2023-06-08 An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 2 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles)

An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 2 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles). Click image to download.

(Click image to download brief.)


This study describes how Russian military theorists think about the initial period of war (IPW) concept and its relation to strategic operations, and posits that due to the nature of the special military operation, the IPW concept was likely in no way a part of the operational planning process. While there were likely political motivations for the use of the term “special military operation” instead of “war,” the term “war” was not used for the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, because it was not envisioned to meet the criteria for “war” as understood by Russian military theorists

An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 1 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles)

An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 1 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles). Click image to download.

(Click image to download brief.)


This study describes the historical evolution of the Russian concept of the initial period of war (IPW). The concept has evolved substantially since its inception, which can be traced back to at least the early 1900s, but it generally pertains to the decisive strategic operations that occur during the first few days of war, that set conditions for strategic success, and the activities that occur before the war (period of imminent threat or preparation period in Russian military parlance) that make these strategic operations possible;


China Justifies Naval Pressure Against Japan

JS Kurama sails in the East China Sea during a trilateral exercise, June 2021.

JS Kurama sails in the East China Sea during a trilateral exercise, June 2021.


“When Sino-Japanese relations become extremely tense, there will be another reconnaissance ship that will continue to perform missions in the waters surrounding Japan.”


On 10 May, the Chinese-language website sohu.com published the below excerpted article, which justifies Chinese naval activities in the East Sea as a response to perceived hostile actions by Japan. Moreover, the article indicates that Chinese pressure against Japan is achieving positive results. According to the article, a Chinese naval reconnaissance ship entered the Sea of Japan through the Tsushima Strait between South Korea and Japan, sailed around Japanese territory, and came within only six nautical miles the Japanese coast.[i] While the article refrains from claiming any strategic benefits, it argues the operation succeeded in frightening and thus sending a message to Japan.

The article also claims that Japanese media has interpreted the Chinese naval activities as treating Japan as an enemy. It suggests that as long as Sino-Japanese relations remain tense, Chinese naval reconnaissance ships will continue performing missions in the waters surrounding Japan. Likewise, the article notes that China dispatched several destroyers and other naval ships to conduct live fire drills in the East Sea after pro-Taiwan remarks were made by officials at the G7 foreign ministers meeting in Nagano, Japan. The end of the article alludes to the alliance between China and Russia, where it notes that Japan erred by trying to restore militarism and embracing confrontation with China and Russia.[ii] As a result of this, the article argues that Japan was exhausting its Self-Defense Forces in dealing with both Chinese and Russian military pressure. This implies that China is employing a strategy of weakening the Japanese military through over-extending its forces and wearing it down, a strategy China continues to use against Taiwan.


Source:

“解放军军舰横穿日本,距离海岸仅6海里,海自如临大敌 (The warships of the People’s Liberation Army went across Japan, only 6 nautical miles from the coast, and freely encountered the enemy),” sohu.com (popular pro-government Chinese-language website targeting a youth and gaming readership), 10 May 2023. https://www.sohu.com/a/674302624_121462986

Japan has become an anti-China bridgehead, and the reconnaissance ships of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) approached its territorial waters to frighten the Self-Defense Forces sufficiently. According to the news released by the Ministry of Defense of Japan, the reconnaissance ship sailed around Japan in three weeks…. At the closest time, it was only about 6 nautical miles from the Japanese mainland.

When Sino-Japanese relations are extremely tense, there will be another reconnaissance ship that will continue to perform missions in the waters surrounding Japan.

In response to remarks related to Taiwan made at the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting, China not only rejected such ludicrous remarks diplomatically. At the same time, a destroyer from the navy in the Eastern Theater Command of the PLA was dispatched to conduct live-fire shooting training in a specific area of the East China Sea.In recent years, Japan has had to face regular military pressure from China and Russia, which has exhausted its Self-Defense Forces.


Notes:

[i] The Tsushima Strait was the site of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905 in which Japan was victorious. More than one century later, since 2020, Japan has observed an increase in Russian naval ships that have passed through the Tsushima Strait and Soya Strait to its north nearly twice as often than a decade earlier. This has concerned the Japanese Ministry of Defense. See Japan Ministry of Defense, “Development of Russian Armed Forces in the Vicinity of Japan,” mod.go.jp, September 2021. https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/pdf/ru_d-act_e_210906.pdf

[ii] Although Japan has been upgrading its military capabilities over the past several years, this has been amid—and generally in response to—a military build-up by China. Further, Japan has consistently since the 1990s spent only between .09% and 1% of its GDP on the military. China, however, has viewed Japan as engaging in “military expansion planning” and has strongly criticized Japan for this.  For more, see: Sheila A. Smith, “How Japan Is Upgrading Its Military,” CFR, February 24, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-japan-upgrading-its-military


Image Information:

Image: JS Kurama sails in the East China Sea during a trilateral exercise, June 2021.
Source: Paul Kelly https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:JS_Kurama_sails_in_the_East_China_Sea_during_a_trilateral_exercise,_-21_Jun._2012_a.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Iran Ready To Help Syria Rebuild Its Defense Infrastructure

Iranian Defense Minister Mohammed Reza-Ashtiani meets with Abdul Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim, Chief of General Staff of the Syrian Army, 10 May 2023

Iranian Defense Minister Mohammed Reza-Ashtiani meets with Abdul Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim, Chief of General Staff of the Syrian Army, 10 May 2023.


“Iran is now ready to use its capacities and capabilities to rebuild and contribute to the development of the infrastructure of the Syrian defense industry.”


The 12-year-old Syrian civil war appears to be nearing its end. As the Arab League re-embraces Syria and the international community begins to discuss reconstruction,[i] an opportunity from which Iran also seeks to profit,[ii] the Iranian Ministry of Defense also seeks to rebuild and reconstruct Syria’s military, according to the excerpted news story from Iran’s Holy Defense News Agency. While neither Tehran nor Damascus have yet reported an agreement for Iran to rebuild the Syrian military, the Iranian government expects repayment for its military investment in and dispatch of volunteers and advisers to Syria during the war.[iii] The recent visit of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to Syria, among other bilateral visits and exchanges, suggest that cementing and augmenting the Iran-Syria axis is a strategic priority for Tehran. From the Iranian perspective, helping rebuild Syria’s defense sector achieves two goals. Strategically, it advances Iran’s goal of militarily eliminating Israel as a Jewish state, while operationally, it provides an important revenue stream for Iran’s domestic military industries.


Source:

“Amir Ashtiani: Amadegi Iran baraye komak beh Tawseah Zirsakht-e Sanaea’-e Defah-e Suriyah (Amir Ashtiani: Iran Ready to Help Develop Infrastructure for Syrian Defense Industry ),” Holy Defense News Agency (official news agency of Iran’s Defense Ministry), 10 May 2023. https://defapress.ir/fa/news/588336

Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, met with Lieutenant-General Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim, Chief of the General Staff of the Syrian Army. While commemorating the memory of General Haj Qasem Soleimani as a martyr in the fight against terrorism and for the security of the Syrian people and the region, Ashtiani stated, “Relations between the two countries are experiencing one of the best periods in their history. We have a strategic agreement, but this is rooted in our brotherly relations.”

The Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, stating that the recent visit of the Iranian president to Damascus and his welcome by the Syrian government and people indicates deep bilateral relations, added, “This trip and its agreements as well as the issues I discussed with the Syrian Defense Minister in Moscow and Damascus are on the agenda….”Ashtiani, emphasizing the work of the Joint Commission on Defense-Technical Cooperation between the two countries, said, “Be sure, the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran is now ready to use its capacities and capabilities to rebuild and contribute to the development of the infrastructure of the Syrian defense industry, just as it stood alongside the Syrian armed forces during the war against terrorism.”


Notes:

[i] Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime controls much of the country except for some northern districts occupied by Turkish forces or their proxies, and the far northeast of the county in which Kurds have established an autonomous administration. The war’s destruction has been vast. A quarter of the country’s population has fled creating a refugee crisis in surrounding counties, and many are Syrians are displaced inside Syria. In some towns, rocket strikes, battle damage, and looting by various militias and armies has rendered upward of 90 percent of the structures uninhabitable.

[ii] For example, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Proposal To Build Railroads and Housing in Syria could Enrich IRGC” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/429079/download

[iii] For example, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Basij Recruiting for Syria Fight” OE Watch, March 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195441


Image Information:

Image: Iranian Defense Minister Mohammed Reza-Ashtiani meets with Abdul Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim, Chief of General Staff of the Syrian Army, 10 May 2023
Source: https://cdn.isna.ir/d/2023/05/10/3/62604330.jpg?ts=1683727966517
Attribution: Iranian Students’ News Agency

Chinese Perspective on Manned-Unmanned Coordinated Operations on the Modern Battlefield

Hongdu GJ-11 Sharp Sword[RG1]  (Chinese unmanned combat aerial vehicle).

Hongdu GJ-11 Sharp Sword [RG1]  (Chinese unmanned combat aerial vehicle).


“The manned-unmanned combat team has rewritten the modern battlefield formation model, with manned platforms leading unmanned platforms to form an integrated combat team.”


Researchers with China’s Air Force Research Institute recently published an article in China’s PLA Daily outlining five trends in coordinating manned and unmanned battlefield operations. Except for the potential for clustered autonomous systems to increase battlefield uncertainty, the authors argue that recent efforts to divide labor between complementary manned and unmanned systems have provided more options for tactical configuration and combat synergy.  The authors, Guo Yilun and Ma Quan assert there are three types of manned-unmanned platforms: 1) direct transmission of unmanned information for rear control, 2) interoperability between manned and unmanned platforms under limited control, and 3) completely controlled manned-unmanned platforms. As autonomous platforms continue to develop, the Chinese military will be able to combine manned and unmanned platforms into combat groups that will facilitate information processing, mission planning and decision-making, command distribution, and formation of operations to provide flexibility in constantly developing battlefield postures. A second benefit the authors believe will result from closer man-machine coordination is increased battlefield situational awareness. A real-time tactical “cloud” system will rapidly detect, process, and distribute requirements based on developing target data. Information from space platforms, sensors, and weapon systems in the land, sea, air, and space domains will be cross-verified and integrated into a unified framework that coordinates manned and unmanned data. Third, distributed command-and-control systems will be able to disaggregate computing, collection, and decision-making functions and assign sub-problems to collaborative manned-unmanned groups. Fourth, the authors argue that systems of higher autonomous control bring greater uncertainty in warfare; as such, autonomous systems should be classified by the degree to which they are integrated with manned systems. The authors suggest four levels of autonomy: non-autonomy, single-machine autonomy, multi-machine autonomy, and clustered autonomy. Finally, the authors assert that further integrating unmanned systems will save more than 60 percent the cost of manned operations and double their effectiveness.


Source:

郭一伦 (Guo Yilun) and 马权 (Ma Quan), “撬动战争形态衍变的新支点 (Prying a New Lever in Evolving Warfare Patterns),” PLA Dailv (PLA-owned media), 27 April 2023. http://www.81.cn/bz_208549/10165050.html

In the face of future intelligent battlefield environments, the use of a large number of intelligent, unmanned weapons and equipment will reshape battlefield combat force systems. Manned/unmanned combat forces will be flexibly organized as needed, and can be combined into different types and sizes of combat groups, which can be linked for information fusion processing, mission planning and decision-making, command distribution, and formation operations according to combat tasks and battlefield posture.


Image: Hongdu GJ-11 Sharp Sword[RG1]  (Chinese unmanned combat aerial vehicle).
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hongdu_GJ-11#/media/File:Gongji-11_20221020.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Iran Opens New Helicopter, Drone Base in Southeastern Provincial Capital

Helicopters purportedly at the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ new helicopter and drone base in Zahedan.

Helicopters purportedly at the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ new helicopter and drone base in Zahedan.


“The helicopter fleet in the southeast of the country was strengthened for large security missions.”


Iran is beefing up its military strike capability in its southeastern province of Sistan va Baluchistan with a new helicopter and drone-capable air base in the provincial capital of Zahedan. While the region is the second-largest Iranian province by size, its population is sparse and the province itself has long been considered a backwater. Indian Ocean trade from its strategic port of Chabahar remains miniscule in comparison to Iran’s Persian Gulf and Caspian ports.[i] According to the following excerpted article from Azad News Agency, the base will “accommodate IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] drones…[a]ll sorts of attack and combat helicopters, search and rescue craft, and unmanned aerial vehicles.” This announcement is notable since the region has long been a strategic Achilles’ heel for the Iranian regime. Smuggling across Iran’s frontier with Afghanistan is a problem that predates Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. The region has long been restive both because its harsh terrain gives shelter to criminals and terrorists and because of sectarian and ethnic tension between the local Sunni and Baluch population and the Shi’ite Persians and Azeris who dominate the Iranian regime and the IRGC. There has been no shortage of unrest in recent years, including high-profile attacks on the IRGC in the region.[ii] These conditions may be the prime reason, albeit unstated in the Iranian press, why the IRGC has established the base in Sistan va Baluchistan. The move may also reflect the Iranian regime hedging its bets regarding future relations with the Taliban across the border in Afghanistan. Curiously, given previous Iranian investment in Chabahar, the decision to locate the base beyond helicopter range to the port raises questions about Iranian strategy, although it may reflect a rolling decision to deemphasize the strategic importance of the port in the future.


Source:

“Paygah-e Havaye va Balgard-e Niru-ye Zamini Sepah Aftah Shod (The Army Air Force Opens its Helicopter Headquarters),” Azad News Agency (an ostensibly private news agency that closely follows the government line), 10 May 2023. https://ana.press/fa/news/846682

…In the presence of General Hossein Salami, Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an air and helicopter base named “Ali Arabi” was inaugurated in Zahedan, in the southeast of the country. It will also accommodate IRGC drones. All sorts of attack and combat helicopters, search and rescue craft, and unmanned aerial vehicles can use the base that is built to the latest technical specifications and aviation standards.General Mohammed Pakpour, Commander of the IRGC Ground Forces, spoke about the objectives in building the base. “With the operation of this base, the IRGC’s ground force helicopter fleet in the southeast of the country was strengthened and equipped for large security, defense, rescue and rescue missions, support, people assistance and service,” he said. “In addition to creating the capacity for maintenance and simultaneous take-off of dozens of helicopters, all capacity for refueling, hangering, repairs and maintenance have been created.”


Notes:

[i] For example, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Construction Begins on the Chabahar-Zahedan Railway” OE Watch, December 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/359394/download

[ii] For example, see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian Border Guard Post Overrun, Guards Abducted” OE Watch, December 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/252911/download


Image Information:

Image: Helicopters purportedly at the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ new helicopter and drone base in Zahedan.
Source: https://ana.press/files/fa/news/1402/2/20/228265_685.jpg
Attribution: Azad News Agency

Beijing Expands Counter-Espionage Law To Crack Down on Foreign Access to Chinese Information

Activities carried out, instigated or funded … to steal, pry into, purchase or illegally provide state secrets, intelligence, and other documents, data, materials, or items related to national security.”


In April 2023 Chinese lawmakers passed a wide-ranging update to Beijing’s counter-espionage legislation banning the transfer of “all documents, data, materials, and items related to national security and interests” and broadening the definition of spying.[i] The amendments, as published in the excerpted statement from the Chinese government’s China.gov website, note that they will take effect on 1 July 2023. The amendments appear to target foreign information-gathering efforts, especially by limiting access to key government and economic data and expanding the range of legal definitions of espionage.[ii] Since the introduction of the legislation in 2014, Beijing has detained dozens of Chinese and foreign nationals on suspicion of espionage.[iii] Several high-profile incidents have emerged, including those involving an Australian journalist and former TV anchor; a Japanese executive; and even a U.S. citizen who has been detained in China since 2016 on charges of espionage related to research he published using open-source information that the Chinese government later deemed to be “state secrets.” Collectively, these incidents have brought attention to Beijing’s unclear definition of what constitutes “espionage.” Earlier this year, Chinese government raids on foreign firms conducting due diligence work in China further underscored the often-questionable lengths to which Beijing will go to control access to information that could be used for a variety of efforts that run counter to the Chinese Communist Party’s interests. [iv]


Source:

“中国人民共和国反间谍法 (People’s Republic of China’s Counter-Espionage Law),” China.gov (Official Website of the People’s Republic of China’s Central People’s Government), 27 April 2023. http://www.gov.cn/yaowen/2023-04/27/content_5753385.htm.

Article 4: “Acts of espionage” as used in this Law refers to the following conduct:

(1) Activities that endanger the national security of the People’s Republic of China that are carried out, prompted, or funded by an espionage organization and its agents, or carried out by agencies, organs, individuals, or other collaborators domestically or outside the PRC borders;

(2) Participation in an espionage organization or acceptance of tasks from an espionage organization and its agents, or seeking to align with an espionage organization and its agents;

(3) Activities carried out, instigated or funded by foreign institutions, organizations, and individuals other than espionage organizations and their representatives, or in which domestic institutions, organizations or individuals collude, to steal, pry into, purchase or illegally provide state secrets, intelligence, and other documents, data, materials, or items related to national security, or in which state employees are incited, enticed, coerced, or bought over to turn traitor.

(4) Network attacks, intrusions, obstructions, control, or disruptions targeting state organs, units involved with secrets, or critical information infrastructure, that are carried out, prompted, or funded by a espionage organization and its agents, or carried out by agencies, organs, individuals, or other collaborators domestically or outside the PRC borders;

(5) indicating targets for enemies;

(6) conducting other espionage activities.

This law applies where espionage organizations and their agents engage in espionage activities targeting a third country within the territory of the People’s Republic of China or using citizens, organizations, or other conditions of the PRC, endangering the PRC’s national security.

Article 14: No individual or organization may unlawfully obtain or possess any documents, data, materials or items that are state secrets.


Notes:

[i] For an English-language translation of the Counter-Espionage Law, see: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/counter-espionage-law-2023/

[ii] For a detailed analysis of China’s Counter-Espionage Law and the new amendments, see: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/bad-as-it-ever-was-notes-on-the-espionage-law/

[iii] The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) has determined many foreign citizens, including U.S. citizens, have been denied due process rights and that they are arbitrarily detained in violation of international law. In March 2023, China’s Foreign Ministry released a report accusing the United States of arbitrary detention of individuals at home and abroad one month prior to releasing its amendments to its counter-espionage legislation. See: “The United States’ Arbitrary Detention at Home and Abroad: Truth and Facts,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 29 March 2023,  https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbxw/202303/t20230329_11050809.html

[iv] In addition to due diligence firms, Beijing has blocked access to the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI), China’s largest academic database, in an effort that analysts assess is aimed at limiting foreign researchers’ access to public discourse and government data. For more on Beijing’s restriction of access to CNKI, see: Lin Yang, “China to Limit Access to Largest Academic Database,” Voice of America, 30 March 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-to-limit-access-to-largest-academic-database-/7029581.html


Iran Unveils New Thermobaric Warhead

An Iranian Fajr-5 rocket launch, February 6, 2017

An Iranian Fajr-5 rocket launch, February 6, 2017.


“Fajr-5 missiles…are now equipped with a new warhead with greater destructive power.”


Iran has long been an indigenously equipped military power,[i] and the Iranian press seemingly announces new weapons every few weeks. However, these announcements are often exaggerations As not every prototype makes it into the arsenals of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or the regular army. Those that do are apparent on the battlefield and across the broader region: Mohajer[GRLCUT(1]  and Ababil [GRLCUT(2] drones,[ii] Moudge-class destroyers, and Fateh-110 [RG3] and Fajr-5 missiles, for example. The Fajr-5 missile is an IRGC staple, which[iii] Tehran has acknowledged giving to U.S.-designated Palestinian terrorist groups. In 2012, a Fajr-5 fired by Hamas hit on an apartment building just outside Tel Aviv.  It is against this backdrop that reports like the accompanying article from IRGC news affiliate Tasnim News Agency, about a new, upgraded warhead for the Fajr-5 are notable. While Iranian press discussion focuses on the thermobaric warhead’s potential for Iran’s own counterterror fight, presumably against Kurdish and Baluchi separatists (respectively located in the country’s rugged northwest and southeast border regions), regional states and actors should assume that the IRGC will not limit a new thermobaric warhead solely to use in its domestic arsenal. Discussion of warhead stability also implies safer shipping and handling by groups less well-trained than the Iranian military. Should reports about the thermobaric warhead be accurate, a greater blast radius like that produced by the new thermobaric warhead, especially when fired against urban targets, will increase damage and lower the threshold for retaliation.


Source:

“Roketha-ye Fajr-5 Sepah Termobaric Shod (Revolutionary Guards’ Fajr-5 Rockets are now Thermobaric),” Tasnim News Agency (news agency affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), 8 May 2023. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/02/17/2887806

…The test of the new type of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’s Fajr-5 rocket equipped with thermobaric warhead has been successfully completed. The IRGC’s 333-mm Fajr-5 missiles, which had previously been delivered to the force as the Fajr-5C rocket, are now equipped with a new warhead with greater destructive power. This new warhead, produced by specialists of the IRGC’s Ground Force’s Self-Sufficiency Research and Jihad, has an explosive power of 1.5 times that of TNT, resulting in a greater radius of destruction and thermal effects. In addition, its lower sensitivity compared with TNT makes it safer to use than conventional warheads.

…When this type of ammunition explodes in the indoor space of underground bunkers or trenches, its destructive pressure stays in the shelter’s enclosed space for longer and causes more destruction, and thus is an efficient weapon for clearing fortifications and trenches….This new type of combat head for these rockets, due to their specific type of performance, is also a suitable weapon to deal with terrorist groups, especially in mountainous and difficult areas because these groups create shelters and strongholds in these areas using natural effects or engineering measures.


Notes:

[i] While many of Iran’s neighbors purchase off-the-shelf platforms and weaponry from the global arms market, the isolation Iran suffered during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War changed Iran’s strategic doctrine to favor production rather than acquisition of armaments. For more information, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Domestic Weapons Production Up 69 Percent,” OE Watch, March 2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195239/download

[ii] For previous reporting on Fajr-5 development, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: IRGC Debuts New Explosive Plant,” OE Watch, July 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195435

[iii] For background, see: Michael Rubin, “A Short History of the Iranian Drone Program,” American Enterprise Institute, 26 August 2020. https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/a-short-history-of-the-iranian-drone-program/


Image Information:

Image: An Iranian Fajr-5 rocket launch, February 6, 2017
Source: https://newsmedia.tasnimnews.com/Tasnim/Uploaded/Image/1395/11/18/139511181130493069920644.jpg
Attribution: Tasnim News Agency

Russia Concerned About Dependence on Chinese Technology

President Putin and Chinese President Xi, Kremlin, June 2019.

President Putin and Chinese President Xi, Kremlin, June 2019.


Russia’s conflict with Ukraine is making Moscow too dependent on Chinese technology…”


Over the past decade, as the Kremlin leadership has touted and celebrated its growing ties to China as it has sought to distance itself from the West. This turn toward Beijing accelerated after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as Western governments imposed additional sanctions and many Western firms departed. As the first excerpt from Russian television channel ORT describes, during President Xi’s visit to Moscow in March, there was talk of a comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation. Having only just recently been labeled as a war criminal by the Hague, the Chinese leader’s decision to make his first foreign visit since the onset of COVID-19 speaks volumes regarding his support for Putin. While political relations today are cordial, some in Russia are beginning to question their country’s growing economic and technological dependence upon China.[i] The second excerpt from Russian-language Turkish news service TRT captures this concern, which attributes it to Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. Not only are there security concerns regarding Russia’s dependence on this technology, but “Russian officials also fear that the growth of the presence of Chinese companies and developments in the Russian market could hinder the development of their own developments in the field of security.”[ii] The article concludes by quoting statistics regarding the growth of Russian firms using “Chinese cybersecurity solutions,” growing from 5 percent in 2022 to nearly 60 percent today. Should the current trend continue, China will gain considerable leverage over Russian information processing.


Sources:

Pavel Matveev, “Завершился государственный визит председателя КНР Си Цзиньпина в Россию (Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Russia ends),” ORT (Russian Main TV Channel), 22 March 2023. https://www.1tv.ru/news/2023-03-22/449553-zavershilsya_gosudarstvennyy_vizit_predsedatelya_knr_si_tszinpina_v_rossiyu

The farewell ceremony took place at Vnukovo airport. State flags, anthems of the two countries, after which the Chinese leader followed the red carpet to his plane.

…A full program, many meetings and negotiations, as a result of which important documents were signed and a joint statement was published on deepening comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction…. In particular, Russia will support Chinese business, which is replacing Western companies. Settlements between the two countries have already mostly switched to rubles and yuan….


“Российские чиновники опасаются растущей зависимости от Huawei (Russian officials wary of growing reliance on Huawei),” TRT (Turkish News Service in Russian), 20 April 2023. https://www.trtrussian.com/novosti/rossijskie-chinovniki-opasayutsya-rastushej-zavisimosti-ot-huawei-12905704

Russia’s conflict with Ukraine is making Moscow too dependent on Chinese technology, as US and EU sanctions have barred Russian firms from accessing Western technology. Instead, the Russian Federation is forced to reorient itself to Chinese developments, in particular, to deliveries from Huawei….

…The document cited by the publication says: some high-ranking Russian officials are concerned that Chinese companies such as Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. may take a dominant position in the Russian market, thereby posing a risk to the information security of the country. …In a report compiled by the Ministry of Digital Development of the Russian Federation in the summer of 2022, microcircuits, network devices and electronics are highlighted as areas of particular vulnerability.

…In addition to fears of growing dependence, Russian officials also fear that the growth of the presence of Chinese companies and developments in the Russian market could hinder the development of their own developments in the field of security…

…As TRT previously wrote in Russian, more than half of companies in Russia plan to switch to Chinese equipment in the field of cybersecurity after European and American manufacturers leave the Russian market.The Russian newspaper Kommersant, citing a survey by K2Tech integrator, notes that until 2022, only 5% of Russian companies used Chinese cybersecurity solutions. Now 60% of companies have switched to them or are planning to switch to them to replace the products of departed Western players – Cisco, Palo Alto, etc….


Notes:

[i] This concern has been growing for the past several years. For additional background, see: Ray Finch, “Russia-China: Potential Allies or Adversaries?,” OE Watch, November 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/340594

[ii] The Kremlin has been careful not to publicize information regarding unfair Chinese business practices and espionage to protect the warming relationship between the two countries.  For some relatively recent background, see: Ray Finch, “Russian Concerns over Chinese Espionage,” OE Watch, December 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/379981


Image Information:

Image: President Putin and Chinese President Xi, Kremlin, June 2019.
Source: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60669/photos
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl

Russia Strengthens Its Military Presence in Central Asia

 201st Military Base.

201st Military Base.


“Russia decided to increase the readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of “US attempts to restore its military presence in Central Asia.”


Russia’s military bases in Central Asia have always been important to its strategic goals in the region, particularly for dealing with potential instability in Afghanistan. While the Russian government initially accepted U.S. airbases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan beginning in 2001 to support operations in Afghanistan, it later pressed both governments to evict U.S. forces. The United States left the Kharshi-Khanbad airbase (known as K2) in Uzbekistan in 2005[i] and left the Transit Center at Manas in Kyrgyzstan in 2014. Russian officials have claimed that U.S. security cooperation with Central Asian states in the 2000s took place as part of an effort to establish permanent military bases in the region, though the United States has not used a regional military facility since it left Manas.

The accompanying excerpted article from Kyrgyzstan’s independent news website Kloop reports on a statement by Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on 28 April 2023 in New Delhi, India about increasing the combat readiness of Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Shoigu noted that Russia made this decision to increase combat readiness because the United States is trying “to restore its military presence in Central Asia…under the pretext of helping in the fight against terrorism.” However, the article also notes that Shoigu did not offer facts to substantiate this this claim. When Russian officials announced measures to strengthen its military bases in Central Asia in the past, they noted specific increases in capabilities, like the transfer of S-300 [RG1] air defense systems to Tajikistan in 2019.[ii] Shoigu also stated that requests from members of the SCO to host military facilities is a “direct threat to stability in the SCO space.” Shoigu did not mention which SCO member would potentially host the U.S. military, but SCO members in Central Asia include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. There have been no reports that any of the three have been negotiating to host U.S. forces, but Shoigu is warning fellow SCO members that Russia will consider hosting the United States as a threat. The article also usefully provides a reminder of the current Russian military bases in Central Asia. These include the Kant airbase outside Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and the 201st Russian military base, home of the 201st Motor Rifle Division, in Tajikistan, the latter of which is Russia’s largest military facility outside its borders. The article ends by noting that Ukraine claimed it destroyed a tactical group from the 201st military base last year, though this has not been verified. While Russia claims it is strengthening its bases in Central Asia as a measure to maintain its presence in the region, without any specific information on how this will take place, it is possible that Russia is doing this to replace losses of the of the 201st in Tajikistan suffered in Ukraine.


Source:

Munduzbek Kalykov, “Шойгу: Россия повышает боеготовность своих военных баз в Кыргызстане и Таджикистане (Shoigu: Russia will increase the combat readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan),” Kloop (an independent Russian-language news website in Kyrgyzstan), 29 April 2023. https://kloop.kg/blog/2023/04/29/shojgu-rossiya-povyshaet-boegotovnost-svoih-voennyh-baz-v-kyrgyzstane-i-tadzhikistane/

Russia decided to increase the readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of “US attempts to restore its military presence in Central Asia.” This was stated by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu as reported by RIA Novosti.

According to Shoigu, “the United States and its allies, under the pretext of helping in the fight against terrorism, are trying to restore their military presence in Central Asia.” However, he did not provide specific facts.

“We regard requests to the countries of the region to deploy military infrastructure as a direct threat to stability in the SCO space…” Shoigu said on April 28 at meeting of defense ministers of the SCO member states in New Delhi.

A Russian military base has existed in Kyrgyzstan since the early 2000s. Its main forces are located in the small town of Kant, not far from Bishkek – these are Su-25 [RG1] attack aircraft and Mi-8 [RG2] helicopters. The Russian joint military base also includes a test site at Issyk-Kul, where Russian sailors test underwater torpedoes.

The 201st Russian military base is located in Tajikistan, and the garrison is deployed in the cities of Dushanbe and Bokhtar. This is Russia’s largest military facility outside its borders. The base includes motorized rifle artillery, reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile and other units, as well as an air group……in mid-April 2022, the Ukrainian army announced the destruction of the tactical group of the 201st Russian military base, which has a permanent deployment in Tajikistan…


Notes:

[i] The withdrawal of U.S. forces from K2 cannot be solely attributed to Russian pressure. In May 2005, the Uzbek military forcefully put down public demonstrations in the Ferghana Valley, killing numerous civilians and drawing the ire of the Bush administration regarding human rights. This began a diplomatic row between the United States and Uzbekistan, which resulted in an Uzbekistani demand that the United States leave the base within six months, eventually withdrawing from K2 in November 2005.

[ii] For more background on Russia’s transfers of S-300s to Tajikistan, see: Matthew Stein “Russia Transfers S-300s to Tajikistan,” OE Watch, December 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues


Image Information:

Image: 201st Military Base.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:201_military_base_09.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0