Monthly Archives: February 2023

Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia

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Memorial of the Martyrs in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

Memorial of the Martyrs in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

“Are two weeks enough to train combatants? Does Burkina Faso have enough arms and ammunition to equip the 50,000 recruits? Will [the government] be able to control the numerous VDP groups scattered throughout the country’s 351 communes?”

Burkina Faso has adopted a two-pronged approach to fighting terrorism: through massive military and vigilante recruitment programs and by moving towards reliance on Russia. In the first excerpted article published bycentrist pan-African think tank Institute for Security Studies, the authors offer a useful overview of Burkina Faso’s domestic military recruiting efforts aimed at extending military force structure, which are marked by volunteer recruitment. Notably, they relay that after receiving some 90,000 applications for citizens to become members of the Volunteers of the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) brigades to combat violent extremist groups, the country has selected some 50,000, which it will assign to posts around the country following only 14 days of military training. The authors worry about the numerous challenges that such a large and likely underresourced mobilization might engender. In the second article from the Mali-based daily Le Journal du Mali, details emerge about the recent meeting between Russia’s Ambassador to Burkina Faso and the latter country’s Prime Minister. As the article details, the two have agreed to work together to fight terrorism, fueling rumors about the presence or entrance of Wagner mercenaries, which Burkina Faso has formally denied but which in-country observers have claimed to exist.[i] The Ambassador also promised to work with Burkina Faso on issues of technology transfers, which is indicative of Russia’s broader approach to garnering African allies. Burkina Faso’s new approach suggests a willingness to risk future instability by training and arming citizen militias, as well as to turn toward pariah states like Russia even if that means risking international isolation. While the efficacy of such new approaches remains to be seen, a key takeaway is that the traditional approaches of addressing African terrorism that have defined the last 20 years—primarily significant French and American assistance—are now in flux in West Africa.

Sources:

Hassane Koné and Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné, “Risks of Burkina Faso’s New Military Approach to Terrorism,” Institute for Security Studies (centrist pan-African think tank), 9 January 2023. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/risks-of-burkina-fasos-new-military-approach-to-terrorism

Fifty thousand Burkinabe civilians have joined the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) to fight the violent extremists currently occupying nearly half of the country. The recruitment campaign, launched in October 2022 by Burkina Faso’s authorities after the 30 September coup, ended on 18 November. More than 90,000 applications were received, and those selected will undergo 14 days of military training.

The military authorities intend to assign 35,000 VDPs in their residential communities and the remainder alongside the country’s Security and Defence Forces nationwide.

The use of civilian auxiliaries to support the security forces in the fight against terrorism has been tested since 2020 under Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, who was ousted as president in last year’s January coup. The civilians intervened mainly in the Kaya (North-Central), Ouahigouya (North) and Fada N’gourma (East) regions.

Captain Ibrahim Traoré, the new president of the transition, has made recovery of the territory lost to violent extremists his priority as did Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who Traoré overthrew in September. While Damiba considered dialogue with terrorists, Traoré seems to be focusing on military action based on the concept of popular defence…. Traoré also invited citizens to participate in the war effort by making in-kind or cash contributions…

Are two weeks enough to train combatants? Does the country have enough arms and ammunition to equip the 50 000 recruits? What living and working conditions will they have? Regarding supervision, will the Brigade of Vigilance and Patriotic Defense be able to control the numerous VDP groups scattered throughout the country’s 351 communes? Could inadequate supervision and human rights training not encourage abuses by the civilian auxiliaries?

“Burkina-Russie: Élaboration d’une feuille de route pour lutter contre le terrorisme (Burkina Faso-Russia: Elaboration of roadmap to fight terrorism),” Le Journal du Mali (privately-owned Malian daily), 12 January 2023. https://www.journaldumali.com/2023/01/12/burkina-russie-elaboration-dune-feuille-de-route-pour-lutter-contre-le-terrorisme/ 

The Russian ambassador accredited to Ouagadougou, with Abidjan as his residence, is staying in the Burkinabè capital where he met the Prime Minister of Burkina, Me Apollinaire Kyelem de Tambèla and several members of his government. Ouagadougou and Moscow will “develop a roadmap of their bilateral cooperation. From this, we will see what Russia could bring to Burkina in the context of security and the fight against terrorism,” Russian Ambassador to Burkina Faso Alexey Saltykov said.

Beyond the security issue, the discussions also focused on the possibilities of formalizing technical and financial cooperation between Moscow and Ouagadougou… The Russian diplomat added that his country is willing to support Burkina through a transfer of emerging technologies in several sectors…

Since the beginning of September 2022, voices have regularly called on the new authorities to move closer to Russia to the detriment of France, to find a solution to the terrorism that has plagued the country for seven years. The head of government, who has stayed in Moscow, has repeatedly affirmed the need to diversify partnerships, fueling rumors about the Burkinabé authorities resorting to the services of the Russian paramilitary group, Wagner.

Image Information:

Image: Memorial of the Martyrs in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Memorial_of_the_Martyrs-Ouagadougou-4.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Iran Fires Indigenous Torpedoes From Submarines for First Time

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An Iranian Navy helicopter drops a Mark-46 torpedo on 31 December 2022 during Zulfiqar 1401 joint exercises.

An Iranian Navy helicopter drops a Mark-46 torpedo on 31 December 2022 during Zulfiqar 1401 joint exercises.

“Torpedoes fired from Fateh and Ghadir-class submarines also destroyed their targets.”

Every year, the Iranian military hosts the Zulfiqar joint military exercises to demonstrate air, naval, and ground components from both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and regular army, often acting in concert.[i] As detailed in the accompanying article from the pro-regime Iranian Students’ New Agency, the most recent exercises occurred in late December 2022. They spanned the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and northern Indian Ocean, and featured demonstrations of Iran’s indigenous Mi’ad (vow) torpedoes launched from Kilo-class Tareq attack submarines against naval targets and Valfajr torpedoes launched from Qadir submarines.[ii] The exercises also included Iranian Army Sikorsky SH helicopters launching Mark-46 torpedoes. While it is not possible yet to assess whether the capabilities of Iran’s indigenous torpedoes match the promise of regime officials, the emphasis on torpedo development and multiple launch platforms underscores the danger that increased Iranian capabilities may pose to shipping in the Persian Gulf and northern Indian Ocean. The Persian Gulf is both narrow and shallow. After the U.S. defeat of the Iranian navy and air force in 1988’s Operation Praying Mantis, IRGC tactics shifted.[iii] Rather than risk direct confrontation with large ships or jet fighters, the IRGC-Navy embraced small speed boats as a low-cost, low-risk way to harass warships and commercial traffic. The development of torpedoes may mark a further shift in strategy that could make IRGC speedboat operations obsolete.

Source:

“Shalik-e Azhdarha-ye Mi’ad va Valfajr az Zirdarya-yehaye Niru-ye Artesh (Firing of Iranian Mi’ad and Valfajr Torpedoes from Navy Submarines),” Iranian Students’ News Agency (a semi-official student-run news agency that promotes the Iranian government’s line). 1 January 2023, https://www.isna.ir/news/1401101106235

During the operational phase of the army’s Zulfiqar 1401 joint exercise, the Iranian torpedo Mi’ad fired from a Tareq [Attack] submarine for the first time and destroyed its target… Iranian Valfajr-2 torpedoes fired from Fateh and Ghadir-class submarines also destroyed their targets in the Oman Sea and northern Indian Ocean. A SH helicopter also hit its target at sea by launching the Mark-46 torpedo. These types of torpedoes are designed and manufactured by young navy specialists in collaboration with the country’s scientific centers and defense industries…. Valfajr intelligent torpedoes combine anti-deception capability, high speed and an explosive warhead with great destructive capacity, and are able to strike with surprise and completely destroy and sink large sea targets and vessels within seconds. They also boast short preparation time that increase tactical power, speed of action and rapid response compared to similar torpedoes.

Notes:

[i] Zulfiqar is a Persian rendition of the Arabic Du-l-Faqir, Imam Ali bin Abi Talib’s legendary split tip sword. Shi’ite Muslims consider the Imam Ali (600-661) to be the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad.

[ii] For more on the Valfajr torpedo, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Submarine-to-Surface Missile Launch System Entered Mass Production,” OE Watch, January 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/380351

[iii] Operation Praying Mantis was a 1988 operation by the U.S. military to retaliate against Iran’s mining of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. For greater background, see: Lee Allen Zatarain, America’s First Clash with Iran: The Tanker War, 1987–88. Philadelphia: Casemate, 2008.

Image Information:

Image: An Iranian Navy helicopter drops a Mark-46 torpedo on 31 December 2022 during Zulfiqar 1401 joint exercises.
Source: https://cdn.isna.ir/d/2023/01/01/3/62473566.jpg?ts=1672563255357
Attribution: Iranian Students’ News Agency

Iranian General Reiterates Goal To Expel United States From Region

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Iran launch missiles targeting U.S. forces on Al Asad Airbase, Iraq, to avenge the death of General Qassem Soleimani, 8 January 2020.

Iran launch missiles targeting U.S. forces on Al Asad Airbase, Iraq, to avenge the death of General Qassem Soleimani, 8 January 2020.

“This goal [to expel American forces] will be pursued until the result is achieved.”

In the early morning hours of 3 January 2020, a U.S. drone strike killed both Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force chief Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy chief of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (al-hashd al-shaabi) on the outskirts of Baghdad International Airport.[i] Five days later, the IRGC retaliated with Operation Martyr Soleimani, consisting of about a dozen missiles fired at Ayn al-Assad Air Base in Iraq’s western al-Anbar Governorate and Erbil International Airport in Iraqi Kurdistan.[ii] Both are Iraqi facilities where U.S. forces  are present. While no American personnel were killed, more than 100 U.S. military personnel were injured in the strike. As the accompanying article describes, over three years later, Soleimani’s death continues to resonate in Iran, with major Iranian military figures calling for the expulsion of the United States from the region.

The excerpted statement from Mohammad Bagheri, an IRGC general who has, since June 2016, served as Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, expresses outrage at the death of Soleimani. As he writes in the below, Operation Martyr Soleimani was “the beginning of the work…of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the axis of resistance to fulfill the efforts of Martyr Haj Qasem to expel American terrorist forces from the region.”Bagheri’s likening of the Iranian retaliation against supposed U.S. planners at Ayn al-Assad Air Base to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor suggests, at least in the IRGC’s mindset, that Iran is at war with the United States. Also notable is that the reformist news outlet Shargh Daily published this piece, as it underscores how, even across Iran’s divided political spectrum, Soleimani’s death remains resonant. 

Source:

“Payam Sarlashkar Bagheri beh Monasabat-e Shahid Soleimani ‘Amaliyat-e (General Bagheri’s Message on the Anniversary of the Martyr Soleimani Operation),” Shargh Daily (website of one of Iran’s more popular reformist newspapers), 7 January 2023. https://www.sharghdaily.com/بخش-سیاست-6/866489-پیام-سرلشکر-باقری-به-مناسبت-عملیات-شهید-سلیمانی

On the morning of 3 January 2020, the terrorist U.S. government killed Lt.-Gen. Haj Qasem Soleimani, the national hero and the Muslim world, and a group of commanders and comrades of the resistance front at Baghdad Airport with a drone strike. This act of terrorism left the Iranian nation, Islamic nations and other nations of the world perplexed as to how a government had been able to target with a drone strike an official guest of the Iraqi government contrary to all legal, political and international rules!

It was obvious that under such circumstances and the martyrdom of the master of the martyrs, the first demand not only of the Iranian people but also the rightful nations was to confront the U.S. terrorist act, but also the rightful nations. The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, realizing this demand prepared to bomb and destroy the U.S. base of ‘Ayn al-Assad on Iraqi soil, which was known as one of the bases where the United States plotting the assassination of General Soleimani. Therefore, on the morning of 8 January 2020, the IRGC’s aerospace force fired 13 ballistic missiles to inflict a hard slap against the terror planning and execution center in the first countermeasure and an action that was unprecedented in the past 70 years and it was able to destroy America’s hegemony in the region and the world. Of course, this operation was the beginning of the work and the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the axis of resistance to fulfill the efforts of Martyr Haj Qasem to expel American terrorist forces from the region. This goal will be pursued until the result is achieved.

Notes:

[i] For a brief overview of both Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, see: Nectar Gan, “Who was Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian commander killed by a US airstrike?” CNN.com, 3 July 2020. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/03/asia/soleimani-profile-intl-hnk/index.html

[ii] For an American account of the Iranian attack on Ayn al-Assad Air Base, see: David Martin and Mary Walsh, “Who would live and who would die: The inside story of the Iranian attack on Al Asad Airbase,” CBS News, 8 August 2021. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iranian-attack-al-asad-air-base-60-minutes-2021-08-08/  

Image Information:

Image: Iran launch missiles targeting U.S. forces on Al Asad Airbase, Iraq, to avenge the death of General Qassem Soleimani, 8 January 2020
Source: https://nournews.ir/Media/photo/20/01/20011101000958_org.jpg
Attribution: NourNews.ir

Iran Moves Sea-Borne Drone Fleet Closer to Reality

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Drone launches during surface and submarine naval exercises, August 2022.

Drone launches during surface and submarine naval exercises, August 2022.

“Today, the economic highway of the country in the Persian Gulf is safe.”

Iran increasingly uses its navy and its drone fleet to project power, and new reporting suggests that Iran has continued to make strides to integrate the two capabilities[i] In the excerpted article from the official outlet of the Iranian Ministry of Defense Holy Defense News Agency, Admiral Shahram Irani, who took command of the regular Iranian Navy in 2021, announced in November 2022 that the Iranian Navy would soon station drones and helicopters onboard its ships. This declaration, which partially repeats an announcement from July 2022 about launching drones from carriers, for the first time was accompanied by photographs of drone launches from both submarines and surface vessels, suggesting that the Iranian Navy has taken the capability to a new level.[ii] While Iranian officials often exaggerate Iran’s military capabilities, the Iranian Navy now appears to have attached a “drone section” to the Navy and made the skill set to launch, maintain, and operate drones more standard among naval personnel. Admiral Irani’s announcement that there would be a “massive” drone exercise in the Indian Ocean in coming months underscores that the ambition to activate a naval drone fleet is moving quickly from the realm of rhetoric to reality.

Such new investment in the Iranian navy continues an effort, now more than a decade old, to make the Navy the vanguard of Iran’s projection of power. Its operational range has expanded, with port calls in recent years ranging from Syria to South Africa, Sri Lanka, and as far as China.[iii] Yet, promises by Irani to expand the Iranian Navy’s operational range to the Suez Canal and Strait of Malacca exaggerate both the navy’s capabilities and Iran’s diplomatic room to maneuver. While Iran’s mention of separate Indian Ocean, Atlantic, and Pacific commands within the Iranian Navy are likely theoretical, they reflect a growing Iranian ambition to become a blue water navy and operate beyond Iran’s traditional areas of operation.

Source:

“Alhaq Balgardha-ye Hajumi va Pehpadha-ye Jadid ba Navegan-e Niru-ye Daryaye Artesh dar Ayendeh Nazdik” [“Addition of New Attack Helicopters and Drones to the Navy Fleet in the Near Future”], Holy Defense News Agency (official news agency of Iran’s ministry of Defense), 22 November 2022, https://defapress.ir/fa/news/557328

Admiral Shahram Irani added, “Soon we will have naval attack helicopters that will help is to escort our ships and also a drone section, and soon we will be equipped with modern drones. The Islamic Republic of Iran Navy’s carrier will cover a radius of at least 2,000 kilometers [1,242 miles] and carry unmanned aerial vehicle systems.” The command of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army’s Navy continued, “The Islamic Republic of Iran Navy’s drone carrier also has the capability to fly hundreds of drones in its waters and manage various missions with them.” He added, “Today, the economic highway of the country in the Persian Gulf is safe, and our fleets have strong activity in this area.” The Iranian admiral continued, “All ships of the Islamic Republic of Iran are under the escort of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy’s combat carriers, and our combat carriers are conducting missions in three areas: The Indian Ocean command, Atlantic Command and Pacific Command.”

Notes:

[i] For background on Iranian drone developments and strategies, see: Michael Rubin, “A Short History of the Iranian Drone Program,” American Enterprise Institute, August 2020. https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/A-short-history-of-the-Iranian-drone-program.pdf?x91208

[ii] For analysis of the July 2022 announcement, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Reportedly Using New Carrier, Submarines To Expand Reach of Drones,” OE Watch, Issue 9, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/425542. For Persian-language reporting on Iran’s quest to build an aircraft carrier, see: “Sakht-e Nav-e Havapaymabar dar Niru-ye Darya-ye Iran (Construction of an aircraft carrier in the Iranian Navy),” Asr-e Iran, 29 September 2011. https://www.asriran.com/fa/news/183171

[iii] For more on the expansion of the Iranian Navy, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Navy Expands Operational Range,” OE Watch, January 2013.

Image Information:

Images: Drone launches during surface and submarine naval exercises, August 2022.
Source: https://static2.borna.news/thumbnail/rLtkN0hf9M38/zKlnR2CgDMsLPypExSqkWVexFSgSRltNvp3exfX06vug6WJOtspsxLwVvO9faXc9wvplisndFdUHpxCkrVbVYdPDnYY4EW_0/IMG-20220825-WA0005.jpg
Attribution: Borna News

Armenia Takes Another Step Away From Russia

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Nikol Pashinyan.

Nikol Pashinyan.

“It is dispiriting that Armenia’s membership in the CSTO did not deter Azerbaijan from aggressive actions.”

Armenia’s frustration with Russia and its role as the de facto leader of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) appeared to reach a head at the organization’s November 2022 summit, when Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan abruptly ended a meeting with leaders of the other member states and refused to sign two documents drafted during the summit. For his part, Pashinyan had previously criticized Russia’s response to multiple attacks by Azerbaijan against Armenia in 2022 and Russia’s inability to deliver weapons that Armenia purchased.[i] The accompanying excerpted articles provide additional context on Pashinyan’s actions during the recent CSTO summit as well as how the Armenian government continues to pursue other security cooperation partnerships—namely with India—due to what it perceives to be continued failures by Russia and the CSTO.

The first article, from the Armenian state news agency Armenpress, reports on Pashinyan’s speech during the CSTO summit. Pashinyan mentions the three major clashes that took place between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War ended and how “Armenia’s membership in the CSTO did not deter Azerbaijan from aggressive actions.”[ii] He states that these clashes caused “great damage to the image of the CSTO both within our country and abroad.” Pashinyan goes on to outline the Armenian government’s position on how its borders have been violated by Azerbaijan and that these actions should have been considered an attack that would have necessitated a strong response from the CSTO. According to the CSTO’s charter, this could have included military assistance, but the organization denied Armenia’s request. Pashinyan ends his speech by explaining how his government proposed negotiating the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s forces from Armenian territory through the CSTO Security Council, but that he would not sign the draft put together by the council because he believes it is an insufficient to prevent Azerbaijan from continuing to act with impunity.

Underscoring Armenia’s disillusionment with Russia, the second accompanying article from the Armenian independent online newspaper Hetq reports on an agreement Armenia signed with India’s Kalyani Strategic Systems two weeks before the CSTO summit to acquire 155 mm artillery systems. The article notes that Armenia’s Defense Minister visited India’s defense exposition in October and that this most recent agreement comes after Armenia signed a contract in September to purchase India’s Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher as well as anti-tank rockets and different types of ammunition.

Overall, there is no indication that Armenia will be leaving the Russia-led CSTO despite calls to do so from Pashinyan’s political opposition. Armenia’s bilateral economic and military ties to Russia make this difficult. Instead, Armenia’s refusal to sign the CSTO’s official response to the situation with Azerbaijan is an example of the types of protest steps we expect the Armenian government to continue to register.

Sources:

“Для нас принципиальную важность имеет подтверждение зоны ответственности ОДКБ в Армении: речь премьера на СКБ ОДКБ (The confirmation of the zone of responsibility of the CSTO in Armenia has the most significance for us: the address of the prime minister at the Special Security Council of the CSTO),” Armenpress (state news agency in Armenia), 23 November 2022.

https://armenpress.am/rus/news/1098011.html

“…The presidency of the Republic of Armenia in the CSTO ends today. This period was very eventful…Over the past two years, the CSTO member state Armenia has been subjected to aggression by Azerbaijan at least three times.

It is dispiriting that Armenia’s membership in the CSTO did not deter Azerbaijan from aggressive actions…These facts cause great damage to the image of the CSTO both within our country and abroad, and I regard this as the main failure of Armenia’s chairmanship in the CSTO…

Our position is as follows: according to the Alma-Ata Declaration of December 21, 1991, the founding countries of the CIS, as independent states, recognized each other’s territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders. This means that the aforementioned countries became independent with the administrative borders that existed between the republics during the Soviet Union. That is, the former administrative borders became state borders, and the territories of the above-mentioned countries were determined by these borders. It is within these borders that the Republic of Armenia became a member of the UN and the CSTO.

Since May 11, 2021, Azerbaijan has used armed forces three times and occupied approximately 140 square kilometers of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia. This happened on May 11 and November 14, 2021 and September 13, 2022.

So, according to the UN resolution of December 14, 1974, number 3314, the above actions of Azerbaijan are regarded as aggression.

What do we expect from the CSTO in this regard? Statements of this fact, in the form of a clearly formulated political assessment. To refrain from such an assessment, saying that there is no border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, means to assert that there is no zone of responsibility of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and if there is no zone of responsibility, then there is no organization itself. It can at least be interpreted that way.

These nuances are also important because they play a decisive role in further collective actions. In this context, I want to respond to comments according to which Armenia is trying to draw the CSTO countries into a war with Azerbaijan. This is pure manipulation, because Armenia cannot be interested in a war, if only because it has suffered enough from wars, including in September of this year.

…Armenia also proposes, by decision of the CSTO CSC, to accelerate the necessary political and diplomatic work with the Azerbaijani side, aimed at the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia to their original positions as of May 11, 2021.

Such a position is important not only for restoring the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia, but also for deterring Azerbaijan from further aggressive actions against our country…Under these conditions, the lack of a clear political assessment of the situation and the failure to make the above decision may mean not only the CSTO’s refusal of allied obligations, but may also be interpreted by Azerbaijan as a green light from the CSTO for further aggression against Armenia…

Therefore, based on this, dear colleagues, at the moment I believe that the draft “Declaration of the CSTO CSC and on joint measures to provide assistance to the Republic of Armenia” submitted for signing is not sufficiently finalized, and in this form, with all due respect, I am not ready to sign these documents…

Vahe Sarukhanyan, “$155M for Artillery: Armenia Signs Another Arms Deal with India,” Hetq (independent online newspaper in Armenia), 11 November 2022.

https://hetq.am/en/article/150099

The Indian press, referring to a November 9 statement released by the local Bharat Forge company, reports that the latter’s military-industrial subsidiary, Kalyani Strategic Systems, has received a US $155 million order to export 155 mm artillery gun systems to Armenia over the next three years.

Although Bharat Forge didn’t disclose the identity of the customer, the Indian Business Standard news site writes that according to its sources in the Indian Defense Ministry the contract was signed with the Armenian government…

…In October, Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan led a delegation to a defense industry exhibition (DefExpo-2022) in Gandhinagar, India displaying locally manufactured armaments and defense systems.

This latest arms deal follows a September 2022 $245 million contract Armenia signed with India to purchase Indian-made Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, anti-tank rockets and various types of ammunition…

Notes:

[i] For more context on Armenia’s acquisition of Indian systems, see: Matthew Stein, “Armenia Acquires Indian Multiple Rocket Launcher System Amid Delays in Russian Deliveries,” OE Watch, Issue #11, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429405

[ii] For background on the recent incidents between Armenia and Azerbaijan, see: Matthew Stein, “Armenia Questions Russian Peacekeeping After Nagorno-Karabakh Incident,” OE Watch, Issue #9, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/425540

Image Information:

Image: Nikol Pashinyan
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nikol_Pashinyan_April_2021_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Canada Makes Additional Claims to Arctic Territory Claimed by Russia

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“The addition is to Canada’s 2019 partial submission that claimed approximately 1.2 million square kilometers of the Arctic Ocean seabed and subsoil.  ‘This addendum to that partial submission regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf in respect of the Arctic Ocean covers an additional area of continental shelf extending beyond the limits provided for in that partial submission, encompassing the full length of the Central Arctic Plateau…”

Canada recently filed a claim to the Arctic Ocean seabed encompassing the full length of the Central Arctic Plateau, including the Lomonosov Ridge. This most recent claim follows a previous Canadian claim made in 2019 that included up to 1.2 million square kilometers of ocean seabed and part of the Lomonosov Ridge. According to independent Norwegian news site The Barents Observer, Canada’s claims to Arctic territory involving the Lomonosov Ridge run counter to Russia’s earlier claim over much of that area. Canada’s claim also comes at a time when Russia’s relations with the West are severely strained. Normally the Arctic Council, comprised of states with a presence in the Arctic, would meet to help solve competing claims. However, due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Arctic Council first ceased operating but is now meeting without Russia and the Russian president of the Arctic Council. It is unlikely that the overlapping claims in the Arctic will be solved diplomatically in the near term since the Arctic Council is dysfunctional and tensions between Russia and West, in this case Canada, are worsening.

Source:

Eil’is Quinn, “Canada extends continental shelf claim, increasing overlaps with Russia in Arctic,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 23 December 2022.  https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2022/12/canada-extends-continental-shelf-claim-increasing-overlaps-russia-arctic

The addition is to Canada’s 2019 partial submission that claimed approximately 1.2 million square kilometers of the Arctic Ocean seabed and subsoil. “This addendum to that partial submission regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf in respect of the Arctic Ocean covers an additional area of continental shelf extending beyond the limits provided for in that partial submission, encompassing the full length of the Central Arctic Plateau,” the government said in the Dec.19 document filed with the U.N.’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives coastal states a 200 nautical mile continental shelf claim that allows countries the right to exploit resources in the seabed and subsoil of their respective areas. The activities could be anything from deep seabed mining and fishing to oil and gas exploration.

Canada has been working on gathering data to support its claims in the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans since 2003. But UNCLOS allows continental shelves to be extended if a state has scientific data to prove that particular underwater geological or geographical features are actually extensions of their continental shelves.

The Lomonosov Ridge is a kind of underwater mountain chain that extends across the seafloor of the Arctic Ocean and is something that Canada, Russia and Denmark all claim is an extension of their respective continental shelves.

Canada’s new filing comes at a time of high tension between Russia and the West.  In March, the seven western states on the Arctic Council paused their participation in the body’s work in protest against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, saying the war undermined many of the founding principals of the forum, which include sovereignty and territorial integrity based on international law. In June, Canada, Finland, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United States said they’d resume limited council work in areas that did not include Russia.

Global Affairs Canada was not able to immediately reply to a request for comment on Thursday concerning Canada’s new Arctic claims and its interactions with Russia during the process. But in the addendum document, Canada says it had regular consultations with Russia, as it did with Denmark and the United States, countries with which Ottawa also has overlapping claims.

“During the preparation of this submission, regular consultations between Canada and the Russian Federation revealed overlaps in their respective continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean,” the addendum said.

“Through an exchange of letters, Canada and the Russian Federation reached an understanding that: When one State makes a submission to the Commission that includes the Arctic Ocean, the other State will promptly transmit a diplomatic note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.” 

In 2021, Russia filed a claim with the U.N.’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf that goes up to Canada’s exclusive economic zone in the Arctic. It takes the commission several years to study the scientific merits of claims filed. Afterwards, countries use the commission’s recommendations to negotiate final boundaries between themselves.  Canada ratified UNCLOS in 2013.

Anticipating Russian Collapse, Chechen Diaspora Groups Jockey for Position

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“These congresses became a kind of political duel between the two leaders of the Diaspora: some participants in the events spoke openly about the division of the Ichkerians into opposing camps.”

Russia’s so-called “special military operation (SMO)” in Ukraine has breathed life into the Chechen diaspora hungry for Russian defeat and the chance to liberate Chechnya. However, the excerpted article from the Caucasus news service Kavkaz Realii describes how two separate Chechen diaspora groups have become bitter enemies as they seek to capitalize on what many Chechens believe is their best chance to reclaim their ancestral homeland.[i] At the core of the contention are two summits that members of the Chechen diaspora held to discuss their future: one in Antwerp and another outside of Paris. The Antwerp summit, held in November 2022, was headed by former minister and commander Akhmed Zakaev, who has taken a leadership role within the Chechen diaspora since he left Chechnya in 2000 after being wounded in battle. He has many followers and has held the title of prime minister of the “Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in exile” for more than a decade. However, many Chechens do not consider Zakaev or his government in exile to be the legitimate heirs to a future independent Chechnya. For its part, the summit outside of Paris, which occurred a day before Zakaev’s summit in Antwerp, was organized by the Tolam movement. This was arranged under the direction of Jambulat Suleymanov and Anzor Maskhadov, the latter the son of former Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. Since the summit occurred, Tolam has morphed into United Force.[ii]

In addition to Zakaev’s government in exile and the United Force, there are at least two other organizations—the Presidium of the Chechen Republic and Chechen Democrats—vying for a leadership role in the independence effort. In a bid to strengthen their respective positions, both the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in exile and the United Force have military presences in Ukraine, fighting against Russia. The second excerpted article from Paris-based Intelligence Online describes the Chechen political movement’s connections to military units in Ukraine. For his part, Zakaev and his government in exile founded the Separate Special Purpose Battalion (OBON), which is attached to the Ukraine Foreign Legion. Underscoring the importance that he places on Ukraine, Zakaev has also placed his appointed defense minister, Magomed Dikiev, in Kyiv. Zakaev’s OBON will join two notable Chechen units already fighting within the Ukraine Foreign Legion: the Sheikh Mansur Battalion, believed to have several hundred men, and the smaller Djokhar Dudayev Battalion. However, as the article notes, the battalions are close to Suleymanov’s United Force faction and therefore do not recognize Zakaev’s authority. Notably, neither article mentions more radical Chechen movements operating out of Turkey, which are also vying to lead a would-be independent Chechen Republic. If an independent or autonomous Chechnya could emerge, the infighting between these groups described above, which fractured the Chechen independent movement during earlier wars with Russia, is likely to again hamper the movement.

Sources:

“Раздор в чеченской диаспоре? В Европе прошли съезды противоборствующих сторонников Ичкерии (Discord in the Chechen diaspora? Congresses of opposing supporters of Ichkeria were held in Europe),” Kavkaz Realii (U.S. government supported but independent news service focused on the Caucasus), 29 November 2022. https://www.kavkazr.com/a/razdory-v-chechenskoy-diaspore-v-evrope-proshli-sezdy-protivoborstvuyuschih-storonnikov-ichkerii-/32152173.html

According to the chairman of the congress Suleymanov, the purpose of the event was the formation of a new social movement. The presidium was attended by veterans of the Chechen political movement: social activist Makhmud Bibulatov, Chechen activist Yaragi Sulumov living in Germany, as well as new figures in the person of the head of the Chechen opposition movement 1ADAT Ibragim Yangulbaev, Saikhan Muzaev (mentioned in the media as a refugee in Georgia and a friend of the one killed in Berlin in 2019, former Ichkerian field commander Zelimkhan Khangoshvili) and others.

…Speaking on behalf of the Chechen diaspora, Maskhadov and the Yangulbaev brothers (the youngest of them, Baysangur, who was recently included in the list of extremists in the Russian Federation, was also here) called for intensifying political activity and confronting certain forces that, in their opinion, lead to disunity among supporters independent Ichkeria. No one has been able to pinpoint what these powers are.

An unnamed representative of the Dzhokhar Dudayev battalion, who is fighting on the side of Ukraine, expressed support for Suleymanov. On his personal Facebook page, Bogdan Chechensky, a representative of the Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion also expressed support for the leader of “Tolam”.

Suleimanov himself spoke sharply about the so-called government abroad, headed by Akhmed Zakayev, and accused the latter of “a trail of adventures and state crimes.” He did not go into details.

…Khusein Dzhambetov, a member of the [Zakaev’s] Separate Special Purpose Battalion participating in the war on the side of Ukraine, and his deputy Hadji-Murat Zumso said that their military units will become the base of the army of Ichkeria in the future.

“Divided Chechen diaspora redoubles efforts to woo Kyiv,” Intelligence Online (Paris-based subscription news outlet), 28 November 2022. https://www.intelligenceonline.com/government-intelligence/2022/11/28/divided-chechen-diaspora-redoubles-efforts-to-woo-kyiv,109868303-eve

Both groups are striving for the same goal: to free Chechnya from what they consider to be its illegal occupation by Ramzan Kadyrov’s pro-Russian regime, an aim shared by other opposition groups and some members of the Ukrainian government. On other matters, however, the two factions are deeply divided, which is why they are holding separate events.

In June, Zakayev, who has appointed himself prime minister in exile, brokered an agreement that was signed by a Ukrainian deputy defence minister, to create a special battalion of Chechen fighters, OBON, within the regular Ukrainian army under contract. OBON currently has around 20 members. The new unit joins other Chechen troops, which have been in Ukraine since 2014: the Sheikh Mansur Battalion, which has several hundred men in rotation, and the smaller Djokhar- Dudayev Battalion. Both battalions are close to the Suleymanov faction and do not recognise Zakayev’s authority.

Zakayev has been active in Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian invasion. As early as February, he made public appeals from London to President Volodymyr Zelensky, encouraging the head of state to create a clear framework for foreign volunteers to become legally involved in the fighting. He regularly visits Kyiv, where he has placed his defence “minister”, Magomed Dikiev, in a permanent diplomatic role.

Notes:

[i] The inability of the Chechens to unite is complicated and has to do with many factors including culture, the importance of family clan, and the national myth, which values every male as a warrior. In an interview for a documentary film, former Chechen warlord and field commander Salman Raduev said, “We are a nation of one million people, we are a nation of one million generals… every Chechen is a general.” Although intended as hyperbole, Raduev’s comment speaks volumes about the Chechens’ inability to fight or govern together. See; Immortal Fortress: Inside Chechnya’s Warrior Culture,” Combat Films and Research for PBS, 1999. https://vimeo.com/ondemand/immortalfortress

[ii] Both movements draw their followers from about 200,000 Chechens who emigrated to Europe during the first and second Russian-Chechen wars between 1994 and 2009.

Russia Compares Ukraine Conflict to WWII

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Soviet Victory Parade, Red Square, Moscow, June 1945.

Soviet Victory Parade, Red Square, Moscow, June 1945.

“Comparing the special operation in Ukraine with the Great Patriotic War is unreasonable.”

The Soviet victory in World War II (WWII), which it calls “The Great Patriotic War,”  is the central to the Kremlin’s current ideology, which recasts it to justify the so-called special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine.[i] According to Kremlin propaganda, just as the USSR fought against the evils of Nazi Germany, so too today, Russian soldiers are defending their country from a Ukrainian “Nazi” threat. By framing this conflict as a fight against Nazism, the Kremlin has been able to tap into narratives of pain, fear, and sacrifice experienced by the Russian people during WWII. However, the accompanying excerpt from the semi-independent Russian news source Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye argues that viewing the SMO in Ukraine through a WWII lens presents its own set of challenges.   

The author asserts that “comparing the special operation in Ukraine with the Great Patriotic War is unreasonable,” proceeding then to remind readers of basic facts surrounding WWII and how they differ from those surrounding the SMO in Ukraine. For instance, in June 1941 “the Red Army had a very significant (several times) quantitative superiority in military equipment over the Wehrmacht.” This was not the case in February 2022, when the Russian military “did not have any quantitative superiority over the Armed Forces and other military formations of Ukraine.” Comparing casualties during the two conflicts, the author points out that so far, Russian total losses in Ukraine are small, noting that “during the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army lost the same number of servicemen on average in one day!”

Responding to those who assert that there can be no negotiations with the current Ukrainian leadership, the author reminds readers that in the summer and autumn of 1941, the USSR tried to reach a negotiated settlement with Nazi Germany. To those who claim that the USSR was the sole victor in WWII, the author reviews the critical role which the Western lend-lease program played in the Allied victory. The author makes other cogent comparisons, suggesting that to measure progress in the SMO thought a warped WWII lens will only “multiply losses and delay victory.”[ii] It is noteworthy that this sober assessment of the SMO was published given Russian press restrictions and the pervasiveness of pro-Kremlin propaganda.

Source:

Alexander Khramchikhin, “Уязвленный патриотизм порождает истерику (Wounded patriotism breeds hysteria),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye (semi-independent Russian news source), 1 December 2022. https://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2022-12-01/4_1216_patriotism.html

Comparing the special operation in Ukraine with the Great Patriotic War is unreasonable. A large part of Russian society is experiencing difficult feelings about the course of the military campaign in Ukraine. Many do not understand why we have not yet won,and sometimes retreating – moreover, from the territories included in the Russian Federation.

Such a reaction to the Ukrainian events is quite understandable in itself, but not should not incite hysteria. Expressing dissatisfaction with what is happening, outside observers cite the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War as a positive example for today’s Russia….

As of June 22, 1941, on the Soviet-German border, the Red Army had a very significant (several times) quantitative superiority in military equipment over the Wehrmacht…. As of February 24, 2022, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the Russian-Ukrainian border did not have any quantitative superiority over the Armed Forces and other military formations of Ukraine. And the qualitative superiority of the Russian side was and remains not so fundamental as to compensate for the quantitative superiority of the enemy.

At the same time, however, hostilities are taking place exclusively on the territory of Ukraine (meaning the territory at the beginning of the current campaign). Ukrainian strikes on the territory of the Russian Federation (taken at the same time) are of microscopic proportions. Irretrievable losses of the RF Armed Forces over the entire period of hostilities are small. During the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army lost the same number of servicemen on average in one day!

Regular statements by some Russian officials about “creating a favorable background” for negotiations with “respected Western partners” produce a painful impression on the Russian population, to put it mildly.… But in the summer and autumn of 1941, at the direction of Stalin and Beria, Soviet representatives… tried to transfer to Berlin proposals for a virtually complete repetition of the Brest Peace. That is, about the surrender to the Germans of the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and maybe also Karelia. …If the Anglo-Saxons had not fought against Hitler (for whom almost all of continental Europe worked), and if Lend-Lease had been supplied not to the Soviet Union, but to Germany, we would have had a very bad time.

…But criticism is different. It is absolutely unacceptable to question the legitimacy of the actions of the army, to talk about its non-existent losses and, moreover, about non-existent crimes. But to ignore failures in various types of support and obvious mistakes in the preparation of the campaign as a whole means to multiply losses and delay victory.

Notes:

[i] For additional background on the Kremlin’s attempt to create a new state ideology, see: Ray Finch, “Russian Culture Ministry Proposes Possible Framework for New State Ideology,” OE Watch, Issue #5 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/417836

[ii] The author, Alexander Khramchikhin, was one of the few Russian military analysts who warned against an invasion of Ukraine, arguing that such an attack could have catastrophic consequences for Russia. See: Alexander Khramchikhin, “Полураспад Украины (Half-life of Ukraine),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye, 11 March 2021. https://nvo.ng.ru/gpolit/2021-03-11/8_1132_ukraine.html

Image Information:

Image: Soviet Victory Parade, Red Square, Moscow, June 1945|
Source: https://tinyurl.com/bdnrfsex
Attribution: Russian Ministry of Defense (Mil.ru) CCA 4.0 Intl

Russia Taking Steps To Improve Mobilization Capabilities

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“Currently, in the military enlistment offices, the personal files of those liable for military service are stored exclusively in paper form, and each military enlistment office creates databases of citizens to be mobilized independently without any centralization.”

In September 2022, Russia began mobilizing 300,000 soldiers for its so-called special military operation in Ukraine—its first mobilization since World War II—exposing weaknesses in its infrastructure to track, prepare, and equip personnel for military service had deteriorated. As the two accompanying excerpts indicate, the Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) have recently enacted changes that they believe will improve the mobilization process.

The first excerpt from Russian pro-business news outlet Kommersant describes how President Vladimir Putin instructed the Ministry of Digital Development to create “a centralized database by 1 April 2024, which will contain information about all Russians liable for military service.” Currently, the article says military enlistment offices store the “personal files of those liable for military service…exclusively in paper form, and each military enlistment office forms databases of citizens to be mobilized independently without any centralization.” During the partial mobilization, this antiquated system resulted in considerable confusion, where draft notices were sent to “wheelchair users, IT specialists who received a deferment, those unfit for health reasons, and fathers of many children.” The plan now is to develop a centralized, digital database, which includes pertinent personal information “about all Russians liable for military service.”[i] The article concludes by asserting that creating this digitized “mobilization resource of 25 million people in Russia” will be a “colossal” undertaking.

There have also been problems providing newly mobilized soldiers with the required personal military kit (uniforms, boots, protective gear, etc.). The second excerpt from the pro-Kremlin news organization RIA Novosti describes the recent decision to appoint the “Kalashnikov Concern…the coordinator of the supply of combat equipment (bulletproof vests, helmets and other items of equipment) to the Russian army.” According to the article, this decision was based on the “unprecedented challenges [faced by the MoD] associated with a special military operation and providing all necessary supplies for the mobilized.”

Sources:

Nikita Korolev, “Айтикоматы: Воинскому учету указана цифровизация (ITcomats: Military registration ordered to digitalize),” Kommersant (Russian pro-business site), 25 November 2022.  https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5692024

Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the Ministry of Digital Development to create a centralized database by April 1, 2024, which will contain information about all Russians liable for military service. The Ministry of Digital Transformation will have to create an IT system that will include sets of all kinds of data about the life of citizens liable for military service: from their level of education and place of residence to current mobile phone numbers, email addresses and information about the available transport. 

The coordinator of the new information system, follows from the document, will be the Ministry of Defense…. After the start of partial mobilization in Russia on September 21, 2022, the media and human rights organizations reported numerous mistakes that the military commissariats made when sending out subpoenas and instructions. For example, summons were received by wheelchair users, IT specialists who received a deferment, unfit for health reasons, fathers of many children, etc….

…Currently, in the military enlistment offices, the personal files of those liable for military service are stored exclusively in paper form, and each military enlistment office creates databases of citizens to be mobilized independently without any centralization, says the interlocutor of Kommersant, who is engaged in the digitalization of one of the law enforcement agencies.

…Taking into account the fact that, according to the official statements of the Ministry of Defense, the mobilization resource of Russia is 25 million people and their data will need to be digitized in a month, “the work ahead is simply colossal,” a top manager of a Russian IT company engaged in developments in the field of artificial intelligence told Kommersant.

“Калашников назначили руководить поставками экипировки, сообщил источник (Kalashnikov was appointed to lead the supply of equipment, the source said),” RIA Novosti (pro-Kremlin news outlet), 13 November 2022. https://ria.ru/20221113/ekipirovka-1831120404.html

The Kalashnikov Concern has been appointed the main enterprise – the coordinator of the supply of combat equipment (bulletproof vests, helmets and other items of equipment) to the Russian army, this measure is needed, among other things, to provide the necessary equipment for the mass replenishment of the Russian Armed Forces – more than 300 thousand mobilized, an informed source told RIA Novosti….

…The interlocutor of the agency explained that this decision was made to unconditionally provide the Ministry of Defense with combat equipment in a situation where the military-industrial complex and the entire system of state defense orders are facing “unprecedented challenges associated with a special military operation and providing all the necessary mobilized.”

Notes:

[i] The plan to digitize data within the Military Commissariats has been discussed for quite some time. For more information see Ray Finch, “Russia Digitizing the Military Commissariat,” OE Watch, October 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/397925

Venezuela’s Dictatorship Strengthens While Opposition Is in Disarray

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Then Venezuelan Interim President Juan Guaidó with Secretary General of the Organization of American States Luis Almagro during a trip to Washington, D.C.

Then Venezuelan Interim President Juan Guaidó with Secretary General of the Organization of American States Luis Almagro during a trip to Washington, D.C.

“A few hours after the fragmented Venezuelan opposition put an end to the figure of the interim government of Juan Guaidó, the Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, launched a diplomatic and political offensive.”

Venezuela’s long struggle against the Maduro dictatorship began 2023 with yet another setback. In 2019, the opposition established an interim government structure to push for a democratic transition in Venezuela, replete with an interim president (Juan Guaidó) who was recognized by nearly 60 countries. That experiment was recently terminated when three of the country’s four main opposition parties voted to dissolve the interim government structure, a move that had been rumored for several months.[i] Since voting to dissolve its own constitutional arrangement, the opposition to Maduro’s regime has fractured.[ii] According to an article from Peruvian media conglomerate Redacción RPP, three of the opposition parties voted to dissolve the structure because it had failed to achieve its objective of a democratic transition away from Maduro’s dictatorship. The article also notes that opacity in the financing and management of international assets had made some opposition legislators uneasy about extending the arrangement. The second excerpted article from Spanish daily La Voz de Galicia reports that the Maduro regime has transitioned to a more offensive posture after several years of being on the back foot, rattled by the opposition’s interim government structure that had been recognized by dozens of countries. Maduro is looking to reassert himself diplomatically and shore up key allies. The Maduro regime’s survival and strengthening serves as a conduit for Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in South America and the Caribbean because of their support for Maduro during the regime’s darkest days.[iii] Close security relationships with other authoritarian states mean that Venezuela will continue to represent a hemispheric security threat and an important staging ground for countries like Russia and Iran.

Sources: 

“Venezuela: El ‘Gobierno interino’ de Juan Guaidó se extinguió sin claridad en sus cuentas (Venezuela: The ‘interim government’ of Juan Guaidó was extinguished without clarity in its accounts),” Redacción RPP (the largest radio and television broadcasting company in Peru), 10 January 2023. https://rpp.pe/mundo/actualidad/venezuela-el-gobierno-interino-de-juan-guaido-se-extinguio-sin-claridad-en-sus-cuentas-noticia-1459150?ref=rpp

The ‘interim government’ of Juan Guaidó, eliminated… by the majority of the former deputies who supported him in 2019, leaves a shadow in Venezuela due to poor accountability. No one knows how much money he managed or what this sort of parallel power that had the support of foreign powers spent it on… in the next 45 days, Guaidó is obliged to account for the period given to him by the former anti-Chavista deputies who abolished the interim government, considering that the structure did not achieve its objectives, not to mention that they do not know the status of the resources managed under this arrangement.

“Maduro pasa a la ofensiva tras la disolución del Gobierno interino de Guaidó (Maduro goes on the offensive after the dissolution of the interim government of Guaidó),” La Voz de Galicia (a Spanish daily newspaper with good coverage of Latin America), 2 January 2023. https://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/internacional/2023/01/03/maduro-pasa-ofensiva-tras-disolucion-gobierno-interino-guaido/0003_202301G3P18993.htm 

A few hours after the fragmented Venezuelan opposition put an end to the figure of the interim government of Juan Guaidó, the Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, launched a diplomatic and political offensive… Maduro also stated in the interview that he awaits the release of the country’s resources frozen in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Notes:

[i] For more information on some of the international legal implications of this decision to dissolve Venezuela’s interim government, see: Ryan C. Berg and Alexandra Winkler, “The Interim Government of Venezuela was Dissolved by its Own Promoters,” CSIS Commentary, 12 January 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/interim-government-venezuela-was-dissolved-its-own-promoters

[ii] For information on infighting in the opposition and its impact on the Venezuelan opposition’s standing among voters, see: Luis González Morales, “Knives Out: Venezuelan Opposition Edition,” Caracas Chronicles, 29 December 2022. https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2022/12/29/knives-out-venezuelan-opposition-edition/

[iii] For more information about Venezuela’s deep security relationship with Russia, in particular, see: Vladimir Rouvinski, “Russia’s Continued Engagement with Venezuela in 2019 and Beyond,” Wilson Center, February 2020. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/russias-continuing-engagement-venezuela-2019-and-beyond-update

Image Information:

Image: Then Venezuelan Interim President Juan Guaidó with Secretary General of the Organization of American States Luis Almagro during a trip to Washington, D.C.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/oasoea/49499293397
Attribution: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0