Tag Archives: Terrorism and Transnational Crime

Turkey Conducts Counterterrorism Operations Against the Islamic State

Posted on by

Turkish Army vehicles in south-eastern Turkey. In light of recent regional attacks by the Islamic State, Turkey is ramping up counterterror measures in the country, especially targeting Tajiks.

“Turkish security services have carried out continuous campaigns against the [terrorist] cells and members of the organization, which resulted in the arrest of thousands, in addition to the deportation of nearly 3,000.”

Turkey’s Anti-Terrorism Division continues its offensive against the Islamic State (IS) and other groups as the government attempts to restrict Tajik nationals access after a string of international attacks. Turkey is actively attempting to disrupt the remaining cells of the IS in the country after several deadly terrorist attacks linked to the group have occurred throughout the globe. Over a week period in January 2024, IS conducted bombings in Kerman, Iran, conducted a shooting at the Santa Maria Catholic Church in Istanbul, Turkey, and finally, the group killed over 130 people during an attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, Russia. According to the first excerpted article from the Saudi-owned international newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, in April 2024, the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Division personnel arrested 48 IS members in Istanbul. Thirty of those arrested were said to be connected to the Santa Maria Catholic church attack. 18 additional members were arrested in Ankara, many of whom are Tajik. The article also notes that at least two of the perpetrators of the Crocus attack in Moscow spent time in Istanbul immediately before the attack. IS fighters traveling through Turkey or using the country as a temporary place to stay is not a new phenomenon, as thousands of fighters and recruits have passed through Turkish borders since 2013. IS fighters and supporters have consistently used Turkey as a hub, despite counter-terrorism efforts. Many IS-affiliated individuals will cross the border from Syria, and Ankara’s primary countermeasure has been deportation to the country of origin with over 9,000 deported to date.[i] According to the second excerpted article from the Turkish-based news outlet TürkRus, Tajik nationals now face deportation and rescinded visa exemptions as a result of the Tajik connection to the recent terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, the Santa Maria Catholic church attack, and a planned attack in Istanbul. Tajiks in Turkey were given a deadline of 20 April 2024 to leave or be under the threat of being forcibly expelled. Although Tajikistan is a small former Soviet republic just north of Afghanistan, approximately half of IS fighters are recruited there. A combination of poverty, lack of religious freedom, and an oppressive dictatorial regime give citizens few options, which IS has capitalized on. Through primarily online recruitment methods, IS appears to have been able to appeal to many Tajik’s grievances with Russia and the West. As for Turkey, the effects of its most recent countermeasures for Tajik nationals are yet to be seen.

OE Insight Summary:

TUR’s Anti-Terrorism Division continues its offensive against the Islamic State and other groups as the government attempts to restrict access to Tajik nationals after a string of international attacks.

Sources:

Saeed Abdul Razik, “طاجيكستان دون تأشيرة تركيا توقف العشرات من «داعش» وتلغي دخول مواطني (Turkey arrests dozens of ISIS members and cancels visa-free entry of Tajik citizens),” Asharq Al-Awsat (Saudi news site), 6 April 2024. https://aawsat.com/شؤون-إقليمية/4952726-تركيا-توقف-العشرات-من-داعش-وتلغي-دخول-مواطني-طاجيكستان-دون-تأشيرة

Counter-terrorism forces in Turkey arrested 48 members of the terrorist organization ISIS, including 30 members linked to the perpetrator of the attack on the Santa Maria Catholic Church in Istanbul on January 28. 18 members of the terrorist organization were also arrested in the Turkish capital, Ankara.

Last February, a Turkish court decided to imprison 25 defendants and conditionally release 9 others who were involved in the armed attack on the Santa Maria Church in the Sariyer district of Istanbul, which was carried out by two ISIS members: the Tajikist Amerjon Khalikov and the Russian David Tandev, who were charged. They were charged with: “belonging to a terrorist organization” and “premeditated murder.” They were among 60 Russian and Tajik suspects who were arrested in connection with the attack, and 26 of them were referred to deportation centers outside the country.

The Turkish security forces arrested 147 ISIS members as part of the investigations, and 17 members of what is known as the “Khorasan Province” affiliated with ISIS were arrested after their identities were identified by Turkish intelligence and the Anti-Terrorism Division in the Istanbul Security Directorate. Confirming their connection to the armed attack on the church and planning to establish an entity to train and deploy ISIS militants in Middle Eastern countries. ISIS, which Turkey has classified as a terrorist organization since 2013 and which was responsible for or attributed to the killing of more than 300 people in attacks in Turkey between 2015 and 2017.

Turkish security services have carried out continuous campaigns against the cells and members of the organization, which resulted in the arrest of thousands of them, in addition to the deportation of nearly 3,000, and preventing the entry of more than 5,000 into the country.

“Turkey 20 Nisan’dan itibaren Tacikistanlıları deport edecek (Turkey will deport Tajikistan citizens as of April 20),” TurkRus (Turkish news site), April 7, 2024. https://www.turkrus.com/3167873-turkiye-20-nisandan-itibaren-tacikistanlilari-deport-edecek-xh.aspx

After the terrorist attack in Moscow, it was revealed that the terrorists were Tajik nationals. Turkey also recently announced that it has lifted visa liberalization for Tajikistan. Turkey announced that it had lifted visa liberalization with Tajikistan. Speaking to Sputnik, Turkish diplomatic sources stated that Turkish officials informed the Tajikistan authorities that Tajik nationals who did not leave the country as of April 20 would be deported from the country.

It is noteworthy that the decision was taken after it was announced that some of the defendants, who were Tajik citizens, who were announced to have carried out the terrorist attack in Crocus City in Moscow, had traveled to and from Turkey before this action, and after many news about this issue appeared in the Russian press.It was noted that Tajikistan is considering the issue of imposing a visa requirement for Turkish citizens in accordance with the principle of reciprocity.

Notes:

[i] The International Crisis Group provides a detailed analysis of the overall challenge Türkiye faces with ISIS-linked foreigners in Türkiye. For more information, see:

“An Enduring Challenge: ISIS-Linked Foreigners in Turkiye,” International Crisis Group, 28 February 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkiye/267-enduring-challenge-isis-linked-foreigners

Image: Turkish Army vehicles in south-eastern Turkey. In light of recent regional attacks by the Islamic State, Turkey is ramping up counterterror measures in the country, especially targeting Tajiks.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Turkish_Army_vehicles_in_south-eastern_Turkey.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Venezuela’s Maduro Targets Previous Allies Under Anti-Corruption Campaign

Posted on by

El Aissami campaigns for governor of the state of Aragua. President Maduro recently had him arrested under the auspices of a national anti-corruption campaign.

“The Venezuelan Prosecutor’s Office has announced the arrest of former minister Tareck El Aissami, a politician who until a year and a half ago belonged to Nicolás Maduro’s circle of trust.”

The Maduro government in Venezuela has launched an anti-corruption probe into politically motivated transnational criminal elements within its regime.[i] According to the first excerpted article in the Spanish daily El País, top targets of the probe include Tareck El Aissami, a former vice president and oil minister, as well as his business partners Samark Lopez, former finance minister Simon Zerpa, and others yet to be identified. El Aissami and his associates stand accused of stealing billions via a cryptocurrency payment scheme at the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). Maduro blames El Aissami and his associates for Venezuela’s moribund economy.

Meanwhile, according to the second excerpted article from the Spanish-language outlet CNN en Español, Maduro organized the extraterritorial assassination of a dissident member of the Venezuelan armed forces, Ronald Ojeda, who was living in Chile. The CNN story quotes the prosecutor in the case, who rules out any other cause of death. Given that Maduro faces a difficult scenario this year, discarding erstwhile allies now considered disloyal, such as El Aissami, appears to be crucial for him to consolidate and maintain his regime’s hold on power in an election year. Formerly, El Aissami was considered one of Maduro’s top allies.[ii] However, as the extraterritorial assassination of Ronald Ojeda shows, the Maduro regime’s criminal links remain strong and capable of operating transnationally within Latin America in service of his regime’s consolidation.

OE Insight Summary:

VEN regime of Nicolas Maduro has undertaken a highly questionable anticorruption campaign that seeks to eliminate challengers to the regime and blame those arrested for its economic woes.

Sources:

“Venezuela detiene al exministro del Petróleo Tareck El Aissami, hasta hace poco un político íntimo de Maduro (Venezuela detains former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami, until recently an intimate politician of Maduro),” El País (a Spanish daily with excellent regional coverage), 9 April 2024. https://elpais.com/america/2024-04-09/venezuela-detiene-al-exministro-del-petroleo-tareck-el-aissami-hasta-hace-poco-un-politico-intimo-de-maduro.html

The Venezuelan Prosecutor’s Office has announced the arrest of former minister Tareck El Aissami, a politician who until a year and a half ago belonged to Nicolás Maduro’s circle of trust. El Aissami was in legal limbo since a mega corruption scheme was uncovered that affected PDVSA, the state oil company that he managed as minister. There is talk of embezzlement in the realm of 21 billion dollars.

“Caso Ronald Ojeda: fiscal de Chile dice que el crimen se ‘organizó y se solicitó’ desde Venezuela (Ronald Ojeda case: Chilean prosecutor says the crime was ‘organized and requested’ from Venezuela),” CNN en Español (the Spanish-language version of the Atlanta-based outlet), 12 April 2024. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/04/12/caso-ronald-ojeda-chile-venezuela-orix/

Héctor Barros, prosecutor in charge of the case investigating the murder of former Venezuelan military officer Ronald Ojeda in Chile, stated in an interview with Chilevisión broadcast…that, according to the investigations, the crime ‘was organized and requested from Venezuela.’ Asked by the Chilevisión journalist about the possibility that the motive for the crime was political, Barros said that he has ‘no precedents that point us in the other direction.’

Notes:

[i] For more information on the criminal nature of the Maduro regime, see: Moises Rendon and Mia Kazman, “Maduro’s Mafia State,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 31 October 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/maduros-mafia-state

[ii] The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project has an excellent profile of El Aissami and his importance to the Maduro regime: “Former Venezuelan Oil Minister and Vice President Arrested for Corruption,” OCCRP, 11 April 2024. https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/18646-former-venezuelan-oil-minister-and-vice-president-arrested-for-corruption

Image Information:

Image: El Aissami campaigns for governor of the state of Aragua. President Maduro recently had him arrested under the auspices of a national anti-corruption campaign.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/tareckpsuv/8139341461/
Attribution: CC BY-NC 2.0 DEED.

Hamas and Houthis Target Youth as New “Islamic Resistance” Movement Emerges

Posted on by

Hamas supporters in Gaza, including families and children, attending the 25th anniversary of the movement’s founding, December 2012.

“Houthi vehicles carrying slogans of supporting Gaza roam the villages with forms to register children and youth into these training courses.”

Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen, both of whom have seen their popularity grow since 7 October, are capitalizing on conflict in Gaza to recruit new generations of young men into their culture of “Islamic Resistance.”[i] According to the first accompanying excerpt from an op-ed published recently in the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed, Hamas’s prior youth training efforts have been critical to its ability to withstand the Israeli campaign. The author mentions the “Futawwa” (youth) training program, which allowed Hamas to spread its “resistance” ideology across Gaza throughout the 2010s.[ii] The second and third accompanying excerpts, from the prominent Saudi dailies al-Sharq al-Awsat and al-Watan, respectively, illustrate how both Hamas and the Houthis have used their growing popularity since 7 October to launch recruitment campaigns, especially targeting the youth. Youth indoctrination is critical for both groups, and both have put substantial efforts into it over the past decade.[iii] The Houthi Movement and Hamas in Gaza share much in common. They are both mobilized movements with Islamic ideological underpinnings that act as de facto governments in their respective regions despite not formally being recognized as such by the international community. The key difference between them is doctrinal—the former are adherents of the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam while the latter is a Sunni, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movement. For both groups, though, “the culture of resistance” is a critical component that arguably supersedes sectarian differences. Perhaps to a greater degree than previously, a focus on sectarian differences seems secondary and increasingly irrelevant in the current context. Instead, Hamas and the Houthis—alongside Shia-majority Lebanese Hezbollah and the “Islamic Resistance of Iraq”—may coalesce into a transnational, cross-sectarian “Islamic Resistance” movement that should be thought of as distinct from the 2010s, Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.”[iv] Both on the Sunni and the Shia side, the new generation of fighters coming of age in the shadow of conflict in Gaza will presumably be less interested in sectarian differences or other intra-Islam disputes than in the fight against Israel.

Sources:

“How and why has Gaza held out?” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily) https://www.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/كيف-صمدت-غزّة-ولماذا

What is the secret of this resilience? … After the attempted coup against the Hamas government and the separation of Gaza from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip fell under a tight siege, and the local “Gaza Authority” found itself under a unique state of “independence.” It was able to make whatever decisions it wanted regarding its society, especially in the fields of education and curriculum making… Specifically, the Hamas Authority introduced the “Futawwa” program into the curricula of its schools, aiming to train students specifically in weapons use and field skills.

“Hamas seeks to exploit the Gaza war in the Lebanese camps,” al-Sharq al-Awsat (prominent Saudi daily), 4 December 2023. https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/4708376-%C2%AB%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%C2%BB-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AB%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86

On Monday, the Lebanese branch of the Hamas movement announced the establishment of the “Vanguards of the Al-Aqsa Flood.” This is an organization with military dimensions, as the statement suggested…

In a statement, the movement called on “young and heroic men” to join the “vanguard of the resistance.” The movement’s sources explained that “this project is linked to Lebanon and does not aim exclusively to gather more fighters, but rather to include more individuals in Hamas who are active in more than one sector.” A statement issued by the movement linked the establishment of these vanguards to “affirming the role of the Palestinian people, wherever they are, in resisting the occupation by all available and legitimate means,” and to “complementing what Operation Al-Aqsa Flood achieved, and benefiting from scientific and artistic energies and capabilities.”

“Houthis recruit children through seminars on war in Gaza,” al-Watan (prominent Saudi daily), 18 November 2023. https://www.alwatan.com.sa/article/1137388

A Yemeni source in Sanaa said that the most rejoicing over what is happening in Gaza is among the Houthi militias, who rose up directly to restore their dilapidated ranks and support their disintegrating fronts… The source stated that Houthi vehicles carrying slogans of supporting Gaza roam the villages with forms to register children and youth into these training courses, a method that does not differ from previous methods of recruitment. However, the Houthis have developed new tricks to entice children and youth to enroll in these malicious courses. This includes sending young graduates to the streets to talk about their participation in previous courses, graduating them without any assignments, and giving them monthly salarie

Notes:

[i] Several opinion polls confirm these groups’ rising popularity, including:

“Wide public support for Hamas’ offensive on October the 7th, but the vast majority denies that Hamas has committed atrocities against Israeli civilians,” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 13 December 2023. https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/963

“How the Israel-Hamas War in Gaza Is Changing Arab Views,” Arab Barometer, 14 December 2023. https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/how-the-israel-hamas-war-in-gaza-is-changing-arab-views/; 

“New Poll Sheds Light on Saudi Views of Israel-Hamas War,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21 December 2023. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-poll-sheds-light-saudi-views-israel-hamas-war;  “Arab Public Opinion about the Israeli War on Gaza,” Doha Institute, 10 January 2024. https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/arab-opinion-war-on-gaza-press-release-en.pdf

[ii] Much has been written on the program over the past decade. See for instance: “Gaza teens graduate from Hamas military school,” Ynet News, 24 January 2013. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4336807,00.html

and “Training Fighters of Future Across Gaza,” New York Times, 14 January 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/world/middleeast/training-fighters-of-future-across-gaza.html

[iii] For more on Hamas youth recruitment, see: “The Road to October 7: Hamas’ Long Game, Clarified,” CTC Sentinel, October/November 2023. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-road-to-october-7-hamas-long-game-clarified/; For the Houthis, see: “Yemen: Houthis Recruit More Child Soldiers Since October 7,” Human Rights Watch, 13 February 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/13/yemen-houthis-recruit-more-child-soldiers-october-7

[iv] The idea of an “Islamic Resistance” axis is not new. However, it bears distinguishing the emergent post-7 October Islamic Resistance from the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.” The latter coalesced in the early 2010s, during the fight against ISIS and in support of the Syrian regime, and at a time when Hamas was estranged from Iran and its proxies. As such, the Axis of Resistance emerged as a primarily Shia organization focused on countering Sunni extremism in Syria and Iraq (or, for the Houthis, fighting against Saudi Arabia and its Yemeni allies). Israel remained part of the discourse, but it was not the axis’s primary focus.

Image Information:

Image: Hamas supporters in Gaza, including families and children, attending the 25th anniversary of the movement’s founding, December 2012.
Source: https://media.farsnews.ir/Uploaded/Files/Images/1391/09/18/13910918213433966_PhotoL.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Names New Leader

Posted on by

Sana’a, capitol of Yemen at Night.

“Despite its decline in the Arabian Peninsula, [AQAP] remains the most effective terrorist group in Yemen, with the intent to launch attacks in the region and beyond.”

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) named a successor after the recent loss of its leader. According to the first excerpted article from the Saudi state-owned international news outlet Al Arabiya, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, aka “Abu al-Laith,” a Yemeni national, has been named the new leader of AQAP. The organization’s official, Ibrahim al-Qusi, confirmed in a broadcast recording that the group’s former leader had been killed, declaring that “Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki is the new leader of the organization in the Arabian Peninsula.”[i] The new AQAP leader, Al-Awlaki, reportedly had direct ties to former al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden and was repatriated to Yemen by Bin Laden. Al-Awlaki is reported to also have originated from the same tribe as former al-Qaeda spiritual leader Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed in 2011. There is a $6 million reward from the U.S. State Department for information about the new AQAP leader, who has “publicly called for attacks on the U.S. and its allies.” The U.S. has designated AQAP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization since 2010.[ii]

The second excerpted article from the Jeddah-based Saudi daily newspaper Okaz, provides some perspective on the current status of AQAP, as well as the potential effect of Al-Awlaki as the group’s new leader. The article notes that the al-Qaeda affiliate has struggled for a multitude of reasons, including the loss of several key leaders, financial challenges, and internal disputes that have led to structural issues. The article also states that Al-Awlaki could be a unifier for AQAP due to his extensive background in the terrorist network, experience in the al-Qaeda leadership council, and previous position as Emir in the Shabwa Province. While there has been a shift in the West to focus on great power competition with China and Russia, and persistent challenges from Iran, the ongoing threat from international terrorist organizations cannot be discounted, especially with new leaders who have openly called for attacks against the United States.[iii]

Sources:

“سعد العولقي.. من هو زعيم “القاعدة” الجديد في اليمن؟  (Saad Al-Awlaki… Who is the New Leader of Al Qaeda in Yemen),” Al Arabiya (Saudi state-owned news outlet), 11 March 2024. https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/yemen/2024/03/11/بعد-الاعلان-عن-مقتل-زعيم-تنظيم-القاعدة-من-هو-خليفته؟

Al-Qaeda in Yemen confirmed the killing of its leader, Khaled Batarfi, without going into details, announcing that his new successor is Saad Al-Awlaki. The SITE Center, which monitors terrorist media, stated that the organization’s legal official, Ibrahim al-Qusi, confirmed in a recording broadcast yesterday, Sunday, the killing of Batarfi, the organization’s leader since February 2020, declaring that “Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki is the new leader of the organization in the Arabian Peninsula.” , which the United States classifies as a terrorist…

Saad bin Atef Al-Awlaki, nicknamed “Abu Al-Laith,”… is of Yemeni nationality, and media reports indicate that he is one of those who was repatriated from Afghanistan to Yemen by the former leader of Al-Qaeda, who was killed by America in 2011, Osama bin Laden. Thus, Al-Awlaki becomes the fifth leader to publicly lead Al-Qaeda in Yemen, after working for years as the extremist organization’s second-in-command in the country.

Saad Al-Awlaki was born in the town of Al-Shu’bah in Wadi Yasbam in the Upper Egypt District in Shabwa Governorate (south). He comes from the large Al-Awalqi tribe, the same tribe from which the spiritual father of Al-Qaeda, Anwar Al-Awlaki, who was killed by an American drone in 2011, descends.

Mohamed Hefney, “خبير مصري لـ عكاظ: الخلافات تفكك تنظيم القاعدة الإرهابي في اليمن (An Egyptian expert to Okaz: Disagreements are Disintegrating the Al-Qaeda Terrorist Organization in Yemen),” Okaz (Saudi based newspaper), 13 March 2024. https://www.okaz.com.sa/news/politics/2157390

Fears are escalating within Al-Qaeda, after the killing of its fourth leader in Yemen, Khalid Batarfi, nicknamed “Abu al-Miqdad al-Kindi,” and the appointment of his successor, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, nicknamed “Abu al-Layth,” who the US administration classified in 2021 as a global terrorist, and offered a reward of $6. Millions of dollars in exchange for providing information about him.

Dr. Nabil Naeem, believes that Al-Awlaki is known for his extreme hostility toward America, and like all of his predecessors, he called for the necessity of launching attacks on the United States of America, which prompted the American administration to allocate a large financial reward to anyone who provides information about him. He stressed that Al-Qaeda in general, whether in Yemen or elsewhere, has become weak and fragile and is witnessing a major liquidation of its leaders, whether in Yemen or other countries in the region. It is not the organization that existed 20 years ago. The new leader of Al-Qaeda in Yemen faces grave challenges and priorities, including how to preserve his life and the lives of his followers from the expected physical liquidation. The Yemeni organization also faces challenges at the financial and structural levels, as the financial level is very weak. Structural level: There is a state of splits and divisions within the organization left behind by the former leader of the organization, which indicates that his death was under the direction of those close to him. Therefore, we do not rule out that the new leadership will seek to bring the terrorist organization together.Al-Awlaki is considered one of the founding leaders of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and he served as a member of the leadership council of Al-Qaeda. He was born in the 1980s. He joined the organization in 2010, and assumed the position of Emir of Shabwa Province until 2014, then he was appointed a member of the organization’s Shura Council, which is responsible for Managing operations, and he was called the second man in Al-Qaeda in Yemen.

Notes:

[i] Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was initially created in 2009 after the Saudi and Yemeni branches merged forces. The group is currently assessed to be one of the most lethal al-Qaeda affiliates. The Council on Foreign Relations published a backgrounder on AQAP, see: “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),” Council on Foreign Relations, 19 June 2015. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap

[ii] For a complete list of designated terrorist organizations by the United States Government see: “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, Accessed 12 March 2024. https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/

[iii] The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community further notes that, “Al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates on the African continent and Yemen will sustain the global network as the group maintains its strategic intent to target the United States and U.S. citizens.” The entirety of the most recent unclassified annual threat assessment issued by the United States Intelligence Community can be located here: “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 5 February 2024. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf

Image Information:

Image: Sana’a, capitol of Yemen at Night.
Source: https://openverse.org/image/c4b13d0f-5ffa-44fc-9a82-518d08dbfbc0?q=yemen Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0

Mexico’s Cartel-Related Violence Spikes as Elections Approach

Posted on by

Mexico has responded to security threats by deploying its army on the streets.

“No more than 12 hours passed between the shooting of the Morena precandidate Miguel Ángel Zavala Reyes, and the shooting of the PAN precandidate, Armando Pérez Luna.”

Mexico has long suffered high levels of violence related to its powerful drug cartels. Violence often spikes during election season, as cartels seek to elect politicians aligned with their agendas and eliminate those opposed. According to the Spanish daily El País, recent assassinations in Mexico have contributed to growing fears that the country’s upcoming elections could witness more violence than in many previous election cycles.[i] The paper reports on two mayoral candidates in the municipality of Maravatío recently assassinated within hours of one another. The article mentions that earlier in the campaign season, cartels abducted and killed a third mayoral candidate from Maravatío. This area of the country features three powerful cartels contesting territory: the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, the Michoacán Family, and the Knights Templar. According to the second excerpted article by Diario de México, which highlights the research of NGO group Data Cívica, 36 aspirants to public office or members of their families were assassinated in January and February alone.[ii] Mexico’s cartels continue to accrete power, and during election season, seek to play a primary role in the selection of candidates. While candidates for federal office receive security protection from the government, local candidates do not. In Mexico, it is often control of local candidates that proves most important for cartel operations.

Sources:

“El terror en Maravatío: asesinados dos precandidatos a la alcaldía en menos de 12 horas (Terror in Maravatío: two mayoral candidates murdered in less than 12 hours),” El País (Spanish daily with excellent regional coverage), 27 February 2024. https://elpais.com/mexico/elecciones-mexicanas/2024-02-27/el-terror-en-maravatio-asesinados-dos-precandidatos-a-la-alcaldia-en-menos-de-12-horas.html 

No more than 12 hours passed between the shooting of the Morena precandidate Miguel Ángel Zavala Reyes, and the shooting of the PAN precandidate, Armando Pérez Luna; two of the people who were seeking to become the next municipal president of Maravatío, a municipality of 80,000 inhabitants in the State of Michoacán…According to the group Data Cívica, ‘In Mexico, electoral violence has become a tool of organized crime to influence the public life of states and municipalities’…During the month of January, at least five candidates or aspirants for elected office were murdered in Mexico.

“Febrero fue letal para aspirantes a cargo de elección popular: ONG (February was lethal for candidates for popular election positions: NGO),” Diario de México (one of the country’s oldest dailies), 15 March 2024. https://www.diariodemexico.com/mi-nacion/febrero-fue-letal-para-aspirantes-cargo-de-eleccion-popular-ong   At least five candidates or aspirants for elected office were murdered in Mexico during February, bringing the total to 10 in the first two months of the year, the non-governmental organizations Data Cívica reported this Friday. The number of homicides related to political violence rises to 36 when public officials and relatives of politicians are also considered, which are detailed in the report ‘Voting between bullets’ in February.

Notes:

[i] For more information on the potential criminal realignment in Mexico’s elections, see: Parker Asmann, “Mexico’s 2024 Election Could Spark Violent Criminal Realignments,” InSight Crime, 15 January 2024, https://insightcrime.org/news/mexico-2024-election-violent-criminal-realignments/

[ii] To read more about the project to track election violence by Data Cívica, see: “Voting Between Bullets, Understanding Criminal-Electoral Violence in Mexico,” https://votar-entre-balas.datacivica.org/

Image Information:

Image: Mexico has responded to security threats by deploying its army on the streets.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/isan/3740048960 
Attribution: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 DEED.

Iraqi Shia Militia Attacks Create Atmosphere of Uncertainty

Posted on by

Photo of Al-Nujaba Movement forces (from PMF) in the Makhul Mountains of Salah al-Din province, one kilometer from the ISIL Front, 6 July 2016.

“Anxiety is rising in Iraq in general… [prompting] the faction leaders to change their tactics and movements and attempt to take stricter security measures to avoid being targeted by America.…”

Strikes and counterstrikes involving U.S. forces and so-called Iraqi “Islamic Resistance” factions of Shia militias may lead militant leaders to seek cover with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in ways that would likely strain U.S.-ISF relations. The first accompanying report, from the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed, claims that Islamic Resistance factions are seeking to safeguard their weapons from U.S. strikes by transferring them to ISF bases under Iraqi Defense Ministry control. The Islamic Resistance is a branding name used by various Iran-led militant Shia Iraqi groups, most prominently Kataib Hezbollah (KH) and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HAN).[i] These militias exert substantial influence in Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which are an appendage of the ISF akin to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[ii] As PMF units, the Islamic Resistance factions are part of the Iraqi state, but their interests and actions are rarely aligned or coordinated with those of the State apparatus writ large. Since the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel, the Islamic Resistance has conducted regular attacks on U.S. positions in Syria and Iraq. The attacks escalated in late January 2024, when an unmanned aerial vehicle attributed to KH killed three U.S. Army soldiers stationed in Jordan. In response, U.S. forces killed Abu Baqir al-Saadi, a KH official involved in planning the attacks. The strike followed an earlier one targeting a HAN leader. Both strikes occurred in Baghdad, prompting Iraqi government officials to publicly denounce them as violations of national sovereignty. Islamic Resistance and other Iraqi Shia militias in turn intensified pressure on their government to negotiate a withdrawal of U.S. troops and launch an investigation into the targeted killings. As reported in the second accompanying article, also from al-Araby al-Jadeed, KH also launched an investigation aimed at identifying and rooting out U.S. collaborators within the Islamic Resistance. As noted in the third accompanying article, from the pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, the Islamic Resistance’s attacks and threats may be used to sow distrust between the United Stats and ISF partner forces. The escalatory tit-for-tat between the Islamic Resistance and U.S. forces is ushering in an atmosphere of increasing uncertainty and distrust in Iraq, further complicating what is already a tangled and potentially volatile security environment.

Sources:

العراق: فصائل مسلحة تضغط لنقل مستودعات أسلحتها إلى قواعد الجيش لتجنّب القصف الأميركي

“Iraq: Armed factions are pressing to transfer their weapons depots to army bases to avoid American bombing,” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 6 January 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B6%D8%BA%D8%B7-%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4

Today, Sunday, Iraqi security sources in Baghdad revealed to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense was under pressure to transfer ammunition depots belonging to armed factions to Iraqi army bases and camps to prevent them from being targeted in the future by American aircraft.

العراق: تحقيقات سرية بحثاً عن “متعاونين” مع واشنطن بتنفيذ عمليات الاغتيال “Iraq: Secret investigations in search of “collaborators” with Washington in carrying out the assassination operations,” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 11 February 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B0-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA

The source told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, on condition that his name not be mentioned, that “the accuracy of choosing the targets and the accuracy of carrying out the assassination operations indicated the presence of a dangerous infiltration and collaborators who provided accurate information to Washington to carry out its strikes”… 

Anxiety is rising in Iraq in general, and among the factions in particular, which fear assassinations and other strikes that may be carried out by the United States of America, whose drones roam the skies of Baghdad on an almost daily basis. This has prompted the faction leaders to change their tactics and movements and attempt to take stricter security measures to avoid being targeted by America.

عزل أميركي للعراقيين خشية «الاختراق»: المقاومة تضمّ «السفارة» إلى بنك الأهداف “American isolation of the Iraqis for fear of ‘infiltration’: The resistance includes the ‘embassy’ in the target bank,” al-Akhbar (pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily), 9 February 2024. https://al-akhbar.com/Palestine/374023

…an Iraqi military official from the security crews residing inside the Ain al-Assad base (west of Baghdad), in an interview with Al-Akhbar, recounts his observations. Since the beginning of the base being subjected to missile strikes, he said, “The American forces have dealt with us with constant caution, and have their own security protocol in terms of inspecting all those entering and leaving the base. But after the recent attacks, it increased its measures in a way that we did not witness even two years ago, when Iran bombed the base with a large number of ballistic missiles”…

He explains that “the American side deals with the Iraqi side with suspicion in terms of exchanging information, for fear of it being leaked to parties linked to the armed factions.” 

Notes:

[i] Of the two, HAN has been by far the most hardline and active member of the “Islamic Resistance” since 7 October. See: “Who Are Nujaba and Why Did the U.S. Just Strike Them?” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 4 January 2024. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-are-nujaba-and-why-did-us-just-strike-them In late January, KH vowed to suspend attacks against the United States. HAN, in contrast, vowed to continue its attacks. See: “Explaining Apparent Muqawama De-Escalation Since January 28,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7 February 2024. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/explaining-apparent-muqawama-de-escalation-january-28

[ii] “KH operates the state-funded 45th, 46th, and 47th Brigades of the PMF. Chain of command nominally runs through the KH-dominated Popular Mobilization Committee in the Prime Minister’s Office. In practice, KH’s PMF brigades frequently disobey the government chain of command while legally remaining organs of the Iraqi state.” See: “Profile: Kataib Hezbollah,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 April 2021. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-kataib-hezbollah

For an up-to-date overview on Iraq’s militia landscape, see: “Iraq’s New Regime Change: How Tehran-Backed

Terrorist Organizations and Militias Captured the Iraqi State,” CTC Sentinel, December 2023. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/iraqs-new-regime-change-how-tehran-backed-terrorist-organizations-and-militias-captured-the-iraqi-state/

Image Information:

Image:  Photo of Al-Nujaba Movement forces (from PMF) in the Makhul Mountains of Salah al-Din province, one kilometer from the ISIL Front, 6 July 2016.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Harakat_Hezbollah_al-Nujaba_in_2016_(24).jpg
Attribution: Fars Media Corporation, CC BY 4.0

Mexican Truckers Protest Rise in Cartel’s Cargo Theft

Posted on by

A port of entry on the U.S.-Mexico border, where most Mexican truckers are bound with their cargo.

“49 assaults on cargo drivers in Mexico are recorded daily, situations that not only put their physical integrity at risk but, in some cases, have resulted in fatal tragedies.”

Since the beginning of Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s presidential term in 2018, 85,000 trucks have been targeted for cargo theft by transnational criminal organizations operating in Mexico.[i] In protest, truckers organized a national strike blocking highways around the country. According to the first excerpted article in the business-focused daily El Financiero, truckers have demanded an action plan from the Ministry of Interior, as well as greater protection from Mexico’s National Guard. According to the article, an average of 49 truckers per day are subject to hijacking, kidnapping, and even murder, while their trucks are seized by criminal groups, emptied for content, and stripped and sold for parts. The second excerpted article in digital news platform Eje Central notes that cargo thefts now cost companies $400,000,000 per year. With this pressure, the Mexican government has acknowledged truckers’ insecurity and committed to reinforcing highway security with 2,000 new patrols, 620 National Guard units, and 800 more Interior Ministry agents. The rise in cargo theft and truck hijackings in Mexico displays a concerning shift in the behavior of transnational criminal organizations. Whereas previously groups exercised territorial control to dominate drug and human trafficking routes, cargo theft has become one of the rising sources of cartel income derived from the loss of territorial control by the Mexican government, especially in rural areas.[ii]

Sources:

“Paro Nacional de Transportistas ‘sigue en pie:’ En estas carreteras hay protestas hoy 5 de febrero (National Strike of Transporters ‘still standing:’ There are protests on these roads today, February 5),” El Financiero (business daily), 5 February 2024. https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/2024/02/05/paro-nacional-de-transportistas-sigue-en-pie-en-estas-carreteras-se-movilizan-hoy-5-de-febrero/

The drivers of heavy vehicles confirmed that their mobilization is still ‘on’ and they will concentrate in various parts of the country this Monday, February 5…about 150,000 drivers are expected to participate…the Security Ministry agreed to the installation of a dialogue to continue the conciliation work and thereby reach agreements regarding the demands of the transporters, who ask for solutions on the issue of extortion and the insecurity they suffer in their daily work…According to the members of the blockade, 49 assaults on cargo drivers in Mexico are recorded daily, situations that not only put their physical integrity at risk but, in some cases, have resulted in fatal tragedies. Cargo drivers mainly demand safety guarantees to carry out their daily operations without putting their lives at risk.

“Transportistas levantan protesta contra inseguridad en carreteras de México (Transporters raise protest against insecurity on Mexican roads),” Eje Central (digital news platform), 15 February 2024. https://www.ejecentral.com.mx/transportistas-levantan-protesta-contra-inseguridad-en-carreteras-de-mexico/ The union agreed with the government of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to increase surveillance on the main roads.The Ministry of the Interior indicated in a statement that security would be reinforced with 2,000 new patrols and 620 National Guard troops. In addition, he added that 800 more agents will join in July. Thefts from cargo transportation cost more than 7 billion pesos each year, according to the Confederation of Industrial Chambers of Mexico.

Notes:

[i] For more information on cargo thefts and their impact on Mexico’s economic performance, see: Ryan C. Berg, “Will Mexico’s Insecurity Scuttle Its Nearshoring Moment?,” in Bringing Supply Chains Back to Mexico, Center for Strategic & International Studies, pgs. 24-26 October 2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/bringing-supply-chains-back-mexico

[ii] For estimates on the loss of the government’s territorial control in Mexico, see: “AMLO has adopted a passive attitude towards cartels,” The Yucatan Times, 28 April 2021, https://www.theyucatantimes.com/2021/04/amlo-has-adopted-a-passive-attitude-towards-cartels-chris-landau/

Image Information:

Image: A port of entry on the U.S.-Mexico border, where most Mexican truckers are bound with their cargo.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/36205567@N07/7314437264
Attribution: CC BY 2.0.

Houthis’ Red Sea Attacks Not Only Motivated by Gaza

Posted on by

Yemen map showing major population centers as well as parts of neighboring countries and the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

“The preparation of the naval force comes in light of the enemy mercenaries’ relinquishing of national sovereignty, and their exposing the country’s sovereign oil, gas and fishery resources to unprecedented plunder…”

While recent naval attacks by Yemen’s Ansarallah group—better known as the Houthis—have been justified as being in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, Ansarallah’s build-up of capabilities to engage in an anti-access naval campaign was motivated by domestic concerns that predate Israel’s operations against Hamas in Gaza. Beginning on 19 October, Ansarallah began targeting primarily commercial vessels in the Red Sea using unmanned aerial vehicles, ballistic missiles, and anti-ship cruise missiles. The majority of these weapons were shot down by ships from the USS Gerald Ford Carrier Strike Group.[i] These attacks were concurrent with other attacks carried out by Iranian allies, all presented as in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza and as part of a coordinated anti-Israel response by members of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”—Hezbollah in Lebanon, “Islamic Resistance” militias in Iraq, and Ansarallah in Yemen. According to the accompanying excerpt from the official Yemeni daily 26 September, Ansarallah leaders have justified their buildup of anti-ship capabilities as motivated by their adversaries “exposing the country’s sovereign oil, gas and fishery resources to unprecedented plunder” and their attempts to “expand and control the most important strategic ports and islands, such as Socotra and Mayun [also known as Perim Island].” From Ansarallah’s perspective, its domestic adversaries—both the Saudi-backed Internationally Recognized Government and the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council—have used the early 2022 UN-brokered truce in Yemen to tighten control over resources and strategic locations on Yemen’s coastline with foreign assistance and complicity.[ii] In August 2023, a few months before hostilities broke out in Gaza, Ansarallah officials threatened to sink two oil tankers seeking to transport Yemeni oil for export from ports in the Gulf Aden under the control of Ansarallah’s domestic opponents. Ansarallah’s position vis-à-vis Red Sea shipping prior to 7 October, per the article, was “to encourage international navigation through the [Bab El Mandab] Strait provided that it does not harm the sovereignty, unity, security or independence of the Republic.” Thus, while Ansarallah’s attacks on shipping vessels transiting Bab El Mandab are—at least rhetorically—linked to Israel’s invasion of Gaza, they should also be understood as a deliberate effort by the group to assert control over the entirety of Yemen’s territorial waters and internationalize the struggle for control of Yemen’s resources and strategic locations.

Sources:

“قدرات اليمن في حماية البحار والمياه الوطنية  Yemeni capabilities for protecting national seas and waterways,” 26 September (official Yemeni daily), 25 September 2023. https://www.26sep.net/index.php/local/64705-2023-09-25-05-09-57

”We were in a raging war with two ships coming to the port of Aden to plunder Yemeni gas, and they retreated four times, most recently yesterday. We informed the companies that owned the ships ‘Sinmar Jane’ and ‘Bolivar’ that we would strike them if they entered to loot gas from the port of Aden, and they are ready to do so. A few days earlier, President Al-Mashat vowed to ‘target the military bases of the Saudi-Emirati coalition forces on the Yemeni islands.’ At that time, he concurred with the Chief of Staff of the Naval Forces and Coastal Defense, Brigadier General Mansour Ahmed Al-Saadi, ‘on the level of qualitative armament that the naval forces now possess, which enables them to confront the enemy with all merit and ability, and allows them to meet the challenges…”


The Minister of Defense, Major General Muhammad Nasser Al-Atifi, had previously confirmed that maritime security of Yemeni territorial waters would be a priority in the next stage…

The preparation of the naval force comes in light of the enemy mercenaries’ relinquishing of national sovereignty, and their exposing the country’s sovereign oil, gas and fishery resources to unprecedented plunder. Alongside this organized plunder are the occupation’s efforts to expand and control the most important strategic ports and islands, such as Socotra and Mayun. It was necessary for the Yemeni armed forces to carry out their duty to protect the territorial waters and the sovereign wealth of oil, gas and fisheries from the dangers coming from the coalition of aggressors and their mercenaries from inside and outside the country, and to prepare themselves as a deterrent weapon for all these ambitions. Regarding freedom of international navigation in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the position of the Republic of Yemen is specific and clear, which is to encourage international navigation through the Strait provided that it does not harm the sovereignty, unity, security or independence of the Republic.

Notes:

[i] For details on Ansarallah’s naval arsenal, see: “A Maritime Menace: The Houthi Navy,” Oryx Blog, 2 January 2023. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2023/01/a-maritime-menace-houthi-navy.html; “Houthis Showcase Large Arsenal Of Missiles, Drones At Sana’a Military Parade,” MEMRI, 21 September 2023. https://www.memri.org/tv/houthis-showcase-large-arsenal-missiles-drones-military-parade; “Under Fire in the Bab al-Mandab: Houthi Military Capabilities and U.S. Response Options,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 8 December 2023. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/under-fire-bab-al-mandab-houthi-military-capabilities-and-us-response-options;“Houthi anti-ship missile systems: getting better all the time,” IISS, 4 January 2024. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/01/houthi-anti-ship-missile-systems-getting-better-all-the-time/ For details on Ansarallah’s anti-ship ballistic missiles, see: “We Might Have Just Seen the World’s First Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Attack,” Popular Mechanics, 1 December 2023. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a45964460/first-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-attack-houthi-rebels/

[ii] For more on control over Socotra, see: Lucas Winter, “Regional Friction Over Yemen’s Socotra Island,” OE Watch, June 2018. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-17883-00-00-00-27-93-72/2018_2D00_06_2D00_01-Regional-Friction-Over-Yemen_1920_s-Socotra-Island-_2800_Winter_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true; For more on control over Yemen’s Arabian Sea ports, see: Lucas Winter, “Saudis Seek Pathway to the Arabian Sea,” OE Watch, October 2018. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-17883-00-00-00-26-69-08/2018_2D00_10_2D00_01-Saudis-Seek-Pathway-to-the-Arabian-Sea-_2800_Winter_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true

Image Information:

Image:  Yemen map showing major population centers as well as parts of neighboring countries and the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
Source: CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/yemen/map
Attribution: Public Domain

Rising Violence Prompts Ecuador To Declare “Internal Armed Conflict”

Posted on by

Noboa, the youngest president in Ecuador’s history, faces a crisis of insecurity.

“President Daniel Noboa issued…an executive decree that reforms the current state of emergency and recognizes the existence of an ‘internal armed conflict.’”

Ecuador has been reeling from a dramatic increase in homicides over the past four years as gangs have evolved into transnational criminal organizations linked to Mexico’s drug cartels.[i]. The country’s homicide rate rose from 6.7 per 100,000 citizens in 2019 to an estimated 45 per 100,000 in 2023.[ii] In a recent 48-hour period, two notorious gang leaders escaped prison, gangs laid siege to the University of Guayaquil, and one group stormed a live news broadcast, televising the bedlam for nearly 20 minutes before cutting the transmission, reports center-left Argentine news outlet Clarín. In response to this spate of violence, the recently elected Noboa government declared a state of emergency. However, the continued threat posed by multiple criminal groups has led Noboa to dramatically increase the sense of urgency, declaring instead an “internal armed conflict.” This empowered the nation’s armed forces to enforce a 60-day curfew and restore domestic security, according to Ecuadorian digital news outlet Primicias. The decree enumerated nearly two dozen armed groups and classified them as domestic terrorist organizations, the outlet says. Noboa is only a few months into his term, following a presidential campaign that featured the assassination at the hands of criminal groups of Fernando Villavicencio, a popular anticorruption candidate.[iii] To complement his presidential decree, Noboa announced a package of increased measures, including the construction of additional maximum-security prisons and the expropriation of criminal assets. The effectiveness of these measures bears watching throughout 2024 to see if Ecuador follows down a similar path as El Salvador or continues to spiral down into criminality and violence.

Sources:

“Súplicas de ‘no me maten’ y una granada en el bolsillo: así tomó en vivo un grupo narco el canal de televisión en Ecuador (Pleas of ‘don’t kill me’ and a grenade in the pocket: this is how a drug group took over a television channel in Ecuador live),” Clarín (Argentina’s oldest outlet that is generally considered center left), 9 January 2024. https://www.clarin.com/mundo/grupo-armado-irrumpio-transmision-vivo-canal-television-ecuador_0_0okSuT5tJC.html

An armed group stormed the live broadcast of a television channel in Ecuador, threatening those who were in charge of the programming with guns and weapons of war. There were also violent episodes at the University of Guayaquil and on commercial premises…the security forces stated only two hours after the assault that they were able to recover the taken buildings.

“Noboa declara conflicto armado interno y dispone la salida de militares (Noboa declares internal armed conflict and orders the departure of soldiers),” Primicias (a digital news outlet based in the capital, Quito) 9 January 2024. https://www.primicias.ec/noticias/politica/noboa-conflicto-armado-interno-militares/President Daniel Noboa issued…an executive decree that reforms the current state of emergency and recognizes the existence of an ‘internal armed conflict.’ Therefore, it provides for the immediate mobilization and intervention of the Armed Forces and the Police in the national territory. The decree was issued minutes after armed attackers took over the TC Television facilities and broadcast live. This new decree establishes the identification of…organized crime groups as ‘terrorist organizations and belligerent non-state actors.’

Notes:

[i] Previous governments, unable to stem the growth in criminal potency, have issued pleas to the international community for a “Plan Ecuador,” akin to the wide-ranging security assistance plan and social makeover that helped save Colombia from similar threats in the 1990s and 2000s. For more information, see: Ryan Berg “President Lasso Calls for ‘Plan Ecuador’ Amid Growing Security Concerns,” OE Watch, 12-2021. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-21393-00-00-00-40-08-49/2021_2D00_12_2D00_01-President-Lasso-Calls-for-_1C20_Plan-Ecuador_1D20_-Amid-_2800_Berg_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true

[ii] For more information on rising homicide figures in Ecuador, see: “How Ecuador Became Latin America’s Deadliest Country,” The Economist, 10 January 2024. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2024/01/10/how-ecuador-became-latin-americas-deadliest-country

[iii] For more on Villavicencio, see: Ryan Berg, “Presidential Candidate Assassination Shows New Depths of Ecuador’s Insecurity,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/presidential-candidate-assassination-shows-new-depths-of-ecuadors-insecurity/

Image Information:

Image: Noboa, the youngest president in Ecuador’s history, faces a crisis of insecurity. Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/presidenciaecuador/53367780040/  
Attribution: Flickr, PDM 1.0 DEED

Pakistan Deporting Approximately 1.7 Million Undocumented Afghanis in Response to Terrorist Attacks

Posted on by

Flag of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

“Suppose that the Pakistani government succeeds in deporting all Afghan refugees, will terrorism be eradicated? Obviously not.”

Pakistan continues to struggle with a series of terror attacks, leading the government to resort to mass deportations of Afghan refugees to curb the violence. According to the first excerpted article from the Pashto-language version of the German media company Deutsche Welle, terrorists carried out four separate attacks in Pakistan between 3 and 6 November 2023. The attacks, in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Balochistan provinces, resulted in the deaths of 17 soldiers, five civilians, with another 24 wounded. The article notes that ten militants were killed in response, and “security forces have received Afghan ID cards from six of the militants killed in the Zhob [Balochistan] attack.” Amid rising tensions due to the ongoing acts of terrorism, the regional government of the Balochistan province alleged that both border nations, Iran and Afghanistan, were involved in recent attacks to increase political pressure on Pakistan. No evidence was provided to substantiate these allegations. Pakistan’s proposed solution to counter the ongoing violence inside its borders includes the deportation of approximately 1.7 million undocumented Afghanis, some of whom have lived in Pakistan for up to 40 years, according to the second excerpt from the independent Afghan news outlet Hasht e Subh. As of December 2023, over 400,000 have left Pakistan.[i] A majority of the remaining refugees currently reside in either the Balochistan or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces that border Afghanistan.[ii] The article notes that Pakistan has not been able to successfully contain the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP)) and has frequently accused the Afghan refugee population of collaborating with the TTP. The article alleges that the Pakistani military has used both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban to further its own geopolitical agenda when convenient. Some Afghan refugees allege that the Pakistani government is committing acts of terrorism by expelling them from the land. A mass deportation of a long-standing population may also lead to an increase in grievances by that community and possibly increased support for the TTP and other like-minded groups, resulting in additional terrorist attacks.[iii] The mass expulsion of undocumented refugees has already created a burden on both the Afghan and Pakistani governments from an economic and human rights perspective.

Sources:

“پاکستان: په ۴۸ ساعتونو کې وسله والو ۴ بریدونه کړي دي (Pakistan: Militants have carried out 4 attacks in 48 hours),” Deutsche Welle (German news site), 6 November 2023. https://p.dw.com/p/4YRJH

According to security sources, militants carried out another attack in The Dera Ismail Khan district of Khyber Pakhtounkhwa yesterday, but this is the fourth attack on Pakistani security forces in the past 48 hours. Last night, police raided a police checkpoint in Ismail Khan district with heavy weapons. The exchange between the police and the armed forces lasted about half an hour, but the militants eventually fled. Police say they have cordoned off the area and are searching for suspected attackers. In the past three days, terrorists have carried out major attacks in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtounkhwa, Punjab and Balochistan provinces, killing 17 security forces, five civilians and wounding about 24 others, including police. Police claimed to have killed 10 people in the attack.

In recent days, attacks in different parts of Pakistan have increased. In the wake of the latest incidents, Balochistan’s regional government has claimed that two neighbouring countries are involved in the terrorist attacks because they want to pressure Pakistan. Balochistan’s Acting Information Minister, Jan Achakzai, told a news conference on Sunday that Pakistan was facing attacks “on both sides” but that it could not undermine the government’s will to defeat terrorists. He claimed that security forces had obtained identification cards from six of the militants killed in the attack. John Achakzai accused India of spreading insecurity in the region and that India’s intelligence agency, “Ro” is “involved in terrorist attacks in Pakistan.” Referring to the two terrorist attacks last week, he said: “We have repeatedly mentioned that India is involved in the terrorist attacks in the country, especially in Balochistan.”

“د کډوالو په اېستلو سره په پاکستان کې ترهګري له منځه نه ځي (Terrorism in Pakistan will not disappear by expelling refugees)” Hasht e Subh (independent Afghan news site), 5 November 2023. https://8am.media/ps/terrorism-in-pakistan-will-not-disappear-by-expelling-refugees/

The interim government of Pakistan has started deporting Afghan refugees en masse, which has provoked widespread protests. The interim prime minister of Pakistan has emphasized that all those illegal Afghan refugees who have been living in Pakistan for the past 40 years will be deported. This move has deepened the crisis which is not new for the Afghans and they have been dealing with it for decades. With the rule of the Taliban, the crisis of immigration has not decreased, but has expanded and increased… This has caused citizens to move to neighboring countries. This is not the only result of the arrival of the Taliban. The strengthening of terrorist groups and the development of their activities is also one of the destructive consequences of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan… The government of Pakistan, which is unable to control the TTP and has not given the desired result to the pressure on the Afghan Taliban to suppress this group, has increased the pressure on the Afghan refugees and accuses the Afghan refugees of terrorist attacks… There is no doubt that the Taliban is involved in many terrorist attacks in Pakistan and will continue to be in the future. But it cannot be that all Afghan refugees are considered terrorists or collaborators of terrorists and the solution is to seek their deportation. In reality, Afghan refugees have not only played an important role in the growth and strengthening of terrorism, but are considered the primary victims of the development of terrorist groups’ activities.

The terrorism that the government of Pakistan is using to expel Afghan refugees from their land today is the result of the deadly game that the soldiers of this country have skillfully played for years and the result was full of benefits for them. Thanks to the terrorist industry managed by the Pakistani army, the people of this country have not seen a stable civilian government and the army has control over all affairs. Terrorism is actually a pretense through which the soldiers introduce themselves as the saviors of Pakistan. If they are not there, the country will become food for wolves… It is not yet clear whether the TTP, as well as the Afghan Taliban, have really escaped the control of the Pakistani army or not; But what can’t be doubted is that the main threat to Pakistan is the soldiers, or to put it bluntly, the managers of the terrorist industry, not the Afghan refugees or the Pashtuns of this country. The Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line are the main victims of terrorism trained by the Pakistan Army.In the last few decades, one of the important tasks of the religious seminaries established in Pakistan with the support of the army was the training of the hard-line jihadi generation, who as proxy soldiers of the ESA during the invasion of the Soviet Union and also during the presence of the American forces in Afghanistan, the Pakistani army overthrew the western-backed government in Afghanistan and established its own proxy regime in the country. But now that the jihad in Afghanistan is over, according to the terrorists, how and where will the thousands of jihadists trained in the religious schools of Pakistan quench their thirst for jihad… Suppose that the Pakistani government succeeds in deporting all Afghan refugees, will terrorism be eradicated? Obviously not. The main supporter of terrorism in Pakistan is the army, which is in control of the entire country, and thus, the main source of terrorism in Pakistan is religious madrassas, which continue to operate whether they are children of Afghan refugees or not. and the army does not care about them. Are only Afghans committing suicide attacks? No. Pakistanis are ahead of Afghans in terrorism and extremism…

Notes:

[i] A supplemental report by the Associated Press detailing recent updates in the deportation of undocumented Afghanis in Pakistan: Sattar, Abdul and Munir Ahmed. “A Pakistani province aims to deport 10,000 Afghans a day,” Associated Press, November 30, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-baluchistan-deport-migrants-afghans-7393238ace4c49acce9d7c77ebd708bf

[ii] For additional information on Afghan refugees in Pakistan, please visit the United Nations Refugee data website: “Registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan” United Nations Operational Data Portal. https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/pak

[iii] To learn more about the potential impact of grievances and their effect on terrorism globally, see:

Murphy, Natalie. “Why Grievances Matter: An Analysis of the Influence Grievances Have on Domestic Terrorism Globally,” Johns Hopkins University, [Thesis] May 2022. https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/0f722198-6850-4d16-8250-5fcad421430b/content

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_Tehrik-i-Taliban_Pakistan.png#globalusage
Attribution: Public Domain