Tag Archives: Syria

The Radical Transformation of Syria’s Military Leadership

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Mugshot of Syrian militant Abu Mohammad al-Jolani after his 2006 capture by U.S. forces in Iraq. In December 2024, al-Jolani became the de facto leader of Syria. 

“[O]f the nearly fifty officers who were promoted on Sunday to be supervisors of the establishment of the new army, more than ten of them do not have Syrian nationality.”

After decades of Ba’athist, secular ideology, and Alawite leadership, the Syrian military’s upper echelons are undergoing a radical transformation steered by the one-time Sunni rebels of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).[i] As widely reported in Arabic-language media and discussed in the first accompanying article, from the Lebanese daily al-Nahar, these moves have “raised widespread doubts and fears.” HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) is now the de facto leader of the Syrian armed forces, by virtue of his command over the HTS-led “Military Operations Department” that seized power in Damascus in December 2024. In late December, al-Sharaa issued a decree promoting several HTS and allied commanders to top ranks in the new Syrian military. The list of promotions was headlined by two HTS military leaders who were given the rank of Major General, one of whom—Murhaf abu Qasra—was appointed as defense minister and the other—Ali Nur al-Din al-Naasan—as armed forces chief of staff. Both hail from Tabyat al-Imam, a Sunni town on the outskirts of the city of Hama.[ii] In addition, five leaders were promoted to Brigadier General, three of whom are non-Syrian nationals who were part of foreign jihadist groups that supported the 2010s Syrian armed uprising.[iii]

The promotion of foreign one-time jihadists to top leadership posts in the Syrian Army has “shocked the Syrian street,” according to the al-Nahar piece. Notably absent from the promotions list are former Assad regime officers who defected to form the Free Syrian Army in 2012, as well as leaders from the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, the Kurdish-led, U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, and armed factions from southern Syria. The dominance of HTS cadres within the new military establishment, as noted in the second accompanying article from the Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, seems likely to create a rift between HTS and other opposition armed groups, perhaps most importantly the southern militias. Although al-Sharaa has voiced his intention to create a unified national army, his initial actions suggest an effort to consolidate power within HTS and its allies before other factions are incorporated into the armed forces.

Sources:

الجولاني يشكّل قيادة جيشه… خليط من أنصاره بينهم عرب وتركستان في رتب رفيعة”


(Al-Jolani sets up his military leadership…a mixture of his supporters, including Arabs and Turkestanis in high ranks),” al-Nahar (Lebanese daily), 31 December 2024. https://www.annahar.com/arab-world/arabian-levant/183813/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%A9


While the commander of the military operations department in Syria, Ahmad al-Sharaa (al-Jolani), seemed to be in no hurry to draft a new constitution for the country and hold elections, he is, on the contrary, moving at a rapid pace to restructure the security services and the Syrian military institution. This has raised widespread doubts and fears about his priorities and the reality of their goals, and whether they are related to actually imposing security and safety or point to the desire to impose the pillars of the new rule through newly established security and military institutions that will not change after the elections, which al-Sharaa said may not be held for four years. What reinforced the fears is that out of the nearly fifty officers who were promoted on Sunday to be supervisors of the establishment of the new army, more than ten of them do not have Syrian nationality…


Speaking to Al Arabiya on Sunday, Al Sharaa confirmed that the upcoming Syrian National Conference will witness several measures, including the dissolution of armed factions and the cancellation of the current constitution. This raised many constitutional questions about the extent to which Sharaa has the authority to make such a decision, given that some argue that promoting officers under the current constitution requires the issuance of a presidential decree…


In terms of regionalism, it was noted that Sharaa relied on officers from Hama to assume the highest ranks (Major General), as well as the Minister of Defense, Marhaf Abu Qasra, and the Chief of the General Staff, Ali Nour al-Din al-Naasan. As for the Brigadier General ranks, which are five, there were only two Syrians among them… The remaining brigadiers are of different nationalities: Abdul Aziz Daoud Khodaberdi, known as Abu Muhammad al-Turkistani, is the leader of the “Turkistani Islamic Party” wing that pledged allegiance to al-Jolani in the past. The second wing is “Foreigners of Turkistan.” Abdul Rahman Hussein al-Khatib is Jordanian and was known in Syria as Abu Hussein al-Urduni. The third brigadier is Omar Muhammad Jaftshi, one of the most prominent military leaders close to Ahmad al-Sharaa. He worked in complete secrecy without revealing his identity and was known by the nickname Mukhtar al-Turki. 42 officers were promoted to the rank of colonel, including several names belonging to non-Syrian nationalities such as Albanian (Abdul Samriz Yashari), Egyptian (Alaa Muhammad Abdul Baqi), Jordanian (Abnian Ahmad al-Hariri), and Tajik (Molan Tarson Abdul Samad). Among these names are a large number who have no military background, but were ordinary civilians before they participated in the fighting against the former regime…


The Syrian street was overwhelmed by feelings of real shock when this formation was issued due to the reliance on different nationalities in building an army that is supposed to be national. However, the supporters of “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” justified this by saying that the decision to naturalize these people with Syrian nationality will be issued soon, as al-Sharaa promised in previous statements.

دمج الفصائل السورية متعثّر: الشرع يسير في حقل ألغام”

(The Integration of Syrian faction falters: Sharaa treading in a minefield),” al-Akhbar (pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily), 11 January 2025. https://www.al-akhbar.com/arab/819090/%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AB%D8%B1–%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%85

The commander of the Military Operations Department, which currently runs Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is walking through a minefield that was planted and nurtured over the past 14 years of war…
Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the arrival of the factions to Damascus, the signs of a rift have clearly emerged between the faction that entered Damascus first (the Eighth Brigade and the coalition of opposition factions in southern Syria led by Ahmed al-Awda), and the man who rose to the top of the political and military scene in Syria, namely al-Sharaa…

Notes:

[i] For the approximately five decades of Assad family rule starting in the 1970s, the Syrian Armed Forces were ideologically linked to the Baath Party, which espoused Arab nationalism and secularism. The military’s top leadership posts were filled by members of the minority Alawite sect, to which the Assad family belongs.

[ii] The city of Hama has deep historical significance to the struggle between the Assad-era armed forces and Sunni rebels, as the site of a major uprising that was violently suppressed in the early 1980s. See: “Why the rebel capture of Syria’s Hama, a city with a dark history, matters,” AP, 5 December 2024. https://apnews.com/article/syria-aleppo-hama-massacre-assad-799f37fd2608532a253cccb48df4e613

[iii] Of the three foreigners, one is Jordanian, one Turkish and the other a member of the Turkistan Islamic Party, which advocates for Uyghur independence from China. Based on statements made by al-Sharaa, it seems likely they and other foreign fighters will be granted Syrian nationality in the future. For more see: Lucas Winter, “The Knotted Future of the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria,” OE Watch, January 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/302489

Image Information:

Image: Mugshot of Syrian militant Abu Mohammad al-Jolani after his 2006 capture by U.S. forces in Iraq. In December 2024, al-Jolani became the de facto leader of Syria. 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mugshot_of_Abu_Mohammad_al-Jolani.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Revolutionary Guard Chief Downplays Departure From Syria

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IRGC commander-in-chief Hossein Salami speaking in the wake of Bashar al-Assad regime collapse.

“Some in political, intellectual, and public circles are promoting that the military of the Islamic Republic of Iran has lost its regional arms. No, the system has not lost its arms. We make decisions and act based on our internal capacities and capabilities to fight the infidels.”

The fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria is a major blow to Tehran, but Iranian officials are not taking the blame. Per reporting by state broadcaster Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), on 10 December 2024, just days after Assad’s overthrow, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander-in-chief Hossein Salami told a gathering of fellow commanders that “Some in political, intellectual, and the public circles are promoting that the military of the Islamic Republic of Iran has lost its regional arms. No, the system has not lost its arms,” referring to its proxies in Lebanon, Syria, and the Gaza Strip known as the Resistance Axis.[i] He added, “We make decisions and act based on our internal capacities and capabilities to fight the infidels.”[ii]

Salami seemed to cast blame on the Assad regime’s military and political apparatus for not heeding their warnings months before about the movements of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and other anti-regime groups. Salami, who said the IRGC tried its best to preserve the regime, also justified why the IRGC did not intervene: “Some expected us to fight instead of the Syrian Army. Is it logical that we involve all the IRGC and basij in a battle of another country when the army of that country is just a spectator?” Still, Salami was proud to note that the IRGC was the last to leave Syria. Interestingly, he compared Hezbollah in Lebanon to Assad, noting how the militant group was able to survive the events of recent months—the Israeli onslaught, twin communication attacks, and the assassination of its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.

The commander-in-chief appeared to not give up on Syria and the Resistance Axis. He explained, “It is not that all paths are limited to Syria. It is also possible that there, too, little by little, it will take a different shape again.” While much of the Resistance Axis has crumbled, the IRGC is not giving up on its project of exporting the Islamic revolution abroad and is merely readjusting its security strategy to the post-October 7 world. [iii]

Sources:

“سردار سلامی: بچه‌های سپاه تا لحظه آخر در سوریه بودند (Commander Salimi: The children of the IRGC were in Syria until the last moment),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 12 December 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00ITrZ.

According to IRIB, the commander-in-chief of the IRGC, on Tuesday, 10 December 2024, in a gathering of IRGC commanders, explained the causes and consequences of recent security and military events in Syria, highlighting the most important parts as follows:

Some expected us to fight instead of the Syrian army. Is it logical that we involve all of the IRGC and basij in a battle of another country when the army of that country is just a spectator? Furthermore, all the routes to Syria were closed. Day and night, the system really attempted to help in any way it could. We have to live with the realities of Syria. We see the realities, and we act on the facts. However, let me proudly tell all of you this: The last people in the line of resistance in Syria who left were IRGC folks. The last person who left this battlefield was a guard. Strategies must change according to circumstances. We cannot address many global and regional issues with stagnation and stability in strategies.

From months before, we were aware of the movements of militants and takfiris (referring to Jihadists). Even our brothers were able to use intelligence tactics to find their axes of attack and transfer them to the political and military levels in Syria. However, because there was no will to change, fighting and perseverance did not exist in their true sense; unfortunately, this incident you saw took place. In contrast, look at Hezbollah, which has been able to pull itself out from under the heavy rubble of bombings and was able to find hope in strength in a truly unbelievable scene.

We thank God Almighty that the resistance front has become independent from our geography. Hezbollah still exists, it’s alive, it’s vibrant. The face of the Zionist regime (referring to Israel) is now met with political hatred in the world. These are major defeats in any form…

Some in political, intellectual, and the public circles are promoting that the military of the Islamic Republic of Iran has lost its regional arms. No, the system has not lost its arms. We make decisions and act based on our internal capacities and capabilities to fight the infidels. We have a strong political logic to fight, we have a strong legitimacy to defend. We have a great nation to stand firm. We have a great leader to provide guidance and inspiration. We have powerful armed forces. They have not been touched. If we had become weakened, we would not have fulfilled our honest promises.

Now, the paths are open to back the resistance front. It is not that all paths are limited to Syria. It is also possible that there, too, little by little it will take a different shape again.

Notes:

[i] The Axis of Resistance is a self-described informal coalition of Iranian supported militias and political organizations across the Middle East. The Axis includes Hamas in Gaza, the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon; the Houthi movement in Yemen; and various Shi’ite armed groups in Iraq and Syria. See: “What is Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’?” Reuters (global news service), 13 April 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-irans-axis-resistance-which-groups-are-involved-2024-01-29/; Lucas Winter, “Gaza War’s Impact on the Middle East Strategic Landscape,” FMSO, June 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/gaza-wars-impact-on-the-middle-east-strategic-landscape-lucas-winterjune-2024/

[ii] The comments were made as many Iranian officials and the public alike began to question the merits of having spent more than a decade propping up the Assad regime financially—between $30 to $50 billion—and materially with weapons, training, and troops. See: “‘Iran was Defeated Very Badly’ in Syria a Top General Admits,” The New York Times, 8 January 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/08/world/middleeast/iran-general-syria-defeat.html

[iii] “Iran has no regrets over Syria costs, says national security chief,” Iran International, 20 December 2024. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202412207613.

Image Information:

Image: IRGC commander-in-chief Hossein Salami speaking in the wake of Bashar al-Assad regime collapse.
Source: Semi-official Islamic Republic News Agency, 12 December 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00ITrZ
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Russia Suspected of Distributing Former Syrian Military Assets To Mali

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Mali recently received a number of heavy weapons from Russia including T-72B3 Main Battle Tanks, like this one on display in Moscow, circa 2017. Russia was known to have T-72B3 tanks in Syria, leading to speculation that the tanks arrived in Mali were part of Russia’s Syrian arsenal.

“The most powerful weapons of the latest generation have arrived in Mali, which will strengthen the capacity of the Malian army.”

Officially, Russia has remained silent regarding the whereabouts of its Syrian stockpile of weapons since the fall of the Assad regime. Previous reporting tracked Russian cargo planes loading military equipment, including air defense systems, arrived in Libya shortly after leaving Syria.[i] A 17 January video published by Bamako-based Mali Cap+ on its Facebook page suggests at least a portion of Russia’s Syrian arsenal is now in Mali. According to an analysis of the Mali Cap+ video by South Africa-based news aggregator DefenseWeb, the shipment, which included T-72 tanks, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-82A 8×8 armored personnel carriers, D-30 towed artillery, and a variety of armored personnel carriers, “may have come from Syria.”[ii] The Mali Cap+ journalist notes the convoy arrived from Guinea. If accurate, the convoy could have offloaded by ship to rail in the port city of Conakry. There is a railroad from Conakry to Kanan; in Kanan, the weapons could have been offloaded onto trucks before crossing into Mali.[iii] However, according to the excerpted article from French news service Le Monde, the equipment was put on trucks in Conakry and traveled by road through Siguiri before crossing the border into Mali. Notably, according to Le Monde, the weapons came from Murmansk rather than Syria—aboard two ships, the Alder and the Siyanie Severa. The Alder is operated by a company under U.S. and Western sanctions.

Mali’s military partnership with Russia has increased dramatically following a series of military takeovers of the country, the last one in 2021, and the formal withdrawal of French-led Operation Barkhane in November 2022. Russia’s Africa Corps, formerly the Wagner Group, began operating in Mali prior to the withdrawal of the last French troops. In addition to the implications of how these Russian weapons got to Mali, or how they are used, the arrival of Russian heavy weapons to Mali on 17 January further cements the relationship between Moscow and Mali’s military government.

Sources:

“Bravo Les armements les plus puiss@nts de dernière génération sont arrivés au Mali, ce qui va renforcer la capacité de l’armée malienne (Bravo the most powerful weapons of the latest generation have arrived in Mali, which will strengthen the capacity of the Malian army),” Mali Cap+ Facebook Channel, 17 January 2025. https://www.facebook.com/CapMaliPlus/videos/8603016179803509

The most powerful weapons of the latest generation have arrived in Mali, which will strengthen the capacity of the Malian army.

I think this will be the new format in the fight against terrorism.

“Russia Delivers Military Hardware to Mali,” DefenseWeb (South Africa based defense news portal covering military and security news on the African continent), 17 January 2025. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/african-news/russia-delivers-military-hardware-to-mali/?referrer=newsletter

Russia has delivered over 100 military vehicles to Mali, including tanks, trucks, and infantry fighting vehicles.

It is suspected the shipment may have come from Syria following the departure of Russian troops after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

It appears Mali could be another recipient of this equipment: on 17 January, a convoy of over 100 vehicles arrived in Mali’s capital Bamako, where it was captured on video by local media company Cap Mali+. Half the vehicles in the convoy were trucks (including armoured Kamaz trucks and engineering vehicles) and the remainder included T-72B3M tanks, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-82A 8×8 armoured personnel carriers, and Spartak, Linza, and Tiger 4×4 armoured personnel carriers. Also seen were three D-30 towed artillery pieces, two anti-aircraft cannons, and a couple of boats.

Frontelligence in its analysis of the convoy stated the vehicles were not sourced elsewhere and sold to Mali because they have Cyrillic text and Russian military markings. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD) said markings indicated the equipment had at one point been transported by rail – possibly in Russia.

…Most likely, the equipment will be distributed between the Wagner PMC units and government forces as part of strengthening the counteraction to paramilitary units in the country and terrorist organizations.”

“La Russie livre des dizaines de chars et de blindés au Mali et réorganise son dispositif militaire en Afrique (Russia Delivers Dozens of Tanks and Armored Vehicles to Mali and Reorganizes its Military Deployment in Africa),” Le Monde (major French daily), 24 January 2025. https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2025/01/24/au-mali-la-russie-procede-a-une-importante-livraison-de-blindes-et-reorganise-son-dispositif-militaire_6514120_3210.html

These Russian military vehicles were unloaded at the port of Conakry, in Guinea, before forming the convoy that took the road to Siguiri and the border with Mali. They were probably transported aboard two Russian ships. The first, the Adler, belongs to the company M Leasing LLC, placed under American and European sanctions for its role in Moscow’s military logistics.

This company is suspected of having delivered weapons from North Korea to Russia, according to the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. On December 14, 2024, the Adler left the port of Murmansk in northern Russia and headed for Conakry.

On December 21, a second Russian-flagged cargo ship, the Siyanie Severa, also left Murmansk for Guinea. The ship belongs to the Russian company OJSC Northern Shipping Company, which is also under US sanctions for transporting its country’s military equipment.

According to the records of the port of Conakry, the Adler arrived on January 8 and left on the 12th. On board, 1,182 tons of “goods.” The Siyanie Severa arrived on January 11 with 834 tons of cargo. On an Airbus satellite image that Le Monde was able to consult (but cannot publish), this second cargo ship is still visible at the quay on January 15. From Conakry, it then takes two days of driving, with such a convoy of trucks, to reach the border with Mali, via Siguiri.

Notes:

[i] “Russia Withdraws Air-Defense Systems, Other Advanced Weaponry From Syria to Libya,” The Wall Street Journal, 18 December 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-air-defense-bases-syria-libya-25810db0?st=jD59wk&reflink=article_email_share

[ii] The convoy or arms also included Russian patrol boats that can be used to patrol the important Niger River. There have been attacks on civilian boat traffic in Mali. See: “Mali: The attack against the civilian boat ‘Tombouctou’ constitutes a war crime,” International Federation for Human Rights, 12 September 2023. https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/mali/mali-the-attack-against-the-civilian-boat-tombouctou-constitutes-a

[iii] There are five major ports in Guinea including Conakry and Benti, both capable of receiving larger ships and a variety of cargo. Conakry has a roll-on roll off (ro ro) capability and a railway spur, while Benti intersects vital roadways such as the Trans-West African Coastal Highway that connects all the West African nations including the landlocked nations such as Burkina Faso. For a description of the five major ports, see: “5 Major Ports in Guinea,” Marine Insight, 22 May 2022. https://www.marineinsight.com/know-more/5-major-ports-in-guinea/

Image Information:

Image: Mali recently received a number of heavy weapons from Russia including T-72B3 Main Battle Tanks, like this one on display in Moscow, circa 2017. Russia was known to have T-72B3 tanks in Syria, leading to speculation that the tanks arrived in Mali were part of Russia’s Syrian arsenal.
Source: Vitaly V. Kuzmin, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-72 – /media/File:Alabino05042017-40.jpg
Attribution: CC By-SA 4.0

Iran Seeks To Cultivate Pakistani and Kurdish Support

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International Department of the Islamic Revolution Cultural & Research Institute unveils translations of Ali Khamenei’s book Palestine at the Tehran International Book Fair, May 10, 2024.

“Freedom fighters around the world will become familiar with the contents of this book.”

While Tehran propagating anti-Israeli vitriol is neither new nor remarkable, its choice about where to direct that propaganda does signal those people that the Iranian regime seeks to cultivate as allies. As reported by Dolat.ir, a government information center, the high-profile annual Tehran International Book Fair recently featured an updated collection of Khamenei’s writings and speeches about Israel and the Palestinians, dating to 1979.[i] Iranian press attention on translations of Khamenei’s writing on the Palestinians into both Urdu and Kurdish suggests renewed efforts by Khamenei to influence both Pakistani and Kurdish audiences. Over the past two decades, the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) has expanded its so-called “Axis of Resistance” to include not only Hezbollah and Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime, but also Iraqi militias and Houthi tribesmen in Yemen. In the early 1980s, the IRGC tried and failed to create a Hezbollah-like movement among Pakistani Shi’ites akin to its organization of Lebanese Shi’ites.

The effort to proselytize and disseminate Khamenei’s views to a Pakistani audience may suggest a renewed effort to cultivate the general Pakistani population. Such outreach would not limit itself to Pakistani Shi’ites but would seek to use Khamenei’s anti-Israel credentials to bolster Iran’s broader foreign policy leadership.[ii] The Iranian emphasis on cultivating Kurds suggests an effort to expand the Iranian regime’s influence among a population that has both been resistant to Khamenei’s worldview and has also cooperated closely with the U.S. military. While Iran maintains an open presence in Iraqi Kurdistan, the United States maintains a more overt presence. Both Iraqi Kurdistan and the Kurdish-dominated Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria impede the IRGC’s “land bridge” between Iran and the Eastern Mediterranean. Flipping the Kurds may not be imminent in the short-term, but Iran tends to play the long game.

Sources:

“کتاب «فلسطین؛ از منظر حضرت آیت‌الله سید علی خامنه‌ای» خشم نخست وزیر اسراییل را موجب شد” (The book Palestine: from the perspective of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, angered the Prime Minister of Israel.),” Dolat.ir (Government Information Center of the Islamic Republic of Iran), 11 May 2024. https://dolat.ir/detail/448480

The book Palestine is a compilation of descriptions, analyses, and proposed solutions by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution on the issue of Palestine. Given the significance and influential position of Imam Khamenei’s perspective on the Palestinian matter, and the unique current circumstances, this book has been translated and made available in various languages such as Arabic, English, Russian, Turkish, and other languages….

Hujjat al-Islam Saeed Solh-Mirzaei, a member of the Assembly of Experts said, “Due to the importance of Palestine for Urdu and Kurdish speakers, this book has been translated into these two languages, and it is hoped that all Muslims and freedom fighters around the world will become familiar with the contents of this book and fulfill their duties towards Palestine. God willing, they will soon pray together in gratitude in the noble Al-Qods.”

Notes:

[i] Filistin az manzar-i Ayatullah Khamini’i (Palestine from the Perspective of His Holiness Ayatollah Khamenei), Tehran: Islamic Revolution Publication, 2011.

[ii] For discussion of Iranian efforts to create Afghan and Pakistani militias, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Praises Revolutionary Guards’ Proxy Afghan Brigade,” OE Watch, 03-2023 https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/iran-praises-revolutionary-guards-proxy-afghan-brigade/; and Michael Rubin, “Cleric Speaks on Iran’s Foreign Militias,” OE Watch, February 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/266059/download

Image Information:

Image: International Department of the Islamic Revolution Cultural & Research Institute unveils translations of Ali Khamenei’s book Palestine at the Tehran International Book Fair, May 10, 2024.
Source: https://cdn-english.khamenei.ir/d/2024/05/11/3/40662.jpg
Attribution: Khamenei.ir

Iranian Commander Threatens Pursuit of Nuclear Weapon

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“IRGC Commander Ahmad Haghtalab delivering speech,” IRIB video screenshot, 18 April 2024.

“If the false Zionist regime wants to exploit the threat of attacking our country’s nuclear centers as a tool to put pressure on Iran, it is possible and conceivable to revise the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear doctrine and policies to deviate from previously declared considerations.”

On 18 Aril 2024, Ahmad Haghtalab, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander the head of security for Iran’s nuclear sites, declared on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, that “If the fake Zionist regime [of Israel] wants to use the threat of attacking nuclear sites to put pressure on Iran, it is possible and conceivable for [Iran] to revise its nuclear doctrine and policies, and deviate from its past declared considerations.” Haghtalab also threatened that if Israel attacked Iran, Tehran has identified Israeli nuclear sites and would respond in kind in the vein of Operation True Promise. This refers to Iran’s 13 April retaliation after Israel’s strike and killing of several high-ranking IRGC commanders at the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus, Syria earlier in the month. Other Iranian officials have also made public comments in recent months about the revision of the country’s nuclear doctrine. As per the second excerpted article, the IRGC-affiliated Javan newspaper noted that Haghtalab’s comments regarding Iran’s possible nuclear pivot were the first made by a high-ranking IRGC official and were made with “coordination with top decision-making bodies.”  Iran appears to be testing the world stage, and with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in shambles,[i] Tehran may be preparing to fully pursue its nuclear program. Indeed, Iran has been incrementally pulling away from the JCPOA and is now enriching uranium at 60 percent purity—short of the 90 percent purity required to be weapons-grade.[ii] In strategic terms, a nuclear weapon could also be considered a deterrent against forced regime change, and the ailing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, now 85, may be thinking about Iran’s survival post-mortem. Whatever the rationale, the renewed discussions of a nuclear revival merit attention.

Sources:

Source:

“مراکز هسته ای کشور در امنیت کامل هستند (Nuclear centers of the country are completely safe)” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 18 April 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00Hf4p

Chief Ahmad Haghtalab, pointing to the Zionist regime’s criminal act by attacking the consulate of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the country of Syria, has stamped out international laws and regulations…

The IRGC commander of the protection and security of the country’s nuclear centers, emphasizing that the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran are fully ready, noted: the nuclear sites of the Zionist enemy have the necessary identification and information and is at our disposal, and so to respond to their possible action. Our hands are on the trigger of firing powerful missiles to destroy specified targets.

He said that if the Zionist regime wants to take action against our nuclear centers and facilities, it will definitely and certainly be faced with our reaction…

If the false Zionist regime wants to exploit the threat of attacking our country’s nuclear centers as a tool to put pressure on Iran, it is possible and conceivable to revise the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear doctrine and policies to deviate from previously declared considerations.

Source:

“ اسرائیل تهدید اتمی مقام رسمی سپاه را جدی بگیرد (Israel must take the nuclear threat of the IRGC official seriously) Javan newspaper (daily newspaper closely tied to IRGC), 18 April 2024. https://www.javanonline.ir/0058dL

These statements, which are made for the first time by a senior IRGC official, are of serious importance in some ways…

Israel must take the message of this IRGC commander seriously because the red line of any country is its national security, and if Iran sees that its conventional weapons cannot provide security for its nuclear facilities, it may reconsider its defense and nuclear doctrines…Certainly this comment, which is widely published by the Islamic Republic’s official media, was not without coordination with the higher decision-making bodies of this system.

Notes:

[i] In 2015, five world powers plus Germany signed what became known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which curbed Iran’s controversial nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, 14 July 2015. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-comprehensive-plan-action_en

[ii] In 2018 the Trump administration withdrew from the 2015 JCPOA deal and reimposed sanctions, despite Tehran having not violating the agreement at the time. See: “President Donald J. Trump is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal,” White House, 8 May 2018. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal/; Francois Murphy, “Iran undoes slowdown in enrichment of uranium to near weapons-grade -IAEA,” Reuters, 26 December 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-undoes-slowdown-enrichment-uranium-near-weapons-grade-iaea-2023-12-26

Image Information:

Image: “IRGC Commander Ahmad Haghtalab delivering speech,” IRIB video screenshot, 18 April 2024.
Source: https://www.iribnews.ir/00Hf4p
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Russia Redeploys Military Police to Southern Syria

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Map showing Syria, Israel, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (1991).

“The [Russian] Military Police has set up an additional post near the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights.”

After over a year of absence, Russian forces have returned to Syrian territory near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, in theory, to curb spillovers of violence from Israel to Syria. Russia’s deployments to date have largely been symbolic, including occasional aerial patrols and the establishment of three military police observation posts in the Syrian provinces of Quneitra and Daraa, near the buffer zone separating Syria and Israel. As reported in the first accompanying article from the Syrian opposition news website Enab Baladi, Russia established its third observation post in the area in early April 2024, after establishing two similar posts in January.

Southern Syria is often considered the cradle of the Syrian civil war, and was a hardened rebel bastion for several years. Daraa province remained highly volatile until Russian-sponsored settlements with rebel groups in 2018 stabilized local security conditions. With a modicum of peace achieved, Russian presence and influence in this part of Syria dwindled beginning in 2018 while Iranian-backed Syrian government forces and militias strengthened their grip in former rebel territory. Following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian forces all but disappeared from southern Syria, allowing Iranian militias to expand their influence in the area, often through local proxies and under the cover of Syrian Army forces.[i] Iranian influence in Syrian territory close to Israel has become a source of heightened concern not just for Israel but also for Russia, which fears that Gaza spillover could threaten Syria’s delicate status quo.

In the months following the 7 October attack, Russia successfully blocked Iranian attempts to launch attacks from southern Syria in support of Hamas in Gaza per the second accompanying excerpt, published in January 2024 in the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed. The redeployment of Russian military police to this part of Syria may therefore be seen as bolstering Russia’s ability to continue preventing escalation on this front. Indeed, Russia’s observation posts have all been set up in the aftermath of Israeli assassinations of high-ranking Iranian officials in Syrian territory: the first two posts were set up in the weeks following the killing of General Razi Mousavi in late December 2023, and the third one the day after General Mohammad Reza Zahedi was killed in April 2024. Russia’s return to southern Syria is less about supporting Iran against Israel than it is about deterring Tehran’s use of Syrian soil to respond to Israeli attacks on Iranian personnel in Syria notwithstanding the deepening Russo-Iranian strategic cooperation. , However, experts are skeptical of Russia’s ability to succeed. According to Mustafa al-Naimi, a Turkey-based Syrian analyst cited in the third accompanying excerpt, also from Enab Baladi, Russia’s efforts are bound to fail. Even if it succeeds in preventing Iran from opening the Syria front against Israel, Russia will be unable to remove Iranian influence from the area, given that its proxies will simply “return to the region wearing the uniform of the Syrian regime.” As such, al-Naimi conjectures, Russia’s symbolic redeployment near the Syria-Israel border is unlikely to do anything other than postpone the inevitable: an expansion of the Gaza conflict into southern Syria.

Sources:

Source: “Russia establishes third military post on borders of occupied Golan Heights,” Enab Baladi English (Syrian opposition English-language news website), 2 April 2024. https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2024/04/russia-establishes-third-military-post-on-borders-of-occupied-golan-heights/

The Deputy Chief of the Russian Center for Reconciliation of the Opposing Parties in Syria (a division of the Russian Ministry of Defense), Major General Yury Popov, stated that the Military Police has set up an additional post near the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights… This Syrian military post is the third of its kind established since the beginning of the current year, after Russia reduced its deployment in southern Syria at the beginning of 2022 following its invasion of neighboring Ukraine.

Source:

ما أهداف روسيا من نشر نقاط مراقبة في القنيطرة؟ “What are Russia’s goals in setting up observation posts in Quneitra?” Al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 6 January 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9

[Researcher Rachid] Hourani added to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that, after the launch of the Israeli military operation against the Gaza Strip, Iran tried to activate several fronts based on the principle of “unifying the arenas.” There were several visits by Iranian military officials to Syria with the aim of opening that front, but they did not amount to much due to Russian rejection and its tendency to use the so-called “Iranian card” and control Tehran’s behavior in Syria.

Hourani considered that Russia can actually curb Iran in southern Syria “because it fully controls the military decision-making in regime areas, in addition to being a major party to the understandings related to Israel’s security threats from Syria, such as the settlement agreement with the Syrian opposition factions in mid-2018 and the Israeli-American-Russian security meeting that took place in mid-2019″…

Source:

ما وراء نشر روسيا نقاطًا عسكرية على حدود الجولان المحتل “What is behind Russia’s setting up military posts on the occupied Golan border?” Enab Baladi (Syrian opposition news website), 14 January 2024. https://www.enabbaladi.net/682917/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%8B%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88/

Mustafa Al-Naimi, a researcher on Iranian affairs, told Enab Baladi, “We are facing a scene of gradual escalation from both the Iranian and Israeli sides.” Al-Naimi believes that the Russian side is trying to reposition itself to ward off any attempt by the Israeli side to advance on the ground along this front by, at the very least, removing the Iranian militias from the southern region adjacent to the Golan.He added that this measure will not work for these militias, because they will return to the region wearing the uniform of the Syrian regime… because of this and the fact that the Israeli side does not trust that Russia has the ground forces needed to control the region at a depth of 45 kilometers, al-Naimi suggests that these measures are “postponing the battle, not preventing it.”

Notes:

[i] For more on the 2018 agreement, see: Armenak Tokmajyan. “A Flashpoint Looms in Southern Syria,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 26 March 2024. https://carnegie-mec.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/04/a-flashpoint-looms-in-southern-syria?lang=en&center=middle-east

For more on post-Ukraine Russian and Iranian presence in Syria, see: Lucas Winter, “Iran Repositions Its Proxies In Syria As Russia Turns Focus To Ukraine,” OE Watch, 02-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-repositions-its-proxies-in-syria-as-russia-turns-focus-to-ukraine/;  Lucas Winter, “Iran Digs Into Central Syria, Filling Vacuum Left By Russia,” OE Watch, May 2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-digs-into-central-syria-filling-vacuum-left-by-russia/; Lucas Winter, “Russian Influence Fades In Southern Syria,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russian-influence-fades-in-southern-syria/

Image Information:

Image: Map showing Syria, Israel, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (1991).
Source: https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-pclmaps-oclc-25871248-golan_heights-1991.jpg
Attribution: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, Public Domain

Iranian Senior Advisor Believes Resistance Axis Already Defeated Israel

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Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi speaking at ceremony honoring Syria martyrs in Esfahan. He recently articulated that he believes that the Resistance Axis cannot be defeated.

“The Soviet Union,…invaded and occupied Afghanistan in 1979 [and] finally ran away… American occupiers from 2001 to 2021 occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, but you saw how they ran away.”

On 1 April 2024, around six months into the Israel-Hamas war, Israel killed several senior members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in an air strike at the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus, Syria.[i] Speaking to IRGC members and the families of those killed, assistant and senior adviser to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces (referring to the Supreme Leader), Major General Rahim Safavi said that the Resistance Axis—Iran’s proxies in the Middle East such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad—have defeated Israel already. GEN Safavi’s remarks, which were published by the Iranian state broadcaster IRIB on 14 April, are noteworthy because they showed that he believes the international community and public opinion have turned against Israel. GEN Safavi argues that the fight against Israel will prevail because “occupiers… don’t have the durability and survivability.” Despite the high death toll and Israel’s continued push to eradicate Hamas in Gaza, he notes that the demise of the militant group was not possible since it is a deeply embedded ideology in the psyche of Palestinians as part of their “culture of resistance.”[ii]

Using history as a reference, GEN Safavi pointed out how the Soviet Union was unable to defeat the Mujahideen in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan war. This view, which is shared by many in the upper echelons of the Iranian clerical establishment, suggests that the Resistance Axis, despite taking heavy hits by Israel in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza, will not be vanquished. In GEN Safavi’s view, the Resistance Axis is winning the battle of hearts and minds, given how the international community and international public opinion have turned against Israel. Thus, regardless of the war’s outcome, GEN Safavi believes that “America and [Israel] have been defeated… and the Resistance Axis has been victorious.” This thinking is what incentivizes Iran to continue materially and financially supporting its proxies in the region because, inevitably, it believes Israel will no longer exist as a country and will be replaced by Palestine.

OE Insight Summary:

Senior advisor to IRN Supreme Leader believes Resistance Axis already defeated ISR because Hamas ideology cannot be eradicated, and ISR is losing international public opinion.

Sources:

“محور مقاومت تعیین کننده سرنوشت آینده منطقه خواهد بود (The Resistance Axis will determine the future fate of the region),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 7 April 2024.

https://www.iribnews.ir/fa/news/4199860/%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B9%DB%8C%DB%8C%D9%86-%DA%A9%D9%86%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%AA-%D8%A2%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF

Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, assistant and senior adviser to the commander in chief of the armed forces (referring to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei), said on April 14 in a ceremony honoring and celebrating the efforts and sacrifices of the terrorized martyrs of Damascus (referring to the high-ranking IRGC Quds Force members killed by Israel on April 1, 2024)…

Addressing the martyrs’ families and the IRGC, he referenced three concepts that change events, trends, and strategies and said: The blood of your oppressed martyrs, the blood of the defenders of the shrine (IRGC-linked personnel dispatched overseas separate from Quds Force), the resistance (axis), and the oppressed Palestine—at least 100,000 martyrs and injured in Gaza—will make a big change in events, trends, and strategies of the region and our country will determine the future fate of the region under the leadership of Iran.

He clarified: The events that are happening now and in the future in the West Asian region (Middle East) or in the international environment and the Islamic World are different during the past four decades in terms of politics, culture, economy, and security…

In the last six months, the Zionist regime (Israel) has committed all kinds of crimes and war crimes, genocide, rape, and famine against two million, which is considered to be the summary of the 75-year record of this regime. These criminal actions change the face of the security, international, media, and culture systems of the world.

Major General Rahim Safavi added: Of course, all the crimes that are currently happening in occupied Palestine are being done with the backing/support of America, some Western countries, and the treacherous silence of some Arab and non-Arab countries (Turkey) in the region…

Contrary to what the criminal [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu announced that (Israel) wants to destroy Hamas’ movement and free its prisoners (hostages), we must say that Hamas’ movement is an ideology, a culture of resistance, and a cause of liberation for Palestinians to freely return to their land, the holy Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque as the first qibla of Muslims…

Pointing out that no occupying force has been able to remain in any land forever during the past 100 years, he states: by studying history, we see that, for example, the Soviet Union, which at the beginning of the victory of the revolution, invaded and occupied Afghanistan in 1979, finally ran away… American occupiers from 2001 to 2021 occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, but you saw how they ran away…

The powerful occupiers in Islamic and even non-Islamic lands don’t have the durability and survivability because nations fight for the freedom of their lands, and defend their rights, land, and this is a rational and divine tradition…In this very Gaza war, until today, the Palestinian fighters have maintained most of their strength and are resisting and carrying out offensive operations. Whatever happens after the Gaza war indicates that thanks to the blood of the Gaza martyrs, defenders of the holy shrine, Yemen, Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraq, and Syria, America and the Zionists (Israel) have been defeated in this six-month war, and the Resistance Axis has been victorious. With God’s grace, the new Islamic Middle East will be formed, centered on the resistance and Islamic Iran.

Notes:

[i] Susannah George and Mohamad El Chamaa, “Israeli strike on Iranian Consulate in Damascus kills key commander, Iran says,” The Washington Post, 1 April 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/01/syria-iran-embassy-strike-israel/

[ii] Aaron Boxerman “What We Know About the Death Toll in Israel From the Hamas-Led Attacks,” The New York Times, 12 November 2023. 1https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/12/world/middleeast/israel-death-toll-hamas-attack.html

Image Information:

Image: Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi speaking at ceremony honoring Syria martyrs in Esfahan. He recently articulated that he believes that the Resistance Axis cannot be defeated.
Source: Iranian Students’ News Agency (semi-official news agency), 12 April 2024. https://www.isna.ir/photo/1403012412626/%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86#7
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Iran Navy Upgrades Bell-212 Helicopters

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Iran Helicopter Support and Renovation Company display of upgraded Bell-212, in Tehran in March 2024. Iran’s Navy has announced that it will equip its Bell-212 helicopters with both SONAR and knockoffs of Hellfire missiles.

“This new missile was nicknamed the Iranian Hellfire.”

Iran’s Navy has announced that it will equip its Bell-212 [R1] helicopters with both SONAR and air to ground missiles, copies of the U.S. made Hellfire missiles. While it appears to exaggerate its mastery of SONAR, its reverse engineering of the Hellfire appears real.

As the Iranian Navy expands its footprint, it relies increasingly on helicopters to project power.[i] The excerpted article from the news portal Khabar Online, describes a Defense Ministry exhibition of new products held at the Iran Helicopter Support and Renovation Company. Headlining the exhibit was an upgraded Bell-212 helicopter, modified to conduct anti-submarine operations and to carry Ghaem-114 missiles, an Iranian copy of the U.S.-made AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-ground missile.

SONAR is important to Iran. Even though the Persian Gulf is both narrow and shallow with an average depth of 100 feet and a maximum depth of just 295 feet, Iranian defense officials worry that enemy submarines can approach their shores and ships without detection. Should war erupt between Israel and Iran, for example, submarine-launched missiles would be a major component of any Israeli attack on Iran. Detecting submarines and developing anti-submarine warfare is increasingly important to the Iranian Navy as it operates farther from its shores. The distance between the Iranian naval base at Bandar Abbas and the Bab el-Mandeb, a strategic waterway between Yemen and Djibouti where Iran currently operates, for example, is nearly 1,700 nautical miles. This is outside the defensive layers of speedboats and shore-based missiles the Iranian Navy rely upon closer to its shores.  It is unclear, however, if the Iranian announcement of its helicopter-borne SONAR system is real. While Iranian press photos showing the helicopter at the Tehran exhibit are new, photographs accompanying Iranian media coverage depicting a Bell-212 deploying SONAR at sea are two years old and depict a U.S. Navy helicopter. As such, Iranian Navy helicopter-equipped SONAR is more likely in development.

The Ghaem-114 missile likely represents a truer capability, albeit one that is not new. In July 2021, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces unveiled a helicopter-launched Ghaem-114 Hellfire copy that it billed as an anti-tank missile with a range of six miles. In April 2023, the regular Iranian Army unveiled the “Shafagh” missile that it also likened to the U.S. manufactured Hellfire.[ii] The current announcement likely reflects the standardization of the Ghaem-114 across Iranian services. Iran also claims that its Ghaem-114 has both thermal and laser guidance with a 50-kilogram warhead. Iranian production of a Hellfire knock-off could have substantive tactical ramifications across the region. While Hamas and the Houthis do not have helicopters, the Iranian military could use lifting or non-enforcement of sanctions to provide these groups helicopters that could fire Ghaem-114s. The Houthis could equip drones with Ghaem-114s, while both Syria and Lebanese Hezbollah, both of which operate helicopters, could immediately introduce the Ghaem-114 to the Israeli frontier and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Sources:

“تجهیز این بالگرد ارتش به سونار و موشک قائم ۱۱۴ “(Equipping this [Bell-212] Helicopter with Sonar and Ghaem-114 missiles),” KhabarOnline.ir (general news website affiliated with reformist political factions), 4 March 2024. https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1880466

Iran Helicopter Support and Renovation Company hosted an exhibition of Iran Ministry of Defense achievement. During this exhibition, the Ministry of Defense displayed some achievements in helicopters, including upgrading Iranian Navy [Bell-] 212 helicopters.

One of these achievements was upgrading the Iranian Navy’s [Bell-] 212 helicopters to equip them with sonar to detect submarines and deal with surface vessels…. Sonar technology enables the identification of ships and submarines through the emission of underwater soundwaves and determines their direction and distance. Submarines, surface ships, helicopters and maritime and anti-submarine patrol aircraft use sonar to discover their targets underwater.

Iran has SH-3 specialized anti-submarine helicopters in its air fleet that it purchased before the [1979 Islamic] Revolution and they can both detect all types of submarines and launch Mark 46 torpedoes. In addition, the [Bell-] 212 helicopters have been equipped with Ghaem-114 missiles to neutralize surface vessels and an electro-optical system to detect and targets vessels night and day….

In January 2020, during the delivery of overhauled helicopters to the armed forces, the Aerospace Force of the Army of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps displayed [Bell-] 214 helicopters with Ghaem-114 missiles, similar to Hellfires.  Although no detailed information about this missile was published, this new missile was nicknamed the Iranian Hellfire and many observers saw the development of this missile in the context of the design of new air-to-ground missiles….Equipping Navy helicopters with Ghaem-114 missiles increases the ability of this force to support amphibious operations seeking to capture the enemy coast and to counter small and fast enemy vessels or to deal with piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

Notes:

[i] Iran has no aircraft carriers, but it designs its frigates to accommodate helicopters as a means both to project power onto land from sea and to defend Iranian ships. For discussion of upgrading and rehabilitating Iranian helicopters, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Reconstruction and Overhaul of Helicopters,” OE Watch, 03 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/382672

[ii] For discussion of Shafagh missile unveiling see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Installs New Precision Missiles On Army Helicopters,” OE Watch, 05 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/iran-installs-new-precision-missiles-on-army-helicopters/

Image Information:

Image: Iran Helicopter Support and Renovation Company display of upgraded Bell-212, in Tehran in March 2024. Iran’s Navy has announced that it will equip its Bell-212 helicopters with both SONAR and knockoffs of Hellfire missiles.
Source: https://media.khabaronline.ir/d/2024/03/04/4/6000265.jpg?ts=1709559703000
Attribution: KhabarOnline.ir

Jordan Alarmed by Escalation in Syrian Smuggling Tactics

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Syria map showing major cities as well as parts of surrounding countries and the Mediterranean Sea.

“What were initially infiltration and smuggling attempts have evolved into full-fledged armed clashes, with the explicit objective of forcibly crossing the border by targeting Jordanian border guard forces.”

Jordanian authorities are signaling growing alarm over the willingness of smugglers from Syria to use armed force to circumvent tightened Jordanian border security. This comes at a delicate moment for the kingdom due to Israel’s campaign in Gaza, given Jordan’s large Palestinian population and concerns that Jordan could become a conduit for weapons to be smuggled into the West Bank. Smuggling has long been an economic mainstay for communities along the Syria-Jordan border, especially after the Syrian government lost control of key border crossings during the Syrian civil war. Since then, smuggling across the border has become increasingly institutionalized and largely controlled by networks within the Syrian Army’s 4th Division, many of them linked to Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah. Concerns that potentially hostile armed groups control smuggling routes from Syria has led Jordan to tighten security across the shared border, in turn leading smugglers to seek new ways to circumvent border security. Recent reports and statements suggest that smuggling networks in Syria are increasingly willing to use force to get across the increasingly monitored border.

The first accompanying excerpt, from the Syrian opposition news website alsouria.net, explains how small-scale smuggling has “evolved into full-fledged armed clashes, with the explicit objective of forcibly crossing the border by targeting Jordanian border guard forces.” The article adds that Jordanian authorities are concerned about weapons being smuggled into the kingdom. Particularly noteworthy was a mid-December firefight in which a Jordanian border guard was killed, weapons were seized, and an airstrike took place on a purported smuggling safehouse inside Syrian territory, attributed to but not claimed by the Jordanian military. The second excerpt, also from alsouria.net, details the handful of weapons seized during the incident—a handful of rocket propelled grenades, mines, and sniper rifles. Although troubling from a Jordanian perspective, the small number of weapons were likely not part of the primary cargo being smuggled, but rather used by smugglers to force their way across the border. Instead, as the excerpt notes, the primary cargo was hashish and five million Captagon pills, likely destined for Saudi Arabia. The production and export of Captagon, a synthetic amphetamine-like substance—produced in Lebanon and Syria and consumed heavily in Gulf countries—has become a key part of Syria’s wartime economy.[i] The third accompanying excerpt, from the English-language Arab Weekly, claims that Jordan is inflating the threat from smugglers to “secure assistance and stronger cooperation” from Gulf countries, most prominently Saudi Arabia, the destination for much of the contraband. If evidence emerges that weapons are being smuggled across the border, concerns that these weapons could end up in the hands of Shia groups in Saudi Arabia would likely elicit a response from Riyadh. Smuggling along the Syria-Jordan border peaks in the cold winter months, due to the dense fog that often envelops the area at night, hampering visibility for those seeking to curb smugglers. While the seasonal uptick is expected, the increasing willingness of smugglers to engage in firefights with Jordanian border guards is concerning. The failure of increased Jordanian border security measures is a latent concern for Amman. Given that Iran and Hezbollah exert substantial influence over smuggling networks in Syria, the Syria-Jordan border may well become an additional regional flashpoint.

Sources:

“Syrian-Jordanian Border Battle Ends With Airstrikes, Amman Hints at Iran’s Involvement,” alsouria.net (Syrian opposition news website) via The Syrian Observer (Syrian news aggregator), 20 December 2023. https://syrianobserver.com/news/86785/syrian-jordanian-border-battle-ends-with-airstrikes-amman-hints-at-irans-involvement.html

What were initially infiltration and smuggling attempts have evolved into full-fledged armed clashes, with the explicit objective of forcibly crossing the border by targeting Jordanian border guard forces…

This form of military operations and clashes underscores the significant challenges confronting Jordan due to the Syrian regime and the escalating influence of Iran and Hezbollah in Syria. Despite the security measures and military tightening implemented by Amman along the Syrian-Jordanian border, smuggling operations have not only persisted but have also intensified. A particularly alarming security threat arising from these clashes is the initiation of arms and rocket smuggling operations, underscoring the extent of Iranian pressure on Jordan.

“حرب وقتلى” على الحدود السورية الأردنية..رسائل وتحذيرات وخيارات مفتوحة

“‘War and death’ on the Syrian-Jordanian border… messages, warnings, and open options,” alsouria.net (Syrian opposition news website), 19 December 2023.

“حرب وقتلى” على الحدود السورية الأردنية..رسائل وتحذيرات وخيارات مفتوحة

The Jordanian army seized about five million Captagon pills and about 13,000 hashish palms, in addition to 4 Rocket Launcher missiles, 4 RPG missiles, 10 anti-personnel mines, a G3 sniper rifle, and a M-16 type rifle equipped with a sniper scope.

“Is Jordan inflating smugglers’ threat on border with Syria?” The Arab Weekly (London-based Arabic-language weekly), 19 December 2023. https://thearabweekly.com/jordan-inflating-smugglers-threat-border-syria Observers believe however that Jordan is exaggerating the developments in the border region, pointing out that the phenomenon of active gangs is not new and that most countries suffer from it. Jordan is not an exception, especially since the neighbouring country, Syria, is gripped by security chaos, observers told The Arab Weekly. They suggest the exaggeration may be related to Jordan’s desire to present itself regionally, especially to the Arab Gulf countries, as the first line of defence for regional security. The aim, according to observers, is to secure assistance and stronger cooperation.

Notes:

[i] For more on the Captagon trade, see: Lucas Winter, “Pharmaceutical Drugs and the Syrian War,” OE Watch, December 2015. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195975 and Lucas Winter, “Syria Becoming Center of Illicit Drug Production and Export to Europe and Arabian Peninsula,” OE Watch, January 2021. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-21393-00-00-00-38-05-55/2021_2D00_01_2D00_01-Syria-Becoming-Center-of-Illicit-Drug-Production-_2800_Winter_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true

Image Information:

Image:  Syria map showing major cities as well as parts of surrounding countries and the Mediterranean Sea.
Source: CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/syria/map Attribution: Public Domain

Syrian Regime, Opposition Wary of Hamas Despite Support for 7 October Attacks on Israel

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Damage in Gaza Strip during the October 2023

“Syrians received the news of the operation as a historic, heroic act that was able to break the prestige of the Israeli occupier…”

On the surface, Hamas seems to enjoy widespread support in Syria among backers of both the government and the anti-government Sunni Arab opposition.[i] Media outlets associated with each side have used laudatory rhetoric to describe the 7 October Hamas “al-Aqsa Flood” operation. The first accompanying excerpt from the anti-Syrian-government news website Syria TV,describes the Hamas raid as “a source of pride for the Arab and Islamic nation in every sense of the word.” The second excerpt, from the pro-Syrian government daily al-Watan, states that Hamas’ raid “will be recorded in history in golden letters that time will not erase.” In addition to widespread support for the operation itself, outlets affiliated with both the Syrian regime and the opposition strongly oppose Israel’s military actions in Gaza. Thus, according to the author of the third accompanying excerpt from the Qatar-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed, events in Gaza have forged the first “consensus among the various components of the Syrian people…since the beginning of the revolution.” And yet, while they agree with the operation, the Syrian government and its opposition also concur in being wary of Hamas. Hamas was an ally of the Syrian government until 2012, when it broke with Damascus and sided with members of the Syrian rebellion. In 2017, however, Hamas’s new leadership steered the group back into the pro-Iran camp, and in 2022, Hamas formally reconciled with the Syrian government.[ii] Many in the Syrian opposition resent Hamas’s return to supporting the Syrian government, as expressed in the fourth accompanying excerpt from the Syrian opposition news website SyriaDirect. Similarly, the Syrian government remains skeptical of Hamas despite their recent rapprochement. Last August, Syrian President Assad accused Hamas’ leadership of “betrayal” for siding with Syrian rebels and against his government for much of the 2010s.[iii] Indeed, since the “al-Aqsa Flood” attack on 7 October, the Assad government has taken steps to remove military assets from areas near the border with Israel, in a sign that it seeks to avoid becoming militarily entangled on Hamas’ side.[iv] This shared perspective between the Syrian government and opposition – widespread support for the  “al-Aqsa Flood” operation, strong opposition to Israeli military activity in Gaza, and a general distrust of Hamas – is likely generalizable to other segments of the broader Arab public.

Sources:

طوفان الأقصى وأسطورة الجيش الذي لا يقهر 

Fayez al-Asmar. “Al-Aqsa Flood and the myth of the invincible army,” Syria TV (Syrian opposition news website), 12 October 2023. https://www.syria.tv/طوفان-الأقصى-وأسطورة-الجيش-الذي-لا-يقهر 

In fact, the Hamas operation is an unprecedented military operation in terms of size and method of implementation in the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and it in itself is a source of pride for the Arab and Islamic nation in every sense of the word. 

بين «طوفان الأقصى» والطوفان الجارف 

Rifaat Badawi. “Between the al-Aqsa Flood and the torrential flood,” Al-Watan (pro-government Syrian daily), 10 October 2023. https://www.alwatanonline.com/بين-طوفان-الأقصى-والطوفان-الجارف/

The “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation will be recorded in history in golden letters that time will not erase, because it will remain engraved in the memory of the Palestinian and Arab generations who believe in resisting and defeating the Israeli occupation, for all of Palestine, from the river to the sea, and its capital will be Holy Jerusalem, no matter how many sacrifices are made and no matter how long it takes.

غزة التي وحدت السوريين

“Gaza, which unified Syrians,” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 15 October 2023. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/غزة-التي-وحدت-السوريين

The “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation and the subsequent Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip formed a consensus among the various components of the Syrian people, with all their affiliations, the first of its kind since the beginning of the Syrian revolution. At the popular level, in all opposition-controlled areas, and in diaspora countries, Syrians received the news of the operation as a historic, heroic act that was able to break the prestige of the Israeli occupier.

من إدلب هنا غزة: السوريون يشاركون الفلسطينيين آلامهم ويستذكرون مأساتهم

“From Idlib to Gaza: Syrians share the pain of the Palestinians and remember their tragedy,” Syria Direct (Syrian opposition news website), 21 October 2023. https://syriadirect.org/من-إدلب-هنا-غزة-السوريون-يشاركون-الفلس/

Many Syrians feel let down by the Hamas movement, which restored relations with the Syrian regime in 2022, after ten years of estrangement that began when it left Damascus in February 2012. This in addition to Hamas’s close relations with Iran, the regime’s main ally in suppressing Syrians who protested against Assad in the spring of 2011, demanding freedom. However, their position on Hamas did not affect their sympathy for the Palestinian cause and support for the people of Gaza, as expressed by a number of sources who spoke to Syria Direct.

Notes:

[i] For additional context see: “Syrians’ Reactions to the First Weeks of Israel-Hamas War,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy-Fikra Forum, 24 October 2023. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/syrians-reactions-first-weeks-israel-hamas-war

[ii] For additional details on Hamas in the region, see: Lucas Winter. “Hamas Rejoins the Resistance Axis,” OE Watch, December 2017.

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/216805

[iii] “After Assad Insulted its Leaders, Hamas to Open Office in Damascus,” Syrian Observer, 15 August 2023. https://syrianobserver.com/news/84563/after-assad-insulted-its-leaders-hamas-to-open-office-in-damascus.html

[iv] “Al-Assad Was Absent from Nasrallah’s Speech,” Syrian Observer, 10 November 2023. https://syrianobserver.com/commentary/86113/al-assad-was-absent-from-nasrallahs-speech.html

Image Information:

Image:  Damage in Gaza Strip during the October 2023
Source: Palestinian News & Information Agency (Wafa) in contract with APAimages,https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Damage_in_Gaza_Strip_during_the_October_2023_-_32.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0