Author Archives: Lucas Winter

Egypt is Rumored To Have Signed Purchase Agreement for Chinese J-10C Fighters

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PLAAF J-10C in action during the 2023 Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace (LIMA) Exhibition in Malaysia.

“The decision [to acquire Chinese J-10C fighter aircraft] comes at a time of geopolitical realignment for Egypt.”

Unconfirmed reports indicate that the Egyptian Air Force may soon acquire the export variant of China’s J-10C fighter aircraft.[i] If confirmed, this would represent a clear deepening of Egypt-China military ties amidst growing regional uncertainty due to the conflict in Gaza.[ii] Although the deal remains unconfirmed by either side, various English- and Arabic-language media outlets are treating the acquisition as a fact.[iii] Many analysts and commentators, noting Egypt’s recent accession into BRICS, portray these developments as signaling an ongoing shift in Egypt’s security partnerships from the United States toward closer relations with Russia and China. The first two accompanying articles, from defense-arabic.com—an Arabic-language defense news website and discussion forum—and RT Arabic—a Russian media outlet—illustrate the kind of reporting driving this narrative. For its part, the defense-arabic.com article suggests that Egypt’s decision to do so “reflects Cairo’s intention to diversify the sources of its military equipment and thus reduce its dependence on American defense systems.” Interestingly, the RT Arabic article sources its story from an Israeli news site, nziv.net, whose reporting has portrayed Egypt as a latent security threat to Israel.[iv] Global and regional actors are likely to use this story regardless of the finalization of the deal, to further broaden agendas, particularly the notion of a growing rift between the United States and Egypt.

The strategic implications of Egypt acquiring Chinese fighter jets may be less dramatic than some predict, as suggested in the third accompanying excerpt from the prominent daily al-Araby al-Jadeed. Egypt has long pursued a policy of diversifying its arms suppliers, and it has considered upgrading its fighter aircraft through deals with Europe, the United States, and Russia. However, the region’s heightened tensions and increasing geopolitical competition could interpret even relatively routine actions as strategically significant, warranting closer attention.

Sources:

مصر تعلن رسميا اختيارها للمقاتلات الصينية J-10C لتحل محل مقاتلات F-16 الأمريكية

“Egypt officially announces its choice of Chinese J-10C to replace it’s American F-16s,” defense-arabic.com (defense news and discussion forum), September 11, 2024. https://tinyurl.com/vyfmemsj

Egypt has officially announced that it will replace its aging fleet of American F-16s with Chinese J-10C “Vigorous Dragon” fighters, after discussions that have continued over the past few months. The decision, announced during Egypt’s first international air show, reflects Cairo’s intention to diversify the sources of its military equipment, and thus reduce its dependence on American defense systems…

The decision comes at a time of geopolitical realignment for Egypt, which recently joined the BRICS bloc alongside major players such as China, Russia and India. In recent years, Egypt has also acquired defense equipment from Russia and France, including the MiG-29M and Dassault Rafale. The Chinese J-10C is set to become a key part of Egypt’s diverse arsenal.

Source:

“مصر تستبدل مقاتلات F-16 بمقاتلات صينية متطورة”.. الإعلام العبري يتحدث عن الصفقة المنتظرة

“Egypt replaces its F-16 with advanced Chinese fighter jets… Hebrew media speaks on the presumed deal,” RT Arabic (Russian media outlet), September 9, 2024. https://tinyurl.com/p9nk35mf

According to Hebrew media, the Egyptian Ministry of Defense has placed its first-ever order to purchase Chinese fourth-generation fighter jets, with an unspecified number of J-10C aircraft ordered on August 19. According to the Israeli news website “nziv”, this development comes at a time when Cairo continues to strengthen strategic and economic relations with Beijing, after joining the BRICS bloc earlier this year…

The website added: “With the exception of three squadrons of MiG-29M fighter jets that Egypt ordered from Russia in 2015, all of Egypt’s fourth-generation fighter jets are of Western origin, and the purchase of the J-10C is seen as a potential turning point for Egypt.” The Hebrew website report explained that Egypt is seeking to gradually stop relying on American weapons, especially since the United States had previously refused to sell the latest F-15 aircraft to Cairo, while it agreed to sell them to Israel, which angered the Egyptians. The website pointed out that the United States may stop the annual grant of billions of dollars to Egypt if it buys fighter jets from China.

Source:

هل تتجه مصر نحو اقتناء مقاتلات صينية؟

“Is Egypt moving toward purchasing Chinese fighter jets?” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), September 15, 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/هل-تتجه-مصر-نحو-اقتناء-مقاتلات-صينية

However, Dr. Merit Mabrouk, director of the Egypt Program at the Middle East Institute in Washington, believes that Egypt cannot replace the United States with China and Russia in terms of its total reliance on armaments. She explained to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that “as for Russia, Egypt cannot buy weapons from it, because American law stipulates that military aid is not granted to countries that buy weapons from Russia, and Egypt is one of the largest countries that receive American military aid.” She added that “as for China, Egypt’s cooperation with it in the military field is not a replacement for the United States, but rather a kind of completion and diversification of weapons sources.”

“The United States was and will remain Egypt’s favorite, and it is Cairo’s first partner in this field, but it decided some time ago to expand its contacts and partnerships, and that it will not limit itself to one partner, because it is not in its interest,” Mabrouk said. “The idea is that Cairo gives itself the right not to be forced to deal with Washington alone in this field, despite its strong desire to deal with it, and this is not only for Egypt but for many other countries,” she added. 

Notes:

[i] In 2022, Pakistan became the first country to obtain the Chengdu J-10 (NATO reporting name is Firebird). If the rumors are confirmed, Egypt would become the second country to acquire the J-10. The J-10 is a relatively old aircraft, declared operational in 2003, and designed primarily for air-to air combat. However, the J-10 can also perform and participate in strike missions. In January 2024 Pakistan J-10CE’s escorted drones on a strike mission against Baloch separatists in Southeastern Iran.

[ii] In late August, Egypt hosted its first-ever International Military Airshow, where the J-10C was prominently displayed, and an alleged agreement was reportedly finalized. Egypt’s interest in the J-10C has been public for over a year, and negotiations seem to have accelerated in recent months. See for instance this May 2023 article mentioning Egypt’s interest in the fighter jets: “China in advanced negotiations for major arms deals with Egypt and Saudi Arabia,” The New Arab, 25 May 2023. https://www.newarab.com/news/china-advanced-talks-major-saudi-egypt-arms-deals; Last July, the Egyptian Air Force commander visited Beijing for discussions with his Chinese counterpart. See:

قائد القوات الجوية يلتقى نظيره الصينى

“Air Force commander meets his Chinese counterpart,” Egyptian Ministry of Defense, 16 July 2024. https://tinyurl.com/ycj3yb6t

[iii] In addition to Arabic-language outlets, an article in The National Interest reported the sale as a fact without providing evidence. See: “The Mighty F-16 Fighter Just ‘Lost’ to China’s J-10 (But Not in Battle),” The National Interest, 13 September 2024. https://tinyurl.com/6kcmcywy

[iv] See for instance: “Israel spreads false allegations to downplay severity of its military setbacks: Source,” Egypt Independent, 30 May 2024. https://www.egyptindependent.com/israel-spreads-false-allegations-to-downplay-severity-of-its-military-seStbacks-source/ and “Egypt ‘preparing for another Yom Kippur War,’ warns Israeli media site,” Middle East Monitor, 16 July 2024. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240716-egypt-preparing-for-another-yom-kippur-war-warns-israeli-media-site/

Image Information:

Image: PLAAF J-10C in action during the 2023 Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace (LIMA) Exhibition in Malaysia.
Source: https://commons.m.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:J-10C_LIMA_2023.jpg

The Failure To Deter Houthi Vessel Attacks May Deepen Saudi-China Security Ties

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The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mason (DDG 87), sails in the Red Sea in support of Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) 31 January 2024.

“Some have gone so far as to assert that there is American collusion with the [Houthis], as Washington does not intentionally target the group’s main command centers in Yemen, nor its main leaders. The reason for the collusion is to harm Chinese trade in the Red Sea…”

Arabic-language media analysts and commentators widely agree that the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian – formed in December 2023 to address Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea — has not effectively deterred Yemen’s Houthis from targeting commercial maritime traffic.[i] However, they are divided on whether this failure is due to deliberate strategic choices or poor planning.[ii] Some commentators suggest that the real target of the operation is China, not the Houthis. They argue that the United States may be intentionally allowing Houthi attacks to weaken China economically and justify military presence in a region with increasing Chinese naval activity. The first excerpt, from the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, reflects this view, with several Yemeni political analysts indicating that the United States is colluding with the Houthis for a broader strategic aim.[iii] This perspective, however, is not universally accepted across the region. Pro-Houthi media outlets, for example, attribute the lack of deterrence to Yemeni strength and U.S. shortcomings. The second excerpt, from the Houthi news website al-Masirah, illustrates the Houthi narrative on Prosperity Guardian, whereby Yemeni forces have shattered U.S. military prestige and effectively deterred U.S. forces in the region. The third excerpt, from the Qatari daily al-Sharq, offers a more mainstream explanation, attributing the operation’s deterrent failure to poor planning and misjudgments about the Houthis. According to the author, effectively securing trade routes in the area will require patience and the involvement of more acceptable mediators, such as China.

Prosperity Guardian’s ineffective deterrence – regardless of the reasons – may be leading Saudi Arabia to seek help from China. Saudi Arabian leadership opted against joining Prosperity Guardian due to their interest in pursuing a negotiated settlement with the Houthis.[iv] In mid-June 2024, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman and top Saudi military officials visited Beijing for discussions that reportedly included a request for Chinese assistance to contain Yemeni attacks.[v] Whatever the ultimate reasons behind Prosperity Guardian’s ineffectiveness, one of its consequences – presumably unintended – could be deepening Saudi-Chinese security coordination in the Red Sea.

Sources:

بعد 8 أشهر من التصعيد… لماذا لم يردع التدخل الأميركي هجمات الحوثيين؟

“After 8 months of escalation… Why did the US intervention not deter Houthi attacks?” al-Sharq al-Awsat (Saudi daily), 18 July 2024. https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5041521-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-8-%D8%A3%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%9F

Despite the passage of eight months since the start of the Houthi attacks on ships under the pretext of supporting the Palestinians in Gaza, the American intervention under the name of the “Prosperity Guardian” has not succeeded in putting an end to the threat of the Iranian-backed group…

[Yemeni researcher and political analyst Abdul Sattar Al-Shamiri] claims in his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat that the continuation of the navigation crisis in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden does not affect America and Israel economically, but rather affects China the most in the long term…

This part related to China is consistent with what Tawfiq al-Jund, a Yemeni researcher at the Sana’a Center for Studies, told Asharq Al-Awsat… “The American military presence in the Red Sea needs justification before world powers, and the Houthi threat to maritime navigation is a strong justification for that, and it must remain for a period of time,” Al-Jund continues…

“Futile restoration attempts…they end in the collapse of Zionism,” al-Masirah (Houthi news outlet), 5 August 2024. https://www.almasirahnews.com/136216/

It was only a few days until the “Prosperity Alliance” found itself in a major predicament, as it was unable to provide protection for the ships of the Zionist entity and ships heading to the ports of the occupied territories. The scope of targeting for our country’s naval forces expanded to include commercial ships of the so-called “Prosperity Guardian” alliance, especially American and British ships, and the bottom of the sea became a stable for a number of them.. Under the pretext of redeployment to carry out other missions in other areas, the (Eisenhower) was withdrawn away from the danger zone, after our national army expanded the geographical scope of its naval military operations to include the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and later the Mediterranean Sea.

Instead of imposing a supposed deterrent against our people and revolutionary leadership, the picture was reversed, and the forces called the Prosperity Alliance were deterred. As a result, the reputation of the US administration collapsed, its prestige fell, and its deterrent image, which its presence in the Middle East aimed to restore, was shattered.

لماذا فشل تحالف الازدهار في هزيمة الحوثيين؟

“Why did the Prosperity Alliance fail to defeat the Houthis?” al-Sharq (Qatari daily), 30 July 2024. https://al-sharq.com/opinion/30/07/2024/%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%81%D8%B4%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%87%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86

Perhaps the main source of confusion or astonishment in Washington as well is that it does not imagine that defeating the Houthis would be this difficult. As a result, some have gone so far as to assert that there is American collusion with the group, as Washington does not intentionally target the group’s main command centers in Yemen, nor its main leaders. The reason for the collusion is to harm Chinese trade in the Red Sea.

The issue of American collusion with the Houthis or Iran, their main supporter, can basically be ruled out simply when considering the huge amount of spending on the operation, which has reached an estimated $30 billion dollars so far, without any result, in addition to the development of the group’s threat to Israel, the American red line.

There are many interconnected reasons for the failure of the campaign against the Houthis. The first and most important is the American-Western miscalculation of the group’s true strength. So in principle, the Prosperity Coalition should have adopted more robust and rigorous plans in its war against the Houthis, and the Pentagon acknowledged this by saying that defeating the Houthis requires a more robust and rigorous strategy… It can be said that defeating an ideological group like the Houthis, operating in a complex mountainous terrain, is next to impossible… Therefore, betting on neutralizing these groups and undermining their threats should be primarily a political bet. It should address the roots of the crisis, not its symptoms. The solution must start from within Yemen itself by intensifying efforts for a comprehensive reconciliation in which the Houthis are recognized as an authentic political and social component. This requires patience and the intervention of more acceptable mediators, led by China.

Notes:

[i] As of July 2024, Houthi attacks had not ceased. See: William Clough, “Military and Security, The Yemen Review Quarterly: April-June 2024,“ Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, 15 July 2024. https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/april-june-2024/22886

[ii] The stated goal of Operation Prosperity Guardian is “ensuring freedom of navigation for all countries and bolstering regional security and prosperity.” See: https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/

[iii] This perspective is most widespread among anti-Houthi factions in Yemen, particularly among members and supporters of the Saudi-based Internationally Recognized Government.

[iv] For more see: Lucas Winter, “Gaza War’s Impact On The Middle East Strategic Landscape,” FMSO Foreign Perspectives Brief, June 2024, page 9, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/gaza-wars-impact-on-the-middle-east-strategic-landscape-lucas-winterjune-2024/

[v] For more details see: Adam Lucente, “Saudi defense chief in China in bid for help with Houthis, boost military ties,” Al Monitor, 25 June 2024. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/06/saudi-defense-chief-china-bid-help-houthis-boost-military-ties; The Saudi delegation included Chief of the General Staff Lt. Gen. Fayyad bin Hamid Al-Ruwaili, Saudi Ambassador to China Abdulrahman bin Ahmed Al-Harbi; Commander of the Strategic Missile Force Lt. Gen. Jarallah bin Mohammed Al-Alweet, Director General of the Office of the Minister of Defense Hisham bin Abdulaziz bin Saif, head of the Armed Forces Operations Authority Maj. Gen. Misfer Al-Ghanem, and Military Attaché at the Saudi Embassy in Beijing Commodore Salem bin Saleh Al-Maliki. The Chinese delegation included Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Central Military Commission Lt. Gen. Jing Jianfeng, Director of the Office of International Military Cooperation at the Central Military Commission Maj. Gen. Li Bin, and several other senior officials. See: “Chinese and Saudi Defense Ministers Discuss Bilateral Relations,” Saudi Press Agency, 25 June 2024, https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2128876

OE Insight Summary:

Arabic commentaries view the USA-led Operation Prosperity Guardian to stop Houthi attacks from YEM as a failure but are divided on causes. This failure may deepen SAU-CHN security cooperation.

Image Information:

Image: The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mason (DDG 87), sails in the Red Sea in support of Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) 31 January 2024.
Source: Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Christopher J Krucke, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command / U.S. 5th Fleet. https://www.dvidshub.net/image/8254865/operation-prosperity-guardian. 
Attribution: Public Domain

Rumors of Russian Military Cargo Activity Underscore Tunisia’s Eastward Turn Away From the United States

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Tunisian President Kais Saied on Inauguration Day, 23 October 2019.

“Kais Saied is a ripe fruit waiting to fall into the hands of the Russians”

Summary: Recent rumors of Russian military cargo flights into Tunisia highlight President Kais Saied’s “eastward turn”— including toward China and Iran — and the potential erosion of Tunisia’s security partnership with the United States.

On 19 May, the Italian daily La Repubblica published a report claiming that Russia may be using a Tunisian airport to transport military equipment, raising questions about Moscow’s designs in the country. Russia exerts substantial military influence in both Libya and Algeria, Tunisia’s neighboring countries.[i] Tunisia, however, is a historical Western security partner in which Russia has traditionally had little to no military influence. The rumors of Russian activities in Tunisia may not amount to much, but they should nonetheless be taken seriously in light of evident Russian attempts to deepen its influence in Libya and the Sahel,[ii] along with Tunisian President Kais Saied’s seeming “eastward turn.”

The report suggests that entities linked to Russia’s Wagner Group had flown equipment and personnel into the international airport of Djerba, a southern Tunisian island popular with local travelers and European package tourists.[iii] There is no open-source evidence supporting claims of Russian military-related movements in Djerba, but speculation among Tunisians is nonetheless rife, as noted in the first accompanying excerpt, from the Qatari-aligned English-language daily al-Araby al-Jadeed. Theories on Russian activities in Djerba include that former Wagner personnel are vacationing in Djerba; that Russia is “transporting migrants to overwhelm Tunisia’s border crossing points”; or that the planes are transporting “personnel and crates of vodka for Russian soldiers on leave in Tunisia.” The Russian embassy was quick to ridicule claims of any military connection to these flights, as shown in the second accompanying excerpt, from the Russian Embassy in Libya’s Facebook page. The week after the publication on Russian flights to Djerba, President Saied flew to Tehran to attend Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi’s state funeral. The last time a Tunisian head of state visited Iran was 1965. The following week, Saied flew to Beijing to attend the China-Arab Cooperation Forum. While Saied’s recent engagement with Iran and China has been more overt than any gestures toward Russia, most analysts see these developments as part of a broader eastward turn in Saied’s foreign policy. Saied’s eastward turn, particularly toward China, as largely motivated by economics explains a Tunisian political activist cited in the third accompanying excerpt, from Qatar’s al-Jazeera. However, there are also ideological affinities between members of Saied’s inner circle and Iranian political leadership.[iv] This confluence of circumstances, according to a Tunisian researcher cited in the fourth accompanying excerpt, from the Kuwaiti daily al-Jarida, makes Saied’s Tunisia a “ripe fruit waiting to fall into the hands of the Russians.”

Sources:

“Tunisia: alleged Russian military activity in Djerba raises concerns,” The New Arab (Qatari-aligned daily), 24 May 2024, https://www.newarab.com/news/tunisia-alleged-russian-military-activity-raises-concerns

Theories on the suspicious events at Djerba airport have become a “culture de trottoir” in Tunisia for months. Some speculate it involves Wagner personnel, while others suggest it’s about vodka shipments. According to some Tunisian analysts, these aircraft are believed to be “cargo planes” and civilian “charters,” not the military aircraft mentioned by La Repubblica. Some sources claim that the aircraft transported Russians affiliated with the former security company Wagner (now “Africa Corps”), who came to rest on the island of Djerba. Others suggest they transported personnel and crates of vodka for Russian soldiers on leave in Tunisia. A far more speculative hypothesis suggests that some aircraft might be transporting migrants to overwhelm Tunisia’s border crossing points, thereby creating a crisis. Wagner’s presence in neighbouring Libya mainly fueled all these rumours… While rumours continue circulating, one thing may seem to be agreed on: Russian aircraft have been seen on Djerba Island. President Kais Saied, known for publicly addressing rumours targeting his country, has refrained from commenting on the situation at Djerba airport.

Russian Embassy in Libya, Facebook Page, 20 May 2024, https://www.facebook.com/RussEmbLib/posts/122143879226177351

Now the Italian “La Repubblica,” having clearly decided to keep up with the task of creating and replicating horror stories about “Wagner,” scares the inexperienced reader with the idea of ​​​​Russian combat aircraft at the airport of the tourist island of Djerba in Tunisia, neighboring Libya. One can only envy their imagination. But as a reaction, we have to say: this is a lie and a fake. A complete lack of respect for the reader, whether in Italy or abroad.

توجه تونس شرقا.. خطة للانسلاخ من الغرب أم مناورة؟

“Tunisia’s eastward orientation… a plan to ditch the West or a maneuver?” al-Jazeera (Qatari news channel), 4 June 2024, https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2024/6/4/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A7-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AE-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8

Political activist Ahmed Al-Kahlawi views the Tunisian-Chinese rapprochement as an important step taken by President Saied to revive historical relations with China, stressing that the Tunisian orientation towards the East was dictated by the economic difficulties that the country is experiencing as a result of dysfunctional cooperation to benefit the interests of Western powers. Al-Kahlawi told Al-Jazeera Net that President Saied chose to lead Tunisia to establish new partnerships with the East because he was certain that Tunisia would reap many economic and investment advantages, especially with China, the rising economic power, considering that Tunisia would achieve great growth that would free it from the hegemony of Western countries.

تونس بين التوجه شرقاً أو الحفاظ على حلفها مع الغرب

“Tunisia between an eastward turn and maintaining its alliance with the West,” al-Jarida (Kuwaiti daily), 30 May 2024, https://www.aljarida.com/article/64205For his part, Tunisian researcher at the Institute for Defense and Security Studies, Jalal Harchaoui, explained that in a context characterized by Russian penetration of the Sahel region and Libya, “Kais Saied is a ripe fruit waiting to fall into the hands of the Russians.”

Notes:

[i] See: Lucas Winter, “Russia Uses Diplomacy To Increase Military Influence In Libya,” OE Watch, 10-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-uses-diplomacy-to-increase-military-influence-in-libya/; Lucas Winter, “Algeria Seeks Non-Alignment By Preserving Russia Ties While Welcoming NATO Overtures,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/algeria-seeks-non-alignment-by-preserving-russia-ties-while-welcoming-nato-overtures/; Lucas Winter, “Algerian Military Deepening Ties To Russia,” OE Watch, 09-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/algerian-military-deepening-ties-to-russia/

[ii] See: Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Amelia Cheatham. “Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Burkina Faso,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, January 2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/burkina-faso-russia-m-dime-report/;  Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Amelia Cheatham. “Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in Burkina Faso,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, January 2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/burkina-faso-china-m-dime-report/; Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Christopher Betts. “Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Mali,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, June 2024, Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Christopher Betts. “Instruments of Chinee Military Influence in Mali,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, June 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/mali-china-m-dime-report-2/

[iii] The La Repubblica article is unavailable without a subscription. It can be found at: https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2024/05/19/news/aerei_militari_russi_tunisia_allarme_usa_migranti_saied_timori_governo_meloni-423030975

[iv] Per Le Monde, “certain circles surrounding Saied have long-standing links with the Islamic Republic,” in particular his brother Naoufel Saied. “Tunisia: Kais Saied’s inclination to turn to Iran,” Le Monde, 25 May 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/05/25/tunisia-kais-saied-s-inclination-to-turn-to-iran_6672647_124.html

OE Insight Summary:

Recent rumors of RUS military cargo flights into TUN highlight President Kais Saied’s seeming “eastward turn”— including toward CHN and IRN— and the potential erosion of TUN’s security relationship with USA.

Image Information:

Image: Tunisian President Kais Saied on Inauguration Day, 23 October 2019.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kaïs_Saïd_2.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Russia Redeploys Military Police to Southern Syria

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Map showing Syria, Israel, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (1991).

“The [Russian] Military Police has set up an additional post near the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights.”

After over a year of absence, Russian forces have returned to Syrian territory near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, in theory, to curb spillovers of violence from Israel to Syria. Russia’s deployments to date have largely been symbolic, including occasional aerial patrols and the establishment of three military police observation posts in the Syrian provinces of Quneitra and Daraa, near the buffer zone separating Syria and Israel. As reported in the first accompanying article from the Syrian opposition news website Enab Baladi, Russia established its third observation post in the area in early April 2024, after establishing two similar posts in January.

Southern Syria is often considered the cradle of the Syrian civil war, and was a hardened rebel bastion for several years. Daraa province remained highly volatile until Russian-sponsored settlements with rebel groups in 2018 stabilized local security conditions. With a modicum of peace achieved, Russian presence and influence in this part of Syria dwindled beginning in 2018 while Iranian-backed Syrian government forces and militias strengthened their grip in former rebel territory. Following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian forces all but disappeared from southern Syria, allowing Iranian militias to expand their influence in the area, often through local proxies and under the cover of Syrian Army forces.[i] Iranian influence in Syrian territory close to Israel has become a source of heightened concern not just for Israel but also for Russia, which fears that Gaza spillover could threaten Syria’s delicate status quo.

In the months following the 7 October attack, Russia successfully blocked Iranian attempts to launch attacks from southern Syria in support of Hamas in Gaza per the second accompanying excerpt, published in January 2024 in the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed. The redeployment of Russian military police to this part of Syria may therefore be seen as bolstering Russia’s ability to continue preventing escalation on this front. Indeed, Russia’s observation posts have all been set up in the aftermath of Israeli assassinations of high-ranking Iranian officials in Syrian territory: the first two posts were set up in the weeks following the killing of General Razi Mousavi in late December 2023, and the third one the day after General Mohammad Reza Zahedi was killed in April 2024. Russia’s return to southern Syria is less about supporting Iran against Israel than it is about deterring Tehran’s use of Syrian soil to respond to Israeli attacks on Iranian personnel in Syria notwithstanding the deepening Russo-Iranian strategic cooperation. , However, experts are skeptical of Russia’s ability to succeed. According to Mustafa al-Naimi, a Turkey-based Syrian analyst cited in the third accompanying excerpt, also from Enab Baladi, Russia’s efforts are bound to fail. Even if it succeeds in preventing Iran from opening the Syria front against Israel, Russia will be unable to remove Iranian influence from the area, given that its proxies will simply “return to the region wearing the uniform of the Syrian regime.” As such, al-Naimi conjectures, Russia’s symbolic redeployment near the Syria-Israel border is unlikely to do anything other than postpone the inevitable: an expansion of the Gaza conflict into southern Syria.

Sources:

Source: “Russia establishes third military post on borders of occupied Golan Heights,” Enab Baladi English (Syrian opposition English-language news website), 2 April 2024. https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2024/04/russia-establishes-third-military-post-on-borders-of-occupied-golan-heights/

The Deputy Chief of the Russian Center for Reconciliation of the Opposing Parties in Syria (a division of the Russian Ministry of Defense), Major General Yury Popov, stated that the Military Police has set up an additional post near the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights… This Syrian military post is the third of its kind established since the beginning of the current year, after Russia reduced its deployment in southern Syria at the beginning of 2022 following its invasion of neighboring Ukraine.

Source:

ما أهداف روسيا من نشر نقاط مراقبة في القنيطرة؟ “What are Russia’s goals in setting up observation posts in Quneitra?” Al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 6 January 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9

[Researcher Rachid] Hourani added to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that, after the launch of the Israeli military operation against the Gaza Strip, Iran tried to activate several fronts based on the principle of “unifying the arenas.” There were several visits by Iranian military officials to Syria with the aim of opening that front, but they did not amount to much due to Russian rejection and its tendency to use the so-called “Iranian card” and control Tehran’s behavior in Syria.

Hourani considered that Russia can actually curb Iran in southern Syria “because it fully controls the military decision-making in regime areas, in addition to being a major party to the understandings related to Israel’s security threats from Syria, such as the settlement agreement with the Syrian opposition factions in mid-2018 and the Israeli-American-Russian security meeting that took place in mid-2019″…

Source:

ما وراء نشر روسيا نقاطًا عسكرية على حدود الجولان المحتل “What is behind Russia’s setting up military posts on the occupied Golan border?” Enab Baladi (Syrian opposition news website), 14 January 2024. https://www.enabbaladi.net/682917/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%8B%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88/

Mustafa Al-Naimi, a researcher on Iranian affairs, told Enab Baladi, “We are facing a scene of gradual escalation from both the Iranian and Israeli sides.” Al-Naimi believes that the Russian side is trying to reposition itself to ward off any attempt by the Israeli side to advance on the ground along this front by, at the very least, removing the Iranian militias from the southern region adjacent to the Golan.He added that this measure will not work for these militias, because they will return to the region wearing the uniform of the Syrian regime… because of this and the fact that the Israeli side does not trust that Russia has the ground forces needed to control the region at a depth of 45 kilometers, al-Naimi suggests that these measures are “postponing the battle, not preventing it.”

Notes:

[i] For more on the 2018 agreement, see: Armenak Tokmajyan. “A Flashpoint Looms in Southern Syria,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 26 March 2024. https://carnegie-mec.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/04/a-flashpoint-looms-in-southern-syria?lang=en&center=middle-east

For more on post-Ukraine Russian and Iranian presence in Syria, see: Lucas Winter, “Iran Repositions Its Proxies In Syria As Russia Turns Focus To Ukraine,” OE Watch, 02-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-repositions-its-proxies-in-syria-as-russia-turns-focus-to-ukraine/;  Lucas Winter, “Iran Digs Into Central Syria, Filling Vacuum Left By Russia,” OE Watch, May 2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-digs-into-central-syria-filling-vacuum-left-by-russia/; Lucas Winter, “Russian Influence Fades In Southern Syria,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russian-influence-fades-in-southern-syria/

Image Information:

Image: Map showing Syria, Israel, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (1991).
Source: https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-pclmaps-oclc-25871248-golan_heights-1991.jpg
Attribution: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, Public Domain

Chinese Officials Seek Engagement With All Middle East Regional Players

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Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hama’s political bureau, at a meeting in Moscow (2020).

“The Hamas movement is part of the Palestinian national fabric.”

China has embarked on a policy characterized by diplomatic engagement with all regional parties alongside rhetorical alignment with the pro-Palestinian views that are dominant in the Muslim world and “Global South.”[i] In mid-March, a Chinese delegation met in Doha with the Qatar-based head of Hamas’s political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh. It was the first publicly acknowledged meeting between Chinese and Hamas officials since 7 October.[ii] The first accompanying excerpt from the Palestinian news agency Safa, reported noteworthy statements by China’s ambassador in Qatar describing Chinese interest in preserving ties with Hamas and describing the group as “part of the Palestinian national fabric.” The meeting should not be considered an expression of Chinese support for Hamas at the expense of other parties, given that it came at the end of a trip that also included visits with officials from Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Qatar.[iii] Instead, the meeting is noteworthy in that it confirms that China is less wary of Islamic activism than in recent years. As noted in the second excerpted article, from Qatar’s Al-Jazeera, China views Hamas and other mobilized Sunni groups with suspicion due to concerns over Uyghur Muslim activism in its western Xinjiang province. Uyghur-related concerns have previously put Beijing at odds with Sunni groups such as Hamas and their backers, including the Qatari government.[iv] More recently, though, these disagreements have subsided amidst a broader regional détente. This trend has not been affected by events since 7 October.This approach may lead to a greater Chinese alignment with Qatar, which has positioned itself as the most effective intermediary between interested governments and mobilized Sunni groups such as Hamas and the Taliban. China’s multi-partner approach to the Middle East is similar to Qatar’s, and one may expect these governments to fully put aside past disagreements regarding Muslim activism as they seek to position themselves as key brokers in a new regional order.

OE Insight Summary:

Diplomats from CHN held their first officially reported meeting with Hamas in QAT, indicating that China seeks good relations with all parties in the Middle East and has softened its distrust of mobilized Sunni Muslim groups such as Hamas.

Sources:

السفير الصيني: حماس جزء من النسيج الفلسطيني ونحرص على العلاقة معها

“Chinese Ambassador: Hamas is part of the Palestinian fabric and we are keen on our relationship with it,” Safa (Palestinian Press Agency), 17 March 2024. https://safa.ps/post/367879/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B5-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%87%D8%A7

The Chinese Ambassador to the State of Qatar, Cao Xiaolin, stated on Sunday that the Hamas movement is part of the Palestinian national fabric and that China is keen on having relations with the group.

الصين تعترف بـ”حماس” بقليل من الخجل!      

“China recognizes “Hamas” with little shame!” al-Jazeera Mubashir (Qatari news agency),24 March 2024. https://www.aljazeeramubasher.net/opinions/2024/3/24/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%A8%D9%80%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%AC%D9%84

The meeting did not appear in international newspapers, and some news sites covered it hastily, quoting an official statement issued by “Hamas.” We did not find an echo of it in the Chinese media, except for one sentence, which was reported by the “Xinhua” agency and the websites of the Chinese embassy in Egypt and Qatar…

Beijing includes “Hamas” on the list of extremist Islamic groups, like the ones it is pursuing in northwest China on charges of “terrorism” and inciting Muslim Uyghurs, Kazaks, and Uzbeks to secede. It does not classify Hamas as a terrorist group, as the United States and its allies do, to avoid being drawn in by the West into problems that it does not need, in a region that is witnessing constant political and security fluctuations, which it will not be able to resolve….

China’s fears of “Hamas” come against the backdrop of strong ideological hostility from the ruling Communist Party, which rejects citizens’ adoption of any religious or political belief other than what the party adopts, under the pretext of protecting the nation-state…

[Chinese diplomat] Wang Kejian lived through the Arab Spring revolutions and knows a lot about the Islamic and tribal movements in the region. He exchanged books with us and talked a lot about them. He has a good understanding of “Hamas” as a national liberation movement…

Notes:

[i] See: “China’s Game in Gaza,” Foreign Affairs,8 January 2024. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-game-gaza

[ii] China’s ambassador to Qatar met with Haniyeh in late February 2024, in a meeting reported by Hamas but never officially confirmed by the Chinese government. See: “Hamas Leader Ismail Haniyeh Meets With Chinese Ambassador To Qatar,” MEMRI (The Middle East Media Research Institute),29 February 2024. https://www.memri.org/reports/hamas-leader-ismail-haniyeh-meets-chinese-ambassador-qatar

[iii] For more details see: “Chinese envoy meets Hamas chief Haniyeh after first visit to Israel since Gaza war began,” CNN, 19 March 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/19/china/chinese-envoy-hamas-meeting-israel-intl-hnk/index.html “China’s Middle East diplomat meets Hamas’ Haniyeh in Qatar,” al-Monitor,19 March 2024. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/03/chinas-middle-east-diplomat-meets-hamas-haniyeh-qatar “Three reasons behind rare China-Hamas meeting in Qatar,” al-Monitor, 22 March 2024. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/03/three-reasons-behind-rare-china-hamas-meeting-qatar

[iv] Alongside Hamas, the Qatari government was among the few Arab critics of China’s Xinjiang policies. Beginning in 2022, however, Qatar ceased to publicly oppose these policies. See: “Activists hail Qatar withdrawal from pro-China text over Uighurs,” al-Jazeera,21 August 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/21/activists-hail-qatar-withdrawal-from-pro-china-text-over-uighurs “U.N. body rejects debate on China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims in blow to West,” Reuters,6 October 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/un-body-rejects-historic-debate-chinas-human-rights-record-2022-10-06/ “U.N. body rejects debate on China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims in blow to West,” Chinese Embassy in Qatar,25 December 2022. http://qa.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zkgx/202212/t20221225_10994873.htm

Gaza War’s Impact On The Middle East Strategic Landscape (Lucas Winter)(June 2024)

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(Click image to download brief.)

Key Takeaways:

  • Three de facto strategic coalitions dominate the contemporary Middle East geopolitical landscape: the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance,” the Turkish-led “Political Islam Coalition,” and the U.S.-led “Arab Normalization” Coalition, anchored by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Hamas fits uneasily between the Axis of Resistance and Political Islam Coalitions, receiving tepid support from both but fully trusted by neither. The Arab Normalization Coalition does not support Hamas.
  • Members of the three de facto strategic coalitions responded differently to Hamas’ 7 October attacks and their aftermath: “Axis of Resistance” members contributed calculated, largely symbolic military support; the Political Islam Coalition supported Hamas in media and diplomacy; and the Arab Normalization Coalition sought to maintain a neutral distance from the war in Gaza.
  • Prior to 7 October, the Middle East was in the midst of a new era of regional détente, in which members of the different de facto strategic coalitions were re-engaging and de escalating their conflicts. The War in Gaza shifted the regional strategic calculus in ways that are not yet clear. Three scenarios are presented for how these changes may occur, and how China and Russia may seek to benefit from them. The first scenario involves increased Turkish-Iranian policy convergence, the second a deepening of Turkish-Egyptian relations, and the third a “grand bargain” that includes Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey. Russia is more likely to benefit from the first two scenarios, while China is likely to benefit most from the third.

Hamas and Houthis Target Youth as New “Islamic Resistance” Movement Emerges

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Hamas supporters in Gaza, including families and children, attending the 25th anniversary of the movement’s founding, December 2012.

“Houthi vehicles carrying slogans of supporting Gaza roam the villages with forms to register children and youth into these training courses.”

Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen, both of whom have seen their popularity grow since 7 October, are capitalizing on conflict in Gaza to recruit new generations of young men into their culture of “Islamic Resistance.”[i] According to the first accompanying excerpt from an op-ed published recently in the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed, Hamas’s prior youth training efforts have been critical to its ability to withstand the Israeli campaign. The author mentions the “Futawwa” (youth) training program, which allowed Hamas to spread its “resistance” ideology across Gaza throughout the 2010s.[ii] The second and third accompanying excerpts, from the prominent Saudi dailies al-Sharq al-Awsat and al-Watan, respectively, illustrate how both Hamas and the Houthis have used their growing popularity since 7 October to launch recruitment campaigns, especially targeting the youth. Youth indoctrination is critical for both groups, and both have put substantial efforts into it over the past decade.[iii] The Houthi Movement and Hamas in Gaza share much in common. They are both mobilized movements with Islamic ideological underpinnings that act as de facto governments in their respective regions despite not formally being recognized as such by the international community. The key difference between them is doctrinal—the former are adherents of the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam while the latter is a Sunni, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movement. For both groups, though, “the culture of resistance” is a critical component that arguably supersedes sectarian differences. Perhaps to a greater degree than previously, a focus on sectarian differences seems secondary and increasingly irrelevant in the current context. Instead, Hamas and the Houthis—alongside Shia-majority Lebanese Hezbollah and the “Islamic Resistance of Iraq”—may coalesce into a transnational, cross-sectarian “Islamic Resistance” movement that should be thought of as distinct from the 2010s, Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.”[iv] Both on the Sunni and the Shia side, the new generation of fighters coming of age in the shadow of conflict in Gaza will presumably be less interested in sectarian differences or other intra-Islam disputes than in the fight against Israel.

Sources:

“How and why has Gaza held out?” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily) https://www.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/كيف-صمدت-غزّة-ولماذا

What is the secret of this resilience? … After the attempted coup against the Hamas government and the separation of Gaza from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip fell under a tight siege, and the local “Gaza Authority” found itself under a unique state of “independence.” It was able to make whatever decisions it wanted regarding its society, especially in the fields of education and curriculum making… Specifically, the Hamas Authority introduced the “Futawwa” program into the curricula of its schools, aiming to train students specifically in weapons use and field skills.

“Hamas seeks to exploit the Gaza war in the Lebanese camps,” al-Sharq al-Awsat (prominent Saudi daily), 4 December 2023. https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/4708376-%C2%AB%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%C2%BB-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AB%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86

On Monday, the Lebanese branch of the Hamas movement announced the establishment of the “Vanguards of the Al-Aqsa Flood.” This is an organization with military dimensions, as the statement suggested…

In a statement, the movement called on “young and heroic men” to join the “vanguard of the resistance.” The movement’s sources explained that “this project is linked to Lebanon and does not aim exclusively to gather more fighters, but rather to include more individuals in Hamas who are active in more than one sector.” A statement issued by the movement linked the establishment of these vanguards to “affirming the role of the Palestinian people, wherever they are, in resisting the occupation by all available and legitimate means,” and to “complementing what Operation Al-Aqsa Flood achieved, and benefiting from scientific and artistic energies and capabilities.”

“Houthis recruit children through seminars on war in Gaza,” al-Watan (prominent Saudi daily), 18 November 2023. https://www.alwatan.com.sa/article/1137388

A Yemeni source in Sanaa said that the most rejoicing over what is happening in Gaza is among the Houthi militias, who rose up directly to restore their dilapidated ranks and support their disintegrating fronts… The source stated that Houthi vehicles carrying slogans of supporting Gaza roam the villages with forms to register children and youth into these training courses, a method that does not differ from previous methods of recruitment. However, the Houthis have developed new tricks to entice children and youth to enroll in these malicious courses. This includes sending young graduates to the streets to talk about their participation in previous courses, graduating them without any assignments, and giving them monthly salarie

Notes:

[i] Several opinion polls confirm these groups’ rising popularity, including:

“Wide public support for Hamas’ offensive on October the 7th, but the vast majority denies that Hamas has committed atrocities against Israeli civilians,” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 13 December 2023. https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/963

“How the Israel-Hamas War in Gaza Is Changing Arab Views,” Arab Barometer, 14 December 2023. https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/how-the-israel-hamas-war-in-gaza-is-changing-arab-views/; 

“New Poll Sheds Light on Saudi Views of Israel-Hamas War,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21 December 2023. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-poll-sheds-light-saudi-views-israel-hamas-war;  “Arab Public Opinion about the Israeli War on Gaza,” Doha Institute, 10 January 2024. https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/arab-opinion-war-on-gaza-press-release-en.pdf

[ii] Much has been written on the program over the past decade. See for instance: “Gaza teens graduate from Hamas military school,” Ynet News, 24 January 2013. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4336807,00.html

and “Training Fighters of Future Across Gaza,” New York Times, 14 January 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/world/middleeast/training-fighters-of-future-across-gaza.html

[iii] For more on Hamas youth recruitment, see: “The Road to October 7: Hamas’ Long Game, Clarified,” CTC Sentinel, October/November 2023. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-road-to-october-7-hamas-long-game-clarified/; For the Houthis, see: “Yemen: Houthis Recruit More Child Soldiers Since October 7,” Human Rights Watch, 13 February 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/13/yemen-houthis-recruit-more-child-soldiers-october-7

[iv] The idea of an “Islamic Resistance” axis is not new. However, it bears distinguishing the emergent post-7 October Islamic Resistance from the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.” The latter coalesced in the early 2010s, during the fight against ISIS and in support of the Syrian regime, and at a time when Hamas was estranged from Iran and its proxies. As such, the Axis of Resistance emerged as a primarily Shia organization focused on countering Sunni extremism in Syria and Iraq (or, for the Houthis, fighting against Saudi Arabia and its Yemeni allies). Israel remained part of the discourse, but it was not the axis’s primary focus.

Image Information:

Image: Hamas supporters in Gaza, including families and children, attending the 25th anniversary of the movement’s founding, December 2012.
Source: https://media.farsnews.ir/Uploaded/Files/Images/1391/09/18/13910918213433966_PhotoL.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Inaction on Gaza Underscores “Arab Street’s” Presumed Powerlessness

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Jordan map showing major cities as well as parts of surrounding countries.

“Gaza not only exposed the failure of the Arab and Islamic regimes in its historical test, but also exposed the silent failure of their peoples, revealed their deteriorating reality, and their weak and shameful positions, and carried the corpse of Arabism to its final resting place.”

“The Arab Street”—a broad term referring to Arab civil society sentiment—is strongly and uniformly opposed to Israeli actions in Gaza, according to several reputable opinion polls.[i] Yet, there has been little to no domestic popular pressure on Arab governments to take meaningful steps to curtail the Israeli campaign.[ii] The first two accompanying excerpts, from the pro-Palestinian daily al-Quds al-Arabi and the pro-Palestinian news website al-Rai al-Yaum, illustrate a perspective that considers the Palestine issue as primarily an Arab—rather than Muslim or nationalist—affair. By this view, the lack of Arab support for Palestine is a simultaneous indictment of Arab governments and the Arab public, both of which are seen as weak and powerless. This state of affairs, one of the authors remarks, has had the effect of “[carrying] the corpse of Arabism to its final resting place.” The assumed powerlessness of Arab citizens and their governments notwithstanding, the “Arab Street” is nevertheless seething. Scenes from Gaza continue flooding traditional and social media, broadcasting what the third accompanying excerpt, also from al-Quds al-Arabi, describes as “a live, terrible, and heartbreaking picture.” Arab governments’ denunciations and symbolic actions against Israel have not turned the Arab public’s focus away from Gaza, which remains a topic of daily discussion. Among Arab governments, Jordan is arguably the most vulnerable to popular pressure due to its large Palestinian population and shared border with the West Bank. The fourth accompanying article, from the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, explains in detail the balancing act played by the Jordanian government, which is seeking to placate popular pressure to push back against Israel without enflaming the situation or otherwise “[raising] the ambitions of the angry street.” There is no indication that Gaza will fade from the center of Arab public discourse anytime soon. The relative quiescence of Arab publics and governments vis-à-vis the conflict, therefore, should not obscure the continued pressures that are building on both to take meaningful action as the conflict in Gaza drags on.

Sources:

العدوان على غزة وغياب الصوت العربي الرسمي “The aggression against Gaza and the absence of an official Arab voice,” al-Quds (pro-Palestinian daily), 26 January 2024. https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1

There is no significant influence of Arab activity on the aggression and other things taking place in Gaza…

The Arab Street does not know how this issue is being discussed between Arab leaders and officials, with their counterparts in the world or among themselves, other than what their media circulates about rejection, denunciation, and repudiations, or descriptions of international impotence without holding themselves accountable for this impotence …

Officially, all Arabs reject the aggression that Gaza is being subjected to, and everyone rejects the occupation’s plans, from destruction to displacement to killing. However, the Palestinians have not witnessed any Arab actions to prevent these plans from occurring…

غزة تشيع الشارع العربي إلى مثواه الأخير “Gaza brings the Arab street to its final resting place,” Rai al-Youm (Pro-Palestinian news website), 8 December 2023. https://www.raialyoum.com/%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D9%8A/

Gaza not only exposed the failure of the Arab and Islamic regimes in its historical test, but also exposed the silent failure of their peoples, revealed their deteriorating reality, and their weak and shameful positions, and carried the corpse of Arabism to its final resting place.

غزة تمثل مأزقا للنظام العربي وسط تململ الشارع الغاضب واحتمالات عودة الإسلاميين “Gaza represents a dilemma for the Arab regime amid the angry street restlessness and the possibilities of the return of the Islamists,” al-Quds (pro-Palestinian daily), 2 December 2023. https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AB%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84/

But the greatest repercussions of the Gaza war are brewing in Arab countries whose screens have not stopped broadcasting a live, terrible and heartbreaking picture of what is happening in the Gaza Strip. The plight of the Palestinians has become part of dialogues on social media platforms and meetings over dinner and in the workplace. This all despite the efforts made by Arab countries to denounce what Israel is doing in Gaza and show political, diplomatic and humanitarian support for the Palestinians in the form of relief convoys, field hospitals, and tolerance for protests. However, the Arab street is seething with anger at the situation, and sometimes uses demonstrations of solidarity with the Palestinians, as it has in the past, to express grievances against the ruling regimes.

الغضب الشعبي والرسمي يكشف مخاوف الأردنيين “Popular and official anger reveal Jordanian fears,” al-Sharq al-Awsat (Saudi daily), 1 December 2023. https://aawsat.com/%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%82/%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B9/4702941-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%B6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86

The inevitability of the intensification of the war on Gaza, and the possibilities of expanding the scope of the current conflict in the Palestinian territories to the West Bank, are real Jordanian fears that are revealed with daily developments…

Indeed, analysts do not disagree that there is a sharp division among the official elites in their assessment of the situation. There are fears that the statements of Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi will raise the ambitions of the angry street, especially after he described the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty law as “a document on a shelf with dust” …

On the other hand, traditional elites called for “early recognition of an imminent danger.” The statements of former representatives and ministers Mamdouh Al-Abadi and Samir Al-Habashna and academic Sabri Rabihat received wide popular acceptance when they called on various occasions to “arm the Jordanian people” and prepare public opinion “for a possible military confrontation with Israel, which does not adhere to the values of the peace treaty with Jordan, and is even trying to tamper with it” …

An unknown future awaits Amman on its western border with the occupying state…

Notes:

[i] These polls also generally express strong disapproval of U.S. support for Israel and general approval of the actions of Iran-backed “Resistance Axis” members in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. The polls include:

“Wide public support for Hamas’ offensive on October the 7th, but the vast majority denies that Hamas has committed atrocities against Israeli civilians,” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 13 December 2023. https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/963

“How the Israel-Hamas War in Gaza Is Changing Arab Views,” Arab Barometer, 14 December 2023. https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/how-the-israel-hamas-war-in-gaza-is-changing-arab-views/ 

“New Poll Sheds Light on Saudi Views of Israel-Hamas War,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21 December 2023. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-poll-sheds-light-saudi-views-israel-hamas-war

“Arab Public Opinion about the Israeli War on Gaza,” Doha Institute, 10 January 2024. https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/arab-opinion-war-on-gaza-press-release-en.pdf

[ii] Some protests have occurred in Arabic-speaking countries, but none has been significant or created any meaningful pressures on governments. For Palestinian support in North Africa see: Jason Warner, “North African Wave of Support for Palestinians at Onset of Israel-Hamas War,” OE Watch, 01-2024.  https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/north-african-wave-of-support-for-palestinians-at-onset-of-israel-hamas-war/

Image Information:

Image: Jordan map showing major cities as well as parts of surrounding countries.
Source: https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/jordan/map
Attribution: Public Domain

Iraqi Shia Militia Attacks Create Atmosphere of Uncertainty

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Photo of Al-Nujaba Movement forces (from PMF) in the Makhul Mountains of Salah al-Din province, one kilometer from the ISIL Front, 6 July 2016.

“Anxiety is rising in Iraq in general… [prompting] the faction leaders to change their tactics and movements and attempt to take stricter security measures to avoid being targeted by America.…”

Strikes and counterstrikes involving U.S. forces and so-called Iraqi “Islamic Resistance” factions of Shia militias may lead militant leaders to seek cover with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in ways that would likely strain U.S.-ISF relations. The first accompanying report, from the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed, claims that Islamic Resistance factions are seeking to safeguard their weapons from U.S. strikes by transferring them to ISF bases under Iraqi Defense Ministry control. The Islamic Resistance is a branding name used by various Iran-led militant Shia Iraqi groups, most prominently Kataib Hezbollah (KH) and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HAN).[i] These militias exert substantial influence in Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which are an appendage of the ISF akin to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[ii] As PMF units, the Islamic Resistance factions are part of the Iraqi state, but their interests and actions are rarely aligned or coordinated with those of the State apparatus writ large. Since the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel, the Islamic Resistance has conducted regular attacks on U.S. positions in Syria and Iraq. The attacks escalated in late January 2024, when an unmanned aerial vehicle attributed to KH killed three U.S. Army soldiers stationed in Jordan. In response, U.S. forces killed Abu Baqir al-Saadi, a KH official involved in planning the attacks. The strike followed an earlier one targeting a HAN leader. Both strikes occurred in Baghdad, prompting Iraqi government officials to publicly denounce them as violations of national sovereignty. Islamic Resistance and other Iraqi Shia militias in turn intensified pressure on their government to negotiate a withdrawal of U.S. troops and launch an investigation into the targeted killings. As reported in the second accompanying article, also from al-Araby al-Jadeed, KH also launched an investigation aimed at identifying and rooting out U.S. collaborators within the Islamic Resistance. As noted in the third accompanying article, from the pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, the Islamic Resistance’s attacks and threats may be used to sow distrust between the United Stats and ISF partner forces. The escalatory tit-for-tat between the Islamic Resistance and U.S. forces is ushering in an atmosphere of increasing uncertainty and distrust in Iraq, further complicating what is already a tangled and potentially volatile security environment.

Sources:

العراق: فصائل مسلحة تضغط لنقل مستودعات أسلحتها إلى قواعد الجيش لتجنّب القصف الأميركي

“Iraq: Armed factions are pressing to transfer their weapons depots to army bases to avoid American bombing,” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 6 January 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B6%D8%BA%D8%B7-%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4

Today, Sunday, Iraqi security sources in Baghdad revealed to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense was under pressure to transfer ammunition depots belonging to armed factions to Iraqi army bases and camps to prevent them from being targeted in the future by American aircraft.

العراق: تحقيقات سرية بحثاً عن “متعاونين” مع واشنطن بتنفيذ عمليات الاغتيال “Iraq: Secret investigations in search of “collaborators” with Washington in carrying out the assassination operations,” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 11 February 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B0-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA

The source told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, on condition that his name not be mentioned, that “the accuracy of choosing the targets and the accuracy of carrying out the assassination operations indicated the presence of a dangerous infiltration and collaborators who provided accurate information to Washington to carry out its strikes”… 

Anxiety is rising in Iraq in general, and among the factions in particular, which fear assassinations and other strikes that may be carried out by the United States of America, whose drones roam the skies of Baghdad on an almost daily basis. This has prompted the faction leaders to change their tactics and movements and attempt to take stricter security measures to avoid being targeted by America.

عزل أميركي للعراقيين خشية «الاختراق»: المقاومة تضمّ «السفارة» إلى بنك الأهداف “American isolation of the Iraqis for fear of ‘infiltration’: The resistance includes the ‘embassy’ in the target bank,” al-Akhbar (pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily), 9 February 2024. https://al-akhbar.com/Palestine/374023

…an Iraqi military official from the security crews residing inside the Ain al-Assad base (west of Baghdad), in an interview with Al-Akhbar, recounts his observations. Since the beginning of the base being subjected to missile strikes, he said, “The American forces have dealt with us with constant caution, and have their own security protocol in terms of inspecting all those entering and leaving the base. But after the recent attacks, it increased its measures in a way that we did not witness even two years ago, when Iran bombed the base with a large number of ballistic missiles”…

He explains that “the American side deals with the Iraqi side with suspicion in terms of exchanging information, for fear of it being leaked to parties linked to the armed factions.” 

Notes:

[i] Of the two, HAN has been by far the most hardline and active member of the “Islamic Resistance” since 7 October. See: “Who Are Nujaba and Why Did the U.S. Just Strike Them?” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 4 January 2024. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-are-nujaba-and-why-did-us-just-strike-them In late January, KH vowed to suspend attacks against the United States. HAN, in contrast, vowed to continue its attacks. See: “Explaining Apparent Muqawama De-Escalation Since January 28,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7 February 2024. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/explaining-apparent-muqawama-de-escalation-january-28

[ii] “KH operates the state-funded 45th, 46th, and 47th Brigades of the PMF. Chain of command nominally runs through the KH-dominated Popular Mobilization Committee in the Prime Minister’s Office. In practice, KH’s PMF brigades frequently disobey the government chain of command while legally remaining organs of the Iraqi state.” See: “Profile: Kataib Hezbollah,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 April 2021. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-kataib-hezbollah

For an up-to-date overview on Iraq’s militia landscape, see: “Iraq’s New Regime Change: How Tehran-Backed

Terrorist Organizations and Militias Captured the Iraqi State,” CTC Sentinel, December 2023. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/iraqs-new-regime-change-how-tehran-backed-terrorist-organizations-and-militias-captured-the-iraqi-state/

Image Information:

Image:  Photo of Al-Nujaba Movement forces (from PMF) in the Makhul Mountains of Salah al-Din province, one kilometer from the ISIL Front, 6 July 2016.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Harakat_Hezbollah_al-Nujaba_in_2016_(24).jpg
Attribution: Fars Media Corporation, CC BY 4.0

Jordan Alarmed by Escalation in Syrian Smuggling Tactics

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Syria map showing major cities as well as parts of surrounding countries and the Mediterranean Sea.

“What were initially infiltration and smuggling attempts have evolved into full-fledged armed clashes, with the explicit objective of forcibly crossing the border by targeting Jordanian border guard forces.”

Jordanian authorities are signaling growing alarm over the willingness of smugglers from Syria to use armed force to circumvent tightened Jordanian border security. This comes at a delicate moment for the kingdom due to Israel’s campaign in Gaza, given Jordan’s large Palestinian population and concerns that Jordan could become a conduit for weapons to be smuggled into the West Bank. Smuggling has long been an economic mainstay for communities along the Syria-Jordan border, especially after the Syrian government lost control of key border crossings during the Syrian civil war. Since then, smuggling across the border has become increasingly institutionalized and largely controlled by networks within the Syrian Army’s 4th Division, many of them linked to Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah. Concerns that potentially hostile armed groups control smuggling routes from Syria has led Jordan to tighten security across the shared border, in turn leading smugglers to seek new ways to circumvent border security. Recent reports and statements suggest that smuggling networks in Syria are increasingly willing to use force to get across the increasingly monitored border.

The first accompanying excerpt, from the Syrian opposition news website alsouria.net, explains how small-scale smuggling has “evolved into full-fledged armed clashes, with the explicit objective of forcibly crossing the border by targeting Jordanian border guard forces.” The article adds that Jordanian authorities are concerned about weapons being smuggled into the kingdom. Particularly noteworthy was a mid-December firefight in which a Jordanian border guard was killed, weapons were seized, and an airstrike took place on a purported smuggling safehouse inside Syrian territory, attributed to but not claimed by the Jordanian military. The second excerpt, also from alsouria.net, details the handful of weapons seized during the incident—a handful of rocket propelled grenades, mines, and sniper rifles. Although troubling from a Jordanian perspective, the small number of weapons were likely not part of the primary cargo being smuggled, but rather used by smugglers to force their way across the border. Instead, as the excerpt notes, the primary cargo was hashish and five million Captagon pills, likely destined for Saudi Arabia. The production and export of Captagon, a synthetic amphetamine-like substance—produced in Lebanon and Syria and consumed heavily in Gulf countries—has become a key part of Syria’s wartime economy.[i] The third accompanying excerpt, from the English-language Arab Weekly, claims that Jordan is inflating the threat from smugglers to “secure assistance and stronger cooperation” from Gulf countries, most prominently Saudi Arabia, the destination for much of the contraband. If evidence emerges that weapons are being smuggled across the border, concerns that these weapons could end up in the hands of Shia groups in Saudi Arabia would likely elicit a response from Riyadh. Smuggling along the Syria-Jordan border peaks in the cold winter months, due to the dense fog that often envelops the area at night, hampering visibility for those seeking to curb smugglers. While the seasonal uptick is expected, the increasing willingness of smugglers to engage in firefights with Jordanian border guards is concerning. The failure of increased Jordanian border security measures is a latent concern for Amman. Given that Iran and Hezbollah exert substantial influence over smuggling networks in Syria, the Syria-Jordan border may well become an additional regional flashpoint.

Sources:

“Syrian-Jordanian Border Battle Ends With Airstrikes, Amman Hints at Iran’s Involvement,” alsouria.net (Syrian opposition news website) via The Syrian Observer (Syrian news aggregator), 20 December 2023. https://syrianobserver.com/news/86785/syrian-jordanian-border-battle-ends-with-airstrikes-amman-hints-at-irans-involvement.html

What were initially infiltration and smuggling attempts have evolved into full-fledged armed clashes, with the explicit objective of forcibly crossing the border by targeting Jordanian border guard forces…

This form of military operations and clashes underscores the significant challenges confronting Jordan due to the Syrian regime and the escalating influence of Iran and Hezbollah in Syria. Despite the security measures and military tightening implemented by Amman along the Syrian-Jordanian border, smuggling operations have not only persisted but have also intensified. A particularly alarming security threat arising from these clashes is the initiation of arms and rocket smuggling operations, underscoring the extent of Iranian pressure on Jordan.

“حرب وقتلى” على الحدود السورية الأردنية..رسائل وتحذيرات وخيارات مفتوحة

“‘War and death’ on the Syrian-Jordanian border… messages, warnings, and open options,” alsouria.net (Syrian opposition news website), 19 December 2023.

“حرب وقتلى” على الحدود السورية الأردنية..رسائل وتحذيرات وخيارات مفتوحة

The Jordanian army seized about five million Captagon pills and about 13,000 hashish palms, in addition to 4 Rocket Launcher missiles, 4 RPG missiles, 10 anti-personnel mines, a G3 sniper rifle, and a M-16 type rifle equipped with a sniper scope.

“Is Jordan inflating smugglers’ threat on border with Syria?” The Arab Weekly (London-based Arabic-language weekly), 19 December 2023. https://thearabweekly.com/jordan-inflating-smugglers-threat-border-syria Observers believe however that Jordan is exaggerating the developments in the border region, pointing out that the phenomenon of active gangs is not new and that most countries suffer from it. Jordan is not an exception, especially since the neighbouring country, Syria, is gripped by security chaos, observers told The Arab Weekly. They suggest the exaggeration may be related to Jordan’s desire to present itself regionally, especially to the Arab Gulf countries, as the first line of defence for regional security. The aim, according to observers, is to secure assistance and stronger cooperation.

Notes:

[i] For more on the Captagon trade, see: Lucas Winter, “Pharmaceutical Drugs and the Syrian War,” OE Watch, December 2015. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195975 and Lucas Winter, “Syria Becoming Center of Illicit Drug Production and Export to Europe and Arabian Peninsula,” OE Watch, January 2021. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-21393-00-00-00-38-05-55/2021_2D00_01_2D00_01-Syria-Becoming-Center-of-Illicit-Drug-Production-_2800_Winter_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true

Image Information:

Image:  Syria map showing major cities as well as parts of surrounding countries and the Mediterranean Sea.
Source: CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/syria/map Attribution: Public Domain