency (independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 29 August 2022.

https://fergana.agency/news/127503/

Kazakhstan will suspend the export of military products for a year. The Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development of the country came up with such an initiative, and it was supported by the Commission on Defense Industry, the website of the Prime Minister reports…the export of weapons, military equipment and military products will be suspended until the end of August 2023.

In the middle of this month, Russian Telegram channels reported on an allegedly planned deal for the sale of Soviet and Russian-made ammunition by the Kazakh company Technoexport…They said that the contract in the amount of $46 million was concluded on July 16, 2022. The reports also provided a list of weapons – shells for howitzers, ammunition for mortars, rockets, armored personnel carriers and so on. The Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development of Kazakhstan denied this information a few days later.

In response, the Rybar Telegram channel published documents (without specifying their origin) that cast doubt on the refutation of the Kazakh authorities.

On August 19, a meeting was held in Sochi between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kazakh leader Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. As the Kremlin reported, the agenda of the talks included the development of Russian-Kazakh relations, strategic partnership and cooperation.

Image Information:

Image: President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, following Russia-Kazakhstan talks in Sochi, Russia
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Putin-Tokayev_(2022-08-19).jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Armenia Questions Russian Peacekeeping After Nagorno-Karabakh Incident

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2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict map.

2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict map.

“The Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan announced the operation “Retribution” in Nagorno-Karabakh in response to the killing of a service member.” 

There have been several clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh since the ceasefire agreement of November 2020 took effect.  While the Russian Ministry of Defense investigated violations of the ceasefire, Russian peacekeeping forces did not take action in response to any of them.  On 3 August, Azerbaijani forces not only carried out strikes on Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh but seized territory near the Lachin corridor, which serves as the only route connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia.  As the accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Kavkazskiy Uzel reports, this incident sparked criticism from Armenia regarding the Russian peacekeeping mission in the region. 

The article reports on the aftermath of the incident and includes comments from Putin’s Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov, who stated that Russia “is acting in accordance with the trilateral ceasefire agreement and expects compliance from Armenia and Azerbaijan.”  Peskov’s comments came as a response to Armenian President Nikol Pashinyan’s proposal to discuss the function of the Russian peacekeeping force.  The article mentions a few details of the incident, including that the “Russian Ministry of Defense blamed Azerbaijan for violating the ceasefire.”  In addition, the article notes that “Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev accused the Russian Defense Ministry of not fulfilling a promise to ensure the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Karabakh” as part of the ceasefire.  The article includes President Pashinyan’s criticism of the Russian peacekeepers, including that Armenia expects “that any attempt to cross the line of contact will be prevented by the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation.”  While the aftermath of this incident continues to unfold, Azerbaijan’s seizure of territory marks a significant difference from previous clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh since the 2020 ceasefire agreement.  As Russia continues to carry out its war in Ukraine, its response to this incident could be an important measurement for how the Russian peacekeeping force responds to any further incidents.  

Source:

“Кремль отреагировал на слова Пашиняна о функциях миротворцев (The Kremlin reacted to Pashinyan’s words on the function of the peacekeepers),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website reporting on the Caucasus), 5 August 2022. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/379832/  

The Russian side is acting in accordance with the trilateral ceasefire agreement and expects compliance from Armenia and Azerbaijan, Putin’s Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov said in response to Nikol Pashinyan’s proposal to discuss the function of the Russian peacekeepers… 

…on 3 August, the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan announced the operation “Retribution” in Nagorno-Karabakh in response to the killing of a service member.  The ministry also reported that it took strategic heights.  Baku demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Armenian military from Nagorno-Karabakh and threatened “even more destructive countermeasures” in the event of provocations on the line of contact.  Authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh reported two were killed and 19 were wounded as a result of the incident.  The Russian Ministry of Defense blamed Azerbaijan for violating the ceasefire. 

… Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev accused the Russian Defense Ministry of not fulfilling a promise to ensure the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Karabakh in accordance with the agreements of 10 November 2020.  On 19 July, the Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan said that Armenian troops will be withdrawn from Nagorno-Karabakh by September… 

…Nikol Pashinyan stated the need to specify the functions of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh.  “A number of events taking place today and earlier have revealed problems of a systemic nature….   Continued violations of the ceasefire regime along the length of the line of contact… in the presence of peacekeepers are unacceptable,” he said. 

Pashinyan stressed that the line of contact “is called the zone of responsibility of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh.”  “And we expect that any attempt to cross the line of contact will be prevented by the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation…” Novosti-Armenia quoted him as saying… 

Image Information:

Image: 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict map 
Source: File: Nagorno-Karabakh war map (2020).svg – Wikimedia Commons  
Attribution: CCA 4.0

India Draws Lessons on Cyber and Electronic Effects From the War in Ukraine 

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GSLV-Mk III-D1 being moved from Vehicle Assembly Building to second launch pad.

GSLV-Mk III-D1 being moved from Vehicle Assembly Building to second launch pad.

While national R&D is focused in this field, the Indian Army is closely watching the advancements made by our adversaries, to ensure that these vital capabilities are inducted into our armed forces well ahead of times. 

The Indian Army has been focused on a possible conflict with China since the border incidents on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in 2017 and 2020.  While Indian officials have been improving the army’s combat and logistic capabilities on the LAC, the accompanying excerpted article reports on an Indian Army exercise involving satellite communications that drew lessons from the war in Ukraine and that officials are hoping will guide further development of army capabilities.  The article from the independent English-language newspaper The Hindu reports on the scenario of the exercise, which involved using all satellite communications in the Indian Army in different technical and operational situations.  The article notes that the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) also took part in the exercise and that it included the eastern regions and northern border areas of India, which includes the LAC.  The articles go on to mention how the Indian Army has been studying electronic warfare in the war in Ukraine at multiple levels and that India believes this further established the importance of satellite communications.  The article notes that the army is currently using ISRO satellites but is set to have its own by December 2025 as India’s Acquisition Council approved the new satellite back in March during the early weeks of the war in Ukraine.  It is also points out that the Indian Army is closely watching the advancements made by its adversaries and that this is an effort to stay ahead of them.  Overall, the exercise and satellite acquisition show how India continues to respond to China and that it is closely watching what is happening in Ukraine.  

Source:

Dinakar Peri, “Indian Army conducts Exercise Skylight to test resilience of its satellite communications,” The Hindu (independent English-language newspaper), 6 August 2022. 

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-army-conducts-exercise-skylight-to-testresilience-of-itssatellite-communications/article65733174.ece

To test the operational readiness of satellite systems and personnel manning them, the Indian Army last week carried out Exercise Skylight validating and showcasing the resilience of its communication capabilities in case terrestrial connectivity is disrupted in future conflicts, officials in the security establishment said. 

“During the two-week long exercise, all satellite communication assets in the Army were activated and various technical and operational scenarios in space domain were simulated.  Various agencies responsible for space and ground segments, as also the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) participated in the exercise,” a source in the security establishment said.  This includes over 200 static platforms and over 80 vehicle based and man portable systems that were incorporated… 

“…the exercise covered the eastern part of the country, northern borders and the island territories. “This will be done regularly,” the source said. 

The Army has carried out detailed studies of cyber and electromagnetic effects in the war in Ukraine. Electronic warfare has played a major role in Ukraine, sources said, “We had multiple iterations on how this conflict has panned out, at various levels.”  

The studies established efficacy of reliable satellite communication like the one afforded by ‘Starlink’, officials said…(the) Indian Army is utilizing the services of a number of ISRO satellites as it does not have a dedicated satellite.  In March, The Defence Acquisition Council cleared a proposal for a GSAT-7B communications satellite.  The army is on course to get its own satellite by December 2025. 

…To train its personnel on all aspects of satellite communication, the Army recently published Request for Information for its own student satellite, for training engineering students in Military College of Telecommunication Engineering on satellite technology. 

…While national R&D is focused in this field, the Indian Army is closely watching the advancements made by our adversaries, to ensure that these vital capabilities are inducted into our armed forces well ahead of times, officials added. 

Image Information:

Image: GSLV-Mk III-D1 being moved from Vehicle Assembly Building to second launch pad 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:GSLV-Mk_III-D1_being_moved_from_Vehicle_Assembly_Building_to_second_launch_pad.jpg 
Attribution: Government Open Data License – India (GODL)

Ukraine War Likely To Reduce Russian Security Commitments in Central Asia

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Emomali Rahmon and Vladimir Putin.

Emomali Rahmon and Vladimir Putin.

“Emomali Rahmon and Vladimir Putin discussed issues of expanding cooperation in the field of security, including through military and military-technical cooperation, as well as in the field of defense construction, especially in terms of modernizing the armed forces of Tajikistan and strengthening the protection of the Tajik-Afghan border.”

The Russian government has repeatedly stated it is committed to security in Central Asia and often points to ongoing security assistance to governments in the region and the 201st Military Base in Tajikistan and the 999th Airbase in Kyrgyzstan as proof of its commitment.  The accompanying excerpted articles offer an update on Russian commitments in Central Asia amid its invasion of Ukraine.  The article from the independent news website Fergana Agency reports on President Putin’s visit to Tajikistan to meet with President Emomali Rahmon at the end of June.  The article mentions that the presidents discussed expanding security cooperation, modernizing Tajikistan’s armed forces, and strengthening the Tajik – Afghan border.  The article does not mention how much money Russia will spend or what equipment it will provide.  The article from the independent news website Kloop reports on Putin’s order to begin negotiating with the government of Kyrgyzstan over a joint air defense system.  The article notes that Tajikistan reached a similar agreement for a joint air defense system with Russia last year.  Tajikistan’s Ministry of Defense cited the need to counter the threat posed by terrorist groups potentially using unmanned aerial systems as one reason for the agreement.  Russian spending and security assistance in Central Asia reportedly decreased following the takeover of Crimea and the Donbas in 2014 due to sanctions but rebounded after a couple of years.  While it is unknown how much money and materiel Russia has so far expended in its invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin will probably have little choice but to reduce its commitment to security in Central Asia at least temporarily.

Source:

“Путин и Рахмон обсудили модернизацию армии Таджикистана и охрану таджикско-афганской границы (Putin and Rahmon discussed the modernization of Tajikistan’s army and the security of the Tajik-Afghan border),” Fergana Agency (independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 29 June 2022.
https://fergana.agency/news/126750/

The President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, and the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon, discussed the modernization of the armed forces of Tajikistan and the strengthening of the protection of its border with Afghanistan…

Putin arrived in Dushanbe on the evening of June 28 for a two-day visit.  Rahmon personally met him at the airport…

“During the talks, special attention was paid to the development of the situation in Afghanistan and the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border.  In this context, Emomali Rahmon and Vladimir Putin discussed issues of expanding cooperation in the field of security, including through military and military-technical cooperation, as well as in the field of defense construction, especially in terms of modernizing the armed forces of Tajikistan and strengthening the protection of the Tajik-Afghan border.”  – Rahmon’s press service said in a statement…

Munduzbek Kalykov, “Кыргызстан и Россия могут создать объединенную региональную систему ПВО — Путин поручил провести переговоры (Kyrgyzstan and Russia could create a regional air defense system – Putin authorized discussions to be held),” Kloop (independent Russian-language news website in Kyrgyzstan), 8 July 2022.
https://kloop.kg/blog/2022/07/08/kyrgyzstan-i-rossiya-mogut-sozdat-obedinennuyu-regionalnuyu-sistemu-pvo-putin-poruchil-provesti-peregovory/

Russian President Vladimir Putin authorized negotiations with Kyrgyzstan on the creation of a unified regional air defense system. Putin signed this order on July 8.

“Instruct the Russian Ministry of Defense to hold negotiations with the Russian Foreign Ministry with the Kyrgyz side and, upon reaching an agreement, sign the said agreement on behalf of the Russian Federation, allowing changes that are not of a fundamental nature to be made to its draft, approved by the government of the Russian Federation,” the document says…

The same agreement on the creation of a joint regional air defense system with Russia last year was approved by the Parliament of Tajikistan.

Minister of Defense Sherali Mirzo, speaking in parliament, noted that the implementation of this agreement is in the interests of ensuring the security of the airspace of Tajikistan “given the growing regional threats and the emergence of new types of hostilities, such as the widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles, including by terrorist and extremist groups.” …It was also reported that Russia is negotiating the creation of a joint air defense system with Kazakhstan and Armenia…

Image Information:

Image: Emomali Rahmon and Vladimir Putin
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_and_Emomali_Rahmon_(2017-10-10)_03.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0