A boat next to a large Russian oil platform, taken in July 2017.

“[The US Administration’s decision to impose restrictive measures against Russian energy sector…] is an attempt to inflict at least some damage on the Russian economy even at the cost of destabilizing global markets ahead of the end of the inglorious term of President Joe Biden.”

After the rollout of new energy sector sanctions in January by the United States and United Kingdom, Russia’s Foreign Ministry responded with a mix of indifference and promises of retaliation for the punitive measure. The sanctions target some 200 entities and individuals in Russia, including senior energy officials, and are meant to curb liquefied natural gas projects and curtail the profits of service providers that support the country’s energy industry. This includes Moscow’s vast “shadow fleet” of vessels that ship oil around the world under third parties to avoid sanctions but have come under fire for allegedly carrying out acts of sabotage in the Baltic Sea.[i]

The reaction in Russia has been relative indifference as per the accompanying article from Russia’s official news agency, TASS. The article suggests that the sanctions would not impede Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine but that their effects could be “destabilizing” for global energy markets.[ii] Russia comprises roughly 11 percent of global crude oil production (approximately 10.75 million barrels per day (bpd)) and consumes only 3.68 million bpd. According to a statement by Russia’s Foreign Ministry, Moscow has promised retaliation. “Of course, Washington’s hostile actions will not be left without response and will be taken into consideration during the calculation of our external economic strategy. We will continue to implement the major projects on oil and gas extraction, as well as import replacement, provision of oil-related services, and construction of nuclear power plants in third countries.”

U.S. attempts to apply economic pressure against Russia in response to its war in Ukraine have not had the desired coercive effect, largely because Russia’s energy sector had been spared. Even previous measures, including the imposition of a $60-per-barrel price cap and targeted sanctions against financial institutions such as Gazprombank, did little to shrink Russia’s war chest.[iii]

Sources:

“Russian Foreign Ministry vows response to new US sanctions,” TASS (Russian state news agency), 11 January 2025. https://tass.com/politics/1897999

“Of course, Washington’s hostile actions will not be left without response and will be taken into consideration during the calculation of our external economic strategy,” the ministry said. “We will continue to implement the major projects on oil and gas extraction, as well as import replacement, provision of oil-related services and construction of nuclear power plants in third countries.”

The ministry pointed out that Russia has been and remains a key and reliable actor on the global fuel market, “despite the convulsions in the White House and the machinations of the Russophobic lobby in the West, which seeks to pull the global energy sector into the hybrid war, which the US has initiated against Russia.”

The ministry underscored that, amid the “failure of Washington’s bid on Moscow’s strategic defeat and sanctions pressure, which was supposed to undermine the Russian economy, which has not only survived by continues to develop despite the unprecedented external economic pressure, the efforts of the outgoing White House team aim to complicate or obstruct any bilateral economic ties, including for the American business.”

The ministry added that this process sacrifices interests of US’ European allies, who have to switch to the more expensive and irregular American deliveries, as well as interests of its own people, currently suffering from the massive wildfires in California, whose opinion regarding the fuel price hike, which remained relevant ahead of the elections, now can be completely ignored.

“Therefore, the upcoming president, who is unable to withdraw the abovementioned sanctions without the Congress’ approval, will inherit scorched earth – both literally and figuratively,” the ministry added.

Notes:

[i]  Jake Lapham, “US and UK toughen sanctions on Russian oil industry,” BBC News, 10 January 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn8xlj9kkkmo

[ii] Illya Tsukanov, “US Anti-Russian Energy Sanctions Threaten to Destabilize Global Markets. Here’s How,” Sputnik International, 11 January 2025, https://sputnikglobe.com/20250111/latest-us-anti-russian-energy-sanctions-threaten-to-destabilize-global-markets-heres-how-1121409189.html

[iii]  According to analysis the latest energy sanctions, which target two of Russia’s largest oil companies, Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, and their subsidiaries, could have more of a desired punitive effect, given recent stresses within the Russian economy. See “Five questions (and expert answers) about Biden’s final round of sanctions on Russia,” New Atlanticist, 10 January 2025,  https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/five-questions-and-expert-answers-about-bidens-final-round-of-sanctions-on-russia/

Image Information:

Image: A boat next to a large Russian oil platform, taken in July 2017
Source: https://timelessmoon.getarchive.net/amp/media/russia-oil-platform-rig-travel-vacation-c8289c
Attribution: CC0 1.0 Universal

President Vladimir Putin visits Russian Special Forces University in Gudermes, Chechnya, in August 2024.

“A key mission for the VOIN is to provide so-called ‘patriotic education’ and combat training for teenage youngsters. The organization has centers in at least 12 regions, among them the two far northern regions of Murmansk and Yamal Nenets Autonomous Okrug.”

The Russian Spetsnaz University in Gudermes, Chechnya, has trained tens of thousands of soldiers from all over the Russian Federation since its establishment in 2013. Soldiers from the Kola peninsula, which borders Norway and is home to Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, are increasingly bringing the skills they pick up in the North Caucasus and applying them to operational environments in the Arctic, according to a recent report in Norway-based The Barents Observer.

Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Chechen Republic, enjoys close ties to the Kremlin. President Vladimir Putin visited Spetsnaz University last August. Kadyrov also exerts influence across Russia’s regions, including its north, through VOIN (“Fighter”), a training military organization with offices expanding across Russia, including in Murmansk and Yamal Nenets Autonomous Okrug in northwestern Siberia and central Russia. Part of VOIN’s mission is to provide “patriotic education” and combat training for Russian teenagers. The former head of Kadyrov’s security detail and combat veteran of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, Daniil Martynov,[i] heads up VOIN’s organizational development. Training conducted by Chechen commanders include drills in sharpshooting and drone flying.

While potentially symbolic of Russia shifting its focus northward, the significance of these reports is unclear. First, fighting in the Arctic does not resemble fighting in the Northern Caucasus, given its extreme climate conditions, poor infrastructure, and important naval components. It is unlikely that Chechen paramilitaries will be fighting in Norway or the Arctic. More intriguing is whether Chechen spetsnaz trainers will influence the “Arctic way of war” in Russia’s far north. Russia recently announced it will be adding up to 50,000 soldiers to its Leningrad Military District, as well as expanding Northern Fleet’s 14th Army Corps into a full Army and establishing a completely new Army Corps in Karelia.[ii]

Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Kadyrov’s militant network is expanding into the Russian north,” The Barents Observer, 7 January, 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/kadyrovs-militant-network-is-expanding-into-the-russian-north/422803

Reportedly, more than 47,000 servicemen have undergone training in Gudermes since 2022. Of them, about 19,000 are so-called volunteers. Among them is Sergei Rezantsev from the town of Olenegorsk in the Kola Peninsula. In December last year, the 43-year-old man was awarded a medal for so-called “bravery” during the war in Ukraine. In a ceremony in Olenegorsk, the local town mayor described Rezantsev as “a true role model for patriotism.” 

In the ceremony, the warrior carried a uniform with the insignia of the Spetsnaz University. Judging from Rezantsev’s social media page, he has long experience from several Russian military operations, including in the North Caucasus.

With the training of soldiers from all over Russia, Ramzan Kadyrov is gradually building a network that includes representatives from major parts of the country. In addition, Kadyrov and his men are also exerting growing influence and power across Russia through the VOIN (“Fighter”), a militant organization that is opening offices in a number of Russian regions.

Notes:

[i] Prior to his position at VOIN, Daniil Martynov was a combat leader of Chechen forces, often referred to as Kadyrovtsy, part of the initial invasion of Ukraine on 22 February 2022.

[ii] Thomas Nilsen, “Kola and in Karelia likely to get tens of thousands of new soldiers,” The Barents Observer, 24 January 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/kola-and-in-karelia-likely-to-get-tens-of-thousands-of-new-soldiers/423579

Image Information:

Image: President Vladimir Putin visits Russian Special Forces University in Gudermes, Chechnya, in August 2024.
Source: Kremlin.RU http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news
Attribution: Public Domain

The Polish-Belarusian border, photo taken on 11 November 2021.

“This is also a very important strategic document. Work on these two documents has been completed, and we plan, together with the Secretariat of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, to submit [them] for approval by the heads of our states at the Supreme State Council.”

Russia and Belarus have nearly finalized a “Treaty on Security Guarantees of the Union State,” according to an interview with Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic Alexander Wolfovich in Izvestia, a pro-Kremlin Russian newspaper. The document, which will be sent for ratification by the Supreme State Council in December, will replace the 1999 union concept. Belarus will receive substantial security guarantees, including the use of nuclear and conventional weapons, “due to external threats.”

The intention of the original treaty was to achieve a federation not unlike the Soviet Union, whereby Belarus and Russia would share a head of state, legislature, flag, currency, coat of arms, anthem, and other insignia of a unified state.[i] The full extent of the Union State never came to fruition, largely because both leaders of the federation, Presidents Boris Yeltsin (Russia) and Alexander Lukashenko (Belarus), quickly lost interest in the provisions of the treaty because both feared it would weaken their own power. Belarus suspended the customs union a few years later, and they never developed a common currency. 

The revised treaty comes amid heightened tensions along Belarus’ borders with Ukraine and Poland, due to a migrant crisis (involving asylum-seekers from the wider Middle East),[ii] nuclear drills conducted on Belarusian territory summer 2024,[iii] and rumors that Belarusian soldiers may be sent to fight in Ukraine.[iv] The security guarantees of the new document suggest that an attack against Belarus, conventional or otherwise, would be considered an attack against Russia.

Interestingly, the original intention of signing the 1999 treaty was economic, not security related. Back then, commercial and economic interests trumped security concerns.[v] Going back to the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has been Belarus’ largest economic and political partner. Vladimir Putin has sought greater integration of the two countries’ economies. As reported by Izvestia, trade between the two neighbors in the first half of 2024 ($25 billion) was up 6.4 percent from the same time last year, with some 133 investment projects underway in the fields of agriculture, energy, tourism, IT, medicine, and pharmaceuticals, according to Deputy Minister of Economic Development of Russia Dmitry Volvach. The revised treaty should strengthen economic integration and trade between the two neighbors.

More importantly, the revised Union State treaty signals greater security cooperation and guarantees between Minsk and Moscow. Belarus has long acted as a strategic buffer zone between Russia and NATO. Although President Alexander Lukashenko sought greater autonomy after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, a disputed election in 2020 and a popular uprising forced the Belarusian leader to seek greater integration with Russia. The revised Union State treaty will further isolate Belarus from Europe and make it more dependent on Russia for its security, both internal and external. While the long-term consequences of the revised Union State remain uncertain, given that Russia and Belarus have both sought to maintain their post-Soviet era borders and independence, greater military cooperation between Belarus and Russia is expected, including closer economic and potential territorial integration and even Belarus playing a larger role in the war in Ukraine, beyond just hosting Russian nuclear and military assets.

Sources:

Elizaveta Borisenko, “Взаимное действие: Москва и Минск подготовили договор о гарантиях безопасности (Union proposal: Moscow and Minsk strengthen cooperation against Western pressure),” Izvestia (a pro-Kremlin Russian newspaper), 11 November 2024. https://iz.ru/1787861/elizaveta-borisenko/vzaimnoe-deistvie-moskva-i-minsk-podgotovili-dogovor-o-garantiah-bezopasnosti

According to [Wolfovich], the provisions of the document will be published in the near future. The document will include the principle of the use of nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as other methods of protecting the Union State. “What our president recently said, what Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin recently said that, God forbid, there will be some aggressions towards the Republic of Belarus, is all true. If today it has the character of protecting the joint and protection of Belarus through the deployment of nuclear weapons on our territory, de facto in December, by the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on the establishment of the Union State, this treaty will already be legally signed,” Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov said earlier.

Russia previously decided to amend the nuclear doctrine, which was last updated in 2020. In particular, we are talking about the expansion of scenarios in which the Russian authorities reserve the right to use nuclear weapons. In the updated version of the document, aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state, but with the participation or support of nuclear, is proposed to be considered as their joint attack on the Russian Federation. In addition, there are provisions that concern Belarus.

“We reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in case of aggression against Russia and Belarus as a member of the Union State. All these issues have been agreed with the Belarusian side and the President of Belarus. Including if the enemy, using conventional weapons, creates a critical threat to our sovereignty,” Vladimir Putin said on September 25.

As for the new concept of the security of the Union State, which will replace the document adopted back in 1999, it will enshrine a provision on joint counteraction to the policies of the United States, unfriendly NATO states and the European Union to achieve strategic goals for mutually beneficial and equal international cooperation. Such strengthening of cooperation in the field of security is primarily related to the foreign policy situation, Dmitry Zhuravlev, scientific director of the Institute of Regional Problems, associate professor of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, tells Izvestia.

Notes:

[i] “The Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation signed the Union State Treaty on 8 December 1999,” Press Service of the President of the Republic of Belarus, https://president.gov.by/en/belarus/economics/economic-integration/union-state?TSPD_101_R0=08eaf62760ab20008e25be59f2426da6e735002c3eb769d3b553a73ed46fd82fa95c1f4983143a0a086c7a2488143000ed156aeeac2db1eb09822ff7aca3ea7bcda21c0e8cb9ef3c1a0b6b7c0271930783b0b327184c7aa97f0896aae08327fc

[ii] See: “Poland to temporarily suspend asylum rights amid Belarus border tensions,” Al-Jazeera, 12 October 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/12/poland-to-temporarily-suspend-asylum-rights-amid-belarus-border-tensions

[iii] See: “Belarus launches nuclear drills a day after Russia announces them amid tensions with West,” AP News, 7 May 2024. https://apnews.com/article/russia-belarus-nuclear-drills-ukraine-war-144422347bb168878cebc0b78071dd99

[iv] See: Mark Temnycky, “Will Belarus join North Korea in fighting Russia’s war?” The Hill, 17 November 2024. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4993006-ukraine-north-korean-fighting/

[v] For analysis, see Helene Alstad Dyndal, “The Union State of Russia and Belarus at the present stage,” Strategem, 11 April 2024 https://www.stratagem.no/the-union-state-of-russia-and-belarus-at-the-present-stage/

Image Information:

Image: The Polish-Belarusian border, photo taken on 11 November 2021.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/premierrp/51674607554
Attribution: Irek Dorozanski

An antiwar protest in central London on 12 March 2022.

“They need to provide all kinds of assistance and even more – both in terms of granting citizenship and in terms of legal protection from the persecution they have in European states, to build a system of constant communication with them, to provide work and so on.”

In October, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new decree pledging humanitarian support for “people who share our values.” The decree was short on specifics of what the support would entail, which values were taken into consideration, or who would be eligible for the assistance, but in a recent interview published by Russian news website Pravda, Dmitry Solonnikov, an influential political scientist and director of the Institute of Modern State Development, said the decree would apply to “all citizens of European states who have a positive attitude towards Russia and are often persecuted for it in their homeland.” The decree would also reportedly apply to people living in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Commentary on the new decree suggests it would chiefly be applied to migrant workers and others seeking Russian citizenship.

The new decree comes at a time of heightened awareness within Russian society—and the halls of power—of criticisms against the country. Russia’s State Duma just approved a bill, first proposed last summer, that would criminalize foreigners accused of “acts of Russophobia.”[i] The Ministry of Internal Affairs defines Russophobia as “a prejudiced, hostile attitude towards Russian citizens, the Russian language, and culture, expressed, among other things,” through the attitudes of individuals, groups, or “unfriendly” states. The bill also establishes “legal norms, legal decisions” regarding “criminal liability” for acts of Russophobia exhibited by Russian officials, citizens, or nationals living across the post-Soviet space.

The latest raft of bills seeking to criminalize anti-Russia attitudes and incentivize greater support for the Kremlin could be an indicator of concerns within Moscow that Russia is facing greater isolation internationally. The recent moves may also be a reflection of growing anti-Kremlin sentiments in Russia and the former Soviet Union, primarily on account of Russia’s stalled special military operation in Ukraine. The new laws could have implications for the millions of migrants currently seeking Russian citizenship, as now they must register for military registration or risk having their application—or citizenship—revoked.[ii]

Sources:

Dmitry Plotnikov, “Собрать адекватных в стране. Для кого новый указ Путина по поддержке разделяющих ценности РФ” (“To Gather Greater Support in Country, Putin’s Signs New Decree to Support Those Who Share Values of the Russian Federation”), Pravda (Russian news website—formerly the official press organ of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party), 19 August 2024. https://www.pravda.ru/politics/2084910-putin-podpisal-ukaz/  

If for their [pro-Russia] views, or their point of view, people suffer from the pressure of political circles in Europe, the United States, then we should support them, probably since they are our workers. But it is not limited only to Europe. Of course, we need to talk about citizens of all countries, both in Asia and in the ‘new world,’ no matter in Latin or North America. Therefore, there is no need to single out someone. These can be both citizens from far afield and citizens of the former Soviet Union.

We help citizens from the Baltic States, former republics of the USSR who treat us positively. And if these are citizens in distant Chile or in distant Venezuela, in Colombia, it’s quite different. We’re talking about everyone.

We are building special relations with Asian countries. Russia talks about a turn to the East, as well as the fact that our main allies are now in Asia. And secondly, the African strategy of the Russian Federation is one of the most important key tasks of the foreign policy course of our country. A year ago, the second ‘Russia-Africa’ Forum was held. And we are talking about the fact that we are actively entering the African continent.

Therefore, of course, we must build relationships with them. The question is not where these citizens came from. Yes, the question is that … [we should] let everyone, anyone, come here to visit us and let’s report that we have accepted 10,000 such citizens, or 100,000 such citizens. It’s about who needs help in this situation, not where they will come from.

Notes:

[i] Konstantin Pakhalyuk, “What does the Kremlin Mean by ‘Russophobia’?” The Moscow Times (English language online newspaper in Russia previously based in Moscow), 11 October 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/10/11/what-does-the-kremlin-mean-by-russophobia-a86664

[ii] Dmitry Plotnikov, “Новый российский закон для мигрантов: не встал на воинский учёт — давай, до свидания! (“New Russian law for migrants: If you do not register for the military – good-bye!”),  Pravda (Russian news website—formerly the official press organ of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party), 9 August, 2024.
https://military.pravda.ru/2080796-voinskiiuchet/

Image Information:

Image: An antiwar protest in central London on 12 March 2022
Source: Alisdare Hickson, https://www.flickr.com/photos/alisdare/51937772099
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0

First meeting of the patriotic youth movement called Yunarmiya 2 June 2016.

“One of the areas of youth policy will be devoted to developing the readiness of young people to fulfill their constitutional duty to protect the Fatherland.”

The Russian State Duma announced on Telegram it will be transforming its Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, or Rosmolodyozh, into a larger body to strengthen and consolidate the country’s youth ideological education initiatives, from kindergarten to higher education. According to the excerpted 12 September post, the Duma introduced a draft law titled “On Systematizing the Sphere of Youth Policy” to instill “a willingness in young people to fulfill their constitutional duty to defend the Fatherland.” The restructuring may signal a need to whip up patriotism and pro-Kremlin ideology in younger generations, as the Kremlin looks to rally more support for its “special military operation” in Ukraine, especially after the Ukrainian Army’s incursion into Kursk and the potential use of longer-range missiles into Russian territory.

Modern Russian state support of youth movements has historical roots and contemporary benefits. The youth movements are a modern analog to the Soviet-era “pioneer camps” that indoctrinated young Russians with Leninist dogma. In recent years, a number of patriotic youth movements backed by the Ministry of Defense emerged to educate youth about Russian and Soviet history.[i] In Fall 2023, the Kremlin held a nationwide school lesson to teach children that Russian elections were free and fair.[ii]  Prior to that, in 2022, the Russian government launched an outfit called The Movement of the First, a pro-Kremlin youth movement aimed at “preparing children and youth for a full-fledged life in society, including shaping their world views on the basis of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” and instilling “love and respect for the Homeland.”[iii] The former head of this movement, Grigory Gurov, will lead the newly restructured Rosmolodyozh.[iv] The latest restructuring may indicate an unease among Russian leaders about the “forever war” in Ukraine and the need to recruit more young conscripts. The move could also signal flagging domestic support for the war. Surveys suggest that two out of three Russians support it,[v] yet these polls may not reflect the true sentiment of most Russians, including Russian youth.

Sources:

Artem Metelev (a member and spokesperson of the State Duma), post on Telegram (a social messaging app) from 2 September 2024. https://t.me/artemmetelev/7162

The special military operation and modern challenges make logical adjustments to the state youth policy. Patriotic education of youth has always been a priority. We propose to reflect new tasks and work tools in federal legislation.

After the adoption of our law this fall:

• Patriotic clubs, historical and local history and search organizations, specialized military-patriotic centers will receive priority support from the state;

• One of the areas of youth policy will be devoted to developing the readiness of young people to fulfill their constitutional duty to protect the Fatherland;

• The effectiveness of patriotic work will be analyzed as part of annual monitoring;

• A set of measures to educate youth in citizenship, patriotism, respect for history and readiness to serve their country will be approved at the federal and regional levels.

Notes:

[i] Evan Gershkovich, Russia’s Fast-Growing ‘Youth Army’ Aims to Breed Loyalty to Fatherland,” The Moscow Times, 17 April 2019. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/17/russias-fast-growing-youth-army-aimst-to-breed-loyalty-to-the-fatherland-a65256

[ii] Pyotr Kozlov, “As Putin’s Re-election Looms, Kremlin Pushes to Indoctrinate a New Generation of Voters,” The Moscow Times, 29 September 2023. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/09/29/as-putins-re-election-looms-kremlin-pushes-to-indoctrinate-a-new-generation-of-voters-a82580

[iii] Website of Movement of the First. http://wefirst.ru

[iv] Maxim Ivanov, Elena Mukhametshina, “Новым начальником Росмолодежи может стать глава «Движения первых» Григорий Гуров” (“The head of the ‘Movement of the First’ Grigory Gurov may become the new head of Rosmolodezh”), Vedemosti (Moscow-based business newspaper) 12 September 2024. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2024/09/12/1061695-novim-glavoi-rosmolodezhi-mozhet-stat-glava-dvizheniya-pervih

[v] Vladimir Milov, “How Strong is Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine?”Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert blog, 9 January 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-strong-is-russian-public-support-for-the-invasion-of-ukraine-2/

Image Information:

Image: First meeting of the patriotic youth movement called Yunarmiya 2 June 2016.
Source: Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, https://tinyurl.com/2×725577