Tag Archives: Ukraine

The Evolution of Russian Unmanned Vehicle Doctrine in Ukraine

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Orlan-30 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.

“The Russian Armed Forces will form a new branch of arms in armed forces — Unmanned Vehicle Troops — in accordance with the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the major Russian daily newspaper Izvestia discusses how Russians are adapting to the changing character of war as experienced in its special military operation in Ukraine.[i] One feature of this change has been the pervasive use of unmanned vehicles in the air, ground, and sea. As Izvestia explains, Russia will adapt to this change by creating a new branch of arms, Unmanned Vehicle Troops, to operate similar to existing branches of service: infantry, artillery, air defense, etc.[ii] Conceptually, unmanned vehicles and their operators and maintainers will be integrated into the Russian combined arms concept as the infantry, tanks, artillery, etc., just as the Russians have Air Defense Troops in the Ground Forces, Aerospace Forces, and Navy. The Unmanned Vehicle Troops will now be a branch of arms in a similar fashion. This means that unmanned vehicles will have dedicated training, sustainment, and representation in the General Staff. This representation will enhance unmanned vehicle training and doctrine, future capability development, and ensure integration with the other arms branches. This development suggests that in the Russian view, the use of unmanned vehicles is not an aberration but will be a permanent feature of future wars and armed conflicts. It is important to note that this announcement does not mean that unmanned vehicles and their operators and maintainers will be found only in stand-alone unmanned vehicle units; they will still almost certainly be found in other types of units, such as infantry, armor, artillery, logistics, signals, and the like.

Sources:

Yulia Leonova, Vladimir Matveev, Bogdan Stepovoy, “С новым родом: войска беспилотных систем создадут в России (A new branch: Unmanned Vehicle Troops will be created in Russia),” Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 17 December 2024.  https://iz.ru/1808177/ulia-leonova-vladimir-matveev-bogdan-stepovoi/s-novym-rodom-voiska-bespilotnyh-sistem-sozdadut-v-rossii

The Russian Armed Forces will form a new branch of arms in armed forces — Unmanned Vehicle Troops — in accordance with the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. This was announced by the head of the Russian Defense Ministry Andrei Belousov at an extended meeting of the board on December 16.

According to him, their creation will be completed in the third quarter of 2025. “The mass use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has become the most significant breakthrough in the tactics of the Russian Armed Forces,” he emphasized.

In turn, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated the need to increase the production of drones. It is no less important, according to the head of state, to train UAV operators, to prepare them according to programs developed on the basis of combat experience.

Russian troops use more than 3,500 UAVs daily, and this figure is growing, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov said at a departmental board meeting…

As the former commander of the Pacific Fleet, Sergei Avakyants, explained to Izvestia, a branch of arms is an organizational structure, as it is necessary to create a theoretical design of operational art for it. That is, to create a theory and practice of preparing and conducting military actions on an operational scale (operations, battles, strikes), — he noted. — This is a move in the right direction, the main thing is that it is not just a sign on an office door. It is necessary to think through a system of training both sergeants and enlisted personnel, and officers. To do this, it is necessary to make changes to the curricula — to create special faculties or educational institutions of secondary and higher education. The innovations should also affect existing military academies, in particular the General Staff Academy.

During the special military operation, UAVs became so indispensable that we reached the point of needing to form separate units [части] and, perhaps, even large units [соединения] with their own infrastructure that would support the use of UAVs. Military expert Dmitry Kornev told Izvestia about this.

According to him, most likely, units, platoons, and separate battalions will be created that will closely interact with other branches of the military and ensure the use of UAVs in their interests.

— The Unmanned Vehicle Troops will most likely receive a status similar to that of the Air Defense Troops — military expert Vladislav Shurygin told Izvestia. — Their units will be part of the Ground Forces, the Aerospace Forces, and also in the Navy, where, among other things, unmanned boats will be developed. All used unmanned systems will belong to them. It is possible that they will be united by some common structure that will be engaged in design, development, and testing. It was not for nothing that the minister said that inter-service centers will be created to test the latest and most promising systems…

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

[ii] This new force, род войск, is not to be confused with a branch of service; вид вооружённых сил (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.). 

Image Information:

Image: Orlan-30 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baba_Yaga_(aircraft)#/media/File:UA_Vampire_UCAV_01.jpg
Attribution: Mike1979 RussiaCC BY-SA 4.0

Russian Volunteer Force Highlights the Evolution of UAV Missions in Ukraine

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Ukrainian Soldiers handling a Baba Yaga UAV.

“Now everything that concerns combat UAVs is developing rapidly, if you stop, you fall behind.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the Russian daily newspaper Izvestia discusses the activities of the Volunteer Corps of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s Española Brigade. The Española Brigade—currently numbering no more than 100 individuals, according to the founder—began as a volunteer formation of soccer enthusiasts, which now provides trained UAV operators and UAVs to support Russia’s conventional force in the special military operation in Ukraine.[i] According to the Izvestia article, the Española Brigade operates its own UAV training center and is developing its own UAVs for use in Ukraine. Although state UAV development programs are entrenched in both Russia and Ukraine, the development of UAV technologies by volunteer units and their personnel in the field also appears to be increasingly common on both sides of the front. It would now seem that the traditional model of governments procuring defense articles from private industry and then supplying these materials to the military is simply no longer effective given UAVs’ rapidly evolving technology and newfound tactical uses. Indeed, both the Russian and Ukrainian militaries are now collaborating closely with industry to quickly deliver new capabilities to the battlefield as the requirements are recognized.

The article also mentions the importance of the Baba Yaga class of large UAVs. The primary mission of the Baba Yaga-class of UAVs is not reconnaissance or bomb dropping, but logistics support. This development illustrates the expanding role of UAVs on the modern battlefield—UAVs are no longer being used just as a means of reconnaissance (intelligence) and/or fires. UAVs are now becoming key capabilities to enable success for other war-fighting functions.

Overall, although volunteer formations like Russia’s Española Brigade are relatively small, they help fill critical shortages of UAV expertise that the conventional force would be hard-pressed to stand up on its own.[ii]

Sources:

Dmitry Korneev, “«Птичья» школа: как в бригаде «Эспаньола» готовят операторов дронов

БПЛА (“Bird” school: how the “Espanola” brigade trains drone operators),” Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 7 November 2024.  https://iz.ru/1786422/dmitrii-korneev/ptica-skola-kak-v-brigade-espanola-gotovat-operatorov-dronov

The volunteer “Española Brigade”, the backbone of which is football fans, has a unique UAV combat training center…the commander and founder of the UAV Combat Training Center is respectfully called Petrovich…“With the start of the special operation, the idea came to organize a UAV combat training center. But it didn’t work out right away. It only opened in May 2023.  He notes that a wide variety of people came to the center.  “We invited those who had experience working with UAVs, even if it was minimal,” he recalls…They started training and preparing people on “commercial” UAVs. Gradually training switched to FPV [first-person-view] UAVs. The trainees first master the theory, and then go to the training grounds. The final stage of the program involves training on a relatively calm section of the front…There, people receive their first combat experience.  The center itself is relatively small. Its resources are designed mainly for the Española Brigade, Petrovich emphasizes…“We have been operating for only a year and a half. However, during this time, we have trained more than 100 qualified UAV operators in various areas” says Petrovich…

“Española”, like many other volunteer units, received special weapons manufactured by the so-called people’s defense industry, that is, developed and released outside the framework of the defense order…Now everything that concerns combat UAVs is developing rapidly, if you stop, you fall behind…, – Petrovich points out, moving on to the scientific and practical activities of the center’s employees.  At Española, they work with the entire spectrum of UAVs…In cooperation with a young design bureau, we are currently developing and conducting experimental tests on two types of d UAVs: a night reconnaissance UAV and a high-speed Baba Yaga UAV.  Due to the abundance of FPV [first-person-view] UAVs, the enemy has problems supplying units on the front line.  “Five, seven, ten kilometers is a dead zone”, he explains.  The fact is that people who sit directly at the front, paradoxically, are sometimes safer than those who are trying to resupply them from the rear. And so the first request for such a Baba Yaga [class UAV] came from such rear detachments.

Petrovich says that the troops needed a fast “bird” that could carry a good load and do it quickly.  The primary mission is supplying provisions, ammunition, and medicine.  The secondary mission is to carry powerful munitions.  A load capacity of, for example, 10 kg allows you to transport an anti-tank mine. Moreover, ammunition can be varied. Now there is a whole line [of UAV munitions]. We call this project “Kikimora”. The active testing phase is underway…The center is also working on countering enemy electronic warfare…The second UAV currently being developed at the center is a night reconnaissance UAV. “It can stay in the air for up to an hour and a half…in terms of range, it’s at least 12 km, we want to increase it to 15-17 km”

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

[ii] Additional Russian volunteer units have filled critical positions in Russia’s war in Ukraine, especially in the field of UAVs. See Charles Bartles, “Russia Gains Combat Power From Volunteer Service,” OE Watch, 07-2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-gains-combat-power-from-volunteer-service/

Image Information:

Image: Ukrainian Soldiers handling a Baba Yaga UAV
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baba_Yaga_(aircraft)#/media/File:UA_Vampire_UCAV_01.jpg 
Attribution: АрміяІнформCC BY-SA 4.0

North Korea Tacitly Acknowledges Its Troops Are in Ukraine

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“If there is such a thing…I think it will be an act conforming with the regulations of international law.”

The official state-controlled broadcaster, the Korean Central News Agency, carried a North Korean vice foreign minister’s statement on 25 October,  marking the first known response by the regime to Western evidence of North Korean troops deploying to the conflict in Ukraine. In response, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister for Russia Affairs Kim Jong Gyu provided a nebulous answer that amounted to admitting that while Kim cannot answer the question of North Korean troops in Ukraine authoritatively, there would be no legal reason prohibiting North Korea from doing so. Importantly, Kim did not deny the story.

North Korea had several options for addressing this growing question. First, it could have stayed silent on the matter. Alternatively, it could have announced its troops in Ukraine in its trademark aggressive media style as a concrete example of growing North Korea-Russia cooperation and North Korean military power. It instead chose a third option, whereby it acknowledged people were asking questions while framing its justification as hypothetical. North Korea’s savvy media operators were doubtless aware of how such a statement would rock the global media environment—and it did.

The regime’s response is intriguing as it does not appear to solve any existing problem in the information domain. It is possible that North Korea was compelled to make a statement on the matter because, for example, party officials had begun asking questions, the regime was preparing additional soldiers to deploy, and/or the regime’s censors wanted to say something about the story before everyday North Koreans heard about it from unauthorized, and therefore illegal, sources. It is also plausible that Russia resisted North Korea’s acknowledgment in order to avoid portraying President Vladimir Putin as weak.

North Korea watchers should be on the lookout for supplementary statements from authoritative sources within the regime, such as (in increasing order of authority) the foreign or defense ministers, the cabinet or state affairs commission, Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong, and Kim Jong Un himself. As North Korea decides to selectively reveal more information about its operations, they are likely to do so according to this assessed media authoritativeness ladder.

Sources:

“조선민주주의인민공화국 외무성 김정규 로씨야담당 부상 최근 여론화되고있는 대로씨야파병설과 관련한 립장 발표 (Vice Foreign Minister for Russia Affairs of DPRK clarifies stand on rumor of troop dispatch to Russia),” KCNA (central state-owned broadcaster), 25 Oct 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/1b5206685a5dd88f86da517afd511712.kcmsf

Kim Jong Gyu, vice foreign minister of the DPRK in charge of Russian affairs, gave the following answer to a question raised by KCNA on Friday as regards a rumor that the troops of the Korean People’s Army are dispatched to Russia which is recently drawing public attention in the world: “I heeded the rumor of the dispatch of KPA troops to Russia, which the world media is building up public opinion.”

The DPRK Foreign Ministry does not directly engage in the things of the Ministry of National Defence, and does not feel the need to confirm it separately.

If there is such a thing that the world media is talking about, I think it will be an act conforming with the regulations of international law.

There will evidently exist forces which want to describe it as illegal one, I think.

Russia Continues To Adapt Training, Incorporating Lessons From Ukraine

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Russian soldiers training ostensibly using revised tactics, lessons learned during its operations in Ukraine.

“The special military operation is the first war with large-scale combined arms actions and assaults on prepared positions after a long period of local wars and anti-terrorist operations led to the fact that now old tactical techniques, both the developments of the 1980s and earlier ones, are simultaneously used with new tactics.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the major Russian daily newspaper Izvestia, discusses how Russia continues to change soldier training based on lessons learned from its special military operation in Ukraine.[i] According to the Izvestiya article, the changing character of war necessitates combining both traditional combined arms warfare tactics with new skills to achieve success in modern warfare. In addition, many Russian forces in the security services, including the Ministry of Defense, and private military organizations are fighting as assault detachments/companies/groups, a method of organization that was widely practiced during the Second World War and abandoned as the Soviets/Russians fielded a fully mechanized force during the Cold War. Therefore, Russia is now using a combination of Second World War, Soviet-era combined arms, and emerging tactics from its combat experience in Ukraineto train its force. Specifically, Russia has regained its dismounted infantry culture, a marked change from the start of the war in 2022, when Russia suffered an inordinate number of casualties among troops riding to battle within their armored vehicles.[ii]

Sources:

Dmitry Astrakhan, “«Нет понятия идеального штурма, каждая операция планируется индивидуально»: Как новобранцы учатся навыкам ближнего боя на полигоне в ДНР (‘There is no such thing as an ideal assault; each operation is planned individually’: How recruits learn close combat skills at a training ground in the Donetsk People’s Republic),” Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 3 October 2024. https://iz.ru/1768527/dmitrii-astrakhan/net-poniatiia-idealnogo-shturma-kazhdaia-operatciia-planiruetsia-individualno

The experience of the special military operation has a significant impact on combat training. Now volunteer assault troops practice close combat in confined spaces of trenches and buildings, approaching strongpoints, clearing, evacuating the wounded and many other specific exercises. Izvestia visited at one of the training grounds and learned how recruits practice vital skills under the guidance of instructors with combat experience.

[T]raining takes place every day. On one day, recruits practice interactions with infantry fighting vehicles, on another day they focus on combating drones. In particular, they practice shooting at UAVs by shooting at clay pigeons.  Camouflaging and stealth movement are also practiced to remain invisible to enemy UAVs…

Combination of the “old” school and the “new”

The special military operation is the first war with large-scale combined arms actions and assaults on prepared positions after a long period of local wars and anti-terrorist operations led to the fact that now old tactical techniques, both the developments of the 1980s and earlier ones, are simultaneously used with new tactics.  At the same time, the latest experience is being implemented on the fly, since the character of battles is constantly changing — a combination of the “old” and the “new.”

So, from the old school we take the experience of moving on armored vehicles, moving along a trench. But in any case, “adjustments” are always necessary in tactical terms, since FVP [first person view] UAVs have appeared now.  “There is no concept of an ideal assault, it is important to act quickly, harmoniously and carefully,” — says a fighter with the call sign Potap.

Each trench, each settlement has its own differences, and therefore each assault operation is planned individually, without a specific template, he clarified…

NATO learns from our fighters’ assaults

It is worth noting that NATO is also looking at the experience of fighting in small groups at equipped strong points with trenches and dugouts. Almost all exercises held in Europe and the US in the last year have included practicing scenarios for storming forest belts and trenches, both according to old instructions and taking into account the experience of the special military operation. In addition, fighting in trenches has become part of the reservist training program in the British Army.

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

[ii] Interestingly, this was the same observation made by Chechens and outside observers during the Russian assault on the Chechen capital of Grozny in December 1994. Russian armored columns attacked from multiple directions, but mechanized infantry did not dismount and were cut down in their vehicles or dismounting under ambush conditions, before they could protect themselves and the armored columns.

Image Information:

Image: Russian soldiers training ostensibly using revised tactics, lessons learned during its operations in Ukraine.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/83/AssaultTraining2015-01.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

The Evolution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Ukraine

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A Russian First-Person-View UAV with small payload attached.

“One of the main military-technical components of combat actions in the special military operation in Ukraine is the mass use of unmanned — aircraft and robotic systems.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the monthly journal of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Voyennaya Mysl, discusses the evolution of UAV use since the inception of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine.[i] The article notes that, early in the conflict, UAV use was primarily characterized by reconnaissance and strike missions, carried out by larger UAVs, such as the large Turkish Bayraktar TB2. As the conflict progressed, these types of UAVs were supplanted by small and relatively cheap UAVs, such as the Chinese-manufactured DJI family of commercial drones, also used for reconnaissance or modified to carry explosive devices. Those drones were then complemented by a new class of first-person view (FPV) kamikaze/suicide UAVs that have recently dominated UAV use on the battlefield. Bayraktar TB2 Turkish Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).

Undoubtedly, UAV use is one of the most salient aspects of the current conflict in Ukraine, and it is clear small and relatively cheap UAVs will play a part in future armed conflict. The wide-scale use of UAVs solves a wide range of problems in modern war, such as: providing situational awareness; acquiring and lasing targets; signal retransmission; electronic reconnaissance and warfare; isolating a given area; interfering with supplies, rotations, and evacuations; destroying stationary and moving targets; supporting assault operations; mining, demining of terrain and water obstacles; and resupply. Although large weapon systems have certainly proved their value in Ukraine, these UAVs show that there is also an important role for relatively cheap electronics in the hands of innovative personnel.

Sources:

N.A. Sokolov, “Анализ тенденций применения беспилотных платформ в специальной военной операции (Analysis of trends in the use of unmanned platforms in the special military operation),” Voyennaya Mysl, (Monthly journal of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces),August 2024.  https://vm.ric.mil.ru/upload/site178/PWOpmGbLL3.pdf

The experience of military conflicts and crisis situations of recent decades, the analysis of the actions of terrorist organizations, testify to the increasing role of promising means of conducting armed conflict. One of the main military-technical components of combat actions in the special military operation in Ukraine is the mass use of unmanned ­aircraft and robotic systems.

A special feature of the use of ­unmanned platforms at the initial stage of the special military operation was the widespread use of reconnaissance and strike systems created on the basis of operational-tactical unmanned aircraft of the medium-altitude class.  As in the conflicts in Libya, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh.  The strike loitering munitions class of UAVs were also used ­as part of mixed groups for reconnaissance ­and strike UAVs (Orion, Bayraktar TB2).

Currently, the main ­emphasis in methods and technical means of development and application has shifted towards the mini class and micro class of UAVs, which is due to the massive use of affordable consumer components, and so are being seen in all environments — air, land, and sea.

Small attack UAVs were used to some extent in Libya, Syria, etc. (mainly of Israeli, Turkish, Chinese manufacture), but in the conditions ­of the special military operation, they became the very means that changed the situation on the battlefield.  The increase in the share of aerial UAVs began with the use of civilian products from the well-known Chinese ­company DJI. At the initial ­stage, these UAVs had a number of advantages (flight time, altitude, modular high-resolution optical-electronic modules), but they also had disadvantages associated with their built-in software, which significantly limited their use. The relatively high cost of DJI UAV kits also ­dictated the requirements for their reusability, limiting the range of tasks to observation and one-time drops of combat loads.

The situation with DJI changed with ­the appearance of alternative factory firmware, which removed the altitude restrictions, no-fly zones, and added additional functionality for flight in difficult weather conditions and at night.  The modified firmware currently supports the entire Mavic 3 series of DJI UAVs, including the Classic Рrо, Епterprise, and Matrice 30. After reprogramming, the DJI UAVs are usually used as relatively reusable reconnaissance and surveillance assets (day and night); as part of reconnaissance and strike loops, including systems that have wired power sources that can provide constant situational awareness; electronic warfare systems; and repeaters for other UAVs…

However, the most widespread class of airborne UAVs during the special military operation are the kamikaze UAVs, also known as FPV UAV (from English – “first person view”), or simply FPV. From the point of view of an external observer, these devices are controlled by their operator as an “avatar”, from the point of view of the operator himself — immersively, with the operator immersed in reality, as broadcast “from the point of view” of the UAV. FPV UAVs are used, as a rule, together with homemade munitions or standard munitions, which are modified for use with UAVs.  The use of FPV UAVs is characterized by flight ranges up to 20 km (with a repeater), and with an average aloft time of up to 10 minutes. 

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Russian First-Person-View UAV with small payload attached.
Source: https://tinyurl.com/44sn36pk

Sahelian States Sever Ties with Ukraine

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Flag of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine.

“The government of the Republic of Niger, in total solidarity with the government and people of Mali, has decided in all sovereignty to sever diplomatic relations between the Republic of Niger and Ukraine with immediate effect.”

Allegations of an “African Front” being opened in Russia’s war on Ukraine have caused multiple nations in the Sahel to sever diplomatic relations with Ukraine as African and Russian leaders accuse Ukraine of supporting terrorist organizations. According to the first excerpted article from French daily Le Monde, Niger and Mali ceased diplomatic relations with Ukraine on 7 August 2024. The decision was made in response to separatist and jihadist fighters in Mali killing dozens of Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) and Malian military personnel fighting in northeastern Mali. In the wake of the battle, Andriy Yusov, the press representative of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, stated: “The fact that the rebels received the necessary data that allowed them to successfully carry out an operation against Russian war criminals has already been observed by the whole world. Of course, we will not disclose the details.”[i] While this is not a direct admission of Ukrainian involvement in the Sahel, Moscow has unsurprisingly sided with Niger and Mali, condemning Kyiv.

Recent actions by Mali and Niger have sparked discussion that a proxy war could be starting in Africa between Russian-backed militaries and separatist groups accused of being backed by Ukraine. According to the second excerpted article from the Africa-based think tank, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), there are likely far more significant geopolitical implications for Africa than regional conflicts between warring tribes and jihadist groups. Russia’s information campaigns in numerous nations have been widely reported on. However, recently, Ukraine’s special envoy for Africa and the Middle East, Maksym Subkh, announced new embassies throughout Africa to help combat the influence of Russia’s Africa Corps. Ukrainian intervention against Russia, indirectly through support or through kinetic operations, would not be unheard of. ISS also reported that Ukrainian special forces were deployed to operate in Sudan to support the Sudanese Armed Forces fighting against Africa Corps mercenaries and allied Rapid Support Forces.

Mali, Niger, and several other nations in the Sahel have faced complex security issues stemming from armed rebellion to radical jihadism and foreign influence for several years. The possible expansion of the Russia-Ukraine war to other portions of the globe, such as Africa, has received mixed reactions. The Economic Community of West African States, a political and economic union of fifteen African nations, including Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali, and Niger, condemned any foreign influence and the expansion of geopolitical events to Africa.[ii] Others may view any attempt to combat Russian expansion and aggression as a net positive. However, if Ukraine does become openly involved in attempting to subvert Russian expansion in Africa, it will undoubtedly cause a shift in the momentum of ongoing armed conflicts in the region. Though, with multiple armed groups active in Sahelian states with varying motivations and allegiances, it would be difficult to limit the extent of foreign aid and influence to exclude all jihadist groups.

Sources:

“Le Niger rompt « avec effet immédiat » ses relations diplomatiques avec l’Ukraine, deux jours après le Mali (Niger breaks off diplomatic relations with Ukraine “with immediate effect”, two days after Mali),” Le Monde, 7 August 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/08/07/le-niger-rompt-avec-effet-immediat-ses-relations-diplomatiques-avec-l-ukraine-deux-jours-apres-le-mali_6270883_3212.html

Niger announced on Tuesday, August 6, that it was breaking off diplomatic relations with Ukraine “with immediate effect,” two days after Mali accused Kyiv of “supporting” “terrorist groups” after a heavy defeat of the Malian army at the end of July during fighting with separatists and jihadists.

“The government of the Republic of Niger, in total solidarity with the government and people of Mali, has decided in all sovereignty (…) to sever diplomatic relations between the Republic of Niger and Ukraine with immediate effect,” declared the spokesman for the Niger government, Colonel-Major Amadou Abdramane, in a statement read on public television.

At the end of July, separatists and jihadists claimed to have killed dozens of members of the Russian paramilitary group Wagner and Malian soldiers during fighting in Tin Zaouatine (north-east Mali). This defeat is the heaviest suffered in a battle by the Wagner Group in Africa, analysts agree.

A Ukrainian military intelligence official, Andri Yusov, had implied that Kiev had provided information to the rebels so they could carry out their attack. “The government of the Republic of Niger learned with great shock and deep indignation about the subversive and unacceptable remarks of Mr. Andri Yusov, spokesman for the Ukrainian military intelligence agency ,” Abdramane said on Tuesday…

“The fact that the rebels received the necessary data that allowed them to successfully carry out an operation against Russian war criminals has already been observed by the whole world. Of course, we will not disclose the details. More information to come here too,” Yusov told Ukrainian television. The video of his statement was relayed by the Ukrainian ambassador to Senegal.

Following these statements, Mali announced the severance of its relations with Ukraine, which on Monday rejected the accusations and regretted the decision, which it considered “hasty” . The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry affirmed that Kyiv “unconditionally adheres to the norms of international law” and “reserves the right to take all necessary political and diplomatic measures in response to unfriendly actions.”

Peter Fabricius, “La guerre de la Russie contre l’Ukraine s’étend-elle à l’Afrique? (Is Russia’s War on Ukraine Spreading to Africa?),” Institute for Security Studies (pan-African think tank), 9 August 2024. https://issafrica.org/fr/iss-today/la-guerre-de-la-russie-contre-l-ukraine-s-etend-elle-a-l-afrique.

Russia appears to be stepping up its multi-pronged offensive to increase its influence in Africa, while Ukraine is fighting back, threatening to turn the continent into a major proxy battlefield.

Russia appears to be stepping up its multi-pronged offensive to increase its influence in Africa, while Ukraine is fighting back, threatening to turn the continent into a major proxy battlefield. Military skirmishes erupted last week in Africa, when Moscow’s Wagner force (now Africa Corps) suffered heavy losses in a battle against Tuareg separatists and jihadists in Tinzawatene, Mali. The setback marks a major blow to the Kremlin, which appeared to be expanding its presence or at least countering Western efforts to regain ground.

After last week’s intense battle in Tinzawatene, in which Tuareg separatists claim to have killed 84 Wagner fighters and 47 Malian soldiers, officer Andriy Yusov, a spokesman for Ukraine’s intelligence agency, said Malian rebels had received the “necessary” information to carry out the attack, hinting at possible Ukrainian involvement. In response, Mali’s military junta severed diplomatic relations with Ukraine, accusing it of supporting “international terrorism.” Ukraine denied the accusation, saying Mali acted hastily, without investigating the incident or providing evidence of its involvement. The military junta of Mali’s neighbor Niger has also severed diplomatic ties with Kiev. Russia has accused Ukraine of opening a new front in Africa, an accusation tinged with irony.

The consequences of the war between Russia and Ukraine could be serious for Africa. The Economic Community of West African States condemned “foreign interference in the region […] and any attempt to drag the region into the current geopolitical confrontations.” The African Union did not respond. This development may not be entirely new in Africa. For Ramani, if Ukraine did indeed contribute to Wagner’s defeat in Mali, it is part of his two-pronged strategy in Africa. On the one hand, diplomatic openness with the establishment of new embassies and, on the other, “discreet special operations like those observed against the RSF in Sudan.”

The “RSF” refers to the Rapid Support Forces, which are engaged in a violent conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). It is well known that Russia, including Wagner, supports the RSF. In February, the Kyiv Post reported that Ukrainian special forces were operating in Sudan, supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces against Wagner’s forces, allied with the RSF. For Ramani, Wagner’s defeat in Mali will lead to introspection. Wagner’s forces will likely be more controlled by the state, “like the process going on in Libya.”

Notes:

[i] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine responded to Niger’s decision in a press release, denying support for terrorist organizations. Located here: “Statement by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry regarding the decision of the authorities of the Republic of Niger to sever diplomatic relations with Ukraine,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 8 August 2024. https://mfa.gov.ua/fr/news/zayava-mzs-ukrayini-shchodo-rishennya-vladi-respubliki-niger-rozirvati-diplomatichni-vidnosini-z-ukrayinoyu

[ii] ECOWAS has a long-standing history in Africa, founded in 1975, and contributes to many social and economic projects including election monitoring, clean water initiatives, human development, regional security, and more. For more information on ECOWAS visit: “About ECOWAS,” ECOWAS, Updated 2024.  https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_Special_Operations_Forces_of_Ukraine.svg
Attribution: Public Domain

Armenia Hints It May Withdraw From Russia-Backed Regional Security Bloc

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Monastery Valley in Armenia

“Armenia will refrain from joining the CSTO Collective Security Council resolution of November 23, 2023 on the CSTO budget for 2024 and from participating in financing the organization’s activity envisaged by this resolution. However, it will not object to adopting this resolution in a curtailed format.”

Armenia recently announced it will no longer pay its dues to the Collective Security Treaty Organizations (CSTO), a Moscow-led security organization comprised of countries from Central Asia and the South Caucasus. According to the first excerpted piece from the Russian state news agency, TASS, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told his countrymen that they can no longer rely on the CSTO and he had no answer to how Yerevan benefits from being a member. The move comes as relations between Yerevan and Moscow have cooled, particularly after a series of clashes over the disputed Nagorno Karabakh region, , last September with neighboring Azerbaijan resulted in the mass expulsion of the enclave’s Armenian population.

Pashinyan, who did not attend the CSTO’s last summit in Minsk in 2023, had hinted that Armenia plans to suspend its participation in the security bloc. Critics of the CSTO claim it is a tool for Moscow to wield military power over former Soviet-bloc countries. The last time CSTO forces were called in to preserve the peace came in January 2022, when roughly 2,500 CSTO peacekeepers – the bulk of them Russian – responded to anti-government rioting in Kazakhstan. But Pashinyan has criticized the alliance for not supporting Armenia during its various clashes with Azerbaijan,accusing Russian peacekeepers of abandoning their positions when Azerbaijani troops crossed into Nagorno-Karabakh.[i] According to the second excerpted article from Armenian TV and radio service Azatutyun, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Armenia is free to withdraw from the organization.[ii]  If Armenia does leave the CSTO, the move could signal a major realignment of the regional balance of power in the Caucasus, as Russia, preoccupied by the war in Ukraine, looks to keep a military presence in the region. Armenia recently held joint drills with the United States, has sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and has expressed interest in one day joining the European Union. If the CSTO were to lose Armenia or other members, it could weaken Russia’s military leverage in the South Caucasus. Alternatively, it could make other regional security blocs like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which also comprises China, more relevant and powerful.

Sources:

Source:  “Armenia to refrain from financing CSTO activity in 2024,” (“Армения воздержится от финансирования деятельности ОДКБ в 2024 году,” TASS (Russian state news agency), 8 May 2024. https://tass.com/world/1785765

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said earlier that his country cannot rely on the CSTO and he cannot answer Armenian society’s question why the country should be its member. In recent time, Yerevan has skipped numerous meeting in a range of integration formats. Thus, Pashinyan did not attend the CSTO summit in Minsk in 2023 and announced that Armenia had suspended its participation in this organization.

CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov told TASS on April 22 that it was a matter of “an independent and sovereign country” to decide whether to take part in the upcoming CSTO summit or not. However, he said that he hoped that many might change for the better before the summit.

Source:  “Armenia Free To Leave Russian-Led Bloc, Says Moscow,” (Армения свободна выйти из возглавляемого Россией блока, заявила Москва), Azatutyun (Armenian TV and Radio service affiliated with U.S. funded RFE/RL) 3 May 2024. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32932373.html#

“We still do not question the sovereign right of our Armenian partners to independently determine their foreign policy course, including in the context of the further work of the organization,” the ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova told a news briefing in Moscow.

“Let me remind you that Article 19 of the [CSTO} Charter establishes the possibility of leaving the alliance,” Zakharova said. “In that case, a member state … must send an official notification no later than six months before the withdrawal date.”

The Armenian government, she said, has taken no steps in that direction so far despite its “constantly circulated accusations against the organization.” This means that Armenia remains for now a full-fledged member of the Russian-led military alliance and must “must fulfill appropriate obligations,” added Zakharova. She did not specify those obligations.Over the past year or so, Yerevan has boycotted high-level meetings, military exercises and other activities of the CSTO in what Pashinian described in February as an effective suspension of Armenia’s CSTO membership. The premier repeatedly said afterwards that he could pull his country out of the alliance of six ex-Soviet states altogether.

Notes:

[i] “Armenian PM Attacks Russian-Led Alliance At Summit In Yerevan,” RFE/RL, 24 November 2022. https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-csto-pashinian-criticism/32145663.html

[ii] During a recent visit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Pashinyan struck an agreement for Russian border guards to withdraw from along the Armenia-Azerbaijani border. See: Gabriel Gavin, “Russia to withdraw troops from Armenia’s border,” Politico.eu, 9 May 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-to-withdraw-troops-from-armenias-border/

Image Information:

Image: Monastery Valley in Armenia
Source: Unsplash, https://unsplash.com/photos/aerial-photo-of-a-village-during-daytime-VQ07UveM3-U
Attribution: Free to use under the Unsplash License

Russia Redeploys Military Police to Southern Syria

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Map showing Syria, Israel, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (1991).

“The [Russian] Military Police has set up an additional post near the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights.”

After over a year of absence, Russian forces have returned to Syrian territory near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, in theory, to curb spillovers of violence from Israel to Syria. Russia’s deployments to date have largely been symbolic, including occasional aerial patrols and the establishment of three military police observation posts in the Syrian provinces of Quneitra and Daraa, near the buffer zone separating Syria and Israel. As reported in the first accompanying article from the Syrian opposition news website Enab Baladi, Russia established its third observation post in the area in early April 2024, after establishing two similar posts in January.

Southern Syria is often considered the cradle of the Syrian civil war, and was a hardened rebel bastion for several years. Daraa province remained highly volatile until Russian-sponsored settlements with rebel groups in 2018 stabilized local security conditions. With a modicum of peace achieved, Russian presence and influence in this part of Syria dwindled beginning in 2018 while Iranian-backed Syrian government forces and militias strengthened their grip in former rebel territory. Following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian forces all but disappeared from southern Syria, allowing Iranian militias to expand their influence in the area, often through local proxies and under the cover of Syrian Army forces.[i] Iranian influence in Syrian territory close to Israel has become a source of heightened concern not just for Israel but also for Russia, which fears that Gaza spillover could threaten Syria’s delicate status quo.

In the months following the 7 October attack, Russia successfully blocked Iranian attempts to launch attacks from southern Syria in support of Hamas in Gaza per the second accompanying excerpt, published in January 2024 in the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed. The redeployment of Russian military police to this part of Syria may therefore be seen as bolstering Russia’s ability to continue preventing escalation on this front. Indeed, Russia’s observation posts have all been set up in the aftermath of Israeli assassinations of high-ranking Iranian officials in Syrian territory: the first two posts were set up in the weeks following the killing of General Razi Mousavi in late December 2023, and the third one the day after General Mohammad Reza Zahedi was killed in April 2024. Russia’s return to southern Syria is less about supporting Iran against Israel than it is about deterring Tehran’s use of Syrian soil to respond to Israeli attacks on Iranian personnel in Syria notwithstanding the deepening Russo-Iranian strategic cooperation. , However, experts are skeptical of Russia’s ability to succeed. According to Mustafa al-Naimi, a Turkey-based Syrian analyst cited in the third accompanying excerpt, also from Enab Baladi, Russia’s efforts are bound to fail. Even if it succeeds in preventing Iran from opening the Syria front against Israel, Russia will be unable to remove Iranian influence from the area, given that its proxies will simply “return to the region wearing the uniform of the Syrian regime.” As such, al-Naimi conjectures, Russia’s symbolic redeployment near the Syria-Israel border is unlikely to do anything other than postpone the inevitable: an expansion of the Gaza conflict into southern Syria.

Sources:

Source: “Russia establishes third military post on borders of occupied Golan Heights,” Enab Baladi English (Syrian opposition English-language news website), 2 April 2024. https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2024/04/russia-establishes-third-military-post-on-borders-of-occupied-golan-heights/

The Deputy Chief of the Russian Center for Reconciliation of the Opposing Parties in Syria (a division of the Russian Ministry of Defense), Major General Yury Popov, stated that the Military Police has set up an additional post near the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights… This Syrian military post is the third of its kind established since the beginning of the current year, after Russia reduced its deployment in southern Syria at the beginning of 2022 following its invasion of neighboring Ukraine.

Source:

ما أهداف روسيا من نشر نقاط مراقبة في القنيطرة؟ “What are Russia’s goals in setting up observation posts in Quneitra?” Al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 6 January 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9

[Researcher Rachid] Hourani added to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that, after the launch of the Israeli military operation against the Gaza Strip, Iran tried to activate several fronts based on the principle of “unifying the arenas.” There were several visits by Iranian military officials to Syria with the aim of opening that front, but they did not amount to much due to Russian rejection and its tendency to use the so-called “Iranian card” and control Tehran’s behavior in Syria.

Hourani considered that Russia can actually curb Iran in southern Syria “because it fully controls the military decision-making in regime areas, in addition to being a major party to the understandings related to Israel’s security threats from Syria, such as the settlement agreement with the Syrian opposition factions in mid-2018 and the Israeli-American-Russian security meeting that took place in mid-2019″…

Source:

ما وراء نشر روسيا نقاطًا عسكرية على حدود الجولان المحتل “What is behind Russia’s setting up military posts on the occupied Golan border?” Enab Baladi (Syrian opposition news website), 14 January 2024. https://www.enabbaladi.net/682917/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%8B%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88/

Mustafa Al-Naimi, a researcher on Iranian affairs, told Enab Baladi, “We are facing a scene of gradual escalation from both the Iranian and Israeli sides.” Al-Naimi believes that the Russian side is trying to reposition itself to ward off any attempt by the Israeli side to advance on the ground along this front by, at the very least, removing the Iranian militias from the southern region adjacent to the Golan.He added that this measure will not work for these militias, because they will return to the region wearing the uniform of the Syrian regime… because of this and the fact that the Israeli side does not trust that Russia has the ground forces needed to control the region at a depth of 45 kilometers, al-Naimi suggests that these measures are “postponing the battle, not preventing it.”

Notes:

[i] For more on the 2018 agreement, see: Armenak Tokmajyan. “A Flashpoint Looms in Southern Syria,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 26 March 2024. https://carnegie-mec.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/04/a-flashpoint-looms-in-southern-syria?lang=en&center=middle-east

For more on post-Ukraine Russian and Iranian presence in Syria, see: Lucas Winter, “Iran Repositions Its Proxies In Syria As Russia Turns Focus To Ukraine,” OE Watch, 02-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-repositions-its-proxies-in-syria-as-russia-turns-focus-to-ukraine/;  Lucas Winter, “Iran Digs Into Central Syria, Filling Vacuum Left By Russia,” OE Watch, May 2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-digs-into-central-syria-filling-vacuum-left-by-russia/; Lucas Winter, “Russian Influence Fades In Southern Syria,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russian-influence-fades-in-southern-syria/

Image Information:

Image: Map showing Syria, Israel, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (1991).
Source: https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-pclmaps-oclc-25871248-golan_heights-1991.jpg
Attribution: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, Public Domain

Russian Import-Substitution Impacts Armored Vehicle Production

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Typhoon K-4386 “Typhoon-VDV” at Armiya-2021. Issues in bringing the Typhoon-VDV to serial production, due to the number of imported components and sophistication in design, illustrates the gap between Russia’s military modernization aspirations and industrial base capabilities.

“Currently, measures are being taken to engage specialized enterprises and organizations in the development and manufacturing of domestic components necessary for the production of protected military vehicles. Solving these issues is now considered by military leadership as one of the priority directions for enhancing combat readiness and reducing combat losses of the troops.”

Recent articles in Russian military publications regarding Typhoon [i] armored vehicle production  highlight the advantages – and tradeoffs – of import-substitution measures across Russia’s defense industry. Moscow’s inability to import critical components has forced Russian manufacturers to simplify designs and shift component production to domestic manufacturers. According to the Russian military journal Material’no-tehnicheskoe obespechenie Vooruzhennyh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii, initial development of the Typhoon series of 4×4 and 6×6 armored vehicles in the 2010s was in response to the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) order to create vehicles capable of protecting crews on par with foreign offerings through 2020. The Typhoon-Kand Typhoon-Y capable of carrying a variety of armaments depending on mission requirements were Russia’s answer to the American-made Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle. Despite their official adoption by the Russian MoD, the number of components of foreign origin prevented mass production of initial models.

The journal further details how the military invasion of Ukraine in 2022 underscored the urgent need for armored transport. While domestic production has been a Russian military focus prior to the Ukrainian conflict, the war has accelerated import-substitution measures. Using existing multi-purpose vehicle chassis and domestic components, Russian military manufacturers began rapidly producing armored vehicles to meet pressing battlefield needs. However, current Typhoons suffer from reduced payload capacity, mobility, and less protection than initial test models using foreign produced parts. Some variants, such as the Typhoon-VDV, remain in limited production due to continued reliance on foreign parts.

The second excerpted article from the Russian military journal Armeiskii sbornik noted the extent of these changes in manufacturing and capability to the current Ground Forces model BMM,[ii] the ZCA-T “Linza,” a Typhoon-K variant. The “simplified chassis” version of the Linza features transmission, transfer block, bridge, power steering, and armor made by domestic manufacturers—primarily KamAZ but lacks a multi-functional command and control terminal. The case of the Typhoon demonstrates the impacts of import-substitution measures on the Russian defense industry and the rapid tradeoffs being made to maintain the current manufacturing tempo.

Sources:

Source: Evgeniy I. Kotyga, Vasily A. Novikov, Ksenia N. Moskalyuk, “Броня На Колесах (Armor on Wheels),” Logistics of the Military Forces of the Russian Federation (Monthly Russian military periodical), No. 4, April 2024. https://on-demand.eastview.com/browse/publication/144326

Pg. 75-76: “Following the tests, the protected vehicles OKR “Typhoon-K” and “Typhoon-U” were accepted for supply to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation by orders of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. However, due to the high complexity of the design and the large number of imported components, they were not mass-produced.

With the beginning of a special military operation, the issue of equipping the forces with protected vehicles became acute. To meet the urgent operational needs of the troops, the production of protected vehicles was organized based on the chassis and components of existing domestic multi-purpose vehicles (similar to unrealized projects with codes “Vodnik,” “Medved,” “Karatel,” etc.).

Pg. 78: “To address technical issues related to “import substitution” in protected vehicles of the “Typhoon-K” 4×4 wheeled formula and “Typhoon-VDV” families, a series of measures have been taken and is currently being implemented in the following main directions:

  • Utilization of domestic armored steels, titanium alloys, and composite ceramic panels instead of foreign-produced armor materials like Armox and Plasan.
  • Full localization of Cummins engines and ZF transmissions by domestic enterprises.
  • Import substitution of automotive components in suspension systems, steering control, electrical equipment, and other vehicle systems and assemblies with domestic counterparts.”

Pg. 80: “The effectiveness of the introduced changes in the design of protected vehicles has been positively evaluated based on the results of the conducted tests. Samples of modernized protected vehicles were accepted for supply to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at the beginning of 2023. Thus, summing up the creation of new and modernization of existing protected vehicles, it should be noted the effectiveness of measures for ‘import substitution,’ simplification of sample designs, and the use of domestic materials, components, and assemblies, which meets the high demand of the troops for this type of equipment.

Source: R. Pokutny, R. Kurmaev, V. Stolbunov, “Красный Крест На Броне (A Red Cross on Armor),” Army Digest (Monthly Military journal), No. 4 (128-129), April 2024. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/publication/470

Pg. 129: However, during the operation of the BMM (Armored Medical Vehicle), a number of shortcomings related to the excessive complexity of the design were identified. Taking into account the changes made (Table 1), on the basis of the ZSA-T “Linza” was created with a simplified design. The goals of creating this modification are to eliminate unnecessary complexity, reduce cost and time indicators at the production and operation stage, and replace imported components with domestic ones. The main changes to the ZSA-T “Linza” of a simplified design include the use of a single-volume body layout formula with a simultaneous increase in the protection class of the medical department, the provision of a spare wheel, and the installation of a “Tucha” smoke screen system, while BIUS (multifunction command and control system) and ABS (most likely the acronym for “anti-brake system”) are excluded.”

Notes:

[i] The Typhoon armored vehicle is produced by ROSOBORONEXPORT, a subsidiary of Rostec State Corporation and manufacturer of military equipment across the Russian Ground, Air, Naval, and Air Defense Forces. Products range from the T-90 tank to the Orlan family of UAVs.

[ii] “BMM” is the overarching term in the Russian Ground Forces for armored medical vehicles.

Image Information:

Image: Typhoon K-4386 “Typhoon-VDV” at Armiya-2021. Issues in bringing the Typhoon-VDV to serial production, due to the number of imported components and sophistication in design, illustrates the gap between Russia’s military modernization aspirations and industrial base capabilities. 
Source: ROSOBORONEXPORT, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Air-droppably_special-purpose_protected_vehicle_%28ZASN-D%29_during_the_%22Armiya_2021%22_exhibition.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0 DEED

Sanctions Drive Russia’s Shift to Domestic Weapons Production

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Still-frame from video of BM-27 Uragan MLRS supposedly moving into position to fire on Ukrainian targets near Belgorod, 16 April 2024.

“The Russian transition to the BAZ-69092 chassis seems to be motivated by several factors… but also aligns with Russian strategic preferences [necessity] for local production.”

Despite Western efforts to dismantle or limit its defense industry, Russia continues to find ways to produce the weapons it needs to fight its war in Ukraine.[i] As discussed in the excerpted article from the Azeri based Caliber news outlet, on 16 April, the Russian Ministry of Defense released a video unveiling an updated version of the BM-27 Uragan [R1] self-propelled multiple rocket launcher (MRL), supported by a new BAZ-69092 [R2] three axle chassis, at work in Ukraine.[ii] According to the Caliber article, the modifications are a reflection of not only the need to modernize Russia’s rocket and artillery systems, but also “align with Russian strategic [necessity] for local production.” The article notes that Russia has lost at least 83 BM-27 systems in Ukraine since it invaded in Feb 2022. Replacement of these and other systems is critical to Russia’s war effort. The article points out the original Uragan chassis were built in other parts of the former Soviet empire, including Ukraine.[iii] The new BAZ-96092 is a multi-platform chassis wholly built in Russia. Russia continues to rearm its military despite sanctions and restrictions imposed by the West to reduce Russia’s ability to fight the war in Ukraine.

OE Watch Insight:

Updated RUS Uragan MRLS appears on UKR battlefield demonstrating RUS ability to replenish its military systems despite western sanctions and restrictions intended to hold back military industrial establishment.

Sources:

“Russian Army deploys new version of BM-27 Uragan MLRS Rocket Launcher in Ukraine,” Caliber (Azeri based news source with good regional coverage from neighboring perspective), 18 April 2024. https://caliber.az/en/post/234544/

On April 16, 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense released a video showing a night-time operation involving the BM-27 Uragan 220mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) near the Belgorod region. Notably, the video unveiled an updated version of the BM-27 Uragan launcher mounted on a new platform, identified as the BAZ-69092 three-axle chassis, marking a significant departure from its traditional ZIL-135LM 8×8 truck chassis.

The transition to the BAZ-69092 chassis is part of an ongoing modernization effort within the Russian Army to upgrade existing military equipment and improve its artillery capabilities. This strategy includes plans to replace the aging BM-27 Uragan MLRS with the more advanced Tornado-S [R1] system….

…

The Russian transition to the BAZ-69092 chassis seems to be motivated by several factors. Firstly, the Russian Army lost at least 83 units in Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict. As of 2023, the Russian Army had only 150 of these vehicles in service, indicating a critical need for the modernization and replacement of this valuable system. Secondly, Russian engineers could face difficulties in modernizing older vehicles such as the ZIL-135LM, whose production ceased in 1995. Thirdly, these difficulties need to be compared with the advantages offered by new platforms for improving combat efficiency. The adoption of the newer BAZ-69092 6×6 chassis offers several advantages, including its capacity to accommodate weapons systems weighing up to 13 tons, but also aligns with Russian strategic preferences for local production.

…It is interesting to note that the BAZ-69092 chassis was specifically developed to standardize and facilitate the use of various military and special vehicles within the Russian army. This initiative began in the early 1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which affected the supply of special chassis as key manufacturers were outside Russia (for instance MKZT in Belarus and KrAZ in Ukraine). The Bryansk Automobile Plant (BAZ) was tasked with developing the BAZ-69092 under the project code “Voshchina-1” to substitute for foreign-made chassis. The model is part of a family of vehicles designed for diverse functions, including combat and support roles, tailored to meet specific requirements of the military.

Notes:

[i] For recent media reporting on Russia’s resurgent domestic arms industry, see: “Russia ramps up weapons production, using mass quantity to outgun Ukraine,” The Washington Post, 19 April 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/19/russia-weapons-production-ukraine-war/; Russia has also received Chinese and Iranian weapons assistance. For recent news coverage regarding Chinese assistance, see: “China Has Helped Russia Boost Arms Production, U.S. Says,” The Wall Street Journal, 12 April 2024. https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-russia-arms-production-help-c098c08b and “US intelligence finding shows China surging equipment sales to Russia to help war effort in Ukraine,” The Associated Press, 19 April 2024. https://apnews.com/article/united-states-china-russia-ukraine-war-265df843be030b7183c95b6f3afca8ec

[ii] Fielding of the new and improved Russian BM-27 had been anticipated for months. See: Російські БМ-27 “Ураган” отримали нове шасі БАЗ-69092 (Russia Modernizes BM-27 Uragan Rocket Launchers with BAZ-69092 Chassis Upgrade),” Militarnyi (Ukraine media outlet focused on the military and defense industry), 22 December 2023. https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/rosijski-bm-27-uragan-otrymaly-nove-shasi-baz-69092/

[iii] The above sourced Caliber article noted that Ukraine is also “modernizing its BM-27 MLRS, fitting the Uragan launcher on a Tatra Т815-7Т3RC1 chassis, resulting in the creation of the Bureviy system. Revealed in 2020 and developed by the Shepetiv Repair Plant, the Bureviy successfully completed fire tests in November 2020. Ukraine also developed the Bastion-03, which combines a KrAZ-6322 chassis with a 9K57 Uragan MLRS launcher. This latter project is part of a Ukrainian initiative to standardize rocket artillery chassis using the KrAZ platform, following the earlier Bastion-01 and Bastion-02 models.”

Image Information:

Image: Still-frame from video of BM-27 Uragan MLRS supposedly moving into position to fire on Ukrainian targets near Belgorod, 16 April 2024.
Source: Russian Ministry of Defence, https://t.me/mod_russia/37664
Attribution: Public Domain