Monthly Archives: September 2024

Cracks Appear in Maduro Regime

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Tareck El Aissami was once one of the most powerful men in Venezuela and a top Maduro confidant.

“Maduro became a victim in the face of a violent opposition that wanted to kill him. It turns out that some of his own people were behind the attack.”

Recently, the Maduro regime has shown signs of schisms within the ruling Chavista Party,[i] now known as the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). The arrest and prosecution of regime insider, former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami, is a watershed moment for elites in Maduro’s inner circle. According to the first excerpted article from the centrist Colombian daily El Tiempo, Maduro accused El Aissami of being behind the assassination attempt, as well as corruption, pilfering roughly $21 billion from the state-owned oil company while serving as oil minister.[ii] According to the second excerpted article from the Spanish outlet El País, El Aissami, in addition to the assassination accusation, fell for endangering the PSUV’s electoral prospects with his large-scale theft of public resources. . The outlet notes how the arrests of El Aissami and his associates sent a chill through many circles of regime elites. They come in the context of Venezuela’s July presidential election, in which Maduro faces stiff competition from an organized opposition that continues to lead Maduro in the polls. The fact that dozens have been arrested alongside El Aissami indicates a growing crisis of trust within Chavismo’s elite ranks.[iii] Further, the money that El Aissami stole to grease his corruption networks has restricted the Maduro regime from greater social spending during the campaign, contributing to his flagging prospects of winning the election.

Sources:

Source: “Traicionado por su propio círculo? Así fue cómo un ministro cercano a Nicolás Maduro casi implosiona al chavismo (Betrayed by his own circle? This is how a minister close to Nicolás Maduro almost imploded Chavismo),” El Tiempo (a Colombian daily generally considered politically centrist), 30 April 2024. https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/los-conspiradores-estaban-con-maduro-como-un-ministro-casi-implosiona-al-chavismo-3338641

Less than a month ago, El Aissami was seen handcuffed, quite skinny, and with an emaciated appearance…even if it were true that El Aissami had been conspiring against Maduro, his imprisonment could be more related to the accusation than to the ‘loss’ of 21 billion dollars from PDVSA, a plot that leaves more than 60 detainees, all allies of the former minister…With the drone attack story, Maduro became a victim in the face of a violent opposition that wanted to kill him. It turns out that some of his own people were behind the attack.

Source:  “Venezuela detiene al exministro del Petróleo Tareck El Aissami, hasta hace poco un político íntimo de Maduro (Venezuela detains former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami, until recently a close politician of Maduro),” El País (a Spanish outlet with excellent regional coverage), 9 April 2024. https://elpais.com/america/2024-04-09/venezuela-detiene-al-exministro-del-petroleo-tareck-el-aissami-hasta-hace-poco-un-politico-intimo-de-maduro.html

The tectonic plates of Chavismo have received a strong shock this Tuesday. The Venezuelan Prosecutor’s Office has announced the arrest of former minister Tareck El Aissami, a politician who until a year and a half ago belonged to Nicolás Maduro’s circle of trust…The definitive fall of El Aissami—a powerful and feared operator of Chavismo, around whom important layers of current national capital had been organized—seems to close the chapter of an expensive fraud on the nation, orchestrated under the shadow of international sanctions, in a time in which…the country’s oil production and the economy, were completely bankrupt, in the midst of a massive emigration of people. This may be the most radical and merciless purge carried out by Chavismo since it came to power…El Aissami is not taken to prison for ideological differences, but for having endangered the revolution and abusing its authority.

Notes:

[i] Chavismo is the movement of those who follow Huge Chavez, which today is encapsulated in the party formally called PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela, in English). Chavistas are followers of Chavismo.

[ii] To understand more about the unfathomable scale of this theft from PDVSA, and the use of crypto currency and middlemen, see: Marianna Parraga, “Exclusive: Middlemen Have Left Venezuela’s PDVSA with $21.2 billion in Unpaid Bills,” Reuters, 21 March 2023. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/middlemen-have-left-venezuelas-pdvsa-with-212-billion-unpaid-bills-2023-03-21/

[iii] For more information on the opposition’s success in pressuring Maduro despite the long electoral odds, see: Ryan C. Berg, “This Could Be the Last Shot to Restore Democracy in Venezuela,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 4 April 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/could-be-last-shot-restore-democracy-venezuela

Image Information:

Image: Tareck El Aissami was once one of the most powerful men in Venezuela and a top Maduro confidant.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/globovision/6336412991/
Attribution: CC BY-NC 2.0 DEED

Armenia Hints It May Withdraw From Russia-Backed Regional Security Bloc

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Monastery Valley in Armenia

“Armenia will refrain from joining the CSTO Collective Security Council resolution of November 23, 2023 on the CSTO budget for 2024 and from participating in financing the organization’s activity envisaged by this resolution. However, it will not object to adopting this resolution in a curtailed format.”

Armenia recently announced it will no longer pay its dues to the Collective Security Treaty Organizations (CSTO), a Moscow-led security organization comprised of countries from Central Asia and the South Caucasus. According to the first excerpted piece from the Russian state news agency, TASS, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told his countrymen that they can no longer rely on the CSTO and he had no answer to how Yerevan benefits from being a member. The move comes as relations between Yerevan and Moscow have cooled, particularly after a series of clashes over the disputed Nagorno Karabakh region, , last September with neighboring Azerbaijan resulted in the mass expulsion of the enclave’s Armenian population.

Pashinyan, who did not attend the CSTO’s last summit in Minsk in 2023, had hinted that Armenia plans to suspend its participation in the security bloc. Critics of the CSTO claim it is a tool for Moscow to wield military power over former Soviet-bloc countries. The last time CSTO forces were called in to preserve the peace came in January 2022, when roughly 2,500 CSTO peacekeepers – the bulk of them Russian – responded to anti-government rioting in Kazakhstan. But Pashinyan has criticized the alliance for not supporting Armenia during its various clashes with Azerbaijan,accusing Russian peacekeepers of abandoning their positions when Azerbaijani troops crossed into Nagorno-Karabakh.[i] According to the second excerpted article from Armenian TV and radio service Azatutyun, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Armenia is free to withdraw from the organization.[ii]  If Armenia does leave the CSTO, the move could signal a major realignment of the regional balance of power in the Caucasus, as Russia, preoccupied by the war in Ukraine, looks to keep a military presence in the region. Armenia recently held joint drills with the United States, has sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and has expressed interest in one day joining the European Union. If the CSTO were to lose Armenia or other members, it could weaken Russia’s military leverage in the South Caucasus. Alternatively, it could make other regional security blocs like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which also comprises China, more relevant and powerful.

Sources:

Source:  “Armenia to refrain from financing CSTO activity in 2024,” (“Армения воздержится от финансирования деятельности ОДКБ в 2024 году,” TASS (Russian state news agency), 8 May 2024. https://tass.com/world/1785765

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said earlier that his country cannot rely on the CSTO and he cannot answer Armenian society’s question why the country should be its member. In recent time, Yerevan has skipped numerous meeting in a range of integration formats. Thus, Pashinyan did not attend the CSTO summit in Minsk in 2023 and announced that Armenia had suspended its participation in this organization.

CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov told TASS on April 22 that it was a matter of “an independent and sovereign country” to decide whether to take part in the upcoming CSTO summit or not. However, he said that he hoped that many might change for the better before the summit.

Source:  “Armenia Free To Leave Russian-Led Bloc, Says Moscow,” (Армения свободна выйти из возглавляемого Россией блока, заявила Москва), Azatutyun (Armenian TV and Radio service affiliated with U.S. funded RFE/RL) 3 May 2024. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32932373.html#

“We still do not question the sovereign right of our Armenian partners to independently determine their foreign policy course, including in the context of the further work of the organization,” the ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova told a news briefing in Moscow.

“Let me remind you that Article 19 of the [CSTO} Charter establishes the possibility of leaving the alliance,” Zakharova said. “In that case, a member state … must send an official notification no later than six months before the withdrawal date.”

The Armenian government, she said, has taken no steps in that direction so far despite its “constantly circulated accusations against the organization.” This means that Armenia remains for now a full-fledged member of the Russian-led military alliance and must “must fulfill appropriate obligations,” added Zakharova. She did not specify those obligations.Over the past year or so, Yerevan has boycotted high-level meetings, military exercises and other activities of the CSTO in what Pashinian described in February as an effective suspension of Armenia’s CSTO membership. The premier repeatedly said afterwards that he could pull his country out of the alliance of six ex-Soviet states altogether.

Notes:

[i] “Armenian PM Attacks Russian-Led Alliance At Summit In Yerevan,” RFE/RL, 24 November 2022. https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-csto-pashinian-criticism/32145663.html

[ii] During a recent visit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Pashinyan struck an agreement for Russian border guards to withdraw from along the Armenia-Azerbaijani border. See: Gabriel Gavin, “Russia to withdraw troops from Armenia’s border,” Politico.eu, 9 May 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-to-withdraw-troops-from-armenias-border/

Image Information:

Image: Monastery Valley in Armenia
Source: Unsplash, https://unsplash.com/photos/aerial-photo-of-a-village-during-daytime-VQ07UveM3-U
Attribution: Free to use under the Unsplash License

Georgian Parliament Discusses Impacts of “Russia Law”

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Video still frame of Georgian demonstrators in front of Parliament building in Tbilisi protesting Foreign Agents law, May 2024.

“The proposed Russia law, … requires all non-governmental groups and media organizations to disclose foreign funding/influence.”

Georgia has been rocked by waves of protests and counter-protests triggered by the re-introduction of a “foreign agents law,” the so-called “Russia law” in parliament by the Georgian Dream party. The legislation, similar to a law passed in Russia and currently in debate in Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia,[i] requires all non-governmental groups and media organizations to disclose foreign funding and influence, thus leading to its name of the “foreign agents law.” According to the excerpted article and interview published in Austrian-based IGlobenews, Georgian Parliamentarian Armaz Akhvlediani,[ii] addressed the history behind the controversial bill as well as how it will impact Georgia’s aspirations to be accepted into the EU. The article notes that “Georgian Dream still supports Georgia’s European Union and NATO membership, but has taken a pro-Russian attitude,” at least for the time being. “They do not want the conflict in Ukraine spreading to Georgia.” Akhvlediani notes however, that the governance style of the “Georgian Dream” administration excludes democratization and European integration and that “the victory of Ukraine in the war and its accession to the European Union are of fundamental importance to Georgians.” The foreign agents law will certainly impact the operational environment in Georgia. The United States has been involved in Georgia for decades to include military training partnerships and weapons transfers. While it isn’t yet clear what the impact will be, the foreign agents law will likely have a restraining effect on the military and security cooperation between Georgia and the United States and its western partners.

Sources:

Diana Mautner Markhof, “Exclusive iGlobenews Interview with Georgian Parliamentarian Armaz Akhvlediani,” IGlobenews (Austria-based non-profit news platform created by graduates of Diplomatische Akademie Wien), 8 May 2024. https://www.iglobenews.org/interview-with-armaz-akhvlediani/

The proposed Russia law, … requires all non-governmental groups and media organizations to disclose foreign funding/influence. Georgian Parliamentarian Armaz Akhvlediani …supports the protests, is strongly anti-Russian and believes the EU/US will fill any void once Russia pulls its considerable influence from Georgia.

Opponents of the bill, believe it will be used to crack down on those not in line with the governing party’s pro-Russian stance. This law, say its critics, will be a roadblock on Georgia’s road to EU membership.

Georgian Dream [political party] still supports Georgia’s European Union and NATO membership, but has taken a pro-Russian attitude. They do not want the conflict in Ukraine spreading to Georgia. The Georgia government gathered its own supporters in the tens of thousands to counter-protest in front of Georgia’s parliament in Tbilisi on 29 April. Georgia has learned the lessons of Ukraine’s color revolution and will likely not back down nor relinquish the streets to the opposition.

Armaz Akhvlediani: Achieving candidate member status is the result of a long-term, tireless struggle for the democratic and European values of the Georgian people. The ruling party, led by oligarch Ivanishvili, then and now fiercely opposes this process, flagrantly violating the country’s constitution, which recognizes the European integration of Georgia as a priority. The governance style of the “Georgian Dream” administration excludes democratization and European integration. Through violence and moral terror, the party led by Ivanishvili aims solely to maintain power. However, most Georgian citizens strongly oppose this and strive to protect Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic choice. The victory of Ukraine in the war and its accession to the European Union are of fundamental importance to Georgians.

Armaz Akhvlediani: The revival of the Putinist law on agents of foreign influence makes joining the European Union virtually impossible. This law, previously withdrawn by the ruling party under public pressure and promises not to revisit the issue, resurfaces, posing a threat to critical NGOs and media outlets akin to Putin’s methods. Despite widespread protests by hundreds of thousands of Georgian citizens and daily calls from Western partners urging the “Georgian Dream” to abandon this initiative, Ivanishvili’s party obstinately persists in obstructing the country’s path toward European integration and democratization.

Notes:

[i] Abkhazia is a de-facto independent state having broken free from Georgia by war in the Fall of 1993. It maintains its own government and armed forces while hosting Russian troops. Russia and only four other nations recognize Abkhazia’s independence. Foreign funded NGOs have been very important to Abkhazia such as The HALO Trust, a Europe based de-mining organization that has spent decades in Abkhazia clearing mines left over from the Georgia-Abkhazia War 1992-1993.

[ii] Armaz Akhvlediani is currently serving his third term in Georgia’s Parliament. He is member of Georgia’s Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security and of its Ethics Council. He is the Founder and Director of the Tbilisi School of Political Studies.

Image Information:

Image: Video still frame of Georgian demonstrators in front of Parliament building in Tbilisi protesting Foreign Agents law, May 2024.
Source: Vakhtang Maisaia
Attribution: By author’s permission

West African Joint Task Force’s “Psychological” Approach Sees Increased Boko Haram Defections

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Major General Ibrahim Sallau Ali commands the MNJTF and greets officers from contributing states

“The success of Operation Nashrul Salam underscores the effectiveness of psychological operations in counter-terrorism efforts.”

In February 2024, the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF)[i] launched Operation Nashrul Salam to dislodge Boko Haram from its bases around Lake Chad in the border region between Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Although operations with similar objectives have been carried out regularly for several years,[ii] the MNJTF has renewed hopes that this time the operation will be more lasting and decisive. The excerpted article in Daily Nigerian from 3 May detailed the MNJTF’s optimism about the operation, and highlighted how it differs from previous operations, namely in its use of psychological operations.

According to the article, written by the MNJTF chief of military public information, Lieutenant Colonel Abubakar Abdullahi, the Lake Chad basin region is the lynchpin of security in West Africa. This was home to some 30 million people until Boko Haram launched an insurgency in 2010 that created widespread unrest and displacement in the region. This time, to dislodge Boko Haram, the MNJTF is not relying on the “hard approach” to countering terrorism[iii] but rather on what Abdullahi describes as a psychological operation.

The operation involved dropping fliers over islands where Boko Haram has hideouts in Kanuri, Hausa, Arabic, French, and English, the five languages spoken around Lake Chad. According to the article, many Boko Haram members surrendered after receiving information about how to defect and enter rehabilitation programs. The article also credits another non-kinetic program called Quick Impact Projects for assisting large numbers of villagers from the Chadian portion of Lake Chad to return to their home villages. MNJTF then provides security so the villagers can recommence their fishing activities and regain their livelihoods. In total, 95 Quick Impact Projects have been implemented in 31 villages, which have impacted an estimated 3,200 people. While Abdullahi may have embellished the success of the operations, the article illustrates that the MNJTF is prioritizing “soft approaches” to counter-terrorism. Such approaches have long been called for by civil society as a complement to the MNJTF and Lake Chad basin region armies’ own kinetic operations and will likely be considered a welcome development.

Sources:

“How troops of MNJTF are progressing towards Lake Chad Basin stabilization,” Daily Nigerian (English and Hausa-language newspaper covering important matters affecting Nigeria, including corruption and military affairs), 8 May 2024. https://dailynigerian.com/troops-mnjtf/#google_vignette

The Lake Chad Basin serves as lifeblood for tens of millions, a unique ecological sanctuary, and a lynchpin in regional stability. Amidst its abundant resources, however, the region has faced its share of turmoil, exacerbated by the shadow of Boko Haram and other insurgent groups.

Enter the MNJTF, a coalition of forces from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin Republic, established with the purpose of counteracting the threat posed by these insurgent groups. Its multifaceted approach, combining kinetic and non-kinetic efforts, has proven effective. Notable successes include the dislodgement of insurgents from its strongholds, rescue of hostages, and reductions in the frequency and severity of attacks in the region. Moreover, the MNJTF has played a major role in facilitating the return of displaced persons and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the affected areas.

The MNJTF has conducted Operation Nashrul Salam, a non-kinetic approach to break the cycle of terror. This psychological operation was tailored to foster surrender and disrupt unity among the terrorist factions. Operation Nashrul Salam disseminated messages across the Lake Chad region in 5 languages, Kanuri, Hausa, Arabic, French, and English, to ensure widespread comprehension. These tailored messages were air-dropped over specific islands known to harbour terrorists, targeting them directly in their hideouts. The operation’s impact was profound, culminating in a significant number of terrorists surrendering.The MNJTF has executed Quick Impact Projects throughout the four sectors of the MNJTF. In particular, after successful kinetic operations, over 3,200 residents of the Bagatelerom community in Chad have returned to their ancestral homes, with MNJTF personnel assisting their resettlement in partnership with relevant agencies.

Notes:

[i] The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprises the four Lake Chad basin states, including Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, as well as Benin and is intended to involve “sharing plans and intelligence, committing troops for longer operations and improving troops’ human rights compliance.” The MNJTF has not significantly reduced Boko Haram attacks or border incursions around Lake Chad, despite claiming several offensives against the group have been successful. See: , “What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?,” Report #291, International Crisis Group, 7 July 2020. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/291-what-role-multinational-joint-task-force-fighting-boko-haram

[ii] See: Jacob Zenn, “Multinational Joint Task Force Lauds Counterterrorism Success Against Boko Haram,” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/multinational-joint-task-force-lauds-counterterrorism-success-against-boko-haram/

[iii] The “soft approach” refers to “all non-military measures adopted by a government in addressing the root causes and containing the spread of terrorism and violent extremism.” This would include flier drops to encourage Boko Haram members to surrender as well as programs to reduce socio-economic inequality, create jobs, and foster political inclusion. In contrast, the “hard approach” to counter-terrorism refers to all military actions taken to contain terrorism, such as the use of air strikes and raids into Boko Haram hideouts. See: Ugwueze, M. I., Onuoha, F. C., “Hard Versus Soft Measures to Security: Explaining the Failure of Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Nigeria.” Journal of Applied Security Research, 15(4), 547–567, (2020).

Image Information:

Image: Major General Ibrahim Sallau Ali commands the MNJTF and greets officers from contributing states
Source: NAweb, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gen_Ali_with_the_MNJTF.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Mali Launches Successful Counterterrorism Operations

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Assimi Goita, the current leader of Mali.

“The FAMA will relentlessly continue their mission of protecting populations throughout the national territory,” reassures the Army.”

The Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) recently publicized a series of successful counter-terrorism operations against armed extremist groups throughout the country. According to the first excerpted article from Arabic-language Moroccan electronic newspaper Tamaghrabit, FAMA announced that it had successfully eliminated Abu Hudhayfah, a former Polisario Front separatist and one of the leaders of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Prior to his time with the ISGS, Hudhayfah was allegedly trained by the Algerian Army and his joint affiliation has signaled a connection between separatist and terrorist organizations in the region. Hudhayfah was also suspected to have assisted with attacks on U.S. and Nigerian forces in Niger in 2017. Mali and the greater Sahel region have faced a significant and sustained threat from armed extremist groups for multifaceted reasons ranging from weak governmental leadership, less international counterterrorism support, and instability in neighboring nations.[i] Although Hudhayfah will undoubtedly be replaced, the FAMA’s successful operation against ISGC is a needed disruption and morale boost for local forces.

Following FAMA’s successful operation against Hudhayfah, the Malian military claimed several other successful counterterrorism operations throughout the Diafarabé area, Ségou region. According to the second excerpted article from Burkina Faso’s French-language independent newspaper, 24heures, the General Staff of the Armed Forces announced air strikes and ground operations that targeted training camps and logistical bases near Nouh Bozo, a village in the center of the country located along the bank of the Niger River. Before kinetic operations, FAMA used information derived from “specialized services” to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance on each target. It was believed that the unnamed terrorist organizations operating the camps intended to “transform the area into sanctuaries to prepare their dark actions against the populations and store their logistics there.” In addition to the destruction of training camps and logistical storage areas, FAMA claimed to have destroyed fuel shipments destined for terrorist organizations throughout the country. The security situation in the Sahel continues to be plagued with instability and terrorism. External players like Russia continue to garner influence in the region. With U.S. troops withdrawing from neighboring Niger, the forces to counter a growing terrorist threat in the Sahel are even more sparse. Mali’s ability to independently conduct kinetic operations against high-value targets may indicate a renewed focus on securing their nation, which could have a positive impact across the region.

Sources:

“الجيش المالي يعلن القضاء على الانفصالي “أبو حذيفة” ويؤكد علاقة البوليساريو بالإرهاب (The Malian army announces the elimination of the separatist “Abu Hudhayfah” and confirms the Polisario’s relationship with terrorism),” Tamaghribit (Moroccan newspaper), 1 May 2024. https://www.tamaghrabit.com/?p=19302

The Malian army announced the elimination of the former Polisario Front separatist and leader of ISIS in the Sahara region, called “Abu Hudhayfah” and nicknamed “Hugo,” in a qualitative operation in northern Mali.

It is noteworthy that “Abu Hudhayfah” had previously received intensive training in the Tindouf camps under the supervision of Algerian army officers… before he was sent to northern Mali to join what calls itself the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. He will then be succeeded by Adnan Abu Al-Walid Sahrawi, who was in turn a leader in the Polisario terrorist organization, before leading ISIS.

The liquidation of the so-called “Abu Hudhayfah” confirms Morocco’s view that the terrorist phenomenon and the separatist phenomenon are linked, and that terrorism is a form of secession… given that terrorist organizations seek to establish political entities on the outskirts of countries where the security focus is less… and thus create “zones of savagery.” “It is managed to reach what is called in the organizational literature the “empowerment stage.”

Source:  “Des regroupements de terroristes identifiés et traités avec succès (Groups of terrorists identified and successfully treated),”24heures (Burkina Faso newspaper), 9 May 2024. https://www.24heures.bf/mali-des-regroupements-de-terroristes-identifies-et-traites-avec-succes-communique/

The harvest seems good for the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA). From May 6 to 8, they began a “hunt” against armed terrorist groups in several parts of the country. Several terrorists have been “neutralized” according to a press release from the General Staff of the Armed Forces dated May 8. A “major local terrorist leader” was also reportedly killed.

“Based on information obtained by specialized services, the FAMA has been carrying out an active surveillance and reconnaissance campaign for several days in the Diafarabé area, Ségou region,” indicates the General Staff of the Armed Forces. This requires, he says, careful work and patience. These operations led to the location and identification of several fallback bases located in forest areas. According to the Malian Army, armed terrorist groups plan to transform this area into sanctuaries. To prepare their “dark actions against the populations and store their logistics there.” Air strikes followed by ground action targeted training camps and logistical bases around Nouh Bozo, on the right bank of the Niger River, on May 6 and 7, 2024.

“The FAMA will relentlessly continue their mission of protecting populations throughout the national territory,” reassures the Army.The Malian Forces are thus on the hunt for armed terrorist groups who sow terror and desolation both within the Defense and Security Forces and among civilians. In this context, several air and land operations are carried out in several parts of the national territory. This Sahel country also intends, in its drive to fight terrorism, to cut off the sources of fuel supply for armed groups.

Notes:

[i] Mali has faced multiple radical Islamist factions, including Al-Qaeda’s Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), and the Islamic State’s Islamic State in Greater Sahara affiliate branches, which have been responsible for numerous deadly attacks throughout the country and have even been able to control territory. The Council on Foreign Relations Global Conflict Tracker published a detailed background and analysis on violent extremism in the Sahel to provide contextual information on the issued faced in Mali and neighboring nations. See: “Violent Extremism in the Sahel,” Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventative Action, Updated 14 February 2024. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel

Image Information:

Image: Assimi Goita, the current leader of Mali.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Assimi_Goita,_August_2021.png
Attribution: Public Domain

Iran Seeks To Cultivate Pakistani and Kurdish Support

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International Department of the Islamic Revolution Cultural & Research Institute unveils translations of Ali Khamenei’s book Palestine at the Tehran International Book Fair, May 10, 2024.

“Freedom fighters around the world will become familiar with the contents of this book.”

While Tehran propagating anti-Israeli vitriol is neither new nor remarkable, its choice about where to direct that propaganda does signal those people that the Iranian regime seeks to cultivate as allies. As reported by Dolat.ir, a government information center, the high-profile annual Tehran International Book Fair recently featured an updated collection of Khamenei’s writings and speeches about Israel and the Palestinians, dating to 1979.[i] Iranian press attention on translations of Khamenei’s writing on the Palestinians into both Urdu and Kurdish suggests renewed efforts by Khamenei to influence both Pakistani and Kurdish audiences. Over the past two decades, the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) has expanded its so-called “Axis of Resistance” to include not only Hezbollah and Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime, but also Iraqi militias and Houthi tribesmen in Yemen. In the early 1980s, the IRGC tried and failed to create a Hezbollah-like movement among Pakistani Shi’ites akin to its organization of Lebanese Shi’ites.

The effort to proselytize and disseminate Khamenei’s views to a Pakistani audience may suggest a renewed effort to cultivate the general Pakistani population. Such outreach would not limit itself to Pakistani Shi’ites but would seek to use Khamenei’s anti-Israel credentials to bolster Iran’s broader foreign policy leadership.[ii] The Iranian emphasis on cultivating Kurds suggests an effort to expand the Iranian regime’s influence among a population that has both been resistant to Khamenei’s worldview and has also cooperated closely with the U.S. military. While Iran maintains an open presence in Iraqi Kurdistan, the United States maintains a more overt presence. Both Iraqi Kurdistan and the Kurdish-dominated Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria impede the IRGC’s “land bridge” between Iran and the Eastern Mediterranean. Flipping the Kurds may not be imminent in the short-term, but Iran tends to play the long game.

Sources:

“کتاب «فلسطین؛ از منظر حضرت آیت‌الله سید علی خامنه‌ای» خشم نخست وزیر اسراییل را موجب شد” (The book Palestine: from the perspective of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, angered the Prime Minister of Israel.),” Dolat.ir (Government Information Center of the Islamic Republic of Iran), 11 May 2024. https://dolat.ir/detail/448480

The book Palestine is a compilation of descriptions, analyses, and proposed solutions by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution on the issue of Palestine. Given the significance and influential position of Imam Khamenei’s perspective on the Palestinian matter, and the unique current circumstances, this book has been translated and made available in various languages such as Arabic, English, Russian, Turkish, and other languages….

Hujjat al-Islam Saeed Solh-Mirzaei, a member of the Assembly of Experts said, “Due to the importance of Palestine for Urdu and Kurdish speakers, this book has been translated into these two languages, and it is hoped that all Muslims and freedom fighters around the world will become familiar with the contents of this book and fulfill their duties towards Palestine. God willing, they will soon pray together in gratitude in the noble Al-Qods.”

Notes:

[i] Filistin az manzar-i Ayatullah Khamini’i (Palestine from the Perspective of His Holiness Ayatollah Khamenei), Tehran: Islamic Revolution Publication, 2011.

[ii] For discussion of Iranian efforts to create Afghan and Pakistani militias, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Praises Revolutionary Guards’ Proxy Afghan Brigade,” OE Watch, 03-2023 https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/iran-praises-revolutionary-guards-proxy-afghan-brigade/; and Michael Rubin, “Cleric Speaks on Iran’s Foreign Militias,” OE Watch, February 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/266059/download

Image Information:

Image: International Department of the Islamic Revolution Cultural & Research Institute unveils translations of Ali Khamenei’s book Palestine at the Tehran International Book Fair, May 10, 2024.
Source: https://cdn-english.khamenei.ir/d/2024/05/11/3/40662.jpg
Attribution: Khamenei.ir

Iran’s Army Chief Claims It Is Accelerating Israel’s Destruction

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“Photo of commander-in-chief of the army (Artesh), Sayyed Abdolrahim Mousavi,” Iranian Online (semi-official news agency affiliated with IRNA), Uknown.

“History is divided into two eras, before and after Operation True Promise.”

Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian Army, Sayyed Abdolrahim Mousavi, recently declared on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting that “just like the resistance of the people of Gaza… Operation True Promise also created a strategic movement in the world.” Mousavi was referring to Iran’s retaliatory attack against Israel on 13 April in response to the Israeli air strike on the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus, Syria that killed senior members of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force earlier that month.[i] Mousavi highlighted how the history of the world had been divided before and after Iran’s operation against Israel.[ii] Referencing comments by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Mousavi emphasized that Israel’s destruction would come in the next twenty-five years and was only accelerated by the events of the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023 as well as Operation True Promise, because the latter chipped away at Israel’s security and invigorated political divisions within Israeli society. Of note, Iran’s 13 April attack brought Israel and Iran out of their forty-five-year shadow war, which had been marked by assassinations, cyberattacks, and sabotage. Israel’s subsequent attack on Iran on 19 April restored deterrence for the time being, but Israel’s limited response – destroying an S-300 [RG1] air defense system, demonstrating Israel’s ability to attack and take out Iranian air defense – has given Iran’s clerics the space to continue making bold statements at a time when regional tensions are at an all-time high, and when miscalculation is always a possibility.[iii]

Sources:

“دنیا به قبل و بعد از عملیات «وعده صادق» تقسیم شده است (The world is divided between before and after ‘True Promise’ operation),” Iranians Students’ News Agency (ISNA), 9 May 2024. https://www.isna.ir/news/1403022014474/%D8%AF%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D9%88-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%82-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA

The commander in chief of the army said: History is divided into two eras, before and after Operation True Promise. Just like how al-Aqsa Storm and the resistance of the people of Gaza took the world in a new direction, Operation True Promise also created a strategic movement in the world.

Today (May 9), Commander Sayyed Abdolrahim Mousavi, on the sidelines of awarding the medal of sacrifice presented by the commander-in-chief to the families of martyrs in the presence of journalists, spoke about the achievements of the army in the country: In the constitution it is emphasized that the army is popular. The army is national capital that belongs to the people of Iran, and wherever the country needs, the army will act.

He continued: If there’s a threat in the skies, the army will fulfill its duties. If needed in the sea, it will raise the proud flag of the Islamic Republic. If a conflict arises, they will fulfill their duty. Air defense forces are a broad umbrella in the sky that will constantly defend the country…The commander-in-chief of the army added: As the Supreme Leader predicted, the Zionist regime (Israel) will not see the next 25 years, with al-Aqsa Storm and Operation True Promise this issue will accelerate, and it is likely that the life of this illegitimate regime will end sooner so that the whole world can be saved from this cancerous tumor.

Notes:

[i] “Iran says Israel bombs its embassy in Syria, kills commanders,” Reuters, 1 April 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-bombs-iran-embassy-syria-iranian-commanders-among-dead-2024-04-01/; Matthew Mpoke Bigg, “What We Know About Iran’s Attack on Israel and What Happens Next,” New York Times, 14 April 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/14/world/middleeast/iran-israel-drones-attack.html

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Jon Gambrell, “Satellite photos suggest Iran air defense radar struck in Isfahan during apparent Israeli attack,” Associated Press, 22 April 2024. https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-s300-radar-hit-isfahan-attack-ce6719d3df8ebf5af08b035427ee215c

Image Information:

Image: “Photo of commander-in-chief of the army (Artesh), Sayyed Abdolrahim Mousavi,” Iranian Online (semi-official news agency affiliated with IRNA), Uknown.
Source:https://inn.ir/news/article/65026/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%84%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%88%DB%8C:-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%82-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C%D9%84-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4%DB%8C%D8%AF
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Iranian Commander Threatens Pursuit of Nuclear Weapon

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“IRGC Commander Ahmad Haghtalab delivering speech,” IRIB video screenshot, 18 April 2024.

“If the false Zionist regime wants to exploit the threat of attacking our country’s nuclear centers as a tool to put pressure on Iran, it is possible and conceivable to revise the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear doctrine and policies to deviate from previously declared considerations.”

On 18 Aril 2024, Ahmad Haghtalab, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander the head of security for Iran’s nuclear sites, declared on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, that “If the fake Zionist regime [of Israel] wants to use the threat of attacking nuclear sites to put pressure on Iran, it is possible and conceivable for [Iran] to revise its nuclear doctrine and policies, and deviate from its past declared considerations.” Haghtalab also threatened that if Israel attacked Iran, Tehran has identified Israeli nuclear sites and would respond in kind in the vein of Operation True Promise. This refers to Iran’s 13 April retaliation after Israel’s strike and killing of several high-ranking IRGC commanders at the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus, Syria earlier in the month. Other Iranian officials have also made public comments in recent months about the revision of the country’s nuclear doctrine. As per the second excerpted article, the IRGC-affiliated Javan newspaper noted that Haghtalab’s comments regarding Iran’s possible nuclear pivot were the first made by a high-ranking IRGC official and were made with “coordination with top decision-making bodies.”  Iran appears to be testing the world stage, and with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in shambles,[i] Tehran may be preparing to fully pursue its nuclear program. Indeed, Iran has been incrementally pulling away from the JCPOA and is now enriching uranium at 60 percent purity—short of the 90 percent purity required to be weapons-grade.[ii] In strategic terms, a nuclear weapon could also be considered a deterrent against forced regime change, and the ailing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, now 85, may be thinking about Iran’s survival post-mortem. Whatever the rationale, the renewed discussions of a nuclear revival merit attention.

Sources:

Source:

“مراکز هسته ای کشور در امنیت کامل هستند (Nuclear centers of the country are completely safe)” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 18 April 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00Hf4p

Chief Ahmad Haghtalab, pointing to the Zionist regime’s criminal act by attacking the consulate of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the country of Syria, has stamped out international laws and regulations…

The IRGC commander of the protection and security of the country’s nuclear centers, emphasizing that the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran are fully ready, noted: the nuclear sites of the Zionist enemy have the necessary identification and information and is at our disposal, and so to respond to their possible action. Our hands are on the trigger of firing powerful missiles to destroy specified targets.

He said that if the Zionist regime wants to take action against our nuclear centers and facilities, it will definitely and certainly be faced with our reaction…

If the false Zionist regime wants to exploit the threat of attacking our country’s nuclear centers as a tool to put pressure on Iran, it is possible and conceivable to revise the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear doctrine and policies to deviate from previously declared considerations.

Source:

“ اسرائیل تهدید اتمی مقام رسمی سپاه را جدی بگیرد (Israel must take the nuclear threat of the IRGC official seriously) Javan newspaper (daily newspaper closely tied to IRGC), 18 April 2024. https://www.javanonline.ir/0058dL

These statements, which are made for the first time by a senior IRGC official, are of serious importance in some ways…

Israel must take the message of this IRGC commander seriously because the red line of any country is its national security, and if Iran sees that its conventional weapons cannot provide security for its nuclear facilities, it may reconsider its defense and nuclear doctrines…Certainly this comment, which is widely published by the Islamic Republic’s official media, was not without coordination with the higher decision-making bodies of this system.

Notes:

[i] In 2015, five world powers plus Germany signed what became known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which curbed Iran’s controversial nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, 14 July 2015. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-comprehensive-plan-action_en

[ii] In 2018 the Trump administration withdrew from the 2015 JCPOA deal and reimposed sanctions, despite Tehran having not violating the agreement at the time. See: “President Donald J. Trump is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal,” White House, 8 May 2018. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal/; Francois Murphy, “Iran undoes slowdown in enrichment of uranium to near weapons-grade -IAEA,” Reuters, 26 December 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-undoes-slowdown-enrichment-uranium-near-weapons-grade-iaea-2023-12-26

Image Information:

Image: “IRGC Commander Ahmad Haghtalab delivering speech,” IRIB video screenshot, 18 April 2024.
Source: https://www.iribnews.ir/00Hf4p
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Iran To Cooperate With Russia On Gas Infrastructure and Trade

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Iran’s gas infrastructure remains both antiquated and inefficient.

“[Mohammad Hosseini] expressed Iran’s readiness to expand its cooperation with Russia to improve the safety of gas facilities against sabotage and terrorist attacks.”

Iran has the world’s third-largest proven oil reserves and, even under sanctions, remains one of the top ten world producers. Yet Iran’s gas industry lags far behind its oil extraction capabilities due to an antiquated refinery and pipeline network. Iran must import much of the gas that it utilizes both to fuel transportation needs and to inject into oil fields to facilitate extraction. Iran is increasingly looking to Russia, for assistance.

The excerpted report from Iran-focused Dubai-based brokerage PCM Farsi, addresses a meeting between Hossein Ali Mohammad Hosseini, the director of the Corporate Planning of the National Iranian Gas Company, and Russian energy officials. Hosseini’s comments that Russia and Iran might cooperate regarding gas infrastructure modernization reflects the government’s commercial agenda: if the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked National Iranian Gas Company can curb losses attributable to waste, then it will not need to spend as much to import refined gasoline.[i] The report also notes the vulnerability of Iran’s gas infrastructure . Iran has blamed Israel, without evidence, for a February 2024 explosion on a major pipeline. In the wake of the Woman, Life, Freedom protests, there have been numerous other gas infrastructure explosions across the country according to reports and social media discussions by ordinary Iranians. Many of these incidents go unreported, while the official Iranian media often dismisses the reported incidents as accidents, or the result of illegal tapping of gas lines to steal petrol. To acknowledge openly the need to work with Russia against gas infrastructure sabotage and terrorism suggests that the Iranian gas industry officials do not fully believe the more innocent explanations from their government. Given the importance of hydrocarbons to Iran’s economy, a faltering gas infrastructure and any vulnerability to sabotage, vandalism, or insurgency could disproportionately affect Iran’s economy and potentially its military readiness.

Sources:

“تهران و مسکو همکاری‌های خود را در زمینه فناوری گاز گسترش می‌دهند” (Tehran and Moscow expanding their cooperation in the field of gas technology),” PCM Farsi (Persian language portal of Dubai-based PCM Brokerage), 14 May 2024. https://pcmfa.news/2024/05/14/11977/

Mohammad Hosseini mentioned the desire for Iran to expand relations with Russia in the energy sector, and said his country welcomes the proposal of the Ministry of Energy of Russia to hold a specialized meeting on digitization, monitoring, and data analysis at the Russian Energy Week, as well as at the St. Petersburg Energy Congress. In his remarks, the director of the National Iranian Gas Company stressed the need to share common experiences in area such as reducing the amount of gas loss, and he expressed Iran’s readiness to expand its cooperation with Russia to improve the safety of gas facilities against sabotage and terrorist attacks.

Notes:

[i] For discussion of Iran’s efforts for gasoline self-sufficiency, see: Michael Rubin, “Achieving Gasoline Self-Sufficiency in Iran,” OE Watch, August 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/241432/download

Image: Iran’s gas infrastructure remains both antiquated and inefficient.
Source: Mojtaba Mohammadgholi, Shana Photo, https://media.shana.ir/d/2023/08/20/3/392725.jpg?ts=1692521593000
Attribution: Shana.ir

Revisiting Russian “Africa Corps’” Organizational Structure

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Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (left) is heading the newly formed Africa Corps, which under his leadership is set to become a key entity through which the Russian state will project power in West Africa.

“The Africa Corps represents the new incarnation of Russian military influence in Africa.”

Following the death of Russian Wagner Group founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious airplane crash near Moscow in 2023, reports have emerged that his successor is Russian Deputy Defense Minister, General Yunus-Bek Evkurov.[i] However, in Africa, the mercenary company’s operation is rebranding as “Africa Corps” whereas the company’s operations elsewhere in the world seem to be retaining the Wagner brand. This new branding may help the company avoid the stigma of its Wagner predecessors for war crimes and smuggling and reduce international pressure against the company in Africa.

The excerpted French-language article in the Chadian publication, alwihdainfo.com, is an African perspective of the differences between Russia’s Africa Corps[ii] and its predecessor Wagner Group. The article acknowledges that Africa Corps is the successor to Wagner Group with important differences. First, it notes that Africa Corps is intended to legitimize the Russian military influence on the African continent while competing with the diminishing presence of the U.S. and European powers. Second, Africa Corps may have a smaller footprint than Wagner in Africa. For example, the article mentions it operates only in Libya, inheriting Wagner’s main bases and most of Wagner’s fighters; Burkina Faso; Mali; Central African Republic and Niger. According to the article, Libya’s position on the Mediterranean Sea facilitates military supply lines and the movement of Africa Corps personnel into Africa. The previous iteration of Wagner had also operated extensively in Sudan and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in Eastern Africa, including Mozambique and Madagascar.[iii]

Another difference highlighted in the article relates to the way that Africa Corps will operate. Africa Corps is now focusing on providing military support to African countries through instructors, weapons, and developing counter-terrorism strategies with host nations in cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defense. In contrast, Wagner soldiers directly participated in missions against terrorist or insurgent groups and functioned separate from, albeit in support of, the Russian government. The article indicates that the new Africa Corps will be more sustainable than the previous Wagner Group because of Africa Corps’ formal integration with the Russian state, and the ministry of defense. Further the ministry’s commitment to Africa Corps indicates that Russia is serious about its geopolitical ambitions in West Africa and Africa Corps’ impact on the region will not be fleeting. At a time when Western influence and partnerships with West African states are waning, Africa Corps is becoming the entity through which Russia will reassert itself.

Sources:

Source: “De ‘Wagner’ à ‘Africa Corps’: la Russie toujours présente au Sahel (From ‘Wagner’ to ‘Africa Corps’: Russia always is present in the Sahel),” alwihdainfo.com (French-language Chadian publication with a reputation for independent reporting and being critical of the government), 3 May 2024. https://www.alwihdainfo.com/De-Wagner-a-Africa-Corps-la-Russie-toujours-presente-au-Sahel_a132053.html

Recently, many people have been curious about the difference between the Russian paramilitary group “Wagner” and the “Africa Corps”, which newly appeared on the African scene and which was also founded in Russia to be deployed in African countries. In this analysis, we will seek to explain the difference between the two organizations, how and where they operate, and what their ambitions are in Africa.

Africa Corps is a Russian military company that was created in early 2024 as a replacement for the Wagner Group. This organization reflects Russia’s desire to extend its military influence on the African continent and to provide legitimacy to its official and public presence in the face of the European and American presence. Africa Corps is deployed in 5 countries: Libya, Burkina Faso, Mali, Central African Republic and Niger. Libya represents the core of the corps due to the previous activity of Wagner elements in the city of Tripoli…. Another factor in the choice of Libya as the headquarters of this corps is its strategic geographical location due to its connection with the Mediterranean coast, which ensures military supply lines and movement of corps members to other countries The Africa Corps’ modus operandi is entirely dependent on providing military support to African countries such as instructors and weapons. The company also is concerns with the development of strategies in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, such as is the case in Mali and Niger… In short, the Africa Corps represents the new incarnation of Russian military influence in Africa.

Notes:

[ii] Since the death of Russian Wagner Group founder and CEO, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious airplane crash near Moscow in 2023, reports have emerged that his successor is Russian Deputy Defense Minister, General Yunus-Bek Evkurov. For a profile of Evkurov, which argues that he “has the full backing of Russia’s military establishment and will not have to beg for ammunition or restrict himself to the use of contractors and mercenaries,” see: Andrew McGregor, “Yunus-Bek Yevkurov: A Profile of Russia’s New Ingush African Corps Leader,” Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume: 15 Issue: 3, 18 April 2024. (URL?) The article notes that under Yevkurov “the Africa Corps will have greater access to resources, but will be expected to be self-sufficient in many ways. This means Wagner-style associations with business interests will likely continue, although disentangling these interests from the Wagner network will be challenging.” In addition, it asserts that “Improving battlefield performance will be a priority for Yevkurov. Thus far, Russian fighters have not proven any more effective in eliminating Sahelian terrorist formations than their French predecessors.”

[iii] See, for example, Brian Katz, Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, Nicholas Harrington, “Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies, CSIS, September 2020, https://russianpmcs.csis.org/

Image Information:

Image: Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (left) is heading the newly formed Africa Corps, which under his leadership is set to become a key entity through which the Russian state will project power in West Africa.
Source:kremlin.ru, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Deputy_Defence_Minister_Yunus-Bek_Yevkurov_and_Wagner_leader_Andrei_Troshev.jpg
Attribution: CC x 4.0