Tag Archives: Ukraine

Sahelian States Sever Ties with Ukraine

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Flag of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine.

“The government of the Republic of Niger, in total solidarity with the government and people of Mali, has decided in all sovereignty to sever diplomatic relations between the Republic of Niger and Ukraine with immediate effect.”

Allegations of an “African Front” being opened in Russia’s war on Ukraine have caused multiple nations in the Sahel to sever diplomatic relations with Ukraine as African and Russian leaders accuse Ukraine of supporting terrorist organizations. According to the first excerpted article from French daily Le Monde, Niger and Mali ceased diplomatic relations with Ukraine on 7 August 2024. The decision was made in response to separatist and jihadist fighters in Mali killing dozens of Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) and Malian military personnel fighting in northeastern Mali. In the wake of the battle, Andriy Yusov, the press representative of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, stated: “The fact that the rebels received the necessary data that allowed them to successfully carry out an operation against Russian war criminals has already been observed by the whole world. Of course, we will not disclose the details.”[i] While this is not a direct admission of Ukrainian involvement in the Sahel, Moscow has unsurprisingly sided with Niger and Mali, condemning Kyiv.

Recent actions by Mali and Niger have sparked discussion that a proxy war could be starting in Africa between Russian-backed militaries and separatist groups accused of being backed by Ukraine. According to the second excerpted article from the Africa-based think tank, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), there are likely far more significant geopolitical implications for Africa than regional conflicts between warring tribes and jihadist groups. Russia’s information campaigns in numerous nations have been widely reported on. However, recently, Ukraine’s special envoy for Africa and the Middle East, Maksym Subkh, announced new embassies throughout Africa to help combat the influence of Russia’s Africa Corps. Ukrainian intervention against Russia, indirectly through support or through kinetic operations, would not be unheard of. ISS also reported that Ukrainian special forces were deployed to operate in Sudan to support the Sudanese Armed Forces fighting against Africa Corps mercenaries and allied Rapid Support Forces.

Mali, Niger, and several other nations in the Sahel have faced complex security issues stemming from armed rebellion to radical jihadism and foreign influence for several years. The possible expansion of the Russia-Ukraine war to other portions of the globe, such as Africa, has received mixed reactions. The Economic Community of West African States, a political and economic union of fifteen African nations, including Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali, and Niger, condemned any foreign influence and the expansion of geopolitical events to Africa.[ii] Others may view any attempt to combat Russian expansion and aggression as a net positive. However, if Ukraine does become openly involved in attempting to subvert Russian expansion in Africa, it will undoubtedly cause a shift in the momentum of ongoing armed conflicts in the region. Though, with multiple armed groups active in Sahelian states with varying motivations and allegiances, it would be difficult to limit the extent of foreign aid and influence to exclude all jihadist groups.

Sources:

“Le Niger rompt « avec effet immédiat » ses relations diplomatiques avec l’Ukraine, deux jours après le Mali (Niger breaks off diplomatic relations with Ukraine “with immediate effect”, two days after Mali),” Le Monde, 7 August 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/08/07/le-niger-rompt-avec-effet-immediat-ses-relations-diplomatiques-avec-l-ukraine-deux-jours-apres-le-mali_6270883_3212.html

Niger announced on Tuesday, August 6, that it was breaking off diplomatic relations with Ukraine “with immediate effect,” two days after Mali accused Kyiv of “supporting” “terrorist groups” after a heavy defeat of the Malian army at the end of July during fighting with separatists and jihadists.

“The government of the Republic of Niger, in total solidarity with the government and people of Mali, has decided in all sovereignty (…) to sever diplomatic relations between the Republic of Niger and Ukraine with immediate effect,” declared the spokesman for the Niger government, Colonel-Major Amadou Abdramane, in a statement read on public television.

At the end of July, separatists and jihadists claimed to have killed dozens of members of the Russian paramilitary group Wagner and Malian soldiers during fighting in Tin Zaouatine (north-east Mali). This defeat is the heaviest suffered in a battle by the Wagner Group in Africa, analysts agree.

A Ukrainian military intelligence official, Andri Yusov, had implied that Kiev had provided information to the rebels so they could carry out their attack. “The government of the Republic of Niger learned with great shock and deep indignation about the subversive and unacceptable remarks of Mr. Andri Yusov, spokesman for the Ukrainian military intelligence agency ,” Abdramane said on Tuesday…

“The fact that the rebels received the necessary data that allowed them to successfully carry out an operation against Russian war criminals has already been observed by the whole world. Of course, we will not disclose the details. More information to come here too,” Yusov told Ukrainian television. The video of his statement was relayed by the Ukrainian ambassador to Senegal.

Following these statements, Mali announced the severance of its relations with Ukraine, which on Monday rejected the accusations and regretted the decision, which it considered “hasty” . The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry affirmed that Kyiv “unconditionally adheres to the norms of international law” and “reserves the right to take all necessary political and diplomatic measures in response to unfriendly actions.”

Peter Fabricius, “La guerre de la Russie contre l’Ukraine s’étend-elle à l’Afrique? (Is Russia’s War on Ukraine Spreading to Africa?),” Institute for Security Studies (pan-African think tank), 9 August 2024. https://issafrica.org/fr/iss-today/la-guerre-de-la-russie-contre-l-ukraine-s-etend-elle-a-l-afrique.

Russia appears to be stepping up its multi-pronged offensive to increase its influence in Africa, while Ukraine is fighting back, threatening to turn the continent into a major proxy battlefield.

Russia appears to be stepping up its multi-pronged offensive to increase its influence in Africa, while Ukraine is fighting back, threatening to turn the continent into a major proxy battlefield. Military skirmishes erupted last week in Africa, when Moscow’s Wagner force (now Africa Corps) suffered heavy losses in a battle against Tuareg separatists and jihadists in Tinzawatene, Mali. The setback marks a major blow to the Kremlin, which appeared to be expanding its presence or at least countering Western efforts to regain ground.

After last week’s intense battle in Tinzawatene, in which Tuareg separatists claim to have killed 84 Wagner fighters and 47 Malian soldiers, officer Andriy Yusov, a spokesman for Ukraine’s intelligence agency, said Malian rebels had received the “necessary” information to carry out the attack, hinting at possible Ukrainian involvement. In response, Mali’s military junta severed diplomatic relations with Ukraine, accusing it of supporting “international terrorism.” Ukraine denied the accusation, saying Mali acted hastily, without investigating the incident or providing evidence of its involvement. The military junta of Mali’s neighbor Niger has also severed diplomatic ties with Kiev. Russia has accused Ukraine of opening a new front in Africa, an accusation tinged with irony.

The consequences of the war between Russia and Ukraine could be serious for Africa. The Economic Community of West African States condemned “foreign interference in the region […] and any attempt to drag the region into the current geopolitical confrontations.” The African Union did not respond. This development may not be entirely new in Africa. For Ramani, if Ukraine did indeed contribute to Wagner’s defeat in Mali, it is part of his two-pronged strategy in Africa. On the one hand, diplomatic openness with the establishment of new embassies and, on the other, “discreet special operations like those observed against the RSF in Sudan.”

The “RSF” refers to the Rapid Support Forces, which are engaged in a violent conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). It is well known that Russia, including Wagner, supports the RSF. In February, the Kyiv Post reported that Ukrainian special forces were operating in Sudan, supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces against Wagner’s forces, allied with the RSF. For Ramani, Wagner’s defeat in Mali will lead to introspection. Wagner’s forces will likely be more controlled by the state, “like the process going on in Libya.”

Notes:

[i] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine responded to Niger’s decision in a press release, denying support for terrorist organizations. Located here: “Statement by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry regarding the decision of the authorities of the Republic of Niger to sever diplomatic relations with Ukraine,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 8 August 2024. https://mfa.gov.ua/fr/news/zayava-mzs-ukrayini-shchodo-rishennya-vladi-respubliki-niger-rozirvati-diplomatichni-vidnosini-z-ukrayinoyu

[ii] ECOWAS has a long-standing history in Africa, founded in 1975, and contributes to many social and economic projects including election monitoring, clean water initiatives, human development, regional security, and more. For more information on ECOWAS visit: “About ECOWAS,” ECOWAS, Updated 2024.  https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/

OE Insight Summary:

Allegations of an “African Front” being opened in RUS’s war on UKR have caused multiple nations in the Sahel to sever diplomatic relations with Ukraine as African and Russian leaders accuse UKR of supporting terrorist organizations.

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_Special_Operations_Forces_of_Ukraine.svg
Attribution: Public Domain

Armenia Hints It May Withdraw From Russia-Backed Regional Security Bloc

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Monastery Valley in Armenia

“Armenia will refrain from joining the CSTO Collective Security Council resolution of November 23, 2023 on the CSTO budget for 2024 and from participating in financing the organization’s activity envisaged by this resolution. However, it will not object to adopting this resolution in a curtailed format.”

Armenia recently announced it will no longer pay its dues to the Collective Security Treaty Organizations (CSTO), a Moscow-led security organization comprised of countries from Central Asia and the South Caucasus. According to the first excerpted piece from the Russian state news agency, TASS, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told his countrymen that they can no longer rely on the CSTO and he had no answer to how Yerevan benefits from being a member. The move comes as relations between Yerevan and Moscow have cooled, particularly after a series of clashes over the disputed Nagorno Karabakh region, , last September with neighboring Azerbaijan resulted in the mass expulsion of the enclave’s Armenian population.

Pashinyan, who did not attend the CSTO’s last summit in Minsk in 2023, had hinted that Armenia plans to suspend its participation in the security bloc. Critics of the CSTO claim it is a tool for Moscow to wield military power over former Soviet-bloc countries. The last time CSTO forces were called in to preserve the peace came in January 2022, when roughly 2,500 CSTO peacekeepers – the bulk of them Russian – responded to anti-government rioting in Kazakhstan. But Pashinyan has criticized the alliance for not supporting Armenia during its various clashes with Azerbaijan,accusing Russian peacekeepers of abandoning their positions when Azerbaijani troops crossed into Nagorno-Karabakh.[i] According to the second excerpted article from Armenian TV and radio service Azatutyun, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Armenia is free to withdraw from the organization.[ii]  If Armenia does leave the CSTO, the move could signal a major realignment of the regional balance of power in the Caucasus, as Russia, preoccupied by the war in Ukraine, looks to keep a military presence in the region. Armenia recently held joint drills with the United States, has sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and has expressed interest in one day joining the European Union. If the CSTO were to lose Armenia or other members, it could weaken Russia’s military leverage in the South Caucasus. Alternatively, it could make other regional security blocs like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which also comprises China, more relevant and powerful.

Sources:

Source:  “Armenia to refrain from financing CSTO activity in 2024,” (“Армения воздержится от финансирования деятельности ОДКБ в 2024 году,” TASS (Russian state news agency), 8 May 2024. https://tass.com/world/1785765

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said earlier that his country cannot rely on the CSTO and he cannot answer Armenian society’s question why the country should be its member. In recent time, Yerevan has skipped numerous meeting in a range of integration formats. Thus, Pashinyan did not attend the CSTO summit in Minsk in 2023 and announced that Armenia had suspended its participation in this organization.

CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov told TASS on April 22 that it was a matter of “an independent and sovereign country” to decide whether to take part in the upcoming CSTO summit or not. However, he said that he hoped that many might change for the better before the summit.

Source:  “Armenia Free To Leave Russian-Led Bloc, Says Moscow,” (Армения свободна выйти из возглавляемого Россией блока, заявила Москва), Azatutyun (Armenian TV and Radio service affiliated with U.S. funded RFE/RL) 3 May 2024. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32932373.html#

“We still do not question the sovereign right of our Armenian partners to independently determine their foreign policy course, including in the context of the further work of the organization,” the ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova told a news briefing in Moscow.

“Let me remind you that Article 19 of the [CSTO} Charter establishes the possibility of leaving the alliance,” Zakharova said. “In that case, a member state … must send an official notification no later than six months before the withdrawal date.”

The Armenian government, she said, has taken no steps in that direction so far despite its “constantly circulated accusations against the organization.” This means that Armenia remains for now a full-fledged member of the Russian-led military alliance and must “must fulfill appropriate obligations,” added Zakharova. She did not specify those obligations.Over the past year or so, Yerevan has boycotted high-level meetings, military exercises and other activities of the CSTO in what Pashinian described in February as an effective suspension of Armenia’s CSTO membership. The premier repeatedly said afterwards that he could pull his country out of the alliance of six ex-Soviet states altogether.

Notes:

[i] “Armenian PM Attacks Russian-Led Alliance At Summit In Yerevan,” RFE/RL, 24 November 2022. https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-csto-pashinian-criticism/32145663.html

[ii] During a recent visit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Pashinyan struck an agreement for Russian border guards to withdraw from along the Armenia-Azerbaijani border. See: Gabriel Gavin, “Russia to withdraw troops from Armenia’s border,” Politico.eu, 9 May 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-to-withdraw-troops-from-armenias-border/

Image Information:

Image: Monastery Valley in Armenia
Source: Unsplash, https://unsplash.com/photos/aerial-photo-of-a-village-during-daytime-VQ07UveM3-U
Attribution: Free to use under the Unsplash License

Russia Redeploys Military Police to Southern Syria

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Map showing Syria, Israel, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (1991).

“The [Russian] Military Police has set up an additional post near the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights.”

After over a year of absence, Russian forces have returned to Syrian territory near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, in theory, to curb spillovers of violence from Israel to Syria. Russia’s deployments to date have largely been symbolic, including occasional aerial patrols and the establishment of three military police observation posts in the Syrian provinces of Quneitra and Daraa, near the buffer zone separating Syria and Israel. As reported in the first accompanying article from the Syrian opposition news website Enab Baladi, Russia established its third observation post in the area in early April 2024, after establishing two similar posts in January.

Southern Syria is often considered the cradle of the Syrian civil war, and was a hardened rebel bastion for several years. Daraa province remained highly volatile until Russian-sponsored settlements with rebel groups in 2018 stabilized local security conditions. With a modicum of peace achieved, Russian presence and influence in this part of Syria dwindled beginning in 2018 while Iranian-backed Syrian government forces and militias strengthened their grip in former rebel territory. Following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian forces all but disappeared from southern Syria, allowing Iranian militias to expand their influence in the area, often through local proxies and under the cover of Syrian Army forces.[i] Iranian influence in Syrian territory close to Israel has become a source of heightened concern not just for Israel but also for Russia, which fears that Gaza spillover could threaten Syria’s delicate status quo.

In the months following the 7 October attack, Russia successfully blocked Iranian attempts to launch attacks from southern Syria in support of Hamas in Gaza per the second accompanying excerpt, published in January 2024 in the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed. The redeployment of Russian military police to this part of Syria may therefore be seen as bolstering Russia’s ability to continue preventing escalation on this front. Indeed, Russia’s observation posts have all been set up in the aftermath of Israeli assassinations of high-ranking Iranian officials in Syrian territory: the first two posts were set up in the weeks following the killing of General Razi Mousavi in late December 2023, and the third one the day after General Mohammad Reza Zahedi was killed in April 2024. Russia’s return to southern Syria is less about supporting Iran against Israel than it is about deterring Tehran’s use of Syrian soil to respond to Israeli attacks on Iranian personnel in Syria notwithstanding the deepening Russo-Iranian strategic cooperation. , However, experts are skeptical of Russia’s ability to succeed. According to Mustafa al-Naimi, a Turkey-based Syrian analyst cited in the third accompanying excerpt, also from Enab Baladi, Russia’s efforts are bound to fail. Even if it succeeds in preventing Iran from opening the Syria front against Israel, Russia will be unable to remove Iranian influence from the area, given that its proxies will simply “return to the region wearing the uniform of the Syrian regime.” As such, al-Naimi conjectures, Russia’s symbolic redeployment near the Syria-Israel border is unlikely to do anything other than postpone the inevitable: an expansion of the Gaza conflict into southern Syria.

Sources:

Source: “Russia establishes third military post on borders of occupied Golan Heights,” Enab Baladi English (Syrian opposition English-language news website), 2 April 2024. https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2024/04/russia-establishes-third-military-post-on-borders-of-occupied-golan-heights/

The Deputy Chief of the Russian Center for Reconciliation of the Opposing Parties in Syria (a division of the Russian Ministry of Defense), Major General Yury Popov, stated that the Military Police has set up an additional post near the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights… This Syrian military post is the third of its kind established since the beginning of the current year, after Russia reduced its deployment in southern Syria at the beginning of 2022 following its invasion of neighboring Ukraine.

Source:

ما أهداف روسيا من نشر نقاط مراقبة في القنيطرة؟ “What are Russia’s goals in setting up observation posts in Quneitra?” Al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 6 January 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9

[Researcher Rachid] Hourani added to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that, after the launch of the Israeli military operation against the Gaza Strip, Iran tried to activate several fronts based on the principle of “unifying the arenas.” There were several visits by Iranian military officials to Syria with the aim of opening that front, but they did not amount to much due to Russian rejection and its tendency to use the so-called “Iranian card” and control Tehran’s behavior in Syria.

Hourani considered that Russia can actually curb Iran in southern Syria “because it fully controls the military decision-making in regime areas, in addition to being a major party to the understandings related to Israel’s security threats from Syria, such as the settlement agreement with the Syrian opposition factions in mid-2018 and the Israeli-American-Russian security meeting that took place in mid-2019″…

Source:

ما وراء نشر روسيا نقاطًا عسكرية على حدود الجولان المحتل “What is behind Russia’s setting up military posts on the occupied Golan border?” Enab Baladi (Syrian opposition news website), 14 January 2024. https://www.enabbaladi.net/682917/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%8B%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88/

Mustafa Al-Naimi, a researcher on Iranian affairs, told Enab Baladi, “We are facing a scene of gradual escalation from both the Iranian and Israeli sides.” Al-Naimi believes that the Russian side is trying to reposition itself to ward off any attempt by the Israeli side to advance on the ground along this front by, at the very least, removing the Iranian militias from the southern region adjacent to the Golan.He added that this measure will not work for these militias, because they will return to the region wearing the uniform of the Syrian regime… because of this and the fact that the Israeli side does not trust that Russia has the ground forces needed to control the region at a depth of 45 kilometers, al-Naimi suggests that these measures are “postponing the battle, not preventing it.”

Notes:

[i] For more on the 2018 agreement, see: Armenak Tokmajyan. “A Flashpoint Looms in Southern Syria,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 26 March 2024. https://carnegie-mec.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/04/a-flashpoint-looms-in-southern-syria?lang=en&center=middle-east

For more on post-Ukraine Russian and Iranian presence in Syria, see: Lucas Winter, “Iran Repositions Its Proxies In Syria As Russia Turns Focus To Ukraine,” OE Watch, 02-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-repositions-its-proxies-in-syria-as-russia-turns-focus-to-ukraine/;  Lucas Winter, “Iran Digs Into Central Syria, Filling Vacuum Left By Russia,” OE Watch, May 2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-digs-into-central-syria-filling-vacuum-left-by-russia/; Lucas Winter, “Russian Influence Fades In Southern Syria,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russian-influence-fades-in-southern-syria/

Image Information:

Image: Map showing Syria, Israel, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (1991).
Source: https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-pclmaps-oclc-25871248-golan_heights-1991.jpg
Attribution: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, Public Domain

Russian Import-Substitution Impacts Armored Vehicle Production

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Typhoon K-4386 “Typhoon-VDV” at Armiya-2021. Issues in bringing the Typhoon-VDV to serial production, due to the number of imported components and sophistication in design, illustrates the gap between Russia’s military modernization aspirations and industrial base capabilities.

“Currently, measures are being taken to engage specialized enterprises and organizations in the development and manufacturing of domestic components necessary for the production of protected military vehicles. Solving these issues is now considered by military leadership as one of the priority directions for enhancing combat readiness and reducing combat losses of the troops.”

Recent articles in Russian military publications regarding Typhoon [RG1] [i] armored vehicle production  highlight the advantages – and tradeoffs – of import-substitution measures across Russia’s defense industry. Moscow’s inability to import critical components has forced Russian manufacturers to simplify designs and shift component production to domestic manufacturers. According to the Russian military journal Material’no-tehnicheskoe obespechenie Vooruzhennyh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii, initial development of the Typhoon series of 4×4 and 6×6 armored vehicles in the 2010s was in response to the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) order to create vehicles capable of protecting crews on par with foreign offerings through 2020. The Typhoon-Kand Typhoon-Y capable of carrying a variety of armaments depending on mission requirements were Russia’s answer to the American-made Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle. Despite their official adoption by the Russian MoD, the number of components of foreign origin prevented mass production of initial models.

The journal further details how the military invasion of Ukraine in 2022 underscored the urgent need for armored transport. While domestic production has been a Russian military focus prior to the Ukrainian conflict, the war has accelerated import-substitution measures. Using existing multi-purpose vehicle chassis and domestic components, Russian military manufacturers began rapidly producing armored vehicles to meet pressing battlefield needs. However, current Typhoons suffer from reduced payload capacity, mobility, and less protection than initial test models using foreign produced parts. Some variants, such as the Typhoon-VDV, remain in limited production due to continued reliance on foreign parts.

The second excerpted article from the Russian military journal Armeiskii sbornik noted the extent of these changes in manufacturing and capability to the current Ground Forces model BMM [RG2] ,[ii] the ZCA-T “Linza,” a Typhoon-K variant. The “simplified chassis” version of the Linza features transmission, transfer block, bridge, power steering, and armor made by domestic manufacturers—primarily KamAZ but lacks a multi-functional command and control terminal. The case of the Typhoon demonstrates the impacts of import-substitution measures on the Russian defense industry and the rapid tradeoffs being made to maintain the current manufacturing tempo.

Sources:

Source: Evgeniy I. Kotyga, Vasily A. Novikov, Ksenia N. Moskalyuk, “Броня На Колесах (Armor on Wheels),” Logistics of the Military Forces of the Russian Federation (Monthly Russian military periodical), No. 4, April 2024. https://on-demand.eastview.com/browse/publication/144326

Pg. 75-76: “Following the tests, the protected vehicles OKR “Typhoon-K” and “Typhoon-U” were accepted for supply to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation by orders of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. However, due to the high complexity of the design and the large number of imported components, they were not mass-produced.

With the beginning of a special military operation, the issue of equipping the forces with protected vehicles became acute. To meet the urgent operational needs of the troops, the production of protected vehicles was organized based on the chassis and components of existing domestic multi-purpose vehicles (similar to unrealized projects with codes “Vodnik,” “Medved,” “Karatel,” etc.).

Pg. 78: “To address technical issues related to “import substitution” in protected vehicles of the “Typhoon-K” 4×4 wheeled formula and “Typhoon-VDV” families, a series of measures have been taken and is currently being implemented in the following main directions:

  • Utilization of domestic armored steels, titanium alloys, and composite ceramic panels instead of foreign-produced armor materials like Armox and Plasan.
  • Full localization of Cummins engines and ZF transmissions by domestic enterprises.
  • Import substitution of automotive components in suspension systems, steering control, electrical equipment, and other vehicle systems and assemblies with domestic counterparts.”

Pg. 80: “The effectiveness of the introduced changes in the design of protected vehicles has been positively evaluated based on the results of the conducted tests. Samples of modernized protected vehicles were accepted for supply to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at the beginning of 2023. Thus, summing up the creation of new and modernization of existing protected vehicles, it should be noted the effectiveness of measures for ‘import substitution,’ simplification of sample designs, and the use of domestic materials, components, and assemblies, which meets the high demand of the troops for this type of equipment.

Source: R. Pokutny, R. Kurmaev, V. Stolbunov, “Красный Крест На Броне (A Red Cross on Armor),” Army Digest (Monthly Military journal), No. 4 (128-129), April 2024. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/publication/470

Pg. 129: However, during the operation of the BMM (Armored Medical Vehicle), a number of shortcomings related to the excessive complexity of the design were identified. Taking into account the changes made (Table 1), on the basis of the ZSA-T “Linza” was created with a simplified design. The goals of creating this modification are to eliminate unnecessary complexity, reduce cost and time indicators at the production and operation stage, and replace imported components with domestic ones. The main changes to the ZSA-T “Linza” of a simplified design include the use of a single-volume body layout formula with a simultaneous increase in the protection class of the medical department, the provision of a spare wheel, and the installation of a “Tucha” smoke screen system, while BIUS (multifunction command and control system) and ABS (most likely the acronym for “anti-brake system”) are excluded.”

Notes:

[i] The Typhoon armored vehicle is produced by ROSOBORONEXPORT, a subsidiary of Rostec State Corporation and manufacturer of military equipment across the Russian Ground, Air, Naval, and Air Defense Forces. Products range from the T-90 tank to the Orlan family of UAVs.

[ii] “BMM” is the overarching term in the Russian Ground Forces for armored medical vehicles.

Image Information:

Image: Typhoon K-4386 “Typhoon-VDV” at Armiya-2021. Issues in bringing the Typhoon-VDV to serial production, due to the number of imported components and sophistication in design, illustrates the gap between Russia’s military modernization aspirations and industrial base capabilities. 
Source: ROSOBORONEXPORT, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Air-droppably_special-purpose_protected_vehicle_%28ZASN-D%29_during_the_%22Armiya_2021%22_exhibition.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0 DEED

Sanctions Drive Russia’s Shift to Domestic Weapons Production

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Still-frame from video of BM-27 Uragan MLRS supposedly moving into position to fire on Ukrainian targets near Belgorod, 16 April 2024.

“The Russian transition to the BAZ-69092 chassis seems to be motivated by several factors… but also aligns with Russian strategic preferences [necessity] for local production.”

Despite Western efforts to dismantle or limit its defense industry, Russia continues to find ways to produce the weapons it needs to fight its war in Ukraine.[i] As discussed in the excerpted article from the Azeri based Caliber news outlet, on 16 April, the Russian Ministry of Defense released a video unveiling an updated version of the BM-27 Uragan [R1] self-propelled multiple rocket launcher (MRL), supported by a new BAZ-69092 [R2] three axle chassis, at work in Ukraine.[ii] According to the Caliber article, the modifications are a reflection of not only the need to modernize Russia’s rocket and artillery systems, but also “align with Russian strategic [necessity] for local production.” The article notes that Russia has lost at least 83 BM-27 systems in Ukraine since it invaded in Feb 2022. Replacement of these and other systems is critical to Russia’s war effort. The article points out the original Uragan chassis were built in other parts of the former Soviet empire, including Ukraine.[iii] The new BAZ-96092 is a multi-platform chassis wholly built in Russia. Russia continues to rearm its military despite sanctions and restrictions imposed by the West to reduce Russia’s ability to fight the war in Ukraine.

OE Watch Insight:

Updated RUS Uragan MRLS appears on UKR battlefield demonstrating RUS ability to replenish its military systems despite western sanctions and restrictions intended to hold back military industrial establishment.

Sources:

“Russian Army deploys new version of BM-27 Uragan MLRS Rocket Launcher in Ukraine,” Caliber (Azeri based news source with good regional coverage from neighboring perspective), 18 April 2024. https://caliber.az/en/post/234544/

On April 16, 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense released a video showing a night-time operation involving the BM-27 Uragan 220mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) near the Belgorod region. Notably, the video unveiled an updated version of the BM-27 Uragan launcher mounted on a new platform, identified as the BAZ-69092 three-axle chassis, marking a significant departure from its traditional ZIL-135LM 8×8 truck chassis.

The transition to the BAZ-69092 chassis is part of an ongoing modernization effort within the Russian Army to upgrade existing military equipment and improve its artillery capabilities. This strategy includes plans to replace the aging BM-27 Uragan MLRS with the more advanced Tornado-S [R1] system….

…

The Russian transition to the BAZ-69092 chassis seems to be motivated by several factors. Firstly, the Russian Army lost at least 83 units in Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict. As of 2023, the Russian Army had only 150 of these vehicles in service, indicating a critical need for the modernization and replacement of this valuable system. Secondly, Russian engineers could face difficulties in modernizing older vehicles such as the ZIL-135LM, whose production ceased in 1995. Thirdly, these difficulties need to be compared with the advantages offered by new platforms for improving combat efficiency. The adoption of the newer BAZ-69092 6×6 chassis offers several advantages, including its capacity to accommodate weapons systems weighing up to 13 tons, but also aligns with Russian strategic preferences for local production.

…It is interesting to note that the BAZ-69092 chassis was specifically developed to standardize and facilitate the use of various military and special vehicles within the Russian army. This initiative began in the early 1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which affected the supply of special chassis as key manufacturers were outside Russia (for instance MKZT in Belarus and KrAZ in Ukraine). The Bryansk Automobile Plant (BAZ) was tasked with developing the BAZ-69092 under the project code “Voshchina-1” to substitute for foreign-made chassis. The model is part of a family of vehicles designed for diverse functions, including combat and support roles, tailored to meet specific requirements of the military.

Notes:

[i] For recent media reporting on Russia’s resurgent domestic arms industry, see: “Russia ramps up weapons production, using mass quantity to outgun Ukraine,” The Washington Post, 19 April 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/19/russia-weapons-production-ukraine-war/; Russia has also received Chinese and Iranian weapons assistance. For recent news coverage regarding Chinese assistance, see: “China Has Helped Russia Boost Arms Production, U.S. Says,” The Wall Street Journal, 12 April 2024. https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-russia-arms-production-help-c098c08b and “US intelligence finding shows China surging equipment sales to Russia to help war effort in Ukraine,” The Associated Press, 19 April 2024. https://apnews.com/article/united-states-china-russia-ukraine-war-265df843be030b7183c95b6f3afca8ec

[ii] Fielding of the new and improved Russian BM-27 had been anticipated for months. See: Російські БМ-27 “Ураган” отримали нове шасі БАЗ-69092 (Russia Modernizes BM-27 Uragan Rocket Launchers with BAZ-69092 Chassis Upgrade),” Militarnyi (Ukraine media outlet focused on the military and defense industry), 22 December 2023. https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/rosijski-bm-27-uragan-otrymaly-nove-shasi-baz-69092/

[iii] The above sourced Caliber article noted that Ukraine is also “modernizing its BM-27 MLRS, fitting the Uragan launcher on a Tatra Т815-7Т3RC1 chassis, resulting in the creation of the Bureviy system. Revealed in 2020 and developed by the Shepetiv Repair Plant, the Bureviy successfully completed fire tests in November 2020. Ukraine also developed the Bastion-03, which combines a KrAZ-6322 chassis with a 9K57 Uragan MLRS launcher. This latter project is part of a Ukrainian initiative to standardize rocket artillery chassis using the KrAZ platform, following the earlier Bastion-01 and Bastion-02 models.”

Image Information:

Image: Still-frame from video of BM-27 Uragan MLRS supposedly moving into position to fire on Ukrainian targets near Belgorod, 16 April 2024.
Source: Russian Ministry of Defence, https://t.me/mod_russia/37664
Attribution: Public Domain

Details Emerge on the Russian Medical System in Ukraine

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A Russian medic applying first aid. While Russia has released very little information about its casualty rate, a newly-released report offers some initial insights.

“The high professionalism of military doctors allowed them to reduce disabilities of military personnel, but most importantly, to reduce their hospital mortality rates, the lowest in history military medicine.”

Since the beginning of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, there has been little, if any, information released from Russian sources about the workings of the Russian military medical system in general, and Russian casualty rates in particular.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the official medical journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Voyenno-Meditsinskiy Zhurnal, is the first publicly released information about the inner workings of the Russian military medical system during the special military operation. Although this detailed 17-page account does not mention specific casualty numbers, some idea of the magnitude of Russian casualties can be postulated by the information it provides about the increases in various types of Russian military medical facilities, including long-term rehabilitation, palliative, and prosthetic care. The article also lays out the four stages of Russian military medical treatment consisting of forward treatment, treatment at Military District facilities, treatment at centralized MoD military medical facilities, and rehabilitation centers. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable effort in placing medical treatment as close to the line of contact as possible to increase positive outcomes. This is being accomplished not only by placing medical units further forward, but also by placing various medical capabilities/personnel at lower echelons than have historically occurred. In sum, the article does not provide Russian casualty figures but does support the premise that Russia has suffered large numbers of casualties in the operation and is adapting in response. The article highlights what the U.S. military medical community may expect if the U.S. engages in Large Scale Combat Operations on the modern battlefield.

Sources:

D.V. Trishkin, “Итоги деятельности медицинской службы Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации в 2023 году и задачи на 2024 год (Results of the medical service activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 2023 and goals for 2024.),” Voyenno-Meditsinskiy Zhurnal (official medical journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense) January 2024. https://voenmed.ric.mil.ru/upload/site229/3JSanq38G6.pdf

The results of an analysis of the medical service activities of the Armed Forces in 2023 in its main areas are presented. Particular attention is paid to the organization of medical care and treatment of the wounded during a special military operation. The multi-level system of staged medical care has proven its effectiveness.  The following results were achieved: the time for providing first aid was reduced by 3 times (to 10 minutes), providing medical care to a serviceman from the moment of injury – by 2 times (to 1 hour); 98% of military personnel were discharged upon recovery after treatment for wounds and injuries; mortality at the stages of

medical care was 0.43%, disability – 2.1%. First aid training for personnel resulted in a potentially preventable mortality rate of 5.2%. The main task facing the medical service in 2024 will be the timely and high-quality provision of medical care to the wounded and sick when performing tasks in a special military operation…

The main efforts of military medicine were aimed at organizing medical support for the special military operation.  The enemy’s use of modern types of weapons and ammunition during military operations determined the prevalence of combined, combined lesions and shrapnel wounds. Taking into account these factors, it was formed a medical care system in which there are 4 main stages for the provision of medical care and treatment to special military operation participants:

— the stage of providing qualified medical care, which is represented by mobile medical units;

— the stage of providing specialized medical care, consisting of stationary military hospitals of military district subordination;

— the stage of providing high-tech medical care, at central military medical facilities;

— the stage of medical rehabilitation at rehabilitation centers and military sanatoriums…

One of the most important aspects in the system medical treatment and evacuation support is the stage of providing qualified medical teams and medical battalions directly in area of the special military operation …medical units are put as close as possible to the line of contact. At the same time, the medical detachments and battalions have been strengthened with surgeons and traumatologists from central hospitals that are capable of performing surgical procedures that were previously not typically conducted at this stage…

The next stage of treatment involves the wounded being treated at military district hospitals…The tactics of “damage control” [«контроля повреждений»] are widely used to providing specialized medical care with the goal of minimizing the volume of surgical interventions in the seriously wounded and performing definitive surgical treatment after stabilization of their condition.

In central hospitals, the basis for the provision of high-tech medical assistance is based on a multidisciplinary approach to the treatment of patients by specialists with different specialties within one military hospital. Multidisciplinary teams include resuscitators, vascular surgeons, traumatologists, general surgeons and extracorporeal detoxification specialists….

[T]he medical system evacuation, includes mass casualty aviation evacuation to district and central military hospitals, and medical evacuation by ambulance, sea, and rail transport…

[T]he quality of medical care provided remains sufficiently high level. The high professionalism of military doctors allowed them to reduce disabilities of military personnel, but most importantly, to reduce their hospital mortality rates, the lowest in history military medicine.

At the same time, in order to prevent a decline in the quality of medical care, the leadership of the medical service of the RF Armed Forces has taken a number of measures aimed at increasing the number of military and hospital medical specialists and units to prevent staffing and medical unit shortages in the special military operation, including:

— forming separate medical battalions, medical companies and medical posts for formations [объединение], large units [соединение], and units [часть];

— 4 additional medical billets in the staffs of the combined arms armies;

— Branch Clinic No. 4 was added to the 1602nd Military Clinical Hospital (Lugansk) with 300 beds;

— construction of military hospitals is underway in Ryazan, Belgorod, Bryansk, Makhachkala, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Mirny, Vladikavkaz, Kursk, Sevastopol, new 100-bed medical buildings are in Samara, Pskov, Krasnoznamensk, Kostroma, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ivanovo;

— major and ongoing repairs of military hospital facilities are underway in Rostov-on-the-Don, Chita, Polyarny, Volgograd, Novosibirsk, Stavropol, Khabarovsk, Selyatino;— a medical detachment (reserve) has been formed and successfully performs its tasks with citizen volunteers that have medical training (currently a decision is being made to form a second detachment from among the volunteers).

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Russian medic applying first aid. While Russia has released very little information about its casualty rate, a newly-released report offers some initial insights.
Source:
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl

Russia Celebrates 10th Anniversary of Crimean Annexation

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A view of the Crimean (Kerch) Bridge, linking Crimea to Russia.

“[The railway] will be another, alternative road instead of the Crimean Bridge,” said President Vladimir Putin.

On 18 March, Russians celebrated the tenth anniversary of their “reunification” with Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. One of the Kremlin’s major priorities for the peninsula was the construction of a $2.5 billion land bridge, known as the Kerch Bridge, to link the annexed region with the Russia-controlled provinces of eastern Ukraine. At 19 kilometers (11.8 miles), the bridge is Europe’s longest. The excerpted feature article in pro-Kremlin newspaper Kommersant, celebrated Russia’s modernization of the peninsula, including a gleaming new $350 million international airport at Simferopol shaped like a sea wave; the extension of a new water pipeline; a large mosque for Crimea’s Tatars; and refurbished statues to commemorate what Russians call the “Crimean Spring.” The article notes that the Kerch Bridge has come under attack by Ukraine at least twice during the special military operation. As an insurance policy—announced at a rally on Red Square to honor President Vladimir Putin’s March presidential victory and the 10th anniversary of the annexation of Crimea—Russia will restore a railway linking Rostov-on-Don with Donetsk and Mariupol, eventually reaching Sevastopol, according to the excerpted article in nationalist online newspaper Lenta.ru. The announced railway connection could suggest that the Russian authorities are concerned about the vulnerability of the Kerch Bridge to attack. Some Western analysts have called on Ukraine’s military to target it with advanced missiles[i] The railway extension project could simply be meant to symbolize the connection of mainland Russia with its annexed peninsula. Either way, the Ukrainian military will have an additional target as it seeks to take back Crimea and weaken Russia’s grip on the peninsula.

Sources:

“Крым десятилетней выдержки: Как обжился полуостров в составе России, (Crimea after 10 Years of Improvements: How the Peninsula has Taken Shape within Russia),” Kommersant.ru (center-right Kremlin newspaper), 17 March 2024. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6535646

After the “Crimean Spring” the peninsula was in a land blockade, so the construction of a transport corridor through the Kerch Strait was declared a priority. On March 19, 2014, President Vladimir Putin instructed to connect new entities with the “big land” by rail and roads. The construction of the bridge worth 228 billion rubles began in February 2016 and lasted a little more than two years. The 19 km long structure was the longest in Europe. After the start of the special operation, the crossing was twice attacked by Ukraine.

“Путин анонсировал появление альтернативы Крымскому мосту” (Putin announced the emergence of an alternative to the Crimean Bridge), Lenta.ru (right-wing nationalist online newspaper), 18 March 2024. https://lenta.ru/news/2024/03/18/putin-anonsiroval-poyavlenie-alternativy-krymskomu-mostu/

The restored railway from Rostov-on-Don to Donetsk, Mariupol and Berdyansk will be an alternative to the Crimean Bridge. Its appearance was announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin at a rally-concert in honor of the tenth anniversary of the reunification of Crimea with Russia, his words are quoted by the TASS agency.

The Head of State noted that the country will continue to restore the railway, which goes from the Rostov region through Donbass and Novorossiya. The President promised that the railway trains would soon go to Sevastopol. “And it will be another, alternative road instead of the Crimean Bridge,” he added. Putin also stressed that Russia and Crimea will go together and further hand in hand. He pointed out that this will be proved not in words, but in deeds, which will only make the country and the peninsula stronger.In November, Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin reported that the new railway from the Rostov region to Crimea, which will become an alternative to the route along the Crimean Bridge, is at the design stage.

Notes:

1 Ben Hodges, Led Klosky, Robert Person, Eric Williamson, “Putin’s Weak Link to Crimea: Kyiv Should Target the Kerch Bridge—but Needs Missiles to Take It Out,” Foreign Affairs, 5 December 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/putins-weak-link-crimea

Image Information:

Image: A view of the Crimean (Kerch) Bridge, linking Crimea to Russia.
Source: Rosavtodor.ru https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Crimean_Bridge#/media/File:Крымский_мост_13_сентября_2019_года_(1).jpg
Attribution: CC By 4.0

Russia Invoking Heroic Military Heritage To Frame Current War

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The city cemetery of Kherson contains a military plot with 122 Soviet graves from the Second World War. The soldiers buried here, belonging to the 49th Guards Rifle Division and the 295th Infantry Division, fell while liberating the city in 1944.

“This is how our valiant warriors reminded the invaders that victory will be ours, just like 80 years ago.”

Russia continues to use memories of past battles and heroic sacrifice to fuel domestic support for its war in Ukraine. According to the excerpted article published by Russian news outlet RTVI, a detachment of Russian soldiers recently conducted a “daring raid” across the Dnieper River, attacking Ukrainian troops near Kherson before retreating across the Dnieper River. Although this story is barely newsworthy considering the larger and more significant battles for Mariupol, Bakhmut, and Avdeevka, it illustrates Moscow’s determination to attach Russia’s rich and heroic military history to the current conflict in Ukraine. Sources quoted in the article claim, “up to 30 [Ukrainian] personnel lost,” and that Russian troops returned “without irreparable losses.” However, the article compares the raid to the  strategic seizing of Kherson from the Germans in March 1944 by General Margelov and the 49th Guards Rifle Division. The 49th was awarded the title “Kherson” an honorific denoting the unit’s role in liberating the city from the Germans, while Margelov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Margolev was later instrumental in developing Soviet paratroop forces and became known as the father of Russian airborne forces.[i] The reference to Margelov in  the article was to connect Russian actions on today’s Ukrainian battlefields with past Russian battlefield heroics. This particular historical comparison augments the recent renaming of the Northern Military District to be the Leningrad Military District, and the renaming of Artic icebreakers to honor Lenin and Stalin.[ii] This is part of a broader Russian effort to use its military history, and Russia’s ongoing heroic fight for survival, to strengthen Putin’s position on Ukraine domestically.[iii] It is not for nothing that Russia refers to the Second World War as The Great Patriot War. Indeed, Russian invocation honoring the past appears to be an integral part of Moscow’s IO campaign surrounding its special military operation in Ukraine. Using Margolev as an example illustrates Russia’s position that this land has been fought for and liberated once before and belongs to Russia.

Sources:

“Сальдо рассказал о «дерзком рейде» на подконтрольный ВСУ правый берег Днепра (Saldo spoke about the “daring raid” on the right bank of the Dnieper controlled by the Ukrainian Armed Forces),” RTVI (Russian news service), 13 March 2024. https://rtvi.com/news/saldo-rasskazal-o-derzkom-rejde-na-podkontrolnyj-vsu-pravyj-beregdnepra/?utm_source=24smi&utm_medium=referral&utm_term=10949&utm_content=6021008&utm_campaign=14335&utm_referrer=24smi.info

On the night of March 13, an assault group of employees from the Dnepr group of troops conducted a “daring raid” on the right bank of the Dnieper River, said the governor of the Kherson region, Vladimir Saldo. According to him, the Armed Forces of Ukraine suffered losses.

“Last night, a joint assault group of fighters from the Dnepr group of troops carried out a daring raid on the right bank of the river,” Saldo wrote in his Telegram channel.

According to the governor, marines, paratroopers and volunteers disembarked from watercraft at the base of the Antonovsky Bridge, “the enemy did not have time to react in time.” The military destroyed several positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, “including a UAV control center and an electronic warfare station, observation, communications and temporary concentration of manpower points,” Saldo wrote.

He added that the Russian military after this “managed to retreat to the left bank without irreparable losses,” and the Ukrainian side lost up to 30 military personnel.Saldo emphasized that “the landing force landed at the same place where in 1944 Margelov’s soldiers captured the first bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper, which became the key to breaking the fascist defense.” “This is how our valiant warriors reminded the invaders that victory will be ours, just like 80 years ago,” the governor is confident.

OE Insight Summary:

In effort to instill patriotism and increase domestic support for its operation in Ukraine, Russia compares the special military operation to past battlefield heroics, usually from World War II.

Notes:

[i] See: “Troops of Uncle Vasya. Why General Margelov is called the father of Airborne,” Rusreality, 27 Dec 2018. https://rusreality.com/2018/12/27/troops-of-uncle-vasya-why-general-margelov-called-the-father-of-airborne/ and also Vasily Margelov, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasily_Margelov

[ii] See Les Grau, “Russia Changes Arctic Icebreaker Names To Honor History,” OE Watch, 02-2024.  https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-changes-arctic-icebreaker-names-to-honor-history/

[iii] Multiple western organizations track Russian use of its history to maintain domestic popular support. A RUSI publication noted that “Kremlin narratives about the Soviet Union’s role in the Second World War are uncritical, mythologised by the authorities. They have become an identifying feature of Russia’s foreign and domestic policy, based mostly around the Soviet Union’s heavy losses and military greatness.” See: Royal United Service Institute (RUSI), 27 July 2022. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/how-russias-narratives-ukraine-reflect-its-existential-crisis

Image Information:

Image: The city cemetery of Kherson contains a military plot with 122 Soviet graves from the Second World War. The soldiers buried here, belonging to the 49th Guards Rifle Division and the 295th Infantry Division, fell while liberating the city in 1944.
Source: TracesofWar.com, https://www.tracesofwar.com/sights/9948/Soviet-War-Graves-Kherson-City-Cemetery.htm
Attribution: CC BY SA

The Race to Incorporate Artificial Intelligence Into Attack Drones in Ukraine

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Russian military prepares Orlan-10 drones for launch during Russia’s Vostok-2018 Maneuvers.

“The Russian Army will receive weaponized drones, operated with the help of artificial intelligence (AI) – their delivery to the troops in the Special Military Operation (SMO) zone is already planned.”

The Russian Defense Ministry has announced that it will incorporate artificial intelligence (AI) into its attack drones to increase their accuracy and precision. According to the excerpted article published by the government news agency RIA News, Russia conducted around 700 successful drone attacks on Ukrainian targets in Avdiivka during the first half of February 2024. The article states that Russia plans to introduce AI to further refine its attack drones as part of a wave of military modernization incorporating more advanced technology and electronics into military systems. The aim is to allow AI to control the drones, increasing the battlefield efficacy of Russia’s drone complex. However, it is important to note that Ukraine is also working to incorporate AI capability in its attack drones. According to the second excerpted article from private Ukrainian media outlet Focus Media, Ukraine’s effort to implement AI on the battlefield has support from the West as well as internally from Ukrainian technology developers. In addition to testing AI-capable drones from the United Kingdom, the Ukrainian Minister for Technology Development reports having more than 20 different teams developing similar technologies. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry believes that AI-capable attack drones could overwhelm Russian positions, while Russia believes the same to be true in reverse. Thus far, Ukraine has developed two AI-capable drones approved for battlefield use, the Saker Scout[i] and SkyKnight2.[ii] While neither Russia nor Ukraine have fully implemented AI into their drone fleets, they are racing against each other to gain this advantage. Should Russia succeed in its goal of increased tactical efficacy in attack drones, it may be able to set a pace of sky-borne destruction that cannot be countered by the Ukrainian and Western technologies currently being employed in the war effort.[iii] AI integrated into attack drones will provide Russia with a technological advantage that is unmatched by regional forces.

Sources:

“Армию России вооружают беспилотниками с искусственным интеллектом (The Russian Army will be armed with drones with artificial intelligence),” RIA News (one of the largest Russian government news agencies), 24 February 2024. https://crimea.ria.ru/20240224/armiyu-rossii-vooruzhayut-bespilotnikami-s-iskusstvennym-intellektom-1135183675.html

The Russian Army will receive weaponized drones, operated with the help of artificial intelligence (AI) – their delivery to the troops in the Special Military Operation (SMO) zone is already planned. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced this during an inspection visit to the Russian central grouping of troops. His words are quoted by the Ministry of Defense. “We have come to this point. This is becoming a pretty serious weapon.” – said the minister, noting that the deliveries of the latest unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russian troops will increase the effectiveness of their application.”

… in the last two weeks of February attack drones have destroyed upwards of 700 different enemy targets in Avdiivka, including armored vehicles, artillery systems, radar facilities, and enemy manpower. In particular, during the liberation of Avdiivka the reconnaissance UAV complex, Orlan-30 [R1] , proved itself well…

Based upon the results of the report, Shoigu set the task to further strengthen the Russian central grouping of troops via electronic warfare, chiefly at the tactical level.

A few days prior, the head of the Russian government Mikhail Mishustin gave instructions to maximize the process of modernizing combat systems used as a part of the SMO and to expand their combat capabilities.

Alexander Zalata, “Украина вооружается дронами с ИИ: чем лучше обычных и когда массово появятся на фронте (Ukraine is arming itself with AI drones: better than the usual and when will they appear en masse on the front),” Focus Media (a privately-owned Ukrainian media company), 22 February 2024. https://focus.ua/digital/628357-ukraina-vooruzhaetsya-dronami-s-ii-chem-luchshe-obychnyh-i-kogda-massovo-poyavyatsya-na-fronte

More than 20 teams are already working on artificial intelligence (in drones) and many of them are already in the final stages, but before launching it must be ensured that the UAVs don’t attack everyone. 

In his article, published on the site Ukrainian Truth, the Minister for Technology Development Mikhail Fedorov, wrote that currently around 20 companies are working on developing AI for implementation in UAVs, in particular, the computer vision technologies (CV) for additional guidance. As the official explained, they will allow UAVs to analyze video streams in real-time, to find and identify objects, such as Russian vehicles, manpower, and artillery. 

At the beginning of autumn, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry stated that one of these drones, the Saker Scout, had been approved for use in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Specialists assure that thanks to the newest optical system this drone can independently recognize and record the coordinates of the enemy’s equipment… Later the Defense Ministry allowed yet another Ukrainian-made UAV to be used in the armed forces that is equipped with artificial intelligence and an autonomous flight system – the SkyKnight2. “And this will already be a decisive advantage, because then we can send a swarm of drones either on their own or with a queen, and they will perform the function of an assault unit. There are many problems, but everyone is moving in that direction,” said Alexey Teplukhin.

Notes:

[i] For further information on the AI-enabled Saker Scout drone, from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s Telegram, 4 September 2023. https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/7951?single

[ii] For further information on the AI-enabled SkyKnight2 drone, from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s Telegram, 19 August 2023. https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/7884

[iii] Kristen Thompson, “How the Drone War In Ukraine Is Transforming Conflict,” Council on Foreign Relations, 16 January 2024. https://www.cfr.org/article/how-drone-war-ukraine-transforming-conflict

Image Information:

Image: Russian military prepares Orlan-10 drones for launch during Russia’s Vostok-2018 Maneuvers.
Source:  
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Russia Increases Defense Spending for 2024

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Early variant of the 152mm self-propelled gun 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV on parade in Moscow, 2015. The Koalitsiya-SV is set to be fielded in 2024.

“It became clear that a large-scale war requires a lot of equipment. It needs to be constantly improved, adapting to new weapons that the enemy has, damaged vehicles need to be repaired somewhere. And the priority in rearmament shifted towards the army.”

According to the 10 January excerpted article from the Russian state-owned domestic news outlet RIA Novosti, Russia will increase its defense spending in keeping with the release of Russia’s federal budget in October 2023 that dedicated “almost 11 trillion rubles” ($117 billion) to the armed forces.[i] The article notes plans to grow the armed forces by nearly half a million men, while most of the funds will be earmarked for weapons and equipment, whose procurement is informed by lessons learned in Ukraine. The emphasis is on ground forces but includes new spending on air and naval assets. As it articulates: “In recent decades, the ground forces of many countries have been financed on a residual basis—the United States relied on the Air Force and Navy. Russia was no exception in this regard, but the Ukrainian conflict put everything in place.”

Increasing the quantity and quality of its armor, tanks, and artillery is a primary focus, according to the article. Russia will ramp up production of improved variants of the T-90M Proryv [RG1] , T-72B3M [RG2] , and T-80BVM [RG3] main battle tanks. Artillery is also being updated with the introduction of the upgraded 152-mm Msta-S [RG4] self-propelled gun[ii] and the latest Malva [RG5] -wheeled howitzer, which entered service in late 2023.[iii] Russia’s newest artillery system, the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV [RG6] , is projected to be fielded in 2024. The weapon systems and upgrades reflect immediate application of lessons learned from the Ukrainian battlefield. Ukraine seemed to have an edge when NATO-manufactured long-range weapons arrived on the battlefield and Russian units were forced to move their command and logistic lines farther from the front lines. The article notes that the Koalitsiya-SV “will become the longest-range weapon in the Russian Army, able to fire a “high-explosive fragmentation projectile at a range of 40 kilometers, and a guided projectile at 70 kilometers…more than enough [distance] for effective counter-battery warfare.” Drones are also featured in Russia’s defense plans for this year.[iv] The “long-awaited Izdeliye-53, another version of the Lancet [RG7] kamikaze drone,” is projected to be fielded in 2024. Like long-range artillery, the Izdeliye-53 could have an immediate battlefield impact as it is said to have a range of more than 60 kilometers. The much-publicized increase in Russian defense spending, and the types of weapons Russia will field, based on lessons learned in Ukraine, could put additional pressure on Ukraine and its Western partners just to maintain the status quo.

Sources:

Andrey Kots, “Приоритеты на будущее. Чем вооружат армию России в 2024-м (Priorities for the future. What will the Russian army be armed with in 2024?)” RIA Novosti (Russian state-owned domestic news outlet), 9 January 2024. https://ria.ru/20240109/perevooruzhenie-1917044593.html?in=t

… Earlier, back in January 2023, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced an increase in the size of the army to one and a half million people by 2026.

…

At the end of October, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov announced the total amount of defense spending in 2024 – almost 11 trillion rubles. The lion’s share will go to the purchase of military equipment. The domestic defense industry has to work hard: it is necessary to saturate not only new units, but also units on the front line with everything necessary.

“Taking into account additional budgetary allocations in 2024, the volume of purchases and repairs of weapons and military equipment will increase,” Sergei Shoigu said at the end of November. “In the current conditions, it is necessary to ensure an advanced supply of weapons, military and special equipment to the troops, as well as to increase the production capabilities of enterprises military-industrial complex for the production and repair of the most popular models.”

In recent decades, the ground forces of many countries have been financed on a residual basis – the United States relied on the Air Force and Navy. Russia was no exception in this regard, but the Ukrainian conflict put everything in place. It became clear that a large-scale war requires a lot of equipment. It needs to be constantly improved, adapting to new weapons that the enemy has, damaged vehicles need to be repaired somewhere. And the priority in rearmament shifted towards the army.

The Ground Forces will continue to receive modern main battle tanks. First of all, the T-90M Proryv, T-72B3M and T-80BVM, which have proven themselves well in combat. New tanks are significantly different from pre-war ones. They received additional armor, equipment to suppress UAVs, and modern communications equipment. Many are equipped with a factory “visor” – a lattice superstructure over the turret with dynamic protection modules for defense against “roof-killing ATGMs” and kamikaze drones.

Motorized rifle units will receive vehicles, BTR-82A [RG1] armored personnel carriers, BMP-3 [RG2] infantry fighting vehicles and modernized BMP-2M [RG3] . The latter began to enter the troops only in 2020. Their difference from the early “twos” is the Berezhok combat module, equipped with a 30-mm automatic cannon, an automatic grenade launcher, a machine gun and four Kornet ATGMs. The vehicle has an updated fire control system, ensuring round-the-clock use, automatic target tracking and increased shooting accuracy.

The artillerymen will receive 152-mm Msta-S [R4]  self-propelled guns and the latest Malva wheeled howitzers, which first entered service with the troops in the fall of 2023. What’s even more important: next year, the promising self-propelled gun “Coalition-SV,” which the troops have been waiting for a long time, will go into serial production. It will become the longest-range weapon in the Russian army… .In 2024, the long-awaited Izdeliye-53, another version of the famous Lancet kamikaze drone, should go into service with the troops. All that is known about the new UAV is that its range is over 60 kilometers and it will be designed to operate in a “flock.”

Notes:

[i] For more information regarding defense spending within Russia’s new federal budget, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Russia’s Federal Budget Puts Economy on War Footing,” OE Watch, 01-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russias-federal-budget-puts-economy-on-war-footing/

[ii] For a look back at Russian efforts to increase the effective firing range of the Msta, see: Charles Bartles, “New Artillery Rounds Will Extend Russian Artillery Range,” OE Watch, January 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/294224

[iii] The Msta-S is an old system introduced in 1989. For information on recent modifications and upgrades, see: “Artillery of the future: modernization of the ACS 2S19 “Msta-S” and its prospects,” Military Review, 16 December 2023. https://military-review.com/12479016-artillery-of-the-future-modernization-of-the-acs-2s19-msta-s-and-its-prospects; the 2S43 Malva wheeled artillery is also a legacy system but previous Russian claims refer to the new variant as the Russian HYMARS, although the effective range as been disputed. See: Ellie Cook, “What Is 2S43 Malva? Soviet Self-Propelled Howitzer Dubbed ‘Russian HYMARS’,” Newsweek, 17 August 2023. https://www.newsweek.com/russia-military-2s43-malva-howitzer-ukraine-himars-artillery-1820411

[iv] Drones, or UAVs, have become ubiquitous in the war in Ukraine at every level. For additional insight on Russia’s use of drones, see: Charles Bartles, “Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons To Engineer Units,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-plans-to-add-remote-mining-uav-platoons-to-engineer-units/; see also, Dodge Billingsley, “Russia Details Plan To Overcome Military Drone Deficiencies,” OE Watch, 01-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-details-plan-to-overcome-military-drone-deficiencies/

Image Information:

Image: Early variant of the 152mm self-propelled gun 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV on parade in Moscow, 2015. The Koalitsiya-SV is set to be fielded in 2024.
Source: Vitaly Kuzman, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2S35_Koalitsiya-SV – /media/File:9may2015Moscow-35_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA BY-SA 4.0