Tag Archives: Ukraine

Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons to Engineer Units

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A Soviet/Russian made POM-2 [R1] fragmentation anti-personnel mine on display.

“The use of UAVs for the remote laying of anti-personnel mines will ensure the element of surprise when used in both the defense and offense…”

The war in Ukraine continues to drive changes in military units and doctrine. Innovative use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been a common theme for both Russia and Ukraine since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Both countries have modified UAVs to lay mines. The accompanying excerpted article from the Russian monthly Военная мысль (Military Thought) discusses Russian plans to formalize this capability by creating a “special mining platoon” within certain engineer units. Although this is one of the first mentions of how adaptations from the so-called “special military operation”[i] are being implemented into Russia’s version of a Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E), it is unlikely to be the last. Other novel uses of UAVs, including as “suicide drones,” will likely be integrated into Russian MTO&E structures soon.

Sources:

D.F. Evmenenko and S.I. Melnik, “Дистанционное минирование местности при помощи

Малых беспилотных летательных аппаратов (The use of small unmanned aerial vehicles to conduct remote mining),” Военная мысль [Military Thought] (monthly Russian military periodical), September 2023. https://vm.ric.mil.ru/

Combat actions in the special military operation do not have the characteristics of high intensity [warfare] and rapid battlefield changes due to widescale usage of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The most widespread among them are multi-rotor helicopter-type devices (multicopters). Simple, cheap and reliable, they are easy to control and very maneuverable at low speeds and low altitudes. These systems can easily change targets in the field. In addition, such systems are easy to transport, scalable in size and load capacity…

The Second World War, military conflicts of recent decades, especially in the Persian Gulf region (Operation Desert Storm), and the US Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan show that their effectiveness increases several times when used suddenly and unexpectedly…

Although remote mining by aviation and artillery troops can be carried throughout the entire operational depth of an enemy formation, the remote mining capabilities of engineer troops are substantially more limited… The UMZ [R1]  and GMZ-K [R2]  universal minelayers only have a range of up to 200 m…

The need arose to develop a system that would allow the creation of minefields under any combat conditions in compliance with the requirements for safe the use of remote mining means for our troops.  As part of solving this problem, specialists from the Tyumen Higher Military Engineering Command School (TVVIKU) developed a device for discharging antipersonnel POM-2R mines…

The use of UAVs for the remote laying of anti-personnel mines will ensure the element of surprise when used in both the defense and offense…It is proposed to use UAV crews with mine containers in a special mining platoon (SMP) with 6 UAVs…The platoon consists of two squads, each with 6 personnel, 3 UAVs, and an all-terrain vehicle such as a UAZ ‘Wolverine’.

Characteristics of a Mine-Laying Multicopter-Type UAV (exact model unspecified in source)

Notes:

[i] Moscow insists on using the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Soviet/Russian made POM-2 [R1] fragmentation anti-personnel mine on display.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/POM-2_mine#/media/File:POM-2S.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0

Former Commander Comments on Future of Russian Airborne Troops

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Colonel-General (Ret.) Vladimir Shamanov

“In our opinion, one should not experiment with one of the most combat-ready branches of the Armed Forces, destroying what at one time was saved with great difficulty.”

Almost since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,[i] there has been much speculation in Russia about the future of its mechanized Airborne Troops (VDV). By most accounts, the VDV has performed the best of all of Russia’s Armed Forces, although the VDV has taken heavy casualties.[ii] In Ukraine the VDV has filled a more conventional role than intended and rarely conducted the missions it was designed for, namely, attacks and raids behind enemy lines. The VDV is now being equipped with heavy weaponry that has traditionally not been provided to it, such as T-90 tanks and heavy thermobaric rocket launchers to facilitate this shift in mission. This has created a debate about the future force structure of the VDV. Some commentators proffer that the VDV should become permanently “heavier,” while others suggest an even lighter structure so the VDV can function as true sabotage and reconnaissance groups or assault groups.  The excerpted article from the quarterly Russian military periodical Defense and Security provides a third suggestion: stay the current course. The article’s primary author is Colonel-General (Ret.) Vladimir Shamanov, former Commander of the VDV, and current Head of the State Duma Defense Committee. Shamanov states that the VDV should be maintained in its current state as a unique light mechanized combined arms force capable of air-mobile operations. Although Shamanov does not delve into deeper reasoning, this opinion could be based on his belief that although the VDV is not currently fighting as designed, this may not always be the case, and at some point the VDV might again start executing attacks and raids behind enemy lines.

Source:

Vladimir Shamanov, Vladimir Kulakov and Olga Kashirina, “Операция Промежуточный Этап (The Operational Intermittent Phase),”  Defense and Security (Quarterly Russian Military Periodical), No. 2,(105), 2023, 15. http://ormvd-zib.ru/n2_2023/morskoe_sodruzhestvo_v_aziatsko-tihookeanskom__regione_str_17-19/

The experience of the SMO [special military operation] shows that lightly armed mobile groups are acquiring great importance. They are able to move quickly, provide cover, move to the rear, and act on the flanks. At the same time, light armored vehicles with modular weapons (machine gun, ATGM, automatic gun) will become their basis. They can become the basis of airmobile forces and form sabotage and reconnaissance and groups. Their tasks are reconnaissance and defeat of the enemy, assisting advancing troops, conducting surprise attacks on important targets, and executing organized withdrawals to [attack] in another direction.

On territory controlled by friendly forces, the use of airborne units as airmobile forces will ensure the strengthening of the strike force on the main axis of attack. This makes it possible to quickly concentrate troops as needed along the front line…

The ‘winged infantry’ is quite capable of acting not only as a combined armed force, but also form the basis of airmobile units and form sabotage and reconnaissance groups. Airmobile units, can inflict sudden blows, that will force the enemy to react, concentrate troops and expose them to attack. If successful, airmobile units can carry out raids throughout the entire tactical depth of the enemy’s defenses.

In addition, the Airborne Troops are able to significantly strengthen the Ground Forces on specified axis — in the event of enemy counterattacks, repels the attack and creates conditions for an attack of the main force.

There is an opinion that the priority way for the development of the Airborne Troops may be their transformation into just sabotage and reconnaissance groups, a “swarm”, capable of striking in several places at the same time, with subsequent evasion of a retaliatory strikes and withdrawal…In our opinion, one should not experiment with one of the most combat-ready branches of the Armed Forces, destroying what at one time was saved with great difficulty.  Only in the Airborne Troops after the well-known “reforms”, was the divisional structure of the troops preserved. On its basis, it is possible to quickly create various airmobile formations…

Notes:

[i] Moscow insists on using the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

[ii] The lightly armored Airborne Combat Vehicle (BMD) series of combat vehicles has not fared well against Western antitank guided missiles and heavier mechanized Ukrainian forces. 

Image Information:

Image: Colonel-General (Ret.) Vladimir Shamanov
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Shamanov#/media/File:Vladimir_Shamanov._Cabinet_photo.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0

People’s Liberation Army Discusses Low-Altitude Air Control

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Soldier from Ukrainian 25th Air Assault Brigade employing Small bomb carrying UAV.

“Low altitude is the “junction” connecting airspace and land. With the rapid development and large-scale application of low-altitude combat equipment such as helicopters, small and medium-sized unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles, the low-altitude battlefield has become increasingly important, and low-altitude control has become one of the comprehensive dominances that must be seized in future land warfare.”

A recent PLA Daily article discusses the importance of low-altitude air control for ground operations and its difference from traditional concepts of air dominance.[i] The article appears to be influenced by recent conflicts such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Seizing low-altitude air control requires an integrated air defense and distributed, networked, system of systems integrating ground and low-altitude air systems with modular, mobile, multi-domain capabilities.  The importance of seizing low-altitude air control[ii] is based on the large-scale use of small and medium unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), helicopters, and cruise missiles. Traditional air dominance[iii] cannot guarantee low-altitude air control due to the sundry of small arms and short-range systems that threaten low flying airframes. The author argues that traditional air dominance operations are generally more centralized, while low-altitude air control is an ongoing, independent, and decentralized tactical operation that seizes control in a certain location for a limited time. Decentralized low-altitude air defense operations to seize control require accurate intelligence with the capability to distinguish between friend and foe, coordinated communications, and timely warning of air threats.

Achieving the capability to control the low-altitude air space even for short periods will threaten an adversary’s ability to employ UAVs and fixed and rotary winged aviation. The author urges the PLA to accelerate the development of intelligent air control UAVs with swarming capabilities, loitering munitions, detection systems to identify low, slow, micro-targets, and innovative tactics to seize low-altitude air control in the critical place and time to influence ground combat. . The capability to control the low-altitude air space would give the PLA a significant advantage protecting its forces and critical infrastructure.

Source:

夺取未来陆战低空制权 (Seize the low-altitude dominance of future land warfare),” PLA Daily (official PRC military newspaper), 23 May 2023. http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2023-05-23&paperNumber=07&articleid=906414

“Low-altitude control is a relatively independent and decentralized tactical-level space control. Low altitude control cannot be achieved and controlled through a single operation or a stage of centralized air control operations. Seizing low altitude control power will run through the entire process of combat, displaying a “distributed, discrete” form with strong tactical, regional, mobile, and full process characteristics. Even without the guarantee of traditional air supremacy, through active actions, it is possible to seize low-altitude supremacy in a certain area and within a certain time limit, forming a low-altitude combat advantage.

To seize low altitude dominance, we should focus on the characteristics of the struggle for low altitude control, establish the concept of “relying on ground control, dynamic control, precise control, and flexible use of air”, and follow the basic principle of “whoever uses it seizes it, seizes it as needed, and manages it as needed”. By seizing it in combat, maneuvering, and using it, we can respectively seize low-altitude control power in the task area through relatively independent and dispersed low-altitude combat and low-altitude air defense operations. At the same time, it is necessary to dynamically implement low altitude airspace monitoring and management, establish a low altitude multi-means and multi-mode monitoring system, fully grasp low altitude situations, strengthen collaborative communication, accurately distinguish between enemy and friendly platforms, timely warning, quickly strike and destroy enemy air combat equipment and air control equipment, accurately handle our air conflicts, and ensure effective control of low altitude and ultra-low altitude airspace.

The low-altitude power struggle in future intelligent warfare will become more intense. The Army’s field air defense system should continuously improve the comprehensive combat effectiveness of the low-altitude airspace, attach great importance to the construction of a distributed low-altitude operational system of systems based on the network, and rely on the network to build air-ground integration, the combination of detection, attack and defense, and mobility, modular low-altitude operational system of systems. Focus on strengthening the research and development of low-altitude detection and monitoring platforms to achieve rapid network deployment and low-altitude ultra-low-altitude high-sensitivity dynamic monitoring, and improve the ability to detect “low, slow and small” aircraft; accelerate the development of intelligent air-controlling UAVs, loitering missiles, and “swarms” to enrich the air-to-ground and multi-mode guidance, multi-mechanism killing, and multi-domain attack capabilities; Continue to improve the ability to detect and attack low-altitude small and micro targets, accelerate the development of new mechanism combat equipment, and form a low-altitude combat capability that covers multiple levels of campaigns, tactics, and operational units.

Notes:

[i] For additional information and perspective, see: Thomas Shrimpton, “Chinese Perspective on Manned-Unmanned Coordinated Operations on the Modern Battlefield,” OE Watch, 06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-perspective-on-manned-unmanned-coordinated-operations-on-the-modern-battlefield/

[ii] The ability to neutralize enemy air defenses and other weapons systems that could attack low flying aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, and cruise missiles would appear difficult to achieve since these weapons would include small arms and short-range gun and missiles systems.

[iii] The PLA defines air dominance or “command of the air” as the Air Force and other services controlling the battlespace for a period of time. Presumably this encompasses offensive and defensive operations, including electronic and information warfare, to neutralize the enemy’s air defense capabilities. The reference to “a period of time” likely indicates the difficulty of sustaining command of the air.

Image Information:

Image: Soldier from Ukrainian 25th Air Assault Brigade employing Small bomb carrying UAV.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:UA_25th_DShV_Bde_Mavic_3_bomber_01.jpg
Attribution: CC By 4.0

Russia Positions Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Belarus

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President Putin and Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, Eurasian Economic Forum, 24 May 2023

“Belarus is now becoming Russia’s “nuclear queen” on the borders with NATO and Ukraine.”

The current Russian leadership appears to be taking concrete measures to reposition non-strategic nuclear weapons into Belarus to support its military operations in Ukraine, according to the pro-Kremlin site Century. A key element of the Kremlin’s propaganda over the past decade has been its focus on its huge nuclear weapon arsenal, which it interprets to symbolize Russia’s superpower status. Not surprisingly, the Kremlin’s nuclear rhetoric escalated after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since then, senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly threatened to use these weapons to achieve their objectives in Ukraine.,

The transfer of Russian nuclear weapons into Belarus was not altogether unexpected. President Lukashenko of Belarus has increasingly become dependent upon Kremlin support over the past several years.[i] Belarus’s economic, defense, and foreign policies largely follow those of Russia. Lukashenko has permitted the Russian military to use Belarus as a staging area while  managing to prevent his soldiers from directly participating in the Ukrainian conflict.. To maintain the fiction of Belarus’ agency and independence, the article declares that “Lukashenko has long asked to place Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of his country.” While these nuclear weapons will remain under Russian control, President Putin addressed the training of Belarusian crews to deliver these bombs via Su-24 [RG1] aircraft or the Iskander-M [RG2] operational-tactical missile systems which belong to Belarus.[ii] According to the article, Putin argues that Russia is merely answering the United States in a “mirror way,” since “America stores 200 tactical nuclear weapons, mostly atomic bombs…in six European countries.” The article concludes with a quotation  from former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who claims that “the horsemen of the apocalypse are already on their way,” and that if Ukraine tries to recapture Crimea, it “would be grounds for Russia to use any weapon.”

Sources:

Alexander Pronin, “Ядерный ферзь России; Растущая милитаризация Европы и наш комплексный ответ (Nuclear Queen of Russia; The Growing Militarization of Europe and Our Comprehensive Response),” Century (pro-Kremlin site), 10 May 2023. https://www.stoletie.ru/rossiya_i_mir/jadernyj_ferz_rossii_537.htm

President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko has repeatedly raised the issue of deploying Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in the republic with the Russian leadership. The last time – in March of this year. His request is finally granted….

According to Putin, President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko has long asked to place Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of his country. He publicly announced this desire even before the start of Russia’s special operation in Ukraine, in 2021…

…The next public discussion of the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus took place in June 2022 during the talks between Lukashenka and Putin.

The Russian leader noted that at that moment in six European countries – NATO members – the Americans stored 200 tactical nuclear weapons, mostly atomic bombs….

“On July 1, we are completing the construction of a special storage facility for tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus,” Vladimir Putin said in March 2023 in Pavel Zarubin’s program.

…And he added that the training of Belarusian crews will begin on April 3. According to him, there are already carriers of (Russian) nuclear weapons in Belarus: these are the Su-24s, the Iskander-M operational-tactical missile systems, modified by agreement with Minsk, as well as our MiG-31s [RG1] ​​with Kinzhals, all this is covered modern air defense systems, including the transferred S-400 anti-aircraft missiles….

Thus, Belarus is now becoming Russia’s “nuclear queen” on the borders with NATO and Ukraine….

By the way, special ammunition will be stored and controlled by the Russian army…. The President of Russia made it clear that the decision of Moscow and Minsk is a response to the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, organized by the West.

“Each day of deliveries of foreign weapons to Ukraine ultimately brings this same nuclear apocalypse closer. This does not mean that it will definitely take place. But the horsemen of the apocalypse are already on their way and continue their movement, you can rest assured,” Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Head of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, commented on the decisions taken by NATO. In addition, Medvedev warned that Ukraine’s attempt to retake Crimea would be grounds to use any weapon, including those provided for by the “fundamentals of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.” He believes that an attempt to “split off part of the state” is equal to “an encroachment on the existence of the state itself.”

Notes:

[i] On paper, at least, Russia and Belarus have formed a “Union State.” The strength of this union improved after President Lukashenko appealed for Kremlin assistance in the summer of 2020. Lukashenko had falsified presidential election results, and when large protests broke out, Russia provided economic and security assistance to quell the demonstrations. Since then, Lukashenko’s room to maneuver has been limited.

[ii] Russia has repeatedly promised to move an airbase into western Belarus for the past several years. There has been some speculation that Russia will use this base as the storage site for its non-strategic nuclear weapons. For background, see: Ray Finch, “Russia Deploying Anti-NATO Air Assets in Belarus Under Guise of Training,” OE Watch, July 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: President Putin and Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, Eurasian Economic Forum, 24 May 2023
Source: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71198/photos/71199
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Intl

India Takes a Step Away from the Russian Defense Industry

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Abstract

India and Russia have had a long-standing security cooperation partnership, with India relying heavily on Russian weapons and equipment for its armed forces. However, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the Make in India initiative in 2014 to develop the country’s defense industry and reduce dependence on imports. The war in Ukraine has caused India to accelerate this process and end negotiations or cancel agreements with Russia on several weapon system acquisitions. Indian officials cited Russia’s logistical problems in delivering new systems as the reason for the cancellations. This article examines how the conflict in Ukraine has impacted one of Russia’s key security cooperation partnerships and how India’s defense industry is developing to produce replacements for these systems. The study provides insights into the challenges and opportunities for India to achieve its goal of self-reliance in defense production.

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2023-06-08 An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 2 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles)

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An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 2 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles). Click image to download.

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This study describes how Russian military theorists think about the initial period of war (IPW) concept and its relation to strategic operations, and posits that due to the nature of the special military operation, the IPW concept was likely in no way a part of the operational planning process. While there were likely political motivations for the use of the term “special military operation” instead of “war,” the term “war” was not used for the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, because it was not envisioned to meet the criteria for “war” as understood by Russian military theorists

An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 1 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles)

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An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 1 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles). Click image to download.

(Click image to download brief.)

This study describes the historical evolution of the Russian concept of the initial period of war (IPW). The concept has evolved substantially since its inception, which can be traced back to at least the early 1900s, but it generally pertains to the decisive strategic operations that occur during the first few days of war, that set conditions for strategic success, and the activities that occur before the war (period of imminent threat or preparation period in Russian military parlance) that make these strategic operations possible;

Russia Concerned About Dependence on Chinese Technology

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President Putin and Chinese President Xi, Kremlin, June 2019.

President Putin and Chinese President Xi, Kremlin, June 2019.

“Russia’s conflict with Ukraine is making Moscow too dependent on Chinese technology…”

Over the past decade, as the Kremlin leadership has touted and celebrated its growing ties to China as it has sought to distance itself from the West. This turn toward Beijing accelerated after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as Western governments imposed additional sanctions and many Western firms departed. As the first excerpt from Russian television channel ORT describes, during President Xi’s visit to Moscow in March, there was talk of a comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation. Having only just recently been labeled as a war criminal by the Hague, the Chinese leader’s decision to make his first foreign visit since the onset of COVID-19 speaks volumes regarding his support for Putin. While political relations today are cordial, some in Russia are beginning to question their country’s growing economic and technological dependence upon China.[i] The second excerpt from Russian-language Turkish news service TRT captures this concern, which attributes it to Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. Not only are there security concerns regarding Russia’s dependence on this technology, but “Russian officials also fear that the growth of the presence of Chinese companies and developments in the Russian market could hinder the development of their own developments in the field of security.”[ii] The article concludes by quoting statistics regarding the growth of Russian firms using “Chinese cybersecurity solutions,” growing from 5 percent in 2022 to nearly 60 percent today. Should the current trend continue, China will gain considerable leverage over Russian information processing.

Sources:

Pavel Matveev, “Завершился государственный визит председателя КНР Си Цзиньпина в Россию (Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Russia ends),” ORT (Russian Main TV Channel), 22 March 2023. https://www.1tv.ru/news/2023-03-22/449553-zavershilsya_gosudarstvennyy_vizit_predsedatelya_knr_si_tszinpina_v_rossiyu

The farewell ceremony took place at Vnukovo airport. State flags, anthems of the two countries, after which the Chinese leader followed the red carpet to his plane.

…A full program, many meetings and negotiations, as a result of which important documents were signed and a joint statement was published on deepening comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction…. In particular, Russia will support Chinese business, which is replacing Western companies. Settlements between the two countries have already mostly switched to rubles and yuan….

“Российские чиновники опасаются растущей зависимости от Huawei (Russian officials wary of growing reliance on Huawei),” TRT (Turkish News Service in Russian), 20 April 2023. https://www.trtrussian.com/novosti/rossijskie-chinovniki-opasayutsya-rastushej-zavisimosti-ot-huawei-12905704

Russia’s conflict with Ukraine is making Moscow too dependent on Chinese technology, as US and EU sanctions have barred Russian firms from accessing Western technology. Instead, the Russian Federation is forced to reorient itself to Chinese developments, in particular, to deliveries from Huawei….

…The document cited by the publication says: some high-ranking Russian officials are concerned that Chinese companies such as Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. may take a dominant position in the Russian market, thereby posing a risk to the information security of the country. …In a report compiled by the Ministry of Digital Development of the Russian Federation in the summer of 2022, microcircuits, network devices and electronics are highlighted as areas of particular vulnerability.

…In addition to fears of growing dependence, Russian officials also fear that the growth of the presence of Chinese companies and developments in the Russian market could hinder the development of their own developments in the field of security…

…As TRT previously wrote in Russian, more than half of companies in Russia plan to switch to Chinese equipment in the field of cybersecurity after European and American manufacturers leave the Russian market.The Russian newspaper Kommersant, citing a survey by K2Tech integrator, notes that until 2022, only 5% of Russian companies used Chinese cybersecurity solutions. Now 60% of companies have switched to them or are planning to switch to them to replace the products of departed Western players – Cisco, Palo Alto, etc….

Notes:

[i] This concern has been growing for the past several years. For additional background, see: Ray Finch, “Russia-China: Potential Allies or Adversaries?,” OE Watch, November 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/340594

[ii] The Kremlin has been careful not to publicize information regarding unfair Chinese business practices and espionage to protect the warming relationship between the two countries.  For some relatively recent background, see: Ray Finch, “Russian Concerns over Chinese Espionage,” OE Watch, December 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/379981

Image Information:

Image: President Putin and Chinese President Xi, Kremlin, June 2019.
Source: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60669/photos
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl

Russian Domestic Support for Ukraine Invasion Weakens as Fighters Return Home

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President Putin, Victory Day, Red Square, 9 May 2023.

President Putin, Victory Day, Red Square, 9 May 2023.

“The funny thing is that now there will be many such heroes all over the country, which is scary.”

According to the excerpted article from official Kremlin news outlet Parliamentskaya Gazeta, during the Victory Day celebration on 9 May, President Putin declared “all of Russia has rallied to support the participants in the special military operation in Ukraine.” Despite some skepticism of such claims, indeed, most indicators suggest that Russian civil society support for the invasion has remained high over time.[i] Some of this robust domestic support stems from the Kremlin’s control over the country’s major media, which has over the past 15 months asserted that Russian soldiers are protecting their country against a quasi-Ukrainian/Nazi threat (supported by the US and NATO).[ii] Alongside the 24/7 propaganda, the Kremlin has also enacted legislation that severely punishes any attempt to protest Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[iii] Nevertheless, despite the Kremlin’s tight control over the narrative, there are growing indications that some Russians are beginning to question the costs behind this conflict, and possibly, their support.

The second excerpt from a regional source in Krasnodar, 93.RU, describes the brutal kidnapping and murder of two local residents by three ex-convicts. The victims’ car had broken down, and after offering to help, the criminals forced them to withdraw money from the bank and then murdered them. The source suggests that these ex-convicts may have recently gained their freedom from prison by volunteering to fight with the Wagner private military company in Ukraine. One of them had been sentenced to 16 years in prison in 2016 for a similar murder, and the article questions how he could have been released so soon. Since “discrediting” the military is now a serious offense in Russia, the author of the article couches the assertion that these ex-convicts had been released from prison by volunteering to fight in Ukraine in vague terms. However, anonymous reader comments to this article are more forthright, pointing out that once these convicts had spent six months fighting in Ukraine, they were now free to return to former criminal habits. Another reader warns that “now there will be many such heroes all over the country, which is scary.” These comments suggest that the blowback from using convicted criminals as soldiers could reduce Russian domestic support for fighting in Ukraine.

Sources:

Anton Grebennikov, “Президент: Вся страна сплотилась для поддержки участников спецоперации (President: The whole country rallied to support the participants of the special operation),” Parliamentskaya Gazeta (official Kremlin site), 9 May 2023. https://www.pnp.ru/politics/prezident-vsya-strana-splotilas-dlya-podderzhki-uchastnikov-specoperacii.html

Today, all of Russia has rallied to support the participants in the special military operation in Ukraine. The country is proud of its heroes, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized during the Victory Day Parade on Red Square…. “There is no more important thing now than your combat work. Today, the security of the country rests on you, the future of our statehood and our people depends on you, you honorably fulfill your military duty – you fight for Russia. Your families, children, friends are behind you, they are waiting for you,” RIA Novosti quotes the president….

Valeria Dulskaya, “Верили до последнего. Кто и зачем убил аниматоров на кубанской трассе (They believed until the very end. Who and why killed the animators on the Kuban highway),” 93.RU (Krasnodar News Site), 4 May 2023. https://93.ru/text/incidents/2023/05/04/72274256/

On the evening of April 28, animators Kirill Chubko and Tatyana Mostyko disappeared on the highway near the village of Berezanskaya in the Krasnodar Territory, who were driving home from work. They broke the wheel, and after some time they stopped communicating. Two days after the disappearance, Kirill’s car was found burned in the forest. More than 180,000 rubles disappeared from the accounts of the animators – they were withdrawn at night from different ATMs. Officers later arrested three suspects….

Unfortunately, that evening it became known that the animators were dead. On the morning of May 3, police reported that they had detained three suspects in the murder of Kirill and Tatiana. They were 31-year-old Demyan Kevorkyan from Krasnodar, 30-year-old Anatoly Dvoinikov from the Tikhoretsky district and 45-year-old Aram Tatosyan from the Apsheron district.

According to investigators, near the village of Berezanskaya, the alleged criminals noticed Kirill and Tatiana standing on the road on the road. The men decided to kill them in order to steal money and other valuables. They attacked the animators, took away their cards, “gaining access to the possibility of conducting banking operations on them.” Then the suspects withdrew more than 180 thousand rubles from several ATMs. Taking the money, the men killed Cyril and Tatyana. To hide the crime, they burned their car and hid the bodies, the press service of the regional Investigative Committee reported….

On May 3, the Investigative Committee announced the arrest of three suspects in the murder of Kirill and Tatyana – Demyan Kevorkyan, Anatoly Dvoinikov and Aram Tatosyan. According to the Russian Investigative Committee, all three had previous convictions…. The media suggest that they participated in the SMO, but there is no official confirmation of this.

Reader Comments:

One convict, who in 2016 was sentenced to 18 years for a similar murder, teleported out of the colony in some completely unknown way and killed the victims.

The funny thing is that now there will be many such heroes all over the country, which is scary.I don’t understand either, they gave him 18 years and he is free. Everything goes according to plan…

Notes:

[i] Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi, “How Strong is Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine?,” Atlantic Council, 2 May 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-strong-is-russian-public-support-for-the-invasion-of-ukraine/#:~:text=The%20Levada%20Center%2C%20which%20is,public%20backing%20of%20over%2070%25

[ii] For additional background on how the Kremlin has used the media to generate support for its policies, see” Ray Finch, CHAPTER 6. THE MOBILIZATION OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY, THE RUSSIAN MILITARY IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, 1 September 2019. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20098.10

[iii]Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian media space had become tightly controlled, especially on matters dealing with national security. For a brief snapshot on some of these restrictive measures, see: Ray Finch, “More Restrictions on Defense Information,” OE Watch, October 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/376377; “Russia Moves Forward with New Restrictions on Military Reporting,” OE Watch, November, 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/397980

Image Information:

Image: President Putin, Victory Day, Red Square, 9 May 2023.
Source: http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/photos/big2x/EONAWWmXRIkYHMVEZf8vmNhVq99RsGK3.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl

Regional Analyst Questions Effectiveness, Sustainability of Russian Missile Strikes in Ukraine

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Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on a MiG-31K[RG1]  Victory Day Parade 2018 Moscow.

Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on a MiG-31K[RG1]  Victory Day Parade 2018 Moscow.

“Russia is increas[ing] the intensity [of missile strikes] to somehow find a loophole in these [Ukraine air defense] systems and break through them.”

Although the intensity of Russian missile strikes against Ukraine increased from March and April 2023 to May 2023, the somewhat limited nature of the strikes may be an indication that Russia is running into a supply problem that could have a strategic impact on its ambitions in Ukraine and its ability to sell weapons on the international arms market. According to the recent accompanying article from Republic of Georgia-based Resonance Daily, which monitors the war in Ukraine and Russian military affairs in general, Russia may be squandering its missile stockpile in a somewhat piecemeal effort to break or find a weakness in Ukraine’s missile defense that it cannot currently exploit. From the perspective of the Georgian defense analyst quoted in the article, “Russia is increas[ing] the intensity [of missile strikes] to somehow find a loophole in these [Ukraine air defense] systems and break through them.” This, the analyst points out, is due to Russia’s inability to achieve any breakthroughs in the ground war. The article, published in the wake of a barrage of Russian missile and drone strikes on Kyiv on 16 May, underscores that Russia is thought to possess only 80 Kinzhal (dagger) hypersonic missiles, and that Ukrainian missile defenses destroyed one “dagger” on 6 May and six more on 16 May. Accordingly, it asserts, Russia now likely has 73 “daggers” in its arsenal. Collectively, these developments suggest that the Kinzhal [RG1] , as well as other missiles in Russia’s arsenal, are quickly becoming a finite resource due to attrition and sanctions, the latter of which makes it much more difficult to manufacture more of these weapons.[i] If the estimations of Russia’s stockpiles are correct, and current sanctions hold, Russia will not be able to replenish its stockpiles in any meaningful way in the near future. As a result, Russia does not possess weapon systems in sufficient numbers to allow it to strike Ukraine with enough salvos to overwhelm Ukrainian missile defense. Moreover, Moscow will be severely impacted in its ability to wage war on any front, threatening its positions in Ukraine and Syria, as well as curtailing its ambitions elsewhere.

Source:

Tamta Chachanidze, “ყველაზე მასირებული სარაკეტო დარტყმა კიევზე და „სათაგური“ ბახმუტში – ბოლო ცნობები ფრონტიდან (The most massive missile attack on Kiev and the “keystone” in Bakhmut – latest news from the front),” Resonance Daily (Georgia based media outlet focused on foreign affairs)16 May 2023. http://www.resonancedaily.com/mobile/index.php?id_rub=8&id_artc=181367&fbclid=IwAR39bK06tvFq8JAzCvR9QhAJVVqUvU3uFI4iITkgHFPXru72jkKrz5f4yQQ

On May 16, Russia launched the most massive three-hour missile attack on Kiev in the history of war. Aeroballistic missiles of the “Kinjali” type were also used. According to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the air defense forces of the country neutralized all the missiles. The Russian side claims the opposite – that with one “Kinjali” the Ukrainians destroyed the air defense system “Patriot”….

From the footage spread on social networks, it can be seen that there were indeed fires in Kyiv after the May 16 rocket attack, however, according to the administration of the capital city, it was caused by the fragments of the downed rockets. According to military analysts, the Russians are already trying to force Ukraine to make some kind of concession with intense air strikes. Or is this a new strategy to “somehow look ugly” to the Western anti-aircraft systems transferred to Ukraine.

They also do not rule out that “Kinjal” was hit by “Patriot”, because there is no such thing as 100% and ideal air defense, and “one or two missiles will defeat even the best air defense”.

…

At dawn on May 16, the Russians launched the most massive missile attack on Kiev in the last year, which lasted more than three hours….

According to Valery Zaluzhn, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in the early hours of May 16, the Russian occupation forces attacked Ukraine from the northern, southern and eastern directions with 18 missiles. According to him, the opponent used 6 aeroballistic missiles “Kinjali”, 9 missiles “Calibre [RG1] ” from naval bases and 3 ground missiles “Iskander [RG2] “. Air defense forces destroyed all 18 missiles.

Several buildings and vehicles were damaged in different districts of Kyiv. 3 people were injured. According to Kyiv Mayor Vitaly Klitschko, it was caused by debris from Russian missiles. However, the Russian side claims otherwise.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, on May 16, a “Patriot” air defense system was destroyed with a “Kinjali” missile. In addition, according to the agency, “high-precision weapons struck warehouses of Ukrainian ammunition and weapons, which the West supplied to Kyiv”.

On the same day the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that, “Russian air defense systems shot down seven Storm Shadow [GRLCUT(3] long-range cruise missiles recently handed over to Ukraine by Britain, the same number of Hymars shells, as well as three Harm-type radar-detecting missiles. In addition, 22 Ukrainian planes were destroyed in Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions.

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine responded to the deadly attack on Kiev and thanked the Air Force of Ukraine for its work and impressive results. “The next incredible success of the Armed Forces of Ukraine! Last night, our sky defenders shot down six Russian hypersonic ‘Daggers’ and 12 more missiles,” Reznikov wrote on Twitter.

In addition, the Minister of Defense of Ukraine wrote an arithmetic equation: “80-1-6=X”, implying the total number of “Kinjali” missiles possessed by Russia to be only 80. On May 6, the Ukrainians destroyed 1 and 6 additional “daggers” on May 16. Accordingly, the Russians now likely have 73 “daggers” in their arsenal.

Colonel Lasha Beridze states to Resonance Daily that the Russians no longer have the resources of a ground attack and are now trying to compensate for this with air strikes.

“Russia no longer has options for a ground attack. They understand very well that they will not be able to defend themselves for a long time, and that is why they are already trying to take Ukraine to some kind of favorable concession with such airstrikes, or it is simply a punitive operation.

“Ukraine already has “Patriot” systems that can fight with “Kinjals” and quite successfully. It has been neglected many times already. Even the best air defense will be hit by one or two missiles, there is no such thing as perfect. Many developed countries could not withstand airstrikes like Ukraine.

“The Ukrainians are successfully repelling the attacks, and as time goes by, these air defense capabilities will increase.

“At the end of the day, Russian armaments with Western technologies have no chance to win and turn the battlefield in their favor. It seems they will increase their airstrikes if they have the chance. However, no matter how they increase missile strikes, there are all indications that they will not be able to increase its effectiveness. Don’t get angry and the “daggers” will come out”, said Lasha Beridze to “Resonance”.

Caucasus International University professor and military analyst Vakhtang Maisaya told “Resonance” that massed strikes have become a common strategy of the Russians, which may be aimed at disrupting the existing anti-aircraft systems in Ukraine.“It seems that this is already a kind of strategy of the Russians, when they try to break through the anti-missile defense, which is very effective, and they increase the intensity to somehow find a loophole in these systems and break through them. When the Ukrainians started intercepting missiles, the Russians now switched to intensive strikes,” Maisaya said.

Notes:

[i] Missiles are not the only Russian weapon system to be in short supply. The number of Russian aircraft are also being diminished. For insight regarding the limited number of Su-35 fighter bombers, see: “Russia’s Su-35: Are Its Military Aircraft Exports Headed for a Fall?,” The Rand Blog, 20 October 2022. https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/10/russias-su-35-are-its-military-aircraft-exports-headed.html

Image Information:

Image: Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on a MiG-31K [RG1]  Victory Day Parade 2018 Moscow.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2018_Moscow_Victory_Day_Parade_66.jpg
Attribution: Kremlin.ru, CCA 4.0 International