Monthly Archives: January 2025

Gabon Shadow Tanker Fleet Transports Sanctioned Russian Oil

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Russia’s Sakhalin-1 oil project, one of many Russian oil facilities in the Arctic, extracts oil that is moved to international markets via an expansive shadow fleet of tankers.

“Since Moscow launched its war against Ukraine and the international community introduced sanctions against the Russian oil and gas industry, the small West African state [of Gabon] has offered shelter to a quickly expanding fleet of shadow vessels that carry sanctioned Russian oil.”

Despite international sanctions passed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian oil is still available on the international market. According to the excerpted article from Norwegian news site The Barents Observer, a Gabonese-registered shadow fleet is now moving Russian oil through the Arctic. Many of the ships flying Gabon’s standard are doing so under a flag of convenience or open registry. International law requires the registration of merchant ships in a host country. Ships registered in a different country than their ownership may fly the ensign, or flag, of the host country and abide by its laws. This flag of convenience, or open registry, may avoid the strict regulations of its home country, skirt safety standards, avoid taxes, or, in this case, provide political advantages. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Gabon has increased its ship registry by dozens, and that all of those newly registered ships are “engaged in shipments of sanctioned Russian oil,”[i] according to the article. The inability of the international community to police shadow fleets like Gabon’s will continue to weaken and ultimately render international sanctions against Russia ineffective. This situation will provide Russia with hard currency to fund its military operations in Ukraine and abroad, and stabilize its domestic economy during war.[ii]

Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Under flag of Gabon, tankers sail sanctioned Russian oil through Arctic ice”, The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 27 September 2024. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/under-flag-of-gabon-tankers-sail-sanctioned-russian-oil-through-arctic-ice/231598

The Sai Baba is sailing the Northern Sea Route from Murmansk to China and is part of a major Africa-registered shadow fleet that now operates in Russian Arctic waters.  Several more tankers are following in its wake.  The Sai Baba is believed to have loaded crude oil in Murmansk in mid-September. It subsequently set course for the Arctic route that connects the North Atlantic with the Pacific. On the 18th of September, the tanker was located near the Kola Bay. Nine days later, it was sailing through the Kara Sea, according to data from Russia’s Northern Sea Route Administration.

As it sails further east, the almost 20-year-old tanker with a deadweight of 158,889 tons will run into a major layer of multi-year sea-ice.  The sea-ice in the Chukchi Sea has troubled regional shipments this summer.  The Sai Baba is ice-class2.

The tanker carries the flag of Gabon and appears to be managed by a company from the United Arab Emirates.  Judging from the Northern Sea Route Administration, it has permission to sail without icebreaker escort in light sea-ice conditions during the period from 10th of September to 31st of October.

The 274-meter-long tanker was built in 2006 and used to operate under the name Cap Guillaume under a Belgian shipper.  It was sold in November 2022 and has since sailed under the name Sai Baba.  It is due to arrive in the Chinese port of Huizhou on October 15.

The Sai Baba  is not the only Gabon-registered tanker that now sails through the rough Arctic waters of the Northern Sea Route.  As it embarked on its Arctic voyage to China, two other Gabon-registered tankers were waiting in the waters outside Murmansk to be loaded.  The NS Nordic (Liberia) and SCF Baltika (Russian Sovcomflot) are likely to follow in the wake of the Sai Baba.  At the same time, the Moskovsky Prospect appears to be embarking on an East-West voyage on the route from India to Murmansk.  Also, the SCF Yenisey, the Suvorovsky Prospect and the Nanda Devi sailed on the Arctic route in late September.

Since Moscow launched its war against Ukraine and the international community introduced sanctions against the Russian oil and gas industry, the small West African state has offered shelter to a quickly expanding fleet of shadow vessels that carry sanctioned Russian oil.

The country that experienced a coup d’état in 2023 is today one of the Russian oil industry’s best friends.  In addition to the seven tankers that currently sail in Russian Arctic waters, dozens of more carriers have been listed in the Gabon ship registry over the last two years.  Among them are reportedly 50 ships owned by Sovcomflot.According to Lloyd’s List (behind paywall), the African nation has employed a private company based in the United Arab Emirates to run the registry.  Almost all the tonnage of the Gabon-registered ships are now engaged in shipments of sanctioned Russian oil.  In 2024, Gabon had the world’s quickest growing ship registry.

Notes:

[i] For a description of how Russia has regained its ability to drill for oil in spite of Western led international sanctions, see: Nidhi Verma, “Russia’s Sakhalin-1 near full oil output after Exxon exit,” Reuters, 9 January 2023. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-sakhalin-1-near-full-oil-output-after-exxon-exit-source-2023-01-09/

[ii] For a recent article regarding flow of and impacts of shadow fleets moving sanctioned oil around the world, see: Rebecca Tan, Pei-Lin Wu and Julia Ledur, “‘Dark’ tanker crash exposes dangers of China’s thirst for cheap oil,” The Washington Post, 2 September 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2024/china-da…F62dc0753ccfdb80ba057ddcf%2F11%2F38%2F66d5d9c2e3b3f24f5576e400

Image Information:

Image: Russia’s Sakhalin-1 oil project, one of many Russian oil facilities in the Arctic, extracts oil that is moved to international markets via an expansive shadow fleet of tankers.
Source: Politikparadox, https://politikparadox.blogspot.com/2014/10/russen-finden-ol-in-der-arktis.html
Attribution: Creative Commons

Russia Pledges To Boost Support Abroad and Criminalize Russophobia

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An antiwar protest in central London on 12 March 2022.

“They need to provide all kinds of assistance and even more – both in terms of granting citizenship and in terms of legal protection from the persecution they have in European states, to build a system of constant communication with them, to provide work and so on.”

In October, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new decree pledging humanitarian support for “people who share our values.” The decree was short on specifics of what the support would entail, which values were taken into consideration, or who would be eligible for the assistance, but in a recent interview published by Russian news website Pravda, Dmitry Solonnikov, an influential political scientist and director of the Institute of Modern State Development, said the decree would apply to “all citizens of European states who have a positive attitude towards Russia and are often persecuted for it in their homeland.” The decree would also reportedly apply to people living in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Commentary on the new decree suggests it would chiefly be applied to migrant workers and others seeking Russian citizenship.

The new decree comes at a time of heightened awareness within Russian society—and the halls of power—of criticisms against the country. Russia’s State Duma just approved a bill, first proposed last summer, that would criminalize foreigners accused of “acts of Russophobia.”[i] The Ministry of Internal Affairs defines Russophobia as “a prejudiced, hostile attitude towards Russian citizens, the Russian language, and culture, expressed, among other things,” through the attitudes of individuals, groups, or “unfriendly” states. The bill also establishes “legal norms, legal decisions” regarding “criminal liability” for acts of Russophobia exhibited by Russian officials, citizens, or nationals living across the post-Soviet space.

The latest raft of bills seeking to criminalize anti-Russia attitudes and incentivize greater support for the Kremlin could be an indicator of concerns within Moscow that Russia is facing greater isolation internationally. The recent moves may also be a reflection of growing anti-Kremlin sentiments in Russia and the former Soviet Union, primarily on account of Russia’s stalled special military operation in Ukraine. The new laws could have implications for the millions of migrants currently seeking Russian citizenship, as now they must register for military registration or risk having their application—or citizenship—revoked.[ii]

Sources:

Dmitry Plotnikov, “Собрать адекватных в стране. Для кого новый указ Путина по поддержке разделяющих ценности РФ” (“To Gather Greater Support in Country, Putin’s Signs New Decree to Support Those Who Share Values of the Russian Federation”), Pravda (Russian news website—formerly the official press organ of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party), 19 August 2024. https://www.pravda.ru/politics/2084910-putin-podpisal-ukaz/  

If for their [pro-Russia] views, or their point of view, people suffer from the pressure of political circles in Europe, the United States, then we should support them, probably since they are our workers. But it is not limited only to Europe. Of course, we need to talk about citizens of all countries, both in Asia and in the ‘new world,’ no matter in Latin or North America. Therefore, there is no need to single out someone. These can be both citizens from far afield and citizens of the former Soviet Union.

We help citizens from the Baltic States, former republics of the USSR who treat us positively. And if these are citizens in distant Chile or in distant Venezuela, in Colombia, it’s quite different. We’re talking about everyone.

We are building special relations with Asian countries. Russia talks about a turn to the East, as well as the fact that our main allies are now in Asia. And secondly, the African strategy of the Russian Federation is one of the most important key tasks of the foreign policy course of our country. A year ago, the second ‘Russia-Africa’ Forum was held. And we are talking about the fact that we are actively entering the African continent.

Therefore, of course, we must build relationships with them. The question is not where these citizens came from. Yes, the question is that … [we should] let everyone, anyone, come here to visit us and let’s report that we have accepted 10,000 such citizens, or 100,000 such citizens. It’s about who needs help in this situation, not where they will come from.

Notes:

[i] Konstantin Pakhalyuk, “What does the Kremlin Mean by ‘Russophobia’?” The Moscow Times (English language online newspaper in Russia previously based in Moscow), 11 October 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/10/11/what-does-the-kremlin-mean-by-russophobia-a86664

[ii] Dmitry Plotnikov, “Новый российский закон для мигрантов: не встал на воинский учёт — давай, до свидания! (“New Russian law for migrants: If you do not register for the military – good-bye!”),  Pravda (Russian news website—formerly the official press organ of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party), 9 August, 2024.
https://military.pravda.ru/2080796-voinskiiuchet/

Image Information:

Image: An antiwar protest in central London on 12 March 2022
Source: Alisdare Hickson, https://www.flickr.com/photos/alisdare/51937772099
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0

Russia Continues To Adapt Training, Incorporating Lessons From Ukraine

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Russian soldiers training ostensibly using revised tactics, lessons learned during its operations in Ukraine.

“The special military operation is the first war with large-scale combined arms actions and assaults on prepared positions after a long period of local wars and anti-terrorist operations led to the fact that now old tactical techniques, both the developments of the 1980s and earlier ones, are simultaneously used with new tactics.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the major Russian daily newspaper Izvestia, discusses how Russia continues to change soldier training based on lessons learned from its special military operation in Ukraine.[i] According to the Izvestiya article, the changing character of war necessitates combining both traditional combined arms warfare tactics with new skills to achieve success in modern warfare. In addition, many Russian forces in the security services, including the Ministry of Defense, and private military organizations are fighting as assault detachments/companies/groups, a method of organization that was widely practiced during the Second World War and abandoned as the Soviets/Russians fielded a fully mechanized force during the Cold War. Therefore, Russia is now using a combination of Second World War, Soviet-era combined arms, and emerging tactics from its combat experience in Ukraineto train its force. Specifically, Russia has regained its dismounted infantry culture, a marked change from the start of the war in 2022, when Russia suffered an inordinate number of casualties among troops riding to battle within their armored vehicles.[ii]

Sources:

Dmitry Astrakhan, “«Нет понятия идеального штурма, каждая операция планируется индивидуально»: Как новобранцы учатся навыкам ближнего боя на полигоне в ДНР (‘There is no such thing as an ideal assault; each operation is planned individually’: How recruits learn close combat skills at a training ground in the Donetsk People’s Republic),” Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 3 October 2024. https://iz.ru/1768527/dmitrii-astrakhan/net-poniatiia-idealnogo-shturma-kazhdaia-operatciia-planiruetsia-individualno

The experience of the special military operation has a significant impact on combat training. Now volunteer assault troops practice close combat in confined spaces of trenches and buildings, approaching strongpoints, clearing, evacuating the wounded and many other specific exercises. Izvestia visited at one of the training grounds and learned how recruits practice vital skills under the guidance of instructors with combat experience.

[T]raining takes place every day. On one day, recruits practice interactions with infantry fighting vehicles, on another day they focus on combating drones. In particular, they practice shooting at UAVs by shooting at clay pigeons.  Camouflaging and stealth movement are also practiced to remain invisible to enemy UAVs…

Combination of the “old” school and the “new”

The special military operation is the first war with large-scale combined arms actions and assaults on prepared positions after a long period of local wars and anti-terrorist operations led to the fact that now old tactical techniques, both the developments of the 1980s and earlier ones, are simultaneously used with new tactics.  At the same time, the latest experience is being implemented on the fly, since the character of battles is constantly changing — a combination of the “old” and the “new.”

So, from the old school we take the experience of moving on armored vehicles, moving along a trench. But in any case, “adjustments” are always necessary in tactical terms, since FVP [first person view] UAVs have appeared now.  “There is no concept of an ideal assault, it is important to act quickly, harmoniously and carefully,” — says a fighter with the call sign Potap.

Each trench, each settlement has its own differences, and therefore each assault operation is planned individually, without a specific template, he clarified…

NATO learns from our fighters’ assaults

It is worth noting that NATO is also looking at the experience of fighting in small groups at equipped strong points with trenches and dugouts. Almost all exercises held in Europe and the US in the last year have included practicing scenarios for storming forest belts and trenches, both according to old instructions and taking into account the experience of the special military operation. In addition, fighting in trenches has become part of the reservist training program in the British Army.

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

[ii] Interestingly, this was the same observation made by Chechens and outside observers during the Russian assault on the Chechen capital of Grozny in December 1994. Russian armored columns attacked from multiple directions, but mechanized infantry did not dismount and were cut down in their vehicles or dismounting under ambush conditions, before they could protect themselves and the armored columns.

Image Information:

Image: Russian soldiers training ostensibly using revised tactics, lessons learned during its operations in Ukraine.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/83/AssaultTraining2015-01.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

China To Cement Strategic Relationship With Peru

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The site of the Chancay Port before China’s megaport project; Chancay is a small fishing hamlet north of Lima, Peru.

“We are convinced that the port will become a strong driver for Peru’s economic development and a model for economic and commercial cooperation.”

China has long held a special interest in Peru, both for its critical mineral endowments and its position in the Pacific. Peru was the first Latin American country to sign a free trade agreement with China and is one of the largest destinations for Chinese investment in Latin America.[i] To further cement its influence and commercial ties, China is constructing a megaport at Chancay, one of its largest and most comprehensive in the Americas, to increase its access to critical minerals and the bountiful harvest of soy, wheat, and other agricultural products from Latin America.[ii] State-owned Cosco Shipping will own and operate the port, giving China outsized control over port operations.[iii]

According to the first excerpted article from the digital outlet Energiminas, once operational, the Chancay port will shorten the main route to Asia by 10 days. The second article from the Peruvian outlet Gestión, notes that Xi Jinping will inaugurate the port later this year at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit and that the Chinese delegation promises to include 750 Chinese investors visiting alongside President Xi. The outlet conveys Peru’s hope that Chancay will catalyze further Chinese investments in sectors such as telecommunications and electric vehicles. Earlier in the summer, China hosted Peruvian President Dina Boluarte for a state visit, where, according to the Gestión Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged support for elevating relations with Peru to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

The strategic implications of the Chancay megaport’s inauguration as Peru hosts the APEC Summit this year are significant. Most importantly, these actions demonstrate China’s march to gain influence in Latin America, where it already maintains several dozen agreements to own, operate, or upgrade port facilities. More importantly, many of these ports are deep water and feature docks with wide berths sufficient for the People’s Liberation Army Navy to make port calls for refueling and logistics.

Sources:

“Cosco Shipping espera inaugurar megapuerto de Chancay en noviembre (Cosco Shipping expects to open Chancay megaport in November),” Energiminas (a digital platform focused on energy and mining), 27 June 2024. https://energiminas.com/2024/06/27/cosco-shipping-espera-inaugurar-megapuerto-de-chancay-en-noviembre/

The president emphasized that the Chancay megaport will be inaugurated in November, with the presence of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping. She (Xi) indicated that, to strengthen this work, the implementation of the Ancón industrial zone is planned near the port. ‘Hopefully, an electric vehicle assembly plant can be installed there, it is in the interest of both Peru and China to take care of the environment. In our country we also have copper and lithium,’ she (Xi) said…For his part, Wan Min, president of Cosco Shipping, said…‘We are convinced that the port will become a strong driver for Peru’s economic development and a model for economic and commercial cooperation. Once its construction is completed, Chancay will become the most modern and intelligent port in South America.’

“Perú buscará capitalizar la llegada de inversores chinos y coreanos en la APEC 2024 (Peru will seek to capitalize on the arrival of Chinese and Korean investors at APEC 2024),” Gestión (a Peruvian daily focused on business and economics), 15 August 2024. https://gestion.pe/economia/apec-2024-peru-busca-capitalizar-la-llegada-de-empresarios-chinos-y-coreanos-al-foro-de-cooperacion-economica-asia-pacifico-voices-of-the-future-noticia/

The upcoming APEC Economic Leaders week, which will take place in November in Peru, will not only bring together heads of state and senior officials from the 21 member economies of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. The arrival of a significant delegation of businessmen is also anticipated, with the participation of up to 750 investors from China…It should be noted that Peru has, to date, trade agreements with 14 of the 21 economies that are members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.

Notes:

[i] For more information on investment flows from China to Latin America, see: Inter-American Dialogue, “China-Latin America Finance Databases,” accessed 13 October 2024. https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/

[ii] For additional coverage of the various phases of Chancay’s development, see: Ryan Berg, “China Nears Completion of Large Port in Peru with Dual-use Capabilities,” OE Watch, 01-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/china-nears-completion-of-large-port-in-peru-with-dual-use-capabilities/

[iii] For more information on the state of Chancay and the concerns about this megaport project, see: Henry Ziemer, “The Geopolitics of Port Security in the Americas,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 23 September 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/geopolitics-port-security-americas

Image Information:

Image: The site of the Chancay Port before China’s megaport project; Chancay is a small fishing hamlet north of Lima, Peru.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/marirc19/8284806040.
Attribution: CC BY-NA-SA 2.0

Taiwan’s Plan To Deter China With Submarines Faces Scrutiny

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Launch Ceremony of the ROCS Hai Kun, 28 September 2023. The Hai Kun is Taiwan’s first and only submarine and the prototype of seven more proposed submarines to be built between 2025 and 2038.

“The threat the submarines are intended to guard against was highlighted anew this week, as Beijing on Monday held a day of large-scale military drills surrounding Taiwan.”

Last year Taiwan unveiled its first attack submarine, the Hai Kun. Taiwan’s ruling party and defense officials have pitched the Hai Kun as a critical deterrent to China’s ever-expanding naval capability. However, according to the excerpted article from Japan-based Nikkei Asia, plans to build seven more submarines based on the Hai Kun prototype from 2025 to 2038 are facing stiff opposition in Taiwan from political rivals and analysts asking questions about the cost of and viability of the submarines themselves.[i]

According to the article, there are calls within Taiwan and from the United States to urgently “develop asymmetric weapons in large quantities and learn how to use them effectively.” Some experts doubt whether the submarines are an appropriate response to counter China’s far more extensive firepower. According to the Nikkei Asia article, Ivan Kanapathy, a former U.S. National Security Council director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, stated that Taiwan’s new submarines are not up to par to operate in “this threat environment” and that to launch them from Taiwan makes no sense. But not all agree. Head of Taiwan’s National Submarine Task Force and former defense chief, Adm. Huang Shu-kuang,[ii] had previously claimed that submarines would help to “counter China’s efforts to encircle Taiwan for an invasion, attack, or a blockade.” The article does note that Taiwan is serious about acquiring large numbers of relatively inexpensive sea drones, taking a page out of Ukraine’s playbook, which “deployed mobile coastal defense cruise missiles and ‘kamikaze’ sea drones, which acted as smart mines.”However, another Taiwanese defense analyst noted that the submarine program could be valuable in creating “a defense economy in Taiwan.”

Taiwan’s success in thwarting a potential Chinese invasion may depend on Taipei’s ability to correctly determine whether submarines or drones, or a combination of both, will give it the best chance of winning a war with China.

Sources:

“Taiwan submarine program faces mounting questions over tactical merits,” Nikkei Asia (Japan based news service that specifically covers the Indo-Pacific region), 15 October 2024. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Taiwan-submarine-program-faces-mounting-questions-over-tactical-merits

Taiwan faces fresh questions over its most ambitious defense program — a government plan to build seven more submarines — as opposition parties push back and some experts call for complementary reforms.

President Lai Ching-te and his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, have pushed the submarine program as a means to deter an aggressive Communist China, which claims Taiwan as its own. Political divisions over the subs reflect broader disagreements over Taiwan’s security and defense reforms that could have global consequences as Beijing ratchets up coercive measures while refusing to rule out an invasion….

Some experts doubt whether the submarines fit into this strategy for countering China’s far more extensive firepower. Ivan Kanapathy, a former U.S. National Security Council director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, said at a recent Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club briefing… questioned the wisdom of the submarine endeavor if it comes at the expense of smaller weapons such as sea drones. “The technology in Taiwan’s new submarine isn’t up to par to operate in this threat environment. Basing submarines here in the heart of the contested area is not smart. Submarines are going to be very useful if they’re coming from a thousand miles away but Taiwan doesn’t have an overseas base, so it begs the question,” he said. “Sending out large numbers of expendable sea drones would make a lot more sense…”

The defense ministry has indeed announced plans to acquire defense drones. Experts say Taiwan could consider establishing a vast drone operation based on lessons from the Ukraine war…

Adm. Huang Shu-kuang, then-head of the National Submarine Task Force and former defense chief, told Nikkei Asia last year that submarines would help to “counter China’s efforts to encircle Taiwan for an invasion, attack or a blockade.”

But one diplomat involved in Taiwan affairs argued that Lai’s administration may need to reconsider its submarine-centric approach… “The problem is that Taiwan’s government has now framed this as their most important reform against Chinese threats.”

Others disagree, seeing broad benefits. Su Tzu-yun, a defense expert at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research think tank, emphasized the importance of submarines not only in fending off China’s blockade attempts, but also in driving Taiwan’s shipbuilding industry and strategic development.

“A submarine can create a counter or balance force to stop or reduce a blockade or quarantine operation by the PLA,” Su said during another TFCC briefing. “But there are additional benefits to the project. … Building a fleet can create a defense economy. Taiwan can build submarines with a permanent shipyard and it can create an economic motor.”

Notes:

[i] “Taiwan earmarks billions to build 7 more Submarines in bid to deter possible PLA attacks.” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong-based media outlet), 24 August 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3275605/taiwan-earmarks-billions-build-7-more-submarines-bid-deter-possible-pla-attacks?share=cnt17jZj5x2IHbTcgP1CgdsGujXmS1xu8Cd5o4Kyc5t3kKRdk3KmSsGYcdjokCp9+rof+rs4CNVI9dikc5HG%2FWDLPW2KQ9cqIjDI0iJnb80InWHGNkf8Z1txcJ9f33PsihBnLZXWcX%2F4gdgwywk6Pw==&utm_campaign=social_share

[ii] Admiral Huang Shu-kuang had offered his resignation in April 2024 due to, in his words, “unfounded accusations and slander targeting the IDS program.” His resignation was refused, and he currently heads up the submarine program. See: “Retired Navy Admiral to Stay on Sub Program,” Taipei Times (Taiwan English language news service), 16 May 2024.https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/05/16/2003817950

Image Information:

Image: Launch Ceremony of the ROCS Hai Kun, 28 September 2023. The Hai Kun is Taiwan’s first and only submarine and the prototype of seven more proposed submarines to be built between 2025 and 2038.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/89/09.28_總統主持「潛艦國造原型艦命名暨下水典禮」_-_Flickr_id_53219332200.jpg
Attribution: CCA BY-2.0

China Blurs Lines Between Military Drills and War

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PLAAF Sukhoi Su-30s like this one participated in Joint-Sword-2024B in October 2024.

“As China’s military drills around Taiwan increase, it is becoming harder to discern when Beijing might be transitioning from a training exercise to war.”

China’s military exercises, which include many incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ), have begun to blur the lines between military exercises and actual war, according to the first article excerpt, published in the online newspaper Taiwan News. In May 2024, after Taiwan’s newly elected president, Lai Ching-te delivered a pro-independence speech, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched Joint-Sword-2024A, a series of exercises surrounding Taiwan and its outer island territories. China referred to these exercises as a “powerful punishment for separatist forces seeking independence.”[i] Five months later, while Taiwan celebrated National Day of the Republic of China (Taiwan Independence Day),[ii] the PLA launched Joint-Sword-2024B, during which they sent planes across the median line in the Taiwan Strait. This was another stern warning against Taiwan’s independence. The second excerpt published on Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense website noted the exercises lasted multiple days, with the biggest incursion taking place on 14 October. On that day, as many as 153 PLA aircraft, 14 PLAN vessels, and 12 official ships operating around Taiwan were detected, with 111 of the aircraft crossing the median line and entering Taiwan’s western, southwestern, and eastern ADIZ.

According to the Taiwan News article, Defense Minister Wellington Koo believes China is testing its ability to attack in various ways, including through gray zone tactics and cognitive operations, joint sea and air training, and targeted military exercises. Its gray zone tactics and cognitive operations can be seen in the ongoing military exercises, which could instill a sense of complacency within Taiwan and among its allies as Chinese military exercises surrounding Taiwan become more normalized. However, one day, a training scenario could unexpectedly escalate into all-out war.[iii] Koo warns that as the scale of China’s exercises grows, it will be increasingly difficult to discern when the PLA is transitioning from “training to a large exercise, and from a large exercise to war.”

Sources:

Lily LaMattina, “Taiwan Says China’s Growing Military Activity Makes Exercise and War Harder to Differentiate,” Taiwan News (Taiwan-based English language news service), 19 September 2024. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/5938651

As China’s military drills around Taiwan increase, it is becoming harder to discern when Beijing might be transitioning from a training exercise to war, said Defense Minister Wellington Koo (顧立雄).

Koo stressed, “We must consider how we differentiate between peacetime and wartime.” He said that as the scale of China’s exercises grows, it will be more difficult to discern when Chinese troops are transitioning from “training to a large exercise, and from a large exercise to war.”

Taiwan has counted 2,076 incursions this year by China’s People’s Liberation Army into its air defense identification zone (ADIZ). Beijing has also sent non-military government ships such as coastguard, marine research, and maritime safety vessels.

“Ministry of National Defense, ROC(Taiwan),” Ministry of National Defense website (official website of the Ministry of National Defense), accessed 17 October 2024. https://x.com/mondefense?lang=en

October 10: Taiwan celebrates its National Day of the Republic of China.

14 October (up until 0600): 153 PLA aircraft, 14 PLAN vessels, and 12 official ships operating around Taiwan detected. 111 of the aircraft crossed the median line and entered Taiwan’s western, southwestern, and eastern ADIZ.

Notes:

[i] For more information, see Cindy Hurst, “Taiwan President’s Inaugural Speech Prompts Chinese Military Drills,” OE Watch, 07-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/taiwan-presidents-inaugural-speech-prompts-chinese-military-drills/

[ii] National Day of the Republic of China commemorates the start of the Wuchang Uprising, overthrowing the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Shortly after, on 1 January 1920, they established the Republic of China. In 1949, pushed out of power by Mao Zedong’s Communists, the Republic of China relocated to Taiwan.

[iii] There are similarities between the recent Chinese exercises and events that led up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine when Russian forces began massing troops near the borders of Ukraine, calling it military exercises, right before the invasion. “Timeline: The Events Leading Up to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” Reuters, 1 March 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/events-leading-up-russias-invasion-ukraine-2022-02-28/

Image Information:

Image: PLAAF Sukhoi Su-30s like this one participated in Joint-Sword-2024B in October 2024.
Source: Dmitriy Pichugin, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army_Air_Force#/media/File:PLAAF_Sukhoi_Su-30_at_Lipetsk-2_(modified).jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

China Concludes Military Drills Near Taiwan

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The China Coast Guard posted a heart-shaped patrol route around Taiwan on their official Weibo account during the exercise, accompanied by the message, “The coast guard’s patrol is in the shape of loving you.”

“Every time separatist forces provoke, the PLA will push forward. The closer the separatist forces align with external forces, the tighter our ‘chain’ around Taiwan will be.”

On 14 October, China conducted large-scale military drills, Joint Sword-2024B, around Taiwan and its surrounding islands. These drills expand upon the previous Joint Sword-2024A drills from late May 2024 and serve as a direct response to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s “Double Tenth” speech in Taipei.[i]

The  Beijing Daily, the official newspaper of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, published the first excerpted article featuring Senior Colonel Zhang Chi, a professor from the National Defense University, and Senior Captain Zhang Junshe, a researcher from the Naval Military Academic Research Institute. According to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers, the Liaoning carrier group conducted joint exercises east of the Bashi Channel with the aim of enhancing joint combat capabilities between the army, navy, air force, and rocket force. A bomber formation accompanied the carrier group to enforce a maritime barrier, practicing the prevention of intervention and interference by external forces.[ii] Senior Colonel Zhang Junshe stated that in the event of mainland military strikes against Taiwan, the Liaoning carrier group would also be capable of targeting the island’s eastern cave bases, such as those in Hualien and Taitung, which are designed to preserve Taiwan’s military combat power. The exercise also highlighted organized blockade drills on key major ports, which account for the majority of Taiwan’s imports, potentially causing significant disruptions to Taiwan’s energy supply, economy, and society during wartime.[iii] Lastly, the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) emphasized the use of ships 1305, 1303, and 2102 for conducting law enforcement inspections around Taiwan to “control the island” and to practice preventing Taiwan independence elements from evading sanctions or escaping using civilian vessels. Notably, this marked the first time they patrolled around the entire island of Taiwan and the islands of Dongyin and Matsu, including the first use of the 2901 Zhoutou-class ship for this type of patrol, the largest armed coast guard cutter in the world. Senior Colonel Zhang Chi reaffirms China’s official statements made during Joint Sword-2024A, asserting that the PLA will deploy additional assets, improve joint operational capabilities, and progressively tighten Taiwan’s defense perimeter with each successive exercise.[iv]

The significance of the CCG patrols is further elaborated in the second excerpted article, published by Yuyuan Tantian, a news outlet under the direct control of the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP. First, the CCG deployed six fleets, twice as many as the previous exercise. Second, diagrams released by the CCG indicate that not only did patrol ships encircle Taiwan for the first time, but they also suggest that the CCG will adopt a flexible and unpredictable approach to future patrols to enhance operational effectiveness and maintain strategic ambiguity. Lastly, the CCG entered restricted waters around the Matsu Islands, setting a precedent for future law enforcement patrols.[v] Joint Sword-2024B ultimately establishes a precedent of the PLA edging closer to Taiwan’s periphery, employing salami-slicing tactics to normalize the increasing displays of military force. This gradual increase in military deployments and restricted geographic scope aims to shorten Taiwan’s response time while minimizing international pushback.[vi]

Sources:

Bai Bo, “辽宁舰航母编队位台岛以东演练，让“台独”势力无处可藏！(The Liaoning aircraft carrier group is conducting exercises east of Taiwan, “Taiwan independence” forces has nowhere to hide!),” Beijing Daily (the official newspaper of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CCP), 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/8jt4jbye

On 14 October 2024, the Eastern Theater Command released a statement announcing that the PLA organized its army, navy, air force, rocket force, and other units to execute the ‘Joint Sword-2024B’ exercise in the Taiwan Strait and in areas to the north, south, and east of Taiwan. Later that evening, the Command issued another statement concluding the exercise, which was deemed successful in testing the joint capabilities of theater forces. This exercise came just days after Lai Ching-te’s “Double Tenth” speech in Taipei on 10 October 2024, where he promoted separatist rhetoric and inflamed tensions between both sides of the Taiwan Strait. According to military expert Zhang Junshe, who spoke to the Beijing Daily, the PLA’s exercise directly targeted the “Taiwan Independence” remarks in Lai’s speech.

During the exercise, the Eastern Theater Command conducted drills on blockading key ports, seizing regional power, sea assaults, and land strikes around Taiwan. These drills tested multi-domain coordination and precision strike capabilities. Professor Zhang Chi of the National Defense University emphasized that each time separatist forces provoke, the PLA will respond by advancing. He added that the closer separatist forces align with external actors, the tighter the PLA will draw the “chain” encircling Taiwan.

The Liaoning aircraft carrier group was also deployed east of Taiwan to conduct joint exercises with the army, navy, air force, and rocket force, focusing on integrating the capabilities of all services. The carrier group was accompanied by bomber formations to establish a maritime barrier, simulating the blocking of external intervention and interference. Zhang Junshe further noted that Taiwan’s military has built large cave bases in Hualien and Taitung in eastern Taiwan to preserve combat power in the event of a mainland strike. However, the Liaoning carrier group will enable the PLA to target these cave bases.

Additionally, the Chinese Coast Guard carried out patrols around Taiwan, inspecting the waters surrounding the island. Notably, this marked the first time the Coast Guard’s 2901 Zhoutou-class ship was used in such patrols, as well as the first complete patrol of Taiwan’s entire island. The Coast Guard aims to prevent “Taiwan independence” elements from evading sanctions or escaping the island using civilian ships or other means during wartime.

Yuyuan Tantian, “环台岛巡航管控的三个突破 (The three breakthroughs in the patrol and control around Taiwan island),” China Media Group (a news media under the direct control of the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP), 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/y3xyrmfp

On 14 October 2024, the Fujian Coast Guard organized a fleet of ships to conduct law enforcement inspections in the waters near Taiwan Island, Dongyin Island, and Matsu Island. According to exclusive information provided to this news source, this coast guard operation marked three significant breakthroughs.

Firstly, a total of six fleets were deployed, twice as many as in previous operations. Notably, this marked the first time the coast guard’s largest 10,000-ton vessel, No. 2901, was used for a mission targeting Taiwan. This ship is equipped with a 76mm caliber rapid-fire naval gun and can reach speeds of up to 25 knots. The 2901 ship has considerable advantages over other law enforcement vessels in the region.

Secondly, a diagram released by the coast guard illustrated the fleets sailing around the waters near Taiwan, expanding from the eastern region to encompass the entire island. However, the diagram did not provide a specific navigation route or detailed latitude and longitude for each point. Instead, arrows were used to broadly indicate the direction of the operation, implying that there would be no fixed route and that the fleets would operate in multiple areas.

Lastly, during this operation, the coast guard entered the waters near Matsu Island and penetrated restricted areas established by Taiwan authorities. This indicates that the coast guard has successfully completed law enforcement patrols around all of Taiwan’s outer islands and may implement regular patrols around Matsu Island in the future.

Notes:

[i] To watch the PRC’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) official response to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s “Double Tenth” speech and to the Eastern Theater Command exercise, see the MOD’s video post, Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/yy3dervp

[ii] Li Chun, “What signal does the Liaoning aircraft carrier formation’s participation in ‘Joint Sword’ exercise send?” China News Network (China state news agency), 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/rkfzbw4n

[iii] Zhao Xi, “东部战区演习演练封控台湾主要港口 (Eastern Theater Command exercises to seal off Taiwan’s main ports),” Beijing News (Newspaper for the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CCP), 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/24r82nhw

[iv] To watch Senior Colonel Zhang Chi discuss and analyze ‘Joint Sword-2024B,’ see his CCTV7 interview, CCTV7 Military Report, 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/nukx75wk

[v] Sean Lin, “4 Chinese coast guard ships expelled as PLA conducts drills near Taiwan,” Focus Taiwan (National news agency of the Republic of China), 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/ypkcywaf

[vi] Helen Regan and Wayne Chang, “Taiwan condemns Chinese military drills around island as ‘unreasonable provocation’,” CNN, 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/3a83zshc

Image Information:

Image: The China Coast Guard posted a heart-shaped patrol route around Taiwan on their official Weibo account during the exercise, accompanied by the message, “The coast guard’s patrol is in the shape of loving you.”
Source: https://tinyurl.com/mwdk2ru7
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.